Yap Crisis
Also described as the Yap Cable Crisis, the Yap Controversy and the Yap Island Controversy.
(See also the earlier, but distinct, Yap Conflict, between the Spanish and Germans.)
Background
Ahead of World War I, the Deutsch-Niederlandische Telegraphengesellschaft, a German company supported largely by Dutch capital and subsidized by both the German and Dutch governments, owned and operated cables which ran from Guam to Yap and there diverged, one line going south to Celebes and the other running north to Shanghai. Another concern, the American Commercial Pacific Cable Company, owned cables running from San Francisco to Guam via Honolulu and Midway Islands, from Guam to the Japanese Bonin Islands, and from Guam to Manila and thence to Shanghai. In addition, the American company operated the Guam end of the German cable from Yap. During interruptions of service on the Guam-Manila cable, a message could be redirected over the German cable, via Yap to Shanghai and thence relayed to Manila by the American cable. This alternative route was regarded by American interests as of the utmost importance in maintaining uninterrupted communication with China and the Philippines.
Japanese Seizure of Yap
In accordance with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan entered and secured the German colonies of the Palau, Caroline, and Marshall Islands early in the First World War. A British warship, the HMS Minotaur, had shelled the 200-foot radio mast on Yap the morning of August 12, 1914, but the British did not send troops ashore.
A Japanese naval squadron took actual military possession of the Islands in the fall of 1914, interning the German officials and business men and eventually shipping them back to Germany. The squadron commander immediately established a military administration of the islands. This marked the end of the German Period (1899-1914) and the start of the Japanese Period (1914-1941).
The seizure of Yap by the Japanese in 1914 and the diversion of the Yap-Shanghai cable to a Japanese island, Nawa in the Ryukyus, deprived Americans of this alternative route and meant that, whenever the Guam-Manila service was interrupted, all American cable traffic with China and the Philippines had to pass through Japan.
Versailles Conference
Accordingly, when the question of mandates was being discussed at the Versailles Conference, President Wilson made certain reservations in regard to Yap, and these were apparently accepted by the Supreme Council. They were not, however, a matter of record, and when the Council of the League of Nations in 1919 confirmed Japan in her mandate over “all the former German islands situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying north of the Equator.” It made no mention whatever of special considerations in regard to Yap.
The United States Government brought the matter to the attention both of Japan and the Council of the League, but considerably weakened her case by waiting for more than a year after the confirmation of the mandate before registering her protest. The issue was a complex one, feelings were sensitive on all sides, and discussion became acrimonious. Japan declined to concede that her mandate was limited by any unwritten understandings at the peace conference, and the United States refused to acknowledge that the mandate thus granted by the League was valid.
Washington Conference
When the Washington Conference assembled late in 1921, the problem of the mandated islands was listed for discussion. The scheduled discussions did not actually occur as a part of the conference Itself, but were carried on quietly between the Japanese and American delegations and resulted in a treaty, signed in February, 1922.
Article I of this treaty gave the consent of the United States to the Japanese mandate. Article II conferred upon the United States all the rights and privileges granted to members of the League by the terms of the mandate, including religious freedom whereby American missionaries might acquire and possess property, erect religious buildings, and open schools throughout the islands. Article III granted to American citizens free access to the island of Yap on an equal footing with Japanese ”in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or of any cable which may hereafter be laid or operated by the United States or by its nationals connecting with the Island of Yap.”
Similar rights were pledged in regard to radio-telegraph, but with the reservation that these should not become operative so long as Japan maintained an adequate station. Article IV secured to citizens of the United States unrestricted rights of entry and residence in Yap, together with the privileges of acquiring and holding all kinds of real and personal property and exemption from censorship over cable and radio. Article V provided that the Japanese Government would exercise its power of expropriation in the island to secure for the United States or its nationals needed property and facilities for the purpose of electrical communication if such could not otherwise be obtained.
Ostensible Resolution
Japan thus acknowledged the special interests of the United States in Yap, but the matter never actually went beyond formal acknowledgment. In 1925, when the cable service between Yap and Guam was interrupted, the United States Navy, when approached by the State Department on the subject, declared that since the cable was not a naval undertaking the Navy would take no action. As late as 1929 the United States still retained technical control over the Yap-Guam cable, but there is no indication that it was in effective operation at that time.
Epilogue
Japan’s threat to withdraw from the League of Nations as a result of the Manchurian affair again, brought the islands into public notice, providing an opportunity for international jurists, mostly American, to pronounce the opinion that if Japan withdrew she would forfeit her mandate, and the islands would revert to the League. Japanese jurists held the opposite opinion. When Japan actually did withdraw in March, 1935, she kept the mandated territory, defining it as ”an integral part of the Japanese empire,” but she continued to administer it in much the same way and to submit annual reports to the League through the year 1938. After that year all pretense of international supervision vision vanished, and the islands were increasingly treated as a closed military area.
Texts Dealing with the Crisis
“Author(s) Unknown. “Treaty Between the United States and Japan with Regard to the Former German Islands in the Pacific Ocean, in Particular the Island of Yap.” American Journal of International Law, vol. 16, no. 2, 1922, pp. 94–98, https://doi.org/10.2307/2213034.
Lee, Rosalie Leong. The American-Japanese Controversy Over the Island of Yap. 1939. University of Hawaii.
Maga, Timothy. “Prelude to War? The United States, Japan, and the Yap Crisis, 1918-22.” Diplomatic History, vol. 9, no. 3, July 1985, pp. 215–31, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1985.tb00533.x.
Poole, Robert Michael. “Yap, the Pacific Island Japan Has Almost Forgotten: Former Japanese Colony Celebrates Its History and Culture on Yap Day.” The Japan Times, 25 May 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2018/05/25/travel/yap-pacific-island-japan-almost-forgotten/.
Price, Willard. “Mysterious Micronesia: Yap, Map, and Other Islands Under Japanese Mandate Are Museums of Primitive Man.” National Geographic, Apr. 1936, pp. 481–510, https://nationalgeographicbackissues.com/product/national-geographic-april-1936/.
Wetherall, William. The Yap Island Controversy: How Japan Gained Submarine Cable Sovereignty in the Pacific. 1968, http://www.wetherall.org/prose/Wetherall_1968_Yap_island_controversy.html.
Wood, Junius B. “Yap and the Other Pacific Islands Under Japanese Mandate.” National Geographic Magazine, Dec. 1921, pp. 591–628.
