Admiral Moorer's Diary 19710716
Moorer, Thomas Hinman (1971-07-16). Admiral Moorer's Diary 19710716. Central Intelligence Agency.
- Has attachment: File:BN5VMIVK.pdf
Abstract: Met with VADM Weinel and Captain Crowe regarding the TTPI negotiating team. I said that I wanted to touch base with Bill Crowe and see exactly what he was doing in his new job as Deputy to Ambassador Hummel. Crowe said that things were alright, but a little confused. Williams was in town last week and seems to be very friendly. He did request that Bill be the Defense representative on the negotiating group. There is going to be a 10-man negotiating team. I said that our track record shows that the US is the worst negotiator in the history of man. We have been highly unsuccessful in Japan, Okinawa, Ta i w a n , and I can just predict that when the President visits China we will have to give up something -- Step the Taiwan Patrol and lower our visibility to please the CHICOMS. The only place left to set up in the Western Pacific is the TTPI. I have talked to the Presi'dent twice and he feels very strongly about this. We should never give our negotiators a fall- back position because they fall back before the first shot is fired. The SALT talks are a good example. The main purpose of this negotiation is to protect the security of the United States not to negotiate as an exercise. We negotiated and managed to give away the Panama Canal and I hope we will not do the same thing to the TTPI. Bil Crowe feels that Williams is a much harder negotiator and is much stronger on his position than State over all. Williams thinks more like Defense than State. He is definitely aware that the number one interest is the US Defense. It is unlikely that he will fall back to the status quo. I told Bill that Secretary Laird came on very strong and was adamant that heOduld be the deputy or defense would not provide anyone. I asked Bill if he needed a yeoman and he does. (NOTE: Navy has been contacted and they are providing a yeoman to Bill Crowe starting Monday on a TAD basis for about 6 months.) The main probleM is the land area, the eminent domain and unilateral termination claims can not be allowed to affect access to bases. Admiral Weinel mentioned there would be no problem with the eminent domain. The land requirements are absolutely solid and we will not fall off one acre. Bill said he would make sure Williams was aware of the firmness of the land requirements. He said they were meeting at Maui. I suggested that they set up a private communications channel with us via CINCPAC or a courier. We agreed to set up a SPECAT system through Joe Va s e y. Bill said we have some allies in Congress. Williams called on several senators and on Congressman Aspinall and they can help on the eminent domain problem. Bill guessed that in the end TTPI would come in as an unincorporated territory. There is no anti-military feeling on Palau. Bill said the Marianas would probably come with us. Williams was trying to get means or better machinery to carry the case to the people. He thinks he will get much better support in Palau this way, but the political situation is still very bad. Bill thinks that our number one land proposal is going to surprise them because we are not asking for any land on Truck, Penelope and very little on Palau. Weinel said only 40 acres of land and all of that is fill that we are going to create ourselves. We also are looking for 35,000 acres on Bathalthop as a maneuver area for the Marines. This will be strictly used for maneuvers on an occasional basis. We planned on building a combined military/civilian development or we may improve the present field on Bathalthop. Bill said that State was excellent at preparing for a conference and that interior can never do what State does in this field. I asked Bill if he needed any other assistance and he said he could use another officer and mentioned LCDR Knott or CDR Jim Elster, both of who would be excellent and who are experienced in the TTPI. I re-emphasized to Bill that the President and I were behind him all the way and to call immediately if anything started going wrong. In this light Bill thought it would be helpful if Laird re- emphasized to Williams at lunch exactly what the Government's position was. Irwin is too soft on every issue so a little extra guidance may help. I said again that this negotiation determines the US defense posture in the Western Pacific for the next 50 years. I pointed out that in Cam Ranh Bay we were giving away everything; that we had turned back Okinawa; we were decreasing emphasis in Taiwan; and we need a place that is US Territory.
