History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Schnabel, James (2012). History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. ISBN 1-4800-3440-1.
- Has attachment: File:8Y55TRFW.pdf
Abstract: '...Peacetime deployments recommended included 13,600 Army troops in the Marianas Islands of Guam, Saipan and Tinian to service a mounting, staging and training area. In the same islands, 18,700 Army Air Force troops would support an operational and service air base area and 27,900 naval personnel would man a naval operating base, a submarine base and a naval air base. Fleet Marine Forces and Fleet Aviation would be included within this naval personnel total. Deployments in the Ryukyus Islands to provide facilities for air operations, a base and staging area for ground forces, a naval air facility and anchorage for defense of the Western Pacific were set at 11,000 Army, 15,100 Army Air Force and 500 Navy personnel. To provide support in the Philippine Islands for operating bases for air forces and for mounting staging and training ground forces and to provide a fleet anchorage and minor naval operating base the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended strengths of 2,700 Army, 2,300 Army Air Forces, and 1,900 Navy-Marine Corps. Air base and naval anchorage facilities in the Bonin-Volcano Islands would require 2,000 Army and 1,100 Army Air Forces personnel. An aerological station in the Caroline Islands would require 20 Navy men..."
"...Subsidiary Base Areas were areas required for increasing the flexibility of the system of primary and secondary bases, using either existing or limited future facilities, not necessarily operated at full capacity. This category comprised: Annette and Yakutat, Alaska; Yap-Ulithi; Eniwetok; Tarawa; Majuro; Palmyra; Palau; Formosa; Funafuti; Talara, Peru; Canary Islands; Georgetown, British Guiana; Belem, Brazil; St. Thomas; Antigua; St. Lucia; and Bahamas..."
"...Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, was among those military men seriously concerned that the introduction of atomic weapons into the US arsenal would require drastic changes in the size and nature of both ground and sea forces. Ignorance as to the true nature of the atomic weapon had led, he believed, to a great deal of dangerous "loose thinking." Admiral King considered that it was of prime importance that the salient facts about these weapons be determined as quickly as possible. On 16 October 1945, he therefore recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they broaden General Arnold's proposal to include the use of US surplus ships as targets and to conduct two tests, possibly at some location in or near the Caroline Islands in the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation..."
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Extra details:
DOI: 10.1097/00000658-194708000-00009 PMID: 17858988 MAG: 2053090676 CorpusID: 2996197 OpenAlex: W2053090676
