Broken Pivot: Examining Changes to the Us Diplomatic Footprint in the Indo-pacific
Cooper, Evan (2024-11-14). Broken Pivot: Examining Changes to the Us Diplomatic Footprint in the Indo-pacific. Security & Strategy (Report). Washington, DC: Stimson Center. p. 34.
- Has attachment: File:NEZQ2E3Y.pdf
Abstract: This report examines how the U.S. diplomatic footprint has changed in the Indo-Pacific region from 2011 — when the pivot to Asia was first announced — to 2024. The last three administrations have repeatedly pledged to focus on the Indo-Pacific, increasingly highlighting competition with China as requiring deeper partnerships with countries in the region. The paper utilizes annual budget requests from the State Department to examine the extent to which the Department has tried to grow its diplomatic presence in the region through new postings at embassies and consulates. A comparison of the funding requests for the regional bureaus and positions dedicated to the Indo-Pacific countries with those for Europe and the Middle East reveals that these crucial elements of the diplomatic footprint have not significantly expanded and remain undersized compared with the U.S. presence in other regions. A closer look at how the U.S. diplomatic approach to India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Marshall Islands has changed from 2011-2024 largely confirms that the diplomatic pivot was incomplete, at best. The paper also analyzes U.S. diplomacy towards China, comparing it with the five countries that the United States has sought to draw more closely into its orbit.
This analysis reveals that U.S. diplomatic outreach towards the Indo-Pacific has been halting and inconsistent. The overarching impediment is a failure by U.S. leaders to implement a strategy of engagement that utilizes the diplomatic tool. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is a positive step towards steady expansion of U.S. diplomacy in the region, but there has not been a commensurate effort by the U.S. Congress to grow the country’s diplomatic footprint. And though summits and high-level meetings between U.S. leaders and their counterparts in the region have yielded concrete agreements, the failure to expand the cadre of U.S. diplomats on the ground conducting daily diplomacy impedes the establishment of sustainable economic and security relationships in the Indo-Pacific region.
Fundamentally, a successful pivot to Asia requires consistent prioritization of the Indo-Pacific and comprehensive utilization of the diplomatic tool. This does not necessarily mean a massive expansion of the international affairs budget, although the State Department is in need of greater funding that, at the absolute minimum, keeps pace with inflation. Rather, there needs to be a calculated deployment of the Department’s resources to achieve the greatest impact in the part of the world that currently holds the most strategic value. Congress should work with the State Department to support the reallocation of existing assets and provide adequate funding for the facilities, activities, and programs overseen by Foreign and Civil Service officers, while targeting areas and issues that can be deprioritized without undermining U.S. strategy. Concurrently, the State Department should continue its effort to become more agile, enabling it to address the most pressing diplomatic priorities at a given time. This includes creating a diplomatic reserve corps, placing a higher emphasis on education and training, and adopting a diplomatic posture review. But for any reforms to yield long-term diplomatic gains, subsequent administrations need to clearly identify their strategic priorities and embrace diplomacy as a primary way to pursue their identified ends.
