The Nixon Doctrine and Us Naval Strategy
Aitcheson, George A. (1972-02-11). The Nixon Doctrine and Us Naval Strategy. USAW Research Papers (Report). Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College. p. 51.
- Has attachment: File:2B8NXVWY.pdf
Abstract: The United States is currently faced with the dilemma of trying to formulate a pacific strategy which will permit an adequate projection of US power in the region while at the sane time affording the means to concentrate on pressing domestic problems. As the Administration wrestles with the problem between withdrawal and involvement, an increase in naval power appears imminent in US Pacific strategy under the Nixon Doctrine. Naval power will continue to provide a multiple of strategic options desired under the lower profile called for b% the Nixon Doctrine. It is also a means of projecting US power in the Pacific and directly influencing the balance of power in the region while reducing the danger of direct involvement overseas. Disturbing conflicts in the proposal for increased reliance on naval power are the declining status of US Navy ships in face of the rapidly increasing capability and threat of the Soviet Navy and our insufficient sealift capability. If the American people and the Congress do not exhibit the will to provide the means necessary to pursue an increased reliance on naval power, the United Stater, may well find its capability to influence events in the Pacific region significantly reduced.
"...A strategic option that continues to be studied and proposed consists of US withdrawal to Guam and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). Supporters of this "Fallback" strategy point to the central Pacific location of the TTPI and their potential to support military requirements throughout the western Pacific. The growing doubt about the viability of US bases overseas further supports the fallback theory. There are, in fact, a number of factors which favor utilization of Guam and the TTPI as the logistical position to move our line of defense in the Pacific. There are those who feel quite feasible and this strategy is continuing to be studied. There seems to be an overriding consideration of the geographical aspects of the proposal, however, and an assumption that these territories can be readily utilized for basing. Careful consideration of all the factors, particularly UN influence, political status negotiations, and the cost of island basing, make the use 11 of the TTPI as a fallback position questionable."
