American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945
Smith, Gaddis (1967). American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-0-07-554794-5.
Abstract: This book is the seventh in a series of eight books designed to examine American involvement in foreign war. Emphasis in this volume, as in the series as a whole, is on the "day-by-day conduct of diplomacy" without concern for military and other factors. The objective is a brief synthesis, for each volume, of existing historical research combined with fresh analysis or interpretation.
Gaddis Smith's volume meets the objectives of the series very well indeed. Without becoming lost in detail, he skilfully relates the story of American diplomacy during the war years "in terms of the themes which American leaden at the time considered significant" (p. vii). He is aware of broad issues, explains them carefully, and supports his explanations with sufficient detail to make them meaningful to practically any intelli- gent reader. Although he might have done more with the general concept of problems unique to diplomacy in a coalition, he is aware that wartime diplomacy has special problems and that it can set firm patterns for the peace that follows.
A major thesis in the book states that American diplomacy sought, as an objective, to change British behavior more than it did Russian behavior. As this thesis is developed the reader may get the impression that Great Britain and the United States were at loggerheads on many issues. Actually, most of the American quarrels with the British resembled family spats. The leaders of the two countries never lost sight of the friendship and affection each held for the other. America's differences with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, were on big, fundamental issues. The wartime agreements with the Soviets were never much more than temporary accommodations, though President Franklin D. Roosevelt had hoped for much more.
Roosevelt's grasp of diplomacy and his ideas on foreign policy are depicted as un- real. Smith writes, for example, "that much of Roosevelt's diplomacy fails of justification even on its own terms," and that "its means were questionable and the results worse" (p. 10). The diplomacy of Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, on the other hand, is made to appear realistic and farseeing. These are dubious judgments. Nonetheless, the author has studied his material, and it is well that he makes forthright judgments. In most instances his evaluations are judicious and sound. His analysis of the often misunderstood doctrine of unconditional surrender (p. 57), for instance, is excellent. It summarizes various views on the subject and then offers a fine, critical interpretation keeping with sound scholarship.
Extra details:
DOI: 10.2307/445523 MAG: 1543657358 CorpusID: 152734590 OpenAlex: W1543657358
