Ground-based Intermediate-range Missiles in the Indo-pacific
Hornung, Jeffrey W. (2022). Ground-based Intermediate-range Missiles in the Indo-pacific. Santa Monica. CA: RAND Corporation, The. ISBN 978-1-9774-0815-0.
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Abstract: When the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, it opened for itself the opportunity to develop and deploy ground-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km--what this report calls ground-based intermediate-range missiles (GBIRMs). But the U.S. withdrawal also sparked a debate regarding where the United States could deploy such missiles. This became a critical topic in the Indo-Pacific because China was never a signatory to the INF Treaty, enabling it to develop a wide array of capabilities that the United States was prohibited from fielding. Considering this threat, the United States has been hoping to develop and deploy a new conventionally armed GBIRM to the Indo-Pacific, but how U.S. allies will respond to Washington's overtures to host GBIRMs is not clear. The author analyzes the likelihood of U.S. treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region--Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Thailand--hosting U.S. GBIRMs. Because these countries are unlikely to agree, the author also examines alternatives to permanently basing these missiles on allies' territories: (1) U.S. co-development of GBIRMs with and/or sales of GBIRMs to an ally for it to command and control, (2) U.S. deployment of GBIRMs to an allied territory in a crisis, (3) peacetime rotational deployment, and (4) deployment on Guam or one of the Compact of Free Association states. Because of drawbacks with each alternative, the author recommends a variation of the first: helping Japan develop an arsenal of ground-based anti-ship standoff missile capabilities
"...It is understood that no U.S. ally is calling for U.S. GBIRMs to be deployed to its territory, and it is also understood that regional states are hesitant to host U.S. missiles because doing so could be seen “as signaling membership in an anti-Chinese coalition” or exposing oneself to Chinese retaliation in the event that missiles are fired at China during a war. Therefore, a final option that the United States has is deploying these systems on the U.S. territory of Guam or one of the three sovereign states in the Compact of Free Association (i.e., the Fed- erated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau), all of which offer the United States special military access opportunities because it is responsible for each state’s defense and security. Per the Compact of Free Association agreement, the United States is granted permission to conduct “activities and operations necessary for the exercise of its authority and responsibility.” What is more, such states as Palau have openly asked for an expansion of U.S. military presence..""
Extra details:
DOI: 10.7249/rra393-3 OpenAlex: W4297662617
