POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MICRONESIA: A VIEW FROM THE ISLAND OF POHNPEI

BY

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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This dissertation describes and analyses the process of political development in Micronesia, with particular reference to the island of Pohnpei. In the past, anthropologists have failed to take into account the historical process of political change in Micronesia when they have studied the political systems present on Pohnpei. Contrary to these studies, the present work indicates that resource competition is the ultimate cause of the Micronesian acceptance of a totally new political system and form of government. The new government structure allows individuals access to new resources, as well as a higher quantity of resources. Individuals, once they acquire these resources, then use them for their own social status and prestige advancement. In addition, this dissertation presents an

analysis of the future of the Federated States of Micronesia government based on ethnographic interview data from Pohnpeians.

CHAPTER 1
THE ISLANDS OF MICRONESIA

Introduction

The islands of Micronesia cover a geographic area larger than the continental United States, but with a land area only .02% its size. Consequently these islands have never been prominent in the world's body of public knowledge. During World War II some of the islands were notorious for the fierceness of the battles that ravaged the land and the people, but even these islands have faded from public memory. Some of the islands are so small they are difficult to find even on a regional map, let alone a map of the world. Today it is not uncommon to tell someone you are planning to go to Micronesia, or have just returned from there, only to receive the response, "Where's that?"

Despite suffering from this relative lack of public knowledge, the islands of Micronesia, along with the rest of Oceania, have become increasingly important in the arena of global politics. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. view control of the Pacific ocean and its islands as a major strategic goal. More importantly, from an anthropology perspective, the islands of Micronesia present a good example of the political and social change that can be wrought

through political negotiation. Throughout the world, political change is occurring primarily through invasions, coups, popular revolutions, anarchy, etc. The instances of peaceful political change occurring through negotiations between two non-belligerent parties are very rare, except in the Pacific.

The primary reason for this peaceful approach is, of course, the small size of the islands. Many of the islands in Micronesia are less than one square mile in land area. It would be politically disadvantageous for a superpower, professing to be a world leader, to forcefully take over any of these islands. The possibility of the islands starting aggressive action against another country is even more unlikely. As the current vice-president of the Federated States of Micronesia stated in a speech in 1986, "With respect to the [future political status negotiations with the] United States, we really only had two choices. Either declare war on the United States--and win--or negotiate a future political status. We decided to negotiate."

There are, of course, exceptions to peaceful change in the Pacific. New Caledonia is currently having what amounts to a civil war. New Caledonia, a French-controlled island, has a large population of French residents, most of whom originally lived in French Algiers before that country gained its independence. Now the non-French residents of New Caledonia want independence for their islands. There

has been much antagonism between the two groups, as well as actual fighting. In 1986, the political tensions were enough to cause the organizers of a Pacific arts festival to move the festival from New Caledonia to Tahiti, even though this meant participants from several countries would not be able to attend.

Recently, Fiji has experienced a series of coups and coup attempts, with a consequent change in that island's government structure. Although some general dissent has been present for several years within the large Indian population on Fiji, the suddenness of the coup took many people knowledgeable of the Pacific by surprise (Bedford 1987).

Micronesia has also not been able to escape some internal strive. Palau, located in the western Carolines at the extreme west end of Micronesia, has had internal political difficulty since the mid-1970s. Political differences in Palau took on a violent aspect when Palau's President Remeliik was assassinated in 1985. Whether or not Remeliik's murderers acted for political reasons, personal reasons, or some combination of the two, was never fully revealed during the investigation (Pacific Daily News 1985, 1986). The conviction of two Palauan men was overturned by the Palauan Supreme Court (Alcalay 1987:51).

Micronesia's contact with the western world started 300 years ago. Since that time the islands have successfully

withstood four different colonial administrations: the Spanish in the 1700s, the Germans in the early 1900s, the Japanese in the mid-1900s, and finally the Americans in the years following World War II. In the early years, numerous traders, warships, merchants, slavers, and deserters visited the islands. The combination of these visitors and administrators forever changed the way of life in Micronesia.

In the following chapters I describe this social change with particular reference to the political change that has occurred in Micronesia. While I discuss Micronesia in general, my field work and research was concentrated on Pohnpei, in the Eastern Carolines.[1] I have tried to place the changing nature of the political development occurring on Pohnpei in an historical context, analyzing what this social change may mean for the island.

For eighteen months in 1984-1986 I lived on Pohnpei, working for the State Department of Education as a computer consultant. In addition to actively working to bring about social change by training Pohnpeians in computer operations, I also studied the political change that was occurring on the island and in Micronesia. I lived and worked in Kolonia, the capital of the Federated States of Micronesia and the capital of the State of Pohnpei. Pohnpei is small (the dirt road around the island is 52 miles long), so I had no difficulty in visiting areas outside of Kolonia, including the outer islands of Pohnpei State. This approach to

research in Pohnpei (living in town while working for the government) produces a view of Micronesian politics that is somewhat different from that produced by more traditional ethnography. In the past, some anthropologists have ignored the dramatic political changes in the islands in order to concentrate on what they felt was "traditional culture." This leads some students of the area to conclude that Pohnpeian culture is stable.

My view is different. Life has changed dramatically in just the past twenty-five years. The older residents of Pohnpei, like residents of other Third World countries, have seen the coming of cars, air transportation, and television. Pohnpeians are now approaching the time when three generations of residents on the island will have lived under no other political system than that introduced by the United States after World War II. Not to focus on the fact that Pohnpeians have been moved away from their traditional life is simply an attempt to maintain them, at least in an intellectual sense, as a "museum" population, forever available for the study of "traditional" cultural patterns.

Thus, the following pages present a different view about Pohnpei than that found in the current anthropological literature. This view is of a new dynamic group of people who sense their future is connected to the new political system that has become formalized in Micronesia. Because this new group of people are a select group of political

elite working in government positions, they can materially affect life on Pohnpei, and have already brought about significant changes in the way Pohnpeians live and work.

Geography

The islands collectively known as Micronesia are located between 1 to 22 degrees north latitude and 130 to 172 degrees east longitude. The eastern edge of the Marshalls is about 4,100 miles from San Francisco (2,100 miles from Honolulu), and the western edge of Palau is approximately 400 miles from the Philippines. The total geographic area encompassed is about 3 million square miles, or roughly the size of the continental United States. There are over 2,000 islands within this area, but the total land area is only 700 square miles, and fewer than 100 of the islands are settled permanently. The islands are of two types: "high" islands, being the tops of extinct volcanoes, and "low" islands, having a foundation of limestone that has built up over the centuries from the secretions of coral organisms. Some of the high islands have mountains that rise over 2000 feet above the sea, while the low islands generally are only 10 to 15 feet above sea level.

Micronesia is made up of three archipelagos: the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The western-most islands of Kiribati (formerly the Gilbert Islands) have some linguistic and

cultural similarities to Micronesia, but because of a different colonial history Kiribati is generally excluded by anthropologists from the list of islands defined as Micronesia. Likewise, Guam, although a part of the Northern Marianas chain, is excluded from discussions about Micronesia because it has been an American territory since 1898. Nauru has also been excluded because of its distance from the rest of Micronesia, and its independent status beginning in 1969.

Pohnpei is the largest of the Eastern Caroline Islands, with a land area of about 132 square miles. It lies 7 degrees north of the equator with a longitude 158 degrees east, or approximately 2700 miles southwest of Hawaii. Pohnpei is a high island and its mountains rise some 2,500 feet above sea level. The climate is tropical and Pohnpei has heavy rainfall, high temperatures, and high humidity. The mountainous interior receives an estimated 400 inches of rain a year (Ashby 1983:3), while Kolonia, the only town, receives about 180 inches a year. The temperature stays fairly constant throughout the year with the mean temperature (about 86 degrees F.) varying less than 2 degrees each month.

Prehistory of Micronesia and Pohnpei

The prevailing theory on the origin of the first settlers of Micronesia is based on linguistic data. All

Micronesian languages belong to one of two distinct groups of the Austronesian language family. Palau and the Marianas belong to the Western Austronesian or Indonesian type, while the rest of the islands, excluding Yap, are grouped together in the Eastern Austronesian group. Yap appears to be a linguistic isolate unrelated to any other language. Based on linguistic evidence, it appears that Micronesia was initially settled from two different directions at different times. The high islands in the west, Palau and the Marianas, were settled first by people moving out of southeast Asia. The eastern islands of Micronesia were settled perhaps 1000 years later by people moving from eastern Melanesia (Craib 1983:922).

Between 1945 and 1977, only 15 archaeology projects were completed in the islands (Craib 1983:922). Most of the archaeology research in Micronesia has been completed since 1977 with several projects undertaken on both high islands and atolls.[2] The archaeological evidence tends to support the prevailing theory of settlement, but specific dates are still confusing. The evidence indicates that the Marianas were settled approximately 4000 years ago and that the eastern islands were settled about 2000 years ago. Settlement of the high islands occurred rapidly, with the spread of people to the outer atolls occurring approximately 1000 years later. These early settlers planted a variety of crops, such as breadfruit and yams. Domestic animals,

primarily pigs, came with people who arrived later. There is some evidence that pigs were present in Palau about 1500 years ago (Craib 1983:923).

Pohnpei has one of the most famous archaeology sites in Micronesia. The site is Nan Madol, a group of ninety-two man-made islets built on the reef on the southeast side of the island. Nan Madol was the capital of an island-wide chiefdom that flourished about 500 years ago, and the site was apparently abandoned by the mid-1700s. According to Pohnpeian oral history, Nan Madol served as the administrative and religious center for a successive group of rulers on the island known as the saudeleurs. At first, the saudeleur was the paramount chief of a small chiefdom located on the main island of Pohnpei. Through warfare and political consolidation the various saudeleurs were able to expand their rule over the entire island. The saudeleur became the head of an elite group of leaders who built Nan Madol to symbolize the special character of the people who lived there, namely, themselves (Athens 1983:51-52).

The end of the reign of the saudeleurs is linked by Pohnpeian folklore to the Thunder God (Fischer, Riesenberg and Whiting 1977). The Thunder God lived in Nan Madol on an islet named Pahnkadira, located in a section of Nan Madol called Madol Pah, or "lower town." The Thunder God had an affair with the wife of the saudeleur, for which he was severely punished. He fled Nan Madol, traveling to Kosrae, a

high island located about 350 miles east of Pohnpei. While on Kosrae the Thunder God had a son named Isokelekel who heard stories his entire life about the cruelty of the saudeleurs. Deciding to do something about them, Isokelekel gathered up an army of 300 men and sailed to Nan Madol. When they arrived the invaders posed as legitimate visitors and had no trouble entering Nan Madol. Isokelekel first won the confidence of the saudeleur, after which he defeated the saudeleur in battle. After defeating the saudeleur, Isokelekel established a new political order with a new paramount chief called the Nahnmwarki. Five separate chiefdoms were established on the island, with Isokelekel becoming the Nahnmwarki of Madolenihmw, the chiefdom in which Nan Madol was located.

The Nahnmwarkis of Madolenihmw continued to live at Nan Madol even after Isokelekel's death. But following the death of the sixth Nahnmwarki, Nan Madol was abandoned. This abandonment occurred perhaps as late as 1724, just about the time the Spanish were consolidating their colonial administration in the Marianas, Guam, and the rest of Micronesia (Athens 1983:55). The Nahnmwarki political structure on Pohnpei, established by Isokelekel 100 years earlier, greeted the Europeans who attempted to colonize the island after 1800.

Early Political Forms in Micronesia

The following sections briefly outline the traditional political forms of the major districts of Micronesia. The traditional leaders present in these political systems guided the Micronesians in the first encounters with Europeans at the beginning of the Western contact period.

The Marshalls

Most of the islands in Micronesia had some form of hereditary class structure through which the chiefly titles were passed from one generation to another. In the Marshalls, the commoner status (kajur) is separated from the royal status (iroij) and the paramount chiefs (iroij laplap). Land tenure is the overwhelming concern in the traditional political system and is intimately connected with the matrilineages that control the traditional leadership.

At the bottom of the Marshalls' traditional system are the kajur who have inherited use-rights for the land. Next above the kajur are the jib, a rank that is on the edge of nobility, followed by the bwirak, regarded as an upper class without the right of succession to the position of iroij laplap. The iroij are the noble class that receive the benefits of the labor produced by the kajur. The position of iroij laplap is filled by the ranking member of the senior ruling lineage. Traditionally, the iroij laplap

owned all of the land and its products within his domain. Although succession to the position was supposedly hereditary, prior to European contact, warfare frequently served to decide disputes between competing iroij.

The legitimacy of the iroij laplap position was reinforced by traditional religion. The person of the iroij laplap was sanctified by the stars, sea, medicine, and magic. If the iroij laplap had assistants, then these people were also covered by the sacredness of the iroij laplap. In return for food, material resources, and help in warfare, the iroij protected the kajur in times of natural disaster and kept social order among the different families. The iroij laplap could command absolute obedience from his subjects under penalty of death.

During the German administration, warfare came to an end and the existing territorial positions of the competing iroij were made permanent. The German administration attempted to govern the Marshalls through the iroij, but the administration's main interest was in copra production. During this period, the type of tribute paid to the iroij changed, becoming largely a share of the copra produced by the kajur.

The Japanese administration actively tried to change the traditional political system, deciding that the kajur were the rightful owners of the coconut trees and, therefore, possessed legal rights to the land. This undermined

the iroij position of absolute dominance over land tenure. By the 1940s, the Japanese had determined that the iroij laplap no longer had absolute power over the land or the kajur, and that they must act fairly for the benefit of their people, and not just for themselves. The resultant loss of the iroij laplap's control over the land and the reduction in their absolute supremacy at the top of the social hierarchy reduced the political status of the iroij laplap, but did not eliminate them completely.

The early American administrators consciously decided to recognize the iroij as being social leaders, but not as being political leaders. In the view of the American military officers who arrived in the Marshalls to form a military government after World War II, the process of restoring political power to the iroij would run counter to the American goals of setting up an independent (hopefully democratic) government. The Americans decided that people who were members of the iroij would be elected to government positions by secret ballot like everyone else. However, some seats and voting privileges were reserved for the iroij in the various atoll councils. Overall, however, the influence of the iroij in Marshallese society varies, depending on the attitude of the people, and the personality of the iroij (Meller 1969:134). The policy of the military administration was that the people themselves should

"operate the municipal councils properly and . . . defer to iroij or not, as the case may be." (Meller 1969:134).

Unlike the Japanese administration, the Americans did not standardize the amount of copra revenues the iroij were to receive. This was left up to the iroij and the workers to negotiate between themselves. Consequently, in some atolls the iroij received less than they would have liked. The iroij in turn refused to take care of medical expenses as part of their obligation to the people. The American administration furthered changed the iroij positions by working under the assumption that the Marshallese people were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional political system. As a result of this assumption, and in order to foster the growth of a new governmental structure, the Americans allowed free decisions to be made concerning the iroij status in the islands (Richard 1957, v.3:1084). The iroij felt that the effect of the American administration's endorsement of the municipal council structure being developed throughout Micronesia was to "destroy iroijs' wills and rights or take over iroijs' concerns" (Meller 1969:134).

At the present time, two social classes, the kajur and the iroij, are recognized in the Marshall Islands. The jib have merged into the kajur class, and the bwirak into the iroij class. Also, the traditional need for absolute purity in royal blood in the iroij laplap has changed. It is

recognized that some modern-day iroij laplap are descended from the marriage of iroij and kajur, a situation that would not have been allowed prior to European contact.

Palau

Traditionally in Palau, the village served as the political unit around which life revolved. The village was traditionally ruled by the klobak, a group of about ten heads of the ranking clans. The highest ranking member of the klobak served as the village chief. The village chief was assisted by the other members of the klobak and answerable to them for his actions. In contrast to the Marshall Islands' iroij, in Palau it was the klobak that was responsible for the economic affairs of the village and for maintaining law and order.

Usually five to ten villages would be politically joined to form a district, ruled by a paramount chief and a district klobak. Membership in the district klobak was determined by clan rank within the district. Consequently, some villages had no representation at the district level, and it was possible for a village chief of low-ranking clan status to have little power and influence at the district level, but a considerable amount of power and influence within his own village. The district klobak concerned itself with all matters that pertained to the district as a

whole, whether it was economics, warfare, land disputes, or breaches of custom (Meller 1969:127).

The districts in turn were organized into two major competing confederations, Koror and Melekeok. With the arrival of the Spanish in Palau, the relative territorial positions of the Koror and Melekeok confederations were permanently frozen with the Spanish administration's prohibition of warfare and institutionalized concubinage, the latter formerly being used for making political ties between rival factions. At the beginning of the Spanish administration, the two highest ranking districts, Koror and Melekeok, were supreme in their confederations, with the paramount chiefs of these two districts ruling over much of the territory of Palau. Today, the holders of these two chiefly titles (Reklai in Melekeok, and Ibidul in Koror) are the center of traditional political power in Palau.

In relations between chiefs and commoners, Palauan chiefs could expect obedience to orders, gifts, services, and general deference. In turn, the chief was obligated to perform his role in a culturally proscribed manner, make contributions of goods in keeping with his rank in the social hierarchy, and take responsibility for the actions of anyone living within his domain. The chief also had the right to act as arbitrator in personal disputes. All of these rights and responsibilities were balanced out to minimize any potential conflicts between the chiefs and

others of high rank in the political unit. Various religious leaders acted as checks against the chiefs and no chief could act without consulting and gaining the consensus of the other members of the klobak. Further checks against a chief making excessive power moves was the grouping of clans in opposing pairs, and the competition between rival villages and districts for social ranking and political power (Meller 1969:128).

Unlike the Marshalls, in Palau, the advent of European colonialism increased the power of individual chiefs. The Spanish administration eliminated most of the practices of the traditional religious leaders, removing one of the checks against the chiefs. It was no longer possible for a low-ranking person to invoke religious sanctions against a higher-ranking person as punishment for presumed excesses. With the freezing of the political confederations, the chiefs' positions were made more secure, but only with the consent and cooperation of the colonial governments. Lineage became less important for succession to a chiefly title as the colonial administrations removed uncooperative chiefs, replacing them with men who could work with the colonial administrations, regardless of their traditional rank. As a result, the chiefs began to work with the colonial administrations, changing their consensus-related role in the klobak into a functional one. The Spanish colonial administrations assumed the chiefs actually had the

power they said they did, and began to focus more and more on the chiefs to get various decisions carried out.

Erosion of the chiefs' power and positions occurred during the German and Japanese administrative periods, so that by the 1940s, the chiefs had been stripped of most of their independent decision-making ability and had become administrative puppets (Meller 1969:129). Taking the chiefs' place in the hierarchy was a new group of people who derived their power and positions through working with and for the Japanese administration. The district klobak was replaced by the rubekul made up of village chiefs, title holders, and others with attained status. The primary function of the rubekul was to deal with the Japanese administration.

The American administration, in keeping with the policy of "indirect rule," ignored the rise of the non-title holders in Palau and restored the chiefs to their positions, in addition, giving them power they did not have prior to European contact. Under the early American administration there was a pan-Palau government formed with chiefs in the highest positions, but without the system of religious and social checks and balances that had existed before the Spanish colonial period. The chiefs' positions were now more important than ever before. Unfortunately for the chiefs, their positions soon began to erode once again. The American concept of choosing political leaders in free

democratic elections was not compatible with the rigid Palauan class distinctions the chiefs drew upon for their political control (Meller 1969:129). They also could not cope with the larger administrative needs of governing all of Palau, rather than just a small portion as they did before the American administration. The non-title holders, who had gained status and power during the Japanese administration due to their skills and abilities to deal with a new political structure, did not fade away once the Americans took over. Soon it became apparent that these people were more adept at running a government bureaucracy than the chiefs. As a result of these factors, the chiefs lost control of the government process to non-title holding Palauans.

Yap

Yap is the most traditional of any of the Micronesian island groups, retaining most of the social and political structures present in Yapese society prior to European contact. The traditional political structure of Yap is unique in Micronesia, being made up of a combination of kinship, class-caste hierarchy, and village-district organization. Yap villages are made up of unrelated and autonomous clans, each sharing a common territorial, class, and caste affiliation, and ranked according to their land-holdings (Mason 1968:295). Each village has up to six

age-based ranks, with the two highest ranks reserved for those who own certain high-status pieces of land. As a consequence, some villages do not have these higher noble ranks. The chief of each village holds his position because he owns a piece of land that gives chiefly powers to the owner. The villages are further grouped into eight districts; the districts being organized into three shifting alliances (Mason 1968:295).

Cross-cutting the internal village hierarchies is a system of class distinctions, with each village ranked in a system of nine classes that are further divided into upper and lower castes (Mason 1968:295). The four lowest classes make up a serf caste subordinate to the higher classes. Members of the serf classes do not own land. Lower caste villages occupy land owned by high caste members and can be dispossessed if families fail to work and provide services to the owners of the land. The high caste owners of the land are supposed to take an interest in the welfare of their subjects, creating a patron-client type of relationship. In addition to not being able to own land, in the past low caste members were denied other types of social freedoms, such as not being able to wear combs in their hair, and having to move out of the path of higher caste members. The class distinction is rather dynamic, although caste distinctions are less so. If a high class family exploits a lower class family, the lower class family can

form ties with a different high class family. In the past, class position could also change through the fortunes of war and other political manuevers. Some cross-class marriage occurs, but rarely between the high castes and low castes.

A low caste village and its people are never able to change its status, although the village can change its affiliation from one high caste village to another. Unlike India, where caste position is correlated with standard of living, life expectancy, birth rates, etc., no such distinctions are found in Yap. Instead, it is in the exercise of political power and the access to special privileges that distinguishes the two castes (Meller 1969:145).

Yap was traditionally divided into two sections making up the "Yap Empire." One section was the high island of Yap itself, the other the low islands located to the east. Two districts of Yap exercised political authority over these low islands. One district, Gurror, controlled the atoll of Ngulu, and the second district, Gagil, controlled the rest of the atoll islands. The Gagil district used the island of Ulithi as an intermediary, with Ulithi playing an important part in the political, kinship, and religious ties that held Yap and the low islands together. All of the low islands were referred to collectively as "Woleai", including the atoll of Woleai. "Woleai" was subordinate in rank to Ulithi, which was subordinate to Yap.

Relations between the district of Gagil and the islands to the east took one of three forms: political, gift exchanges, and religious offerings. For political communications orders from the paramount chief of Gagil traveled along a single communication route. First, the orders went to the paramount chief of Mogmon on Ulithi, who passed them to the other islands of Ulithi atoll, to Fais and Sorol, and to the atoll of Woleai. From Woleai, the communication next went to Eauripik, Faraulep, and Ifaluk. From Ifaluk, it was passed to Lamotrek, which sent them along to Elato and Satawal. Satawal would then send the communication to Puluwat, which would finish the chain by sending it to Namonuito, Pulap, and Pulusuk. The order was rigidly observed, with the chiefs east of Ulithi never being able to communicate directly with the chief of Gagil, except by reversing the order and sending communications through Ulithi. Thus, Ulithi held a considerable amount of political power as the intermediary between Gagil and the other atolls. In order to control this political power, succession to the paramount chief's position on Ulithi was subject to approval from Yap. Despite this ranking of the atolls and the subordinate positions of all of them vis-à-vis Ulithi and Yap, internal control on each of the islands was vested in each paramount chief.

The second type of relationship between Yap and Woleai was gift exchanges (sawei). Some of the upper caste clans

of Gagil were considered to be the owners of the eastern islands and as such, were obligated to act as the "parents" of the "children" who lived on them. The sawei exchanges consisted of the eastern atolls sending gifts to Ulithi, from which fleets of canoes would travel to Yap carrying the accumulated gifts. The fleets would return from Yap with gifts that were distributed on Ulithi and the outer islands. If residents from one of the eastern islands visited Yap, they would be treated as "children" of that clan, and likewise, if residents from Yap visited the outer islands, they would be treated as "parents." Parents were obligated to provide resources such as food and clothing and to give parting gifts to the visitors before they returned home. In turn, the outer islanders owed filial respect and general obedience to the parent clans. A similar relationship existed between the outer islands and Ulithi.

The third type of relationship was through religious offerings. These offerings were made to the religious leaders of Gagil and were independent of the communication and sawei relationships. Gifts were sent to appease the spirits on Yap for the benefits the spirits would bring to the outer islanders. In addition, the head of the ruling matrilineage could order his magicians to cause plagues and typhoons to torment the outer islanders, if religious offerings were not provided.

During the Japanese administration, the village chief's power was greatly reduced. The American administration continued the trend, focusing on the district chiefs for their administrative needs. Despite this change in political emphasis, however, the Yap islands remain the most traditional of any of the islands in Micronesia, and the hereditary chiefs retain a significant amount of political and social authority.

The Northern Marianas

On the opposite end of the continuum from Yap are the Northern Marianas. Nothing of the traditional political system remains in effect today. Prior to Spanish colonization in the 1600s, the Chamorro society was divided into three classes: nobles (matua), high-ranking commoners (atchoat), and low-ranking commoners (mangatchang). A person's rank and class were associated with land ownership and clan membership. Only nobles and high-ranking commoners could own land, with the low-ranking commoners working it for them. The nobles controlled all economic activity in the islands, drawing from within their ranks various specialists such as canoe builders, navigators, and warriors. The islands were not united under a single ruler, much the same as in other parts of Micronesia. There were apparently a number of independent districts, each ruled by

a paramount chief, that would occasionally change rank depending on the outcome of warfare (Alkire 1972:10-14).

Other than this, not much is known about the traditional political system in the Marianas. During the last thirty years of the 1600s the population of the islands was decimated by warfare with the Spanish and by disease. The population dropped from an estimated 50,000 to 4,000 during this period (Hughes and Lingenfelter 1974:8). Of the Chamorros living today, almost no one can claim to be a "full-blood" because of extensive intermarriage having occurred over the centuries with the Spanish, Filipinos, Japanese, and Americans.

Truk

The traditional political system of Truk falls between the non-existent traditional political system of the Marianas and the still relatively powerful systems found in the Marshalls, Palau, and Yap. During traditional times, being a chief on Truk was "largely local and personal in nature" (Gladwin 1950:17). The outcome of warfare or changing population numbers could shift the chiefly position from one lineage to another. Political and social authority was granted to a number of classes, not all of them of chiefly rank. One class had the responsibility of determining policy, another for administrative functions, and a third class was responsible for settling disputes. Unlike

the Marshalls or Palau, the village was the largest political unit. There were no political districts and the jurisdiction of one type of chief might not have been the same as for another type. The village chief was usually the oldest man in the ranking lineage, with senility constituting the measure of incompetency. There were no paramount chiefs responsible for an island or a group of islands.

When the Americans arrived in Truk they needed someone through whom they could channel various orders and administrative decrees. There was no traditional chief position that fit this role as could be found in other parts of Micronesia. Therefore, the Americans created a chief who was administratively responsible to the American administration for an island or group of islands. Later, the offices of chief, assistant chief, and secretary were created for each atoll. Often the chiefs became autocrats and all of the people chosen to work for the Americans did their best to maximize their own positions while producing the results desired by the American administration (Gladwin 1950:17).

Pohnpei

There are five traditional chiefdoms on Pohnpei: Sokehs, Kitti, Madolenihmw, Uh, and Net. Riesenberg (1968:50) has called the folklore surrounding Isokelekel a kind of traditional political charter from which these five

chiefdoms were created. According to this folklore, after defeating the ruling saudeleur, Isokelekel assumed the title of Nahnmwarki, designating a line of eleven royal titles below him. His son, Nahnlepenien, took the title of Nahnken and formed a second line of eleven titles below him. One by one, various sections broke away to form their own chiefdoms, each with their own Nahnmwarki and Nahnken and corresponding lines of title holders. Each chiefdom in turn was divided into sections, with each section ruled by a chief appointed by the Nahnmwarki. The five chiefdoms have evolved into the five municipalities of the present day. The town of Kolonia is a separate administrative entity, originally being a part of Net.

The traditional polity of Pohnpei in evidence today continues the dual line of noble titles in each of the five chiefdoms, and in the sections within each chiefdom. The Nahnmwarki is the traditional ruler of the municipality and ideally should be the genealogically senior male of the ruling matrilineage in the highest ranking subclan of the ruling clan. This then makes the Nahnmwarki's title the highest in a ranked line of titles controlled by the ruling clan (Petersen 1982a:16).

The head of the second line is the Nahnken. The titles ranked below the Nahnken generally go to the sons of the Nahnmwarki or to the sons of the high ranking men in the highest ranking matrilineage. Because movement within both

lines of titles is based on genealogy and merit, presumably anyone holding a title in the two noble lines could rise to the top ranked position in their line. According to Petersen (1982a:17), the closer a person is to the ranking line of a matrilineage, the more "mana" (manaman in Pohnpeian) that person has. A chief has the right to rule because the collective "mana" of his ancestors is invested in him. In practice it often does not work in this ideal fashion, occasionally leading to rather fierce conflicts about who should get which title. Kinship in Pohnpei is matrilineal, with the Nahnmwarki line and the Nahnken line of titles connected to different lineages. It is possible then for both a father and son to have the highest titles in the two noble lines. Usually, genealogy, combined with the production of a high amount of resources (kava, yams, and pigs), will insure that a man receives increasingly higher ranking titles (Petersen 1982a:17).

Both of the noble titles have eleven ranked sub-titles below them. The Nahnmwarki was the head of the chiefdom (wehi), but the Nahnken was responsible for actually carrying out policy, acting in this capacity much like a prime minister. Traditionally, the Nahnmwarki's position was connected with the sacred realm, precluding him from participating fully in secular decision-making in his chiefdom. The Nahnmwarki and the Nahnken were responsible

for appointing the remaining title holders in their two lines.

Each chiefdom was further divided into sections (kousap). Each section also had two lines of titles, so that a person could hold both noble and section titles at the same time. The Nahnmwarki was responsible for appointing the section chiefs, but rarely did this without consulting the commoners. The section chief was usually the highest ranking male in the ruling matrilineage of the section. In addition, there were honorary titles given, usually of unspecified rank, so that every man would normally have at least one title. Women have the feminine equivalents of their husbands' titles, and women of the ruling matrilineage will sometimes receive titles of their own.

The high-title holders were responsible for the defense and care of their subjects, as well as punishing criminal behavior, arbitrating disputes, and acting as judges in customary law. The high-title holders also owned all of the land. The commoners worked the land and gave first-fruit gifts, feasts, and labor for various projects to the high-title holders.

There are two kinship units on Pohnpei, the extended family and the clan. The extended family is made up of several generations held together through patrilineal ties. Everyone in the extended family will usually live in the

same residential area, although this has been changing over the last thirty years as more and more people move to the urban center, Kolonia. The oldest male is in charge of the group, and there are clearly defined rights and obligations for each member.

The clan consists of a number of extended families that consider themselves descendants of a common female ancestor, and some clans have totems (Fischer 1957:250). There are eighteen clans on Pohnpei spread throughout the municipalities. Membership in a clan cannot be changed (Riesenberg 1968:5-6).

Clans are divided into subclans, each of which is ranked by seniority. The senior male in each subclan is its leader, his functions being social and economic; clans have no overall leaders. The subclans generally control the ruling lines of titles in the chiefdoms. Although subclans are ranked among themselves, these rankings are usually not agreed upon and the actual genealogical ties between members of subclans and clans are, for the most part, unknown (Petersen 1982a:20).

With the coming of the Protestant missionaries, the title structure began to show signs of breaking down. The missionaries saw the system of feasting and free labor paid to the Nahnmwarkis as a stifling influence on the economy and well-being of the Pohnpeians. They therefore set out to weaken it as much as possible. The real blow to the

traditional system did not occur until the German administration, however. The Germans were only interested in increasing the economic activity in Micronesia, specifically copra production. They saw the system whereby the Nahnmwarkis owned all of the land as putting a damper on the copra production by individuals. The German administration changed this by declaring that all land would henceforth be owned fee-simple-title, making it possible for individuals to own land. The German administration also limited the number of feasts that could be given to the Nahnmwarkis to one per year. The Germans also instituted several governmental functions that served to move the Nahnmwarkis out into public view more often in order to manage the affairs of their chiefdoms.

For the most part, the Japanese left the German administration changes in place, since they were also interested in increasing the islands' agriculture exports. The Japanese intensified the role of the high-title holders in the management of local affairs by making the Nahnkens judges in their home chiefdoms. The top administrative posts were held by Japanese, however, and they retained final authority over the administration of the island.

Despite the weakening of the Nahnmwarkis, a great deal of deference continued to be paid to the high-title holders, continuing up to the present day. This was shown early on to the American administration when the United States

attempted to establish a unicameral island legislature, stipulating that the members were to be elected by secret ballot. The chiefs were the first ones elected, even when they were clearly uninterested in being a part of the new legislature.

The preceding sections briefly outline the political structures present in Micronesia when the American administration took over governmental control of the islands after World War II. With the exception of the Northern Marianas, and to some extent Truk, all of the island groups had some form of hereditary chiefly structure, whereby the chiefs owned all of the land and held absolute authority over the various island peoples. With the advent of European contact, these structures began to erode with the chiefs losing some of their power and authority. Except in the case of Truk, the American administration attempted to work through these existing structures in setting up local governments and establishing a system of "indirect rule." In the case of Truk, chiefs had to be invented since they did not exist as such during traditional times. In all of the islands, the United States attempted to establish, through the traditional leaders, a system of free democratic elections to choose island legislatures.

Current Political Organization

The United States has been in charge of administering the islands of Micronesia since World War II. In 1947, the United Nations designated the United States as the administering authority for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). At that time the islands were subdivided into six districts: the Marshalls, Pohnpei, Truk, Yap, Palau, and the Northern Marianas, excluding Guam. (Since Guam was a United States possession before the war, it was not made a part of the post-war trust territory.) In 1977, Kosrae, originally a part of the Pohnpei district, was administratively separated to form its own district.

On Pohnpei, each of the five traditional chiefdoms is a civil municipality with its own elected chief magistrate and council. Kolonia is a separate administrative area and has a mayor instead of a chief magistrate. A municipal judge is appointed by the Pohnpei State Governor for each municipality, based on recommendations made by the residents of the municipality. Each of these five municipalities can make its own laws as long as they are not in conflict with that of the State or National (FSM) government.

Each municipality also elects representatives to the State Legislature: three each from Sokehs, Madolenihmw, and Kitti; two each from Kolonia, Net, and Uh; and one each from the outer islands of Kapingamarangi, Nukuoro, Ngatik, Pingelap, and Mokil.

The Pohnpei State government consists of the legislature, a judiciary, and an executive branch made up of a governor and a lieutenant governor. The legislative and executive branches of the state government are elected, and the two judges comprising the judiciary branch are appointed by the governor. In addition, the executive branch consists of six departments: Administration, Education, Conservation and Resource Surveillance, Community Services, Legal Affairs, and Health Services. The directors of each department are appointed by the governor and approved by the state legislature.

The former TTPI districts of Pohnpei, Truk, Yap, and Kosrae formed the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) in 1979, with Kolonia, Pohnpei, established as the FSM capitol. The FSM government consists of fourteen senators in a unicameral legislature. Each of the four states has an at-large senator; the remaining ten senators are elected based on the population of each state. The president and vice-president of the FSM are selected by the FSM legislature from the four at-large senators.

The judiciary of the FSM consists of two Supreme Court justices, both of whom are appointed for life by the FSM legislature.

The executive branch consists of the president, the vice-president, and five departments: External Affairs, Social Services, Resources and Development, the Attorney

General, and Finance. Each of these department heads is appointed by the President.

Economics

Natural economic resources are few on the islands, generally supporting people at a subsistence level. Micronesia has a lot of ocean, but very little land, making export-oriented agriculture difficult. Because the islands are widely scattered, transportation and communication are expensive and difficult to achieve. The whole region is also far from major markets in industrialized countries, increasing the difficulty of establishing an export economy. Outside observers of the region have concluded that Micronesia has no resources and that the economic potential of the area is "pitifully small" (Nevin 1977:24). Carl Heine, a prominent early politician from the Marshalls, summed it up this way: "The economic welfare and progress of the peoples of Micronesia are almost entirely dependent upon agricultural and marine resources, imported goods, and large government payrolls" (Heine 1974:4).

Though Micronesia's economy is not strong, it produces a standard of living far above the abject poverty seen in other Third World countries. Until the United States started to increase the TTPI funding in the early 1960s, the islands were self-sufficient with subsistence crops and local fishing. The principal crops were taro, yams,

bananas, breadfruit, and coconuts. The resources to be found in the ocean are numerous: lobster, crab, clams, all manner of fish (the most important being tuna) and sea turtles. Traditionally, people living on the outer islands were much more dependent on fishing than those on the high islands who had a wide variety of crops available to them.[3] Although Micronesia does not compare with the United States economically, the people are generally healthy and well-nourished.

Since the 1960s, the consumption of durable goods such as trucks, TVs, VCRs, sewing machines, etc., has risen dramatically. One of the first things a visitor notices when arriving in Micronesia is the large number of cars and trucks being driven around on these small islands. On Pohnpei, there is roughly one vehicle for every ten people. Considering that the average family size is around six people, that equals roughly one vehicle for every two families. There are only 11.2 miles of paved road on Pohnpei, and if you lined up every vehicle end-to-end you would cover half the road surface. A visitor walking down the main street of town early in the morning of a workday might say that <u>everyone</u> owns a car or truck, and they are all driving them right at that very moment. The policeman directing traffic at the main intersection of town would probably agree.

The number of cars and trucks is indicative of the changing economy in Micronesia. In the early 1960s, Micronesia imported roughly $2 of goods for every $1 of goods exported. In 1977, this had changed to $7 imported for every $1 exported. Most surprising was the level of food imports, which totaled more than two and one half times that of all exported products. This is in spite of Micronesians doing a lot of subsistence farming and fishing. Peoples (1985) maintains that for Kosrae, the subsistence production of food has not kept pace with the rapid increase in population on that island. This is probably true for other islands as well, but there has also been a change in food preference. On Pohnpei, more and more people are choosing to buy more "American" types of foodstuffs than they have in the past. The reasons for this change are simple: the average disposable income is greater now for Pohnpeians than it used to be, there is a greater variety of foods now than in the past, and there has been a change in attitude toward non-traditional foods. If you attend a feast you will still be served pork, yams, taro, fish, and breadfruit, all cooked in a variety of ways. In addition, it is likely you will be served hot dogs, canned corned beef, Japanese noodle soup, and ice cream. As Peoples points out (1985:11), an interesting paradox in Micronesia is that the material standards of living have risen very rapidly since the 1960s, while at the same time the

production of local goods (principally agriculture) has declined. The reason for this is, however, simple, and has been pointed out by everyone who has ever written about Micronesia. The United States, as part of its policy for the political development of the region, has supported the Micronesian economy to the point where, without a permanent program of United States aid, Micronesia could not exist at its current economic level.

Methods

As I mentioned earlier, I spent 18 months on Pohnpei from September 1984 to June 1985, and from November 1985 to June 1986. I was hired as a computer consultant by the Pohnpei State Department of Education to install microcomputers in the Department's main office and to train Department staff in a variety of microcomputer applications. As an employee of the Pohnpei state government, I was required to maintain the same hours as other state government employees, from approximately 7:30 am until 4:30 pm, five days a week. I originally intended to carry out research on the impact of microcomputer introduction on Pohnpeian society, while I fulfilled the duties of my contract with the Department of Education. (This work has been reported elsewhere in Evans and Bernard 1987). However, early in my stay on Pohnpei, I became aware of the political change occurring around me in the state and FSM

national governments. My position as a state government employee made it very easy for me to shift my research focus to the political change occurring in Micronesia, and on Pohnpei in particular. I did not have to gain any entrée into the "community", in this case the government; I was already in it as a paid employee. I also did not have any difficulty in identifying the actors in the political arena. For the most part, they were the same people I encountered while I performed my contractual duties.

These same advantages made it difficult later during the research when I began to discover that the political environment was not what I had been led to expect from the anthropological literature about Pohnpei. The most important of these disadvantages is that I was an employee of the state government, and had made friends with a number of people in and out of the government. Consequently, I was able to learn very specific information about the political establishment on Pohnpei--information that could damage the careers and social standing of my informants for telling me, and of political figures as well. This is, of course, nothing new to anthropologists, and in the following pages I have dealt with the problem in the same manner as I have in other research efforts. If I was not able to sufficiently hide the identity of the person giving me some piece of information, I simply did not use it. In some cases, this has limited my use of direct quotes.

My contractual duties outside my research project forced me to conduct almost all my field work activities during the evenings or on the weekends. In reality, except for the field trips I took to the outer islands of Pohnpei State or to Guam, virtually all my field work was conducted during my free weekends. During the field work periods I interviewed 37 Pohnpeians from different sectors of Pohnpeian society. Twenty-three of these interviewees are male, and 14 are female. Almost everyone spoke English well enough for the interviews to be conducted in English. In three cases (one from Pohnpei, and two from Nukuoro) I used a translator as an intermediary. The interviewees come from all sectors of Pohnpeian society. Most (25) were employed in one way or another by the FSM or Pohnpei State governments. The remainder (12) had a variety of occupations, from farmer/fisherman, to businessman, and "housewife." Of the 25 interviewees who worked for the governments, 15 lived in or near Kolonia, the rest lived outside of Kolonia in Net, Uh, Sokehs, or Kitti. Of the 12 interviewees who did not work for the governments, five lived outside of town, two lived on Nukuoro, one lived on Ngatik, and the remaining four lived in Kolonia. The ages of the interviewees ranged from the mid-20s to the mid-60s.

For each of these interviews I used a structured open-ended interview schedule. Almost everyone was asked questions from the same set of "core areas" I was interested in,

such as their recall of past political events, their thoughts on the political system present on Pohnpei, their plans for their personal future, and the potential impact they foresaw from the political status negotiations with the United States. The interviews were, however, open-ended, and no two were exactly alike. Some people were interviewed more than once, either as a continuation of the first interview, or as a follow-up interview to clarify some information. Most of the interviews were tape recorded, except when the interviewee expressed a desire that their comments not be taped.

In addition to the formal structured interviews, I had numerous conversations with people in and out of the government on Pohnpei, what Werner and Schoepfle (1987:299) call "casual interviews." The ethnographic data gleaned from these conversations, and from the process of participant observation while I lived and worked on the island, was added to the interview data base.

The Research Problem

The literature on political change on Pohnpei suggests the traditional political system remains a strong vital component of Pohnpeian society, and that the new political structure introduced by the United States since 1945 is less important than the traditional one to Pohnpeian society. This conclusion contradicts by finding that the new

political structure is the cause of significant social change in Pohnpeian society.

During the first few weeks of my stay on Pohnpei, it became quickly apparent to me that the anthropological literature concerning the traditional political system on Pohnpei inadequately explained the activity I observed throughout my day-to-day work. I therefore formed the working hypothesis that the traditional political system of Pohnpei had for the most part ceased to be an important part of Pohnpeian society because it had been replaced by the political system introduced by the United States. The reason for this replacement seemed simple: the new political system allowed Pohnpeians access to resources previously restricted to those Pohnpeians who held high rank in the society. I further hypothesized that all the methods of political gain and maneuvering present in the traditional political system, such as a reliance on kinship and feasting, would not be present in the new political system, and would have been replaced by Western-style methods, such as efficiency in work and personal qualifications.

By the end of my research project, it was clear that my working hypotheses were only partially supported by my research data. The traditional political system on Pohnpei <u>has</u> been largely replaced by the new political system introduced by the United States, and there are two reasons for this replacement. First, all Pohnpeians, not just the

traditional leaders who hold high-rank, have more access to resources under the current political system than they did at any time previous to the formation of the Trust Territory. In particular, a new political elite which does not have its base among the high ranking title holders, now has access to more types of resources and a higher quantity of each, than at any other time in Pohnpeian history.

However, the striving for resources did not suddenly occur with the advent of the democratic form of government introduced by the United States. Nor did the Pohnpeians replace the traditional methods of political advancement with more western bureaucratic forms. Pohnpeians have always competed intensely for resources, whether these resources were material goods, or prestige and status. The difference between the present period and the past is that during the early period of European contact, the chiefs had a clear advantage over the commoners in the competition for these resources, but as will be seen in the next chapter, this did not stop the commoners from competing for these resources anyway. Now, the chiefs have been replaced by a new political elite, but this elite does not have the overwhelming advantage over other Pohnpeians in the competition for resources that the traditional leaders had during the early Euroamerican contact period.

Another of my findings is that Pohnpeians have internally modified the new political system introduced by the

United States by using many of their traditional forms of political maneuvering for advancement. Thus, many activities, such as nepotism and conflict of interest, viewed as detrimental to a western form of bureaucracy, have become integral to the process of political advancement in the new political system on Pohnpei.

Except for the formation of a new political elite on Pohnpei, the activities associated with competing for resources by using the current political system are ones that were carried out by Pohnpeians since the first period of European contact. The second reason the new political system has replaced the traditional one is really quite simple, but not obvious without an understanding of the colonial history of Micronesia: the United States allowed them to participate in the government of their islands. The American form of government, and the process by which it was introduced, was the first of four colonial administrations in which Pohnpeians were allowed to fully participate, whether or not they were a high ranking title holder. Other colonial administrations either ignored the Pohnpeians (and Micronesians in general) in the area of government, or paid lip service to the traditional political leaders while continuing to run the government.

As will be seen during the course of the remaining chapters, the current political development occurring on Pohnpei, and by extension Micronesia, is not caused by the

United States forcing Micronesians to accept a foreign government structure, as has been suggested in the literature. Instead, the political development which is occurring, and has occurred in the past, is the result of a continuous and historical process of people competing for resources through manipulation of the political system present at the time. The variance in rate or type of political development is a factor of the amount of participation in the government the foreign administration would allow the Micronesians to have.

Notes

1) The official name for the island was changed in 1985 from "Ponape" to "Pohnpei." At the same time, two official languages were declared for the island, English and Ponapean. An official ruling on whether the latter should be called "Pohnpeian" has not yet been made.

   Other names have changed as well in the modern Pacific. The New Hebrides is now Vanuatu; the Gilbert Islands have become Kiribati; Kusaie in the Federated States of Micronesia is now Kosrae. Palau is sometimes referred to as Belau, but usually only in reference to Palauan cultural situations. This is not always the case, however, and the two names seem to be used almost interchangeably by Micronesian people.

2) Much of this post-1977 archaeology work occurred because of the passage of the National Historical Preservation Act in 1977. Because Micronesia was still the Trust Territory of the Pacific at the time, the provisions of the Act were extended to cover archaeological and historical sites in Micronesia.

3) Even today Pohnpeians are said to be less capable fishermen than people from Kapingamarangi, Nukuoro, or Kosrae, though those who say this are residents of these outer islands.

CHAPTER 2
CONTACT BETWEEN POHNPEIANS AND EUROAMERICANS

Brief and general descriptions of the history of Micronesia are not too hard to find in the anthropological literature. Almost every writer attempts to include a few pages which outline the high points of the colonial history of the islands. Regarding political development, however, these brief descriptions constitutes one of the major failings of current anthropological literature on Micronesia. It is impossible to see any antecedents, precedents, or change in the political life of Micronesia on the basis of a superficial look at the history of political activity in the islands.

In this chapter I present a moderately detailed description and analysis of the history of Euroamerican contact with Micronesians, concentrating on Pohnpei. This ethnohistorical description shows the evolution of political change in the islands, and lays the foundation for explaining why Micronesians have so easily replaced their traditional political systems with that of a foreign power.

Discovery

The first European to encounter Pohnpei was probably Hernan Cortes' cousin, Alvaro de Saavedra Ceron, who set sail for the Philippines from Zihuatanejo on October 31, 1527. He arrived in the Philippines approximately three weeks later, having discovered several small islands along the way. Ceron decided to try and find a return route across the Pacific (something no one else had been able to do), and after refitting, he ran along the northern coast of New Guinea, landing at one of the Admiralty Islands. He then turned north and east, and after sailing for some time recorded an island lying at seven degrees north latitude. He named it Barbudos because of the bearded natives he met living there (Hezel 1983:16; Sharp 1960:19).

Pohnpei was not seen again by Europeans until 1595 when Pedro Ferdinand de Quiros almost ran aground while trying to reach the Philippines. After having a rough time in the Melanesian islands of the South Pacific, Quiros was anxious to reach his destination, so he ignored the natives who came out to guide his ship past the reefs. The island was not visited again by Europeans for 230 years (Hezel 1983:34; Quiros 1904, v.1:113-114, 156).

In the late 1700s and early 1800s, British merchantmen made discoveries throughout the Pacific. Pingelap and Ngatik (both outlying islands near Pohnpei) were discovered in 1793. A Spanish captain by the name of Monteverde

discovered Nukuoro in 1806. In 1809, Pingelap was rediscovered, this time by a Captain MacAskill who gave his name to the island (Hezel 1983:82-83).

A Russian navigator named Fedor Lütke, gave Pohnpei the name Senyavin Islands in 1828, a name it retained for about one hundred years. Until Lütke's visit, Pohnpei had not been sighted since Quiros' visit in 1595. Lütke's rediscovery corrected the mistaken assumption that Pohnpei and Truk were the same island (Hezel 1983:90).

The Whalers

Until the late 1820s, a few new animals were introduced on Pohnpei and the residents acquired a few new tools, but no Europeans lived on the island itself. Unlike Palau and Kosrae, life on Pohnpei changed very little before 1800 because of contact with Europeans (Hezel 1983). By 1830, however, life had changed a great deal, as Pohnpei became popular as a provisioning stop for whalers from England. A notice was even placed in a popular seaman's journal proclaiming Pohnpei "an island very well worth the attention of whalers" (Hezel 1983:109).

Along with increased contact with Europeans came new diseases brought by the European sailors. In 1830, the population of Pohnpei is estimated to have been about 15,000 (Ashby 1983:25). By 1886, the population had decreased to 2,000 (Ashby 1983:26). One smallpox epidemic in 1854 caused

most of this depopulation. The epidemic began when an American whaling ship left six seamen sick with smallpox on the island during March, 1854. Soon the disease spread over the island, resulting in the death of about half of the residents (Ashby 1983:26).

Between 1830 and 1840 most of the ships that stopped at Pohnpei were British whalers out of Sydney, Australia, and merchant ships making the run between Australia and China. The ships often had crews made up of convicts from the Australian penal colonies, either as stowaways or as crew signed on by short-handed captains (Hezel 1978:265). Often, at the ship's first stop in Micronesia some of these crewmen deserted and others were put ashore to become the first of what Hezel calls, the "beachcombers" (Hezel 1978). A later visitor to Pohnpei called these first European expatriates "the outcasts and refuse of their nations" (Shineberg 1971:158).

One of the more famous of the Pohnpei beachcombers was James O'Connell, who arrived on the island about 1830. His book, A Residence of Eleven Years in New Holland and the Caroline Islands, has been described as containing more fantasy than factual information (Riesenberg 1968). Riesenberg noted that "Some of O'Connell's information is so patently and flagrantly wrong that one wonders whether we are dealing with a pathological liar" (cited in Ashby 1983:22).

When O'Connell left the island in November, 1833, there were about 30 Europeans living on Pohnpei. Trading ships out of Salem began to call on the island as news of the high-quality turtle shell and bêche-de-mer present in the area spread among European traders. A good portion of these ships left a few men, and occasionally, took someone off the island. The men who were left behind had little difficulty establishing a new life on the island, as Pohnpeian chiefs were very eager to have them act as their personal middlemen to deal with various whaling ships that stopped to reprovision at Pohnpei. Pohnpeian chiefs even competed among themselves to keep the expatriates employed, with some of the expatriates offered anything that would make their lives easier (Hezel 1983:112-113).

This mutually satisfying situation did not last, however, and by the mid-1830s a number of Pohnpeians, primarily lower-ranking chiefs, were having second thoughts about allowing expatriate Europeans to remain on the island. In 1835, a boat load of shipwrecked seamen landed on the island's shore and were nearly killed by the Pohnpeians who met them when they refused to observe island custom and turn over their boat. Most of the island chiefs had by this time decided they had had enough of the Europeans living in their domain. A plan to kill all of the expatriates on the island was stopped, however, when an influential chief from Madolenihmw sabotaged the plan by offering protection to

expatriates if they would move into his territory (Hezel 1978:267).

Belligerent and obtuse behavior among the Europeans caused this change in the Pohnpeians' attitude. The expatriates were often drunk and constantly fighting among themselves and were abusive to the people who lived near them. Some of the Europeans were armed with muskets and threatened violence against the Pohnpeians (Hezel 1983:118-122).

The ill feelings about the Europeans came to a head in 1836 when the London whale ship Falcon went aground in Madolenihmw harbor. The whale oil and ship's stores were taken off the ship by the crew and stored on a small island before the ship broke up. The Falcon's sailors soon became impatient to leave Pohnpei because they were continuously losing their belongings through petty theft committed by a few Pohnpeians. One day, Captain Hingston of the Falcon caught a group of Pohnpeians attempting to steal the topsail, and in retaliation he struck their leader, the Nahnawa of Madolenihmw. A few days later, the chief returned with some of his men, clubbed Hingston to death, and killed and mutilated four other sailors from the Falcon. In the next few days, the Nahnawa rallied his followers and declared his intention to kill every foreigner on the island and in the harbor.

Meanwhile, the Falcon's crew rallied their own support from other Europeans who lived on Pohnpei. The sailors soon received word from three other ships in the harbor that they would receive help if they signed over full title to all of the whale oil and stores that had been saved. The Falcon's crew, in no position to negotiate, agreed to the terms. Soon a combined force of forty seamen from the ships, the Europeans who lived on the island, and 400 Pohnpeian allies went on the offense against the Nahnawa and his men.

In the ensuing battle, the Nahnawa's army was outgunned and suffered heavy casualties. The Europeans and their island allies went on a rampage, burned houses, cut down trees, and destroyed crops. They shot the Nahnmwarki and terrorized the Pohnpeians, and all the while refused placating offers of kava that were made. After several days the Nahnawa himself was caught and hung from the yardarm of the Lambton, one of the European ships in the harbor (Hezel 1983:118-122).

One of the principals in this battle was Charles "Bloody" Hart, the captain of the cutter Lambton. Shortly before this battle on Pohnpei, Hart had stopped at Ngatik where a good deal of fine-quality turtle shell could be found. Hart was beginning his trade negotiations when he and his crew were attacked by a large group of armed Ngatikese. Hart and his men escaped from Ngatik with no loss of life among them.

About a year after the Falcon incident, Hart and the Lambton returned to Pohnpei. Hart picked up several Europeans and 20 Pohnpeians from the island, along with two canoes and an extra whaleboat. Hart armed all of the men with muskets and set sail for Ngatik. When they arrived at Ngatik, Hart and his men attacked the Ngatikese, and continued for two days to kill anyone they found on the island. By the end of the fighting, all of the island's adult males were dead, as well as several women and children. Hart installed an expatriate Irishman as the new chief of the island. In return for full possession of the island, the new Irish chief was to provide turtle shell for Hart.

The violent encounters changed Pohnpeian behavior in that they stopped attacking ships in the harbor and Europeans on the island, but Pohnpeian resentment of the Europeans was not curtailed. A number of the dead Nahnawa's followers, including his brother and three black American deserters from whale ships (Hezel 1978:267), moved to a small island on the northeast side of Pohnpei. They lived there for a number of years and shared a common hatred for the white Europeans (Hezel 1983:122).

By the early 1840s, the Pohnpeian society had been changed forever by the presence of the European visitors. Between 1834 and 1840, fifty ships stopped at the island, all of them engaged in active trade with the Pohnpeians. The captains of these whale ships were interested in trading

for fresh provisions and resting their crews. Pohnpeians had become dependent on the Europeans' tobacco, and drinking European-style alcoholic beverages was becoming more popular. In order to meet these needs, the Pohnpeians provided fresh food and water to the whale ships, and around the late 1830s also made available female prostitutes. Pohnpeian prostitutes were usually between 9 and 16 years of age and were sold to the sailors by their brothers and uncles (Hezel 1983:122).

Pohnpeians and expatriate Europeans alike always needed new resources the island did not naturally provide, such as tobacco, cloth, iron tools, muskets, and gunpowder. The expatriates called upon island chiefs to provide resources (turtle shell, bêche-de-mer, vegetables such as taro or yams, fish) that were used to trade for the off-island goods (Hezel 1978:268). The lower-ranking Pohnpeians were called upon in turn by their chiefs to collect these items as payment of their obligations to the various chiefs. The expatriates took the island goods to the ships, and received off-island trade goods as payment. After the deals were completed, the chiefs received a portion of the trade goods, such as "one or two muskets, axes, adzes for making canoes, powder or a portion of tobacco" (Blake 1924:667). Individual Pohnpeians could try and make their own deals with the ships' crews, but because of the ability of the chiefs to acquire island resources in large quantities from

their subjects, the bulk of the trading occurred through the chiefs and their expatriate middlemen. The profit margin was especially high on turtle shell and bêche-de-mer, often as much as five hundred percent (Shineberg 1971:173). Pohnpei was known to have some of the best turtle shell in the area, and during the 1830s Pohnpeians supplied the Europeans between 400 and 500 pounds of turtle shell a year, which sold at approximately five to six dollars per pound (Hezel 1983:126).

By the early 1840s, tobacco had become the medium of exchange on the island; almost every man, woman, and child on Pohnpei had become an addicted smoker. Prices for various goods were fixed in terms of heads of tobacco: one dozen chickens for "24 figs of Negrohead tobacco", 10 figs for one hundred yams, breadfruit, or coconuts, and two figs for one bunch of bananas (Shineberg 1971:173). Western-style currency had as yet no monetary use on Pohnpei. In some cases Pohnpeians would drill holes in coins and use them for neck pendants (Hezel 1983:127).

As the ship traffic increased, so did the desertions of sailors. Life on board a whaling ship was arduous; often the ships would not return to their home port for several years, and the tropical atmosphere of Pohnpei was too much of an attraction for less-than-committed sailors. The Eliza had 16 desertions in 1836; in 1841 the Offley lost so many men it could not make sail. In 1842, the Sharon lost eleven

men, and the following year the Fortune lost seven. Frequently, the expatriates who already lived on the island encouraged sailors to desert their ships and sometimes even helped them escape. Ships' captains offered a bounty of ten to twenty dollars a head to any Pohnpeian who brought in a deserter. Despite this effort the desertions continued. The European population on Pohnpei increased to about 60 in 1840, and to 150 in 1850. Ship captains began to sign on Pohnpeians to replace the deserting Europeans, and consequently more and more Pohnpeians began to see the world while they worked as sailors on European ships. For example, the Honduras lost most of its crew in a fight at Kosrae and was forced to take on an almost all-Pohnpeian crew in order to sail to Hawaii (Hezel 1983:124; Ashby 1983:24).

Doubtless the arrival of the Europeans, and the advent of expatriates setting up long-term residence on the island, had adverse impacts on life on Pohnpei. One of the most obvious results of the European contact was the prostitution which was used by the Pohnpeians to acquire European goods. The traditional social system was apparently still intact during the European contact period, because the chiefs of the island maintained control over the distribution of the new off-island trade goods. These goods--the woven cloth, iron tools and cooking pots, tobacco, and firearms--were obviously in great demand by the Pohnpeians. Unfortunately

for the Pohnpeians who did not have a high-ranking title, the chiefs demanded their subjects provide the island resources that were traded for these European goods, and then the chiefs kept most of them. The competition between the chiefs for these trade goods is obvious from the chiefs' behavior toward the "beachcombers." The rest of the Pohnpeians had to compete using the social rules of the traditional title system where they automatically were put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the chiefs. Prostitution, because it could be an arrangement between one Pohnpeian and one European sailor, was one method by which less-privileged Pohnpeians competed (with their chiefs and with each other) for European trade goods. The spread of venereal disease among Pohnpeians may be due to the rise in prostitution during the European contact period.

Warfare had been present in Pohnpeian society long before the Europeans arrived, but the nature of warfare changed with the introduction of firearms. In 1843, Captain Andrew Cheyne, a British trading captain who tried to set up a trading station on Pohnpei between 1842 and 1844, reported that "there is scarcely a man of any note on the island, who has not a musket, and many of the chiefs have 3 or 4 each, together with plenty of ammunition" (Shineberg 1971:190). Cheyne estimated there were 1500 muskets owned by Pohnpeians, and that muskets had displaced spears and clubs as the preferred weapons of battle. The rules of warfare

also changed when the Europeans refused to cease fighting when Pohnpeians offered local forms of placation.

Another obvious change in Pohnpeian society was the Pohnpeians' complete acceptance of European alcoholic beverages, even though they still continued to use sakau, a beverage made from the root of the pepper plant. The Europeans also taught the Pohnpeians how to ferment coconut toddy, now known as tuva, still a popular drink on some of the outer islands 150 years later. Alcoholism is a serious problem on Pohnpei today; a problem that can be directly traced to this European contact period.

The greatest impact of European contact with Pohnpeian society was a change in the social behavior of the Pohnpeians themselves. This change in behavior is directly related to the increase in business with the ships and traders that stopped at Pohnpei. Hezel (1983:130) calls the Europeans a "moral pestilence", but there were only 150 of them living on the island by 1850. Modern day scholars are too anxious to condemn only the Europeans and place the blame for what they see as the past degeneration of life on Pohnpei squarely with the European community. The facts preclude this kind of over-simplified conclusion. Many Pohnpeians participated in smoking, drinking, and the sale of women to passing sailors, while everyone, not least of all the chiefs, enjoyed the increased trade and acquisition of off-island goods.

The Pohnpeians' behavior during this period indicates that they desired the trade with the Europeans. Several thousand Pohnpeians allowed fewer than 200 European expatriates to live on their island in the first place. If the Pohnpeians, collectively, did not want these early Europeans to live on their island, they could have kept them off until the Europeans came in force (which they did 60 years later). Micronesians were not totally powerless during 1820-1870, the early period of the European invasion of their islands. Truk had a reputation for years for the fierceness and general unfriendliness of its residents toward Europeans, successfully keeping foreigners off their islands until the Germans took over Micronesia in the late 1890s. The one time that some Pohnpeians organized to expel the Europeans from their island (or kill them), 400 Pohnpeians joined with the Europeans to fight against the Nahnawa of Madolenihmw and his followers. This is hardly the action of people who do not want foreigners living on their island. It is also the first documented instance of the Pohnpeians reaction to rapid social and cultural change on their island. While the Trukese apparently cooperated enough with each other to keep foreigners off their island (a gatekeeping process made easier because their islands lacked the quality and quantity of resources Pohnpei had), the Pohnpeians competed and fought among themselves, as well as with the Europeans, in pursuit of European trade goods.

Although the source of the various behavior changes evident from the ethnohistorical record can be traced to the resident Europeans and the visiting sailors, no one was forcing the several thousand Pohnpeians who lived on the island to participate in the non-traditional activities introduced by a relative handful of Europeans. I think the historical record indicates the island chiefs were eager to use the Europeans and their skills as middlemen with the whaling and merchant ships in order to increase their own wealth and social standing. The Europeans lived throughout the island, most taking up residence with one of the various chiefs. The chiefs provided land, food, and women, and in exchange they accepted a portion of the profits from the Europeans' business dealings (Hezel 1983:125). As Hezel (1978:271) points out, the beachcombers were instrumental in establishing the trading contacts between the European ships and the Pohnpeians, which is what the Pohnpeian elite society needed them to do. Once the Pohnpeians had enough experience with the European trading process, they took charge of it themselves. The Pohnpeians found in this process of trade with the European ships a new outlet for the intense resource competition that was already part of Pohnpeian culture; an outlet which allowed Pohnpeians other than high-title holders, as well as the chiefs, to more easily acquire resources which were defined by the Pohnpeians as highly valuable.

The Missionaries

In August, 1852, the first missionaries arrived on Pohnpei to set right the perceived wrongs brought about by the whalers (Hanlon 1983:42). The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, an interdenominational agency based in Boston, was in charge. The first missionaries on Pohnpei were two American couples and a Hawaiian family.

The missionaries first stopped at Madolenihmw and informed the Nahnmwarki of their plans. Unfortunately for the missionaries, the three principal chiefs of Madolenihmw were involved in an intense rivalry with one another. The missionaries asked for, but did not receive, permission to live in Madolenihmw. They then went on to Kitti, the most powerful chiefdom on the island at the time, to see about setting up a mission station there. The Nahnken of Kitti agreed to the missionaries' plan and gave them land on which to build a house, as well as his personal assurance that he would support them any way he could. The Nahnken was a young man, only about 30, and already the most powerful leader on the island (Hezel 1983:143). He was friendly with foreigners and had married the daughter of James Hadley, an expatriate living in Kitti who worked as a harbor pilot and trader. The Nahnmwarki of Kitti, on the other hand, the highest ranking chief in Kitti according to the traditional

political system, was against the missionaries and did not want them in his chiefdom (Hezel 1983:144).

Because the chiefs of Madolenihmw had refused permission for the missionaries to live there, the missionaries were in fact forced to live and work in Kitti. The Nahnken's acceptance in Kitti made it that much easier to get started on their mission. In April, 1853, Luther Gulick, a licensed physician, managed to obtain permission from the Wasai of Madolenihmw, the third ranking chief in the chiefdom, to set up a mission station in Madolenihmw.

The missionaries had a broad agenda for bringing civilization and a belief in the Christian God to Pohnpei. The more traditional aspects of Pohnpeian culture, such as drinking sakau, polygamy, and the religion of spirit worship, were considered "mortal sins" by the missionaries, as were the introduced behaviors of the expatriate Europeans, such as smoking, drinking alcohol, and using firearms as weapons in fights. In addition to these sins, there was the prostitution that brought in the European trade goods, and the increase in venereal disease, especially syphilis. The missionaries blamed most of these "sins" on the Europeans. The missionaries failed to recognize that Pohnpeians were engaged in activities like prostitution in order to acquire European trade goods that the traditional leaders, like the missionaries' protector

the Nahnken, kept the Pohnpeians from acquiring on their own.

In general, the Europeans who lived on Pohnpei were friendly with the missionaries. Many of the European expatriates attended church services on a regular basis, and visiting ship captains brought mail, news, welcome company, and conversation (Hezel 1983:146).

Like missionaries the world over, no matter what time period is being considered, the early missionaries on Pohnpei felt their way of living and thinking was the only correct way for people to live and think. This inevitably lead to conflicts with people on the island who did not necessarily agree with their point of view. A whispering campaign was soon started by the Pohnpeians, and gossip about the missionaries spread across the island. Naturally, the missionaries blamed this latest behavior on the European expatriates and elevated the conflict to a moral battle between "Light and Darkness" (Hezel 1983:148). However, the historical record clearly shows the missionaries' difficulties began when they denounced Pohnpeian behavior that had become crucial to the island's economy.

One of the most serious impacts of the European invasion of Pohnpei was the outbreak of smallpox in February, 1854. The disease was introduced to the island by the whale ship Delta and quickly spread across the island. Although the missionaries had a small supply of vaccine they

used to inoculate some Pohnpeians, the supply was soon exhausted. To make matters worse, a rumor spread that the epidemic had been deliberately caused by the missionaries themselves (Hezel 1983:148).

The smallpox epidemic raged for three months, eventually killing over 2000 people, nearly half of the population of Pohnpeians, including a large number of high-title holders (Hezel 1983:141, 149). The social upheaval brought about by this massive population loss caused intense conflict between competing groups of Pohnpeians for vacant titles. There were endless rounds of feasting, numerous fights, and the constant movement of people trying to better their chances of social advancement by changing their residence from one location on the island to another. By early 1855, the social upheaval had died down and new leaders were in place. These new leaders were evidently more inclined to be friendly with the missionaries, because their ministry soon spread from Kitti to the other four chiefdoms of Pohnpei. The original missionaries were joined by two new missionary families, and soon there was mission activity on Pingelap, Ngatik, and Mokil (Hezel 1983:151).

The missionaries did more than just try to convert the Pohnpeians and change Pohnpeian social behavior. For a number of years the wives of the missionaries were in charge of schools around the island, teaching children how to read Pohnpeian. The missionaries wanted to translate the Bible

into Pohnpeian and have Pohnpeians read it in their own language. To this end, the missionaries acquired a printing press and printed passages from the Bible in Pohnpeian. The schools ran sporadically over the years because they were dependent on the time and energy of the women missionaries to teach the classes. Eventually, all of the elementary schools were permanently closed. Several years later, in the 1870s, another effort was made to start schools on Pohnpei, but this time, instead of elementary schools, the missionaries started schools to educate older Pohnpeians so that they could assume the positions of teachers and ministers throughout the islands (Hezel 1983:151-153).

By the mid-1860s, the missionaries had support from about 3000 Christian sympathizers on the island. About this time, the traditional chiefs began an effort to eradicate the missionary influence from their island. From the beginning of their mission effort, the missionaries had preached a line of doctrine that forbade people to pay tribute to the traditional chiefs. Much to the dismay of the traditional chiefs, this new doctrine was beginning to catch on with some lower-ranking Pohnpeians. The chiefs understood if the new doctrine concerning tribute became generally accepted, they would lose a major portion of the status they had always held, and most importantly, lose most of the preferential access they had to the European trade goods. As a result of the anti-missionary effort by the

traditional chiefs, hostilities began between the pro-missionary and anti-missionary supporters, and a few deaths occurred in Kitti. The Nahnmwarki of Madolenihmw threatened to take away the titles and land of his Christian chiefs, but the people rallied in their support and the Nahnmwarki had to back down.

During this same period, the missionaries on Pohnpei made a direct effort to change the political structure of the island. The missionaries gathered all of their sympathizers together and "elected" a "civil head" (Hezel 1983:245) to take the place of the man the Nahnmwarki had chosen to be the Wasai in Madolenihmw. The Nahnmwarki, being outnumbered by the missionaries' followers, decided not to engage in any type of conflict. The missionaries were encouraged by the Nahnmwarki's response to their action and went on to appoint "sheriffs" who would bring social offenders to the "civil head" for judgement. In addition, seven representatives were elected, one from each sub-district. These seven men were to meet with the chiefs to enact legislation for Madolenihmw. The "civil head" was made the presiding "judge" of Madolenihmw, and as such took responsibility for deciding land disputes, family quarrels and like matters. Previously, these had been the responsibility of the Nahnmwarki. The same type of political maneuvering tried by the missionaries in Kitti failed

because they lacked the support from the upper ranks of chiefs which they had in Madolenihmw (Hezel 1983:246).

Eventually, the missionaries stopped their overt meddling in Pohnpeian affairs. The traditional political system surrounding the Nahnmwarki's was too firmly entrenched in the society for a few superficial changes to supplant it immediately. The authority to give and take away land and titles, and the system of tribute, were too well ingrained in Pohnpeian culture to disappear quickly. However, social change which had started seventy years earlier continued, and the beginning of the eventual lessening of the Nahnmwarkis' roles can be traced to this period of political maneuvering by the missionaries and their Pohnpeian supporters.

By 1867, the missionaries and their supporters had, however, won at least one clear victory over the traditional chiefs. Most of the people on the island, including most of the high-title holders, had become sympathizers or members of the church. After seeing that they could not defeat outright the missionaries' efforts to convert people, the chiefs accepted, although somewhat reluctantly, the presence of the missionaries on their island. In contrast to the whalers and "beachcombers", whom the chiefs had voluntarily accepted in order to acquire resources, the chiefs were forced to accept the missionaries in order to maintain some degree of control over their people. To a large extent, the

chiefs were forced into this situation by their subjects who seemed eager to accept a foreign doctrine incompatible with the traditional political system present on Pohnpei. The alternative faced by the chiefs was the complete denunciation of the traditional political system by their subjects and the removal of the chiefs from positions of high rank in the society--the exact situation that occurred on Kosrae during this early period of missionary activity. This was not just a theoretical alternative, this was an actual one, because some of the missionaries present on Pohnpei were instrumental in bringing about the political change on Kosrae.

The Blackbirders and The Traders

By the late 1860s, Pohnpeians had adapted to two different forms of European expansion on their island: the whalers and the expatriates, and the missionaries. A third group loomed on the horizon--blackbirders and traders. Trade had become and important factor in the economy on Pohnpei, but in the first half of the 19th century it was often a sideline business of the whalers and ship captains. Andrew Cheyne had attempted to set up trading stations on Pohnpei during the 1840s, but after several years of only mediocre success, he gave up and went elsewhere.

In 1868, Cheyne's old landholdings were sold to Benjamin Pease, a con man who had been in the Pacific for

some time (Hezel 1983:227-233). Pease soon had a group of Pohnpeians working for him felling trees destined for China aboard one of several ships Pease had chartered to call at the islands in Micronesia. Pease was known throughout the Pacific as a less-than-honorable person, and by 1870, the naval cruiser Jamestown was looking for him in order to serve several complaints filed by business associates and creditors (Hezel 1983:231). Although the Jamestown never caught up with Pease, the action apparently frightened him out of Micronesia, for he was not seen again until 1871 when he arrived on Guam on a stolen brig. After serving several months in a Manila prison, Pease lived quietly on the Bonin Islands until his death in 1874.

Although Pease caused quite a commotion on Pohnpei for a couple of years, it was no more than some of the expatriates had done twenty years earlier. The blackbirders and pirates of the 1870s caused much more personal damage to the Pohnpeians.

In 1871, the Honolulu and Sydney newspapers were printing warnings about the "man-stealers of the Pacific", also known as blackbirders (Hezel 1983:233). For many years ship captains had cruised the islands looking for able-bodied men to take to the copper mines of Peru, the coffee plantations of Central America, and the cotton and sugar fields of Queensland (Hezel 1983:236). Later, during the American Civil War and the Union blockade of the South,

there was a world-wide shortage of cotton, and cotton plantations were started by German businessmen on Fiji and Samoa. The labor needs of these operations steadily increased, and after the American Civil War, when cotton was replaced with sugar and other crops, the labor needs of the plantations increased beyond the supply available on the Fijian and Samoan islands. Although the men "recruited" for these plantations were paid for their labor, in reality they were often kidnapped from their home islands by the captains and held prisoner until the ships reached their destination. Once they had arrived on Samoa or Fiji it was very difficult for the men to return to their home islands.

By 1872, it was not only men the blackbirders were looking for; they were also taking women to serve as mistresses for the plantation overseers. Several ships stopped at islands in the northern Marshalls to kidnap women who were reported to be the best looking in Micronesia. The women "fetch at the Fiji Islands twenty pounds a head, and are much more profitable to the slavers than the men" (Hezel 1983:237).

The German firm of Godeffroy & Son was one of the larger employers on Fiji and Samoa and had about 500 laborers, most of whom were Micronesian (Hezel 1983:239). These men were paid two dollars a month, lived in dormitories, and apparently had adequate food. Despite the

acceptable accommodations, most of these laborers died before the end of their three year contract.

By 1873, the worst of the blackbirding was over due to pressure on the blackbirders from American and British warships. However, labor recruitment in the Pacific did continue for another ten years. Most of these later laborers were Gilbertese recruited for the sugar plantations in Hawaii. Even this labor recruitment stopped by 1882 when it became apparent to the plantation owners that the Pacific islanders were not capable of handling the work of harvesting sugar (Bennett 1976).

Also during the 1870s, resident traders started to appear in the islands. Most of these traders had a different outlook on life than their predecessors, the beachcombers (Hezel 1983:250). These traders wanted to make a profit and return to a life in Europe or America; most of the beachcombers had no such future plans. While in Micronesia, the traders lived a life of relative comfort. Their houses and food were provided by the ruling chiefs, and women would occasionally be given to them as wives (Hezel 1983:250).

By 1880, three major trading firms were on Pohnpei: Capelle, Hernsheim, and Henderson & MacFarlane. Copra had become the major commodity in Micronesia, and took the place of turtle shell and bêche-de-mer on Pohnpei as the most important trade items. Copra production on Pohnpei was

never as important to the German traders as it was in the Marshalls or Yap. The annual production of copra on Pohnpei was only 40 tons, compared to the Marshalls' 700 tons and Yap's 1500 tons (Hezel 1983:254). In addition to copra, Pohnpei produced 350 tons of ivory nuts and 3 tons of pearl shell each year. By this time, the role of middleman for the beachcombers had been eliminated and Pohnpeians, both chiefs and commoners, were carrying out the negotiations for their goods. By 1883, actual currency was in use for exchange, as well as the time-honored barter system (Hezel 1983:255).

By the mid-1880s, the desire for western goods was as much a part of the Pohnpeian culture as the Nahnmwarkis. The main activity of the Euroamerican traders present in Micronesia was buying copra and bêche-de-mer. Both items required a fair amount of labor from the Pohnpeians, since the Germans did not bring very many laborers to the island themselves. Without this labor, and the overall cooperation of the Pohnpeian people, the Germans would have been forced to abandon their trading operations on Pohnpei. Prior to the entrance into Micronesia by the German trade companies, many small, one-man trading companies had to do just that.

The Spanish

The Spanish were nominally in control of Pohnpei from 1886 to 1899. On July 27, 1886, two Spanish warships

arrived at the island to raise the flag. In April, Captain Don Isidro Posadillo arrived with fifty Filipino soldiers and six Capuchin missionaries. The present town of Kolonia (called Santiago de L'Ascension by the Spanish) was established, and the new colonial government proceeded to build a fort and interact with the Pohnpeians.

The Spanish colonial government immediately experienced conflict with the residents of the island. A protestant missionary, Rev. Edward T. Doane, raised a protest with the Spanish colonial administration, claiming he owned the land the Spanish took for their new settlement. The governor rejected his claim, arrested Doane, and sent him to Manila for a hearing (Ashby 1983:30). The following June 16, 1887, some Pohnpeian workers refused to report to work on the fort being constructed by the Spanish. Twenty-seven soldiers were sent to Sokehs island to force the workers to report, and subsequently one officer and sixteen soldiers were killed, with the ten survivors retreating back to Kolonia (Santiago). On July 4, the governor, along with a number of officers, tried to escape to a ship offshore. The Pohnpeians caught them and killed them, and blockaded the new Spanish settlement.

In September, Doane returned from Manila with his land claim upheld. On October 29, two more Spanish ships arrived, one with a new governor, along with 200 soldiers and two batteries of artillery. The new governor was able

to establish a semblance of peace and for several years the Pohnpeians tolerated the Spanish presence on the island. A new Catholic church was built in Wone, Kitti, and the fort was completed in Kolonia.

Henry Nanpei became prominent in island affairs at this time. Nanpei is one of the more famous Pohnpeians in the history of the island and the only Pohnpeian to have a statue of himself erected in his honor (in fact, it is the only statue on the island) (Fischer 1970:40). Nanpei began to play a dominant role in the politics between the Spanish government and the religious missions built on the island.

Nanpei was the son of the Nahnken of Kitti, and his mother was the daughter of the Englishman James Hadley. The Nahnken transferred most of the land he controlled to his son, as was his right by virtue of his rank. Nanpei's mother, Nalio, was a commoner, so Nanpei owed his personal wealth and position to his father, which was contrary to the traditional matrilineal rules on Pohnpei at the time. Because of the very extensive land holdings he received from his father the Nahnken, Nanpei came to have the same power and influence as his father and the Nahnmwarki of Kitti. He received the title of Nanpei, sixth in the line of the Nahnmwarki, even though he was not a member of the matrilineal clan of the Nahnmwarki. His descendants today use the title as a family name and the family continues to have

extensive landholdings across the island, including ownership of Ant Atoll, about eight miles southwest of Pohnpei.

Nanpei was the protege and benefactor of the Protestant Mission in Kitti where he served as pastor (Fischer 1970:40). As a young man, Nanpei traveled extensively; he went to school in Honolulu and visited the United States. It was his hope that an American protectorate would be established on Pohnpei and a congress would be established which he would lead (Fischer 1970:41). Nanpei began to use the rift between the Protestants and Catholics on Pohnpei to further his goal of inducing the Americans to move in.

About this time, the Nahnmwarki of Kitti changed his allegiance from the Protestant mission to the newly constructed Catholic mission in response to Nanpei's growing influence. The Spanish governor built an army post in Kitti designed to protect the new mission. The local Pohnpeians were not happy with the new post, but due to the rank of the Nahnmwarki, they did not openly dispute it. However, violence broke out with the death of a Catholic from the Marianas who had married into the Nahnmwarki line and who had helped with the construction of the Catholic mission. When the mission was finally finished, it was only 60 meters from the Protestant mission (Fischer 1970:41), and the Protestants, led by Doane, did their best to disturb any proceedings conducted at the new Catholic mission.

In 1890, the Spanish governor planned a road around the island, traversing all of the major chiefdoms. In addition, construction was started on a Catholic mission station at Oa in Madolenihmw, only six meters from the principal Protestant mission on Pohnpei (Fischer 1970:41). On June 25 a group of Protestant Pohnpeians attacked the Catholic mission at Oa, killing 35 soldiers. Nanpei rescued a number of the Catholic workers and two priests and took them to the Protestant girls' school in Oa (Fischer 1970:41). The Spanish later counter-attacked, but were defeated.

Later, a force of five hundred Spanish infantry attacked the fortified positions of some Pohnpeians in Madolenihmw. They left behind 118 Spanish dead and 85 wounded.

The Spanish governor blamed the Protestant missionaries for the hostilities on the island. On November 2, 1890, all of the Protestant missionaries were expelled from Pohnpei and they subsequently left for Mokil and Kosrae. The Catholics were more tolerant of sakau and smoking, and with the Protestant missionaries gone, the Catholic priests made increasing numbers of converts during the 1890s. In particular Net, Sokehs, and the Awak section of Uh became centers of Catholic support. Despite the large number of conversions which took place after the fighting was finished, the Spanish administration continued to run the governmental affairs of the island and interacted with the

Pohnpeians only when they needed labor or more religious converts. I think one reason large numbers of Pohnpeians converted to Catholicism was because the Spanish would more readily protect them from their hostile neighbors if they were Catholics rather than Protestants.

The Germans

Spain lost its Micronesian possessions after the Spanish-American war. The United States acquired Guam (and the Philippines) and Germany purchased the Northern Marianas, the Marshalls, and the Carolines. German administration centers were set up at Saipan, Palau, Yap, Truk, Jaluit, and Pohnpei (Ashby 1983:36).

Unlike Spain, Germany had a plan for the islands. The German administration wanted to establish sources of raw materials in Micronesia and use the islands as markets for finished German goods. In the beginning, the current Pohnpeian social structure was left unchanged and both Catholicism and Protestantism was encouraged. Even the American missionaries removed by the Spanish were allowed to return.

Later, the German administration invoked various social reforms in an attempt to create the best environment possible for economic development. The five main chiefs were convinced to stop warfare among themselves, brothels were closed, and alcoholic beverages were forbidden for

Pohnpeians. An attempt to have the Pohnpeians give up their firearms met with less success. In return, the Germans dismantled the Spanish fortifications and eliminated armed guards around the administration complex.

During the early years of the German administration, life on Pohnpei was tranquil. The religious warfare that had occurred earlier was not evident and conflict between the Pohnpeians and the German administration was low. But this changed. A new German administrator, Victor Berg, who replaced Dr. Albert Hahl in 1901, decided that German was to be the only foreign language taught in the schools. Since the schools were run by either American missionaries or German Capuchin priests, who had replaced the Spanish Capuchins in 1905, the Protestant Americans were at a disadvantage. The American missionaries were replaced in 1907 by German Lutheran missionaries (Fischer 1970:49). Later attempts by Catholics to expand in Uh and Madolenihmw, the main Protestant strongholds, were resented by Pohnpeians in those chiefdoms. The Pohnpeians' resentment of foreign rule began to build.

In 1905, the worst typhoon in recorded Pohnpeian history hit the island (Ashby 1983:37). Two hundred and fifty people were killed, crops and houses were destroyed, and nearly all the livestock on the island died. The German administrator was faced with the problem of how to best distribute government food stores to the Pohnpeians. He

decided he would solve two of his problems with one solution and declared that government food stores would only be exchanged for firearms and ammunition. The Germans offered the Pohnpeians four sacks of rice (56 pounds per sack) or 20 dozen salmon and 20 dozen corned beef for each gun, and 10 pfennigs for each cartridge (Fischer 1970:49). In the beginning, only old guns were exchanged, resulting in 254 guns and 1532 rounds of ammunition turned in to the Germans. The Pohnpeians obviously did not trust the Germans; word spread that the Germans would attack the Pohnpeians once all of the guns were turned in. The Germans countered by saying that hunting weapons could be obtained by paying a license fee. As food remained in short supply, more weapons were exchanged. Within 3 months, 545 rifles and 3998 rounds of ammunition had been turned in to the Germans (Fischer 1970:49). Considering that the population of Pohnpeians was only about 3700, this was one gun for every six people, or roughly one rifle for every adult male on the island.

The German administrator, Victor Berg, died in 1907, shortly after excavating some bones at the sacred city of Nan Madol. The new administrator, a man named Fritz, arrived on Pohnpei in April, 1908. Fritz was a veteran of the Marianas district and had some definite ideas about how to organize the Pohnpeians for the Germans' benefit. The most important of Fritz's new directives was to end the traditional tribute given to high-ranking chiefs, in order

to stimulate commercial agriculture. He also imposed a requirement that all able-bodied males contribute 15 days of labor for civil projects, most notably a road construction project. Fritz's new labor rule was simply a means for the Germans to receive free labor for their own projects. In addition, Fritz implemented a management plan for planting and harvesting of coconut trees. The new plan was supposed to stimulate the copra trade on Pohnpei. The implementation of these new directives led to an increased level of conflict and resentment between the Pohnpeians and Germans.

Fischer (1970:50) says that many Pohnpeians preferred the traditional tribute given to the chiefs to the new road construction, and opposed the plan on those grounds. Other Pohnpeians had different ambitions.

Henry Nanpei and his followers still wanted to set up an elected congress on Pohnpei, but before they could establish a congress, they had to destroy the traditional power base of the chiefs. Some of Nanpei's followers, therefore, were in favor of the German policies that limited the chiefs' power over their people. On the other hand, Nanpei opposed the new road construction because he felt it would give the Germans easy access to Kitti, thus forcing him to stop his trade in contraband with unlicensed whaling vessels and Japanese ships (Fischer 1970:50).

The Pohnpeians' attitudes toward the German administration were motivated by resentment of foreign rule,

opposition to the road building, the religious conflict, and old indigenous political feuds (Fischer 1970:50). In the case of some of the leaders, personal greed could be added to the list. For example, Henry Nanpei and a Kitti noble, the Soun Kitti, had a dispute over who owned Ant Atoll. According to the traditional system of land tenure and religion on Pohnpei, the rank of high priest of the goddess Nahnluhk was connected with the title of Soun Kitti and the ownership of Ant. The introduction of Christianity eclipsed the goddess Nahnluhk, but the title to Ant remained with the Soun Kitti. Nanpei denied the claim of the Soun Kitti, and backed up his own claim with documents from the Spanish Governor Pidal of August 13, 1896, giving him sole possession of Ant. This was further strengthened by the German administrator Dr. Hahl on December 16, 1899. Both governors based their decision on a document held by Nanpei's father, the Nahnken of Kitti (Fischer 1970:51). In order to further his own ends, Nanpei tried to play all sides. Nanpei sent messengers to the governor telling him of the resentment to the road building project, hoping that this would draw attention away from his quarrel with the Soun Kitti, as well as stop the road which could potentially end his off-island contraband and weapons trading. In the process he hoped to appear as a friend of the German administration by offering wise advice (Fischer 1970:51).

In 1908, the Soun Kitti suffered an attack on his land and plants and homes were destroyed. Nanpei allegedly instigated the attack. Afterwards, Nanpei and the Nahnken of Kitti wrote to the German governor asking that all Catholics be removed from Kitti so that peace could be established in the area. This request included the removal of the Soun Kitti, who was a Catholic.

Whatever the reason, the new rules of the German administration caused increased tension between the Germans and the Pohnpeians, and the latter became very resentful. On August 15, 1908 Fritz telegraphed the Condor, reported that "Ponape threatens unrest" (Fischer 1970:52) and asked for help. Help arrived on September 2, in the form of 100 Melanesian troops, and the arrival of the German ship Jaguar on October 15. Also in September, Dr. Hahl arrived and told Fritz that all of the trouble was due to the fight for Ant Atoll by the Soun Kitti and Henry Nanpei.

After a year and a half, Fritz was transferred to Yap with none of the problems on Pohnpei resolved. His successor, Gustav Boeder, kept Fritz's policies and added his own arrogant, authoritarian attitude (Fischer 1970:52; Ashby 1983:38).

On April 6, 1910, Boeder ordered that work should commence on a road around Sokehs designed to eventually link up with a road that went around the entire island (the Spanish had not been able to complete theirs). Naturally,

forced labor was to be used, and the Pohnpeians, as well as the Mokilese and the Pingelapese who had moved to Pohnpei after the 1905 typhoon, were once again displeased. As if the forced labor were not enough, one of the German overseers had a mistress from another area of Pohnpei who "lorded it over" the people of Sokehs (Fischer 1970:52). A rebellion was planned by the people of Sokehs, but the Germans learned of the plan and stopped the uprising before it got started.

After the stopped rebellion, Boeder added the policy of corporal punishment for a variety of offenses. One of the new punishments most resented by the Pohnpeians was the shaving of prisoners' heads, because the act of touching another's head was considered a serious insult. When a Kitti man was put in prison and his head was shaved, many Pohnpeians felt that blood revenge on Boeder by the man's relatives was the only response (Fischer 1970:53). Tension between the Germans and the Pohnpeians increased.

The only large German ship in the harbor, the steamer Germania, left Pohnpei at this time and no ship was due to call at the island for seven weeks. A chief on Sokehs named Soumatau, knowing a ship was not due to arrive at Pohnpei for some time, led a work stoppage on the new road on October 18, 1910. Boeder was informed and he set off for Sokehs, refusing an escort of soldiers. Immediately upon arriving on the Sokehs side of the channel, Boeder, his

secretary, two servants, and four Mortlockese men from the boat crew, were shot dead. In addition, two German overseers of the road construction project were killed when they tried to escape (Fischer 1970:55).

The senior administrator, Dr. Girschner, quickly learned of Boeder's fate. Just like the American whalers 70 years earlier, Girschner realized that with only 100 soldiers at his disposal, he would require the help of other Pohnpeians if he hoped to put down the rebellion. He also wanted to avoid the fate of the Spanish governor, Posadillo, who had been killed by the Pohnpeians in 1887 (Fischer 1970:39). The Germans sent messages to Uh, Net, Madolenihmw, and Kitti, asking the Pohnpeians for help. The response must have been gratifying for the Germans: 500 Pohnpeians showed up to help the Germans, against an estimated 250 insurgents on Sokehs (Ashby 1983:40). Net, Uh, and Madolenihmw sent help immediately, but Kitti, allegedly due to pressure from Henry Nanpei who advised against helping the Germans, appeared three days after the request for help was sent to them (Fischer 1970:55). The Germans armed each of the Pohnpeians with a machete, and passed out 100 rifles and ammunition to their new allies (Fischer 1970:55). The town of Kolonia was blockaded by the rebels, but the Germans hoped to contain the rebels on Sokehs island and limit their movement. For their part, the

rebels had free movement on Sokehs, and in Palikir on the main island.

The Germans, with their 100 Melanesian soldiers and their new Pohnpeian allies, could have easily defeated the Sokehs rebels within days of the start of the uprising, except that many Pohnpeians throughout the island were in sympathy with the people of Sokehs, and according to Pohnpeian folk history, some of the Pohnpeians who were ostensibly allied with the Germans were smuggling arms and ammunition to the rebels (Fischer 1970:56). Many Pohnpeians are said to have asked the Germans what they would have done if the Pohnpeians had not come to their aid. Given the history of Pohnpeian politics, the Germans' Pohnpeian allies may have been there as much to get rid of the Sokehs people, as they were there for any liking of the German administration, especially given the ill-feeling spawned by the German labor and punishment policies. Whatever the Pohnpeians' motive, the Germans were glad to have them, even though it did mean that they had to feed and house 500 extra people for the 40 days remaining until the return of the Germania.

The Germania returned to Pohnpei on November 26, and immediately set sail for Rabaul to pick up reinforcements. The Planet was dispatched from Rabaul to Pohnpei with 42 troops and on December 5, the Germania returned with 50 Melanesian troops. On December 13, the steamer Siar arrived

at Pohnpei with 70 troops. With the arrival of the Siar, the Germans allowed their Pohnpeian allies to leave Kolonia and their duties were taken over by the newly arrived soldiers. Three more warships arrived in quick succession; Cormoran on December 20, and the Emden and Nurnberg on January 10, 1911, along with more troops (Ashby 1983:40).

On January 13, the warships shelled rebel positions on Sokehs island. After the shelling, the western side of Sokehs island was assaulted by 100 Melanesian troops. The Melanesians succeeded in taking the summit with the help of reinforcements. The shelling and subsequent assault of Sokehs island brought an end to the main part of the rebellion, but fighting continued for another month. A rebuilt Spanish fort, used by the rebels for defense, was attacked on January 26, and the resistance of the rebels who remained on Sokehs island became confused and sporadic. The fighting came to an end due to the rebel's fatigue and their lack of supplies (Ashby 1983:41). Soumatau, the chief who started the uprising, surrendered on February 11, after which only 30 rebels remained at large. On February 23, the Germans regained complete control, four months after Boeder was killed. This was the last uprising against a foreign government on Pohnpei.

As punishment for the rebellion, on February 24, 1911, the Germans executed 17 men believed to have taken part in the death of Boeder. Nearly the entire population of Sokehs

and Palikir had their land confiscated, and 426 people were exiled to Palau. They were later allowed to return during the Japanese administration, but their land was gone because the new German district administrator, Dr. Heinrich Kersting, had given the Sokehs and Palikir land to immigrants from Mokil, Pingelap, and Ngatik, who had come to Pohnpei after the 1905 typhoon. In addition, land was given to a group of Mortlockese who had come to Pohnpei after a typhoon in 1907. As a result of these land transfers about 1250 people were resettled on Sokehs and in Palikir (Ashby 1983:42).

During the remaining three years of the German administration, Kersting instituted a new system of land tenure that guaranteed private and continuous ownership of land by Pohnpeians throughout the island. According to the new land tenure system, inheritance was to be carried out through the patrilineal line and there was to be guaranteed access to land by all family members. All land sales were forbidden unless approved by the German administration, and in order to stimulate copra production, ten coconut trees per month were to be planted by each landholder, along with any other crops thought necessary by the German administration. For the most part, the new land tenure system was to the benefit of the general populace of the island, especially commoners. The new system did, however, put a stop to the traditional

system of inheritance, and limited the power of chiefs over land in their area.

Pohnpei has had a diverse population throughout its history. There have been numerous times when part of that population would align itself with a foreign ruler against other Pohnpeians. Most notable of these incidents were once in 1836 when 400 Pohnpeians allied themselves with the whalers in an attack against the Nahnken of Madolenihmw, and again in 1898 when Henry Nanpei led an attack against the Catholics at Awak and the Spanish came to the Catholics aid. I believe one possible explanation for this behavior might be based on the claim of the German anthropologist, Hambruch, who said he discovered a secret society on Pohnpei during his work on Pohnpei in the late 1800s, dedicated to the overthrow of foreign rule and the return of Pohnpei to Pohnpeians (Fischer 1970:53). Hambruch claimed this society had been in place for ten years and had members all over Pohnpei, including Soumatau of Sokehs, who had initially planned the first rebellion that was stopped by the Germans. The American anthropologist, Bascom, apparently favored the idea that the new corporal punishment policy was the cause of what later came to be known as the Sokehs Rebellion, but Fischer says that a pan-island secret society with political goals was possible, given the experience of the early American administration after World War II.

I think it is evident from the historical record that even if there was not an actual group of people who worked together to overthrow foreign administrations, there were numerous individuals who worked toward that goal in their own way, all across the island. Fischer (1970:54) states that Pohnpeians are reluctant to talk about the Sokehs Rebellion with foreigners, but this has obviously changed over the years. During several conversations I had while on Pohnpei, people expressed pride that not only had a relative of theirs been a part of the action, but also that the rebellion had happened at all. The current municipality of Sokehs has an annual Sokehs Rebellion Day with athletic events and feasting to commemorate the event.

The Japanese

Japan declared war on Germany at the beginning of World War I and immediately seized the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas islands. Almost immediately after taking control of the islands, Japan expelled most of the foreign traders and missionaries (Fischer 1970:59; Ashby 1983:44). The Japanese divided the area into 5 districts: Pohnpei, Truk, the Marshalls, Palau, and the Marianas. A separate district for Yap was created a few months later (Fischer 1970:59).

The Japanese government gave the Nanyo Boeki Company a trade monopoly for the area which it retained throughout the thirty years the Japanese were in control of Micronesia. In

addition, other companies were formed for specific purposes (Fischer 1970:59). In 1918, the Japanese formed a Civil Administration department to handle the affairs of the local Micronesians (Fischer 1970:59).

At the end of World War I in 1920, the Japanese legally gained control over Micronesia at the Versailles Peace Conference. During the peace conference, Japan received the secret consent of Great Britain, France, and Russia to annex all of the German islands north of the equator. The Americans objected to this secret arrangement, so the League of Nations gave Japan a "Class C" mandate instead of allowing Japan to annex the islands (Fischer 1970:60). The League of Nations imposed several conditions upon Japan in the mandate, including the conditions that mission activity was to be allowed to take place and Japan would not be allowed to fortify the islands. In order to meet the condition of allowing mission activity, Japan established and subsidized Congregational Protestant missions on Pohnpei in 1920 (Fischer 1970:60). In 1921, Spanish Jesuits took over the work of the expelled German Capuchins. In order to meet the condition concerning fortification of the islands, a military withdrawal was begun in 1920 and completed by 1922 (Ashby 1983:45), the same year the transfer of administrative duties to civilians was completed (Fischer 1970:60). Japan's original plan for the islands was to use them as settlement areas to accommodate an expanding population of

Japanese in Japan, and to provide many natural resources needed for Japan's economy. To this end, the civilian government arranged government subsidies for the Nippon Yusen Company to cover shipping costs between the islands and Japan, and to Nanyo Boeki for shipping between the administrative centers and the outlying islands (Fischer 1970:60). In 1923, the Japanese administrative government began to give Micronesian leaders annual government subsidized tours of Japan. By 1927, hospitals had been built at all of the administrative centers (Fischer 1970:61).

Between 1920 and 1935, Japan's focus on Pohnpei was on agriculture. A new facility was built in 1926 that replaced the existing German agricultural station (Ashby 1983:45). The facility, called the Tropical Industries Research Institute, was staffed with experts from universities and government, and had departments of agriculture, livestock, and forestry. The building that housed the Institute survived the bombing during World War II and still stands today.

Pohnpei was known as a prime agricultural island, and the Japanese administration's efforts through the Institute made the island almost self-supporting in produce products, such as pumpkins, squash, pineapples, papaya, sugar cane, watermelon, onions, cucumbers, beans, rice, egg plant, and coffee (Ashby 1983:45). The Japanese also introduced tomatoes, green peppers, okra, spinach, cabbage, lettuce,

parsley, water cress, turnips, radishes, carrots, peas, peanuts, and soy beans (Ashby 1983:45). Several truck gardens were started in the Palikir area as well.

In addition to the work of the Institute, the Japanese took control of nearly 10,000 acres of land, on which they managed the production of coconut trees, sweet potatoes, vegetables, and rice (Ashby 1983:45). In 1930, the Nanyo Boeki Company started a copra processing plant, and before World War II, about 3,000 tons were shipped annually. In 1934, the Japanese built a plant to process manioc and tapioca flour in Madolenihmw, along with a sugar mill to process locally grown sugar cane for export back to Japan. Later, this plant was converted to produce alcohol for the war effort (Ashby 1983:45). Some Pohnpeians apparently did not want to sell their land to the Japanese for this plant, and pressure was applied by company officials and the local police chief. Nothing happened to the protesting landowners, however, other than losing their land (Fischer 1970:61).

By 1932, because of the rapid growth in the Japanese population on Pohnpei, the Japanese administrative government established a town council for the town of Kolonia in order to manage the local needs of the new Japanese residents (Fischer 1970:61).

At about the same time, the Japanese began harbor construction that had potential military value. In response to

formal inquiries from the League of Nations, Japan formally denied that any of the islands were being fortified (Fischer 1970:61).

In 1936, the Japanese completed the Nanpil Dam on Pohnpei, a hydroelectric project designed to provide water and electricity for Kolonia (Fischer 1970:62). In order to protect the dam's watershed, the Japanese designated the forest above the dam off-limits to logging. Logging had become a profitable enterprise for some Pohnpeians and Japanese individuals, and it was at this time that the Japanese started a reforestation program on Pohnpei (Fischer 1970:62).

During this fifteen year period, the bulk of the Japanese administration effort was directed to these and other economic activities. In an effort to incorporate the Pohnpeians into the work force, the Japanese offered Pohnpeian children aged eight years or older the chance for three years of schooling at one of six elementary schools established on the island (Ashby 1983:46). For the brighter students, two additional years were sometimes offered. This contrasts with the six year course given to Japanese students, with two additional years for the brighter ones (Ashby 1983:46). In 1935, a policy of mandatory attendance for all students within walking distance of a school was implemented. Also, the Japanese no longer allowed parochial school attendance to be a substitute for public school

attendance (Fischer 1970:61). By 1937, 70% of the eligible Pohnpeian children were attending school during at least part of the year (Ashby 1983:47).

After Japanese government leaders received international criticism in 1935 for Japan's invasion of Manchuria, they withdrew their country from the League of Nations. In 1936, the Japanese government closed Micronesia to all non-Japanese shipping, and military needs took precedence over all other interests in Micronesia. With the start of Japan's war with China in 1937, Japan directed all of its economic activities in Micronesia toward the war effort. The Japanese took land for airstrips and military facilities (Ashby 1983:47) and an increased number of Japanese were sent to the islands. By the beginning of World War II, there was over twice as many Japanese as Micronesians in Micronesia (Ashby 1983:47).

Pohnpei fared better than some of the islands during the war, but it was not without hardships. There were shortages of everything, and infant mortality increased due to inadequate medical care (Ashby 1983:47). Some Pohnpeians were conscripted for forced labor; 200 Pohnpeians were sent to work on other islands. Twenty Pohnpeians were drafted into the Japanese army to fight in Rabaul in July, 1942. Of these draftees, twelve were killed, five were taken prisoner, two returned to Pohnpei in 1943, and one is still unaccounted for (Ashby 1983:47).

American bombers and submarines stopped most of the flow of food and troops to the Micronesian islands in 1944, which forced the Japanese to rely on local produce to feed their soldiers. The Japanese military took possession of breadfruit trees, coconuts, and other food crops owned by the Pohnpeians. Many of the coconut trees were eventually destroyed because soldiers removed the heart of palm for use as a vegetable (Fischer 1970:63). Many more coconut trees were lost when large areas of coconut groves were cleared for sweet potato gardens and for lumber that was used in fortifications. When the American military forces stopped the flow of supplies into the islands, they also stopped the export of fish, copra, and other products. Consequently, the Japanese administration diverted all the local Pohnpeian labor to military construction work.

The Japanese fortified Pohnpei with twenty guns of different sizes and types, and mined some of the harbors. The Japanese constructed two airfields on Pohnpei, one before the war, and one after the war started. This second airfield was built in only 16 days by 100 Japanese construction workers and 820 Pohnpeians. The pre-war constructed airfield was inadequate for military use, except by very slow planes. The other airfield was used only once by the Japanese before it was put out of action by American bombing raids (Ashby 1983:49). The Japanese also had a complete seaplane base on Langar, one of the small reef islands which

surround Pohnpei. On February 12, 1944, this seaplane base was used by six Japanese flying boats from Saipan on a highly destructive bombing raid on American forces on Roi Namur at Kwajalein atoll. Later in the month, American bombers destroyed the seaplane base (Ashby 1983:49). The Americans reconstructed part of the base and used it as a seaplane facility. Other than ships, seaplanes were the only form of transportation to Pohnpei until the runway on Takatik island was completed in 1970.

By 1944, the American strategy of island-hopping was in full swing. Pohnpei, however, was bypassed by American landing forces during the war because American military officials felt there was too much rainfall for an adequate air base, and the terrain of the island made it difficult to land troops (Ashby 1983:48). Yet the Americans felt Pohnpei was along the path of potential Japanese bombing raids, like the one conducted against Roi Namur, so the American military decided to destroy as much of the island's offensive capability as possible. On February 15, 1944, forty-two B-24 Liberator bombers attacked Pohnpei. American bombers attacked twice more, on February 17 and February 20, followed by two attacks with incendiary bombs on the 22nd and 26th. In all, 118 tons of high explosive and 6000 incendiary bombs were dropped on targets on Pohnpei. The principal targets of the American bombing raids were the seaplane base on Langar, and the two airstrips on the main

island. The bombing destroyed all three of the principal targets and leveled the town of Kolonia. Since the Japanese normally kept Pohnpeians away from the military facilities, Pohnpeian casualties during the war were light (Ashby 1983:50).

The Americans continued to conduct bombing raids on Pohnpei throughout the rest of 1944. On May 1, 1944, six American battleships, along with their escorts, stationed themselves off the northern coast of the island and for seventy minutes shelled the Japanese gun positions. The ships were not damaged by the Japanese guns.

As the American military forces advanced closer to the main islands of Japan, the bombing raids on Pohnpei became more regular, but less intense. Fishermen were able to adjust their activities to the timing of the bombing raids and went to sea immediately after the planes left, knowing they would not be back for at least several days, and probably not for several weeks (Ashby 1983:50).

The Japanese forces on Pohnpei surrendered one month after the official surrender of Japan. At the time of the surrender, there were 5805 Japanese army troops, 2005 Japanese sailors, 5679 Japanese civilians, and 5864 Micronesians on Pohnpei (Ashby 1983:54).

While Pohnpeians fought the American whalers, and the Spanish, and German administrators, they showed little resistance to the Japanese, either before or after the war.

This was due in part to the overwhelming numbers of Japanese nationals present on the island (Fischer 1970:64). The Japanese were also quick to punish offenders of their rules, and discipline was very strict. Many Pohnpeians who experienced life under the Japanese administration have stories about people who were beaten or otherwise harshly punished for seemingly minor offenses. There were no uprisings by Pohnpeians, as there had been during the Spanish and German administrations, although there were a few mysterious deaths of Japanese military personnel during the war (Fischer 1970:64). The Pohnpeians seem to have stayed out of the way the best they could, cooperating with the Japanese when they had no other alternative, and waited for the war to end.

The American Period

The Americans gained control over Micronesia after Japan's surrender at the end of World War II. Almost immediately, two policy positions on the future of the islands became prominent in U.S. government planning. The first policy position favored annexation, which would have made Micronesia a formal part of the United States. This included the possibility that at some unspecified future time, Micronesia might be given territory, and later, statehood status. In the Atlantic Charter, however, the U.S. was committed to reject all territorial claims

resulting from wartime victories. The second policy position focused on the United States' postwar national security interests, which depended on maintaining control over the central and western Pacific. The two alternatives on what to do with Micronesia (and its residents) created conflict between the U.S. political and military objectives (H.R. Report 99-188, Part 2:154; Nufer 1978:42-45; Gale 1979:52-61).

At the San Francisco Conference on April 25, 1945, the U.S. sponsored a proposal to place Micronesia under the International Trusteeship system. However, the initial submission of the draft was delayed due to difficulties between the Department of State, which opposed annexation, and the military, supported by Congress, which was afraid that American strategic interests would be placed in jeopardy if U.S. military use of the islands was subject to a Soviet veto (Gale 1979:59-60). A subcommittee of the Senate Naval Affairs committee, composed of Senators Byrd of Virginia, Eastland of Mississippi, Tobey of New Hampshire and Capehart of Indiana, went to San Francisco to enforce the military's interests in the islands (Murray 1957:36). Many congressmen and military officials felt the U.S. had paid for the islands with the blood of its soldiers. These officials were reluctant to compromise on the issue of the strategic importance of the islands to U.S. national security (Pomeroy 1951:xix; Gale 1979:48).

In November, 1946, on receiving assurances the U.S. would control any draft trusteeship agreement (Gale 1979:60), President Truman made the decision to submit to the U.N. Security Council a trusteeship agreement under which Japan's League of Nations mandate in the Pacific would be administered by the U.S.. The proposal was submitted to the Security Council on February 26, 1947. Despite the Soviet Union's objections, the agreement was approved on April 2, 1947. The agreement was then submitted to the U.S. Congress, which on July 18, 1947 passed a Joint Resolution (61 Stat. 397) authorizing the President to approve the agreement on behalf of the U.S.. Truman's approval was given at once and the agreement went into force that day, making Micronesia the only strategic United Nations trusteeship (de Smith 1970:131).

There was a reason for Truman's and the U.S. Congress's haste in determining Micronesia's political status. In the summer of 1946, the U.S. military began setting up a base at Bikini Atoll in the Marshalls. This was the beginning of atomic testing,[1] and the military brought along two bombs, ninety battleships, some aircraft carriers, and assorted submarines.[2] On July 1, 1946, the first of the nuclear devices, code named Crossroads-Able, went off, and on July 25, the second device, Crossroads-Baker, went off (Miller 1986:75-79). There would be 66 such tests in the Marshall

Islands before the end of above ground nuclear testing in 1963 (H.R. Report 99-188, Part 2:134).[3]

The military and the scientists who worked for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) wanted Bikini Atoll for their tests because the search for a continental test site had not yet begun,[4] so Truman approved the Trust Territory Agreement quickly. What is surprising is that the Soviets agreed to the Trust Territory agreement without formal debate in the Security Council (despite having raised objections outside the formal structure of the U.N.). The Soviets even expressed unqualified approval of the general principles of the agreement (de Smith 1970:129-130)--before the first nuclear testing activity at Bikini Atoll.

The Navy

After the Trust Territory was established, the administration of Micronesia was turned over to the United States Navy. The Navy organized a military government for Micronesia, and Truman appointed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as the first military governor. Even prior to the end of World War II, there seemed to be little doubt in the minds of the American military commanders that the United States would win its war with Japan. As early as 1942, both the Army and the Navy began training programs for "military government officers." The Army's school was located at the University of Virginia, and the Navy's at Columbia

University (Richard 1957, v.1:7-8). A total of 347 officers completed the Navy's training program between August, 1942 and December, 1944. All the successful graduates were commissioned into the Naval Reserve, and 66 of the officers received M.A. degrees for their academic work (Richard 1957, v.1:47). Later, the Navy started a second program at Princeton University, and smaller training programs were conducted at other schools around the country (Gale 1979:64). By the end of the training programs, 1,414 officers had received formal training in military government, 1,333 of them at Princeton and Columbia (Richard 1957, v.1:53).

The initial contact between Americans and Micronesians living in the islands came before the defeat of the Japanese forces. During 1943 and 1944, a few Marshallese acted as spies for the Americans in the Marshall Islands. The group included Dwight Heine, later to become prominent in Micronesian politics and the Trust Territory administration. Some of these Marshallese spies were caught by the Japanese and executed, including Dwight Heine's grandfather (Nufer 1978:39).

After the war, the Navy found that people's lives had become totally disrupted on all of the islands in Micronesia. The Navy had the impression that there was no law on the islands while law enforcement was under the control of the Japanese forces. Navy administrators saw no

evidence that an indigenous system of laws had ever been developed, other than that dictated by "custom." After the removal of all Japanese governmental officials and employees to Japan, the remainder of the Japanese nationals in the islands were placed into camps and held as prisoners of war, rather than being held as civilian prisoners. The Japanese police forces were replaced with Micronesian police forces, and the Japanese courts were replaced with military courts. Crimes committed by Micronesians were judged by traditional chiefs, with sentences limited to no more than one year of imprisonment and 100 dollar fines, unless approval was given by the military governor (Richard 1957, v.1:246-250).

In an effort to establish some kind of organization for the military government, the Navy used "civil administration units" for each of the six districts: the Marianas, Yap, Palau, Truk, Pohnpei, and the Marshalls. Each unit was assigned 12 Naval officers and 50 enlisted personnel. One of the officers was appointed as the civil administrator and another was appointed as his deputy. The High Commissioner was placed in overall control of Micronesia and had his headquarters located at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (Richard 1957, v.3:157).

Micronesians who had some proficiency in English were used as interpreters by the Navy. Others, primarily in the Marianas, were given paramilitary training and served in

limited capacities with the United States military forces based on Saipan (Nufer 1978:40).

Despite having a structure for the new civil administration of the Trust Territory, the Navy administration of Micronesia was primarily conducted without a comprehensive plan that was applicable to all of the islands (Gale 1979:66). There were two reasons for this. The Navy had training programs on military governments in place for several years, but the Navy commanders only sent out vague guidelines about how to set up governments on the various islands, and how to deal with any traditional political structures that might exist. Individual administrators were left largely on their own to deal with these issues (Richard 1957, v.2:78). This led to abuses of power such as the example of the judge on Saipan:

> . . . who had never practiced law or served as a judge in civil life. His general approach was rather like that of a young prosecuting attorney interested in a good record of convictions.
>
> He had constructed a dock in which the silent defendants stood, waiting their turn before his desk. The judge would ask if the defendant had heard the charges. The defendant would give a short bow and say yes. Then the judge would say, 'Didn't you know it was wrong to do so and so?' The defendant always replied yes. So the judge would fine him, say $20 and give him $15 and five days. No witnesses were brought in to verify or refute the charges. No record was made of testimony. Right to counsel existed by convention only, since the judge could rather easily talk anyone out of it (Gale 1979:68).

The Navy's second reason for not having an all-encompassing plan for the Trust Territory would hamper U.S. and Micronesian political development efforts in years to come. The islands making up the Trust Territory were lumped together in one unit as if they were inhabited by people who just happened to be spread out over three million square miles of water. But they were not from the same culture. There were at least nine unique languages, half a dozen major cultural forms, and three different colonial administration histories present in Micronesia. It is somewhat surprising that the Navy administration did not pay more attention to these differences between the island groups, or understand more about existing island life and the various social structures present in Micronesia, because the Navy spent considerable time and effort in the training of its military government officers. The Navy was also responsible for one of the largest and most comprehensive anthropology projects in modern times: the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA).

Before CIMA, in 1941, anthropologists were joined by other social scientists (primarily political scientists), and hundreds of students, as military government officers. As naval officers, anthropologists served as information gatherers, as trainers and educators of military officials, and as field investigators (Gale 1979:74). Also in 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Yale University's

Cross-Cultural Survey, directed by George Murdock and funded by the Carnegie Corporation, was directed toward collecting and analyzing information on Micronesia (Richard 1957, v.1:50). In 1942, the Navy concluded that the work would not be completed in time to meet the planned Micronesian island invasion schedule, so the project was taken over by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Early in 1943, George Murdock was commissioned as a Naval Intelligence officer to produce a series of Civil Affairs Handbooks on Micronesia. These volumes later served as guides for the military government officers being trained at Columbia and Princeton (Richard 1957, v.1:50-51). One former District Administrator is quoted as saying the handbooks were a "very well done piece of work" (Nufer 1978:38), although Gale (1979:74) is critical of the work as being nothing but translations of existing Japanese documents.

In 1946, Felix Keesing, one of the few anthropologists who had specialized in the Pacific before World War II, was named as associate director and coordinator of studies for the training of Navy administrators at Stanford's School of Naval Administration (Richard 1957, v.2:151). Keesing proposed five areas of instruction that were later expanded into fifteen courses. These five areas covered Micronesia and its people, language, civil and colonial administration, the islands and their place in global society, and policies and programs of island administration and how to implement

them (Richard 1957, v.2:154-159). The training concentrated on local problem solving, rather than on a more general organizational approach, and relied heavily on role-playing techniques (Keesing 1949; Richard 1957, v.2:159-160). Despite the comprehensiveness of the courses, some writers have criticized the overall effectiveness of the officers who went through the training, saying that staff were transferred too frequently for them to accomplish anything significant (Gale 1979:75).

Social scientists also worked with the United States Commercial Company (USCC) before the CIMA program began. The USCC was a government corporation involved with economic rehabilitation and planning in the islands prior to the formation of the Trust Territory (Gale 1979:75). The resultant report (Oliver 1971) was originally published by Harvard in 1949.[5] The report called for a comprehensive program to raise the level of economic development in Micronesia to a point where household incomes would be equal to what they had been during the Japanese administration. The report also showed that Micronesians had become used to imported goods and that they would not be satisfied with returning to an isolated existence.

Whether or not the Navy was happy with the work of Douglas Oliver or the report he edited (Gale 1979:76), a plan was put together for a much more extensive use of anthropologists in Micronesia. Oliver's report presented a

number of recommendations for economic development in the islands, but the Navy felt they needed information about other areas, and the application of that information to problems encountered in administration (Richard 1957, v.3:571). In 1946, the Navy began discussions with members of the National Research Council on the possibility of future scientific investigations in Micronesia. The result of these discussions was the establishment of the Pacific Science Board, designed "to aid the scientists of America who wish to engage in scientific investigation for which there is a need in the Pacific area, to advise Governmental and other Agencies on scientific matters pertaining to the Pacific, and to further international cooperation in the field of Pacific Science" (Richard 1957, v.3:574). Both Murdock and Oliver were members of this advisory group. It was this group of academic advisors that later established the CIMA program (Richard 1957, v.3:576).

On December 26, 1946, the Navy formally requested the National Research Council to undertake an anthropological research program in Micronesia. On January 11, 1947, the Council accepted the proposal and formed CIMA. George Murdock was placed in charge of the program (Richard 1957, v.3:576).

Forty-two scientists were originally part of the CIMA program, including 35 anthropologists, 4 linguists, and 3 geographers. These scientists came from twenty different

universities and museums; one was from the University of Sydney in Australia. Some were established scholars, others were predoctoral students. Many have become "anthropology household" names, such as Homer Barnett, Kenneth Emory, Thomas Gladwin, Ward Goodenough, William Lessa, George Murdock, Saul Riesenberg, Alexander Spoehr, David Schneider, and John Useem (Richard 1957, v.3:577). The first CIMA members arrived in Micronesia in July, 1947, and the last ones left in January, 1949. The average stay of the CIMA scientists was six to seven months (Richard 1957, v.3:578). One direct result of their work was the establishment of the staff position of District Anthropologist, a position where 25% of the time was allocated to the anthropologist's own studies (Richard 1957, v.3:578).

The CIMA program has been described as "most satisfactory" (Richard 1957, v.3:582) and the results of the various studies were of great worth not only to the Navy administration, but also to the anthropologists themselves. George Murdock said:

> The far-flung islands of the Trust Territory have a total land surface of less than 850 square miles, on which live about 70,000 native inhabitants. Prior to the last war, scientific knowledge of these people depended primarily upon a German expedition in 1908-10, supplemented by early explorer's accounts, scattered missionary reports, and a few leakages through the 'copper curtain' imposed by Japan. The available information was as inadequate for military and administrative purposes as for scientific purposes. This vacuum in knowledge has within half a decade, yielded to an abundance of detailed information

> perhaps unparalleled for any comparable area in the world. How this has been accomplished is a story of cooperation between civilian anthropologists and the United States Navy, charged first with the conduct of war and then with administrative responsibilities in the area which might well serve as a model for the collaboration of lay scientists and government agencies in a political democracy . . . (Richard 1957, v.3:582).

Murdock also pointed out several basic facts about Micronesia that would affect any political development efforts made in the region:

1) The Guamanians and the Chamorros of the other Marianas Islands form an indivisible cultural unit. That our administrative authority over them derives from different sources does not justify imposing serious restrictions upon communications, travel, and migration between them.

2) The inhabitants of the Marianas have had intimate contact with European civilization for some three hundred years, and have attained a level of culture comparable to that of the Filipinos. They are therefore ready for a maximum measure of self-government.

3) The inhabitants of the Caroline and Marshall islands are still primitive peoples in all essential respects. They are far indeed from being ready to accept our own complex legal and political institutions and make them work satisfactorily. Their traditional governments still operate reasonably well, and can be transformed into democracies in the modern sense only through a long evolutionary process.

4) The Caroline and Marshall Islanders are by no means homogeneous, but fall into a number of diverse cultural and linguistic groups with very different needs and aptitudes. The Palauans are progressive and eager to adopt Western ways. The Yapese are ultra conservative and deeply suspicious of foreigners. The Trukese desire material

> advantages but are satisfied with their traditional social structure. The Pohnpeians, the Kusaians, the Marshallese, and the Polynesian inhabitants of Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro reveal equally distinct and divergent attitudes and local cultures. An attempt to administer these varied groups according to a single inflexible formula would invite disaster. Legislation respecting them should be confined to establishing a neutral and humane over-all policy, allowing great latitude to local administrators in adapting that policy to variable needs and conditions (Richard 1957, v.3:582-583).

Not everyone involved with the CIMA program felt the results were worth the effort, and there were differences of opinion as to the effectiveness of the CIMA scientists in the policy decision making arena (Hall 1950; Gladwin 1950; Gale 1979:78). Nevertheless, the CIMA program produced a solid core of information about Micronesia, and most anthropologists working in Micronesia today can trace their intellectual "roots" to one of the original members of the CIMA program. Given the wealth (and bulk) of the information produced by anthropologists and other social scientists in these immediate post-war years, it would seem that social scientists should claim some of the responsibility for the poor record of U.S. administration in Micronesia.

Overall, the period of Navy administration in Micronesia was seen as a positive development by the Micronesians themselves. The last years of the Japanese administration were marked by harsh living conditions, forced labor, and occasional beatings. In contrast, the

Navy officers appeared friendly and helpful. In later years, Micronesians would remark that the years of the Navy administration were better than the current period of the Department of Interior administration (Nufer 1978:40-42).

> The people of Micronesia became accustomed to a new life-style, a style where everything was handed out free. Massive operations in the area by the United States Navy, accomplished with few worries over cost or logistic support, resulted in Micronesians' present fond memories of the military government (Heine 1974:5).

By 1948, the Navy had started the process of moving Micronesia towards a democratic system of government, and moving Micronesians into government positions. Although the Navy administration never officially said that self-government meant democracy (Richard 1957, v.3:385), the underlying philosophy was that any self-government structure should be similar to that of the United States (Meller 1969:23). With the Naval directive, "Municipal Governments and Local Taxation," each of 118 municipalities were allowed to make local rules for government, subject to the approval of the military government (Richard 1957, v.2:298). These municipalities were to be the "basic political units of the territorial government" (Hughes and Lingenfelter 1974:21). The chief executive of each municipality was the municipal magistrate, chosen either by popular election or appointed by the Navy's district administrator. Later, a legislative council was established for each municipality.

The Navy knew as early as 1945 that their administration of the islands was to be temporary (Richard 1957, v.2:149). In a letter dated February 11, 1948, President Truman directed the Department of the Interior to make plans to take over the administration of Micronesia (Nufer 1978:46). The transfer of administration took place on July 1, 1951. The Navy cooperated and the transition was smooth. Several experienced officers chose to stay in the islands and work for the Department of the Interior (Nufer 1978:41-42).

On January 1, 1953, the Navy regained control over Saipan and Tinian from the Department of the Interior. Each of these islands had existing military facilities, a fact that ostensibly provided a rational basis for the exchange, although the Navy went through an intensive 16 month lobbying effort to bring it about (Nufer 1978:49; Van Cleve 1974:9). The Navy placed a security restriction on the Northern Marianas from 1953 to 1962, a period during which no tourists were allowed on the Mariana islands, and no one without a "security pass" was allowed to travel to Saipan (Nufer 1978:50). Nufer implies that this political separation between the Marianas and the rest of the Trust Territory started the political split between the districts that would be culminated in the mid-1970s. He quotes one official as saying there were no ill feelings between the districts, but neither were there any grounds for

integration of the districts (Nufer 1978:50). In 1971, with the publication of the Pentagon Papers in the New York Times, it became known that the Navy had built a 28 million dollar facility for the CIA on Saipan. The facility was used to train Chinese Nationalists, and later in the early 1960s, South Vietnamese advisors (Shapiro 1972:10).

As part of the political infighting between the Navy and the Department of the Interior over the administration of Micronesia, the Department of the Interior said they could manage the Trust Territory for the same amount of money the Navy budgeted for its operations in the islands (Nufer 1978:51). This amount was about five million dollars per year, an amount that never varied much until the Kennedy administration. The lack of funds has always been cited as a major failing of the Department of the Interior's early years of administration effort (see for example de Smith 1970, Oliver 1971, Heine 1974, Hughes and Lingenfelter 1974, McHenry 1975, Nufer 1978, Gale 1979). In later years, Trust Territory officials were quoted as saying that the Navy spent more than five million dollars annually, taking into account the costs of using Navy planes, ships, and training operations as part of the operating costs of the administration (Nufer 1978:51). A more realistic figure for the Navy's expenditure is 25-30 million dollars annually (Nufer 1978:51).[6]

The Department of the Interior

The Department of the Interior was in charge of the administration of the Trust Territory for 25 years. In each of the three decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Department's policies changed according to the prevalent political feeling about Micronesia at the international level, as well as at the local level.

The 1950s. In 1954, the Department of the Interior moved the Trust Territory administrative headquarters from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to Guam. At the same time, two administration departments were moved to other islands; Public Health was located on Pohnpei, and Education on Truk (Nufer 1978:52). Publicly, the Department of the Interior policy was to have Micronesians appointed to positions of administrative responsibility in the Trust Territory government. In the Department's annual report for 1956 (Department of Interior 1956:337), this process was described as slow; it was also noted that Micronesians were appointed to government positions as soon as they were ready to take over the responsibilities. The first Micronesian appointed to such a position was a District Education Administrator, in 1955. In the same year, the Palau Congress was granted a charter, becoming the first district legislature in the Trust Territory (Nufer 1978:52).

In keeping with the U.S. policy to promote democratic government in Micronesia, the Trust Territory administration

actively worked to develop the local government sector throughout the 1950s. In the mid-1950s, Kolonia, Pohnpei, became the first chartered town in the Trust Territory. The municipalities established earlier (in 1948) became incorporated and served as a training ground for young Micronesians in the new political structure being established in the islands (Hughes 1970). In Palau, the Palau Congress was given control over the collection of taxes and establishment of a budget. Later, a district budget was established in a conference for municipality Magistrates (Nufer 1978:53). In 1952, the first territory-wide advisory meeting was held in Truk, attended by American officials and Micronesians chosen by the Trust Territory administration (Gale 1979:81). In 1957, the Trust Territory administration invited Micronesian leaders chosen by district congresses to a conference on Guam to discuss the political problems of the Trust Territory (Department of Interior 1957:362). In spite of these political development efforts, some writers have been quite critical of the efforts of the United States administration, saying, "Other than the chartering of municipalities . . . few advances were made during the 1950s toward advancing self-government beyond those steps already taken" (Gale 1979:81).

If political development in Micronesia was slow, then progress in other areas such as health and the economy was virtually nonexistent. There were two reasons for the lack

of development of Micronesia's health and economic resources during the 1950s. First, the United States government did not provide enough money to the Trust Territory administration to manage the Trust Territory and to reserve funds the administration needed for capital improvements and investments that would have made the Trust Territory economically self-sufficient. There was also a lack of skilled Micronesians who could advance and administer the economic development efforts, but as seen in the area of political development, the lack of personnel was rapidly changing. Second, the area of political development was just easier to oversee than economic development. Micronesians were familiar with the concept of politics, although some were more familiar with the political structure being imposed on them by the United States than others. The Navy's view that there was no law or political structure in the islands following World War II was an oversimplification made by people unfamiliar with the intricate political structures surrounding each islands' traditional leaders (McKnight 1974:52).[7] The Trust Territory was trying to generate successes that would appear favorable in their annual reports to the Department of the Interior, and even more importantly, to the United Nations. What the Trust Territory administration did not anticipate was the speed at which the Micronesians would take over the political structure for themselves.

The 1960s. By the mid-1950s, the first generation of American-educated students graduated from high school. Some went to work for the Trust Territory administration, while others continued their education by attending the University of Hawaii. During this early period of political change in Micronesia, command of the English language was often a high priority. The early graduates of the Pacific Islands Central School (PICS), located on Truk, were usually the only ones who had the necessary language skills needed to work for the Trust Territory government and were consequently appointed to the new government positions made available to the Micronesians by the American administration. Most of these new government workers came from low ranking families or clans on their home islands and they saw employment in the new government structure as a means to advance their social position in their home island social setting. At this time, the concept of a unified Micronesia was not widely understood or accepted by the general public, but these newly educated Micronesians had been exposed to the idea, along with other trappings of the West, through their teachers school. This made it easier for them to interact with the American administration officials.

In 1959, a few University of Hawaii students formed the "Micronesian Club," a group of students made up of young Micronesians who would later become some of the important political leaders in the Trust Territory.

The original Micronesian Club members were the start of what became a new Micronesian elite. The first members of this elite were distinguished from the traditional elites by their American-style education, their fluency in English, and the fact that most of them worked for the Trust Territory administration after finishing college. It was these Micronesian Club members who first questioned the Trust Territory administration's activities, goals, and plans for the islands. Most of the members of the group majored in political science, and by the early 1960s had graduated from college and returned to their home islands. Some of the Micronesian students campaigned for Kennedy in 1960, and all were self-identified Democrats and liberals (Nufer 1978:56).

Most of the original Micronesian Club members are still active in the politics of their respective countries today. The members included Dwight Heine, Bailey Olter, Bethwel Henry, Alfonso Oiterong, Oscar DeBrum, Leo Falcam, Tosiwo Nakayama, and Lazarus Salii.

There are many examples of the accomplishments of this distinguished group. Dwight Heine, an American spy during World War II, and grandson of a German copra trader, was the first Micronesian to become a District Administrator in the Trust Territory. Later, Heine was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Congress of Micronesia.

Alfonso Oiterong was among the first Micronesians to receive a master's degree and was the Director of Education in Palau for many years during the Trust Territory administration. Oiterong later became Vice-President of the Republic of Palau.

Tosiwo Nakayama, elected to the first session of the Congress of Micronesia, became the President of the Senate, served as President of the Constitutional Convention in 1975, and is currently President of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Oscar DeBrum served as a District Administrator in the Marshalls during the Trust Territory administration.

Leo Falcam, from Pohnpei, was an Executive Officer to the High Commissioner, led the Pohnpeian delegation in the Constitutional Convention of 1975, was the District Administrator in Pohnpei, and then served as the Liaison Officer for the Micronesian Washington Office. After returning to Pohnpei, Falcam was elected as Pohnpei's first state governor, and later appointed as FSM Postmaster General.

Bailey Olter, from the island of Mokil in Pohnpei State, was elected to the first session of the Congress of Micronesia, served as a member and later vice-chairman of the various political status negotiation committees, and was a member of the Pohnpei delegation at the Constitutional Convention in 1975. Olter, a prominent businessman on

Pohnpei, is currently Vice-President of the Federated States of Micronesia.

Bethwel Henry, from Pohnpei, was elected to the first session of the Congress of Micronesia and became Speaker of the House of Representatives, a position he held for a number of years. Later, upon the formation of the FSM, Henry was elected to the Pohnpei State Legislature, and again became the Speaker.

Lazarus Salii was an early employee of the Trust Territory administration and was elected to the first session of the Congress of Micronesia in 1965. Later, Salii became the chairman of the various political status negotiation committees, and is currently President of the Republic of Palau.

All of these Micronesian Club members just began to be seriously involved in the government of Micronesia in the early 1960s. At the same time, events in the international political arena began to change world opinion about Micronesia. On June 8, 1961, the United Nations Trusteeship Council released a report on their visiting mission to the Trust Territory of that year, the first such visit by a group of U.N. officials since 1947 (Gale 1979:100). The report was critical of the United States administration, although not stridently so, and focused largely on the lack of economic development (Gale 1979:101). The report did not have much of an effect on the international political scene;

events in Europe and confrontations between the United States and the Soviets took precedence there. Internally, however, the report did shake up the Kennedy administration and the U.S. began to direct more administration attention to the problems in Micronesia.

In 1962, after the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, the CIA closed its operation on Saipan, and all security restrictions were lifted from the Trust Territory except for Kwajalein and Bikini Atolls. Also in 1962, a typhoon hit Guam destroying most of the island, and a polio epidemic began on Ebeye, the island where the workers from the Kwajalein missile testing site lived. Congress sent Guam 60 million dollars that year to modernize the infrastructure (Gale 1979:102). One reporter claims that the health problems on Ebeye caused Kennedy to decide to take more direct action in the Trust Territory (Oberdorfer 1964).

In April, 1962, National Security Action Memorandum 145 (NSAM) created an interagency task force from the Departments of State, Interior, Defense, and Health, Education and Welfare, that was to plan a course of action for the Trust Territory (Gale 1979:102). Immediately upon formation of this task force, new activity began in Micronesia. The Marianas were returned to the jurisdiction of the Trust Territory, 140 new American teachers were hired to teach English in the elementary schools in the Trust Territory, and new health programs were created throughout

the islands (Gale 1979:102). The budget for the Trust Territory increased from 6 million in 1962 to 15 million dollars in 1963 (Gale 1979:104).

One other recommendation of the NSAM memo was for the United States government to sponsor a survey mission to the Trust Territory with the authority to bypass the Washington political factions and to move administration policy out of its ineffective routine (Gale 1979:105). Some members of the U.S. Congress were afraid the United States would lose its Pacific possessions if the Micronesians voted in a plebescite to become politically independent. In a concession to these Congressmen, the NSAM memo supposedly contained a policy whereby an accelerated rate of social welfare would be used to guarantee that Micronesia would continue to be part of the American "political family." The basis of the policy was the assumption that the Micronesians would vote for a continued political affiliation with the United States if they received tangible financial benefits ahead of time (Gale 1979:105-106).

In 1962, President Kennedy selected a group of scholars and advisors who were to travel to Micronesia, assess the situation in the Trust Territory, and make recommendations for the future in the form of an administrative plan. The survey mission traveled to each of the six districts in the Trust Territory in July and August, 1963. The group's report, to become known as the "Solomon Report", after the

group's leader Anthony M. Solomon, was submitted to Kennedy in October, 1963. Although international events prompted the original NSAM memo, which in turn caused Kennedy to send this survey mission to Micronesia, the increasing sophistication and activity of the new educated Micronesian elite set the stage in Micronesia for the events that followed the survey mission.

Initially, the U.S. classified the entire report, which led to controversy in later years. The report was divided into two parts: the first was concerned with the team's mission and the political future of the Trust Territory, and the second was concerned with the social, education, and economic development of the islands. In the mid-1960s, after some revisions and editing by the State Department, the Office of Territorial Affairs declassified Volumes II and III, and released them to the general public (Nufer 1978:58).

The first volume remained classified, however. In 1971, Francisco Uludong, a Palauan student at the University of Hawaii, and editor of the student publication Young Micronesian, published the "Introduction" and "Summary" to Volume I. Later that year, these sections were published in the Micronitor, a weekly newspaper in Majuro. An American independence-for-Micronesia group, Friends of Micronesia, next published the excerpts (Nufer 1978:59), and finally, in 1975, McHenry, a former member of the State Department,

published the excerpts as an appendix in his book Micronesia: Trust Betrayed (McHenry 1975).

The report contained one particular question and answer about the political future of the Trust Territory that aroused the indignation of these Micronesians and Americans:

> What are the elements to consider in the preparation for organization, timing and favorable outcome of a plebiscite in Micronesia, and how will this action affect the long-run problem that Micronesia, after affiliation, will pose for the United States?
>
> . . . Winning the plebiscite and making Micronesia a United States territory under circumstances which will: (1) satisfy somewhat conflicting interests of the Micronesians, the United Nations and the United States along lines satisfactory to the Congress; (2) be appropriate to the present political and other capabilities of the Micronesians; and (3) provide sufficient flexibility in government structure to accommodate to whatever measure of local self-government the Congress might grant to Micronesia in later years (McHenry 1975:328).

This idea sounds well in line with the stated goals of the United States in which governmental control was to be gradually turned over to the Micronesians, while the area was maintained within the American "political family." The controversy that later occurred over the Solomon Report recommendations turned on the idea that the United States was going to annex the Trust Territory. The opponents of the Solomon Report recommendations felt an annexation decision would have forever ruled out the possibility that Micronesia would gain political independence. It would also

have been in violation of the United Nations mandate for the Strategic Trusteeship.

Thoughts among Americans in the islands (compared to those of Americans outside the Trust Territory) seemed to be split. The District Administrators and other American employees of the Trust Territory thought the Solomon Mission was just adding credibility and influence to what they had been saying for years: they needed more money (Nufer 1978:59-60). They felt that some kind of "post-political ties" with the United States might result in later years, but that the main thrust of the Trust Territory administration's effort was "to bring the Micronesians up to a level where they could make an informed decision of their own" (Nufer 1978:60). Annexation was one possibility among many, but was not the overall goal of the Trust Territory administration. As for the controversy over the classified nature of the report, Maynard Neas, a District Administrator in Pohnpei during the time of the Solomon Mission, remembered that although district officials had to return their copies of the report, no one told them they could not talk about the contents of the report, so they did (Nufer 1978:60). Consequently, lots of people in and out of Micronesia knew, in general, what the report contained.

The Micronesians were also clearly split in their views of the future political status of their islands. Uludong, and his supporters, felt the report's recommendations

substantiated their belief the United States was trying to bypass and nullify any attempt by the Micronesians to gain political independence. It is significant that Uludong printed the excerpts from the report at the same time a political independence movement was gaining influence in the Congress of Micronesia. In contrast to the independence movement supporters' belief, Lazarus Salii, in an interview in the early 1970s, wondered why the United States did not push the annexation initiative more strenuously (Nufer 1978:60-61). Salii commented that Micronesians were not politically conscious at the time, and were without any kind of national, or pan-Micronesia cohesion. Salii felt most Micronesians were in favor of the American administration, and outside of the Micronesia Club, no one would have resisted an effort by the United States for permanent political ties (Nufer 1978:61).

The Solomon Mission even prompted a study about the Mission's study. The Carnegie Endowment sponsored a study reporting that, after the Solomon Report was submitted to President Kennedy on October 9, 1963, a second National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 268) was released that "directed the interagency group to proceed with implementation of the report's recommendations" (McHenry 1975:20). McHenry (1975:20) said a covering memorandum attached to NSAM 268 by a White House official "passed along President

Kennedy's request that he be notified by November 30, 1963, of the date of the plebiscite."

After Kennedy's assassination, the White House lost interest in the Solomon Report (Nufer 1978:61). The increasing United States presence in Southeast Asia forced the Johnson administration to focus attention on other areas. Under Johnson's domestic policy, many new programs were extended to Micronesia, but not in the systematic way advocated by the Solomon Report (Gale 1979:109). The funding of these new programs in Micronesia set the precedent that treated the Trust Territory as a domestic issue, rather than an international one, and also allowed individual Micronesians to gain experience in lobbying Washington for increased appropriations (Gale 1979:110).

Local governments. The Congress of Micronesia did not become established until the mid-1960s. In the preceding twenty years, there were two antecedents in local government established by the American administration throughout most of Micronesia. The first was the municipal governments initiated by the Navy administration. The second was the district legislatures. In almost all cases the district legislatures were preceded by some sort of advisory body, usually in the form of a council, that was located between the municipal governments and the Trust Territory administration in the overall government hierarchy. The primary

function of these advisory bodies was to act as communication channels between the Trust Territory administration and the individual islands. The advisory bodies were also a mechanism for local officials to meet administration officials and be "informed, reminded, requested, notified, and advised" (Meller 1969:47).

On Truk, the process of forming an advisory body was started soon after World War II. The American administration chose a council consisting of traditional leaders, the council then choose a chief for each atoll. This attempt to organize a government structure above the village level did not work because the Trukese had no experience with anyone more authoritative than their village chiefs. The advisory body was replaced by an advisory council made up of island chiefs, some of whom had to be chosen by the Americans (Gladwin 1950:17-22).

By 1952, the meetings between the advisory council and the administration officials had become the Truk Conference of Magistrates. These meetings evolved into week-long affairs, complete with administration-prepared agendas and committee work. In 1953, the District Conference of Magistrates created a Permanent Advisory Committee that had the authority to represent all of the islands of the Truk District and advise the District Administrator on issues of government (Meller 1969:48). The Truk District Conference

of Magistrates was later replaced by the Truk District Legislature.

Pohnpei created a district legislature in a similar fashion to that of Truk's process. After the war, traditional leaders met with administration officials on a monthly basis to discuss problems encountered in governing the whole island. (The outer islands were not included due to the problems of travel and the lack of a Nahnmwarki-type system of traditional leaders). In 1950, this group of traditional leaders was replaced by an elected 22-member body that represented the island of Pohnpei. This body was made up of both traditional leaders and commoners meeting as one group (Meller 1969:49), and was later replaced by the bicameral Pohnpei Island Congress.

Saipan established a municipal government in 1947. Because almost all of the people in the Northern Marianas lived on Saipan, it quickly evolved into a unicameral legislature that was amended two years later with the creation of a second legislative chamber (Meller 1969:49). Later, the municipal legislature was modified to fit the pattern established by the Guam Congress, with an "upper" and "lower" house. In 1963, the Trust Territory administration approved the formation of the Marianas District Legislature.

The process of establishing a district legislature in Yap was similar to the process in other districts in

Micronesia, but it required more time. The slow pace was due to the still-powerful traditional political system, and the Yapese cultural tradition of not rushing into anything. Soon after World War II, the Navy administration established municipal governments and encouraged the election of magistrates for each municipality. Demonstrating the power of the traditional leaders in Yap, the people dutifully elected a high ranking chief to each magistrate position. Over time, the chiefs' lack of experience with the type of government structure imposed by the American administration caused the chiefs to designate representatives to act for them as magistrates. Eventually, people were elected to the magistrate position based on their popularity and abilities and not just because they were a chief. However, all of the elected magistrates were people who held high rank, if they were not in fact chiefs (Meller 1969:152).

During the early 1950s, the Yap magistrates met periodically with administration officials, primarily to hear whatever new orders the Trust Territory government wanted to pass along. By 1956, a Magistrates Council was officially created. Each magistrate was elected by secret ballot for a three year term on the Magistrates Council. The Magistrates Council recommended policy decisions, levied and collected taxes, and dealt with budgeting decisions. After several years of negotiation and discussion with the Trust Territory

administration, the Magistrates Council evolved into the Yap District Legislature in 1965.

The Marshalls did not have the rather long build-up from municipal or magistrate councils to a district legislature that the other islands in Micronesia experienced. In 1949, following a conference of magistrates, the Trust Territory administration called a meeting of the iroij laplap. (Five of the iroij laplap were also magistrates.) At this meeting with the iroij laplap, the administration officials outlined a plan for organizing a district-wide legislature. As proposed, the legislature was bicameral with one house reserved for the iroij laplap. With this move the Americans acknowledged the authority of the iroij and the need for their support. In turn the iroij saw the creation of their own house in the legislature as a way to bolster their weakened position with respect to commoners, institutionalize the iroij status, and defend their class interests by using the democratic principles of the West (Sandelmann 1953:109).

The Council of Micronesia. The municipal councils, and later the district legislatures, provided the Micronesian people experience at the local level with the new government structure introduced by the United States administrative authority. At the territory-wide level there were two direct precursors to the Congress of Micronesia. The first

was formed in 1948 by the Navy, called the Legislative Advisory Committee. This Committee was made up of five heads of departments in the American administration, and as such was entirely composed of American administrators (Meller 1969:181). The original order that created the Committee included a provision that Micronesians should be made members of the Committee as soon as possible, with eventual control being turned over to them. The Navy intended to use the Committee as the starting point for a territory-wide legislature (Meller 1969:181). The logistical problems of having the Trust Territory headquarters located in Hawaii, general conservatism on the part of the American administration, and the issue of whether or not the United States government would install an Organic Act for Micronesia, all combined to keep Micronesians off the Committee. The Committee was dissolved at the end of 1952.

The second precursor to the Congress was more successful. This attempt started as a meeting held on Guam in 1949 between the American administration officials and two Micronesians from each district. The Micronesians asked administration officials for assistance with fishing, boat building, controlling insects, and starting industries in the islands (Meller 1969:182). The Micronesians also asked for technical assistance from the Japanese and for increased trade with Japan.

This first meeting was considered a success by all of the participants, but was not repeated until 1953, after the Department of Interior took over the administration of the Trust Territory. In July of that year, two representatives from each district (excluding the Northern Marianas which was again under Navy administrative control) attended a meeting on Truk called the First Trust Territory Conference on Self Government (Meller 1969:183). The Micronesian representatives were still not familiar with the way the American form of government worked, so they came to the meeting with prepared papers, rather than with topics for discussion. When American administration officials asked the Micronesians about other things of importance in their districts, the Micronesians insisted that they could not speak for everyone in their respective districts.

Partly as a result of the Micronesians' unwillingness to discuss affairs of government in their districts and their unfamiliarity with the political structure the American administration was trying to construct, no further conferences were held until 1956. In that year, the High Commissioner held a conference for district leaders on Guam. This conference was much more successful and the United States decided to hold an Inter-District Micronesian Conference every year (Meller 1969:184). U.S. officials hoped that an annual conference would provide a mechanism by which Micronesian leaders could learn about the

administration's goals and policies. American administration officials, in turn, would become familiar with problems at the district and local level. In addition, U.S. officials hoped that more information would be disseminated to the local populace if scheduled annual meetings were held (Meller 1969:184).

A second conference was held in 1957 and was successful as well. In 1958, the delegates were more familiar with the process of discussing the problems of the Trust Territory, so they decided to rename their group the "Inter-District Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner." The delegates increased their consultative function in the areas of taxation, agriculture, shipping, political development, and education. In 1961, the delegates again voted for a new name, this time "The Council of Micronesia."

By this time the delegates were elected for two-year terms, and there were a variety of committees and subcommittees formed within the main body. One of these subcommittees focused on political development. The political development subcommittee proposed that the Council of Micronesia become a true legislative body for Micronesia, and that the organization of this body not be delayed for too long. The last recommendation was prompted by the Trust Territory administration's feeling that a legislature should not be created before 1965, by which time it was hoped that all the delegates would be popularly elected on a

proportional basis (Meller 1969:186). (Although elections were held in all districts, some of the districts had delegates that were chosen by the traditional leaders.)

In 1962, the Council of Micronesia formed a successor to the political subcommittee and charged it with drafting the structure for a Congress of Micronesia. By 1963, the subcommittee had returned several proposals to the Council, and in November, 1963, the Council voted in favor of the final proposed structure. At that point it became the task of the Trust Territory administration and the Department of Interior to stipulate the details of the legislature's structure (Meller 1969:187).

Throughout the process, from 1956 to 1963, the Micronesian delegates received varying amounts of information from their constituents. Due to transportation difficulties, and cultural concerns in some of the districts, contact between elected delegates and their constituents was limited, however. Most Micronesians did not know about or have any input into the political development process. In addition, even though the Trust Territory administration allowed the Micronesians to fully explore the possibilities for political development, the American administration kept firm control over the drafting of the final document that created the Congress of Micronesia (Meller 1969:197-198). This limited even further the ability of most Micronesians to affect the process.

Public opinion did appear to influence the debate between proponents of a bicameral legislature and proponents of a unicameral legislature. The arguments for a unicameral legislature were that it would be more economical to operate, and that it might be hard to find a sufficient number of qualified people for more than one house in the legislature, at least initially. The advocates of bicameralism argued that if the new legislature had two houses, the rights of individual districts would be protected from the prejudicial attitudes of islanders toward people from districts other than their own. Also traditional leaders saw a second house as a way to maintain influence over the new legislative body. They apparently thought the second house would be reserved for people who held high rank, in a form similar to that of the Marshalls District Legislature. Some delegates remarked "they had to speak for bicameralism to placate the nobility at home, whose support they need in future elections" (Meller 1969:202). Many of the delegates did not have high-rank, and the bicameral advocates' argument for the protection of individual state's rights supported the traditional leaders without explicitly supporting the formation of second house reserved for chiefs. The Council eventually voted in favor of a bicameral legislature and the American administration concurred, saying that it was the choice of the Micronesian people (Meller 1969:202). On September 28, 1964, by order of the

Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, the Congress of Micronesia was formed.

The Congress of Micronesia. The first elections for the new Congress were held on January 19, 1965. Prior to the elections, candidates had to be nominated, either by themselves or by someone else. A few candidates were self-nominated, but because this ran counter to the public modesty requirements of the various Micronesian societies, most candidates were nominated by someone else.

The general Micronesian populace did not have much influence on the nominations of candidates for the new Congress. Each of the districts recommended to the Trust Territory administration that a nomination procedure be put into place for the Congress of Micronesia elections similar to that found in their respective districts. The recommended nomination procedure generally followed the precedent set for the Council of Micronesia, where the district legislatures had selected the candidates for the delegate seats in the Council. In the Marshalls, the district legislature selected 10 candidates for the Council who then ran at-large; the two highest vote-getters were declared elected to the Council. The Truk District Legislature also had selected Council candidates, but restricted the election to five candidates. In similar fashion, the Palau District Legislature restricted their Council delegate election to

the five candidates the legislature had chosen. The procedure in the Marianas was somewhat different, in that the municipal bodies selected five candidates for one of the two delegate seats. These candidates then ran in an election on all of the islands except Rota. The second delegate seat was given to Rota outright. The Pohnpei District Legislature dispensed with candidate nominations and elections altogether. The Pohnpei District Legislature selected both delegates to the Council of Micronesia (Meller 1969:255-256).

The recommended nomination procedure was struck down by the Trust Territory administration because the United States did not want a nomination process that made it possible for dominant factions in district legislatures to control the Congress of Micronesia through the nomination of their own candidates, at the expense of their opponents (Meller 1969:256). Therefore, the Congress of Micronesia candidate nomination procedure in each of the districts differed from that used for the Council of Micronesia.

In the Marianas and Palau, established political parties nominated candidates, one from each party for each seat in the legislature. In the Marianas, only party candidates ran for office, but in Palau, some independents also stood for election, in addition to candidates nominated by the political parties. Pohnpei had a more complicated procedure whereby the municipal councils chose represent-

atives to serve on committees within each of three voting districts (Meller 1969:234). These committees then made the nominations for candidates to both the House and the Senate of the Congress of Micronesia. This biased the Pohnpei nominations to ward candidates who were already a part of the political establishment. It did not stop some individuals from nominating themselves, but they were few and none of them were elected (Meller 1969:256). In Yap, both the Yap Islands Congress and the Yap Islands Council (the latter made up of traditional chiefs) selected candidates for Congress. In the Marshalls and in Truk, most candidates were nominated by other individuals.

In all the districts, no candidates were disqualified because they worked for the Trust Territory administration. In fact, the rule that Micronesians in top-level government positions could not hold a legislative position at the same time, was waived for the first two congressional elections. Consequently, 72% of the 95 candidates in all the districts were concurrently employed in non-legislative government positions at either the territory or district levels (Meller 1969:280).

The campaigns of the candidates varied greatly: some did no campaigning while others held public meetings, went on handshaking tours, and used other tactics in the best American tradition (Meller 1969:261-267). Except for the Marianas and Palau, where both party politics and individual

personalities were factors, most candidates fell somewhere in the middle between "no campaigning" and "lots of campaigning," with the most usual tactic being negotiations in less public "smoke-filled rooms" (Meller 1969:262; Hughes 1970:208). Even so, campaigning for the first Congress of Micronesia was more obvious than any before in Micronesia.

In general, the nomination process was heavily biased in all the districts toward those candidates already established in the new political system. It therefore comes as no surprise that most of those elected to the Congress of Micronesia were from the new political elite being established in the islands--they were the people already in place in the new government structure. The new Congressmen were young, proficient in English, and more educated than their constituents. They had prior experience with the American form of government, and less than half of them had connections to the traditional side of politics in Micronesia (Hughes 1970:203-223; Meller 1969:275-290). Of those candidates elected (33 victors out of 95 total candidates), 75% had held a seat in a district legislature at some time, 34% were current holders of a district legislature seat, and 51% had been delegates to the Council of Micronesia (Meller 1969:279). Clearly, a new political order was emerging in Micronesia. The 1965 elections to the Congress of Micronesia provided clear evidence that the traditional political system, which had lasted for hundreds

of years through four foreign colonial regimes, was no longer as powerful as it once was.

Hughes (1979:211) argues that in the case of Pohnpei, the acceptance of the role of Congressman is in part due to the lack of any traditional role with which the role of Congressman would conflict. This may partly explain the initial acceptance of the new role of Congressman, but it does not explain the lack of participation by Pohnpeian traditional leaders in the new political process at the very beginning of the new government's formation. Although two traditional chiefs <u>were</u> elected to the first session of the Congress of Micronesia (one from Pohnpei, the other from Truk), neither were reelected, and no high-ranking chief from Pohnpei has since been elected to Congress. This despite the fact that Pohnpei is still regarded as having one of the more active traditional political systems in Micronesia (Petersen 1982). For one reason or another, the fact remains: traditional leaders have been removed or have removed themselves, from the political governance of the island.

Political feeling ran strong among the newly elected political elite. The new Congressmen shared a common background--over half had attended high school together, primarily at Pacific Islands Central School (PICS) on Truk (Gale 1979:211; Nevin 1977:55). Two-thirds had some college education, usually at the University of Hawaii, and eight of

the 33 legislators had college degrees. In several cases, the new Congressmen even had the same courses in college, since most majored in political science. In particular, was a course on legislatures offered during the early 1960s by Norman Meller. Meller was instrumental in establishing some of the early district legislatures and the Congress of Micronesia. Later, in 1975, Meller served as the chief political consultant for the Micronesian Constitutional Convention.

With this common background, and having successfully established a Micronesian legislative body, the Congress of Micronesia legislators were ready for even bigger assignments. One of the first tasks undertaken by the new Congressmen was the formation of a political status negotiation committee, charged with negotiating an undetermined future political relationship with the United States.

The 1970s. During the 1970s, two things were particularly important in the political development of the Trust Territory: the political status negotiations with the United States, and the Micronesian Constitutional Convention held in 1975 (Meller 1985). Both of these showed that Micronesian political unity during these formative years was more of an illusion than a fact. For example, the people of the Marianas did not decide to attend the Constitutional Convention until the last moment. The Marshalls sent delegates to the Convention, but they did not represent the

ruling iroij who were in control in the Marshalls District Legislature. In addition, the Palauan delegation attempted to take over the Convention when they applied overt pressure to the Convention delegates to accept a constitution written by members of the Palauan delegation. Despite the difficulties the Convention delegates experienced among themselves, by the end of the 90-day session they had produced a constitution that contained a bit of everything that everyone wanted. The delegates' next problem occurred when they took the constitution back to their home islands and tried to convince their constituents that the document should be ratified.

Following the close of the Micronesian Constitutional Convention in 1975, there followed an intense program of education that lasted for two years. Radio programs were prepared, village meetings were held, and the proposed constitution was translated into the nine major languages in Micronesia.

Several problems were debated. Pohnpeians were afraid that the constitution would allow large numbers of Trukese to buy all of the free land on Pohnpei. Also, leaders on various islands were worried about the loss of local autonomy to a national government. The Micronesians went to the polls on July 12, 1978. As expected, the Marshalls and Palau voted "No", and Truk, Yap, Pohnpei, and Kosrae voted "Yes". The latter four island groups currently make up the

Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The Marshalls district became the Republic of the Marshalls, and the Palau district became the Republic of Palau. Each of these new republics drafted and ratified its own constitution.

The new constitutions took effect one year after ratification. The new FSM government took over the rights and obligations of the Trust Territory government, and obeyed all regulations of the Trust Territory that were not in clear violation of the new constitution. An interim Congress was convened to help with transition matters, and the seat of government was moved to Pohnpei which had been designated several years earlier as the capital of the new government.

On March 27, 1979, elections were held to select the members for the first Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia. As stipulated in the Constitution, the Congress is a unicameral body with one at-large member from each state, and a set number of members from each state based on population, distributed as follows: Truk - 5, Yap - 1, Pohnpei - 3, and Kosrae - 1.

During this period, the American policy of "Micronization" (Nufer 1978:75085) colored both the actions of the Constitutional Convention and the future political status negotiations. The American administration moved Micronesians into positions of responsibility at an increasing rate, which in turn lead to increasing lack of

efficiency. Strik Yoma, a Micronesian Club member who was Pohnpei's lieutenant governor when he died in 1984, is quoted in Nufer (1978:77-78) as having said that some Micronesians were put into positions for which they were unprepared, and that in some cases individuals were passed over for positions for which they were qualified. Yoma also thought the officials placed in the top positions were too loyal to their own districts, and that this was detrimental to the Trust Territory as a whole.

Ratification of the FSM constitution, and the resultant split in the Trust Territory, forced the United States to make some bureaucratic changes in the Trust Territory administration. Fred Zeder, the Director of Territorial Affairs from 1975-1977, told the United Nations Trusteeship Council in June, 1976, that more than 700 people were employed at Trust Territory Headquarters on Saipan in that year. Of these, 642 were Micronesians and 95 were American civil service employees (Nufer 1978:79). Zeder planed to revamp the whole Trust Territory government structure in order to increase the efficiency of the bureaucracy. In a speech to the U.N. in 1976, Zeder outlined some of the changes he had made in order to further the process of "decentralization" of the Trust Territory government from Headquarters on Saipan, to the individual districts. His overall goal was to cut the Headquarters staff to fewer than 300 by 1980 (Nufer 1978:79). The personnel changes

initiated by Zeder included replacement of the of the High Commissioner by a Samoan who had previously been Deputy High Commissioner. Other key personnel, such as the Attorney General, the chief financial officer, and the Director of Public Works, were replaced outright or were reassigned to other positions (Nufer 1978:83). Included in the list of personnel who lost their jobs due to Zeder's demand for business-like efficiency was the District Administrator for Pohnpei, Leo Falcam. Falcam was part of the Pohnpeian delegation to the Micronesian Constitutional Convention and was the first Pohnpeian to hold the position of District Administrator on Pohnpei. After his firing, Falcam was appointed by the Congress of Micronesia to their Washington, D.C. liaison office to work with the very people who had fired him.

The moving of Micronesians into top executive positions allowed the Micronesians themselves to face the problems of government--to make mistakes and to come up with solutions. This experience will make it much easier for the new government leaders, now that the FSM has gained political autonomy.

Summary

In this chapter I have presented an overview of the history of Euroamerican contact in Micronesia. It is apparent that the Pohnpeians have attempted to use each

successive foreign power as a means to acquire highly valued resources. In the process of gaining more and better resources than they had before, individual Pohnpeians acquired higher social status and rank in their society. One indicator of rank in Pohnpeian society is the title system. Pohnpeians have always competed for titles, and the title system was predominant in all traditional Pohnpeian political activities.

While I lived and worked on Pohnpei I observed Pohnpeians competing for titles at feasts and at other social gatherings. Although many Pohnpeians have dropped out of the title system, the competition for titles continues. But without material resources, no Pohnpeian can compete for titles in the title system. Pohnpeians must first acquire those resources which they can use to show that they deserve some title, especially one higher in rank or prestige than those they already hold.

This is in fact what Pohnpeians have done through the course of their colonial history. They cooperated with foreign invaders, even when the invaders had inferior arms or were fewer in number, so that they could gain access to Euroamerican material resources. The fact that they used those resources to compete for titles does not mean that they were competing for titles in the first place, as Petersen (1982:118-119) has concluded. Pohnpeians used their new resources to acquire more resources to engage in

social competition, and to achieve a higher material standard of living. Henry Nanpei is a good example of a Pohnpeian who both cooperated with and fought with foreign administrations. In the process he acquired material resources and social rank, so that today his descendants own a significant portion of the land on Pohnpei and have high social rank as well. Nanpei embodies an ideal that Pohnpeians have strived to emulate for centuries, an ideal that involves the successful competition for material goods, and conversion of these resources into social rank.

Notes

1) One test, Trinity, had occurred before Nagasaki and Hiroshima, north of Los Alamos, New Mexico, July 16, 1945 (Miller 1986:35). Also, in one sense, both the Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombings could be considered tests since the devices used were of two different designs.

2) The rather cavalier attitude of the United States at the time has continued to be a sore point for the Marshallese, especially the Bikinians, to this day. The 170 inhabitants of Bikini were moved to Rongerik, about 130 miles away. After the move, several United States officials, including Vice Admiral William Blandy and Commodore Ben H. Wyatt, held a meeting with Bikini's chiefs, saying "the President knows the sacrifice you have made and he is deeply grateful to you for that. You have made a true contribution to the progress of mankind all over the world, and the President of the United States extends to you, King Juda, his thanks for all you have done" (Laurence 1946).

3) The French would continue their above-ground nuclear testing until 1971, and the Chinese continued their above-ground nuclear testing until 1980 (Miller 1986:525).

4) In 1950, five locations were considered for a continental test site: White Sands Proving Grounds in New Mexico; Dugway-Windover Proving Grounds in Utah; Tonopah Gunnery Range near Las Vegas; an area of central Nevada; and Pimlico Sound in North Carolina. Nevada was chosen (Miller 1986:80-81, 492).

5) Besides Douglas Oliver, other authors of this report included Edward T. Hall Jr., John Useem, Ed Galahue, William Bascomb, and Leonard Mason.

6) A note should be made here about the so-called "zoo theory" purported to be the basis of early United States administrative policy (Chapman 1978; Hanlon and Eperiam 1983:85; Heine 1974:146). Allegedly, the idea was to establish a defense perimeter around the islands while disturbing the lifestyle of the Micronesians as little as possible. Presumably the Micronesians would return to a "traditional" way of life. There is no evidence that this was ever an official policy of the Navy administration. Gladwin (1950) reports the rather extraordinary efforts made on Truk to accommodate the changes occurring due to the American presence. No where in the three volumes of Richard's history (Richard 1957) is there an indication that this was an official policy of the United States. It might very well have been the preferred policy of individual professional military officers, but as Richard (1957, v.2:144) points out, in the early years (pre-1946) most Navy officers did not want to be in Micronesia, seeing it as a dead end for later promotion. Others simply served their time until they could get enough "points" to transfer elsewhere. With the introduction of Keesing's newly trained officers from Stanford this situation began to change, since all of these officers volunteered for military government duty.

The "zoo theory" was simply a reaction by critics of the United States administration toward the slow progress of economic development, of which there has been practically none since World War II. Heine (1974:21) sees it also as a way to keep news media out of the Trust Territory, but this hardly seems likely except for the closed islands of Johnston and Kwajalein which were under direct military control. There were never any restrictions placed against publication of any work completed during the Navy administration, most notably the CIMA program. The "zoo theory" is also a reaction by people who object to the work done by anthropologists immediately after World War II, seeing them as being supporters of American colonialism (see

Gale 1979). The "security pass" nature of Micronesia during the Navy administration, during which only social scientists and others on government business were allowed to visit the islands, reinforces this viewpoint. Not surprisingly, this "theory" has also been used by prominent United States Senators to denounce American Indian Reservations as being the "private zoos of anthropologists." The inclusion of the "zoo theory" as a statement of official policy, such as that found in Hanlon and Eperiam (1983), does a disservice to anyone (Micronesians included) interested in an accurate reflection of history in the islands.

7) Hall (1950) and Gladwin (1950) sum up the opposing viewpoints of the Navy administration quite nicely.

8) No reasons were given by Nufer for Falcam's firing, although the implication was that Zeder felt Falcam was not doing an adequate job. In 1986, I asked interviewees about Falcam's tenure as the District Administrator of Pohnpei. No information was divulged other than general complaints about the government, none of which seemed to be connected to Falcam in particular. One recurring story, however, was of the time a group of Pohnpeian women were in front of Falcam's office demonstrating against rampant alcohol consumption on the island. Falcam allegedly called the police who allegedly broke up the demonstration with tear gas. I was never able to find official confirmation of this story and it remains a part of modern Pohnpeian folklore.

CHAPTER 3
THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS NEGOTIATION PROCESS

In my interviews with Pohnpeians about the political change they were experiencing today, I asked questions about the political negotiations that were taking place with the United States. Few of the people I interviewed knew any details of the process, and many people I talked to during the eighteen months I spent on Pohnpei did not know basic facts about the process or about the political status their government was attempting to acquire for them. I was interested in the process, which was one reason I asked people about it in the first place. In this chapter I present a brief description of the negotiation process and of the people who were the participants.

Negotiating the Compact of Free Association was a long process. It lasted sixteen years and involved four separate committees from Micronesia and four presidential administrations in the United States. An historical look at this process can help define the goals and attitudes of both the Micronesian and the U.S. administrations, as well as identify the participants. In the case of the U.S. administrations, the goals of the negotiators follow a

general, but clearly outlined policy of "strategic denial" by the United States (Ranney and Penniman 1985:53). The personal agendas of individual U.S. negotiators played only a minor role, although personality did affect the length of time the negotiations required. Individual Micronesian personalities and internal Micronesian politics played major roles throughout the sixteen-year process, and the personal political and financial goals of individual Micronesians helped define the process of political independence for the Micronesian people. For the Micronesians, gaining political independence without the requisite financial independence was their most important goal.

By 1962, eight of the trust territories mandated by the United Nations had become politically independent and there was a growing opinion in the U.N. that the Micronesian Trusteeship Agreement should be terminated. The Solomon Mission participants recognized this and recommended a course of action that they hoped would increase the Micronesians' desire to remain politically affiliated with the United States, if not in fact, make them economically dependent on the United States. The 1964 United Nations Visiting Mission was headed by Frank Corner, Ambassador from New Zealand, who had been involved with his government's agreements with Western Samoa and the Cook Islands. The Visiting Mission report indicated that a political breakthrough in Micronesia was eminent. If it occurred,

self-determination would become a real issue in the international political arena, rather than a hypothetical one (Gale 1979:211).

During an interview in the mid-1970s, Lazarus Salii said that he had written a letter to the High Commissioner in 1961 in which he discussed Micronesia's political status. In the interview, Salii took credit for being the first person to make public the Micronesians' desire to begin political status talks (Nufer 1978:57). The idea that political status negotiations between the Micronesians and the United States should begin may not, in fact, be Micronesian in origin. Nor did the idea become a topic of political discussion topic the mid-1960s. Two people whom I interviewed were present during the early years of the political status negotiations between the United States and Micronesia. They stated independently that American Peace Corps volunteers served as lawyers and advisors to the Congress of Micronesia, and that it was those volunteers who first pushed for political status negotiations to begin.

Recall that the Congress of Micronesia was formed in 1965. In August, 1966, one of the first acts by the new Congress was to petition President Lyndon Johnson to establish a Micronesian status commission. The United States Department of the Interior made a similar request at the same time, but the Department of State opposed the idea. While State and Interior argued the issue for a year,

President Johnson submitted a joint resolution to the United States Congress in late August, 1967, recommending that a status commission be formed to consist of eight members of Congress and eight Micronesians. This type of commission had already been rejected by a group of Micronesian legislators, and another year passed before the United States Congress withdrew the proposal (McHenry 1975:89). Given the delay and seeming the inattention of the U.S. administration, the Congress of Micronesia decided to move forward with the formation of their own commission. The first meeting of this Micronesian Future Political Status Commission took place in November, 1967.

The mandate of the Future Political Status Commission was to study political education and the experiences of other territories, and to identify and report on the various forms of political status Micronesia might be able to attain (Gale 1979:215). The Commission held three one-week sessions between November, 1967 and June, 1968. On June 26, 1968, the Commission submitted an interim report to the Congress of Micronesia in which nine possible status alternatives were discussed and four major forms of political status available to the Micronesians (independence, free association, commonwealth, and "trust territory" or the status quo) were identified. The Commission did not make any recommendations in this interim report as to which form

of political status would be best for Micronesia (Armstrong 1979:214).

The Commission members asked the Congress of Micronesia to extend the Commission's mandate and funding for another year so that they could analyze each of the four major forms of political status identified in the Interim Report and make a recommendation to the Congress. The Congress agreed to extend the Commission's mandate for a second year.[1]

In April, 1969, the Commission proposed to the Congress of Micronesia that the United States and Micronesia enter into a free association agreement based on four main principles:

1) That sovereignty in Micronesia resides in the people of Micronesia and their duly constituted government.

2) That the people of Micronesia possess the right of self-determination and may, therefore, choose independence or self-government in free association with any nation or organization of nations.

3) That the people of Micronesia have the right to adopt their own constitution and to amend, change or revoke any constitution or government plan at any time.

4) That free association should be in the form of a revocable compact, terminable unilaterally by either party (Armstrong 1979:215).

In the final report submitted to the Congress of Micronesia in July, 1969, the Commission recommended that a status of "free association" with the United States be sought by Micronesia (Future Political Status Commission

1969:8). The report pointedly did not consider a continuance of the status quo, even though there was support for the "trust territory" status among the general population of Micronesia and among Micronesian legislators (Gale 1979:218).

The work of the Commission and its choice of a status of "free association" was heavily influenced by two men. One was John W. Davidson, a professor at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University; the other was Lazarus Salii from Angaur, Palau, the first chairman of the Future Political Status Commission. Davidson had been responsible for drafting the Cook Islands' "free association" agreement with New Zealand (a status very similar to Micronesia's "free association") and had also worked as a consultant to the Papua New Guinea independence movement. Salii, the current President of the Republic of Palau, is a member of the American educated elite who gained experience and notoriety by working for the Trust Territory government. Salii has a B.A. in political science from the University of Hawaii, and worked for the Palau Legislature and the Trust Territory government before he was elected to the first session of the Congress of Micronesia (Gale 1979:215).

In statements which set the tone for all the future negotiations with the United States, the Commission explained their recommendation:

> We choose a free state because the continuation of a quasi-colonial status would prove degrading to Micronesia and unworthy of America. Difficulties and problems will surely arise, but the administering authority in these islands must become an authority administered by Micronesians. At the same time, we choose an associated state because we recognize the historically unique partnership between Micronesia and the United States. In recommending free association with the United States, we seek not an end but a redefinition, renewal and improvement of this partnership.
>
> Whatever our particular evaluations of the American administration in Micronesia may be, we feel that one contribution has been indelible, one achievement almost unqualified: the idea of democratic, representative, constitutional government. Our recommendation of a free associated state is indissolubly linked to our desire for such a democratic, representative, constitutional government. We endorse this system--which was brought to us by America and which we have come to know as an essentially American system.
>
> Yet our partnership with the United States and our endorsement of the American democratic system must be joined by our wish to live as Micronesians, to maintain our Micronesian identity, to create a Micronesian state. Such a state, we believe, would be a credit to America and to ourselves. As a self-governing state in free association with the United States, our past twenty years of partnership would be raised to a new level in a compact, not between guardian and ward, but between more nearly equal friends (Future Political Status Commission 1969:8).

The Commission members were well aware that the best bargaining points the Micronesian leaders had in negotiations to attain the Commission's recommended status of "free association" were the Micronesians' land and the strategic placement of their islands:

> Yet there is one item of material value which Micronesians can offer the United States--an item which is most precious in Micronesia and to

> Micronesians: the use of their land. Micronesians recognize that their islands are of strategic value, that the United States may require the use of some areas for purposes of military training and defense. We have seen the strategic value of these islands, have seen them conquered in historic battles, have seen them used for nuclear experiments and missile testing. Our experience with the military has not always been encouraging. But as a self-governing state in free association with the United States, we would accept the necessity of such military needs and we would feel confident that we could enter into responsible negotiations with the military, endeavoring to meet American requirements while protecting our own interests.
>
> Relinquishing use of land, accepting the presence of large numbers of military personnel, accepting the risk of treatment as a target area by a hostile power in war are not conditions to be lightly undertaken. But as a self-governing state we would be far more prepared to face these prospects than as a Trust Territory (Future Political Status Commission 1969:9).

The Commission members left little doubt as to what their recommended action would be if a status of "free association" was not possible with the United States:

> For ourselves, we look forward to the success of future negotiations with the United States. But if these negotiations should fail, if it should not be possible to achieve the alternative we recommend, then we have only one remaining course. It is the second alternative mentioned in the Trusteeship agreement, an alternative which might bring economic hardship and administrative difficulties. That alternative is independence. Independence is not the alternative we now recommend, but if it should prove impossible to renew our partnership with the United States as an associated free state, the Political Status commission feels that independence would be the only road left open to us.
>
> In the times to come, we will look to the United States for friendship and aid; but, whatever our relationship with the United States,

> whether as an independent nation or an associated free state, we must also look to Micronesians, look to ourselves. We maintain that the basic ownership of these islands rests with Micronesians and so does the basic responsibility for governing them (Future Political Status Commission 1969:9-10).

In the Commission's report, commonwealth status was rejected despite the significant financial gains that would accrue from such a close relationship with the United States, and despite the desire of the Northern Marianas residents for either a reintegration of their islands with Guam or arrangement of commonwealth status with the U.S. (Solenberger 1979:222). The Commission rejected commonwealth status for Micronesia because they feared that such a status would result in Micronesians losing control of their islands. Commonwealth status would allow Americans to buy land on the islands, and to hold key positions in the government. In addition, Micronesians would be subject to United States tax laws, and be subjected to an increased level of "Americanization" (Future Political Status Commission 1979:49).

In August, 1969, just prior to the start of formal negotiations with the United States, the Congress of Micronesia dissolved the Future Political Status Commission and formed the Political Status Delegation. The Congress gave this delegation the mandate to begin negotiations with the United States concerning Micronesia's future political status (Gale 1979:219). The membership of the Political

Status Delegation was almost the same as the earlier Commission, so it was easier for Salii and his supporters to pursue a status of "free association" than it would have been had the delegation consisted entirely of new members.

At the first round of formal negotiations in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 30-Oct 17, 1969) the U.S. team agreed to the concept of "free association." This agreement was useless for any policy making during this early period of negotiations, because extensive personnel changes that had occurred throughout the Department of the Interior when Richard Nixon was elected President in 1968. There was little corporate memory in the Interior Department about the work that had already been completed on the status negotiations, and the new people hired after the election were not prepared to take over the task of negotiating Micronesia's future. In the Department of the Interior's Office of Territorial Affairs, every official had been changed, including the director, who was replaced by the 73 year old widow of a former Republican congressman from Hawaii, who "never did figure out what the score was" (McHenry 1975:94). This shift in personnel was not limited to Interior. At the State Department, officials of the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee took responsibility for the Trust Territory from lower-ranking, but more knowledgeable staff (McHenry 1975:94). These personnel shifts and internal "turf wars" caused confusion

and ignorance on the part of the United States staff about what the people of Micronesia wanted and about the policy alternatives available to the negotiating teams.

Lack of basic knowledge about Micronesia led the new Secretary of the Interior, Walter Hickel, to make a trip to the area to observe the conditions and needs of the Micronesians (Hickel 1971:205). In a speech on Saipan, May 4, 1969, Hickel encouraged the Micronesian legislators to "dream big dreams" that would help build a political relationship with the United States. He acknowledged that so far the Micronesians had had little voice in the government of their islands, but Hickel said that would change and the Micronesians would be in charge of the future government (Hickel 1971:206). Unfortunately, Hickel's statements, though well-meant, were premature. The Nixon administration did not have any policy concerning Micronesia (other than to maintain the status quo), and could not even decide who was going to be involved in developing any new policy (McHenry 1975:96).

As their opening move during the first round of formal negotiations, the United States made an offer of "territorial status" for Micronesia. This offer was rejected by the Political Status Delegation (Armstrong 1979:215). The Micronesians in turn presented their own agenda for discussion, which consisted of eleven items:

1) Micronesians wished to draft and adopt their own constitution.

2) Micronesians wished assurance that no confiscation of land and no military bases would be established in the islands without full consultation and consent of the government of Micronesia and fair compensation; that land currently held, controlled or possessed by the United States under lease or other arrangements would be renegotiated.

3) The United States, subject to certain exemptions, limitations, and conditions, would conduct Micronesia's external affairs and provide protection from outside aggression and consult with Micronesia before entering into international obligations with respect to Micronesia.

4) Micronesia would agree not to allow any other country to enter into Micronesia for military purposes.

5) The United States would agree to an early settlement of Micronesia's postwar damage claims.

6) The United States would remove all barriers to the free movement of Micronesians into the United States.

7) The United States would agree to remove all barriers to the free movement of goods from Micronesia into the United States.

8) The United States would fully consult with the government of Micronesia in matters of shipping, civil aviation and communications.

9) Micronesians would have access to the United States Ninth Circuit Court and the United States Supreme Court.

10) Micronesia would continue to have access to banking facilities in the United States, to the use of United States currency and postal services.

11) The United States would guarantee financial aid to Micronesia.

The U.S. negotiators agreed in principal with the agenda, except for item #2 regarding control of land. The United States also would not permit any negotiated status with Micronesia to be unilaterally revocable. The Political Status Delegation reported back to the Congress of Micronesia that there were significant differences between the United States and the Micronesian positions (McHenry 1975:97).

The next round of negotiations was held in Washington, D.C. (May 4-8, 1970), where the U.S. made an offer of "commonwealth" status even though this status had already been rejected by the Future Political Status Commission the previous year in its report to the Congress of Micronesia (Political Status Delegation 1970:C2). In addition, in January, 1970, the Political Status Delegation's chairman, Lazarus Salii, had privately rejected the commonwealth proposal when Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Harrison Loesch, informally presented the proposal to Salii at Salii's home on Saipan (McHenry 1975:99). The draft proposal was labeled as a "commonwealth," apparently because the Future Political Status Committee had reacted favorably to the political status of Puerto Rico, which the United States also called a "commonwealth." In reality, however, the draft proposal would have made Micronesia an unincor-

porated territory of the United States, a status held by Guam and the Virgin Islands (McHenry 1975:99).

The Political Status Delegation rejected the proposal at the May meetings held in Washington, D.C. (Armstrong 1979:215) and recommended that the Congress of Micronesia do the same. The Congress of Micronesia rejected the proposal of "commonwealth" status after much debate during its July, 1970, session on Saipan. The Marianas delegation dissented (Heine 1974:178).

In the sixteen months between the second and third rounds of the negotiations, the U.S. team was consumed by bureaucratic infighting. An Interagency Group had been placed in charge of the United States negotiation effort. Staff members of the agencies that were part of the Interagency Group were more concerned about their own positions than they were about the Micronesians. Representatives of these agencies were also unable to speak for their own departments. In addition, staff members in the Department of the Interior's Office of Territorial Affairs did not get along with administrators in the Trust Territory government because they felt the TTPI government officials hindered the progress of the negotiations in an attempt to keep their jobs (McHenry 1975:102).

Furthermore, the personnel involved changed repeatedly during the early years of the negotiations. On June 24, 1971, President Nixon appointed Haydn Williams as his

personal representative to the Micronesian negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador. On July 28, 1971, the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations was established to support Williams' effort. In the span of three years, two Navy officers served as office director, and in less than four years, three people served as deputy United States representative (McHenry 1975:103). Williams and his deputy, James M. Wilson, were seen by American and Micronesians alike as being cold, aloof, and difficult to work with (McHenry 1975:104-105). There was suspicion about each country's motives, staff, and positions--suspicion generated primarily by former Peace Corps volunteers, according to McHenry (1975:106). Both the Micronesians and the Americans had former Peace Corps volunteers working as lawyers and staff members for the two status delegations (ibid).

Over time, the Micronesians became more politically astute with the help of their Australian and U.S. consultants, and their former and current Peace Corps volunteer lawyers (Lingenfelter 1974:63). They also came to feel that the Political Status Delegation, and even the Congress of Micronesia, did not speak for all Micronesians. Until 1971, there had been little attempt on the part of the former Future Political Status Commission, the Political Status Delegation, or the Congress of Micronesia to inform the general populace of Micronesia as to the status of the negotiations or even what was being discussed. Although

Gale reports that hearings were held "throughout the Trust Territory" (1979:218), the members of the Future Political Status Commission and Congress who were in favor of "free association" discounted the public opinion expressed during these gatherings (Uherbelau 1970:9). In the Future Political Status Commission's Report (1969:5), fifty public meetings were cited as the source of public opinion with regard to the political status issue, yet the information gleaned from these meetings was not considered important because it came from "politically unsophisticated" sources (Future Political Status Commission 1969:30). The Future Political Status Commission stated that the need to move forward with the status issue was of greater importance than the political education or involvement of the general public (Future Political Status Commission 1969:31). The U.S.-educated Micronesian elite who made up the commission felt that they were the only people capable of deciding Micronesia's future, and they wanted no interference from their constituents.

No one I interviewed or talked to during my fieldwork between 1984-1986 could remember any public hearings or meetings held before 1971. Many Micronesians either did not know about or did not understand the issue of political status. Despite this, and despite the lack of integration of public input into the Commission's work, former Micronesian staff member, Carl Heine, blamed non-Micronesian

"self-appointed advisors" for the rejection of the draft compact by the Congress of Micronesia in 1972, writing that the criticism expressed was "at best, shallow and superficial" (Heine 1974:131, 153, 155-56). Some of these "self-appointed advisors" were the same Peace Corps volunteers who had worked as lawyers for the Congress of Micronesia and District Legislatures.

The Congress of Micronesia and the Political Status Delegation were having other problems besides feeling superior to the people they represented. By 1971, internal cultural and political differences between the Northern Marianas and the other districts of the Trust Territory began to cause difficulties in the political status negotiation process. The people of the Marianas wanted commonwealth status for their islands, and the delegation and the Congress of Micronesia had decided against accepting the United States offer of commonwealth. In February, 1971, the Marianas District Legislature voted to secede from Micronesia "by force of arms if necessary" (McHenry 1975:103) and join the United States. The Marianas members of Congress approached the U.S. negotiators about the possibility of splitting off from the rest of the Trust Territory and pursuing the status of commonwealth for their separate islands. The United States agreed to the separate negotiations, and Franklin Haydn Williams announced the decision in a speech to the Marianas Political Status

Commission on Saipan (Nufer 1978:85). During the fourth round of negotiations in Koror, Palau, the U.S. negotiating team began talks with the Northern Marianas leaders (Armstrong 1979:216).

The United States agreed to these separate talks for at least two reasons. First, it was clear that the Northern Marianas wanted to negotiate separately from the rest of the Trust Territory. They had tried since 1951 to gain either reintegration with Guam or commonwealth status for themselves (Solenberger 1979:222). The cultural, linguistic, and kinship ties between Guam and the Northern Marianas were strong, and increased business activities, particularly tourism, were developing between Guam and its northern neighbors. The residents of the Northern Marianas did not want to share their business and tourism revenues with the poorer residents of the other districts. When a Trust Territory income tax bill was proposed for the islands, with the funds collected to become general revenue for the use of all of the districts, Saipan arsonists set fire to the Congress chambers and the home of the Trust Territory High Commissioner in protest (Pacific Daily News, Feb. 21, 1971).

The second reason for the United States' ready acceptance of separate negotiations was the desire of the U.S. military to secure land for naval and air bases in the western Pacific. The military planned to construct new bases on Tinian and possibly on Rota, bases that would

strengthen existing forces on Guam and in the Philippines (McHenry 1975:63), and thereby help secure the proposed "forward defense area" which encompassed the Philippines, the Caroline Islands, Guam, the Northern Marianas, and Japan (McHenry 1975:69).[2]

Meanwhile, dissent within the Micronesian Political Status Delegation spread with the formation of the Independence Coalition in the Congress of Micronesia (Gale 1979:229; Meller 1985:56). In 1971, the Independence Coalition claimed a loose membership of 11 of 33 members of the Congress of Micronesia (Meller 1985:68). By early 1972, the membership increased to half of the members of the Congress (Wiliander 1972:21).

In the third round of negotiations in Hana, Hawaii (Oct. 4-12, 1971), the U.S. and the Political Status Delegation agreed on a status of "free association" where the United States would retain control over foreign affairs and defense, and Micronesia would control the internal government. United States laws would apply only where mutually agreed upon under this initial arrangement (Armstrong 1979:216).

Even though the two negotiation teams agreed on the status of "free association," two issues, control of land and a unilaterally revocable compact, were again points of contention. At one point Ambassador Williams implied that some flexibility on the part of the Micronesian delegation

would produce concessions from the United States (McHenry 1975:109). If the Micronesian delegation members had agreed among themselves, compromises might have been worked out between the two sides, which in turn would have allowed the whole negotiating process to end many years sooner than it did. For example, near the end of the third round of negotiations, a compromise 5-year unilateral termination period was considered by the Delegation and almost offered to the United States. However, the chairman of the delegation, Lazarus Salii, had already made public statements against any such proposal (McHenry 1975:108-109), and after much heated debate the delegation decided not to make the offer (Heine 1974:129).

In the fourth round, at Koror, Palau (April 2-13, 1972), the termination procedures of any negotiated political compact between the two countries was the main topic of discussion. The U.S. remained firm in its position that bilateral consent should be required before the termination of any political arrangement between the two countries. Salii, having received authorization from the Congress of Micronesia to come to some kind of agreement (McHenry 1975:109), felt that the right of unilateral termination was essential to preserve the sovereignty of Micronesia. Salii proposed a compromise procedure which contained four conditions: 1) there would be an initial five year period when termination would require mutual consent; 2) there-

after, one-year notice would be required for unilateral termination by either party; 3) unilateral termination by Micronesia would have to be approved by the Congress of Micronesia and a majority of the public; and 4) immediately upon notice of termination, both parties would negotiate in good faith a security agreement which would protect the United States' military base plans (McHenry 1975:110). The United States negotiators agreed after they changed the initial five-year period to fifteen years, and added procedures which would allow individual districts the option of association, even if Micronesia as a whole decided to vote for independence.

The fourth round of negotiations was important because for the first time the United States and the Micronesians agreed on the principal of unilateral termination. In addition, both parties reinforced their agreement reached at Hana, Hawaii during the third round, that a Compact of Free Association would govern the relationship between the two countries, with the United States in charge of defense and foreign affairs, and Micronesia in charge of internal affairs. And for the first time the question of money was discussed in the context of the negotiations; the Micronesian Delegation proposed 100 million dollars annually, which the United States rejected.

After round four, the Political Status Delegation was reorganized as the Joint Committee of Future Status; Salii and the key members were kept on the Committee.

The actual work of drafting a Compact agreement began during round five, held in Washington, D.C. (July 12-Aug. 1, 1972). Three major sections were drafted; Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Defense. Four other sections required further work and were not included in this initial Draft Compact of Free Association; finance, trade and commerce, immigration, and travel. Eight major provisions were included in the Draft:

1) Micronesians would have the right to adopt their own constitution, which could be changed at any time within the limits set by the Draft Compact.

2) The government of Micronesia would be in charge of internal affairs.

3) In the event of termination of the Compact, the Micronesians could choose their own political status.

4) The United States would be in charge of foreign affairs.

5) The United States would avoid interference in internal affairs while discharging its obligations in foreign affairs.

6) The United States would be in charge of the defense of Micronesia.

7) The United States would have an exclusive right to establish military bases and facilities in Micronesia.

8) Any further land requirements by the United States would be submitted to the Micronesian government for approval (McHenry 1975:242).

Finance obligations were not agreed upon by the time of the fifth round and therefore were not in the Draft Compact.

The Micronesian Joint Committee proposed that financial and transitional arrangements be discussed during the sixth round and the U.S. agreed. Both sides agreed that the language of the Draft Compact was tentative and preliminary until final approval of the complete compact was obtained.

Everyone who was part of the Micronesian and American negotiating groups seemed relatively pleased with the negotiations after the fifth round, with mutual feelings of accomplishment. In Micronesia, however, things were not going so well. The Independence Coalition had gained support throughout Micronesia, and the Congress of Micronesia was forced to hold two special sessions, one in Truk, the other in Pohnpei, while the Congress chambers in Saipan were rebuilt following the arson attack. In this atmosphere, the Joint Committee submitted the Draft Compact to the Congress of Micronesia for its approval, expecting to receive accolades for their effort. Instead, in August, 1972, Senator Roman Tmetuchl, a challenger for Salii's leadership of the Liberal Party of Palau, succeeded in having the Congress reject the Draft Compact and pass instead a resolution which required the Joint Committee to negotiate for free association and independence at the same time. It is obvious from this action that the Joint Committee and the Congress of Micronesia were not thinking about the political status negotiation in the same manner.

Until this time, only the Micronesian negotiators had a good understanding of the negotiation process, what had been agreed upon, and even what "free association" was. Although the members of the Congress of Micronesia had been presented with the official reports from the Joint Committee, and supposedly had held extensive discussions with them, what was actually put on paper in the draft compact and the rhetoric of the political arena were perceived by the members of Congress as two different things. There was also increased pressure from the general populace of the Micronesian islands with regard to the whole negotiation process. Despite the lack of a formal attempt to inform and educate the public, information had been circulated and a lot of Micronesians were not happy with what they were hearing (Heine 1974:153).

After reading the Micronesian congressional records, and talking to many Pohnpeians about this period of the negotiations, I think that what bothered people the most was the lack of discussion of financial assistance--specifically, dollar amounts--in the Draft Compact. There had been hints all along, by both sides, that the eventual negotiated political status and the final dollar amount of financial assistance agreed to by the United States would be related. There were some people, primarily the members of the Independence Coalition, who thought the United States should pay for an "association" with Micronesia. The

general public of Micronesia also wanted to see what kind of money was offered before they gave their approval (no matter how unofficial) to any agreement. And finally, the Micronesian traditional leaders had long understood how to negotiate "political relationships" for the best possible price; they had a history of negotiation with foreigners for over 200 years. With the passage of the resolution rejecting the Draft Compact, the Congress of Micronesia in effect said they would decide on the form of the political association when they felt the money issue met their requirements. Clearly, the final dollar amount was felt to be more important than the subtle differences between "free association" and independence, and the Congress would approve whichever status they felt had the greatest financial payoff.

When the United States negotiators heard about the new mandate from the Congress of Micronesia, they blamed Salii for the derailment of the negotiations. The Americans felt Salii was having political difficulties in his home district of Palau, and in an attempt to bolster his own political credibility (important for someone who came from the lowest-ranking island in Palau), Salii introduced the Draft Compact to the Congress too soon and without adequate preparation of the legislators (McHenry 1975:111). The rejection of the Draft Compact by the Congress of Micronesia and the passage of Tmetuchl's resolution put Salii under considerable

pressure to negotiate for independence (a status he did not agree with), along with free association, which he did agree with. The rest of the Joint Committee was equally caught off-guard by the move of the Congress. During the next round of talks with the United States, Senators Tosiwo Nakayama and Andon Amaraich, both from Truk, and both ardent supporters of independence, were unprepared to begin negotiating for independence as a viable political status (McHenry 1975:112).

The sixth round of negotiations, held at Barbers Point, Hawaii (Sept. 28-Oct. 6, 1972), quickly broke down over the move by the Micronesians to negotiate simultaneously for independence and free association. Despite Salii's insistence that the new negotiation mandate was the will of the Congress of Micronesia, the Americans did not take it seriously. They believed Salii's willingness to negotiate for independence (a status he did not want for Micronesia), after he put so much time and effort into the Draft Compact, was an effort to bolster his credibility and influence in Palau after he was seriously challenged by Tmetuchl. The official response of the U.S. negotiators was that they did not know what the Micronesians meant by "independence" and they had no instructions on how to deal with the issue in any case. The independence advocates in the Congress of Micronesia were adamant about having the choice of independence included in any plebiscite held in Micronesia; the

Americans were equally adamant that independence was out of the question as far as U.S. strategic needs in Micronesia were concerned. The talks broke down completely when the U.S. negotiators said they were unwilling to discuss any finance issues given the new mandate of the Joint Committee, and would not discuss finance issues until the new mandate of the Joint Committee was made clear to them (McHenry 1975:243). In turn, the Joint Committee disagreed with the United States government's decision to negotiate separately with the Northern Marianas (which began after the official fourth round meetings in Palau), and repeated an earlier statement that said the Joint Committee was responsible for negotiating the future political status of all six of the Trust Territory districts.

Over a year passed between the sixth and seventh round of negotiations. During that year the Micronesians and Americans disagreed over the issue of independence brought up by the Micronesian Congress, the return of public lands to Micronesian control, and the U.S. government's negotiations with the Northern Marianas. Round seven of the negotiations did not occur until November 14-21, 1973, in Washington, D.C. By that time, the Independence Coalition had lost strength and members. The inclusion in the Draft Compact of a provision for unilateral termination served to satisfy the supporters of independence that any negotiated agreement would only be in place on an interim basis until

Micronesia achieved full political independence (Meller 1985:69). The political status of independence for Micronesia was not discussed by the Micronesian negotiators during the seventh round. The only reference to independence by the United States negotiators was a remark made by Ambassador Haydn Williams who said the amount of money Micronesia could expect from the Americans would depend on the closeness of the political relationship between the islands and the United States government (Armstrong 1979:218). This was, from the beginning, the key to the United States position in the negotiation process--the U.S. was not concerned with the amount of money a political agreement with Micronesia would cost, as long as the political ties between the two countries were rock solid. The United States was willing to pay for what it wanted, and the main thing they wanted in Micronesia was the right to keep everyone else out (particularly the Soviets). This was in contrast to the Micronesian idea that the type of status was less important than the final dollar amount of any negotiated agreement. As I have shown in the history of the contact between Euroamericans and Pohnpeians, this approach had been evident in the Micronesians' behavior for over a century.

A complicating factor in the negotiations was that, prior to round six, the Micronesians did not appear interested in deciding what the bottom line should be. Other

things seemed to take precedence, particularly among the general populace of Micronesia. The most important was the right of eminent domain the United States possessed in the Trust Territory. Many Micronesians (especially on Palau and on Pohnpei where 68% and 66% of the land area, respectively, was open to eminent domain) feared that if the right of eminent domain was left in any negotiated agreement, the Micronesians would eventually lose control over their land to the United States military. No amount of money could compensate for this loss of control over land, an important element in Micronesian cultures. In an effort to draw the Micronesians back to the negotiating table after the impasse in Barbers Point, the U.S. announced that public lands would be transferred to local control and the right of eminent domain would cease upon termination of the Trust Territory (Armstrong 1979:219).

Despite these concessions, talks broke down again after round seven. The United States negotiators proposed a 43 million dollar annual grant to Micronesia, and the Micronesians counter-proposed an 80 million dollar annual grant and the continuation of U.S. domestic programs. The negotiators were unable to draft a compromise. Earlier, after the breakdown of talks following round four, the heads of the United States and Micronesian delegations convened for "informal" talks and worked out an agreement on their differences. The same thing occurred in 1974 after the

breakdown of negotiations following round seven. The Joint Committee of Future Status was already small, with only six key members, but apparently this was still too many people to reach an agreement, so the head of each negotiating team met three different times (in Carmel, California, Guam, and Hawaii) and worked out a compromise grant payment. The agreement stipulated payment of 55 million dollars annually for 15 years, plus a capital improvements program totaling 145 million dollars, to begin before termination of the Trust Territory (Armstrong 1979:220). This was 230 million dollars less than the Micronesians proposed, and the annual grant of 55 million dollars was 5 million dollars less each year than the actual appropriation received from the United States in 1974 (Gale 1979:104).

Every time the Micronesians decreased their representation in the negotiation process, they ended up with less than what they were already receiving from the United States. The Congress of Micronesia should have opened up the negotiation process to more people from their islands, rather than relying on the apparently faulty judgement of their negotiators. The unwillingness of the Congress and the political negotiation team to open up the process has continued to create difficulties in Micronesian politics to the present day, particularly with regard to state versus national government rights and obligations.

The year 1975 was the culmination of the talks between the United States and the Northern Marianas. The result was the signing of the "Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America" (Armstrong 1979:216). The Covenant was passed by the Northern Marianas Legislature and approved by the people of the Northern Marianas in a plebiscite later that year.

Talks with the rest of the islands of the Trust Territory did not continue until 1976. Round eight was held in Saipan (May 28-June 2, 1976) and by its end, both parties had initialled a Draft Compact. Unfortunately, the Draft Compact was missing a section concerned with the control of marine resources, an area the Congress of Micronesia considered to be very important. A newly reorganized Commission on Future Political Status and Transition took over the Micronesian end of the negotiations. Andon Amaraich from Truk was named chairman of the new Commission, but no new talks were held until late 1977 (Armstrong 1979:220).

The reason no new talks were held for over a year is the Trust Territory continued to fragment politically. Both Palau and the Marshalls were now pushing for separate negotiations for their islands, both for the same reason the Northern Marianas had wanted a commonwealth status--they did not want to share their current and expected financial resources with the poorer islands of the central Carolines

(Armstrong 1979:223). The Marshalls received a substantial sum of money each year from the United States for the use of Kwajalein Atoll for testing new missiles and tracking systems. Up to this time, the money from the Kwajalein leases went into the general funds used by the Trust Territory administration for all of the Trust Territory districts. The Marshalls wanted this money for their exclusive use. In March of 1974, the Marshall Islands District Legislature adopted a resolution informing the United Nations that they did not want to be a part of Micronesia upon completion of the negotiations with the United States, and that they intended to pursue their own line of negotiations. Amata Kabua, a Senator from the Marshalls in the Congress of Micronesia, was named chairman of the Marshall Islands Political Status Commission. (Kabua is currently the President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.)

Palau's position was similar. Although the Palauans did not have any United States military activity on any of their islands (other than the American military Civil Action Teams, primarily composed of engineers and heavy equipment operators, found on all of the main islands in Micronesia), the potential for new bases was high, given Palau's geographic location in the "Defensive Arc" envisioned by the United States military. Also, Palau was considered by the U.S. as a potential fall-back position if the military ever

lost its bases in the Philippines. Like the Marshalls, Palau formed its own Political Status Commission, with Congress of Micronesia Senator Roman Tmetuchl as its chairman.

As I noted earlier, Micronesia called for a constitutional convention which took place July 12-Nov. 8, 1975. Senator Tosiwo Nakayama from Truk, presided over the convention, which included elected delegates and traditional leaders (Meller 1985). Both the Palau and the Marshall delegations to the "ConCon" were ambivalent about the resulting constitution because both groups of islands had already formed their own negotiation teams and planned to separate from the rest of Micronesia. The legislation that accompanied the draft constitution specified that four of the five districts had to approve it in order for the constitution to become effective. If both Palau and the Marshalls voted against it, as expected, the draft constitution would fail, and the Trust Territory would irrevocably split apart.

The Kosraians, at the time a part of Pohnpei District, were not happy with the way they were treated as by the Pohnpei Legislature when it came time to divide money and services. Consequently, for some time the Kosraians had been asking the TTPI administration to make their island a separate district. If the proposed Federated States of Micronesia constitution was to survive, four districts had

to approve it, so the backers of the constitution decided to support Kosrae's request to become a separate district, gambling Kosrae would vote for the constitution (Hanlon and Eperiam 1983:88). Since Yap, Truk, and Pohnpei were all backers of the constitution, Kosrae's vote would make the constitution effective and it would not matter how Palau and the Marshalls voted. Thus, the United States was faced with the prospect of having three different negotiation processes where there had been just one.

Faced with the increased fragmentation of the Trust Territory and virtually no progress on the status negotiations for almost two years, the United States attempted to stabilize the situation. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus invited the leaders of the Congress of Micronesia and the speakers of the six district legislatures to a conference in Honolulu on May 18-21, 1977. Two policy points were made by the U.S. at this conference. First, President Carter wanted the negotiations to continue, with termination of the Trust Territory by 1981. Second, even though the United States was in favor of a united Micronesia, it was not against separate negotiations. The latter policy was prompted by the strong separatist statements made by both Kabua and Tmetuchl at this conference, and it became clear to the U.S. negotiators that a framework incorporating three separate negotiation processes would have to be worked out.

A second conference was called for July 25-27, 1977, on Guam. During this conference, a two-tier negotiation process was designed (Armstrong 1979:225). The first tier would focus on those aspects of any future political status common to all six of the districts. The second tier would address specific items of interest to each individual district. Each district legislature would send its own representatives, thereby insuring that the unity of Micronesia would be decided on a district level. Given the negative vote by both Palau and the Marshalls on the proposed Federated States of Micronesia constitution, this policy of two-tier negotiations effectively opened the door for separate negotiations for Palau, the Marshalls, and the FSM.

Renewed negotiations were begun in 1977 at Molokai, Hawaii (October 24-27), with Ambassador Peter R. Rosenblatt appointed by President Carter as his personal representative (Armstrong 1979:225). These meetings were followed in 1978 by two meetings between the heads of the delegations in San Diego, and Hilo, Hawaii. The Molokai meeting and the special meeting in San Diego revealed that some significant differences still existed between the two delegations. One difference was that the two delegations were not using the same definitions for various items (like "free association") under negotiation. The Hilo, Hawaii meeting between just the heads of the delegations resulted in an agreement on

eight basic principles that defined the concepts under discussion. These principles guided the remainder of the negotiations. For the first time, the Micronesian political status commissions and the United States were talking about the same things.

On July 12, 1978, a referendum was held on the constitution proposed for the Federated States of Micronesia. As expected, the residents of Palau and the Marshalls voted against it, while the people of Yap, Truk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae voted in favor of it. The constitution was ratified for the latter four states, which became the Federated States of Micronesia. Palau became the Republic of Palau, and the Marshalls became the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The newly created states of the FSM held elections for the first Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia on March 27, 1979. Because of a provision in the constitution, the general populace does not elect the President, who is instead chosen by the other Senators in the Congress from a group of four elected at-large Senators. Tosiwo Nakayama, a Senator from Truk, and head of the Constitutional Convention, was chosen by the Congress as the first President.

Summary

The history of the negotiation process shows that the political development of Micronesia has followed a similar

pattern over the entire period of contact between Euro-americans and Micronesians. The one cultural trait which stands out is the propensity for Micronesian leaders to negotiate a political relationship with a foreign power based on the amount of resources they can expect to gain from the negotiated status, rather than the amount of political autonomy they will have under the agreement. This is a cultural trait, and not merely idiosyncratic behavior on the part of particular Micronesians. The men who negotiated with the United States during the 1960s and the 1970s were members of the new Micronesian elite, educated in western schools and universities. Still, this new elite negotiated in the same way their traditional leaders did with the whalers, the Spanish, the Germans, and the Japanese.

Acquiring resources took on a new meaning during the late 1960s and the 1970s because of the huge dollar amounts involved. Once both sides started to include actual amounts of money in their agreements, it became clear to everyone in Micronesia just how much could be gained from a close political relationship with the United States. To a certain extent, as early as 1969 the Micronesian negotiators knew they would be economically better off with a close political relationship with the United States. This is why the Future Political Status Delegation did not push the issue of independence very strenuously in the early 1970s, despite

the fact that they had been given instructions to do so by the Congress of Micronesia, and the fact that a large number of their constituents were in favor of independence. The announcement by the United States that the amount of any financial agreement was contingent on the type of political agreement between the two countries changed the behavior of the Micronesian negotiating team, and hastened the political fragmentation of the Trust Territory. This political fragmentation was further hastened by natural cultural differences between the districts and the desire of these districts to keep the money they received from the United States for their own use, rather than for the use of all Micronesians.

Notes

1) The members of the Future Political Status Commission, all members of the Congress of Micronesia, were: Lazarus Salii, Bailey Olter, John Mangefel, Tosiwo Nakayama, Francisco Palacios, and Ekpap Silk. Three Congress members were on the Commission during the work for the Interim Report, but were replaced for the Commission's second year: Amata Kabua, Petrus Mailo, and Francis Nuuan.

2) McHenry, writing in the early 1970s, concludes the United States military needs in Micronesia, particularly as a fall-back position, or forward defense area, were unwarranted. With the removal of Ferdinand Marcos as President of the Philippines, the statement made by the Philippine leftist guerrillas that they would not stop fighting until all United States bases were gone, and continuing strain throughout the Unites States' Asian allies over nuclear weapons being transported through their territory, contingency planning is still considered vital by the United States

military. For an extensive discussion of the military interests in Micronesia, see McHenry (1975:54-86).

CHAPTER 4
POHNPEIANS AND THE NEW POLITICAL ORDER

The Governed and Their Government

The future of the islands of Micronesia lies with its new government. In the preceding chapters I have outlined the history of Pohnpei from the first period of European contact to the present day. I have shown that the current political culture of Pohnpei reflects the competition for resources that is part of traditional Pohnpeian society and which, when combined with a benevolent foreign political system that encouraged their participation, caused the Pohnpeians to replace their traditional political system with the introduced system. The new system has since become the political system of choice for managing the day-to-day political activities of the island.

The case of political change on Pohnpei, and Micronesia in general, confirms what is already known about the process of forming small independent states (de Smith 1970). First, we know that running a government, even a small government such as the FSM, costs a lot of money. Western society has defined some things as essential to a minimum standard of living--things like electricity, water, indoor plumbing, effective health care, public schools, and roads. These

basics are only partially available on Pohnpei, but the capital investment needed to produce them would strain a national government that is trying to grow and expand.

Second, in the formative stages of a new government it is difficult to recruit skilled people for political and managerial positions. Low salaries and the lack of possibility for advancement kept skilled Americans away from Pohnpei during the early years of the U.S. Trust Territory administration. Micronesians who went through the American education system lacked practical experience, and as a consequence the government moved in fits and starts. Mistakes were made by both American and the Micronesian officials.

On Pohnpei, as in other small states (de Smith 1970:94; Benedict 1967), kinship, friendship, social status, and personal background often count more than do qualifications when someone is considered for employment or advancement in the government ranks. This produces inefficiency (in the Western sense of the word) in bureaucracies that may be inherently inefficient to begin with. Because of the opportunities for wage labor and other benefits and resources, the incentive to work for the government and to acquire political power is high among Pohnpeians. The fact that the government is the main employer on the island increases competition for jobs, nepotism, and corruption. Pohnpeians

perceive manipulation of the new political system as a means for an individual to acquire new resources.

For example, when plans were made by the FSM national government to build a new capital complex in Palikir, one of the early policy decisions was that local construction companies should have higher ranking in the bidding process, than off-island companies which often have lower costs due to a greater economy of scale. Construction contracts are resources offered by the political system.

The new system also provides government jobs which allow people to buy valued commercial goods that they could not otherwise afford. Because they have more money, they can also indulge in larger funerals, title feasts, and weddings.

Finally, the current government structure on Pohnpei was imposed completely from the outside by the American administration, with only a limited attempt to adapt the system to the island's needs, capabilities, and existing political system. The Americans flew in, dropped a bureaucracy on the island, and plugged it in. The fact that the political system works at all is a credit to the Micronesians' effort to construct a government for their islands, and the patience of the Pohnpeians to tolerate the FSM government on their island.

These four problem areas--high cost, lack of trained personnel, inefficiency, and an alien political

system--produce a tension which threatens to pull the new government of the FSM apart. A more fundamental problem is that the islands that make up the FSM nation are all separate ethnic cultures. At least three distinct languages (Pohnpeian, Nukuoroan, Kapinga), and three dialects of Pohnpeian (Mokilese, Pingelapese, Ngatikese) are spoken in the State of Pohnpei alone.[1] In addition, Pohnpei has a small population of Mortlockese who live in Sokehs. Because of the presence of the FSM government on Pohnpei, people from Truk, Yap, Palau, and the Marshalls are also currently living on Pohnpei. All of these people interact on a day-to-day basis, seemingly forming a plural society (Cohen and Middleton 1970:9).

To a certain extent, the same could have been said about the original Trust Territory, but the Trust Territory still split when it became evident to the Micronesians that the island groups could acquire more money from the United States by themselves, than they could receive by staying in one political union. The FSM faces the same kind of potential political division, since the government has a large, but finite, amount of money which has to be equitably distributed to a diverse set of ethnic groups. All of these groups will be trying to maximize their share of the funds.

The FSM Government

The Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia is a unicameral body that consists of one at-large member elected from each state, and ten members elected on the basis of population. The FSM Congress chooses the President and Vice-President from the pool of four at-large members. This method of choosing a President has met with some controversy, since some people claim that the general population should have a right to vote for their own President. However, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1975 felt that given the propensity for Micronesians to vote along ethnic lines, the differences in population between Truk and the other islands would allow Trukese a virtual monopoly on the office of the President and the Vice-President if these two positions were popularly elected (Meller 1985:296).

The initial transition from the Trust Territory government to that of the FSM was fraught with problems for two reasons: the desire of the newly elected members of the FSM Congress to be in charge of everything, and the continuing future political status negotiations with the United States.

These two areas are not entirely unconnected. One of the major reasons the negotiations with the United States started in 1969 was the need felt by members of the Congress of Micronesia to have more control in the administration and government of their own islands, particularly in the area of

finances. Not surprisingly, some key members of the new FSM Congress had also been members of the Congress of Micronesia, and they felt that with the power of the newly ratified Constitution behind them, they could at last have full control over their government. This attitude was bolstered by the earlier call of the Carter administration to terminate the Trust Territory Agreement in 1981.

From the TTPI government standpoint, the termination date was unclear, and the problems of dealing with four brand new governments, all clamoring for immediate and total control, made the TTPI administration reluctant to release any control over anything until it was clear that the four new governments were going to stay within the United States political "family." (In the case of the Marianas, of course, this was already assured.)

Particularly vexing for the FSM officials was the delay in funding and control over government finances. Initially, there were to be funds to help with the transition of the government from Saipan to Pohnpei. The FSM officials felt that having money available was critical to the standing of the new government vis-à-vis the Micronesian state and local officials. This feeling was made public in 1981 when Petrus Tun, the Vice-President of the FSM, criticized the TTPI administration for its slow movement on this issue. The Vice-President's statement was prompted by criticism from

the four FSM states that wanted their share of the money (The National Union, Sept. 30, 1981).

As both the TTPI administration and the FSM officials became more comfortable with the new political scene, the initial problems of transition were solved. More control over finances was passed on to the FSM government, but the Trust Territory High Commissioner retained the right to veto legislation approved by the executive and legislative branches of the FSM (a right the High Commissioner's office had held with the previous Congress of Micronesia). The TTPI administration also served as a distributor for most of the money the United States gave to the FSM. In an attempt to resolve the difficulties over money, and to enhance the position of the FSM government structure, the FSM officials worked to have the FSM designated as a "state agency," a designation that would allow the United States to appropriate money directly for the FSM, which in turn would pass it on to the individual states (The National Union, Sept. 15, 1982).

This was just one of a series of attempts to enhance the position of the FSM government in relation to that of the individual states. During the early years of the FSM government, FSM officials attempted to deal with the issue of national versus state jurisdiction and rights by sponsoring national-state leadership councils charged with working out the areas of authority and responsibility.

By the sixth and final session in August 1981, the problem of jurisdiction was set aside, and the question of who was going to continue job programs cut by the Reagan administration took priority (The National Union, Aug. 9, 1981). Despite this early effort, the definition of the jurisdiction between the FSM national government and the state governments continues to be a sensitive area. In an interview I had in early 1986, the governor of the State of Pohnpei identified this area as his primary concern for the future of the FSM government structure.

In his 1981 statement, Vice-President Petrus Tun also identified foreign investment, international trade, and commerce as three areas in which the national government and state governments had differences. These differences caused President Tosiwo Nakayama to issue Administrative Directive No. 1 on July 18, 1981. This order requires the state governments to receive FSM permission before they have any contacts with foreign governments (The National Union, Sept. 15, 1981). The primary reason Nakayama issued the order was because of overtures made by an elected official to the Soviet Union and other countries.

During the transition period, one of the most serious threats to the stability of the new FSM government was over the issue of independence for Faichuk, a small group of islands in the Truk Lagoon. Since 1960, the Faichuk residents have had an ongoing dispute with the leaders of

Truk over what they felt was too much attention paid to Moen, the district center, and not enough attention paid to the problems of the outer islands, Faichuk in particular. The Faichuk residents had tried to gain independence for their islands since 1960, because they believed that as an independent state they would receive a higher level of goods, services, medical treatment, and capital improvement projects. The granting of state status for Kosrae for no other reason than to assure the ratification of the Constitution simply increased the Faichuk residents' enthusiasm for their own independence. As a result of their lobbying efforts, a bill to make Faichuk a separate state was introduced in the first session of the FSM Congress. The bill never made it out of committee, but was reintroduced during the Second Congress (The National Union, July 30, 1981). Again, no action was taken, but the bill was finally passed during a special session of the Third Congress held on Truk (Petersen 1982b:76).

Reaction to the bill was immediate and negative, especially on Pohnpei. For years Pohnpeians have felt some antagonism and foreboding about the Trukese, their greatest fear being that the Trukese would somehow gain control of Pohnpei. The current voting situation in the FSM Congress is a balance between Truk and the other three states, Yap, Pohnpei, and Kosrae. In the Faichuk independence bill,

Pohnpeians saw the rise of yet another Trukese state, and the possibility of Trukese dominance of the FSM government.

Pohnpei political leaders, joined by leaders from Yap, voiced strong opposition to passage of the bill. Faced with this kind of local opposition, President Nakayama had no choice but to veto the legislation. The Faichuk islanders were very upset with the veto and later Nakayama admitted he may have saved the FSM union at the expense of his own political future (Anonymous 1982).

The veto did not completely mollify the Pohnpeians' negative feelings toward the FSM government. One increasingly voiced complaint was that Pohnpei's old and inadequate electrical generators were overloaded even more than usual with the addition of the FSM government offices and facilities. (According to Petersen (1982b:76) the lack of electricity was the reason the special session of the Third Congress was held on Truk.) In addition, there were complaints about alleged discrimination in hiring for FSM government jobs (The National Union, Feb. 15, 1982). There was also opposition against the plans for the new government's capitol buildings to be built in the Palikir area of Sokehs municipality.[2] People who had become more aware of the benefits to be gained from the FSM government wanted increased local benefits from the capitol construction (The National Union, Nov. 30, 1981). With regard to the new capitol construction, the Pohnpei State legislators, often

at odds with the FSM legislators, wanted special funding made available to local residents for the construction of housing which would then be rented to FSM government employees. There were also complaints from prominent Pohnpeians, such as Bethwel Henry, Speaker of the Pohnpei State Legislature, about the excessive land requirements of the capitol project.[3]

All of this negative feeling about the FSM government, and the way the FSM government was managed on Pohnpei, caused some Pohnpei State legislators to introduce a bill in early 1982 in the Legislature which called for a referendum on whether or not Pohnpei should remain part of the FSM. The bill was never passed, but the fact of its introduction did make the FSM officials aware they would not be able to make broad governmental decisions without first having local Pohnpeian support. Even though Pohnpei's elected representatives and the governor of the state expressed support for the FSM, these were the public reactions they thought were necessary to avert a crisis. Many of the Pohnpeians I interviewed, including state government employees, felt the FSM government was out of touch with what the states needed in government services. Many people also had the opinion the areas under the control of the FSM government should be turned over to the various state departments.

From the beginning, then, the FSM government has tried to centralize the functions of its executive, legislative,

and judicial branches in order to enhance its power over the states. To do this, FSM official have tried to control economic development and finances on the individual islands. At the request of the President, the FSM Congress passed legislation creating three national development committees: the Foreign Investment Board, the FSM Development Bank, and the FSM Copra Development Board.

The Copra Board generally sets the government price for copra, but they respond to the world market price for copra, rather than set artificially supported prices. This limits the amount of change the Copra Board can effect on its own. Also, there are few people who still depend on copra as their source of cash income. My informants told me that during the "Arab oil embargo" of the mid-1970s, copra prices rose world wide and a lot of people were able to make money from copra production. (It was never clear how the embargo affected prices.) Copra prices have dropped since then, however, and now it is mainly outer-islanders and some rural families who continue to make copra. Even for these people, their production has dropped and they no longer rely on copra as their only source of cash. Unless copra prices rise on the world market, the Copra Board will continue to have little effect on government policy decisions.

Real power is present on the other two boards, however. The Foreign Investment Board has the right to say "no" to any investment activity by non-Pohnpeians. While I was on

Pohnpei, a Pohnpei resident applied to the Board to build a new "shopping center." The main component of the center was to be a variety store which would feature a diversified inventory and competitive prices. The Pohnpei resident's obligation was to supply the site, using land his family had owned since the German administration, while outside investors would supply the money (about ten million dollars). The Foreign Investment Board decided against the application for the new business complex. It was widely rumored among Pohnpeians that the board acted in this manner to prevent the new project from undercutting the prices of goods at other large stores, forcing them out of business. The potential loss of these other businesses might be enough to cause a negative decision by an FSM government body. Several of the Foreign Investment Board members were currently active businessmen, however. One owned a large store on the island and was allegedly under financial strain. To my knowledge, no official statement concerning this episode was ever released. This lack of an official statement, plus the apparent conflict of interest in having businessmen make regulatory decisions that affect their competitors, gives the appearance that a few businessmen are exerting influence in order to maintain a monopoly on the sale of consumer goods sold on Pohnpei. Consumers might have enjoyed lower prices if the new stores had been constructed, but the businessmen would make more profit if

prices continued to stay high. The interests of consumers and businessmen were opposed. and consumers lost.

It is no coincidence that Pohnpeian government leaders are also business leaders. By and large, the government leaders have more years of education, and because of this, more English, math, and business skills, than rural islanders. These skills allow them to take advantage of the rapidly changing economy of Micronesia. These personal attributes also make them good loan risks. Consequently, a large number of development loans go to government leaders and their relatives, instead of to Pohnpeians living in the rural areas of the island.

The third national-level committee, the FSM Development Bank, is in the business of loaning money. Any Micronesian can apply for a loan from the Development Bank, and many Pohnpeians do apply for business loans. The most common information I heard about the FSM Development Bank during my interviews was that only "big shots" could receive loans. This may not be the official policy of the FSM Development Bank, but there is some evidence that business is conducted as if it were. In 1986, a potential applicant told me he had asked about the availability of a loan for a minimum of 30,000 dollars, and possibly much more. He was told by the FSM Development Bank that his loan was assured and that he would not even need collateral, because his business partner

was a very prominent elected FSM official who had other business interests on Pohnpei.

There are other sources of loan money on Pohnpei. The two bank branches on the island (the Bank of Hawaii, and the Bank of Guam) gave out personal loans while I was on Pohnpei, although the loan agreements usually restricted what the borrower could do with the money. There was also an office of the Farmer's Home Administration in Kolonia. The FHA office was originally established on Pohnpei to give loans to farmers and rural residents. Their loan policy changed, however. One interviewee told me his father-in-law, who was a subsistence farmer and fisherman, had applied for a loan from the FHA office, because he needed some money to develop some of his land for agriculture. He was told by the FHA employee his loan application was denied because he did not have a government job. The only way he would receive the loan was if his son-in-law, who did have a government job, would cosign and agree to have the loan payments deducted from his paycheck. My interviewee pointed out that if the applicant had had a government job, he would not have had the time or energy to proceed with his agricultural plans, and therefore would not have applied for the loan in the first place. He could not understand why a government agency would adopt procedures that made it impossible for people to receive the services the agency was supposed to provide.

Feelings of resentment toward the FSM government are perpetuated by stories like these, and others about the dealings of politicians and prominent Micronesians. Unfortunately, the decisions of the FSM Development Bank, the Foreign Investment Board, or any other government agency, are not generally open to the public. Requests for information about the basis for decisions are not granted to the local population. Information is only derived from "insiders" in the government, who may or may not know the whole story. Pohnpeians thrive on gossip, but it is not the most reliable source of facts. I found that one result of this lack of information about government decision-making is that most Pohnpeians, even those who have government jobs, do not know much about how their government works or what it is doing.

Other attempts by the FSM government to centralize the operations of the government structure are evident in the requirement that the individual states must submit detailed five-year development plans to the FSM. The FSM is trying to direct the process to ensure that national and state interests are compatible. In addition, a U.N. technical advisor recommended the FSM take direct control over development projects in the individual states (The National Union, Aug. 15, 1982).

The most significant arena of conflict over national versus state control of government, however, is the Compact

of Free Association with the United States. The FSM was the sole negotiator of the Compact, and is the recipient of all of the money, as well as the dispenser of the funds to the states. Having close to one billion dollars over the next fifteen years makes the FSM government structure very important for the future well-being of the islands.

The Governed and Their Government Leaders

On Pohnpei, there has always been a distinction between people in the social, political, and economic areas of the society. Traditionally, the Nahnmwarkis and Nahnkens, each with eleven title-holders below them, were at the top. Prior to European contact, the Nahnmwarkis had an almost-sacred aura. They refrained from (or were not allowed to) participate in the mundane day-to-day affairs of the society. The Nahnkens took care of the administration and both the Nahnmwarkis and the Nahnkens shared in the benefits bestowed on them because of their rank; most often, food and labor was given to them by the commoners in payment for use of the Nahnmwarkis land.

During the period of European contact, from about 1820 until the beginning of the German administration in 1898, the Nahnmwarkis became more involved in the day-to-day administration of their kingdoms. The most obvious sign of this increased involvement was the employment of the "beachcombers", the shipwrecked or deserted sailors from the

whaling and merchant ships, who began to exploit the resources of the islands in the early 1800s. In trade for an easy life, housing, food, women, and a limited form of authority, the Nahnmwarkis received from the beachcombers the benefits of their trading skills and their contacts with the European ships' captains. The most highly sought after European items--cloth, iron pots, muskets and tobacco--were paid for by the labor and resources of the Nahnmwarkis' people. The lower ranking Pohnpeians were not blind to the activities of their leaders and some of them realized that the high ranking title holders were taking advantage of them for personal gain--in conflict with the traditional definition of how the leaders were supposed to behave. Consequently, these lower ranking Pohnpeians began to make their own deals with the ships' captains and crew, often by trading women for goods.

Prior to the German administration, the Nahnmwarkis were in control of the land in their kingdoms. Their people grew crops and lived on the land only with the permission of the Nahnmwarkis. The Germans, seeing this practice as detrimental to productivity and efficiency, declared all land would be owned by individuals and divided up the five Nahnmwarkis' land, giving fee simple title to heads of households. They also declared an end to the extensive feasting system through which the Nahnmwarkis and Nahnkens, and to a lesser extent other title-holders, gained a

substantial portion of their resources. The Germans did allow one yearly feast in honor of the Nahnmwarkis to remain. Due to actions by both outsiders and the Nahnmwarkis themselves, the control over the social, political, and economic areas of the island held by the Nahnmwarkis began to erode.[4]

The Japanese administration continued the process of reducing the control of the Nahnmwarkis over their people. The Japanese nominally recognized the Nahnmwarkis as leaders, but they installed their own administrators to handle the affairs of the people. The Nahnmwarkis simply became contact points for the Japanese.

The American administration finished the process of removing political control of the island from the Nahnmwarkis. There had always been Pohnpeians who resented the feasting and tribute system dominated by the Nahnmwarkis and the other high title-holders, so the reduction in power of the Nahnmwarkis was easier to accomplish than might have been anticipated. During the American administration, the position of chief magistrate and a municipal council were established in each municipality, and each position was popularly elected. Pohnpeians continued to hold a certain amount of respect for the Nahnmwarkis and some voted for the Nahnmwarkis to become the first chief magistrates. By the late 1940s, however, the Nahnmwarkis controlled only the title system; they had, and continue to have, the power to

give and take away the titles that every man covets. As younger Pohnpeians gained a western education and command of English, they began to move into the chief magistrate positions and various positions within the Trust Territory government.

This younger generation of Pohnpeians shapes the future of the island. All of them have attended schools based on the American education system (Colletta 1980). Most have attended college in the United States, the Philippines, or Australia. Many have bachelor degrees, and a number of Pohnpeians have graduate degrees.

This process of the traditional leaders being forced out of government has been repeated on some of the other islands in Micronesia. The Marianas have no "traditional" leaders, and Truk's traditional chiefs work primarily at the village level, so it was natural that in these islands the educated younger generation would rise quickly to the top positions in the American imposed government structure. The Kosraean traditional leaders were replaced during the early missionary period. Yap has the strongest traditional component in Micronesia, but Yap's traditional leaders are not anti-progress. This helps to alleviate tension between the younger and older generations. Palau has basically followed the pattern of Pohnpei, and Palauan traditional leaders do not have the power and influence they had at one time. The "traditional" component in the Palau government

is primarily made up of younger, educated Palauans who have chosen to back traditional culture as a political maneuver against the leaders of the opposition party. In the Marshalls, there is great tension between the iroij currently in power and the commoners, especially with regard to the Kwajalein Atoll lease money paid by the United States. While the iroij are currently in control of the Marshallese government, the Kwajalein dispute indicates that basic factional disagreements, present since at least the 1960s, are still causing disruption.

A significant number of current Micronesian political leaders do not come from backgrounds where they or their families hold high-ranking titles. The current President of Palau, Lazarus Salii, a prime mover in the Congress of Micronesia, and in the negotiations for the Compact of Free Association, comes from a low ranking island in Palau. Likewise, the current Vice-President of the FSM, Bailey Olter, is from Mokil, an outlying island of Pohnpei sometimes looked down upon by some of the more ethnocentric of Pohnpei's residents. I was told by one informant that a past governor of the state of Pohnpei was given a title from his home municipality because he had attained political prominence but did not have a title. More and more of these kinds of "honorary" titles are being given to Pohnpeian businessmen and politicians.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the American administration was looking for people who were able to carry out governmental decisions in Micronesia. The two qualities defined as most important for any Micronesian who wanted to work in the TTPI structure was knowledge of English and knowledge about the new political system the United States wanted to introduce. The newly educated Micronesians coming out of the University of Hawaii fit these job qualifications, and they were chosen for jobs in the TTPI government over traditional leaders who could not speak English.

What occurred, then, was the fostering of a new American educated political elite which has dominated the government political arena for the past twenty-five years. This elite group has used the government structure to further the political and economic goals of their respective Micronesian countries. Along the way they have also furthered their own personal goals of gaining resources and prestige. New members have been allowed in, but the basic direction and focus of the group has remained the same.

That this elite group is present is readily apparent by examining the list of names of those in top government positions in the TTPI government, and comparing it to the names in the current FSM, Palau and Marshalls governments. On Pohnpei, new members of this elite frequently come into the system through the State Legislature, or occasionally, from the municipal level. However, a recent election in

Pohnpei indicates there has been little change at the FSM level of government. All three candidates for the Pohnpei at-large senatorial seat were men who have been active in TTPI and Micronesian government since the early 1960s, and all of them have held top elected positions in the past.

Field and Higley (1985:10-11) define a national elite as a group of people consisting "of persons who are strategically located in the major hierarchical organizations of bureaucratic societies, who arbitrate and manipulate the conflicts of interest which pervade such organizations and societies, and who utilize organizational power to influence national political processes and decisions." They distinguish this national elite from "the family-based aristocratic, caste, tribal, and other ruling groups which exist in largely agrarian, nonbureaucratic societies" (Field and Higley 1985:11). Political situations such as Micronesia have been defined as being unable to start a spontaneous political elite because the political processes in the country are the result of what the dominant political power (in this case the United States) will allow (Field and Higley 1985:11).

I would argue that the new political leaders in Micronesia fit the definition of a national elite, despite the fact that the United States was the force behind the new elite's beginnings. The political leaders in Micronesia today constitute a new political elite for two reasons.

First, the traditional leaders, chosen by the American administrators for the initial political positions, were not able to maintain power in a pan-Micronesian sense. In some cases they could not control individual islands. Second, there have been no significant moves to change the current form of government found in Micronesia. Despite considerable freedom at the Micronesian Constitutional Convention, no proposals for socialist, communist, autocratic, or other forms of government were made. The delegates to the "ConCon" were clearly in favor of keeping the form of the American-style government in place. There was considerable support for a plural executive form of government, but a uniexecutive form was chosen--even though this was an artificially introduced form of government, and the plural executive form fit the traditional models found in Micronesia (Meller 1985:202-205).

During my research I asked people what motivates a young Micronesian to enter politics. Their answers reflected the same things that governed political life for centuries on the islands--resources and power. In the traditional system on Pohnpei, working your way up the title-ladder was the way to gain resources (food, and sometimes labor), and social respect. With regard to the two "royal" lines of titles below the Nahnmwarkis and Nahnkens, land was also included as a benefit. With the coming of the American administration, the way up the new political ladder was to

join the Americans in their administration of the islands. The rewards were the same as with the traditional system--influence, and resources, especially money which was an increasingly important commodity on the islands. If a young man was bright enough, and persistent enough, there were virtually no limits to how high he could go in the new political game, whether or not he held a high ranking title. As one writer put it: "Like the military in some developing countries, [the elected government] has at times been an avenue for those not in selected positions according to traditional measurements of power" Gale (1979:116).

According to my interviewees, there appear to be two different career choices available to someone who wants to advance in the political realm. Which career choice an individual chooses is dependent on the ambitions of that individual. The first course, and the most popular (as well as the most attainable), has been to get a government job, and then, through patience and work, advance through the ranks to a position of some administrative authority. Making as many friends as possible along the way can help circumvent some of the obstacles, and the advancement time will be shorter. Qualifications for advancement are not necessarily required if a person has powerful friends somewhere in the higher ranks. Years of schooling is not necessarily required in order to successfully compete for a government job. However, more and more emphasis is now

placed on the degree status of government employees and applicants than just a few years ago. Available positions are scarce, and it is no longer unusual to hear of people with college degrees unable to obtain a government job immediately. In any competition for jobs, if all other considerations between two applicants are equal, the applicant with the higher degree will almost invariably receive the job, although there are exceptions.

The second course for political advancement is to actually run for office and win. Because there are so few of these elected positions, in comparison to government employment, it is considerably harder to succeed in this second career choice, although the rewards may be higher. Several things are required of a person running for office: education, confidence, the backing of relatives and friends, and all other things being equal, personality.

The first requirement is an obvious one. With virtually no exceptions, the leading factor determining whether someone votes for a particular candidate is the candidate's education. This has occurred since the first elections for chief magistrates were held (Hughes 1970), and was mentioned in several interviews I conducted during my research. Without at least a high school education, a candidate seems to have little chance of advancement beyond the municipal level of elected officials. This trend has become more and

more pronounced as the number of high school and college graduates has increased in Micronesia.

Confidence is usually acquired by candidates through earlier work in a government job. Most of the younger Micronesian politicians have held government jobs early in their career, and becoming elected to office is one of the goals of nine of the fifteen men I interviewed who had government jobs. None of the women I interviewed said they desired an elected political position.

The third requirement, the backing of relatives and friends, would seem obvious, but on Pohnpei it has particular significance. Until the early 1980s, there were no organized political campaigns by candidates. I had heard about this before I arrived on the island, so I was somewhat surprised to see "Vote for -----" signs on trucks and street corners. The practice has not been implemented to the extent found in the United States, but the trend is present. Much more important for a candidate's success is the word-of-mouth support provided by friends and relatives. Often a candidate will visit the Nahnmwarki of his home municipality in order to gain the support of the traditional sector, composed mainly of the older, rural population. This support has been described to me as necessary for a candidate's success, but not sufficient for being elected to office, much like the elderly or black vote in U.S. elections.

By personality, a Pohnpeian means whether or not a candidate is a "good" person, "good" defined in a number of ways, such as loaning money to anyone who asks, or giving rides to people when they see them walking along the road.

Pohnpeians consider the field of politics a worthwhile endeavor. There do appear to be problems with the current system on Pohnpei, and by extension, Micronesia. These problems are inherent in any bureaucracy, and include corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency. No government system can exist for long without the ultimate support of the governed. The formation of the current governments in Micronesia are a clear case of pressure from the Micronesians having forced the United States to enter political negotiations with the islands. Subsequent events are an indication that the current FSM government is pressured by the same people they supposedly represented during those negotiations.

Corruption is not an issue raised frequently on Pohnpei, either by Pohnpeians or by outsiders. Corruption is, however, an issue that has started to become more apparent in the government. Many Pohnpeians have ties to the Philippines, either through having gone to school there, or by having relatives from there or living there currently. There are also a number of Filipinos who live on Pohnpei. The departure of Ferdinand Marcos and his government, with

the subsequent disclosures of nearly incredible corruption, captured a lot of attention on the island.

There is corruption on Pohnpei, as there is in any government structure, but it is not as overt as that in the Marcos regime in the Philippines. Many people, both Pohnpeians and outsiders (principally Americans), rationalize instances of corruption by government officials simply as being the way the government operates on Pohnpei. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a seemingly corrupt act from a similar act dictated by the cultural values present in Pohnpeian society. The most common of these instances is the case of a government employee who "appropriates" government supplies for his own personal use, such as in the construction of a house. In these cases, the government items are considered to belong to the government employee by virtue of his rank or position. This is not unlike a high title holder who appropriates some resource because it "belongs" to him, by virtue of his title, in the first place. A similar case was cited by one anthropologist who has worked for a number of years on Pohnpei, as an example of the way Pohnpeians manage to circumvent a foreign political system which they allegedly do not support (Petersen 1984).

It is more difficult to explain away other behavior that has occurred frequently on the island. In these pages I have described several instances of corrupt behavior on

the part of government leaders, for which they were never called to task. There are numerous examples of this kind of questionable behavior on Pohnpei. A high ranking government official, when asked about corruption on Pohnpei, responded: "potentially, Micronesia could be worse than the Philippines. We have corruption now. It is not too bad, but it could be."

Conflict of interest, and nepotism are two of the most common forms of irregular behavior from government officials. Conflict of interest in Micronesia is very hard to control because the members of the political elite are also businessmen and social leaders. Examples of conflict of interest abound, such as the attempt by some FSM officials to designate a new FSM bank as the official investment house for the expected Compact money. Some of the government officials who actively sponsored the proposal also served as the new bank's officers. This particular proposal was stopped. Others have not been, as in the case of the FSM Investment Board stopping a new business that would have conflicted with the business interests of the Board's members. Conflict of interest is not limited to Micronesians in the government. One of the more publicized cases involved a former Peace Corps volunteer who served as a lawyer in Micronesia. He later became the FSM Attorney General, and as such was part of the political status negotiations between the Micronesians and the United States.

Near the end of those negotiations, he left his government position and took a job with the law firm hired by the United States to represent its interests in Micronesia. Several United States congressional opponents of the Compact of Free Association mentioned this incidence of possible conflict of interest as a reason for voting against the Compact (House of Representatives 1985).

Charges of nepotism abound on Pohnpei, principally charges that some government department head is only hiring employees from his home municipality or home island. Nepotism is difficult to prove on an island that has a small population because almost all of the indigenous residents are related to each other in someway. There is, nevertheless, superficial evidence that favoritism may be at work in some cases. For example, one government agency at the national level has about 10 employees. The competition for these jobs is quite high because these jobs have higher salaries than most others in the government. It is perhaps a coincidence that all but one of the employees come from the same municipality as the head of the agency. To my knowledge, no official charges have ever been made, nor has an investigation ever taken place. Several Pohnpeians told me during casual conversation they are resentful and suspicious of the situation, but that they do not know how to effect any changes.

Eventually, Micronesians will be forced to come to grips with corrupt and irregular behavior by their government leaders, because this behavior is ultimately incompatible with a democratic form of government. If, however, Micronesians decide against having a strict democratic form of government, then they may be able to modify the rules and form of their government to incorporate behavior dictated by cultural values present on the islands. I believe the Micronesians will change the rules their government operates under when access to the resources made available by the U.S. becomes noticeably uneven. Some actions have already taken place, such as the successful prosecution of a local businessman on Pohnpei who failed to pay any taxes, and the dismissal of Pohnpei state government employees for violation of state laws. The latter, however, was overturned by the Pohnpei State Legislature, which indicates it is simply too early in the process to accurately predict what final course will be taken.

The Governed and Their Economy

Pohnpeians seem to have readily incorporated the idea of making changes in the economic sector of their society. There is a high demand for wage labor, primarily in the government sector, because even the lowest paying government job can provide two to three times the cash income of farming and fishing. The trade-off for the Pohnpeians is

that once they have a government (or business-related) job, they have less time for farming and fishing, which leads to what some Pohnpeians perceive as new social problems. For example:

> Ten years ago I could walk into Kolonia and not be afraid along the road. . . . Afraid of drunks, or something like that, somebody doing something to me. Somebody robbing me. I could leave [home], go somewhere else for a couple of months and come back, and things would be just like I'd left it, and nobody would come in and vandalize it or steal anything.
>
> . . . Maybe ten years ago there was more cooperation and caring between families. The number of houses isn't that much different. There was still people across the road, still people on the other side of the [mangrove] swamp. But, everybody was more concerned with taking care of themselves. Everybody was a farmer or fisherman. There was always leftover stuff, whether it was papaya, or potato peels, or something like that, leftover stuff from the farming, that could be fed to the pigs. Whereas, these days, if you work in Kolonia, you come back with a bag of rice. There's nothing left over for the pigs there.
>
> . . . We have problems with pigs coming into our garden, even though there are pig laws, laws that you have to keep them tied, or penned in. I think it is ironic that now we have the laws and there's many, many more problems. The reason is there used to be more people around, so they kept an eye on the pigs more, and now that everybody's working in Kolonia there's not as many people around keeping an eye on them.

The above speaker is an elderly rural Pohnpeian. Similar changes in behavior were noted by others, such as a middle-aged rural woman, who now lives in town:

> . . . These days things are different. These days there are machines that can help do work, and you can take a car or taxi into Kolonia. You don't have to walk or use a canoe. . . . I think the idea of working in Kolonia makes a big difference.

> There never used to be commuters. Now we have 'first trip', 'second trip', you know? . . . These are the trips of the taxis that take all of the workers into town. 'First trip' is for people who have to be at their [government] job at 7:30 am. 'Second trip' is for those people who have fish or something to sell, or who are visiting or shopping.

The social change that has occurred on Pohnpei might simply be an expansion of Pohnpeian life in order to incorporate new alternatives. This is clearly not the case in the political sector, however, and may not be the case in the economic sector, as the above comments from Pohnpeians indicate. Pig ownership, like the title system, has been considered by anthropologists to be a traditional cultural value in Pohnpeian society. Pigs were, and are, owned primarily as a status symbol. It would be reasonable to expect people to have a better chance of owning pigs in the present day, given the increased cash income from wage labor, than before the increase in the wage labor sector of the economy occurred. This is, however, not the case.

> People don't have a lot of pigs now, not like they used to. People aren't farming, they don't have stuff planted in the ground, so they don't have anything to feed the pigs. They buy that 'pig feed' from [the store]. . . . It's always been a status symbol to have a lot of pigs, and when there's a funeral to be able to kill a big pig and take it, or take a big pig and kill it there. More so than having a pig around for money or for food. But, now, people don't have any. Just like -----'s grandmother died, he needed to have five big pigs, this was his responsibility. And the last time before the funeral that I saw him, he was at the bank getting a loan so he could go out and buy pigs.
>
> [Interviewer]: "What's a big pig cost?"

"Four hundred, 500 pounds, a dollar and a half a pound."

[Interviewer]: "That's about 600 dollars for one?"

"Easy."

[Interviewer]: "Six hundred dollars for one pig, five pigs, that's 3000 dollars?"

Yeah. That's why in Kosrae they made a--I don't know if it ever became a law--but there was a resolution in the legislature to put a limit on what people could do for funerals. You know, 'cause in the past, okay you took pigs, and they were your pigs, and your yams and things like that. You took as much as you could, it was the fruit of your own labor, your own hands there. Now, that same thinking's going [on], but people try to outdo each other, plus now you can even get a loan and buy stuff. It just got carried away.

In the case of pigs, the new wage labor opportunities have had two effects. People no longer have the time to farm, therefore they can no longer feed the pigs from the vegetables and fruits of the farm harvest. A significant portion of the employed pig owners choose to feed their animals commercial pig feed, instead of farm produce. On the other hand, people now have the money and willingness to take on a high personal debt in order to fulfill their social obligations. Given the high demand for pigs on Pohnpei for virtually all social functions, it is surprising that no one has started a commercial pig operation.

The economic and political sectors were linked on Pohnpei throughout the history of the island. The interplay between economics and politics is clear to Pohnpeians today. An elderly man who lives in Kitti, who had worked for the

Japanese and was familiar with the economic development present during the Japanese administration, was particularly upset about the lack of similar development in the present day: ". . . there's nobody working now . . . on things to make the economy self-supporting. . . . The economy's always going to need help from the outside, it can't make it on it's own".

When I asked this same man what kinds of projects he would like to see developed, he responded by listing the ones he remembered from the Japanese administration period, such as a paper making operation, a sawmill, a sugar processing plant, a soap making plant, and a pineapple processing plant. He went on to explain:

> All these processing plants, or machines that make these various products, or else do the processing here and sent it to Japan to be finished, something like that. All kinds of things like that that used local products, local help, and so, when it came down to it, we didn't have to ask for assistance during the Japanese times.
>
> I agree with the emphasis on marine resources, because I think that's where the resources are that Pohnpei has, that FSM has. But, the thing I worry about is during Japanese times, fishermen could come here, and there was a processing plant and they shipped fish to other places. Nowadays people bring the fish in, and even though there are ice boxes and stuff, they're full; there's not enough people eating the fish.

The Compact of Free Association will provide approximately one billion dollars to Micronesia over the next 15 years. As stipulated in the agreement, 40% of this money is for economic development. Some Pohnpeians see the past

behavior of their government leaders to be an indicator of what will happen with this new money. A young Pohnpeian who works in the government sector had this to say when I asked him what he thought would occur with future economic development:

> Well, I think it's politics. No one can tell right now what's going to happen. You see, several years ago, there was a grant, a development grant that comes into Micronesia. And before it reached the people? [Two Congressmen] took the loan, and they shared it. . . . They took all the loan and they just split it. . . . [One of the Congressmen is] one of those senior Congressmen, way when it started in 1965, all the way until now. . . . He's like a millionaire.
>
> . . . We really got some businessmans up there. What I think they'll do, . . . they'll set up something that they're the only ones who are eligible or who can get that. If they set up a contract or something like that, they'll do it so that either one of them, or all of them, are qualified for everything, but nobody else besides them.
>
> . . . That's what I really believe, they'll do something like that. And I can really bet on it. They've been doing it for a long time, why not?

Despite misgivings about their government leaders, Pohnpeians tend to be optimistic about their personal economic futures. The same man who made the comments above, responded to a question about his own goals like this:

> I'm going to work for [a government department] another three years, and then I'm going to make a big loan, if I can. Save up some money as collateral, and then make a big loan, like say thirty thousand, and build something. Not a house, but an egg [operation], a chicken [operation] to sell eggs, or things like that, or pig [operation] or whatever, or just anything. That's my goal.

Other Pohnpeians said similar things about their personal goals. One middle-aged man who works in the government sector, wanted to start a pepper plantation, even though he admitted he was not too interested in business and would like to stay in the government. Others said they wanted to start a store, or a gas station, or some other business operation.

There is a clear link to Pohnpeians between success and the ownership of a business. However, many people expressed reservations about the way some Pohnpeians were trying to achieve this success. One interviewee (a government employee and store owner) had this to say:

> Most people are not aware of what's going to happen in a few years here on Ponape. . . . They're selling land to Ponapeans, outsiders, anybody. I heard of one guy who sold some land for a case of beer. Other people are selling land for the same price as a pickup, because they don't have one now, and they want one.

A few people I talked to during the course of my stay on Pohnpei expressed some concern about the future. One elderly man put it this way:

> . . . It's going to be hard at the end [of the Compact period], because up until this point it's been 'give me this, give me money for the schools.' United States give us this money for the schools, United States give us this money for food, USDA, United States give us this money for training in business, United States give us this money for the Aging Program. And at the end of 15 years, if the United States says, 'Well, okay, this is the end of the 15 years, that's the end of the money coming,' then there's going to be a big problem.

One Pohnpeian man, highly placed in the government sector, saw the Compact of Free Association as an opportunity for Pohnpeians to increase the economic sector, but was worried that everyone had not thought through the implications.

> Yes, I think most people will recognize that as opportunity. What they don't realize is that Ponape is an island, you can only have so many stores, you can only have [a] certain number of things to sell, annually. I hope this thing doesn't create [a] false image. That the Compact--there's more money coming in and there's going to be prosperity, yes, during the first few years. But if you put the money in the wrong project, and did not put the money where it can multiply and generate revenue, then after fifteen years following the draw-down of the Compact money, the fifteenth year is supposed to be zero funding from the United States. I hope people realize that it means that the FSM will [have to] come up, on it's own, with money to replace all those money that we've been receiving from the United States. That's what it means. You set a level of services, government services to the people. The United States is reducing it's allocation to the area. We are supposed to put in money to fill up that [gap], because if we don't then the services start dropping, up to the point where maybe [the] government could not do anything.
>
> The people don't realize that sovereignty means they have to pay taxes. If you talk about taxes here in Micronesia, no one will want to pay taxes. But they don't realize that all this money comes from the United States taxpayer. They thought that the United States send this--I mean they make money--government just crank out bills, money, and just send it out, and say, here's money. They don't realize that in order for government to survive, it has to levy taxes so that we can have the revenue to support all these services that they want. People don't--I don't think there are enough people in Ponape, or in FSM, who are fully aware of this. Because we have gotten used to U.S. Congress appropriations from the Department of the Interior. It will take us a

> while to open our eyes and realize that if we want to be a sovereign state we will have to change our mentality, our line of thinking, and be willing to pay taxes and support our own government.

There does seem to be some evidence that this man is right about the lack of knowledge concerning the Compact on the part of the average Pohnpeian. Most people I talked to did not know what the Compact provisions contained, or very much about the negotiation process itself. All but three Pohnpeians I interviewed place the reason for this lack of understanding squarely with the government leaders.

The Governed and their Compact

Several times throughout the previous chapters I have alluded to the idea that American administration officials and Micronesian government leaders made little attempt to inform the general Micronesian public as to the current state of political affairs in the islands. During the early years of the American administration this was partly due to the problems of communication and transportation in the TTPI, and the widespread lack of English literacy among Micronesians.

These problems have for the most part been solved. Telephone service now links the main islands with the rest of the world through Comsat earth stations, although the outer islands still only have radios for communication. Jet airline service connects the main islands of Majuro, Pohnpei, Truk, Yap, and Koror, with Guam and Honolulu.

Airline service to some of the outer islands is available, with more planned for the future. Kosrae is working on the construction of an airport that will handle jet aircraft. Currently, only small commuter airplanes provide airline service between Kosrae and Pohnpei, and Kosrae and the Marshalls. English literacy has increased substantially since World War II.

To a certain extent these technical solutions do not address the basic problem of how to provide the average Micronesian with information about the government and the world. The news media has been undeveloped in Micronesia throughout both the American administration and the current Micronesian period. This varies somewhat between the islands, but in general there are few sources of news information on any island.

By far the most widely disseminated is the Pacific Daily News from Guam. This newspaper carries articles about the FSM, the Marshalls, and Palau, as well as world news and local Guam items. Unfortunately, the number and types of articles it carries about Micronesia are few. From September, 1984-June, 1985, and from November, 1985-June, 1986, I collected 206 articles about the FSM, the Marshalls, and Palau in a non-exhaustive search,[5] or about one article on Micronesia (excluding the Northern Marianas) every three days. Of these 206 articles, over half (120) were about politics and/or government in the islands. Thirty-nine

articles were about the Compact of Free Association, 33 concerned politics in Palau, 31 were about politics in the FSM, six were about politics on Pohnpei, four were about politics in the Marshalls, and one was about politics on Truk. The remaining six articles about politics covered several different islands. The remaining 86 articles from the set of 206 were on various topics such as health, education, economics, fishing, and general news about individual islands.

The Pacific Daily News relies on freelance writers who are residents in the islands to provide the articles. While this practice gives the articles a local flavor, and is certainly less expensive than having someone stationed in the three countries, the quality of the written pieces sometimes suffers, and the frequency of articles is spotty. The writers who send in the articles also have rather blatant biases. For example, the writer from the FSM is the wife of the FSM Chief Justice (both Americans) and rarely writes on anything other than official news releases.

No other widely distributed newspaper is generally available in all of the islands in Micronesia. Palau does have two newspapers of its own, both of which extensively cover the local scene. Likewise, the Marshalls have a newspaper published in Majuro. Other than the Pacific Daily News, the only "newspaper" in the FSM is a government-published newsletter, The National Union. Unfortunately, it

does not publish anything that is not approved by government officials.

Each of the Micronesian countries have radio stations that carry news information. All of these radio facilities are government operated, and are the first source of news in the islands. The radio stations were also used to educate the public about the Constitutional Convention, the Compact, and different votes and elections. The stations often transmit Voice of America news broadcasts once each day.

Television broadcasting is virtually non-existent. On Pohnpei, the television station was "on" for only four months during my fieldwork. The owner of the station had tried to provide a service earlier, but ran into difficulties getting people to pay him for the broadcasting service. The owner started the service again in late 1984 without a fee assessed to viewers. After an unsuccessful attempt to install a very large satellite antenna, the owner discontinued the broadcasting service until, in his words, he "could figure out how to make money from it."

Kolonia is the only distribution point for the Pacific Daily News and then only by subscription. The National Union has a somewhat wider distribution throughout the other parts of the island, undoubtedly because it is free. Not everybody owns a television set on Pohnpei, although due to the popularity of VCRs in Micronesia, almost all Kolonia residents have access to a television. Unfortunately, the

television station broadcasts a low power signal and without a rooftop antenna it is impossible to receive a clear signal more than about a mile from the station. External antennas just became available in one store on Pohnpei when I left the island in June, 1986, even though the station was not broadcasting a signal. When the television station did broadcast a signal, it was always video tapes recorded from Los Angeles television stations. These programs (with commercials included) were always three to four weeks out of date, and rarely included news broadcasts. No attempts were made to produce and broadcast Micronesian or local Pohnpeian news. The radio station does not normally reach the outer islands, but reception on Pohnpei itself is usually good.

The lack of a news and information transmission medium is the reason Pohnpeians told me they knew little about the specifics of the Compact negotiations that were currently underway. The lack of a news transmission mechanism also made it much easier for the government officials to follow the Micronesian behavior pattern of not divulging information (Petersen 1982a). Consequently, many residents of Pohnpei, including Pohnpeians, outer islanders, and other Micronesians, did not know basic facts about the Compact, such as the amount of money that was being discussed, provisions for the use of the money, or government operations. A Pohnpeian male who was a highly placed

elected official during the early 1980s, described the efforts of the government in this way:

> I can't recall any public discussion of the Compact, conducted by government officials. . . . There was involvement by the State, but no one was aware of that. I mean, you ask the people in the municipalities, municipal governments, I don't think they would say they are aware Pohnpei was represented. But, I became aware of it, because [the] Legislature gave its advice and consent on the appointment of [a] representative of Pohnpei State in the status negotiation. . . . There was lots of work, and meetings, and so on, going on. But it never got out of the status negotiation [team]. Nobody ever tried to tell the people about it.

Many people told me that the Compact and the negotiations were simply too complicated to understand. The FSM government eventually tried to rectify this lack of understanding by holding public education meetings throughout the four FSM states. Unfortunately, these public education efforts came after the bulk of the negotiation was over, when the FSM and United States governments were ready to present the Compact of Free Association to the Micronesian voters in a plebescite. The State public education teams were given only 30 days to complete their work before the plebescite. There have been charges over the years that these public education meetings were conducted in an unfair and biased manner, and that information about the Compact was unevenly disseminated in the population. For example, the comments of a young college graduate from Mokil:

> [They printed out] in Ponapean, the Compact of Free Association. But, as well as I know, they

> just passed it out to the--it's called section--section 1 of the voting area, from Kolonia. And when they passed out that thing in 1983, what they do is, they just pass it out and they go page by page. They say--first page--they read the sentence and they say what the sentence mean, that's it. They go to the next sentence, all the way through the book, that's all. It's like they're just explaining [translating] [to] everybody that what's in the book, and that's it.

The above is one observer's remarks about the public education process in Kolonia, the urban center of Pohnpei. The public education process on the outer islands was even less thorough.

> When they go to Mokil, two hours on Mokil, too. That's what they did too . . . And one of the men stood up and he questioned them. He said, 'How do we know that thing is really true?' You got to tell us good things about it, and bad things about it. Because most of the time they just read the sentence and define it, or explain that sentence, or that paragraph. If you ask anything, they will say good things about what the Compact will do. But they don't say any bad things about it.

The charge that the people responsible for the public education process did in fact campaign for the Compact agreement, as opposed to making an unbiased presentation of all of the alternatives, is common on Pohnpei. Perhaps the public education teams campaigned for the Compact because the FSM government leaders decided the individual states should be responsible for the public education programs in their respective areas. In any event, the people who conducted the public education meetings and workshops were <u>not</u> the ones who had been directly involved in the negotiations, or who even knew themselves what provisions the

Compact contained. They had little choice but to present the Compact as it was written in the "book," because they did not have any information beyond the written draft. One Pohnpeian who was involved in public education meetings on Pohnpei said:

> But on the education on the Compact, there was no alternative presented to the people so they could weight the difference and say, 'yeah, maybe independence or maybe Commonwealth is better, or maybe something else is better.' They were just given Free Association status.

The quality (and quantity) of information made available to people during this 30 day period obviously varied. One man from Nukuoro described the process he saw:

> . . . they mentioned something about independence. They say we have three choices, independence, commonwealth, and they did the same thing, okay? When they talk about independence, they only talk about the bad things about independence. If you're independent and if you're not developed, it's not good, if you're not developed, it's not good to be independent. But, they just say, okay, when we're not developed, it's not good to be independent, but they didn't say, if we're developed, it's good to be independent. . . . They did the same thing with commonwealth . . . so, people say 'hey, we have lights, we have electricity, why do we want to go back and stay in the dark,' because these people undermined their brains. They tell them all these things.

The United Nations observers of the plebiscite in 1983 concluded that the public education program was "generally factual, objective, and fair" (Ranney and Penniman 1985:64). I think, however, that the United Nations observers were not present in Micronesia for a long enough period to be able to hear about these kinds of problems. Nor did they have the

necessary background on how the negotiation process had been conducted. Although the observers were social scientists, it is not clear to me that they had any particular expertise in Micronesian cultures; rather, they concentrated on the general process of "state formation." Some of the problems associated with the public education process should have been noticed by the U.N. observers. One very obvious problem, with an equally obvious solution, occurred when people in Kitti tried to find answers to their questions. A young government employee from Kitti said:

> At the meeting some of the old people had questions. About the Compact and things. But these guys couldn't answer the questions. So the head of the committee came to another meeting, [name of committee chair]. But he couldn't answer the questions very well either, because he didn't speak Ponapean. He had to have a translator, because he's from Truk.

The obvious solution was to have a Pohnpeian speaker from the negotiation committee go to this meeting in Kitti and answer the people's questions.

There were attempts by people outside the FSM government to educate Micronesians about the Compact of Free Association. The most well-known of these attempts was the Micronesian Seminar, run by several Catholic priests who lived and worked in Micronesia. While the Micronesian Seminar leaders made some attempt to present the Compact in "layman's" language, they themselves were not totally unbiased in their approach to public education. The Micronesian Seminar made no attempt to explain other

alternatives to Free Association, having decided instead to try and explain the Compact as clearly as possible. In the process, they "campaigned" for their own changes to the Compact, particularly in the area of "perpetual denial rights." The United States had succeeded in keeping a form of "denial" in the Compact, ostensibly to keep a country hostile to the United States' national security interests from gaining any advantage in Micronesia. The Micronesian Seminar leaders felt this "denial" was actually a denial of the right of Micronesians to decide what overtures to foreign governments could be made by their FSM government. The FSM Congress was not overwhelmingly in favor of "perpetual denial," but felt they had to keep the negotiations moving by accepting some compromises. So, instead of simply helping the Micronesians understand the Compact and its alternatives, the Micronesian Seminar leaders tried to convince the Micronesian electorate to make changes in the agreement. Unfortunately, the Micronesian Seminar leaders apparently did not understand that the Micronesian electorate had never been included in the negotiation process, nor that the electorate had a mechanism to effect the outcome.

Just as in the United States, many people on Pohnpei do not feel their elected officials pay enough attention to what the people want from their government. This feeling is based on the action the government leaders have shown during

the last two decades. This action is best summed up as an attitude held by the government leaders, that they are "trustees" for the people who elect them, rather than their representatives. In 1970, in response to a suggestion that people other than Congress of Micronesia members be involved in the future political status negotiations with the United States, Senate President Amata Kabua said, "The people give us this unique right [to negotiate] when they elect us. They do not elect members of the other branches of government" (Mason 1974:241). Nor was there ever any consideration of including people outside the government ranks in the negotiation process. This attitude runs counter to the ideal of government by consensus usually found in the traditional political systems in Micronesia, and prompted this statement from a young Pohnpeian in 1985:

> You know what these guys should do? These guys, like [a Congressman] and these other guys, the ones in the government, they should come out and sit down in a sakau bar and they should talk to the guys there. Then they would really hear some stuff. Because if these guys would drink sakau then people would talk to them and they would learn.

Many Pohnpeians I talked to during my research did not know about the Compact, and were not bothered by the fact they knew so little about the Compact. One young rural woman explained her lack of knowledge about the Compact, and said: "I never been listening to Compact explain, that's why I don't know [about the] Compact". And there are a number of Pohnpeians who explicitly trust their government

leaders to handle the negotiation process. A young man who learned about the Compact while in school in the early 1980s said he thought everything would be fine in the future: "I trust our leaders. I know they're picking the right government for us".

From these and other statements made by people to me in interviews, it seems there are people who are happy with the way their government is being run. There are also people who are unhappy with the way their government is conducted. I do not know if this dissatisfaction is more widespread or more intense than that found in other countries. Pohnpei did vote against the ratification of the Compact of Free Association in 1983, and there was a move to start the process of leaving the FSM union before the Compact plebiscite. Pohnpeians tend to be quite independent, but the dissatisfaction expressed to me was strongest from the outer islanders, who historically have always felt discriminated against by the Pohnpeians.

Traditional Elite versus New Elite

The new political elite which has come to power in Micronesia did so largely through the efforts of the American administration. The residents of Pohnpei, and probably the rest of Micronesia as well, have continued to elect these men because the demands of dealing with the outside world require skills that are still not widely

distributed in the population. Plus, the incumbents have been able to acquire their own prestige and status through the office they hold. The legitimacy of the government is not questioned on Pohnpei, and the government structure has apparently been claimed as their own by the residents of the island. The rise of this new government, with increased responsibilities and power, coupled with the historical actions of the traditional leaders, has led to a decrease in power and prestige of the traditional system. No longer are people bound to the wishes of the Nahnmwarkis and other high title holders. More and more people participate in feasts and title functions only if they want to, not as a requirement for placement in the society. And, more and more young people have chosen not to follow the traditional practices. One young woman, a government employee said:

> The Nahnmwarkis, they've lost a lot of the power. Now, it's kind of like people don't get acquainted with them. Like me, I don't, I don't work with the traditional leaders.

Petersen (1979a, 1979b, 1982a, 1982b, 1984) argues that the traditional political system and way of life (i.e. title system and the feasting that goes with it) is not in the process of fading away, despite the social change which has swept the island. To a certain extent he is right. Particularly at the "section" level of Pohnpeian society, the title system is active and people devote a great deal of time, effort, and resources to it. But, the Nahnmwarkis do not, and have not for some time, participated in the

government at the state or national level, with one exception. That exception was the 1975 Constitutional Convention held on Saipan. Twelve delegates were named from the traditional sector (two per district) to attend the convention. They had one notable success--the inclusion of a statement in the Constitution that precludes the national government from infringing on the areas under the control of the traditional leaders. On Pohnpei that means the title system. With this one item the traditional leaders came away from the convention pleased with their efforts, and because of it Hughes and Laughlin (1982:78) claim they made the Constitution legitimate to the people.

What Petersen ignores and Hughes and Laughlin do not recognize sufficiently, is that the Constitution also allows states to allocate FSM legislative seats for traditional leaders (Meller 1985:274). So far this has not happened and there is no sign that it will happen.[6]

The inclusion of traditional leaders as delegates to the Constitutional Convention was done not only out of respect for the cultural heritage of Micronesia, but also to gain legitimacy for the process of political change. In 1975, there was a lot of political dissent on the home islands, brought about by the negotiations taking place with the United States. The legislators in the Congress of Micronesia (some of whom were part of the Micronesia future political status negotiating team, and others who were

delegates to the Constitutional Convention) needed to increase their popular support at home. By incorporating the traditional leaders into the Constitution approval process, the new Micronesian political leaders did add legitimacy to the constitution process, but they also gained increased popular support for themselves. The inclusion of traditional leaders in the constitution convention did not suddenly, by itself, make the political change process legitimate, nor did the awarding of honorary titles. The role of elected politician had gained its own legitimacy in Pohnpeian (and Micronesian) culture long before this convention was held in 1975, as is evident from Hughes' work (1970, 1974). In effect, the politicians gave legitimacy back to the traditional title system when they allowed the traditional leaders to have their one clause in the constitution, and when they themselves accept honorary titles which they do not need in order to gain power or legitimacy in the current political system. The constitution essentially forced the traditional leaders to accept and support the new political system; it did not reestablish the waning roles of traditional leaders within the traditional social setting (Meller 1985:205).

Naturally, some of the traditional leaders are not happy with their diminished power in Pohnpeian society. During the two-year public education process after the Constitutional Convention, an effort was made by some

traditional leaders and their supporters to convince their fellow Pohnpeians to vote against the proposed constitution. Many residents of Pohnpei State interpreted this effort as an attempt to return the political control of the island to the traditional system of the Nahnmwarkis. Pohnpeians were not comfortable with the proposed constitution, favoring instead an independent status for themselves, much like the political leaders of Palau and the Marshalls advocated for their islands. The issue was confused by the supporters of the traditional political system who defined "independence" as a return of the Nahnmwarkis' power. The outer islanders, especially, were against this because the outer islands did not have traditional leaders comparable to the Nahnmwarkis and therefore would have been eliminated from a government established around such a system. Consequently, most outer islanders were solidly behind the constitution proposal.

Some people, primarily rural Pohnpeian residents, were in favor of a return to the Nahnmwarkis' and their political system. One Pohnpeian woman explained her reasoning this way:

> Ponapeans before used to get along very well together, even without democracy. All of them together. Now, everybody's going their own separate way. No more good cooperation. A lot of friction between different families, between different municipalities. I feel that democracy is one of the reasons that this is happening. United States--you've got people from all over, the melting pot idea, and you have a lot of education, and you've got, you know, different kinds of people that [are] working together,

democracy is the best idea there. I'm not convinced that it is here.

. . . I'd probably go back to the Nahnmwarki system. Sometimes maybe you'd get one that wasn't good, but tiahk, customs--very, very important. So, two examples. If you're a thief and it gets around that you're the one that's been stealing these things, the Nahnmwarki calls you, give you hell, scold you for your behavior, and then tell the boss of your village, because there's a boss [section chief] in each village, to take away your title and give you work to do. So, it's almost like being in jail, but not physically being restricted to one place. An then when there's a feast for the Nahnmwarki, or a feast for some high-titled person, everybody has to donate some food to the Nahnmwarki. And he would take some of that food and give it to you, because he knows that right now you're having a problem. So, the people on top are also trying to take care of everybody. I also feel that--well, maybe like the same thing that the people who wrote the [United States] constitution put the electoral college in, figuring that there aren't enough people that are really smart enough to run the government.

Okay, the other one is that, if there was a fight going on, between two different families or two groups, and you took those two groups to court, the court could decide which was right, which was wrong, but it could not bring these people together again. Okay, if they were called in front of the Nahnmwarki and they sat down and they had sakau together, that at the end of the sakau, at the end of that meeting, these people would probably be back together again, back to being cooperative. I realize that it's kind of opposed to democracy, but that's my recommendation.

The preference of Pohnpeians for independence was supported by a strong prejudice against anyone from outside Pohnpei, including the outer islanders in Pohnpei State. The traditional political system supporters capitalized on this ethnocentrism in their attempts to debate and challenge the government leaders, many of whom were not from Pohnpei

proper. One outer islander explained the situation this way:

> They [Pohnpeians] say they can support themselves, with their population, and the size of their population, and with their land. When this idea of independence comes up and the Compact of Free Association, it's like, all those Congressmens on Saipan are either Pingelapese or Mokilese, see. None of them are real Ponapean. It's like, these Ponapeans saying that, maybe that's why those outer islands, like Pingelapese, Ngatikese, they want free association, because they can not go back to their island and be independent.

The idea that "everybody got along fine with each other" before "democracy" is not evident from the historical record, or even from the recent history of the mid-1970s. Some Pohnpeians feel that war between the islands could have happened during the period before the vote on the constitution.

> The move for independence was really, really strong. [The debate between] this Compact of Free Association and independence was really going. People from the municipalities, they were saying that war could break out anytime . . . between the people who want independence and the people who want the Compact of Free Association, and between Ponapeans, Yapese, Trukese, Kosraians.
>
> . . . There was this one guy, and he used to come up to our house and he'd say, 'I'm really preparing. Because when we fight against each other maybe I can kill a lot of Trukese or Yapese.'

Many outer islanders felt they had to support free association in order to defend their social positions against those of the Pohnpeians. There was a widespread belief among outer islanders that if Pohnpei became inde-

pendent, all non-Pohnpeians would be removed from the island.

> . . . because all these lands will belong to the Nahnmwarkis again. So, if we have independence, yeah, we have Land Commission, but the power is still in the hands of the Nahnmwarki or Nahnken or something like that. So, it's no use. You got to work two weeks, get the money, go to your land, get everything, take it to the Nahnmwarki, because if you don't, he kick you out. So, it's a gamble.

The stories about people who bought guns in preparation for hostilities increased the uncertainty many Pohnpeians felt about this particular time period. A young Pohnpeian woman said:

> . . . it was not only shoot Trukese, it was shoot Mokilese, or maybe Kitti fight Madolenihmw. It was almost like going back to the old days. Luckily, independence lost.

On Pohnpei, the vote for the Constitution was narrowly in favor of ratification. This was the last attempt by the traditional leaders of the island and their supporters to regain the political control they had lost over the last 50 years. There seems little question that the current government structure and the politicians, officials, and civil service employees who work within it, has replaced the traditional title system in Pohnpeian society, and represents ". . . the acme of social mobility in modern times" (Mason 1974:231).

Petersen (1982a) argues against this view, and shows how the title system influenced peoples' lives and actions in a section of Uh municipality in the late 1970s. However,

the intrigue and social jockeying that Petersen describes occurred only at the section level; it did not spread out to encompass the whole municipality, and never penetrated the political realm controlled by the state or national government. Despite the title-related activity that continues, especially in rural areas of the island, younger Micronesians are pursuing careers in government in order to gain influence and resources. They are not single-mindedly pursuing titles, although they may acquire titles during the course of their government and political careers.

The two political systems exist then, as parallel, but unequal, lines of political control on Pohnpei. The Nahnmwarkis have little control beyond their own municipality. Most of the Nahnmwarkis' political activity occurs at the "section" level of the municipality, and is contained within the title system. The elected politicians have effective control over all other political activity, from the municipality to the national level.

These two political arenas rarely overlap in participants, and since the "ConCon" in 1975, have never overlapped in function. For 150 years Pohnpeians have lived on two different social planes, one involving interaction with each other, and the second involving interaction with foreigners. As the interaction involving foreigners increased, so did the power and prestige of those able to engage in this interaction, which in turn led to the rise of

the new elite. As the FSM works to take its place in the world, the new political system will continue to grow until it dominates the social setting, becoming the primary mechanism for gaining social status on Pohnpei.

The Future of the FSM

Virtually everything written about Micronesia in the last twenty years has included statements about its future. Now that Micronesia is officially four separate governments, three autonomous and one a commonwealth, the future in many respects has arrived. Although the economic development in the islands, or the lack of it, is usually what observers point to as the primary problem for the future, it is the political stability of the new unions that will ultimately affect whether or not economies can be built.

In the case of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, political stability is surely going to continue. The residents of the Marianas see their future clearly linked to that of the United States. Palau and the Marshalls are similar. Each has something the United States wants--namely, land for possible military use. The military is active in the Marshalls at the Kwajalein Missile Range. Palau is important more as a possible staging area and as a potential site for new military bases. In the Marshalls there is no strong independence movement, only conflict between different factions vying for control of the govern-

ment structure. In Palau, there is an independence movement, although its members may be less interested in actual independence for Palau, than in having more economic and political alternatives available for the Palauans. In any case, the President of Palau, Lazarus Salii, is pro-American in outlook and wants to establish a close relationship with the U.S. (Alcalay 1987:51).

The FSM is different. The United States has never had any plans for military bases in the FSM, nor are there any contingency plans (at least none publicly avowed) for the future. The importance of the FSM lies primarily in its ability to deny access to a large section of the Pacific by any other global power. Because "deniability" is the reason for the FSM's importance to the United States, the political stability of the FSM union is paramount. History has shown the island groups in the FSM have not shared a common colonial past, nor do they share a common culture. The unity of the FSM must continually oppose the centrifugal forces caused by the cultural pluralism found there.

An important part of the concept of pluralism is integration, defined by Cohen and Middleton (1970:6-7) as the processes of interaction between diverse groups that produce a viable political system. Cohen and Middleton propose three different concepts that can indicate the degree of interaction in a nation-state: transactional flow, functional interdependency, and congruence of values.

As shown in Africa, these processes do tend to create political systems. In the case of Micronesia, this has been reversed--the political system was put in place first, then the processes of interaction between the peoples living on the various islands were begun.

Transactional flow is the amount and nature of the interaction occurring over a designated geographical space. In the FSM, transactional flow would occur between the individual states and between the various municipalities within the states. The more interactions there are over time, the greater the integration of the society. During the pre-contact period, transactional flow occurred through trade between the islands. This trade was usually limited to intra-island activity, although some trade did occur between Yap and Palau (the source of the Yapese stone "money"). Long open-ocean voyages in canoes were possible and did occur, but not often enough to be the basis of any pan-island political system.[7] During the colonial administration eras, and at the present time, transactional flow occurs through travel by government employees on business, and individual Micronesians who can afford the air travel or ship travel. As more of the outer islands become linked to the main islands, transactional flow will begin to include those people who have historically been left out of the mainstream FSM affairs.

Functional interdependency usually refers to the relationships between different parts of a political system that must be maintained in order to meet the requirements of the individual parts and the system as a whole. In Micronesia, functional interdependency can be observed in two areas: the bureaucratic government structures, and the traditional socio-political structure. The relationships between the FSM government and the state governments make up the first area. The second area is the relationship between the government structures (both the FSM and the states) and the traditional political sector. Obviously, unless the FSM government and the state governments cooperate in the political system, a unified nation is not possible. Cooperation between the government structures and the traditional political sector (i.e. the traditional leaders) is not necessary for the continuation of the FSM, however. Some of the islands, notably Kosrae and Truk, do not have a traditional sector nearly as active as that found on others, such as Yap and Pohnpei.[8] And in the case of Pohnpei, the traditional sector has lost political control over the years to the point where the title system is the only thing left in its domain.[9]

The third requirement for integration is the congruence of values. When this occurs, everyone in the society shares a common identity and outlook on life, which tends to hold the society together. In the case of Micronesia, this would

seem to be contrary to the fact of the cultural pluralism present in the islands. Everyone has a major ethnic identity, such as Trukese, Yapese, or Pohnpeian. To a certain extent, these ethnic identities can be acquired by immigrants to an island (Lieber 1984). But, in the case of Pohnpei, most people identify and socialize with others from the same ethnic background, hence, the occurrence of ethnic communities on the island, especially in the municipality of Sokehs. Perhaps the best known of these ethnic communities is the Kapinga community of Porakiet, made up of immigrants form the island of Kapingamarangi in Pohnpei State (Lieber 1968, 1984).

The congruence of values arises from the new values Micronesians have started to incorporate in their lives during the last two decades. These values include the "goodness" of work and efficiency, the need to acquire consumer goods, and the desirability of a more Western lifestyle. A person only needs to travel to any of the main islands in the FSM to see these new values expressed. The proliferation of video tape rental stores on Pohnpei, from two in the fall of 1984, to over a dozen in Kolonia alone a year later, is one example. Another example comes from the interview data. When asked what they were going to do once the Compact was finally in effect, almost all of my interviewees replied "open a store." The drive to be a business person on Pohnpei is very strong, and has led to a

proliferation of small family-run stores in Kolonia which sell general merchandise. A third example comes from an interview with a young fisherman who had trouble selling his catch in Kolonia. After further investigation it became apparent that the reason he could not sell his catch was because the fish sellers had more than they could sell already. The reason for the surplus was that Pohnpeians were not eating as much fish as they used to. Instead they have substituted chicken, turkey tails, canned corned beef, canned tuna, and canned mackerel. This last example clearly shows that values have changed considerably on Pohnpei.

Almost fifteen years ago Mason wrote that what was needed in Micronesia was the building of a "Micronesian identity" that cut across the insular tendencies of individual islanders (Mason 1974:229). The new elite may help accomplish this by providing a different, more open route for social advancement for young people who have acquired new western values and educations to go along with their traditional cultural values. In addition, the new elite provides a political structure that will remain in control as long as external regional-ethnic conflicts do not disrupt the union of the FSM. If the union is disrupted then the traditional political systems found in the FSM could make a comeback and regain some of their lost power and control over the government of the islands. However, enough young people have become indoctrinated in the new political

structure and in the new cultural values, that a return to a system whereby the traditional leaders hold ultimate control is highly unlikely, even in the event of a political separation of the FSM states.

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters I have described the history of Pohnpei and shown how the pattern of European contact helped shape the change in the political structure present in the islands of Micronesia today. Anthropologists have been active in Micronesia for decades, but have focused on those parts of the traditional culture that are still readily evident, such as the traditional title and feast system on Pohnpei. Although these activities are still occurring, they are no longer the main activities of Pohnpeians in the modern world. The main activity now seems to be the overt acquisition of resources, which are then used to gain social status and prestige. The acquisition of resources has always been important. The difference is that traditionally, the resources were used for the acquirement of titles and the associated social status. Now the acquirement of the resources themselves, without the titles, brings about the increase in social status. The new political system has opened up the access to new resources the Pohnpeians are using to acquire social status outside of the traditional title system.

Following Bailey (1969) we see that there is one political field on Pohnpei, composed of two political arenas. Bailey defines the political field as one in which the rival groups do not share agreed-on rules for regulating their conflict. The political arena is an area where the same rules are accepted by all of the participants. In the case of Pohnpei, and by extension, Micronesia, one political arena is composed of the traditional leaders. On Pohnpei, these are the Nahnmwarkis, Nahnkens, and the title-holders ranked below them. The second political arena is that made up of the elected government officials and government employees of the three new governments in Micronesia (excluding the Northern Marianas).

A new political elite has been formed on Pohnpei, members of which are the participants in the elected government official political arena. This new elite was formed from American administration efforts to foster political development in Micronesia through a process of increasing the participation of Micronesians in the American-style government installed after World War II. At first, the American administration needed Micronesians to work in the government--Micronesians who had command of English and who were familiar with, or were at least willing to learn about, the style of government being implemented by the Americans. These skills increased in importance as new systems used for the election of government leaders were implemented. The

Pohnpeians were not unaware that these new skills were required of their new elected officials (Hughes 1970).

During the 1970s, the Congress of Micronesia, and later the FSM Congress, became more and more important in charting the political and economic course for the Federated States of Micronesia. The members of the two Congresses gained their own legitimacy through the offices they held. The new elite did not have to be born into ruling matrilineages, or have uncles in the right places, in order to gain prestige and status in the society. On Pohnpei, several politicians rose in power and prestige who came from traditionally low-ranking (or unranked) social backgrounds.

As more and more Pohnpeians gain an American-style education, and as communication technology and news media spread on Pohnpei, the actions of this new political elite come under increased scrutiny from the people who elect them. In the past, cultural values lessened peoples' feelings of inequity and disfavor with the Nahnmwarkis. These values kept dissent about the Nahnmwarkis and the traditional political system in the background. The new elite were able to rise to power in this atmosphere, because it was not widely known by their constituency what they were actually doing in the government. Several Pohnpeians I interviewed during the time of my fieldwork expressed displeasure with the actions of their elected officials. They did not express displeasure with the office itself,

only with the occupant of that office. The ultimate political stability of the three new island countries depends on the peoples' faith, not only with the office, but the office holders as well.

New cultural values have also been installed in Micronesia along with a new political structure and a new political elite. These new values follow those of the Western powers, and there is a strong focus by Pohnpeians and other Micronesians on consumer items, such as cars, trucks, stereos, home appliances, VCRs, and televisions. New food items have taken an increased share of the Pohnpeians' dollars, where before subsistence agriculture and fishing provided the bulk of their diet. The change in values has not been a wholesale event, however, with efficiency and economy in the government and business sectors of Pohnpei still following the Pohnpeian cultural norms. This means that some of the behavior which Americans define as nepotism and corruption could also be defined as extensions of traditional political norms. Other behavior is connected to the time-honored attempt to gain social status and prestige in Pohnpeian society, no matter what the means. Slowly, however, even this is changing, with high government officials now publicly speaking out against conflicts of interest (primarily of their opponents) and new sanctions being taken against those people who do not play by the rules of the new government.

The new political elite, political structure, cultural values, and increased numbers of Pohnpeians with American educations, means the power of the traditional leaders has further declined in the last twenty-five years, so that now any recognition of them by elected officials is essentially symbolic. Even though Petersen (1982a) has shown that the title system is alive and well at the smaller, section level of Pohnpeian society, it is evident in 1988 that there are many Pohnpeians who no longer participate in that system. More and more young people have consciously chosen the career routes of government or independent business in order to acquire prestige and status in the modern Pohnpeian society.

Factors in the traditional political arena, such as kinship, are still important in government. Further study is required to determine how kinship effects the success that individual Pohnpeians have in acquiring government jobs, or in running for elected office. My interview data show that a man (Pohnpeian women rarely run for an elected office) must have the support of relatives and friends in order to be elected. Kinship helped structure the traditional title system, and Pohnpeians may now be using kinship to integrate the new political elite and political structure into their everyday lives.

Political development on Pohnpei has occurred in the context of individuals competing for resources. Whether

they were in the traditional system or the new democratic system, the main way they advanced was to have a constant flow of resources that could be exchanged for social status. No matter which political arena, or political field Pohnpeians may choose to participate in, they can not participate without resources. Bernard and Pelto (1987:359-368) have suggested four basic mechanisms concerning technology and social change. Although a new political system is not the same as new technology as defined by Bernard and Pelto (1987:360), my research indicates that at least two of the same mechanisms are present in the process of political development.

The first mechanism is the acquisition of resources. Pohnpeians have competed for resources throughout the recorded history of their island. Pohnpei is a lush island, and the possibilities for agriculture and fishing are good. Pohnpeians have used their natural resources, plus all of the off-island resources they could acquire, in the competition for social status and prestige.

The second mechanism is what Bernard and Pelto (1987:362) call "the drive to reduce cognitive dissonance." Pohnpeians are willing, and have been in the past, to change their cultural values in order to bring them into line with the new way of life brought about by the new political system. One result on Pohnpei is that many young people do not support or interact with the traditional leaders. The

beginning of one change in family structure is evident with some families that rely on government employment as their main source of income. A change in family structure, that in turn is caused by an increase in cash income, is cited by Hezel (1987:289) as one cause of an increase in suicide on Truk. A less direct example of Pohnpeians changing their cultural values in an attempt to decrease cognitive dissonance is even mentioned by Petersen (1982a:115-126) as an example of the strength and vitality of the traditional system. I maintain instead that what Petersen says is a change in behavior in order to maintain the traditional system, is actually a change in cultural values in order to bring the traditional system in line with changes in peoples' behavior. Pohnpeians have changed their behavior with regard to the traditional system in response to having greater access to resources through the political system initiated by the United States.

This case of political development in Micronesia shows that the concepts of political development derived from the formation of new African states do transfer cross-culturally, even though the basic process of political development happened in an exactly opposite fashion. The present Micronesian government structure did not arise through some indigenous need for a political structure. It was imposed on the Micronesians by outside political powers. The Micronesians have accepted it, not because they were

disenchanted with their past political systems, but because it was a new way of gaining resources and power in their societies. In the process, a new political elite has come to power and replaced the traditional political leaders in the political arena. This new political elite has incorporated into their definition of self, new concepts and abilities to maintain control of the political sector. This process has not been a one-way street, however. Many more Pohnpeians than in the past have now acquired some of the skills and abilities the new political elite used to acquire power and dominance in the society. My research on Pohnpei shows that despite people being unhappy about parts of the system, or about some of the individual behaviors of their government leaders, everybody wants to be a participant in the new political arena. The new political elite must find a way to incorporate these people into the system, because a political structure can not last very long without the support of those governed by it. For Micronesians, the crucial time is the next 15 years, after which they will either have the means to become truly independent, or they will be forced by the new cultural values they hold, to enter into an even closer political relationship with the United States.

Notes

1) Whether Ngatikese, spoken on the island of Ngatik, is a dialect or a distinct language is still being debated.

2) The Palikir section of Sokehs is about a 30 minute drive from Kolonia, if the road is in good shape. Plans for paving the road from Kolonia to Palikir have been in the works for several years, but the funding for the effort, sometimes estimated to be well over one million dollars, has never materialized.

3) In later years, most of these problems were worked out. Special rules were implemented that gave preference to local construction companies in the bidding process for the new capitol, and the final land was acquired from the local landowners. Unfortunately, most of this effort was wasted. No construction companies from Pohnpei even bid on the capitol construction project, and the road to the site has yet to be paved. Groundbreaking is supposed to occur in the spring of 1987.

4) The Germans were actively changing life on Truk as well as Pohnpei. In 1904, from 4 to 10 Germans arrived on Truk, an island notorious at the time for its unfriendly demeanor with foreigners. These German administrators simply told the Trukese that they should stop all warfare and turn over their guns. The Trukese did just that, turning in 436 guns (Gladwin and Sarason 1953:41).

5) The Pacific Daily News was delivered from Guam by air freight every other day, because that was when the flights from Guam to Pohnpei occurred. Sometimes the newspapers did not get on the plane, other times the full complement was not sent, sometimes they just disappeared. These are all reasons why I was not able to get each day's paper while in Pohnpei even though I had a "subscription." Also, those days I was not in Kolonia, either out in other parts of the island, or visiting the outer islands (which took anywhere form two to four weeks each trip) I was not able to acquire copies of the newspaper.

6) Note that this process was not limited to Pohnpei. The decline of the power of the traditional leaders occurred in all of the islands of Micronesia, except Yap, which remains the most traditional of all the islands in Micronesia. The traditional leaders on Pohnpei still garner respect, but their area of control has been reduced in all cases to that of the title system, which as Petersen (1982) and Hughes (1982) so stridently point out, remains an important influence in peoples lives on Pohnpei.

7) One version of the downfall of the Saudeleurs on Pohnpei during the pre-contact period tells of invaders from Kosrae who sailed across the ocean in giant war canoes. After defeating the Saudeleurs the invaders stayed and made Pohnpei their home, perhaps because it was too hard to get back to Kosrae.

8) Kosrae's traditional leaders have been figureheads since the missionary period in the mid-1800s (Peoples 1985:44-51).

9) This last point is disputed by some anthropologists. See Lieber (1984) and Petersen (1982b) for other views.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Michael J. Evans began his work in anthropology in 1975 as a member of an archaeology field crew in Arizona. Since that time Evans has worked on eleven applied anthropology projects in the Southwest, most recently as the project manager of the Native American component of the Nevada high-level radioactive waste social impact assessment effort. In addition to social impact assessment projects, Evans has also been a computer consultant for UNESCO in France and Spain, and for the Ministry of Education in Mexico City. The research this dissertation is based on was carried out while Evans was a computer consultant for the Pohnpei State Department of Education in the Federated States of Micronesia. Currently Evans holds a staff position as Research Investigator at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

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

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

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

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

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