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The Compact of Free Association, Micronesian Non-Independence, and U.S. Policy

by Catherine Lutz*

A substantial portion of the islands of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands have been effectively annexed by the United States. The near-culmination of the process of incorporation was reached when the two houses of Congress gave final approval to a document called the Compact of Free Association on 16 December 1985. The compact grants the U.S. the permanent and irrevocable "military denial" of other countries to Micronesia, a thirty year lease on the Kwajalein Missile Range, and fifteen years of very broadly construed control over Micronesian "defense" and foreign policy. To understand how this has happened and what the impact has been for the Micronesians of the Trust Territory, it is necessary to briefly review the last forty years of American involvement in the islands and then to examine what social science research has revealed about the impact of U.S. rule of the islands.

Micronesia was wrested by the U.S. from the previous Japanese colonizers during the last phase of World War II. In 1947 the United Nations designated the islands a Strategic Trust Territory to be administered by the U.S. Although the charter for that administration was to "develop" the islands and to prepare them for self-determination, successive U.S. administrations and military leaders have apparently never wavered from the goal of permanently maintaining effective control of the islands. From the war until 1961, the main policy towards the Trust Territory was to exclude outside powers and influences, a policy that had the effect of preventing economic development.¹ Little effort was made to repair infrastructural damage from the war. Many physical and economic structures that had been put in place by the Japanese were either eliminated or allowed to deteriorate.

A radical turnabout accompanied a critical U.N. visiting committee report and the decolonization movement in the

early 1960s. National Security Action Memorandum No. 145, signed by President Kennedy, formalized the goal of attempting to permanently incorporate Micronesia into the U.S. state structure.² The results of a task force assigned to develop recommendations on how to achieve that goal was termed the Solomon Report.

[The] Solomon Report . . . clearly laid out a strategy . . . The U.S. would pump large amounts of money into Micronesia, build a community-service infrastructure, establish a host of development programs and a dependency upon cash, hold a plebiscite at the point at which the Micronesians' hopes had been raised, and then pull back support as the various development programs failed to succeed.³

One example is the report's recommendation that Washington ought "to offer Micronesian wage earners two specific inducements to seek affiliation with the U.S. First, after such an affiliation Micronesian and U.S. personnel basic pay scales would be equalized . . . Second, rather than introduce a retirement program for Micronesian government employees, the Social Security system should be extended to all wage and salary earners in Micronesia."⁴

In 1969 negotiation between the U.S. and Micronesia began on the question of the islands' future political status. By 1985 the resulting document—The Compact of Free Association—had been approved by Congress and by a majority of the people of two of the fragmented political entities that had resulted, The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Marshall Islands. The Micronesian votes need to be understood, however, in the context of the unfavorable socioeconomic conditions that U.S. policies of the previous several decades had promoted.

We can begin by examining the overall environmental

*A slightly different version of this paper was presented as testimony before the Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives on 25 September 1984.


1. Roger C. Gale, *The Americanization of Micronesia* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979); Donald F. McHenry, *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1975).

2. Matthew Eilenberg, "American Policy in Micronesia," *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1982), pp. 62–65.

3. Glenn Peterson, "A Moral Economy and an Immoral Trusteeship," in C. Lutz, ed., *Micronesia as Strategic Colony: The Impact of U.S. Policy on Micronesian Health and Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Cultural Survival, 1984), pp. 89–96.

4. McHenry, *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed*, p. 238.


5. Gale, *The Americanization of Micronesia*; Daniel T. Hughes and Sherwood G. Lingenfelter, eds., *Political Development in Micronesia* (Columbus, OH: State University Press, 1974); George Kent, "Development Planning for Micronesia," *Political Science*, Vol. 34 (1982), pp. 1-25; Lutz, ed., *Micronesia as Strategic Colony*; McHenry, *Micronesia: Trust Betrayed*; David Nevin, *The American Touch in Micronesia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977); and Glenn Peterson, "Breadfruit or Rice?: The Political Economics of a Vote in Micronesia," *Science and Society*, Vol. 43 (1979), pp. 472-485.
6. Mary Lord, *Testimony before Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs*, U.S. House of Representatives, 25 September 1984, p. 219.



**Both photos on this page are from Robert Wenkam, Micronesia: the Breadfruit Revolution, text by Byron Baker (Honolulu, HI: East West Center Press, University of Hawaii, 1971), pp. 65 and 135. Courtesy of Robert Wenkam.*



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(drawing from the Coconut Journal, Manila)



Throughout Micronesia people depend heavily on USDA food shipments.

educated in Japanese schools, and hospitals were built on the major islands.

Like the Americans who followed them, the Japanese saw control of the islands as central to their national security interests, and they proceeded to fortify the islands. As a result, some of the most devastating battles of the war were fought in Micronesia. A reflection of the correlation that some Micronesians see between militarization and war (rather than peace or "defense") is contained in the contemporary local saying that notes, in comment on both their past and future, "When soldiers come, war comes."

The Americans who came in 1945 eventually brought changes in a number of areas. They brought economic dependency, new health problems, an educational system that has failed its promise, and militarization, each of which we will look at in turn.

Dependency takes special forms in Micronesia. The once-thriving copra trade dwindled to insignificance with the increase in U.S. appropriations, which rose dramatically after 1962. More importantly, those funds were not intended or used in any serious way to develop other local industries or resources, such as fish, to take the place of copra. The value of exports as a percentage of imports was a phenomenal 4 percent in the Marshall Islands in 1981. The absence of a product to sell on the world market, however, has not prevented the development of a consumer society. U.S. appropriations, which have gone primarily for the salaries of government employees, have supported the importation of a wide range of goods. These imports are not, however, the kinds of capital items that would foster the development of an indigenous economy. Rather, they include primarily food, tobacco, alcohol, and cars. Canned fish, tobacco, and beer alone account for 67 percent of all imports into the Marshall Islands in 1981. The U.S. policy of nondevelopment has also created a huge class of government employees whose ability to eat depends on the continuance of dependence on the United States. Most people no longer fish and farm, but must rely on the U.S. government allocations for their support.

This brings us to the question of the impact of the last

forty years on Micronesian health. The influx of U.S. dollars and the many federal food programs that have been extended to Micronesia have led to drastic changes in the local diet. The abundant and nutritious prewar locally produced diet has been replaced with foods that are not only imported, but less nutritious than indigenous foods. Taro has been replaced with imported white rice, coconut molasses with imported refined sugar, fresh fish with fish canned in the U.S. and Japan, coconut milk with Coca Cola, beer, whiskey, and coffee. The bloated stomachs that can be observed on children in those areas of Micronesia where the dependence on imported food is the highest are signs of the malnutrition that has resulted. This health problem was rare before the War. Other diet-related diseases such as diabetes, obesity, and infant diarrhea and dehydration have also skyrocketed as a result.⁷

For Micronesians, their choice in the plebescites was as "free" as those of boat passengers who have been taken far from their shore by a pilot whose interests and itinerary are not their own and who are then given the choice of remaining on the boat or swimming the 200 miles back to shore. Micronesia was not given the choice of complete political independence combined with an assured foreign aid package that would be directed towards the repair of the damage done to their economies and social systems by the strategic colonization of that area by the United States over the last forty years.

The failure of the U.S. to do more than window dress for visiting U.N. commissions in their approach to health in Micronesia has meant that modern hospital structures are built in some districts but that tuberculosis, leprosy, meningitis, cholera, and other deadly and preventable diseases continue to run through the islands. Dr. John Trautman, the director of the National Hansen's Disease [Leprosy] Program of the Department of Health and Human Services, estimated that in some areas cases of leprosy would soon reach 40 percent of island populations, which would make this "the most significant epidemic, percentage wise, in the history of the world."⁸ U.S.-abetted dependency is evident in the area of health as well. Micronesia continues to depend almost completely on U.S. nationals for their physician pool as well as, of course, on U.S. funds for the purchase of medicines. Many, if not most of the dispensaries on Micronesia's atolls are without necessary

7. Leslie and Mac Marshall, "Infant Feeding Practices in a Trukese Village," in C. Lutz, ed., *Micronesia as Strategic Colony* (1984), pp. 37-51.

8. Dr. John Trautman, *Testimony before Subcommittee on Public Lands*, 12 December 1984, p. 6.

drugs and equipment. Senator Konou of the Marshall Islands noted, in a letter to Congress, that the dispensaries of Jaluit (including, at 12,000 persons, one-third of the Marshalls population) "are almost completely empty of equipment, supplies and medicine. Two of the three . . . were constructed . . . in the past two years . . . There are five major islands without dispensaries . . . The health aides who run the other dispensaries in some cases do not even have a stethoscope to diagnose the frequent respiratory ailments."⁹

A dramatic rise in suicides has also taken place in Micronesia, and this in precisely the fifteen year period (1964–1979) when the greatest increase in U.S. economic aid and social change occurred. Trukese fifteen- to nineteen-year old boys have a suicide rate of 255 per 100,000 population. This compares with a U.S. rate for the same age boys of 12.8 per 100,000 and puts the Trukese rate among the highest ever recorded anywhere in the world.¹⁰ When many young people suddenly begin to take their own lives, it is clear that their family and social ties have been seriously eroded. It is also clear that the main contributing factors are the social changes that have resulted from the shift in Micronesia from productive, self-sufficient communities to dependent communities.

Thirdly, the U.S. occupation of Micronesia has brought an education system which, while continuing and broadening the previous Japanese policy of literacy for Micronesians, has failed to generate economic development. Importing Western liberal arts models of schooling and U.S. texts to Micronesia may have produced in many students what U.S. policymakers intended, that is, positive attitudes towards things American, but in many cases it also turned them away from a respect for their own culture and indigenous economic skills, away from fishing, agriculture, and boatbuilding to a desire for government employment in white-collar jobs administering service programs funded by the United States.¹¹

Finally, the U.S. presence brought Micronesia above-ground nuclear weapons testing,¹² which destroyed people's homes and health in the Marshalls. The general militarization of the islands included, early on, a \$28 million C.I.A. base on Saipan, multi-billion-dollar missile-tracking facilities on Kwajalein, a major airfield and base slated for development on Tinian, detailed plans for a jungle warfare training center on 30,000 acres of scarce land in Belau, and a Coast Guard station on Yap. A survey of conditions on Yap in 1977 in fact demonstrated that the first priority in Micronesia has been the U.S. generals' interests. The main intersection at the center of the capital of Yap State was the confluence of two dirt roads. These roads passed by the hospital and government office buildings that each date from the war period. This antiquated

infrastructure stood in contrast to the elaborate and modern loran station that was being built at the same time several miles away. A similar comparison in the Marshall Islands shows a modern, clean, seven-doctor hospital on Kwajalein, reserved for 3,000 U.S. base personnel, and a hospital on neighboring Ebeye (for 7,500 Marshallese) with one functional toilet, cockroaches, a badly leaking roof, no bedpan service, and one physician.¹³ The primary form of development that has come to Micronesia with U.S. control has been military development. Despite claims to altruistic motives and an interest in indigenous economic development and independence, U.S. government priorities have been clear, and Micronesians have suffered a decline in their real standard of living as a result.

The U.S. government is buying Micronesia, however, not with genuine development; genuine development would empower the people of Micronesia to opt for independence by giving them an economic infrastructure that would allow them to produce their own food, buy their own medicine, and train their own doctors. Rather, Micronesia's land and independence are being bought (in a coerced transaction) with imported food, tobacco, alcohol, and government payroll checks.

Having reviewed the overall impact of the U.S. occupation of Micronesia, let us now examine the specific case of one island, Ifaluk, in the Federated States of Micronesia, where I conducted a year's anthropological research in 1978. This small atoll of 430 people illustrates some of these more general influences, but also presents a picture of resistance to some of the deleterious changes just described.

Ifaluk is a very atypical Micronesian island in that it has retained much of the self-sufficiency and cultural integrity that existed in the immediate postwar period. In fact, Ifaluk and Ebeye islands can be said to exist at opposite ends of a continuum of social dislocation. Ebeye's slum conditions and dependency¹⁴ stand in marked contrast to Ifaluk's self-sufficiency in food and its relatively pristine environment. Ebeye social conditions came into being a narrow channel away from the heaviest U.S. presence in Micronesia at the Kwajalein Missile Range, while Ifaluk has been relatively protected from the effects of the just-described U.S. policies by its position 500 miles from the nearest Trusteeship office or road. The positive social conditions on Ifaluk can also be attributed to the selective but strong resistance of the people to attempts to

9. Senator Evelyn Konou, *Testimony before Subcommittee on Public Lands*, 12 December 1984, p. 143.


10. Donald H. Rubenstein, "Epidemic Suicide among Micronesian Adolescents," *Social Science and Medicine*, Vol. 17, No. 10 (1983), pp. 657–665.

11. Nat J. Colletta, *American Schools for the Natives of Ponape* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980); Nevin, *The American Touch in Micronesia*.

12. Glenn H. Alcalay, "Maelstrom in the Marshall Islands: The Social Impact of Nuclear Weapons Testing," and William J. Alexander, "Missiles, the Military and the Marshalls," both in Lutz, ed., *Micronesia as Strategic Colony*, pp. 25–36 and pp. 7–24, respectively; and Giff Johnson, this issue of BCAS.

13. United Nations Trusteeship Council, *Report of the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory* (1982).

14. Alexander in Lutz, ed., *Micronesia as Strategic Colony*, pp. 7–24; Johnson this issue of BCAS.



Taro. The most important root vegetable for the majority of Pacific islanders, taro requires moist soil and matures eight to fifteen months after planting. When ripe, the edible portion of this thick starchy root is cut off below the stalk, and the stalk is then replanted. The tender leaves are eaten as greens after thorough cooking, and the root is boiled or baked until tender, then peeled. Cooked taro can be creamed, scalloped, sliced, or fried—even made into taro chips. In Hawaii, cooked taro is mashed and pounded, then water is added to make poi, a thick, sticky paste eaten with pork and fish [SPH, p. 52].

undermine their autonomy, a resistance that has been accomplished through its strong traditional leaders. Ifaluk chiefs have rejected a recent government offer to blast a wider hole in the channel leading into their lagoon so as to allow entry by navy ships and ships carrying consumer goods. Such action would have drastically altered the rate of water exchange between lagoon and ocean, thereby endangering their lagoon fishing grounds. They have also outlawed alcohol when community peace was threatened, and have placed a ban on the use of gas-powered boats, as motors are known to chase fish out of their small lagoon.

Ifaluk enjoys self-sufficiency in its food supply. One local man described their taro patches as a “bank,” or island-controlled stock of wealth. In addition, women weave their own elaborately designed clothing, and men build world-class sailing canoes with which they bring in fish. Work is valued, outmigration, interpersonal violence, and suicide are at very low rates, and traditional leaders, who rule by consensus, command respect. The Ifaluk retain their indigenous communal and cooperative social system as well as a strong sense of themselves as people whose own way of life is good and can be sustained.


Some of the problems generated by U.S. policy and priorities can be seen on Ifaluk as well, however. The ship that visits the island at irregular intervals peddles American sugar, coffee, tinned fish, and rice, and an increase in purchases of those items (achieved not via copra-export earnings but via the government salaries of several islanders) had begun. The ship also brought baby bottles—in an era when we know the perilous health consequences for children of discouraging breast feeding—and disposable lighters, this into the fragile ecosystem of a one-half-square-mile atoll. Ifaluk’s children have occasionally gone past high school for further training. While one was a minimally trained health aide, he was often assigned to another outer island. Ifaluk had, instead, a young man trained in air conditioner repairs, an occupational niche which Micronesia has need for only if it has already trained farmers and doctors, and has the resource base to sustain chilled air. The local dispensary was, for the year of my research on Ifaluk, usually without necessary drugs, as well as without adequate medical staff. A meningitis epidemic went unchecked through nearby islands while I was there, killing a five-year-old boy on Ifaluk. Tuberculosis was common in adults, and children frequently died at birth or in the first year. As recently as 1965, fully 5 percent of the Ifaluk population

suddenly died after a visiting American ship brought a disease organism to which they had little resistance. The one form of on-island communication with the outside world that they have, a short-wave radio, can only reach a short-wave on another island, which can itself only sometimes reach the nearest communications center at Yap.

Let me, finally, relate the events I observed on Ifaluk one December day in 1977, events which should serve as an illustration of the nature of the existing U.S. approach to these islands. As in many previous years, a U.S. Navy airplane appeared overhead and dropped two large parcels for the people of the atoll. These parcels contained gifts from the families of navy personnel stationed on Guam donated in response to a radio appeal on the behalf of “the poor people of Micronesia.” These gifts, which included fuzzy bedroom slippers, women’s wool pants, bikinis, and fake fur hats, were items of clothing which had been used and discarded by their American owners. Nearly all of the donated items were unusable in a tropical climate or unwanted by the Ifaluk, who proceeded to store them away as rags or throw them into the pits they dig for other, more organic, local trash.

This event encapsulates much of the pathos and irony of the U.S. military colonization of Micronesia. The military has come, unbidden, and has ensured its continued presence by bringing America’s refuse in its wake. While some Micronesians have gained access to antibiotics and literacy, we have mainly sent “gifts” of nuclear fallout, Budweiser beer, Winston cigarettes by the carton, and a dependence on imported fish in one of the world’s richest fishing areas.

The Compact of Free Association will continue, under a new guise, to produce the same economic dependency and health deficits. Why can we expect these effects to continue or even to intensify under the Compact of Free Association? First, the previous negative impact of the U.S. approach to Micronesia occurred while we were there under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement which required the U.S. to “promote the development of the inhabitants . . . toward self-government or independence . . . promote [their] social advancement . . . [and] protect their health.” With that charter and



Woman weaving in Yap. She is using the simple breast loom that is the only type traditionally found in the Pacific. Only narrow material can be woven on this type of loom [SPH, p. 468].

international oversight eliminated, there is even less incentive for the U.S. to do anything but promote its own state interest at the expense of the Micronesians.

Second, it is clear from historical research¹⁵ as well as from the testimony presented in the 1984–85 Congressional hearings on the compact that the primary American objective in Micronesia continues to be military, and that there is no time limit on this objective. If the U.S. can continue to buy military advantage, it will do so. The U.S. government is buying Micronesia, however, not with genuine development; genuine development would empower the people of Micronesia to opt for independence by giving them an economic infrastructure that would allow them to produce their own food, buy their own medicine, and train their own doctors. Rather, Micronesia's land and independence are being bought (in a coerced transaction) with imported food, tobacco, alcohol, and government payroll checks.

The contemporary sociopolitical situation in Micronesia represents a particularly clear example of ineptitude and what was at times intentional social *dis-engineering* on the part of the government of the United States, a country that envisions itself as being committed to freedom and economic opportunity. The Compact of Free Association proposes to admit Micronesians to neither the myth nor the reality of that commitment. Our generals and negotiators make no pretense to that; they claim baldly that we need to defend the United States at a point 8,000 miles from our continental shores. In a letter to Congress dated 24 July 1985, Admiral Crowe, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, succinctly summarized the compact's relationship to military interests:

The delegation of defense responsibilities and authority to the U.S. together with the provisions that the freely associated states will refrain from *any action* the U.S. determines to be inconsistent with defense and security requirements, provide the latitude needed to support our security interests [emphasis added].¹⁶

Similarly, the State Department's Fred Zeder, the "ambassador" to Micronesia and chief U.S. compact negotiator, gave written testimony before a House committee in which he accurately described how the provisions of the compact that are intended to protect the Micronesian environment are subject to those military interests. As he said, "the President may exempt any United States activity from the environmental provisions of the Compact if he finds that so doing would be in the paramount interest of the United States."¹⁷ Those environmental provisions are, in effect, window dressing. Much of the compact is likewise not law binding the behavior of both parties but "suggestions" for the U.S.

The often-repeated notion that the compact represents independence for the people of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshalls is belied by the fact that these latter political entities will not be eligible for United Nations membership or for international aid based on statehood status.¹⁸ A

high-ranking USAID official testified before Congress that that agency cannot be involved in economic aid to Micronesia because "the relationship between the United States and the trust territories is unique and does not parallel AID's typical bilateral assistance relationship."¹⁹ Micronesia, in other words, is not an independent state.

The often-repeated notion that the compact represents independence for the people of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshalls is belied by the fact that these latter political entities will not be eligible for United Nations membership or for international aid based on statehood status. A high-ranking USAID official testified before Congress that that agency cannot be involved in economic aid to Micronesia because "the relationship between the United States and the trust territories is unique and does not parallel AID's typical bilateral assistance relationship."

The Compact of Free Association is a document that will continue the process which began in 1945, in which Micronesia has become a territory of the United States. Anyone who claims that this document is a step on the road to independence is ignoring the accumulated data on the phenomenal rise in the socioeconomic dependence of the Micronesian system on the U.S. and the declarations of our generals in every decade from World War II up until their most recent testimony before Congress.

The vote in Micronesia for the Compact of Free Association ought to be considered in the light of the fact that U.S. policy has created a new Micronesia society which relies on U.S. appropriations for its daily bread and where traditional farming and fishing skills have been lost. The voters had little real choice. They could choose to eat or to go hungry. That this is so is clear from an analysis of where the pro-independence votes came from in Micronesia, which is primarily from those areas that have maintained local food production.²⁰ When tremendous economic pressures are applied by the world's most powerful nation against one of its smallest, the no votes represented immense courage on the part of those who cast them. For Micronesians, their choice in the plebescites was as "free" as those of boat passengers who have been taken far from their shore by a pilot whose interests and itinerary are not their own and who are then given the choice of remaining on the boat or swimming the 200 miles back to shore. Micronesia was *not* given the choice of complete political independence

15. Gale, *The Americanization of Micronesia*.


16. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 131, No. 101, Thursday, 25 July 1985, p. (H)6330.

17. Fred M. Zeder, *Testimony before Subcommittee on Public Lands*, 7 August 1984, p. 123.

18. Roger Clark, "Self-Determination and Free Association—Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Strategic Trust?" *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1980).

19. Larry Smucker, USAID, *Testimony before House Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks*, 21 May 1984, p. 45.

20. Peterson, "Breadfruit or Rice?" *Science and Society*, Vol. 43, (1979), pp. 472–485.



"Hurry up and sign."

combined with an assured foreign aid package that would be directed towards the repair of the damage done to their economies and social systems by the strategic colonization of that area by the United States over the last forty years.

The congressional hearings held on the compact in 1984 and 1985 received very limited public attention. Although those hearings were extensive, they were primarily given over to pro-compact U.S. government witnesses. The testimony of many public witnesses (including church and human rights groups and social scientists) and Micronesians did much to contradict the favorable picture painted by government witnesses. The latter tended to focus on the schools that have been built rather than on the paucity of teaching materials, and on the military's needs rather than on the needs of Micronesians for the agricultural land on which U.S. military facilities will be constructed. Administration witnesses neglected to seriously discuss the dramatically declining nutritional status of Micronesia's people, and when they did mention the problem, attributed it and most other health problems to local ignorance. According to Richard Montoya of the Department of the Interior, "Much of the disease in Micronesia is related to environmental or cultural habits out there. For example, . . . selective malnutrition, again, is due to a lack of dietetic education."²¹ Much was made of the recently built hospital facilities in some areas of Micronesia, but little was said about how anything but continued political subordination to the United States will pay for the staff and drugs for the hospitals in the future.

When the House of Representatives voted to approve the Compact of Free Association on 25 July 1985 (by a vote of 360 to 12), the preceding floor discussion reflected the many contradictions this disguised annexation of Micronesia presents for the myth of an anti-colonial America. The politicians have been somewhat more constrained in their public statements than the generals cited above by the notion of self-determination, and so the rhetoric of independence was conspicuously in use. However, statements to the effect that the compact represented the Micronesians "establishing their sovereignty and autonomy over their domestic and foreign affairs" glaringly contradicted not only the explicit language of the compact but also contrasted sharply with other statements made on the floor that same day by compact supporters. Those statements recognized the compact and the control it gives the U.S. as a "great deal" for the U.S. In other cases, representatives spoke the language of colonialism: Micronesians, said one Representative, "have come of age" (as children do). The U.S. had fulfilled its pledge "to be the guardian and mentor of Micronesia."²²

The compact as passed by the U.S. Congress went back to Micronesia for administrative review at the beginning of this year. The final step that remains to be taken in this process is the official termination of the trusteeship by the United Nations Security Council, and on 12 May 1986 the U.S. officially requested consideration of the case by the council. That represents the last point at which voters can be heard in protest before the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands are bound permanently, at least through the military denial provisions of the compact, to the United States.



*This cartoon is from the *Guardian*, 9 August 1985, p. 1.

21. Richard T. Montoya, *Testimony before House Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks*, 12 December 1984, p. 4.

22. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 131, No. 101, Thursday, 25 July 1985, p. (H)6349.