GERMAN COLONIAL POLICY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS:

Origin, Determinants and Implementation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART V

CONCLUSION

PREFACE

"The Germans are coming!" In the mid-1880's, that was an anxious cry where Australian and New Zealand businessmen were concerned. They were familiar with Theodor Weber, the "South Sea King" and his "Long-Handle Firm," the Deutsche Handels-und Plantagengesellschaft zu Sudsee Inseln Hamburg (DHPG). Its trading stations were spread throughout the Pacific from the Tuamotu Islands to New Guinea, and its ships carried a significant portion of the European trade in the Pacifc. By then Weber and his German proteges had gained a reputation as tough and calculating merchants, not only with their competitors but with the Islanders as well.

Land acquisitions in the Samoa Islands and New Guinea for copra plantations, gained legally or through confiscation by the these merchants, inevitably led to disputes with Islanders. Land once "sold" to the white man was difficult to reclaim, and animosities on the part of both German merchant and Islanders continued to simmer, occasionally leading to violence and bloodshed. Passive and active resistance on the part of the Islanders led to a call for assistance and protection from the mother country by the German traders and planters. Soon the islanders found German warships at their shores demanding guarantees of friendship or warning of retaliation for misdeeds against the German Empire's loyal and prosperous subjects. When politics did not go the latter's way, they sought to make politics work to their advantage, either by tacit support of the opposition or by direct interference.

Land ownership to the Islanders was important, but no less so to the Germans, who required law and order and security of property for their financial prosperity. In Germany, the merchants were supported by a very vocal minority favoring acquistion of colonial territories and expansion of the Empire into Africa and the Pacific.

Eventually the vocal minorities and their support within the Imperial government were politically powerful enough to create the conditions favorable for colonial acquisitions. Bismarck, steadfastly cautious about colonial endeavors, reversed his attitudes about colonial acquisition in 1884 and 1885 to declare protectorates in Africa, the Marshall Islands and New Guinea. He returned to his previous policies thereafter, which his successor, Caprivi, maintained. However, Kaiser Wilhelm II chose to exhibit and maintained a more aggressive attitude toward territorial acquisiton until the beginning of World War I. At the turn of the century, turmoil in Samoa combined with the defeat of the Spanish to give the German merchants the security and stable colonial government they required and Kaiser Wilhelm the remaining territory of Micronesia that he wanted.

For most of the fifteen years remaining of German Colonial Rule in New Guinea, Samoa and Micronesia, the administrators had difficulty just keeping the peace. The turmoil, which the Germans experienced from the outset, did not end with colonial acquisition. The government could not totally pacify or subjugate the Islanders. Their resistance continued pressure on the colonial administrators until foreign occupation of German Pacific territories as result of World War I.

This paper intends to review events and factors which gave rise to and shaped German policy in the Pacific. It traces the foundations for German entry into the Pacific, the wellspring of colonial aspirations and the methods by which acquisitions were effected. Its major purpose is to define the policies of the German colonial participants and government which were in force before and after formal annexation. The native response to German activities, though not often found in print, can be considered as explicity forming indigenous "policy" toward the German colonials.

PART I

ORIGINS OF GERMAN COLONIAL POLICY

EARLY COLONIAL ASPIRATIONS

The foundation of German colonial policy in the Pacific lies with institutions developed as early as the twelfth century A.D. The concept of the "Charter Company", employed in German New Guinea and the Marshall Islands in the late nineteenth century, as a means for commercial development of an area and the use of its administration as a political arm of the government are first encountered in the German "Hansa" or merchant association. The Hansa merchants established centers of trade in the Baltic where they obtained trading rights and concessions from feudal lords. They gradually penetrated the commerce of these countries by acquiring freedom from customs and native laws, but most importantly they were able to obtain favorable trading positions with the establishment of their "factories," a concept which was also integral to the Pacific trade seven hundred years later (Townsend: 9).

With the advancement of the Age of Exploration, circa 1500, the North German Hansa towns took a "lively interest in the Portuguese discoveries and the Hansa sent many of its vessels by the new waterways in search of commerce from the East." As early as 1503 the German towns of Nuremburg and Augsburg, led by the Welser firm, formed a commercial establishment at Lisbon which developed into a large trading company and won rights from the King of Portugal to visit the East Indies. "King Dom Emanuell

gave the German company the right of precedence in the Indian trade, and authorized a company charter permitting German merchants to establish their own courts in Lisbon" (Townsend: 12). The company failed due to Portuguese trader reaction and lack of support from a national government or authority.

For the next twenty-five years the German firms attempted to penetrate the Spanish network of commerce without success. However, in 1528 the opportunity arose to colonize and govern Venezuela in South America in exchange for a large loan to King Charles V of Spain. The Welser firm governed the colony for thirty years but lost it due to strife with the Indians and Spaniards, financial mismanagement and, again, the lack of national support (Townsend: 13).

During this period of exploration, the Hohenzollerns, upon whom the control of the Hanseactic League fell, were alert to the prospects afforded them. According to Friedrich Wilhelm, the Great Elector and Prussian King, "trade and commerce are the most important foundations of the state." Seven years after his succession to leadership, he tried to form an East India Company but was thwarted in his aims by war with Sweden in 1647. In 1650, he purchased Tranquebar and Fort Danesberg on the southeast coast of India from Denmark, built up a small navy in 1666 and sent out an expedition to "reconnoiter" the Guinea coast . As a result of these activities, the Great Elector established a protectorate on the Gold Coast and subsequently chartered the African Commercial Company to which he gave a monopoly (Townsend: 14,15).

The Great Elector, distracted by ambitions of monarchy, let his colonies wither. His successor, Frederick Wilhelm II, attempted to transfer the African Company's rights to the East India Company and to maintain the colony, but his attempts were unsuccessful. Thereafter, the Hohenzollerns endeavored to continue the earlier initiative. Almost one hundred years later in 1750, a revival of the spirit was seen with Frederick the Great's moves to charter an Asiatic Company based at Emden. It prospered for a few years but failed. He later tried unsuccessfully to revive the Asiatic Company in 1775. "Prussia's efforts thus ended in 1775, so far as any material results could demonstrate, and her aims and ambitions far outstripped her achievements. Nevertheless, the early Hohenzollerns contributed the idea if not the successful practice of a state-directed commercial and colonial policy to Germany's historical tradition" (Townsend: 16).

The Hohenzollerns lost their overseas territory for various reasons. The Great Elector gave up territory and his stations in India for lack of funds. The Dutch, along with the French, continually harrassed the Guinea coast. The African Company consistently required subsidies and Frederick Wilhelm II, eventually in need of money, ceded all Prussian interests for a small indemnity. The ravages of the Thirty Years War at home played a decisive role, as distant colonies represented a financial burden for a nation that required rebuilding. At the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the notion of colonization was considered impractical by Frederick Wilhelm III, as a result of the Napoleonic Wars and German

Revolution at home (Townsend: 28). European politics precluded adoption of any real colonial policy during the early years of the 19th century. The Congress of Vienna offered Russia little flexibility, either, for the Germanic Confederation was hardly the vehicle by which it could leap to a position of world-power status. The Confederation, created by the Congress of Vienna, was yet a politically and economically weak agglomeration of small states with an unarticulated policy, dominated by Austria and supported in its conservative policies by Russia. Moreover, it was both financially and militarily impotent to take over the reigns of a colonial policy; initiative would have to be left to private entrepreneurs (Townsend: 23).

THE GERMAN POPULIST MOVEMENT

After the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars favorable conditions arose for acquiring possessions. According to Mary Evelyn Townsend, "not only were conditions ripe externally for a vigorous colonial expansion, but internally a change had swept over the German people, awakening them, broadening their horizon, and making them eager for adventure and discovery. Since the War of Liberation and the invigoration of a new national consciousness, they felt themselves to be more Germans than Prussians, than Bavarians or Saxons. The urge for national expansion experienced by the English, the French and the Dutch during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries was now beginning to be felt tardily by the Germans in the nineteenth century" (Townsend: 31).

The first indications of a populist movement for colonial acquisition arose among intellectuals. Historians, like Treitschke and Droipen, urged expansion through the taking of territory. As early as 1812, Heeren wrote that colonies should be an integral part of the state. In the German Diet, representatives in 1817 recommended colonies to stem the tide of out-migration to other countries (Townsend: 33). By the 1840's political economists like Roscher and Wappaus preached colonization. They were led by Friedrich List who urged colonization in his book, National Systems of Political Economy. His writings remained a "cornerstone" of a long line of proindustrial and protectionist thinking which advocated the theory of a central customs union (Smith: 12). Noted naturalist Alexander von Humbolt, although against colonies, created supporting propaganda from his accounts of travel and research. A multitude of publications describing far-off lands and travel were available by the mid-1850's. Gottfried Duden's Travel Through the Western States of North America "touched off a veritable fever" for immigration to Missouri (Townsend: 35).

Townsend contends that these voluminous publications created a colonial cult theory. "Never can it be said of Germany, as it is often said of Great Britain, that she built up her colonial empire in a 'fit of absence of mind'. For while it may be an English characteristic to construct a policy, post facto, it is equally a German habit to formulate a priori an abstract theory as a guide to practice" (Townsend: 36).

Encouragement of emigration for colonization began as early as 1817. From 1817 to 1826, annual emigration averaged 6,000 people. Between the years 1830-1844 emigration was estimated at 22,000 annually, rising to 66,000 for the years 1856 through 1860. The restructuring of German agriculture had caused the massive cycles of emigration and the change in structure also influenced many other occupational groups to emigrate due to dislocation from industrialization throughout the nineteenth century (Smith: 10). The year 1872 experienced the greatest emigration out of Germany when 128,000 people left the country. After this intense period of emigration, the movement declined precipitously as the German industrial machine became an importer of labor (Townsend: 10).

This was a period of an ever-rising tide of emigration to the Americas. Settlers' spirits were high. Germans that settled in Texas were pressing for annexation of the Mexican Territory before it could be taken by the United States. Bunsen, the Prussian Minister to England, had also urged Bismarck to seize Mexico and California. He "did his best to persuade Frederick Wilhelm IV to accept Mexico's offer to sell California to Prussia in 1842. The plan included a canal to be cut through Panama and a gradual assimilation of Oregon and the Trans-Rocky Mountain region, but needless to state, none of it was ever realized" (Townsend: 40).

During this period of emigration, various influences were pushing for a German stake in colonial development. The Deutsche Kolonial-gesellschaft was established in 1842 to create a series of private

colonies around the world. The Chatham settlement in New Zealand was its first endeavor. The German nobility were also interested in the possibility of a new feudal state in North America which would profit off the peasantry. The gold rushes of California and Australia created another fervor of excitement. As a result, several societies were set up to control the flow and destination of emigration and to foster nationalism. Foremost among them were the Nationalverein fur Deutsche Auswanderung und Ansiedlung und the Berlin Verein zur Centralisation Deutsche Auswanderung und Kolonisation, organized in 1849 (Townsend: 42).

The missionary societies came to influence German nationalism and colonial development, also. At least eight strong societies had been founded to work abroad by 1870. The largest were the Barmen Rhine Mission, the Bremen Mission and the Bassler Mission. In the 1860's, German missionaries had founded stations in New Guinea, the Marshall Islands and Samoa. The impact of the missionary organizations is most impressive because "they crystallized into societies which became active centers of agitation for national expansion. "Felix Fabri, a powerful religious leader of the times, came to play a major role in the push for further expansion late in the century" (Townsend: 44).

THE TRADERS ENHANCE THE POPULIST MOVEMENT FOR COLONIES

The populist movement was instrumental in creating a fervor for overseas expansion, but it was the commercial trading companies that were the most effective in putting Germany physically on the map. The

destruction of the Zollverein in 1834 and an improvement in sea transportation made it possible for the old Hansa towns of Hamburg, Lubeck and Bremen to rise to prominence again. The 1830's through the 1860's saw enormous energy devoted to commercial development in remote areas. Africa had become a new frontier and trade grew steadily with the placement of Hansa "factories" along the west and southwest coast of Africa (Townsend: 46).

The surge of commercial activity by the Hansa in the 1830's was carried to the Pacific islands in the 1840's. The Hamburg firm of Johann Cesar Godeffroy and Son had created a trading network of stations that extended from South America to Cochin China. "From Valparaiso, the Godeffroys had begun the penetration of Polynesia by first supplying the French garrison of Tahiti; then by developing the briefly flourishing pearl shell fisheries of the Tuamotus" (Fox: 137). Their center of operations were moved to Apia, in the Samoa Islands, in the mid-1850's, from which they consolidated the copra trade and became the most successful firm in the Pacific. In 1871, Theodor Weber, the firm's manager, added New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago to its sphere of influence. By the mid-1880's, German trade extended to the Marshall Islands and to Matupit of New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago. An estimated fifty German ships traded with Samoa and the Tonga Islands and carried at least fifty percent of all trade with the area (Townsend: 49). Already established were stations in the Fiji's, plantations in the Tonga Islands and thirty-six trading stations throughout the Pacific area.

The activities of the Godeffroys were brought home to the German people in 1861, when the House of Godeffroy founded the Godeffroy Museum and exhibited materials from the cultures of the Pacific. To publicize activities, Godeffroys also published the Journal des Museum Godeffroys from 1871 to 1879 (Townsend: 49).

BISMARCK STRESSES CAUTION IN COLONIAL ACQUISITION

After 1848, Prussia concentrated on strengthening its military stature. The Prussian government was not concerned with immigration to colonial areas, nor had it the mind to involve itself in colonial intrigues. The elite of the Hanseatic cities did not want to upset the English and the industrialists were not interested in costly risks. Nor did any major interest group support colonialization at the time (Smith: 5). The merchants were prospering in Africa and it was important to maintain stability at home. An aggressive attitude toward developing colonies would have to wait some thirty years.

From 1866 to 1871 Germany immersed itself in internal unification, which was led by the powerful nobility of the Prussian state. At that time, the prospect of colonial acquisition became a public issue and was effectively used as campaign material by contesting parties. Bismarck, however, publicly shunned colonization, but allowed his mouthpiece, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, to rally support for the colonial cause (Smith: 6).

The early 1870's saw a resurgence of the colonial spirit. Men like Treitschke, who had early written of colonial conquest, and von Weber advocated the annexation of African areas and islands in the Pacific. Das Kleine Journal and Die Welt Post, mouthing jingoistic slogans, advocated taking New Guinea, Fiji and the New Hebrides. Support for a colonial policy was even found with the Navy, as colonial development would spur naval development.

It was, however, the economic crisis of 1873 that led to or influenced further expansion outside Germany as a means for recuperating financially. The depression was characterized by falling profits, sluggish demand and strong international competition in Europe. The market decline led commerce and industry to call for tariff protection and expanded markets outside Germany. The new Central Verband deutscher Industrieller, organized to lobby in favor of protection and concentration of foreign investment in oversees markets, was established at mid-decade to deal with the problem. This organization mirrored the attitudes of the famous economist of mid-decade, Friedrich List. He had become the ideological prophet for the period, and his theories were "the primary theoretical voice of industrial progress, protection, and the direct attachment of an industrial Germany to her own exclusive markets and sources of raw materials" (Smith: 13).

As the trade grew in the Pacific, a greater need or, at least , desire for naval protection was often suggested. Not all supported this view. Except for Albrecht and Livonius, most of the ruling class

"did not possess sufficient sympathy, understanding and imagination to appreciate the movement for colonies" (Townsend: 58). Their motivation after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was to strengthen their internal resources, preserve a tenuous friendship with England and attain security for Germany at home. The prevailing "laissez-faire doctrine" of the time also worked to discourage colonial expansion by government, when all went so well for private enterprise.

Aside from a minority that had supported colonialism and were becoming increasingly vocal, it cannot be said that the new Germany was alert to the advantages of colonialism. The number of actual colonial enthusiasts who joined or supported organizations was fairly small and limited to certain sections of the middle class. As previously noted, some real disadvantages to colonization were especially seen by the upper classes. During the first five years of the Reich, Bismarck showed a decided unwillingness to become involved in colonial entanglements. In 1871, he refused France's offer to colonies as a form of reparation, over the objections of the jingoistic opposition. Bismarck rejected enumerable petitions to take territories and to set up naval stations in China and Samoa. He claimed that the Empire possessed neither men nor money to support such a venture. With regard to Samoa, he reprimanded Stuebel, his Consul in Apia, for suggesting annexation and advised him to "avoid any friction with the United States, to be tactful, and to promote no independent policy" (Townsend: 66).

Bismarck's reasons were sound. He realized that the Empire was not a world power and that it made no sense to excite the antagonisms of the major powers. Bismarck realized that if Germany sought expansion overseas it would have to be in cooperation with Great Britain. It has even been alleged by some writers that Bismarck approached Great Britain to arrange a modus vivendi, but the notion has been rejected by United Kingdom scholars (Townsend: 67). Bismarck was also engrossed with centralizing the regime and embroiled in the Kulturkampf. And after all, it appeared that there was a lack of support among the general public for colonization and stiff opposition in the Reichstag.

It is later in the decade that Bismarck accepts the premise that Germany must foster colonialism abroad to secure and maintain a position of supremacy in Europe (Townsend: 62). When he broke, in 1878, with the National Liberal party, staunch opponents of colonialism, he began to discretely pursue a policy of expansion (Townsend: 68). He did tread warily, for he recognized that "a great nation like Germany could not, in the end, dispense with colonies. He hesitated to embark upon colonialization without adequate preparation and a definite impulse from the nation itself" (Townsend: 68).

In the years 1876 and 1879, he instructed his naval commandant to establish treaties with Tonga and Samoa. The Tongan treaty "guaranteed reciprocal commercial freedom and the right to establish a naval station at Vava'u." The Samoan treaty was the result of Germany's desire to protect the commercial interests of Godeffroys, jeopordized by the civil

war between claimants to the "kingship" of the islands. It gave trading advantage to Germany, and also "ceded to Germany rights which the Samoan government is forbidden to grant to any other nation as well as the right to establish a coaling station on the island of Upolu" (Townsend: 70). Germany also made other treaties with the Ellice and Gilbert Islands, the Marshall Islands, and islands in the Duke of York group of the Bismarck Archipelago. But Bismarck made quite an effort to play down the importance of the treaties, justifying them as a basis for protection of German business and denying any interest in colonial territory. He printed the clarification in the Deutscher Reichs Anzeiger, as a measure of assurance for the major powers. Nevertheless, by 1879, along with England and the United States, he was willing to establish a joint municipal protectorate over the town of Apia on Upolu (Townsend: 71).

PRESSURE BUILDS FOR AN AGGRESSIVE COLONIAL POLICY

Bismarck's economic policies were seen to change in the latter half of the 1870's. The dismissal of his Minister of Commerce, Rudolph von Delbruch, and the repudiation of his "free-trade" policies represented a new course for the Chancellor. In 1879, he established a schedule of protective tariffs, which was a key factor in the development of the oversees Empire later. The pressure to develop such policies came from his support in the Reichstag and in the private sector, an alliance of big Prussian agriculture and big industry (Smith: 15). Bismarck's switch from free trade policies also signalled that a new ideal for national

economics was installed in the ruling class.

The failure of the House of Godeffroy marked a turning point in Bismarck's attitude toward colonial involvement. Prior to 1870, Bismarck as the Chancellor of Prussia, expressed his encouragement to Weber of Godeffroys that Samoa be a place of German immigration and that he would support the company with arms and send a warship to protect the trade. The scheme was interrupted by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and put off for later consideration (Townsend: 66). By 1880, the whole picture had changed, virtually overnight. The House of Godeffroys had over-reached itself in 1878 as a result of mining speculation in Europe and was compelled to borrow money from Baring Brothers of London to keep itself solvent. Nonetheless, it failed in 1879 (Townsend: 72).

Bismarck wanted to underwrite the firm in order to fend off British or foreign takeover. He proposed a bill for that purpose to the Reichstag to maintain international stature and avoid losing Germany's strong commercial interests in Samoa. "Prompted by Godeffroy and by von Hansemann, the head of the Diskonto Gesellschaft and his brother-in-law von Kusserow, the Auswartiges Amt counselor for overseas affairs, the German government announced its intention of guaranteeing a four and one-half percent dividend for twenty years of a new company, the Deutsche Seehandels-Gesellschaft" (Kennedy: 22).

The Subsidy Bill became a test case for Bismarck's foreign policy and a crucial factor for future imperial designs. The opposition ripped into

his program in the Reichstag and "tore off the disguise of national glory and proclaimed the Bill an inauguration of state-directed colonialism." The Subsidy Bill failed and it proved to him that it was unwise to initiate a colonial policy. Beaten but not down, he fell back to the position he had taken a decade earlier; that one should advance no policy without first having popular support. Moreover, it was the early 1880's and his supporters were none too numerous; he did not choose to struggle against parties that could damage his fiscal policy and Social Insurance Legislation in the Reichstag (Townsend: 74,75).

After the Subsidy Bill defeat, he rejected a number of moves by private parties to acquire colonies, but he attempted, without success, to set up an economic council which would appropriate funds for government acquisition of territories. For a while he left the subject cool and outside lobbyists to their own means of whipping up public fever.

Several prominent individuals and groups again came into the struggle in favor of colonization. Wilhelm Hubbe-Schleiden, a lawyer, explorer, national politician and publicist, can be credited with elevating the controversy to the level of national scrutiny. Hubbe-Schleiden's theorized that "colonies were necessary to prevent the degeneration of the German people through industrialization and the sapping of Germany's strength through emigration" (Smith: 24). The economic side of the question of "life and death" for Germany was exploited to a feverish pitch by Felix Fabri, founder of the Westdeutsche Verein fur Kolonisation und Export (Townsend: 78,80). Although he was the Inspector of the

Barmen Rhine Mission, he brought together both influencial commericial and religious spokesmen. In retropspect, his voice was not lost upon Bismarck (Smith: 21).

Advocates from trading interests formed the Central Verein fur Handels Geographie und deutsche Interesse in Ausland in the mid-1870's. It was the precursor of the Kolonialverein and the Deutsche Kolonial-gesellschaft and called for an aggressive export offensive. The major interest group which entered the forum was the Kolonialverein, which was established in 1882 by leaders of the colonial movement. With its official publication, the Kolonial Zeitung, it participated in an attack upon the Progressive and Center Parties of the Reichstag and against the retrenchment policies of Bismarck (Smith: 22).

Carl Peters, a young, well-educated and engaging individual, founded the Gesellschaft fur deutsche Kolonisation and became the leading advocate of colonialism in Germany. His organization became the first of its kind to acquire property and establish a private colony. His organization and the Kolonialverein merged in 1887 and became the Kolonialgesellschaft, the only major colonial organization to continue to operate up to and through World War I.

BISMARCK INAUGURATES THE COLONIAL EMPIRE

During 1884, Bismarck felt that he no longer need subordinate his colonial policy in order to maintain harmony in his relationship with Great Britain. Previously his foreign policy reflected the need to steer clear of any show of antagonism toward England. By 1884, the terms had grown more favorable for an aggressive German colonial policy: in 1883, Germany's security in Europe was assured and he had improved his position with France by means of the Triple Alliance of 1881.

Bismarck began his pressure on England by harking back to reparation claims of German planters who were dispossessed by the British annexation of Fiji in 1874. Initial claims by the German planters had been ignored by England since 1875, for the British failed to appreciate the German case. In April, 1883, the British Colonial Office refused to comply with Bismarck's request for recognition of the problem. Furthermore, the Colonial Office felt that the two powers had no common ground on which to negotiate. The British felt even more secure because of assurances from the French of non-intervention in New Guinea. With British refusal, Bismarck became even more furious and willing to force cooperation (Knight: 65-70). He steadfastly pushed the issue and demanded a joint commission of English and German participants to settle the problem. The Commission, however, was seated only after arrangements over the partition of claimed territories by Germany and Britain had been resolved in 1885.

"But it was in Africa that Bismarck pushed his confident nationalism policy; a climax which, in conjunction with affairs in the South Pacific, that created an international crisis and precipitated an outburst of German patriotism strong enough to launch a state-directed colonial policy" (Townsend: 83). The Anglo-French Convention and Anglo-Portugese Treaty of early 1884, which respectively partitioned the Congo, established high customs duties and monopolistic control by the English. It caused bitter antagonism of German interests in Africa, prompted an enraged public outcry in Germany, and enabled Bismarck to seize upon a long awaited opportunity. He requested France to join him in condemnation of the British moves, and the French agreed to unite their commercial interests with those of Germany in the Congo. In April 1884, he placed the Luderitz factory in Southwest Africa under German Imperial protection (Townsend: 87,88). Thus he created the German Colonial Empire.

While events were building to a crisis in Africa, similar incidents were driving Bismarck closer to annexation of Pacific territories. Letters from his consuls, Dr. Oskar Stuebel and Franz Hernsheim, warned of impinging commercial interests of Australia upon German business as early as 1881. The matter began to grow in intensity as the Australians became more vocal in their press and parliament against the intrusion of Germany in their sphere-of-influence.

Both Stuebel and Hernsheim wrote Bismarck in early August of 1883 that Australia had "provisionally" annexed New Guinea. In fact, it was Sir Thomas McIlwraith, Premier of Queensland, Australia, that instructed

the police magistrate of Thursday Island to proceed to Port Moresby and proclaim the area in the name of the Queen. The British Colonial Office repudiated his proclamation on the basis that annexation was an Imperial, not a colonial, power and that Germany offered no threat to its security (Grattan: To 1900; 493,494).

In the light of the Australian moves, Hernsheim feared that any interference with the labor trade by Australia would ruin his business. Weber, also on August 6, 1883, warned Bismarck of the impending Australian move and its potential damage to DHPG operations. "An annexation of these islands would prevent the Company from procuring laborers there and as no other islands in the South Sea could make up for the deficiency, the existence of our plantations on Samoa would be jeopardized. If Samoa itself were annexed by one of these powers, German interests would cease to exist altogether"
(Premier's Office: 33).

The Intercontinental Conference of December 1883 in Sydney passed the following resolution:

> That in the opinion of this convention no purchases or pretended purchases of land made before the establishment of British jurisdiction or dominion in New Guinea or the other islands of the Pacific not having a recognized government, should be acknowledged, except in respect to small areas of land actually occupied for missionary or trading practices (Premier's Office: 35).

Upset by the turn of events, both Godeffroy, now Director of the DHPG, and Hernsheim wrote to Bismarck in January 1884 to "take measures to secure to the German houses the possession of the land which they have purchased, or may purchase in the future" (Premier's Office: 35).

Bismarck pressed the English Foreign Minister, Lord Granville, in April of 1883 for an explanation and again sought to resolve the issue of reparation payments (Townsend: 87). At the same time, Bismarck pressed the English on the labor recuiting problem and for damages suffered by German merchants as a result of the actions of Australian labor recruters in 1883 (Knight: 66).

The issue of the labor trade was settled in haste by Griffith, a Foreign Service Officer for the British, who paid indemnities to the German merchants. He recognized the danger of the labor trade and its clashes upon a stable foreign relationship (Knight: 66). However, the payment of reparations to the Fiji traders was still not close to settlement. Granville, at the head of the Foreign Office, did not want to oppose Bismarck and pledged to "re-examine" and refer them to a mixed commission. On the other hand, Granville received opposition on this issue from the British Colonial Office which failed to understand the significance of the issue and was not prepared to come to terms with Bismarck.

A most important and eventful communication was received by Bismarck from Adolph von Hansemann in late June of 1884. Von Hansemann notified Bismarck that he had instructed Captain Finsch, a German explorer, to surreptitiously establish settelments in New Guinea on behalf of the DHPG, and he requested Bismarck to support the venture (Premier's Office: refer Appendix letter #19). In a letter to Bismarck of July 1884, Stuebel again recommended to Bismarck that he not allow the British or

Australians annexation of either the islands north of New Britain or the northern coast of New Guinea.

June through December characterized a period of Anglo-German estrangement. In June of 1884, the British were not prepared for Bismarck's aggressive actions. His willingness to unite the Egyptian issue with the Fiji issue caught the Foreign and Colonial Offices off guard. On June 15, 1884, Granville suspended action on German complaints. Consequently, Plessen, Bismarck's emissary, delivered two personal messages to Granville on September 23rd. Their content must have promised potentially damaging results, for the latter led the British Cabinet to limit its protectorate to the south coast of New Guinea, which they proclaimed on October, 23, 1884.

In early August, Granville and Munster met and held preliminary talks in order to facilitate an agreement on their respective areas of interests in the Pacific. On August 9, 1884, Count Munster informed Bismarck that he broached the issue with Lord Granville and Lord Granville assured him that an arrangement could be made. "He was glad of these colonial efforts of Germany and hoped a friendly agreement respecting them might be arrived at" (Premier's Office: 42). Thereafter, the German and British governments entered into negotiations with respect to the partition of the islands, after their mutual benefit.

Taking advantage of the entente with the British, Bismarck notified von Oerzten, his Imperial Commissioner in New Britain "to hoist the flag

in the archipelago of New Britain and along that part of the northeast coast of New Guinea" on August, 19, 1884. A day later he notified von Hansemann that "instructions have been given to support your undertaking. The acquisition made by you will be placed under the protection of the Empire" (Premier's Office: 42). In mid-September Lord Granville notified Bismarck of his intentions to resolve the Fiji issue.

Meade, Granville's emissary, presented the German Foreign Office with a scheme " for a general settlement of all colonial questions affecting the two countries" (Knight: 74). It was most significant, because it proposed that France obtain territory in the New Hebrides. Busch, the German Foreign Ambassador to England, responded to Meade, "any arrangement which embraced the Pacific would have to be in some degree of a tri-partite nature, as France has claims which would have to be considered" (Knight: 77). In any case, French interests were not interfering with those of Germany in the Pacific. Then on December 23, 1884, Bismarck officially announced his protectorate over northeast New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, refered to at the time as New Britain.

Later the British and Germans would settle the boundary issues. The Germans were given a "free hand, up to the level of establishing protectorates, to the north of New Guinea west of the Gilbert Islands. Samoa was declared to be a separate matter, since it was affected by treaties with the United States as well as Germany and Britain. Tonga and Niue, affected by German and English treaties, were declared neutral territory" (Grattan:To 1900, 496-497).

PART II

PACIFIC COLONIES IN TRANSITION

GERMAN TRADE SETTLES IN SAMOA

August Unshelm, the manager for Godeffroys, visited Samoa in search of a Pacific headquarters central to the coconut oil trade, which the firm intended to exploit. Unshelm settled at Apia in 1857 because of the missionary and whaling stations already in place. It provided the center for transhipment of coconut oil to Europe gathered from his agents throughout the Pacific.

The House of Godeffroy prospered under his successor, Theodor Weber, who the British referred to as the "South Sea King" and who utilized skillful methods akin to machiavellianism to achieve his aims. "By the exercise of great tact and a show of liberality in dealing with the natives" a former employee asserted that Weber "in a great measure swallowed up the trade of the Samoan group" (Fox: 138). In 1867 he began to change his operations from coconut oil to copra collection. In order to insure a steady supply, he began to legitimately purchase land from the Samoans. "A mania for selling land" swept Samoa as "turmoil and warfare in the late sixties stimulated a demand for firearms." "It is averred that the existence of a Godeffroy arms factory at Liege conferred a distinctive advantage over rivals, and it was implicitly believed by some that Weber deliberately let loose the dogs of war to stimulate the sale of land (Fox: 141). "During this period of turmoil Weber purchased

25,000 acres, while a San Francisco syndicate engaged in speculation and claimed to have purchased in excess of 300,000 acres (Kennedy: 10). Mulifanua and Vailele, DHPG plantations, were instituted in 1865 and 1867,as a result of this era of turmoil. By 1875 Weber held control over 61,500 hectares of suitable crop land (Fox: 28) and (Hempenstall: 28).

Successful and well ensconced in Samoa, Weber formulated a scheme for annexation and colonization in the late 1860's which he presented to Bismarck while on a visit to Berlin (Townsend: 66). Chinese tenant farmers were to grow rice, jute, sugar cane and coconuts on the lowlands, while German settlers were to render the uplands productive of coffee, corn, tobacco and cinchona. Finding it difficult to involve Samoans in plantation labor, he found it necessary to draw upon labor from Niue, Raratonga, from the Line Islands and the atolls of Micronesia (Fox: 142). The importation of Micronesians increased until the late seventies, when approximately 1200 were in Samoa; but thereafter, the supply dwindled and he turned to the Bismarck Archipelago and Mioko region for contract labor (Fox: 143).

SAMOA AT WAR AND FOREIGN INTRIGUE: 1870 TO 1883

In Samoan affairs, the death of Malietoa Mali in 1866 left his family divided; some supported his brother Tavalou, others his son Laupepe. Misconstruing Samoan culture in the light of European concepts of heredity, the British consul and missionaries supported Laupepe.

Traditional conflict between the Tumua and Pule, two groups of Samoan talking chiefs, ensued (Fox: 138). The German plantations were often vandalized and Weber sought to curtail the fighting by offering the opportunity of annexation to Bismarck in 1871, primarily to protect his financial investments. Bismarck, however, would not support his request and the fighting continued until the missionaries and European consuls were able to curtail the strife in 1873 (Fox: 138). A constitution blending Western and Samoan ideals was created and Malietoa Laupepe and Tupua Pulepule were alternately to share the royal titles, while the high chiefs and talking chiefs occupied the two house legislature, the Ta'imua and Faipule.

Colonel A.B. Steinberger, a former American official sent to Samoa in 1872 by President Grant to survey the problems, was appointed as the Prime Minister of the new government. He served in the position for less than a year, disguising the fact that he no longer possessed the backing of the United States government and that he had driven a secret bargain with Godeffroy, while in Germany, for support in return for special treatment and a monopoly for Godeffroy's business. While he had endeared himself to the Samoan leadership by his attempt to establish a unified Samoan body, the European consuls, including Weber of the DHPG, resented him for his meddling. In 1874 the United States government absolved itself of any support for his leadership and the consuls were then successfull in having him deported in 1875 (Kennedy: 9).

Out of embarrassment, the Steinberger affair led to Malietoa

Laupepe's removal and the Samoan Ta'umua and Faipule decided not to appoint a successor. For three years Samoans rested in a period of relative tranquilty and freedom from strife, but in 1876 Malietoa Laupepe returned Upolu to political chaos. He set up his seat of government at A'ana and found encouragement in German and English adventurers. He attempted to overthrow the Ta'imua and Faipule, but his warriors were dispersed in battle (Kennedy: 12).

Griffin, the new Amercian consul, urged the Samoan leadership to maintain the old Steinberger system. Alarmed at this American intervention, Weber again pressed for recognition of German rights and threatened damage claims and intervention with use of a German warship. When the German warship arrived, the Samoan leadership requested the United States for protectorate status and Griffin accepted. The U.S. Congress, however, was suspicious of the situation and determined that the government need not be involved with anything that smacked of colonialism. Congress at the time did not want to give a hint of cooperating with Britain against the Germans (Kennedy: 13). The affair ended with an American-Samoan Treaty of Friendship in 1878, which granted the United States most favored nation privileges, rights to a naval station at Pago harbor, and a statement that the United States would aid Samoa " if differences occurred with other governments" (Kennedy: 14).

Griffin's proclamation of a protectorate forced Weber's hand again. In July of 1878, he requested the German Navy to seize several harbors of

Upolu in order to "force a helpless Samoa government pay off old compensation claims" (Kennedy: 15). At the time he succeeded in having two harbors blockaded. Early in 1879 the warships returned to Samoa, and the matter was settled in a "friendly" fashion. A German-Samoan Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1879. It granted Germany most favored nation status, freedom from import and export duties, and a naval station at Saluafata. In addition, all Samoan laws relating to German subjects were to be submitted to German authorities and could only come into force with German approval (Kennedy: 16).

Bismarck was reasonalbly satisfied that the treaty would aid the situation in Samoa and protect German interests in the islands, based upon a clause of the treaty granting Germans the peaceable possession of all lands of Samoa. Unlike his consul, Bismarck had no stomach for annexation of Samoa. Strong Reichstag opposition and the desire to avoid any confrontation with either England or the United States determined his response (Kennedy: 17).

By 1879, the power of the Ta'imua and the Faipule had declined and that of Malietioa had risen. The islands were again on the verge of civil war, with Weber "tacitly" supporting Malietoa and England behind Tavalou. The British sent Sir Arthur Gordon from the Fiji's Western Commission Office to survey the situation. Realizing that no country could annex Samoa on the basis of their treaty arrangements, he supported an attempt to make Apia an independent municipality under tripartite administration (Kennedy: 22). When civil war broke out in 1879 between Malietoan and Tavalouan forces, Weber employed the warship Bismarck to

arrange a cease fire, in reality to maintain the Malietoan party in power. Later both Tavalou and Laupepe agreed to the reestablishment of a more representative government or Ta'imua and Faipule. Tavalou was to be considered the King and Laupepe was appointed as his regent. A three man executive council to administer Upolu was established in March of 1880 (Kennedy: 24).

The unexpected death of Tavalou in November of 1881 plunged the islands into political chaos, again. An agreement made on board the U.S. Lackawanna made Laupepe the King and Tapua Tamasese the regent with the positions to be rotated every few years. In the interim the European consuls continued to influence Samoan affairs. Weber had become dissolutioned with Malietoa, because of Malietoa's disinterest in coming to terms with the problems of vandalism at the plantations and because of Malietoa's education by the London Missionary Society (Kennedy: 30).

The conditions continued to worsen as Malietoa was unable or unwilling to restrain his people and maintain law and order. The new German consul, Captain Zembsch, became so disturbed with the disobedience, the requirement of constant naval surveillance, and the trading in arms that he went so far as to recommend the annexation of Samoa by the British. His dislike for the intrigues on the part of both the Samoans and Europeans won him respect from the Samoans and other consuls, but brought his dismissal and replacement by Dr. Stuebel, a man who would not wince at the use of naval power and who was prepared to preserve Deutschtum in Samoa (Kennedy: 30,31).

In 1883, agitation from New Zealand for annexation of Samoa caused Weber to act more aggressively. Weber could not accept the New Zealand annexation, because it would assuredly involve an investigation of his labor trade and treatment of the natives, and a review of his land speculation. The Sydney Convention, which pointedly advocated removal of land in the hands of foreigners, was clearly unsatisfactory for his business. In addition, Malietoa wanted a review of land practices because Weber had acquired Mulinu'u, the traditional seat of Samoan government from an American settler (Kennedy:34,35). Malietoa offered US$5000 for the return of Mulinu'u Point, but the Germans responded that it would be held in reparation for Samoan misdeeds and for violation of German property (Le Suer: 139). For their part, the Germans had suffered enough from the native civil war and deprivations to their plantations.

AN ERA OF GERMAN COUPS: 1884 TO 1899

In 1884 Stuebel and Weber forced a treaty upon Malietoa giving Germany unquestionable authority in the conduct of native affairs (Hempenstall: 28)and (Appendix). When the warship Bismarck was in port, Stuebel and Weber summoned Malietoa to sign a German-Samoan Treaty. The document provided for a German-Samoan State Council, a German Secretary or Advisor to the King, a German Treasurer, that Germans control appointment to and control of the police, and a clause that redressed German claims by punishment. Weber's action was not spontaneous; as early as 1883, Weber had drawn up the document, but no warship had arrived to enforce it (Kennedy: 35).

"Unable to subject Malietoa to his will and enraged about renewed secret appeals for British protection, Weber threw all the weight of German influence in Samoa in favor of the Vice-King Tamasese, and when the King protested, Stuebel had marines land in January 1885 and took over Mulinu'u Point, raising the German flag" (Kennedy: 44). Shortly thereafter, the German contingent occupied Apia and Tamasese was proclaimed King. Upon word of his consul's action in Samoa, Bismarck reprimanded von Kusserow for attempting to support Stuebel. He instructed the Navy that there would be no support for Stuebel's action and informed Gladstone that he intended to maintain the status quo. He preferred to achieve Samoa be legal means and had no intention to disregard the treaty rights of the other powers (Kennedy: 45) It was at this time that Bismarck's son Herbert was in long bargaining sessions with the English over the partition of the Pacific.

After 1885, Britain became less of an obstacle for Germany, but the United States influence increased. The English consul assured Malietoa that the situation could be worked out, but England could take no territory as Salisbury had no intention to anger Bismarck. Malietoa then offered to place Samoa under United States protection. The American consul, Greenbaum, accepted but the Secretary of State, Bayard, repudiated the agreement (Le Suer: 141). Meanwhile Weber continued to make plans for a German administration and he wrote to the Forieign Office for a stipend of 100,000 Marks which the DHPG would use to administer the government.

During a visit by a special three-power commission, the Germans approached the English and Americans and pressed, although lightly, for more German control of Samoa. Germany would allow Tonga to be administered by Britain and Pago Pago to be neutralized. The proposal was acceptable to the British and they agreed to present it to the Americans at the Washington Conference in the Summer of 1887 (Kennedy: 58-59). As a result of the close relationship that had developed between Bismarck and Salisbury, they drafted a secret agreement on April 23, 1887, which had to do as much with European affairs as with Samoa. The British gave Germany "de facto" control of Samoa in exchange for free trade and navigation in the islands. Because Germany believed that Tamasese had universal support and would win in a Samoan election, the Germans proposed that the "kingship" be elective.

At the Washington Conference of June, 1887, Bayard would accept no arrangement giving Germany "de facto" control of Samoa. He was particularly annoyed to hear from one of his informers that Brandeis, a former DHPG employee, was training Tamasese's military forces. Consequently, the Conference did not go past six sessions.

Bayard's strong position forced the German government to take a more drastic stand in Samoa. Becker, the new consul, called for four warships on the 23rd of August. He demanded $13,000 in reparations, landed 700 marines, declared martial law, and put the Samoans under curfew. Malietoa was deposed, Tamesese was installed as King, and the municipal government of Apia was declared in abeyance (Knight: 69).

The German coup generated another set of problems for Becker and the DHPG. The British and American consuls took a hard line on this latest German adventure. The Washington government stiffened its intercourse with Bismarck, but Salisbury, having given Bismarck a free hand in Samoa, reprimanded his consul (Kennedy: 69). "Tamesese Tupua was very soon discredited in the eyes of Samoans and non-Europeans by the methods used to eliminate political oppostion and to impose demands of a centralized government on the decentralized Islanders" (Hempenstall: 28). Anarchy and intertribal battle ensued and the chiefs only supported him when the German warships were in port (Kennedy: 69).

In December of 1887, Commodore Heusner of the German Imperial Navy warned the German Admiralty, that Tamasese's government could only exist with the implementation of force (Kennedy: 73). Brandeis was using every means possible to maintain Tamasese in power, including the importation of extensive shipments of arms, but his autocratic and unpopular measures were unable to prevent unrest. He even went so far as to ban public assemblies and cricket matches by the English residents.

In consequence of Tamasese's unsatisfactory handling of government and people, Malieatoa engineered an insurrection headed by Mata'afa Josefo in September of 1888. The immediate reasons were an announcement of a capitation tax, deportations of Samoans for misdeeds against German persons or property, and Tamasese's claim to the title of Tafa'ifa. Brandeis led a force of 500 to root out Mata'afa, but found instead that his forces were routed from their implacements and compelled to take a

position at Mulinu'u Point, under the protection of the warship Adler. Having received rumors of Mata'afa's intention to pillage Apia, the Americans and British landed troops to protect their citizens. Malietoa, was taken under house arrest, placed on a warship and secretly taken first to Hamburg and then to the Marshall Islands (Kennedy: 75-78).

Dr. Knappe, the newly installed German consul, received a request from Weber in late 1888 to prevent the plunderings of his plantations by Samoan warriors. Knappe requested a contingent of marines to confine Mata'afa and bring him to justice. Before the marines could reach their intended destination, Mata'afa's forces ambushed 50 of the Germans. This prompted Knappe to proclaim a state-of-war and request military support from Germany. Bismarck, infuriated by Knappe's proclamation and suggested annexation, fiercely scolded Knappe publicly for breaking established treaties. Bismarck also declined to support Tamasese, on the advice of naval officers, and for reasons of cost in men, supplies and hardware (Kennedy: 77,78).

Bismarck's retreat was the result of many factors. There was universal condemnation in the United States for the actions of the Germans in Samoa, the Congress in Washington appropriated $600,000 for protection of U.S. rights in Pago Pago, and mobilization of the U.S. fleet had been rumored. At the time, Bismarck genuinely feared an American reprisal and was unwilling to take an anti-American attitude. In other respects, relations in Europe were insecure, that is, the French and Russians had arrived at detente; Bismarck's standing in the

Reichstag was waning with the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and his relationship with Salisbury required that he take no aggressive actions. In the end, Bismarck proposed the Berlin Conference. He was "anxious to come to an understanding in the subject by peaceful negotiations" (Kennedy: 81).

The hurricane of March 15th, in which all the American, English and German warships in Apia Harbor were destroyed except the British "Calliope", convinced the three powers that the cost in men and machinery probably was not worth what Samoa had to offer.

At the Berlin Conference Samoa was declared an independent neutral country. The municipal government of Apia was reorganized and linked with the indigenous Samoan government through a Supreme court, and Malietoa Laupepe was reinstated with the consent of Tamasese's followers. But he immediately gave up his position to Mata'afa, who was unsatisfactory as leader of the Samoa Islands for the Germans. In consequence, the German consuls and Bismarck appealed to the British, who then threw their support to Malieatoa.

The period after the reorganization was marked by an unsettling truce and wrangling among the divided consuls and Samoans. The government of Europeans was constructed in a piecemeal fashion; some of the officials arrived in Samoa as much as one and one half years late and the municipal administration was in disarray. The Samoan government had neither money nor enough influence among the people to maintain order (Kennedy: 98-99).

Matters went from bad to worse in 1891. The Europeans were always quarreling. Schmidt, the Chief Justice, annoyed everybody, the American and English consuls were at each other's throat and a deadlock existed on many issues. Mata'afa moved his headquarters away from Apia to Malie and was made king by his supporters. By the beginning of 1892, Samoa lacked "peace, order or effective administration." Faced with administrative chaos from the constant bickering between officials, the Americans proposed a conference to iron out the problems. At this stage, the Germans refused, but replaced their chief justice and president with more congenial and less rigid men. The Land Commission, which ruled upon claims and arbitrated disputes, was about the only operation that could claim to be effective. No land squabbles or incidents occured after 1894 (Kennedy: 100-102).

Civil war broke out in 1893; Mata'afa was again in rebellion. This time his main support came from his traditional opponents, or Tamasese's group after his death. Caught between a rock and a hard spot, the Germans and English managed to convince Mata'afa to turn himself in for the sake of Samoa. After his surrender, he was deported to the Marshall Islands on a German warship. But the unrest was not quelled with Mata'afa's departure, the DHPG plantations continued to be vandalized and Tamasese's son took up the resistance by leading forces against the government. Having had their fingers burnt from intervention previously, the Germans and British remained cool to the idea of sending troops this time. Weber was clearly concerned. He appealed to the administration to

curtail the sale of arms and support a policy of disarmament. This was a significant change from his position when he supported Brandeis in the late 1880's (Kennedy: 101).

In 1894, New Zealand proposed a protectorate over the Samoas to the alarm of the Germans. Prime Minister Richard Seddon, known to be a strong but popular imperialist, petitioned London for New Zealand administration of Samoa. It came at a time when all three powers were becoming increasingly dissillusioned over Samoa. For Germany, the growing influence of the London Missionary Society and English teachers and the competition from Australian business served to diminish its prospective of Deutschtum in Samoa. For Weber, it capped a period of financial loss. From 1889 through 1894, the DHPG plantations had sustained enough damage to incur successive losses for the company. By 1894, Weber was willing to sell the DHPG operations in Samoa and had been negotiating with a New Zealand firm for its purchase. However, the sale never went through, since his asking price was too high.

Perhaps Seddon realized that the time was ripe for annexation by a single power. All three powers realized that some change must occur. "There was little hope of this unique structure of government functioning smoothly when the vast majority of the participants and observers looked forward to its future demise" (Kennedy: 114). Therefore, what was to happen next was against the best aims of the three powers.

Both the London and German press caught hold of the issue and proceeded to make it a matter of national pride. A colonial campaign

commenced with Seddon on one side and the Pan-German League on the other. Neither Britain or Germany could yield for the sake of loss of face (Kennedy: 116) The Navy League went so far as to advocate the taking of Samoa with a group of six cruisers and landing forces. Caprivi, not anyone to force an issue against the security of his country, refused to go along with the plans of the League and Kayser, Director of the Colonial Department. However, the attitude of the government changed with the demise of Caprivi and the accession of Wilhelm II as Kaiser, with von Bulow as Chancelor. Both men were "Kolonialmensch" and it seemed an "exciting" overseas policy to the Kaiser. Yet the planned German coup did not take place; the United States did not appear to be backing down from its position on Samoa; the British were not frightened by Admiral Tirpitz's great naval aspirations; and in the end, the situation in Africa proved to overshaddow the relatively minor incidents in Samoa (Kennedy: 118-120).

By the end of the nineteenth century Samoa was preparing for another round of strife and warfare. Upon Malietoa's death, the Samoans united with the Tumua and Pule in favor of Mata'afa, who had recently returned from exile. The American Chief Justice, Chambers, put the government in the hands of the legal heir, Tanumafili Malietoa. Civil war was on again, except this time, Mata'afa's rebels, with German support, set fire to a greater part of Apia. Dr. Raffel, the German consul, took control of the government, but was recalled by the Colonial Department. The Americans then arrived in February of 1899, proclaimed Mata'afa's

government to be illegal under the terms of the Berlin Conference of 1889, opened fire on his rebels with warships and British marines were landed. On March 23, 1899, Tanumafili was restored to power, Mata'afa was in rebellion and the islands in anarchy (Fox: 140) and (LeSuer: 145-147).

An international commission was established in August of 1899 by the three powers; the tripartite decision abolished the "kingship" principle and placed the government temporarily in the hands of an administrator with a council of consuls assisted by a native assembly and a high-court justice. Great Britain waived her claims to Samoa for privileges in the other islands of the Pacific. The United States received Tutuila, Manua and the other eastwardly islands of the Samoas. Germany then annexed Upolu and Savaii; they were to be under the control of its treaty negotiator, Wilhelm Solf, and Samoa was braced for the period of Imperial rule (LeSuer: 148) and (Hempenstall: 31).

THE NEW GUINEA COMPANY SETS UP SHOP: 1884 TO 1889

Captain Otto Finsch's "scientific expedition" arrived at Astrolabe Bay on the northern coast of New Guinea in 1884 to a rousing reception of "OH MACLAY." Nikolai Miklоucho-Maclay, a Russian naturalist, who settled in the area in 1871 came to be revered as a demigod by the natives as a result of the material goods that he could acquire. He lived in good stead with them until his departure in 1883, when he predicted his European "brothers" would follow. The German arrival appeared as

confirmation of the prediction. Finsch raised the flag at Finschhafen, the first settlement for the company, in November 1884. It was to be the scene of the great experiment in planned colonization from Australia and Germany (Hempenstall: 164).

Baron George von Schleinitz was the first appointed Governor of the New Guinea Company. The initial tasks issued to him by the Berlin Directors of the Company were to: open up land which was unowned, for company use; determine the topography of the area; and learn the language and customs of the natives. In the first years of Company colonization, von Schleinitz encountered some serious problems. He wrote that management suffered, not from native resistance or conflict, nor from soil availability or fertility, but from "the lack of willing and skilled labor, which first has to be trained and brought in from elsewhere; and from the discharge of the functions associated with the political administration assigned to the Company, which are rendered considerably more difficult by the legal position created at the outset by the legislation of the German Reich" (New Guinea Company Annual Report: 1886-87). Peter Hempenstall writes that the Company was "overrun by an army of officials trying to administer numerous impracticle regulations derived from Prussian civil and criminal law" (Hempenstall; 165). For example, land prices were determined by the Berlin Directors and their approval of the sale could take as much as six months.

The relations with the natives soon became a problem. From the time of initial settlement in the area, the New Guinea Company had never

formulated a native policy, but its position was that the natives were to be considered a "natural resource to be exploited with a minimum of outlay" (Hempenstall: 165). Shortly after the colony's foundation, von Schleinitz could no longer rely upon a local supply of native labor and he was forced to import workers from the Bismarck Archipelago. Relations with the mainland natives became progessively less cordial as land disputes caused a number of misunderstandings. Attacks on Schmiel, his deputy, and other personnel forced von Schleinitz to deal with the local natives in a more brutal fashion. In response, a police force was instituted to curb violence (New Guinea Company Annual Report: 1886-87).

As a result of his administrative difficulties, von Schleinitz also altered the Imperial government laws to fit the colony's requirements, but legislation remained a privilege of the Imperial Chancellor, with two judges, one in Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the other in the Bismarck Archipelago to administer it. However, he forbade trading in weapons, ammunition and liquor, and empowered the station managers to discipline the natives (Moses, I.: 290). A portion of the draft ordinances contained measures for criminal conduct which even Berlin officials found disturbing. He had sanctioned food rations, confinement and flogging and "explained away its heavy emphasis on corporal punishment with the observation, that from childhood, Pacific Islanders, Malays and Chinese were accustomed to blows and other severe punishment" (New Guinea Company Annual Report: 1887-88). These altered regulations were ultimately tempered by the Berlin officials. The overall, effect, however, was to

transfer jurisdiction over the natives to the New Guinea Company until 1897. This was accomplished by the Kaiser's Imperial Ordinance of July, 1888, which initially guaranteed just, humane treatment for the natives. Von Schleinitz resigned shortly thereafter, because of differences of policy. Attitudes did not change rapidly, however, as one could find mistreatment by white settlers well into the Australian period (Hempenstall: 166).

By the end of 1890, no verdict in a criminal case had ever been passed against a native in court. Swift retaliatory actions were employed to handle the natives. Several courses of actions were employed by the New Guinea Company: villages would often be forced to supply hostages when the culprit was not apprehended or arrested; compensation, e.g., pigs, livestock and vegetables were requested of the family or village; villages were occassionally forcibly subdued; and the torching of settlements had not been unknown (Moses, I.: 291).

In addition, the actions of Stanislaw Kubary from 1887 to 1889 contributed to poor relations with the local natives. Kubary zealously proclaimed land purchases from his ship along Astrolabe Bay by posting notices of purchase and generally did not enter into agreements of sale with the natives. The disputes arrising out of his claims became a constant source of friction between the Company and the Siar, the tribe which owned the land. When the Company attempted to dislodge them and deny them use of the traditional fishing grounds, they sought mediation from the newly arrived missionaries, who upheld the Company's claim. For

the next several years, the Siar people passively resisted by refusing to work the plantations being cleared on their land (Hempenstall: 168).

THE DECLINE OF THE NEW GUINEA COMPANY: 1889 TO 1899

From 1889 to 1891 the Imperial Commissioner, Fritz Rose, "virtually ran the colony during the interlude of imperial administration" of the new colony (Hempenstall: 171). After surveying the New Guinea Company records, Rose felt accutely the need to start again from scratch, to establish shipping communications, to create harbors and landing places, to cut roads and to improve relations with the natives. He was well aware of the existing problems, particularly with the relationship between whites and natives. Skirmishes with native forces occured throughout the Company's brief history. Therefore, he sought to establish intermediaries in each settlement to lessen the danger of violence. At the same time, he realized the need for a larger and more effective police force to keep the peace, and the inadequacy of the German Navy to carry out the task. In fact, the Foreign Office in 1887 and the German Admiralty set limits on the use of military forces by personal fiat and without written request for action (Hempenstall: 169).

April 1892 saw the return of administration of the protectorate to the Company, with plans for retrenchment. The unprofitable stations of Finschhaffen, Hatzfeldthafen, and Jombe near Madang were closed down. The case of Finschhafen was exascerbated by an outbreak of fever which killed more than a dozen of the Company's officials. The Company started

anew, with exploration and an intention to open up new opportunities. Again it was forced to look outside its chief port of Madang for labor, because no man could be forcibly induced to work the plantations; the Company lacked the means to establish or enforce a labor system (Moses,I: 298). The Siar people were in arms and other groups were restive. When mid-decade rolled around, it was evident that the adminis-tration of the protectorate should not remain in the hands of the New Guinea Company. The Company's Directors in Berlin decided that it was not possible to carry out colonization under Bismarck's original concept of Charter, so it began to negotiate for the complete transfer of govern-mental affairs to the Colonial Office. The New Guinea Company formally relinquished administration of the colony to the German government in 1899. The New Guinea Company was the last Charter company to relinquish government control of the original companies licensed by Bismarck to administer colonial territories (Hempenstall: 173).

Personal relationships and the attitudes that the Company officials held contributed significantly to their problems. "Whereas responsible officials tried to gain the natives' trust, cooperation, and even friendship by learning the vernacular, getting acquainted with local customs and respecting these in their dealings with the native population, others found it impossible to communicate with them at all. Contempt for, as well as fear of the numerically superior masses, indifference to their culture, or hatred of them, as well as personality problems, which were accentuated by the isolation of a station, by the pressure and stress of their position, and by the trying climate, led these men in a ruthless sometimes savage way" (Moses,I.: 293).

At the close of its Charter, the New Guinea Company had little to show in terms of success. It had provided no roads, no health station, no maps for the protectorate, and no substantial settlement. Its colonial expatriates managed to alienate coastal peoples, and had it not been for the mediations of the missionaries, the Company may have found itself in the middle of a bloodbath. The reasons for its failure had been: too much central control in the initial development stages; corruption in Berlin; an anarchial administration at Finschhafen; constant turnover of personnel; natural disasters; the accumulation of a massive debt; lack of programs to bring the natives into cooperation; both passive and active resistance by the natives; and the refusal to establish security in the area (Townsend: 149-150) and (Hempenstall: 173).

Although the company remained as an economic force on mainland New Guinea until World War II, it had lost the status it enjoyed under the Charter. It no longer had the right: to promulgate laws defining the legal position of the protectorate and the laws applicable to the territory administration of the protectorate; to conduct all foreign affairs of the protectorate; nor the right to organize and command all military forces in the protectorate (Townsend: 148).

BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO: SETTLEMENT TO 1899

A decade before the establishment of the protectorate in New Guinea, Eduard Hernsheim set up his first trading station at Port Hunter of the Duke of York group in 1875. He had arrived shortly after the missionary,

George Brown, of the Australasian Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society. Trading had previously been restricted to barter commerce in the islands and traders had to gather and dry their own coconuts. Because this was often perilous without the support of the natives, traders carried firearms and violence was a common aspect of the trade. Ten of Godeffroys' traders came to a violent end in the late 1870's. After the failure of Godeffroys, the DHPG carried on exploratory commerce in the 1880's along the Gazelle coast of New Britain (Hempenstall: 120-121). During the late 1870's, a desire emerged among the Tolai, a native people of the Gazelle peninsula, for firearms. The supply of weapons to the Tolai was met by means of trade for parcels of land and it was mutually satisficatory to both parties. The traditional war leaders or luluais found it advantagous to carry firearms which were more effective than the spears of their enemies.

The period 1882 to 1885 marked a particularly active time for such land purchases. At this time Queen Emma, a part-Samoan woman of high status and married to a European, was able to amass a vast area of land at Ralum Point on the Gazelle peninsula and elsewhere. According to Hempenstall, "it was Ralum which led the way in developing commercial plantations on a large scale" in the Bismarck Archipelago (Hempenstall:125). Queen Emma was successful because she recognized that one could conduct business effectively by functioning as a "big man" in the society. Her provision of generous feasting won over the populace.

Law and order on the Gazelle peninsula had been established by means of a private police force prior to German annexation in 1884. This changed after 1884, as planter and native existed by mutual accomodation under terms of economic advantage for both. Technically, the New Guinea Company put little emphasis upon development in the Bismarck Archipelago. The only signs of Company activity was a magistrate located at Matupit (Hempenstall: 126).

Friendly relations broke down between settlers and the Tolai in the early 1880's when Queen Emma began constructing roads through Tolai territory. It gave rise to the Tolai "bullet-proof ointment" war of 1893. Schmiel, then the New Guinea Company Governor, arrived to arbitrate the dispute, since it had disruptive affects on the Company's labor force at Herberthohe. Ultimately the Tolai suffered significantly. Schmiel was unable to mediate the dispute and then unleashed German marines, European settlers and New Ireland laborers upon the Tolai villages. Thereafter, the Tolais remained peaceful and the Germans inaugurated a new phase of development in the area. Schmiel, concerned about the degree of hostility present, intended to set up land reserves to protect the Tolais in the future. He died on a trip to Berlin in 1895 and was replaced by Imperial Judge Albert Hahl in 1896.

Hahl's administration coincided with the denouement of the New Guinea Company, but he proved himself an active participant in governmental and island affairs. Basically, Albert Hahl was interested in strengthening both the status of the planter and the New Guinea native. He felt it

could be accomplished by bringing them into the administrative system, educating them and elevating them economically. "Albert Hahl early established a tradition of direct, personal and dynamic administration by constant travelling, by initiating contacts with outlying communities, by leading expeditions and police tours and by helping to resolve parochial disputes" (Hempenstall: 132). His first problem was the resolution of the Tolai issue. He knew the Tolai had not grasped the full implications of land purchases, namely, that their people would be permanently alientated from their land. He also agreed to negotiate with Queen Emma to establish a reserve for the Tolai and to convince her that her scheme for resettlement of their tribe must be shelved.

Secondly, he expected a sound Colonial Empire. Therefore, he wanted to provide a secure territory for efficient plantation commerce. This included the construction of road networks from trade routes into the hinterland and at strategic points. Rather than impress the natives for labor - he was not interested in another uprising - he used prisoners to do most of the work. To adjudicate disputes, carry administrative decisions to the villages, and primarily oversee road construction in the localities, he created the position of "luluai" with limited administrative authority. The system was not perfect, but it brought the natives closer to the colonial government (Hempenstall: 135). By 1899 Hahl had made some progress, but apart from the east coast of the Gazelle peninsula, "it fell to individuals to insure their own safety, a task which many undertook with more belligerence than diplomacy" (Hempenstall: 139).

PART III

BERLIN'S COLONIAL POLICY, 1885 TO 1914

BISMARCK RETURNS TO POLICY OF CAUTION: 1885 TO 1890

The Reichstag had come to be a thorn in Bismarck's side during the late 1880's, particularly with respect to his colonization policies. In the early 1880's the National Liberals split on tariff issues, united with the Progressives and formed the Freisinnige Party which in turn united with the Socialist Party in opposition to Bismarck's policy. In the spirit of liberalism, these representatives could not support colonization's capitalistic approach, nor indecent treatment of natives. They considered it foolish: the policy could not be supported by the government purse (Townsend: 95). After annexation of both African and Pacific areas in 1884, this political cartel continued to admonish Bismarck and disturb his activities at home.

With the extension of German protection over the Marshall Islands and the Caroline Islands in 1885, Germany's expansion of Empire conflicted with the interests of Spain. In 1884, European traders and the chiefs of Yap petitioned the Spanish crown for annexation of the Caroline Islands. Less than a year later and within several days of the other, the Spanish accepted the request while the German gunboat Ilitch proclaimed German protection over the islands. The actions of the two countries aroused a public outcry in both, to the extent that the German embassy in Madrid was sacked. Uninterested in disturbing the security of the Spanish

throne, Bismarck submitted the dispute to Pope Leo XIII (Brown: 140) and (Hezel: 353).

Bismarck's strategy was masterfully executed. Not only did Germany receive trading rights in the islands and a Papal Decoration for Bismarck, but it nearly vanquished his opposition in the Reichstag. Prior to this action, the Center Party, which was Catholic-dominated, had held the balance of power in the Reichstag and normally sided with the Freisinnige and Socialists. Bismarck's further opposition to the Arab Slave Trade in Africa, a position sponsored by the Center Party, and the deferral of the Micronesian question to Rome, won the Center Party over to him. He now was free to seek support of his colonial policies and money to administer them and he again reiterated in the Reichstag that German administration of colonies would be in the hands of the Charter companies (Townsend: 117-119).

Bismarck, however, kept the colonial administration within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, partly to control expenses and primarily to avoid the Reichstag. He was in no mood to open his administration to the criticisms of the parties and unwilling to engage in "horsetrading." If he wanted to spend more money, it meant a full budget review. He did not believe it was worth the effort at that time to engage the Reichstag over colonial matters (Smith: 43).

Bismarck's reconciliation with England began after the crises of 1884. He accomplished a definitive settlement of New Guinea boundaries

in 1885 and a "fait accompli" over East Africa. His manipulation of the equilibrium between French, Austrians and Russians and the removal of Anglo-Russian friction in Afghanistan enabled him to abandon his "camouflage" and assure the British of support in Egypt against France, so long as Great Britain recognized German colonial claims in Africa and the Pacific (Townsend: 112). From 1886 to 1890, Bismarck "subordinated his colonial policy more and more to his foreign policy, dictated in turn by Germany's European position, which was none too secure. He strove for the English entente, the maintenance of the Russian Reinsurance Treaty, and the holding apart of the two flank powers, eshewed all aggressive action in the colonial field and returned almost to the caution of the early seventies" (Townsend: 114).

Prominent colonialists, like Felix Fabri, did not like Bismarck's policies after annnexation. Fabri attached Bismarck vehemently. He responded that Bismarck was negligent not to establish regular administrations, that he failed to invest in economic development and that he didn't acquire suitable territiories for colonial settlement. Fabri turned away from Bismarck until the latter fell from power in 1890. But Bismarck refused to bend to the colonialists, for he was far more concerned with secure international relations and entente with England (Smith: 44).

From the period 1885 to 1889, Bismarck also chose to determine foreign policy without his advisor, von Kusserow, who had served him through the early 1880's. He had alledgely dismissed von Kusserow for

"lackluster performance" (Smith: 46). "In the interim, colonial affairs were channeled through various departments on a case-by-case basis. This low-level pattern obviously conformed to Bismarck's notions of colonial administration" (Smith: 45). Perhaps Bismarck was indeed disgusted with the handling of the prior affairs by his Foreign Affairs Council.

RETRENCHMENT UNDER CAPRIVI: 1890 TO 1895

German colonial decisions under General Leo von Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, subordinated the colonies to an even greater degree than had Bismarck. Caprivi was indifferent to colonial expansion, had no fixed colonial policy, and expressed a willingness to give up colonial territories for the security of the homeland. Although he recognized advantages from economic development and perceived them as another means of overseas defences, he preferred company control rather than governmental entanglements (Townsend: 159-161).

Caprivi's attitude about colonial Empire is responsible for two significant changes from Bismarck's mode of rule. Caprivi reorganized the structure of the colonial administration under pressure from the Reichstag, which wanted a colonial administration accountable to itself. He, unlike Bismarck, was willing to share his interests with the Reichstag and he created the Kolonialabteilung or Colonial Department which became a special section of the Foreign Office. Dr. Paul Kayser was appointed its Director and became the individual who defended policy and requested budget appropriations before the Reichstag (Smith: 45,46).

In order to maintain a tighter grip on the territorial administrations, Caprivi placed all governors under the direct supervision of Kayser.

In 1891, Caprivi established the Kolonialrat. The Kolonialrat was a special advisory body of colonial participants appointed on the basis of their interest and expertise in colonial affairs to sit with Kayser, the Director, for the purpose of improving the government's colonial policies. The Kolonialrat consisted of nineteen colonial participants, two representatives from missionary societies and several members of the public. Foremost among the members were von Hansemann, the developer of the New Guinea Company, and Weber, Director of the Deutsche Handels and Plantagen Gesellschaft.

The period from 1890 to 1895 represented a time of opposition to the government in the Reichstag and growing weariness with colonization among the public. The Reichstag became the arena for debate of colonial policies. Although Caprivi's administration and Kayser's policies, in particular, were attacked from many sides, there appeared no clear center power, nor was there a single group that could establish a consensus. On the whole, no Reichstag party was truly anti-colonial, but few were pro-colonial. The domestic feature of colonialism was the most interesting characteristic of politics during this period. "Much of German colonial politics, therefore revolved, not around narrow business interests in particular colonies, but around varying uses to which colonialism could be put by broad social and economic interests within Germany" (Smith: 122).

The National Liberals, a party of capitalists, were consistent supporters of colonization, although they had become increasingly disappointed with the poor financial returns and the financial losses of not only the New Guinea Company but of the African companies as well. The members of the National Liberal Party did not possess uniform attitudes about colonialism, but possessed a few notions in common. They supported expenditures to develop capital resources in the colonies and "settlement colonialism." The National Liberals were, among others, the spokesmen for small business interests against big finance and big industry (Smith: 148).

The Center Party which eventually supported Bismarck in the late 1880's became more and more disapproving of wars and cruelties attendant with colonialism, especially in Africa. They led the campaign to get government to allow missionaries in the colonies. The missionaries interests were seldom successful when pursued in and for itself, but when their concerns paralelled others, they could prevail (Smith: 141, 143). The Freisinnige Party occassionally took a moral stance on issues, but for the most part its members were more concerned with economic matters. They could accept colonies when it was evident that they were financially successful (Smith: 146). But none of the Reichstag parties were able to manipulate the public, carry as much political clout and stir up colonial fever as well as the Pan-German League.

"The Pan-German League advocated an aggressive foreign policy, government action to defend the status of the lower middle and artisan

classes, protection of German nationality abroad and German culture at home, and action against ethnic minorities, especially Poles and Jews" (Smith: 144). It had been established in 1890 to support settlement of the colonies by German settlers and it tapped sources which appealed to the anti-industrial segment of the middle class. The Pan-German League became Caprivi's most ardent foe, for he was big business oriented. It attacked Caprivi for his support of Bismarckian attitudes, that is, his acceptance of "concession companies" as the means by which colonies would be administered. The Pan-German League also attacked Caprivi for his lack of efforts in expanding the Empire and his stance against "settlement colonialism" (Smith: 144).

Opposition to Caprivi coalesced among these parties because of his tariff policies, and the tariff issue became the major issue of his administration. He had introduced a reduction in the tariffs in the early 1890's and the net effect of the reduction was a boon to industry. The agricultural interests and anti-industrial interests attacked him vehemently, and it accentuated the differences between the major political parties. The general agrarian position and "settlement colonialism" appealed to one side in oppostion to the conservative alliance of big business and industry. Colonial issues that might have been settled at the territorial level became magnified because parties to the disputes could command political faction support in the Reichstag" (Smith: 152).

KAISER WILHELM II AND THE PERIOD OF STORM AND STRESS: 1895 TO 1906

Upon the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II to power in 1895, German colonial policy was turned around overnight. The Kaiser placed himself at the head of the colonial movement, which he described as a branch of his "Weltpolitik." He stated that "colonial policy is only a branch of world policy which the German Empire must follow for the protection of its continental position" (Townsend: 179). His policy was marked by "feverish attempts at acquisition of colonies and spheres of influence" throughout the world, and he was supported by administrators who did more than just echo his opinions. Prince Bernhard von Bulow, the new Chancellor, Baron von Holstein, and Marshall von Bilberstein were all strong protagonists for colonial expansion (Townsend: 181).

Wilhelm II set out on a "Neu Kurs" from his predecessors. In the five years preceeding 1900, he proposed a continental block against England, supported the Boers against the English in Africa, reached out for territories and interests in Africa, concluded a Chinese settlement in 1898, effected a "reapprochement" with England in the same year, sought naval bases in the Philippines and acquired Samoa, the Caroline Islands and Mariana Islands. Some called his drive for territory the "policy of hysterical expansionism," occasioned with "childish bluster and bad manners" during a period of "storm and stress" (Townsend: 183-186).

The Kaiser desired a naval base in the Pacific, supposedly for the protection of German commercial interests. When two German missionaries

were murdered on Shantung peninsula in China, he seized the area and secured the Treaty of Riao-Chow in 1898. In May of 1898, Prince Henry reported from the Philippines that the people (several merchants) were prepared to put themselves under German control. Upon the receipt of the news, he dispatched Vice-Admiral Diederich to watch and to grab a naval station, if suddenly liquidated by the Spanish. Seeking to avoid any confrontation with the United States and feigning interest in the course of treaty negotiations, he informed John Hay, the United States Secretary of State, that Germany would not object to American annexation of the Philippines if Germany obtained a coaling station there and acquisition of Samoa, the Caroline and Mariana Islands (Brown: 142-145).

The Kaiser, unwilling to wait for the outcome of the Spanish-American War, secretly negotiated the conditions of sale for Micronesia with the Spanish who were reluctant to settle before the conclusion of the peace treaty with the Americans. On September 10, 1898, he secured a lien against Ponape, Yap and Kusaie and a second provisional treaty in December of 1898 promising the sale of the Caroline and Mariana Islands for 17.5 million Marks (Townsend: 195). Upon completion of the deal, he immediately informed Hay, who was furious, but nevertheless acceeded to the Kaiser's wrangling for territory.

The purchase of the islands accentuated Britain's antagonism to the German Kaiser, but the British were in no position to complain vehemently. The Anglo-German Treaty of 1898 allowed both countries certain rights in Africa. The British needed friends, for Russia, France and Italy were

threatening her colonies. 1899 was a most favorable year for Germany to acquire territory in the Pacific. The Kolonialrat sought a solution to the crisis in Samoa. It favored a transfer of Germany's rights in Samoa in return for a portion of the Gold Coast in Africa, the Solomons and an indemnity payment for Samoa. Admiral von Tripitz, Director of the Imperial Navy, however, convinced von Bulow and the Kaiser of the strategic importance of Samoa and also succeeded in gaining a large public following for his efforts. The arrangement was reversed with the outbreak of the Boer War, in favor of von Tripitz's recommendation, and Germany received Upolu, Savaii and Manono from the Treaty of 1899, while England secured Tonga, a larger part of the Solomons (Bouganville), and a "rectification of the boundaries of Togoland and Germany's renunciation of extra-territoriality in Zanzebar" (Townsend: 200).

The Kaiser's "Weltpolitik" initiatives were obviously a success after the fall of Caprivi as Chancellor. Although often confused with a style of diplomacy, its philosophy was closely related to economic or imperialist colonialism, that which expressed colonies in terms of trade, mining and plantations. Its key aims were expansion of German industry and the acquisition of markets and sources of raw materials. Formal colonization, i.e. "settlement colonialism" played a minor role in the formulation of Weltpolitik (Smith: 175). During the 1890's, the Kaiser's colonial policy drew its most ardent support from the Navy League and the Kolonialgesellschaft, two organizations that often propagandized for oneanother. They were responible for raising flagging interest among the public for colonies and for opposing the various anti-Kaiser agrarian and middle and low class interests (Smith: 172).

The Kaiser's political success in foreign policy was marred by violence abroad and strife at home. The Colonial Department's policy of granting wholesale concessions in the colonies to attract capital proved to be unfortunate. When the Charter companies were dissolved, concessionaires were allowed to pick up the pieces. Especially in Africa, these firms exploited and brutalized the native inhabitants. The Herero Rebellion saw 14,000 people starve after the government pushed them into the desert for agitating against improper land deals and corruption in South West Africa (Townsend: 243). The Reichstag representatives began to hear about the militarism associated with the colonial bureacracy and a full-scale debate ensued.

The scandals in Africa were well published in the German press. Again the Reichstag parties captitalized on the misfortune of the Reich's colonial policies and the Colonial Department served as a vulnerable symbol for the misdeeds wrought in the protectorates. The internal "reform" movement had been gathering momentum towards the end of the nineteenth century in Germany and its politics spilled over and became wedded to those of the colonies. The Socialist, Freisinnige and Center Parties became adamant against further colonial acquisitions after the turn of the century. It was believed that the concessions had too much foreign influence and parties opposed them for their big business orientation. Their arguments were further backed by news of the rebellions in the Kameroon's, East Africa and South West Africa from 1903 to 1905 (Townsend: 243). Because the questions of the concessions had become a full-blown affair from 1901 to 1905, the Kaiser also began to

lose the aid of his most ardent of supporters in the Reichstag, the Conservatives and the National Liberal Parties (Smith: 161).

The Colonial Department even began to swing away from the idea that the concession companies were the best way to maintain colonies. By 1905 the office ranks determined that the concessions, not only had created a condition of duress, but they had performed poorly and their operations had impeded orderly economic growth and development (Smith: 161).

Normally colonial politics never occupied a position of national prominence; they were always associated with other policies. But in 1906 the disputes in the Reichstag were elevated to a position of strategic importance for both the Reichstag and the Kaiser's government. Debates had raged over the Colonial Departments policies of resource development, land ownership, taxation, labor supply and native participation in administation of the colonies. The Reichstag parties discussed the issues of who should govern, and the nature of the government, be it directly or indirectly administered (Smith: 162-164). When the Colonial Department was pressed to request an emergency supplement to the colonial budget in late 1906, the Reichstag refused (Smith: 183).

This crisis within the Reichstag offered the opportunity for the Reichstag to press for parliamentary control over the government and its foreign policy. The Social Democrats advocated abandoning the Empire, the Center Party favored it in essence, the left liberals were split on the issue and the Freisinnege Party used the issues to avocate reforms of

the system. Because of this crisis, von Bulow faced some very serious difficulties. His main source of support had been the Kaiser and as a result of the severe political strife his government had been caught in a position of weakness (Smith: 185).

In response, von Bulow "turned the liability into an asset by representing the colonial Empire as something of great national importance and by using the Colonial Society (Kolonialgesellschaft) as support" (Smith: 186). Secondly, he replaced Colonial Director Oskar Stuebel, who had resigned over the Herero and Maji Maji rebellions in November of 1905, with Bernhard Dernburg. Third he removed the Colonial Department from the control of the Foreign Office and made it a ministry as a concession to the Reichstag (Smith: 186,187). Finally, he dissolved the Reichstag and called for new parliamentary elections, claiming that the opposition were "obstructionists and unpatriotic" (Smith: 190,191).

CHANGE AND REDIRECTION: 1907 to 1914

Dernburg was chosen by Chancellor von Bulow to lead the campaign. Dernburg's appointment to the position of Secretary of the Colonial Office was, by itself, novel. He was a dynamic man who possessed liberal attitudes but had close ties with big business and the conservative elements of the economy and society. He was a Jewish businessman, had connections with the Freisinnige Party, possessed progressive economic ideologies that were reformist and favored rapid economic development. For von Bulow, he was something of a maverick who could turn the whole situation around for the Chancellor (Smith: 187).

Dernburg traveled the country telling the German people that the colonies were for them, not for adventurers, traders, bureaucrats, militarists or companies. The land was to be recovered for national use and the natives were to be regarded as "the most valuable asset of the colonies," to be protected with guaranteed rights (Townsend: 249). The meetings were organized by the Kolonialgesellschaft, he derived active aid from the Pan-German League, and the Conservative, National Liberals and Freisinnege Parties rallied to his patriotic platform. In the elections, von Bulow scored a resounding victory against the opposition (Smith: 191). He greeted the cheering crowds with "you have placed Germany in the saddle and now she can ride" (Townsend: 243).

Although the Chancellor did well in the election against his rivals, the experience of the previous years had been chastening. The country in the course of the election campaign had learned of the revelations of moral mismanagement and exploitation. The Colonial Secretary had been given a double task: "on the one hand he was obliged to resuscitate and to popularize the colonial sentiment in Germany and, on the other, thoroughly recontruct the political and economic administration of the land and peoples overseas" (Townsend: 247).

The Secretary, was more successful with his reorganization of the Colonial Office than with whipping up public sentiment. He was credited with establishing a competent bureacracy, sought to have colonial officials well-educated, placed control and restraints on the military, abolished the Kolonialrat because of its identification with private

business and its incompatibility with the role of government, and created an agricultural and economics section which drew upon members of the Chamber of Commerce for economic and technical advice.(Smith: 197) and (Townsend: 250).

Dernburg argued that the colonies must pay for themselves, that government would be the crucial provider of working capital, but he did not favor reliance upon big business for this effect. At the local level, Dernberg reorganized the finances of the colonies, revised colonial laws, synthesized customary law and tribal law, discharged officials involved in scandals or questionable acts, regulated the military and police practices, reconstituted the civil service, and promoted his policy of "Selbstverwaltung" or self-government which favored a multiracial, communal government (Townsend: 251-253) and (Smith: 166,167).

The Dernburg era brought to the German Colonial Empire an air of enlightenment and renaissance in imperialist ideology. A new flowering of "scientific colonialsim" which rationalized economic exploitation was accompanied by a movement for social reform in the colonies. Dernburg resigned in 1910, was temporarily succeeded by Lindequist for one year, and was followed by Wilhelm Solf, former Governor of Samoa. Solf's goal was "to make peace throughout the colonial establishment and secure the role of the Colonial Office." His humanitarian concern for native protection was the most notable aspects of his administration (Smith: 215).

Toward the end of the German Colonial Empire, international relations lacked the drama of the period of storm and stress. Kaiser Wilhelm's policy began to take on a Bismarckian resemblance by 1911 and he became "truly freightened by the threat of isolation and encirclement." Therefore, he sought "to combine imperialistic ambition with a more favorable foreign orientation by cautious, sometimes even bold, concessions in the colonial field" (Townsend: 307).

PART IV

GERMANY'S PACIFIC EMPIRE, 1900 TO 1914

SAMOA UNDER WILHELM SOLF

Herr Meyer-Delius, Director of the DHPG in Apia at the turn of the century, in a letter to the Colonial Department in January of 1900 suggested that the man to head the new position as Governor of Samoa "allow freedom for the Samoans in their own administration and be purposeful in his methods but experienced in handling Islanders" (Hempenstall: 32). Wilhelm Solf was chosen as the head of the new German government for Samoa. Hempenstall describes him as being "a distinct departure from the usual German colonial official. Better educated than the majority of his service colleagues, a man of the world familiar with British colonial policy from his experience in India, Solf felt altogether superior to the middle-class, nationalistic, somewhat pettifogging German administrator. He brought to Samoa a natural respect

for the intrinsic value of exotic cultures and a readiness to deal with the Samoans on their own terms" (Hempenstall: 32).

During the first few months of his administration, he was besieged by Samoan chiefs with inquiries about the status of the new government. While waiting for his request to Berlin for the same information, Solf created "virtue out of political necessity." He proclaimed the Kaiser to be Tupua Sili, the highest chief, and himself as the Kaiser's representative in Samoa. He announced the retainment of: Mata'afa as the paramount chief; the Faipule, or council of advisors; the European judicial system. Shortly thereafter, he received a directory from the Colonial Department in Berlin that he was accorded the responsibility "to determine the manner in which the question of native administration will be best solved while maintaining peace and order" (Hempenstall: 35). The instructions permitted him a great deal of personal latitude to arrange matters as he saw fit.

Solf envisioned a role for the Samoan leadership which would pursue German colonial direction and rely upon legal precedent. He gave the Samoan leadership the obligations of collecting taxes, supervising road maintenance, cocoa planting, and jurisdiction over local and native law and order. During the first year of his administration, he instituted the poll tax, an ordinance requiring fifty coconuts to be planted on unused land and formulated a disarmament strategy which netted about 500 weapons (Hempenstall: 35,36).

The next several years, Solf had to deal with two major threats to his authority: Lauake Namulau'u, spokesman for Savaii, and Richard Deeken, founder of the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft (DSG). Lauaki, acting as Mata'afa's power broker, recognized Solf's designs of subjection of Mata'afa to the German regime. Secondly, the Malo, the traditional Samoan government, was upset with Solf's removal of its responsibility for financial affairs and the splitting of several traditional districts into independent administrative units. Lauaki called a strike against Schultz, Solf's deputy, while Solf was away. Solf's response was to exile two chiefs to Herberthohe in New Guinea while permitting Lauaki to remain in order to keep the peace (Hempenstall: 36-38).

Deeken and his settler organization, DSG, became embittered over the the relationship of Solf with the DHPG. In 1903 the members of the DSG were in need of financial assistance to see their small plantations through difficult times. Solf was unwilling to aid the organization, because Deeken wanted Samoans for servile labor and he disliked the pan-Germanic philosophy of exploitation that the DSG held. A bitter battle of words ensued and reached to Berlin through the influence of the Pflanzerverein of Samoa. Solf wanted Deeken removed from the island while Deeken, through his connections in the Reichstag, demanded Solf's resignation and a strenghtening of the militia and suitable ordinances for his fledgling DSG which was initially set to compete with the DHPG. In 1904, Deeken overstepped the law for mistreatment of Chinese labor and fraudulent activities. He was imprisoned temporarily in Germany and for a time his opposition was mute.

An outgrowth of the battle between the two men resulted in the Faipule petition of June 1904. Seizing upon the strife of the European community, the Samoans again made several demands upon Solf's administration. The Malo sought to influence decisions and review Solf's policies and administration; it was an attempt to reassert the position of the Faipule. Suspecting Lauaki and several other chiefs of being the provacateurs, Solf called their bluff by requesting an apology, which he received. Thereafter, the Samoan Malo hesitated to challenge Solf and he went about his business without significant intervention by the chiefs (Hempenstall: 42).

The Oloa Movement in 1904 was a spirited attempt by the Samoans to reassert their influence, not by violence or aggression, but by means of commerce. Pullack, a young half-caste son of a German customs official promoted the idea of a cooperative, solely financed and managed by Samoans, to compete with European plantations. Solf reacted negatively to the scheme when he heard of the rumors of its formation. The whole notion challenged the basis of the colony; in addition, he thought it wouldn't work and considered it a stand of the Mulinu'u government against his policies. In December of 1904, he took direct action to stop the scheme by deportation of Pullack, by threatening officials of the Mulinu'u government with dismissal, and by putting pressure upon Lauaki to assist with the keeping of peace and order. Solf could not allow the Oloa Movement to become institutionalized in the traditional Samoan government (Hempenstall: 44).

Solf's attempt didn't terminate the Oloa Movement. While he was on a visit to New Zealand, the Samoans revived it, and sent a letter to the Kaiser in January of 1905 complaining that Solf discriminated against their commercial initiative. Schultz jailed two active leaders, and by the time Solf arrived back, all internal strife had ceased. The Malo avowed repentence, but Solf showed no appeasement (Hempenstall: 46). This time he threatened Lauaki with exile, abolished the House of Tumua, reduced the institutional importance of districts and set up a new salaried Faipule (Hempenstall: 47). Basically, Solf meant to restore his influence and break the power of the Mulinu'u government. In June 1905, he issued orders that Mulinu'u be vacated from which had been sown the seeds of discontent. Although he publicly ridiculed the chiefs at Lufilufi, he did not sack Mata'afa, for he blamed their petition on Deeken and members of the DSG for contriving the whole affair.

Lauaki emerged again in late 1908 as a considerable threat to Solf's government. With Mata'afa showing signs of senility and sickness, Lauaki began to rekindle ambitions to reinstate the Samoan government. While Lauaki was requesting Solf to reinstate the Faipule, Solf was actively convincing chiefs not to go against his administration. The Pule movement gained strength in 1909 with Lauaki at its head. The atmosphere became very tense during that time. Settlers began preparing for war as Lauaki continued his agitation from Savaii. Solf telegraphed to Berlin for military assistance, fearing an uprising. In mid-March, German ships arrived with Marines aboard and blockaded Savaii. Solf called for Lauaki to surrender himself and avoid military action and Lauaki did not resist (Hempenstall: 61-64).

Solf was anxious to avoid bloodshed, although he had used the threat of force. He could have executed Lauaki for treason, but he chose to send him into exile in Saipan, Mariana Islands, with five other chiefs. He proved to be very careful in his punishment of dissident villages, also. Although he dismissed all their officials for twelve months, he avoided the impression of engaging in a wholesale purge (Hempenstall: 64).

Solf again vented his anger on Deeken and his Pflanzerverein for their supposed collusion in Lauaki's aborted attempt to reestablish Samoan chiefly influence. In response, Deeken petitioned the Colonial Office and the Reichstag for an armed garrison, a naval vessel, and a Melanesian police force to replace the Samoan Fitifiti. Colonial Secretary Dernberg responded by inferring that the colonists wanted to be absolute masters. Berlin refused to cooperate with the settlers for the Berlin government had a real fear of Samoans as a formidable enemy and was not interested in assuming a militant posture. Secretary Dernberg informed the Reichstag that the Colonial Office would not support the settlers' intentions. Thereafter, most of the Europeans backed Solf. The British consul, Thomas Troad, paid the Governor his highest compliment when he remarked that "even England could never have guaranteed nine years peace in the group without the employment of human repression" (Hempenstall: 67).

At the end of the decade, Solf's task was to resolve the issue of succession after Mata'afa's death. He did so by proclaiming that to avoid any slight to the two "royal" lines, the Kaiser, the Tupu Sili,

would abolish the Alii Sili upon Mata'afa's passing. Thereafter, the two leaders would act as advisors to the Governor. Recognizing that there might be some discontent with the arrangement, Berlin appropriated 40,000 marks for compensation to the people of Samoa (Hempenstall: 67).

So satisfied was Berlin with Solf's administration, that in 1911 he became State Secretary of the Colonies. When Solf left, Schlutz took over and followed the same policies and approach Solf had used.

In summary, Solf's policies were both sensitive to the island culture, but sufficiently firm as to erode Samoan control of national politics. He encouraged Samoan involvement in local affairs to draw away their interests from national politics. It was clear that strong direct rule was his intention and to some extent it was achieved, although it was tempered by permissive local activities. He believed in development with Samoans and through their traditional system, not in spite of them. His methods were generally patient and non-militant. He did not believe Samoans could or should be exploited ruthlessly.

Solf's rule was of service to the Samoans. He was able to create a situation that avoided war and violence for his entire administration. He regulated land sales in 1907, which disallowed further purchases for plantation purposes. He would not allow Deeken and the DSG to achieve their goal of a "master race" state; he protected the Samoans and the Chinese laborers in the later years from the unscrupulous dealings of the

Pflanzerverein (Moses, J.: 234-261). Above all, he proved himself a masterful politician, as he was able to balance off Samoan and Europeans during a difficult period and won respect from both groups.

THE NEW GUINEA COMPANY AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE

After 1900, the New Guinea Company was free to apply itself to the business of business without concern for administering the protectorate, which was now in the hands of Albert Hahl. Hahl left responsibility for the economic development of the mainland to the New Guinea Company and intended to intercede on its behalf only in case of a breach of native security. At the termination of the Charter, rapport between the Company and natives of the Astrolabe Bay and Madang area was low. The Siar openly rejected any notion of enforced labor for the purpose of either clearing land or road building. Police troops had to be stationed nearby before the Siar would comply with Hahl's orders to participate in road construction (Hempenstall: 180).

It wasn't until 1905 that government control in Friedrichshafen was strong enough for the appointment of native administrators. Siar resentment over enforced labor, land encroachment by the Company, the troops nearby and the Rhenish Mission led to the Madang Revolt in 1904. Hahl, realizing that it was as much the fault of Company pressure as that of an unpacified people, extended direct rule to the area with the organization of villages under the position of "luluai," which had been utilized in the Bismarck Archipelago since 1897 (Moses, I.: 302). He

realized that land acquisition was at the heart of the issue and instructed the Company to survey the area, allow the natives access to fishing areas and guarantee them dwelling places. Thereafter and until 1912, the Siar obeyed the government. The luluais found little support, however, from the people and passive resistance was endemic (Hempenstall: 184). In 1912, a plot to kill the Europeans was discovered. In response, the German government convened a court of inquisition and banished the accused groups from the area.

Elsewhere throughout the region, violence carried the day during the middle of the first decade. The Wampar people had moved into the Lae region and were preying upon the Lae people. In a set of attacks, more than one-hundred of the latter were killed in 1907. The belligerence of the Wampar had discouraged any development of the area and Hahl was determined to put a stop to the lack of security. The four years from 1907 to 1911 marked a time of large punitive expeditions mounted by government forces (Hempenstall: 190). At that time, the Huon Gulf was the only area on the mainland over which the government could claim to have control. This was in part the result of the activities of the Neuendettlesau Missions and also due to impressive shows of power by expeditions.

"On the mainland, north of the Huon peninsula, the nominal control which the Germans claimed over the entire coastline amounted to little more than a record of formal control and a thin veneer of direct rule. The authority of the Reich was hardly acknowledged beyond the coastline

enclaves of Europen settlement - Aitape, Potsdamhofen, Monumbo and Madang- and the immediate highlands "(Hempenstall: 194). Warships often remained an invaluable aid in the maintenance of security, for there were many "flashpoints" in the whole of the protectorate. Some villages had to be subdued by relentless engagements to quell native violence, directed against both Europeans and other natives (Moses, I.: 306). He relied heavily upon his 1000 man police force, which was so inadequate for the task that he could afford to divert only 100 newly outfitted troops to the Ponapean rebellion in 1910. His plan for the future included more of the same military pressure and forceful pacification. "In 1914, relations on the mainland remained poised on a thin line between an uneasy peace and open war"(Hempenstall: 196).

Hahl, althought he was always faced with the belligerence of the natives, also attempted social reforms. The government tried to curb the excesses of the labor trade and ensure the voluntary recruitment of laborers by enacting legislation in 1909. His "favorable treatment of the natives in the courts aroused the indignation of the Europeans". By 1914, a portion of the natives of Kaiser Wilhelmsland had reached accomodation with the government. Young men saw labor recruitment as travel and excitment and as a means to acquire Western goods. Their education was implemented by means of on-the-job training. Attempts were also made to bring the natives into the modern European health system by offering inexpensive services (Moses, I: 301).

THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

Hahl returned to Herbertshohe in 1901 from Ponape, where he as Deputy Governor had administered the island government for a short time, to assume the position of Governor of New Guinea and the Island Sphere. Upon his return he emphasized policies which he had formulated prior to accepting his stewardship of the Ponape government. He was convinced of the need to pacify the natives in order to mobilize them for the developing economy. Violence by natives was regarded as tanamount to acts of war, but violence was an inescapable component of colonialism. He prefered to eliminate violence by sound administration, but was prepared to use force when necessary (Hempenstall: 140).

As the New Guinea Company still operated plantations on mainland New Guinea, Hahl sought to concentrate his development interests in the Bismarck Archipelago where the outcome would be more productive, leaving the Company to open up the mainland. On the mainland, he would react only under conditions of widespread unrest and then only by reprisal. His first five years of administration emphasized attention to the Gazelle peninsula of New Britain, northern New Ireland and Bouganville, which were all depots for acquiring natives for plantation labor. Direct rule based upon his luluai method was extended to these areas, also. A District Officer was appointed to maintain surveillance and mobilize natives for government tasks (Hempenstall: 141).

His administrative innovations after 1901 included organized public works and the imposition of a poll tax. He used the tax receipts to construct roads. An instruction from him "authorized officials to co-opt all able bodied men in the areas of control for up to four weeks to assist in the construction and maintenance of roads, or to work on govern ment plantations" (Hempenstall: 142). So effective was the road program, that the transportation network serviced all main villages. Occassionally resistance was encountered to the construction of roads, especially on Bouganville island, but the attitude of the Tolai of the Gazelle peninsula changed after 1900 because they were gaining better access for their produce. However, they were opposed to the corvee, or enforced labor. In exchange for their labor service, they willingly submitted to a head tax of five Marks, collected by the luluai, which Hahl instituted in 1906 (Hempenstall: 142).

Land disputes with Europeans were a constant problem for Hahl. The Europeans had acquired approximately 53,000 hectares of land but only had 10 percent of it under cultivation at the turn of the century. In 1902, the Tolai were in possession of a dozen land reserves. "Hahl had to fight plantation owners for every metre where wholesale land alienation had occured in Company days" (Hempenstall: 143). In 1902, Berlin gave the Governors the authority to regulate conditions for European ownership of land and to expropriate legally obtained land to insure to the natives the possibility for an economic existence. Outside of Hahl's control, abuses could still occur. Hahl returned 5750 hectares of Queen Emma's land in 1904 to the Tolai (Hempenstall: 141).

"The last great Tolai war in the Gazelle penisula, in the Spring of 1902, can be traced directly to the ommissions of the German land policy." The killing of Rudolph Wolf, a German farmer, started from a land-use dispute and perpetrated the war while Hahl was stricken by fever. In retribution, Hahl's young magistrate and assistant, unleashed 2000 armed laborers, who were not Tolai and worked for plantation owners, upon the Tolai villages. The act of violence re-kindled old intergroup rivalries and fighting between natives continued until October. The Colonial Office later described the incident as an "injudicious" decision on the part of Hahl's administration (Hempenstall: 149-150).

On August 14, 1904, To Marias, a member of the Baining tribe, led a massacre upon a mission in the Gazelle peninsula and Hahl sent an expedition to arrest the guilty. He did not mount an avengeful massacre against the Baining as his subordinate had done against the Tolai, but he did not show mercy. Fifteen of the Baining were killed in the resistance and seven were hanged, while twenty were given long prison terms. However, Hahl did commit one indiscretion. To Marias had been beheaded during the fighting and his head was delivered to Hahl. Hahl shipped it off to Freiburg University upon which the press in Germany "roundly" condemned him (Hempenstall: 149-150).

In the years that followed the Baining Massacre, Hahl applied himself to securing plantation areas and bringing areas without security under the colonial umbrella. He was convinced from the example of Kavieng's success as a trading station in the early 1900's that secure areas made

excellent stations for recruitment and that a show of government permanence would secure economic growth in the long run. His pacification process was often bloody and arduous and truly secure areas could be claimed only in the vicinity of the recruitment stations in New Ireland and two large concerns in Bouganville. By 1914, his most difficult task was that of taming the Manus people of the Admiralty group. Some headway had been made in their acceptance of German hegemony when World War I occurred (Hempenstall: 152-158).

The German period closed with Hahl still Governor of German New Guinea. Over the course of twenty years in the area, Hahl developed a set of policies that served various clientele. Albert Hahl's administration extended law and order and government supervision over the protectorate. At the same time, he meant to bring the natives into the governing system, at least by indirect means. The strategy to utilize luluai was only partially effective, as many of the government's chosen leaders were not traditional village leaders. Resistance was still widespread outside of government "controlled" areas, where expeditionary forces could only provide temporary security. His head tax did not achieve its intended goal; on the contrary, it spurred native planting, cultivation and marketing instead of indigenous work on plantations. On occassions of violence, he responded quickly with reprisal. However, the lessening of violence in the area was more attributable to missionary work than to his policies and administration.

With respect to Hahl's treatment of the natives, it cannot be said that Hahl was a personally brutal or callous individual, like von Schleinitz or von Bennigsen. Although he reacted to native brutality in the line of duty, he must have worked diligently on the behalf of the natives and for their fair treatment. He received disdain of European planters for his opposition to indiscriminate recruitment and its injustices. He tried to stop the labor trade to Samoa, conducted by the DHPG, a German firm. He fought for regulation of labor recruitment and he was concerned about depopulation, to the extent that he put embargos on the "worked-out" areas to maintain native economic activity. He had to endure the planters' unceasing demands for labor, which ultimately forced him in 1913 to renew the recruitment drive. He worked to restore lands to islanders who had been displaced due to both legal and illegal activities. Finally, because of his attempts to procure equitable treatment for the inhabitants of New Guinea, he attracted the "contempt and genuine animosity of many of the German planters" (Hempenstall: 158-161).

GERMAN ADMINISTRATORS AND PONAPEAN ENTANGLEMENTS

The sale of the Caroline and Mariana Islands to the German government in 1899 marked the end of Spanish rule in the Pacific. Since the mid-1600's, the Spanish had acquired an especially "nasty" reputation for their record of brutality, subjection and near extinction of the Chammoro peoples. Almost from the day of their arrival in Ponape after Pope Leo XIII's ruling in their favor, their presence in Ponape was

scarred by violence and bloodshed. For most of their rule, the colonial officials and supporting troops were prisoners in their own garrison at Kolonia, living in fear of venturing into the Ponapean hinterland. The Spanish Governor must have been astonished at the sight of Albert Hahl's "skeleton " crew that arrived to replace his troops. Noting that Hahl only had a doctor, a harbor master, a police official and a mixed force of forty-six Malays and Melanesians, the Spanish Governor urged Hahl "to leave with him immediately, lest his puny group be massacred with the week" (Hempenstall: 81).

Hahl had known violence and bloodshed from his recent years as Imperial Judge with the New Guinea Company and was aware of the recent history of the Spanish in Ponape. Neither he nor Berlin was interested in provoking the islanders. Hahl's immediate policy was "to let the ground lie fallow for awhile" (Hempenstall: 80). Recklessness against fighters seasoned for a decade would promptly spell the end of his hapless crew. It would be a high price to pay for an area in which no more than fifty Europeans resided at one time and that showed a rather lackluster record for commerce as compared to other islands in the region.

His low-key approach belied his notions of policy for Ponape, which he entertained upon his arrival. "Hahl had drawn up a list of objectives, centering on the curtailment of the powers of the High-Chiefs, on balancing the interests of clans and on completely restructuring indigenous land rights" (Hempenstall: 81). In short, he intended nothing less than the destruction of the feudal system of Ponape.

However, in the first months, he stressed preservation of the Ponapean system, freedom of religion, protection of individual property rights, but played down economic and social change because he considered the situation still volatile, as a result of the Spanish era. He set up a system of indirect rule out of necessity, not design. "The High-Chiefs were delegated local judicial powers in minor civil and criminal matters, while important cases affecting the districts were left to the Deputy Governor, in "concert with the Chiefs" (Hempenstall: 82).

Hahl's administration of Ponape was shortened by his appointment to the position of Governor of New Guinea and the Island Sphere. Victor Berg, a colonial servant in German East Africa replaced him. Hahl left feeling frustrated for he had not been able to gain Ponapean trust. It would be left for Berg to make them "loyal servants of the German Empire." Berg's initial policy was to forcefully assert Imperial authority and to meet resistance with reprisals. However, Berlin thought otherwise; he was told not to provoke unrest or problems. His term, thereafter, was one of "restraint and sobriety" (Hempenstall: 82).

When Hahl departed for New Guinea, he left with Berg the responsibility to disarm the Islanders who had acquired a considerable stash of weapons. Berg began by implementing Hahl's disarmament policy in Truk where he collected over 400 weapons in three months by offering payment. Berg was later able to capitalize on the destructive typhoon of April, 1905 to acquire some of the Ponapean weapons. In return for each weapon, he offered meat and rice or 35 Deutsche Marks which the Ponapeans

could use to purchase food during the famine which followed the typhoon. The arrival of a German warship about the same time soured the feelings of Ponapeans, for it was rumored that the Germans would now turn upon them (Hempenstall: 84).

The situation was looking up for Berg until the German Capuchins, Catholic missionaries in replacement of the Spanish, arrived and began to prosyletize in the northern districts of Ponape. The Protestant church had held sway in southern Ponape as a result of the work of the American Board of Foreign Missions which began its work in the mid-1800's. "Religion over the years had become a powerful reinforcement of political sudivisions. The complexion of one's faith was now a badge of political allegiance: the Catholic North against the Protestant South." Berg, although pressed by his Catholic countrymen, would not sanction their request to move into the southern districts, for he needed the support of Henry Nanpei, "The Protestant Church" in the southern districts and a powerful political figure. Relations with the Catholic Capuchins were strained until Berg's untimely death in 1907. His death also coincided with the change in the Colonial Department and Dernburg's desire to see the Colonies become self-sufficient (Hempenstall: 85).

Albert Hahl, now Governor of New Guinea and overseer of the Island Sphere, returned to Ponape in the interim and managed to shake up the Ponapean chiefs by announcing the Reich's decision to convert the present communal land tenure system, which was under the control of the chiefs,

to a freehold system with individual ownership of parcels of land under the control of commoners acting as homestead tenants. Hahl left soon after with the islanders confused and rumoring serious changes in the Ponapean social and land tenure system. In 1908, George Fritz came to Ponape in replacement of Berg. He was the previous District Administrator of the Mariana Islands and had been relatively successful in a number of social and development programs (Hempenstall: 87). Fritz was an official in the true colonial sense of the word.

Fritz's immediate actions were to introduce a levy of personal taxes, the imposition of corvee labor, and the implementation of Hahl's policy of a change in the Ponapean land tenure and ownership system. However, he modified Hahl's original plans, claiming that it was essentually not workable. Instead of abolishing the absolute right of the chief over the commoner's land, the chief would receive a monetary compensation. The tenants would be obliged to work for government on projects for fifteen days of each year for one Mark per day, of which half would go to the chief as compensation. The government would retain the other half. The chiefs would become the supervisors of the project and sometime administrator of local affairs. It was a "subtly disquised system of mass taxation and corvee labour, designed, at one stroke, to reduce the independence of the chiefs and involve them more closely in administrative control, to accustom the people to ordered work and to open up the island at minimal cost" (Hempenstall: 89). The system could only work with the chiefs' support and willingness to cooperate.

By the summer of 1908, Hahl and Fritz had just about convinced the Colonial Office that the scheme would work, when Ponapean politics began to interfere with their plans. Henry Nanpei had become embroiled in a land succession dispute with another chief, Sou Kiti. Sou Kiti could draw support from the northern chiefs and by late summer of 1908, the island was near the brink of warfare. Fritz unfortunately was not attuned to the complexities of the political affair, and soon found himself deep in the middle. Once more, it appeared that he was on the side of Nanpei and the Protestant South. Indeed, he was in open conflict with the Capuchin missionaries who had taken the role of mediator for the northern districts (Hempenstall: 93-94).

Out of fear and an interest in quelling any possible uprising, Fritz called in two German cruisers and 200 Melanesian troops in the fall of 1908 to soften a desparate situation. In order to complete his road project, he instituted armed patrols. Convinced that they were in a state-of-seige, both he and Hahl requested a peace keeping force from the Colonial Office, which would insure that all reforms were carried out. A naval vessel, 200 soldiers and completion of a network of roads were the prerequisites they envisaged. Fritz also asked for an extra fiscal grant of 40,000 Marks over two years to offset the cost of constructing the roads with paid voluntary labor, since the planned public corvee was momentarily out of the question. Berlin began to consider withdrawing the German government to Truk, but Hahl was against the move. He advised that Ponape must be pacified in order to avoid ramifications spreading throughout the Island Sphere (Hempenstall: 95-96). As a result, Dernburg accepted Hahl's opinion, but turned down the peace keeping force idea.

Fritz was transfered to Yap unexpectedly in October of 1909. His "incipient system of close Imperial control seemed to have been dealt a damaging blow, and the success of his innovation was very doubtful" (Hempenstall: 98). His demotion was largely the result of his mishandling of the Protestant-Catholic dispute, the latter having good friends and strong support in the Center Party of the Reichstag.

Fritz's replacement, Carl Boeder - a demanding authoritarian-, arrived in December of 1909 from Dar-es-Salam. He arrived with the conviction "that the rod was a legitimate and effective method of instilling colonial discipline," and he began his administration in a forceful manner. He set about to complete the work of his "weak" predeccessor by forcing the corvee upon the islanders, and the Sokehs chiefs, in particular, to accept Fritz's innovations. In fact, he doubled their work period because of their previous resistance against corvee labor and land reforms. By April 1910, he had installed compulsory labor to build a road around the island. The chiefs were subsequently upset that they had lost their right to performance of duties by the commoners, their compensation, and their ability to influence island affairs. The Ponapean people "found themselves subjected to a new and distasteful regime" and resented Boeder's methods (Hempenstall: 100).

By May of 1910, there was a definite groundswell of opposition against Boeder. The chiefs and commoners wanted to withdraw from the corvee system, but Boeder would not permit it. Most persistent in their

opposition were the Sokehs people. When Boeder left the island in July, a rumor circulated of a Sokehs revolt. Upon his return, he called in a German cruiser to show the power of the German regime. Surprisingly, Boeder did not punish anyone; he opened the ship to show the potential destructive power of the German military. In retrospect, it may have been the only wise tactic he had pursued in Ponape.

Things went from bad to worse for Boeder. When no ships were in port, the Ponapean road workers demanded a raise. "Boeder refused, threatened the High Chief (of Sokehs) with deportation and threw him bodily out of the office"(Hempenstall: 102). From that day onward, Boeder's days were numbered. To make matters worse, he instituted corporal punishment for those Ponapeans who disobeyed orders.

The breaking point came on 17 October 1910 when Boeder administered a beating of a Sokehs youth, one of the High Chief's own. Soumadau, the chief and leader of revolts against the Spanish, was determined to obtain retribution. In the days that followed, the Sokehs people would rise in rebellion against the German regime. Boeder, for all his intransigence and cruelty, was murdered by Soumadau. One could infer from the events related here that Boeder only received what he deserved. But what about the Sokehs people? The future seemed already clear to Soumadau: the southeast corner of Nan Madol - a stone wall of an ancient religous village and area signifying the spirit of the Sokehs people - had recently fallen, signalling the end of the Sokehs people (Ehrlich: 190).

The prophecy was fulfilled, in addition to the hanging of the ringleaders, over 400 men, women and children were sent into exile, at first, to Yap and then a few to Palau to work in the phosphate mines of Anguar, where conditions were harsh (Hempenstall: 118).

With the Sokehs affair at an end, Germany's presence in the islands had but three years to run. Boeder was succeeded by Heinrich Kersting, who led the German forces against the rebellious Sokehs. Unlike Boeder, Kersting "showed every sign of respecting the sensibilities of the island people, and he combined an authoritative presence with sympathy for the plight of Pacific Islanders under the German Rule" (Hempenstall: 113). Kersting took his job seriously, and reasserted the priorities of Hahl and Fritz. His accomplishmentsd were:

-commissions were charged with establishing limits on homesteads, erecting boundaries and making maps of the island districts;

-issuance of land regulations that provided land would go to the oldest male heir of the tenant; and

-promulgation of regulations in 1911 which gave the chiefs power to try and sentence people guilty of minor offenses.

Author's note:

As this paper is meant to review policy and policy determining actions, a full description of the Sokehs Rebellion has not been included. It should be noted, however, that the German response, directed by Kersting, to the Rebellion involved the use of marines as land forces and the bombardment of the Sokehs stronghold by German warships. For further information, refer to the writings of Peter Hempenstall or Paul Ehrlich.

It was not his intention to destroy the power or influence of the Nahmwarkis (High Chiefs), rather he institutionalized them in the administrative system. "Kersting protected the Ponapean system to some extent. Islanders were made aware that their autonomy and economic freedom did not eliminate the duty of submission to customary social sanctions or to lawful demands of the High Chief" (Hempenstall: 114-115).

For the remaining years the Ponapeans were outwardly "pacified." Henry Nanpei and Kersting were involved in checking the influence of the Capuchins in the South, because Kersting disliked their approach to education. He planned to put island education under the direction of the Reich, but due to the coming of World War I, this never materialized.

THE CAROLINE AND MARIANA ISLANDS

The Caroline and Mariana Islands were declared a protectorate by the German government and put under control of Imperial Governor von Bennigsen on October 13, 1899. Yap, Palau and the Mariana Islands except Guam, which had become a United States Territory, were administered as sub-districts of the Island Sphere and adrift of central administration until they came under the jurisdiction of the Vice Governor at Ponape in 1903.

The first District Officer in Yap, Arno Senfft, arrived in 1901 and immediately established a government based upon the structure of the Spanish system. Over-chiefs were designated for eight Yapese districts,

and each village in the district was represented by a president, who reported to the district over-chief. Monthly meetings were held to convey communications to the villages from the center, Colonia (McKinney: 76). Senfft was also charged with the control of the Palau Islands. He set up the same kind of indirect system as he used throughout Yap and a negro by the name of Gibbons, who had spent time there, was chosen to represent his government in his absence from Palau (McKinney: 79).

Achievements during these first years in Yap were primarily the construction of roads and a causeway, and the maintenance of peaceful relations with the Yapese. Apparently, Senft had no trouble with violence, in comparison with Ponape, because he dismissed the Melanesian police force which he brought with him and built a force composed of policemen from each district (McKinney: 77,78). The only event that may have tarnished his record was the uprising of the "Kalis" or sorcerers in Palau. The uprising had its origins in the closing of the men's houses and the attempt by the German administration to discredit the Kalis and terminate the payment of tribute to them by the people of Palau. Not a shot was fired, but six of the Kalis were banished to Yap for several years (McKinney: 79).

Senfft made an effort during the first years of his administration to foster a coconut planting program, due to the weakness of the cash economy in the area. To oversee the planting, he initiated a system of inspection by his police officers. The laying of the telegraph cable, from Yap to Guam with connections to the Shantung Peninsula in China, was

an undertaking which was to spur development in the region. Although it was a major event, prosperity was short-lived and Colonia, which had been impacted most by the flurry of activity, returned to its economic slump (McKinney: 83).

The Mariana Islands were administered at first by District Office, George Fritz. Like his colleague in Yap, Fritz also established his government along the lines of the Spanish system. The lowest level of representation was at the village level with an elected mayor and an assistant. The islands were organized into districts and villages were placed under the jurisdiction of an indigenous district "overseer" who was responsible to Fritz.

Fritz wasted no time in exerting his control over the Mariana Islands. He instituted a head tax, work tax and slaughter tax on cattle and hogs, the latter having its antecedent in the Spanish period. The work tax or head tax could be paid or substituted with labor on governmental projects; the head tax represented three Marks or six days of work annually; the work tax was graduated depending upon age and marital status (McKinney: 84-85).

Fritz experienced little trouble with the Chamorros and Carolinians, both indigenous ethnic groups, as they had long been "pacified" by the Spanish conquistadors and mission. His police force of Malays was soon dispatched to New Guinea and he used local men for the purpose. This was possible because the sale of guns and liquor had been forbidden from early in his administration (McKinney: 85).

Noting that the Mariana Islands "had the greatest potential for economic growth and the poorest immediate economy," he set out to introduce changes (McKinney: 87). His programs were mostly in the agricultural sector. His administration sponsored coconut planting and instituted an ordinance requiring not less that one-quarter acre of land to be planted for garden crops. Having been formally trained in forestry and agriculture, he established an experimental farm. Unfortuneately, none of this had any lasting effect upon the economy, as the typhoon of 1905 destroyed all crops (McKinney: 88,89).

Fritz's most enduring achievement was the establishment of compulsory education for children from the ages of six through twelve. This was a departure from policy throughout the German Pacific, as the Catholic and Protestant missions had been organizing and delivering educational services (McKinney: 91). In order to populate the islands, which had most of the population removed to Guam by the Spanish, Fritz sanctioned settlement by both Germans and other Islanders from Micronesia. Where islands were devastated by typhoons, Fritz moved the people to Saipan (McKinney: 88).

The period from 1899 to 1906 was relatively uneventful. German business was trying to rest economic control of the Mariana and Western Caroline Islands from the Americans and Japanese, but the effort was indecisive. Throughout the period, the area remained nominally under the control of the New Guinea Governor and Vice-Governor in Ponape, and it was seldom that either interfered with District Officers.

THE JALUIT GESELLSCHAFT IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

The period between first German settlement in the Marshall Islands and annexation was peaceful and without native resistance, in contrast to either New Guinea or Samoa. Adolf Capelle, agent for Stapenhorst and Hoffschlager, established trading stations in 1860. He was followed by Franz Hernsheim, of Robertson and Hernsheim in 1877, when the latter set up a "factory" in the islands. A year later, and about the time Bismarck authorized commercial compacts throughout the Pacific, Captain von Werner of the German Navy concluded a treaty with Chief Kabua of the Ralik chain of the Marshall Islands. Eight years later in 1885, Lieutennent Raettger claimed a protectorate over the entire Marshall Islands in the name of the German Empire (McKinney: 11-14). Chief Kabua and four other chiefs signed the treaty accepting protectorate status. They agreed that the Marshall Islands would "henceforth be under the protection of the German Empire and that none of the chiefs were to enter on their own into negotiation with any other power (Hezel: 358). The Anglo/German Agreement of 1886 confirmed a demarcation of the two powers' colonial and economic interests in the Pacific and Germany's acquistions were completed with the addition of Nauru in April, 1888.

Initially, the administration of the Marshall Islands was placed in the hands of the Jaluit Gesellschaft. Bismarck put his slogan, "THE FLAG FOLLOWS TRADE," into operation as he had promised the Reichstag in 1884 (Townsend: 124). The Jaluit Gesellschaft was organized through the unification of the Deutsche Handels-and Plantagengesellschaft in Samoa

and the Hersheims, and administered as a Micronesian section of the DHPG. The firm, however, never received the "Schutzbrief," or full standing and sovereignty in colonial affairs, enjoyed by the New Guinea Company (Townsend: 150). It had the right to conduct business and hold unclaimed land, but the political administration of the Marshall Islands Protectorate was lodged in the position of the Imperial Commissar and his Deputy Secretary, appointed by the Colonial Office. Appointment to these two positions were to be approved by the Reichs Chancellor. The Jaluit Gesellschaft had some measure of influence, however, because laws and ordinances were not to be instituted or carried out without consultation with the management of the firm (McKinney: 18).

The instructions to the Imperial Commissar in 1886 authorized him "to issue whatever ordinances he should deem necessary on general administration, customs and taxes, and punishment for violations. The authority he held for punitive actions were a declaration of maximum imprisonment for three months, fines and confiscation of individual items for disobedience of police orders" (McKinney: 22). Taxation, by which the administration was to be supported, was somewhat complex. It was different for natives and whites, with taxes of the former to be paid in kind, the latter in money (McKinney: 28). The Commissar used the native chiefs to carry out local administration and to collect taxes (McKinney: 30). The Commissar was also responsible for setting up a system of justice; issuing laws directly or indirectly affecting the natives; and making laws governing land issues, labor and contracts (McKinney: 37).

Shortly after the beginning of the Protectorate (1887), an ordinance was issued which forbade the purchase of land from natives by foreigners, which also applied to the rights or privileges to the use of the land. It protected natives and provided the Jaluit Gesellschaft with a monopoly over trade. In 1890, the ordinance was supplemented with another forbidding the settlement of traders on land belonging to natives without an agreement recognized by the Commissar. Thereafter, trading was restricted to those already in business (McKinney: 22, 23).

Matters that proved difficult in other areas within the German Colonial Empire were resolved without resistance in the Marshalls. An ordinance in 1886 was issued forbidding the sale, gift or transferral of firearms and ammunition to natives. Furthermore in 1898, the chiefs supported an order to collect outstanding weapons. Missionary activity in the early years of German rule created animosity between the administration and the missionaries. Later they came to an understanding and by 1900 were on good terms. The missionaries provided education and health services, directly benefiting both the administration and islanders. Only a minor wage dispute by the Islanders ruffled the even course of the administration during the period from 1901 to 1906.

From 1885 to 1900, the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Marshall Islands developed in a peaceful manner, unlike the Samoas and New Guinea. The Gesellschaft report for 1900 read, "on Jaluit itself, a monotonous life prevails. This is helped along by complete lack of singing birds and animals, so that only the roaring of the seas, the rush of the sudden

rain pouring down with great force, and the thundering of the surf against the coral reefs interrupt the deathlike quiet" (McKinney: 17). The Gesellschaft's growth over the period was only slightly more exciting. It expanded with Chiefs profiting, but the record was in no respect startling.

In terms of economic success over the years, the Gesellschaft's history was mixed. The year 1901 saw the Jaluit Gesellschaft buying out the last of its competitors. The Pacific Islands Company was made a supplier, under contract, to the Gesellschaft and the number of its trading stations was reduced. On the other hand, from 1903 to 1905, the firm experienced heavy competition from Australian entrepreneurs. To counter the financial success and influence of the Australians, the Gesellschaft invoked prohibitive taxes against the foreign firms. In response, the British government challenged the Kaiser on the impostion of restrictions. Just previously, the company experienced a major financial setback due to the devastating June 1905 hurricane. Had it not been for the profits the company had taken from Nauru's phosphate, these two events could have spelled financial disaster for the firm.

In 1906, the Kaiser ended the Charter of the Jaluit Gesellschaft. The Marshall Islands Protectorate was put under the jurisdiction of the Island Sphere, where it occupied the same status as the Eastern and Western Carolines - Ponape and Truk, Yap and Palau - and the Mariana Islands government.

THE ISLAND SPHERE AND AN INTEGRATED COLONIAL POLICY

The reorganization of the Colonial Department in Berlin at mid-decade also affected the structure of the government in Micronesia. In April of 1906, the Jaluit Company was divested of any further administrative control over the Marshall Islands. Control was transfered to the Herbertshohe government in German New Guinea. Five years later, the Jaluit District Office was reduced to station status and the Marshalls and Nauru were put under the control of the Vice-Governor of Ponape. Saipan had previously been reduced to a comparable status in 1907 and the administration of the Mariana Islands then came under the jurisdiction of the Yap District Officer. In 1911, two Districts were redefined: the Eastern Carolines - Truk, Ponape, Kusaie and the non-Carolinian areas of Nauru and the Marshall Islands; and the Western Carolines - Yap, Palau and the Mariana Islands (McKinney: 128-130).

Dernburg's directive that the government offices of the colonies should find their own support prompted Hahl to centralize and unify the financial system. Throughout the Island Sphere, a head tax was instituted of 40 Marks on non-natives, with variation in assessment upon natives, dependent on their status. The collection of the taxes was left to the District Officers. All previous taxes in force prior to unification in 1909 were abolished. In addition, import and export tariffs, which were utilized in all colonial territories of the Empire, were applied to the Pacific territories by Berlin.

Because Dernburg wanted the colonies to be financially independent, the Herbertshohe administration placed its emphasis upon economic development. Phosphate rights were given to the Pacific Phosphate Company of London for Nauru and the Deutsche Sudsee Aktien Gesellschaft for the Anguar mine in 1909. The Hanseatische Sudsee Syndikat obtained the mining rights to Fais in the Carolines. Hahl was particularly interested in reducing the influence of the Japanese trading firm of Murayama in the Mariana Islands. He was also concerned with the challenge of Burns-Philp, an Australian firm, to the financial viability of the Jaluit Gesellschaft in the Marshalls (McKinney: 114-118). Finally, agriculutural development was emphasized; specialists were sent from Berlin; disease eradication was attempted; and training was initiated in agriculture techniques.

The government began to give more attention to the problems experienced by the natives. In some cases, population redistribution was necessary because of uninhabitable atolls after the destructive typhoons of 1905 through 1907, when deaths were in the hundreds (Hezel: 419). Carolinians were moved to Saipan and the south islands of the Palau group. Mortlockese were sent to the Truk Lagoon and Ponape. Senfft, in particular, thought the movement of Carolinians would help to break the feudal system in the Yap area, which required the sending of surplus tribute to the main island of Yap annually. The population redistribution was stopped by 1914, and later most of the Islanders were either repatriated or found their way back to their home (McKinney: 107).

Regulation of the labor trade also received attention. Ordinances in 1906 restricted term employment to only within Micronesia, and then only with the permission of the Governor; definite contracts were required; and approval of native officials was needed. These regulations were skirted, however, during the labor unrest at the Anguar phosphate mines in 1910, when the management faced difficulties because of disobedience from the Micronesian employees. District Officer Fritz called attention to the problem and would not support the firm, since it failed to live up to contract expectations. That is, goods were paid instead of wages, there were frequent whippings, and penalties were put on the staff by the German management. In the end, Fritz was replaced by an Officer who would support the firm and its labor requests, and the Phosphate Gesellschaft was able to find its requisite of labor from the exiled men of Sokehs (Hezel: 422-423). This incident reiterated the importance of the German firm in the formulation of German colonial policy.

PART V

CONCLUSION

INTERNATIONAL GERMAN COLONIAL POLICY

The literature search and the resulting text have defined the events that led to the drive for German colonies in the Pacific and revealed the policies which the German government and its administrators pursued. It should be apparent that one ought not generalize about German colonization and the measures used to effect Imperial rule throughout the Pacific. While the acquisition of territory and the administration of one island group may have been peacefully implemented, other areas experienced civil strife and anarchy. In another respect, it is unclear whether the German participants or the German government and its representatives had formulated well defined policies in advance or their actions and activities were determined by native response to colonization.

With regard to initial colonization, it is yet unclear whether the actions of Bismarck after 1879 were intended or they developed from pressures throughout the early 1880's. We should like to know, how much was planned and how much came by accident. One thing may be said of Bismarck; he was a clever man. He allowed others to speak and be criticized while he moved cautiously. The actions and words of Caprivi and Kaiser Wilhelm II speak for themselves. Caprivi was willing to give up territory for peace and security, while the Kaiser could risk the Empire with his "childish bluster." Nonetheless, none of these men were totally responsible for Germany's colonial history or the events which transpired.

The German merchants, e.g., Weber and the Hernsheims, although they were not singulary responsible for formulating colonial policy in the Pacific, may be said to have significantly influenced the outcome of events in their respective areas. Their indifference to any nation that claimed protection over the islands was short-lived. Weber proposed government backed colonization as early as 1870, and it was only a little more than a decade later that his German consuls petitioned Bismarck for annexation. Their actions in Samoa were based upon a need to control the Samoan anarchy and a genuine fear that the New Zealanders and Australians, who were becoming increasingly vocal and anti-German, would ultimately drive them out of business. Therefore, it may be generally said that Germany's desire for territory in Samoa resulted from commercial issues and not from a desire for "settlement colonialism" or missionization.

Alternatively, the acqusition of New Guinea was the outgrowth of a deliberate policy of intended agricultural and land exploitation together with a grand scheme for colonization. Its formulation was rooted in the desires of Berlin bankers, like von Hansemann, to establish a network of healthy trade throughout the Pacific. Their interests in colonization, however, found no sympathy with the Reichstag in the early 1880's, for it was the Reichstag that would ultimately finance their endeavors.

Their most effective alternative was to throw their weight behind Bismarck in an alliance of big business and big agriculture. To cultivate the relationship between big business and Bismarck's Reich,

Bismarck appointed von Kusserow as his Colonial Advisor. That relationship was not only fundmental for enterprising businessmen, but it was also based upon familial ties, as von Kusserow and von Hansemann were brothers-in-law.

The German consuls, with the assistance of Weber in Samoa, played a role in colonization. All, except Zembsch, were politically motivated to advance the cause of Germany. For the most part, they were businessmen. Both Hernsheims, with businesses in the Marshall Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago, assumed the position of consul before their businesses were absorbed into the DHPG and the Jaluit Gesellschaft. Based upon this knowledge, one may reason that Bismarck received less than objective information from his consuls. On the other hand, he was often at odds with his consuls in Samoa, but this does not mean that he was unsympathetic to their desires or actions. Stuebel, for all his intrigues, was allowed to remain, while Zembsch, who questioned German presence and activities was dismissed.

The role of the colonial societies in Germany during the Bismarck era and after should not be over-emphasized. Although they were able to stimulate the desire for colonization, they were not in the position to direct policy. For much of the thirty years of German Colonial Empire, their activities were an embellishment for the movement. Occasionally, as in 1906, they fulfilled an important role in arrousing public sentiment for colonial development. But on the whole, their attitudes and the social and economic groups from which they drew their base were

philosophically and politically opposed to the men in political power, and it is unlikely that they would have been permitted a significant voice in policy determination. The manner in which Solf and Dernburg exposed Deek and the Pan-German Pflanzerverein serves as an example.

In retrospect, it is safe to say that the Reichstag, of all interests not directly associated with Bismarck or the Kaiser, was most influential in determining the course of colonial development in the Empire. Although there was no one powerful party that possessed enough political clout to control events, there remained a balance among parties in the Reichstag which contrived to hold colonial issues and development as secondary concerns. However, it cannot be said that the parties within the Reichstag were adamantly against colonial growth. Only during the early 1900's does one find strong resistance to colonies, and this had arisen from poor management in Africa. As a result, von Bulow was faced with a Reichstag that intended to maintain a close watch over territories and a tight reign on their purse. But it was not significantly different for either Bismarck or Caprivi; neither were interested in going up against the Reichstag and one should not discount the power that this parliament held over its Imperial administration.

Missionization in the Pacific played a significant role in the restructuring of indigenous government during the 19th century. To a certain extent missionaries influenced the earliest constitutional government in Samoa in the early 1870's. But, on the whole, missionary

activity was relegated to caring for the religous needs of the Islanders in the German flag territories. The decisiveness of the German traders and the swiftness by which they acted toward the Islanders is a reason for a diminished influence of the missionaries in the protectorates, and the general dislike of missionaries and their institutions, on the part of the German administrators, kept the missionaries out of the mainstream of politics for the most part. The missionaries' collaboration in the Ponapean entanglement should be considered an anomaly. Their overall position with respect to political influence at the local level was weak, because their numbers were few. In Germany the central religious societies seemed to put little effort into the Pacific. Their heavy politicing was predominantly slanted toward Africa or based upon national politics, and their moral platforms were often in opposition to the Chancellors. Therefore, the missionaries never achieved the predominance in local affairs that occurred, for example, in Hawaii.

In summary, the timing by which territory was taken or put off had much to do with the groups heretofore discussed. The partition of the Pacific Islands in 1884 and 1885 was in many respects due to the relationship between Bismarck and his aids, and their relationship with others. Von Hansemann's ability to obtain territory in New Guinea can be directly tied to his relationship with von Kusserow, his brother-in-law and Bismarck's personal counselor on colonial issues. Weber and von Kusserow were also proteges, and it was von Kusserow who kept Bismarck informed of activities in Samoa. In the same manner, Herbert Bismarck, the Chancellor's son, had cultivated a strong personal relationship with

Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister of England. It was Herbert Bismarck who performed the negotiations for partition of the Pacific Islands for his father. Therefore, it appears that Bismarck kept policy making fairly close to the chest, trusting the most sensitive issues to his closest advisors and son. Based on this knowledge, it would appear that the Chancellor's intentions were not merely a matter of coincidence with other diverging colonial interests. It is conceivable that the acquisition of territory was a well-disguised plan, unknown to all but his closest aids.

How much of Bismarck's actions were opportunistic and how much was manipulated or spelled out in advance has been the topic of historians for the past century. As noted, a number of interest groups were party to the initiation of the Colonial Empire. Hoisting the flag over New Guinea was tantamount to filling a void which otherwise would have been filled by the Australians. He had a willing partner in von Hansemann, who could take the financial risk. Bismarck was able to capitalize on French indifference and he had courted the British who needed Bismarck as much as Bismarck needed them.

Samoa turned out to be something of a rotten apple for Bismarck, and Weber later. The dismissal of von Kusserow in 1885 may have been born out of von Kusserow's support for Weber and Stuebel's coup. It obviously had the potential of disrupting the negotiations with the British. But one must wonder how Oskar Stuebel could have risen to the position of Director of the Colonial Department in the beginning of the 1900's

without the backing of the Chancellor. It is certainly possible that Bismarck's repudiation of his consuls' declarations of protection in Samoa were merely a smoke screen to disguise his colonial aspirations.

The acquisition of the Marshalls were shown to be a matter of commercial determinism. It had not taken long, from 1875 to 1885, for the islands to be settled by German traders and subsequently to have been put under the umbrella of the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich. The Hernsheims, at the head of the Jaluit Gesellschaft, never had to deal with a theory of development; they experienced no opposition or unsettling activities. The Caroline and Mariana Islands were acquired adroitly by the Kaiser. He purchased the islands before they could be traded away to the United States by Spain.

INTERNAL GERMAN COLONIAL POLICY

It is easier to assess German colonial policy after establishment of Imperial rule in the Pacific; one does not get "caught up" with the synister intent of the policy and there is a distinction between locally made decisions and those of the central office in Berlin. Prior to 1906 the Colonial Department left much of the local decisions to the Governors of the protectorates. After Dernburg reorganized the Colonial Department and it was elevated to the status of a Ministry, Berlin paid closer attention to local details, and in some respects unitized its colonial system of administration throughout its African and Pacific territories.

Law and order, upon analysis, was probably the most sought after goal of the colonial administrators. The search for peaceful conditions was a recurrent theme during the German era in the Pacific. The first official policies in all the protectorates forbade the sale of weapons or armaments and ammunition to the Islanders. Secondly, disarmament of the Islanders was implemented as quickly as possible. Third, a police force was either established with local individuals or they were staffed by Malays.

In the case of native rebellions, the administrators used a variety of tactics to defeat or to bring to justice those who were deemed responsible for misdeeds. In New Guinea, Ponape and Samoa resistance was met by expeditions of land forces, generally comprised of other Pacific Islanders and German marines. Where it was inefficient to apply land forces or when the government sought to show its enormous strength and power, the Imperial Navy in conjunction with the local administration would authorize the bombardment of shoreline villages. Punishment was meted out by means of bannishment from the area, exile to penal camps, sentencing in local jails, or capital punishment in front of a firing squad or hanging.

In the later years of the Empire, after Dernberg, the government took direct responsibility for the development of the islands. Prior to 1906, the prevailing philosophy was to let business take care of development. Thereafter, the local government and the Berlin central government

applied itself to both social and economic development. Education was left in mission hands except in the Mariana Islands, but plans were being made to shift education to government responsibility. Hospitals and disease control were addressed in the last five years of the Empire and there was an attempt to provide services to the Islanders.

Economic development prior to Dernberg was mainly the concern of the companies, but he issued a directive in 1906 that all protectorates make themselves self-sufficient. Whereupon, there was a greater push to develop infrastructure, i.e., roads, wharfs, and markets. In order to finance these ventures, a head tax was required of all inhabitants of the Empire. Where taxes were not collected by local leaders, corvee labor was emphasized to create the needed infrastructure.

Labor reform laws were formulated as a result of the problems experienced in the African colonies. Both Hahl and Solf explicitly made an attempt to protect the Islanders from unscrupulous labor practices. The laborers were further protected by labor laws initiated by Berlin in the latter part of the first decade of 1900.

Land regulation was initiated early in the 1900's in both Samoa and German New Guinea. Regulation was primarily designed to curb the results of the land speculation of the late 19th century. Attempts by both administrations were made at that time to return land to its rightful owners and the regulation was followed by court adjudication. Of all the policies of the German administrators, these were the most successful.

It would appear that the attempt to break the powers of the native chiefs was of paramount interest to both Solf and Hahl, and all of their colonial underlings throughout the German Colonial Empire. They moved quickly to establish direct rule over the area, while employing various methods to weaken the power of the chiefs. At the same time they sought to bring them into the administration of the government at the local level by offering positions which required the administration of justice by and for the Islanders. It was a form of appeasement and a means to stabilize relations. Later, Dernberg expressed the Colonial Ministry's desire for "selbsverwaltung" for the Empire in the Pacific.

Finally, the nature of German rule in the Pacific must be viewed in the context of the German administrators and their policies. Whatever can be said of German colonial rule in the Pacific can be attributable to their actions.

APPENDIX

GERMAN INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH SEA.

A Collection of Documents presented to the German Reichstag in February, 1885.

ABSTRACTS.

No. 1.—HERR A. VON HANSEMANN TO PRINCE BISMARCK.

Berlin, Nov. 11, 1880.—Herr A. von Hansemann, Chairman of the German Marine Commercial Company (Seehandlungs-Gesellschaft), now in liquidation, forwards a memoir of his company's board of directors, prepared by the request of Prince Bismarck, conveyed in a note dated May 7, 1880. He forwards the memoir, which proposes:—

1. That Mioko, on the Duke of York Island, a coaling port of the German navy, be made the centre of future Colonial efforts.
2. That an Imperial subsidy be granted to a line of steamers which a consortium of the commercial firms now established there are prepared to start, and which would connect Mioko and Apia, Tongatabu, and other places having German factories.
3. That coaling stations be secured along the north-east coast of New Guinea, between the East Cape and long. 141° E., where the commercial firms interested would establish factories.

(*The memoir referred to above is not printed.*)

No. 2.—COUNT VON LIMBURG-STIRUM ON A CONVERSATION WITH HERR VON HANSEMANN, ON FEB. 15, 1881.

Memorandum.—Prince Bismarck, after the rejection of his propositions respecting Samoa (by the Reichstag), does not consider it expedient to take any steps in the direction pointed out by Herr von Hansemann. A Government, not cordially backed by the nation, could not accept the co-operation of commercial firms in the way indicated. The vote on the Samoa Bill had shown that a large majority of the people's representatives took no interest in this question.

Government, looking to the attitude of the Reichstag, could not occupy territories in the South Sea. This would have to be left to private enterprise. At the same time, Government would extend its protection, naval and consular, to property in land acquired by private adventurers.

No. 22.—DR. STUEBEL TO PRINCE BISMARCK.

Apia, June 17, 1884.—I learn from a telegram in the Australian papers that Lord Derby is prepared to take possession of New Guinea if the colonies are willing to bear part of the expense.

I beg to state that a step of this kind would seriously endanger German interests in the South Sea. There, too, islands not yet taken possession of, are being scrambled for. This process may be delayed for a time, but can never be made retrogressive. Delay is of use only to England and her colonies. The assurances of the London Cabinet may be honest enough, but events will override them. Out here, everybody, from the highest official to the smallest tradesman, works at the anglicanisation of the whole Pacific, without taking the least notice of these assurances. Germany must not trust to them, unless she is prepared to face one day accomplished facts.

The Samoa Islands by themselves would not sufficiently justify an active colonial policy of Germany in the South Sea, although we defend from them our commercial position in Tonga and in the scattered islands to the north. But even Samoa would become a forlorn hope, unless we succeed in maintaining our footing in New Britain. Politically, as well as geographically, the north coast of New Guinea forms part of New Britain. The arguments applied by England to the south coast of New Guinea and to Torres Strait, apply with equal force, from a German point of view, to the north-east cost and Dampier Strait.

English interests in New Guinea are limited to the south coast. German interests in New Britain demand that England be excluded from the north coast. The extension of German commercial enterprise to that coast is merely a question of time. Had it not been for the loss of the *Mioko*, the German Commercial and Plantation Company would before this have established itself there. It is desirable that other German capitalists should assist in the conquest of this coast. A territory like that of the archipelago of New Britain, including the north coast of New Guinea, would indeed be an object worthy of German colonial enterprise. Bounded by the Dutch Indies this territory would not be exposed to suffocation from surrounding English colonies, and would afford us means to hold Samoa, commercially as well as politically.

This is the very thing England desires to prevent by this movement in our flank, and the danger likely to arise, if England is allowed to occupy the north coast of New Guinea, is very serious indeed.

England may take the whole of the south coast, but if the north coast, from the East Cape to long. 141° E., falls into the hands of a foreign power, our interests would be seriously jeopardised.

No. 23.—COUNT MÜNSTER TO PRINCE BISMARCK.

London, August 9, 1884.—I have informed Lord Granville of our desire to arrive at an early understanding with reference to the South Sea.

Lord Granville listened to me with interest. He declared that England was not jealous of German colonial enterprise, and that he was aware that Germany possessed important interests in several of the South Sea Islands. The English Government was desirous to define the limits within which the influence of either country was preponderating. As regarded New Guinea, he said it was news to him that German interests existed there. Confidentially he added that the negotiations between the home Government and the colonies, about the annexation of

No. 19.—HERR VON HANSEMANN AND BARON BLEICHRÖDER TO PRINCE BISMARCK.

Berlin, June 27, 1884.—The German Marine Commercial Company (See Handels-Gesellschaft), having gone into liquidation, owing to the rejection by the Reichstag of the Samoa Bill, it has become our task, not merely to reorganise the German Commercial and Plantation Company, but also to pursue the original aims of that Company in a different mode.

The plan submitted to your Excellency in 1880, with reference to a South Sea enterprise on a larger scale, could not be realised.

The first steps for resuming this enterprise had been taken when the Queensland Government, in April, 1883, took possession of New Guinea and the adjacent islands, and some months ago they were resumed.

Our undertaking is to be carried on in accordance with the principles laid down by your Excellency in a recent debate of the Reichstag, as entitling it to a claim to the protection of the German Government.

As far as the public is concerned, our undertaking will be an expedition fitted out by the German Commercial and Plantation Society of Hamburg, with a view to founding additional factories, as in the ordinary course of business, in the Western Pacific. In pursuit of this object an agreement has been entered into between the Company and a Society, specially founded for the expedition, and consisting of Messrs. ———, with the undersigned as managing directors.

The German Commercial and Plantation Society has purchased a steamer for the purposes of the expedition at Sydney, which will take the name of *Samoa*, and sail under the German flag.

Dr. Finsch, of Bremen, has been entrusted with the command of the expedition, and has already started, accompanied by Captain Dallmann, of Bremen, and a few picked sailors. Dr. Finsch will ostensibly take a passage in the trading vessel *Samoa* on a scientific cruise.

Dr. Finsch and Captain Dallmann are charged to explore the coasts, to seek out the best harbours, to establish friendly relations with the natives, to found factories (for which purpose officers of the Commercial and Plantation Company are on board), and to make extensive purchases of land. The land thus acquired, together with that already in the possession of the Company, are to form a solid foundation for a colony in the Western Pacific.

The labour trade ought not to be permitted to invade these new German settlements, as the command of labour will give them an advantage over other islands in the South Sea as well as over Queensland. The Commercial and Plantation Company has, consequently, bound itself to engage no labourers for Samoa.

Mioko is intended to become the central point of these settlements. Dr. Finsch and Captain Dallmann are instructed to conceal their object, and to examine, first of all, the southern part of New Britain and the north-east coast of New Guinea as far as 141° E. They are on no account to visit the south-east coast of New Guinea or Torres Strait.

We beg your Excellency to accord protection to this enterprise, and more especially to instruct consular officers and commanders of war to register the land purchases to be made.

No. 24.—TELEGRAM TO THE GERMAN CONSUL-GENERAL, SYDNEY.

[Berlin] August 19, 1884.

Inform Imperial Commissioner von Oertzen in New Britain—

That it is intended to hoist the German flag in the archipelago of New Britain and along that part of the north-east coast of New Guinea which lies outside the sphere of interests of Holland and England, where German settlements already exist, or are in course of formation; and—

That he is authorised to support purchases of land by Germans and to register the agreements made, without prejudice to third parties.

No. 25.—PRINCE BISMARCK TO HERR VON HANSEMANN AND HERR VON BLEICHRÖDER.

Varzin, August 20, 1884.—Instructions have been given to support your undertaking. The acquisitions made by you will be placed under the protection of the Empire, on the same conditions as in south-western Africa, subject to the condition that they are not made in territories to which other nations have legitimate claims.

(Enclosure No. 2.)

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND SAMOA.

November 11, 1884.

In order to secure to the German residents of Samoa the benefits of a good government, and in execution of Art. VII. of the Treaty of Amity between Germany and Samoa, of January 24, 1879, the Imperial Acting Consul for the South Sea Islands on the one hand, and the King, the Vice-King, and the Government of Samoa have agreed to the following stipulations:—

Art. I.—A German-Samoan Council of State shall be created. Of this Council there shall be members:—The German Consul or his representative; two Samoans, one to be nominated by the King, the other to be nominated by the Vice-King, in concert with the Taimua and the Faipule; and two Germans, to be nominated by the German Consul.

Art. II.—The German-Samoan Council of State is to discuss and adopt such laws and institution as may be to the mutual benefit of the Samoans and of Germans residing in Samoa. It will more especially lay down legal regulations with reference to such punishable acts on the part of Samoans which affect injuriously a German, or a subject of some other state in the service of a German, or a coloured labourer in the service of a German, or the property of any such person. The same regulations are to be applied to punishable acts committed by coloured labourers in the service of a German.

Art. III.—The regulations laid down by the German-Samoan Council of State will be signed by the King and Vice-King, and made law. In the preamble it is to be stated that the law is published after having been determined upon by the German-Samoan Council of State.

Art. IV.—The King, in concert with the German Consul, will nominate a German official of the Samoan Government. This official will act as secretary and adviser of the King in all affairs which affect Germans residing in Samoa. He will exercise the office of a German judge in all offences in which Germans residing in Samoa are interested, and which do not involve a sentence of over two years' hard labour. He will also, conjointly with a Samoan judge, act in cases where Samoans and coloured labourers guilty of having injured Samoans or their property are concerned; and be sole judge where offences against coloured labourers have been committed by coloured labourers. Offences involving more than two years' hard labour will be judged by the German Consul (or by a person appointed by him) and by a Samoan judge.

ART. V.—A prison will be built for the confinement of offenders who have committed offences in which Germans resident in Samoa are interested. Offenders condemned to hard labour shall be suitably employed, and the produce of their labour may be devoted to covering of the expenses of administration. The German official of the Samoan Government shall have the superintendence of this prison.

ART. VI.—The King, in concert with the German Consul, will appoint policemen, who shall be employed in the prison service, and in the maintenance of security on German plantations. These policemen shall be under the orders of the German official of the Samoan Government.

ART. VII.—The expenses arising from this Convention shall be covered by court fees, fines, the produce of the work done by prisoners, and by taxes to be levied upon the Germans interested.

A representative of the German ratepayers shall be entrusted with the administration of these moneys. The German-Samoan Council of State will fix the rates, as well as the expenses.

ART. VIII.—This Convention, subject to the ratification of the Imperial German Government, is to come into force at once. As long as it has not been ratified, payment of taxes shall not be demanded. The Imperial German Government shall have the right to give six months' notice of the termination of this Convention.

In proof of this we have hereunto set our seals.

Signed at the German Consulate, at Apia, Nov. 10, 1884.

(Signed) DR. STUEBEL,
Imp. Acting Consul.

(Signed) MALIETOA,
Le Tapu o Samoa.

(Signed) WEBER, as witness.

(Signed) TUPUA,
Le Sui Tupu.

GLOSSARY OR TRANSLATION OF GERMAN NAMES AND TERMS

Auswartiges Amt	Foreign Office
Berlin Verein zur Centralisation deutsche Auswanderung und Kolonisation	The Berlin Association for the Centralization of Emigration and Colonization
Central Verband deutsche Industrieller	The Central Union of German Industrialists
Central Verein fur Handels Geographie und deutsche Interesse in Ausland	The Central Association for Commercial Geography and German Interests in Foreign Countries
Das Kleine Journal	The Small Journal
Deutsche Handels- und Plantagengesellschaft	The German Commercial and Plantation Company
Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft	The German Colonial Society
Deutsche Reichs Anzeiger	The German Empire's Advertiser
Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft	The German-Samoa Company
Deutsche Seehandelsgesellschaft	The German Sea Trading Company
Deutscher Sudsee Aktien Gesellschaft	The German South Seas Joint-Stock Company
Deutschtum	pertains to a German way of life
Die Welt Post	The World Post
Diskonto Gesellschaft	The Discount Company
Freisinnige	Liberals
Gesellschaft fur deutsche Kolonisation	The Society for German Colonization
Hanseatische Sudsee Syndikat	The Hansieatic South Sea Syndicate
Hohenzollerns	a ruling class of the Prussian state

Journal des Museums Godeffroys	The Journal of the Godeffroy Museum
Kaiser	Emperor
Kolonialverein	The Colonial Union
Kolonial Zeitung	The Colonial Journal
Kulturkampf	pertains to Bismarck's internal social struggles in the Reichstag
National Verein fur deutsche Auswanderung und Ansiedlung	The National Association for German Emigration and Settlement
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung	The North German Universal Journal
Pflanzerverein	The Planters' Company
Phosphat Gesellschaft	The Phosphate Company
Reich	Empire
Reichstag	Parliament
Weltpolitik	pertains to a philosophy of international policy
Westdeutsche Verein fur Kolonisation und Export	West German Association for Colonization and Export
Schutzbrief	Protectorate "certification"
Zollverein	Customs Union

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