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A Journal of Micronesian Studies



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
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Righting Civil Wrongs: The Guam Congress Walkout of 1949

ANNE PEREZ HATTORI

In 1949 members of the Guam Congress House of Assembly executed a walkout from their chambers. As an event that protested the inadequacy of Guam's political status and promoted US citizenship and civil government for the people of Guam, the walkout served as the climax of a half century of Chamorro political resistance. In viewing the circumstances leading up to the walkout, this article draws out political and social issues of disquiet preceding the 1950 Organic Act. Proceedings of Guam Congress sessions and documents of the naval government of Guam are surveyed in reaching conclusions concerning the historical and contemporary significance of the walkout.

When Guam received its Organic Act in 1950, after half a century of US naval occupation, it was not a benevolent gift from a generous colonizer nor was it a prize awarded to the Chamorro people for their loyalty throughout a brutal wartime experience. Rather, its long-overdue passage in an era of decolonization is attributable to other factors, including 50 years of Chamorro resistance climaxed by a walkout by members of the Guam Congress in 1949. The walkout generated intense national publicity, and friends of Guam residing in the United States stepped up their lobbying efforts, using the walkout to illustrate graphically Chamorro dissatisfaction with US naval rule.

In a recent interview concerning those times, a former member of the Guam Congress, Carlos Taitano, disclosed, "We knew something had to

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happen. We had to tell the American public. Martial law was really horrible and we had to create an incident which would bring publicity to Guam" (Carlos Taitano, personal communication, Nov. 29, 1993). Taitano revealed that several months prior to the walkout, two news correspondents—one representing the Associated Press and the other the United Press —visited Guam to report on military affairs. He entertained them at his home in Mangilao and narrated to them a brief history of Guam under the oppressive naval government. Taitano and the reporters agreed that if the Chamorro people's desire for self-government was to be heard, an incident of substantial magnitude must occur, one great enough to warrant major coverage in the newspapers. Taitano agreed that should such an incident unfold, he would personally inform the two reporters by radiogram.

When the walkout occurred on March 5, 1949, it generated coverage in newspapers throughout the United States. A few of the 1949 headlines read:

> *The New York Times,* March 6, 1949: "Guam Assembly Quits: Protests What It Calls a Navy Move to Limit Its Power";
>
> *Washington Post,* March 6, 1949: "Navy Action Protested by Guam Assembly";
>
> *Honolulu Star-Bulletin,* March 29, 1949: "Guam's Boston Tea Party";
>
> *Washington Post,* April 3, 1949: "Guam Rebels at New Navy 'Rule'" (Coulter, 1949).

Despite the publicity in 1949, authors of Guam historical accounts have paid scant attention to the protest. Charles Beardsley (1964), Earl Pomeroy (1951), and Frederick Weber (1970) disregarded it completely in their studies; others devoted thin paragraphs to the incident. Michael Dean Zenor (1949, p. 79) remarked that the Guam Congress members acted "hastily" and reduced the walkout to an act of "political immaturity." Richard Roy Griffith (1978, p. 171) removed responsibility from members of the Guam Congress, remarking that "the Attorney General apparently had encouraged the lower house to take such action." He added that the Chamorro public attended village meetings where they "vehemently expressed satisfaction with their ousted elected representatives" (p. 174). In a one-paragraph summary of the walkout, Paul Carano and Pedro Sanchez (1964, p. 348) referred to it as "an unpleasant incident . . . which resulted in increased agitation for transferring Guam to the control of a civilian department of the federal government and for the passage of an organic act." In Sanchez's

later, independent work (1988, p. 299), he maintained the walkout occurred because members of the Guam Congress "felt betrayed by the Governor."

House of Assembly Speaker Antonio B. Won Pat emphasized "the Assembly action was not based upon any single incident, but upon a series of actions" ("Mr. Won Pat," 1949, p. 1). Written accounts, however, have focused primarily on one incident—the vetoed subpoena bill of the House of Assembly—as the cause of the walkout. A closer examination of the issues and events leading up to the walkout exposes a battery of unresolved issues, each of which added to the frustration of disempowered legislators. From the beginning of US rule in 1899, and intensifying after World War II, the Chamorro people suffered through land alienation, civil rights violations, discrimination, arbitrary naval rule, and the absence of self-government. In its articulation of political inadequacies, the walkout became a significant episode in the movement for US citizenship by the Chamorros of Guam, a movement that climaxed with the Organic Act of 1950.

What were the issues driving the Guam Congress' 1949 act of defiance? What are the "series of actions" referred to by Speaker Won Pat? What does the walkout reveal about Chamorro views and understandings of US citizenship? An examination of the 9th Guam Congress proceedings provides a glimpse into the political and social circumstances that culminated in the March 5 walkout.

INTRODUCTION TO US COLONIALISM

Thirteen months after the United States seized Guam from Spain, the first appointed governor of Guam arrived, on August 10, 1899. Accompanied by US Marine and Navy troops, Captain Richard Leary proclaimed the occupation of Guam, the southernmost of the Mariana Islands. In one of the few written accounts of Chamorro response from this period, visiting Brigadier General Joseph Wheeler (1900, p. 16) commented that the indigenous people "seemed very desirous of establishing the kindest relations with the Americans, and . . . they hoped for and expected great advantages to come to the island from American rule." Indeed, from village to village, Wheeler and other visiting Americans were greeted in typically generous and hospitable Chamorro style.

Governor Leary established a system and style of government that served as the model for later naval governors in their domination of the Chamorro people: in the governor was vested all executive, legislative, and

judicial power. Only 2 weeks after his arrival, Leary banned public celebrations of patron saints' feast days, *fiestas* that today remain significant occasions for celebration on Guam. Leary also enacted an order banning the ringing of church bells before 8:00 in the morning. Wheeler's 1900 report revealed Chamorro displeasure with executive orders pertaining to religion: "Orders with regard to religion are evidently considered as a hardship and are distasteful to the majority of the people" (p. 36).

The autocratic rule of naval governors was a continual source of frustration to the indigenous people of Guam. In a 1901 petition to the US Congress, Chamorro leaders criticized, "It is not an exaggeration to say that fewer permanent guarantees of liberty and property rights exist now than when under Spanish domination" (*1901 Petition to the United States Congress*).

A handbill circulated in 1910 provides one example of the typically humorous way in which Chamorros deal with adversity. Anonymously authored, the handbill was discovered by Governor E. J. Dorn in 1910 and was found circulating in later years as well. It read:

Salam! Salam!
I'm the Governor of Guam,
I'm glorious and great,
I'm a pampered potentate,
So I am.
I run things as I please
Get down on your knees,
I'm the ruler of the
tightest little island in the seas,
That's me.
Those who do not like my way,
I shut up or send away,
I'm a wonder and I know it,—
Of the thirty-third degree.
Behold! Behold!
I'm fearless and I'm bold.
I'm the government, the law;
Kings refer to me with awe,
So I'm told.
When I want, I go and take,
When I roar, the windows break,
When I shake my fist in anger,—

People stand around and shake.
Salam! Here in regal state I sit.
To be candid, I am it—
German Willie's not a marker to
The Governor of Guam. (Maga, 1988, p.48)

EXPRESSIONS OF RESISTANCE

A petition in 1901 declared loyalty to the United States, stating that "the change of sovereignty was welcomed by the inhabitants of Guam," but that "[a] military government at best is distasteful and highly repugnant to the fundamental principles of civilized government" (*1901 Petition to the United States Congress*). Drafted by a group of 32 Chamorros residing in Agaña, the petition asked that the US Congress establish a "permanent government" on Guam, reflecting their understanding that the naval administration was only a temporary form of government.

In a 1933 petition signed by 1,965 indigenes of Guam, petitioners again professed their loyalty to the United States and asserted their aspirations for citizenship while also reminding the members of Congress of their responsibility under the Treaty of Paris to determine the political status of the Chamorro people. The petition noted critically that "the Virgin Islands, although a later acquisition having been purchased from the Danish Government on January 25, 1917, have had full American citizenship granted on the natives on February 25, 1927" (*1933 Petition to the United States Congress*).

Other petitions to the US Congress surfaced in 1917, 1925, 1929, 1936, 1947, 1949, and 1950, but all efforts were consistently thwarted by US naval opposition to citizenship and civil rights for the Chamorro people. Some of the petitions seem to have gotten "lost" in the files and never received a response; others were rejected outright for a variety of reasons. In 1918 Governor Roy Smith explained to the petitioning Guam Congress members, "The present time is probably not opportune to bring it up again, when [the US] Congress is so fully occupied with great and momentous matters affecting the very life of the nation" (Bordallo, 1982, p. 85). The Depression, regional tensions caused by Japan's ominous presence in Micronesia, and both the First and Second World Wars were used as excuses for ignoring the political concerns of the Chamorro people.

In 1917, Governor Roy Smith created an appointed advisory Guam Congress. Anthropologist Laura Thompson (1944, p. 149) indicated that the Guam Congress was created "mainly as a result of native dissatisfaction at the loss of their political privileges." Its members were appointed by the governor and they were to act in a merely advisory capacity. Despite their inability to enact laws or policies, the Chamorro legislators used this opportunity to criticize the naval government and to discuss questions of civil rights and citizenship.

The members of the Guam Congress also hosted visiting American dignitaries and used those opportunities to relay their wishes. Despite supportive and encouraging messages from nearly every visiting US Congress member or cabinet-level visitor, numerous bills introduced in the US Congress failed to gain passage. Because of this history of failed legislation, Chamorro political leaders decided that direct contact with Washington, DC, legislators would be necessary to further the citizenship drive.

In July 1936, 8 months after a tour of Guam by Secretary of War George H. Dorn, the Guam Congress selected two of its members, Baltasar J. Bordallo and Francisco B. Leon Guerrero, to travel to Washington, DC, to lobby in the US Congress and in the capital on behalf of the Chamorro people. After the naval governor of Guam refused financial assistance for the trip, colleagues in the Guam Congress began a fund-raising drive. Jeff Tainatongo Barcinas of Merizo, whose father Jose was a Council member in the 5th through 10th Guam Congresses, recalled stories shared by his father about these hopeful fund-raising efforts. Jeff reminisced:

> F. Q. Sanchez was in the House of Council, and Jesus Quinata, also from Umatac, was in the House of Assembly. The two were able to raise money with village kids carrying blankets. They'd walk through the villages with their blankets spread out across the road and people would throw their coins or dollars into the blankets. . . . That was how they'd go about fund raising. (Jeff T. Barcinas, personal communication, Oct. 30, 1993)

The islandwide fund drive for Leon Guerrero and Bordallo raised over $6,500, capital sufficient for the trip to Washington, DC. There the two met with President Franklin Roosevelt and testified before Congress. Bills conferring citizenship on the indigenous inhabitants of Guam were introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives; however, the Navy proved to be a powerful foe. On behalf of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson objected to citizenship for Chamorros, citing the complicated international situation in the Far East. Citizenship for the Chamorros

would "aggravate the danger to peaceful international situations" (Bordallo, 1982, p. 130). Further, Swanson reasoned,

> There is every indication that these people have not yet reached a state of development commensurate with the personal independence, obligations, and responsibilities of United States citizenship. It is believed that such a change of status at this time would be most harmful to the native people. (Bordallo, p. 130)

Both Bordallo and Leon Guerrero testified in rebuttal to Swanson's assessment, but the Navy's control over Guam prevailed. Neither bill was acted upon during that session of Congress; however, both Bordallo and Leon Guerrero would remain prominent figures in Guam's political scene.

DESTRUCTION, DISPOSSESSION AND DISCRIMINATION

Chamorro concerns remained unaddressed by the US Congress at the time of Japan's attack on Guam on December 8, 1941. Guam was to be occupied by this foreign power for nearly 3 years, during which time the Chamorros suffered egregious atrocities at the hands of the Japanese military. In the last month before US reoccupation of the island, the Chamorros were herded out of their villages and moved into concentration camps where they were forced to provide labor and food for the Japanese military population. Men, women, and children worked on huge agricultural projects and on military construction projects such as airfields, bunkers, and gun emplacements. Executions, beatings, and rapes were bleak aspects of the war experience that became embedded in the Chamorro memory.

Unforgettable also was the US campaign to recapture Guam. By the time the reoccupation and Guam's liberation were concluded, the island's villages had been devastated by the effects of American bombardment. All across Guam, about 80 percent of the island's homes, buildings, and permanent structures were destroyed (*Hale'-ta*, 1994, p. 109). The capital of Agaña, home to over half the Chamorro population before the war, was almost completely destroyed by the bombardment. By 1950, the population of Agaña had decreased from its prewar peak of over 10,000 to only 760 residents (Sanchez, 1988, p. 268). Sumay, the second largest village, with a prewar population of over 1,900, was condemned by the military for civilian use (Sanchez, p. 269).

Over 200,000 military personnel were stationed on Guam for the remaining battles of the war. Within 1 year, 21 US military bases were con-

structed on Guam (Underwood, 1987, pp. 93–95). By 1946, only about one third of Guam's land remained under indigenous ownership (Thompson, 1947, p. 125). By 1947, 1,350 families had lost their land and homes because of military policy (Maga, 1988, p. 197). Adding insult to injury, Chamorros involved in the mammoth military construction projects complained bitterly of a discriminatory "Navy-decreed pay rate of less than one-fourth the pay rate [of stateside hires] . . . for identical skills in identical jobs" (Collier, 1947, p. 2). Ironically, even Chamorros who enlisted in the service of the US military faced discrimination: The Navy allowed admission of Chamorro men as mess attendants only, regardless of educational background.

Although issues such as discriminatory practices and unsatisfied political desires for US citizenship and civil government plagued Chamorros, military land-grabbing was *the* critical concern of the postwar Chamorro population. The appropriation of land by the military touched Chamorro lives unlike any other imposition of the US government. The military wanted bases to complete their war effort, and lands were taken without regard for the Chamorro land tenure system. In Agaña and Sumay alone, approximately 11,000 of the island's 20,000 inhabitants were displaced (Sanchez, 1988, pp. 159, 268). Although these were the two villages most sorely hit by military land-grabbing practices, other Chamorros in different areas all over the island suffered the same fate. To provide shelter for these thousands of displaced Chamorros, the military government Public Works Department constructed small frame dwellings and tent frame structures for approximately 1,400 families. These were built in the new or enlarged villages of Dededo, Barrigada, Sinajana, Yona, Asan, Santa Rita, and Agat ("Housing," 1949, p. 1).

By 1948 the naval administration was condemning lands almost exclusively for the recreational use of military dependents. In Agaña, roughly 500 people were displaced when 82 lots were condemned for a park ("Condemnation," 1948, p. 3), and in Tamuning 60 hectares of Tumon Beach were condemned for a military recreational center (GCHA, Nov. 4, 1949, pp. 16–17). Chamorros were further perturbed to see fertile lands seized by the military sitting idle. In Barrigada, Frank C. Perez reported that his farmlands, once used for raising livestock, were lying dormant ("Land Disposition . . . ," 1949, p. 1). What also bothered the people was the seemingly arbitrary nature in which lands were selected. No one's land and home were beyond the possibility of demolition by military bulldozers. These feelings of insecurity surfaced in the citizenship debates; in the words of Council member Francisco Sanchez (1949, p. 2) of Umatac, Chamorros typically believed

> the granting of American citizenship to the Guamanian people will remove one of the greatest fears among us, and that is the fear of insecurity. . . . The government of the United States . . . extends protection not only to individuals, but also to their property."

For his part, Governor Pownall defended the appropriation of lands for recreational use as an "essential requirement of the Armed Forces of the United States in prosecuting the war" (Pownall, April 26, 1948). Such was the case of beachfront property in Tumon, requested for recreational use by the commanding general, Marianas Bonins Command, for the combined air and ground forces based in Guam. Pownall rationalized that "to provide adequate athletic facilities for the personnel of the Armed Forces on Guam is of direct concern to the local Government in effecting law and order, harmony and morale" (Pownall, April 26, 1948).

For the most part, Chamorros did not dispute the need for military bases. With the war experience so fresh in their minds, Chamorros welcomed bases as a sign of future protection against foreign invasion. Yet when the military began condemning lands for parks and recreational facilities for exclusive military use, resistance to land alienation multiplied. Sanchez commented, "While they [the Chamorro people] fully recognized and offered no complaints for land taken for military use, they did not accept the position that private land should be held for security perimeters, recreation and contingencies" (1988, p. 271).

THE 9TH CONGRESS FIGHTS FOR LAND AND JUSTICE

In a 1946 report to the United Nations detailing numerous features of American rule in Guam and American Samoa, the Navy Department described the Land and Claims Commission as the real estate agency for the Governor of Guam (ACNO, 1946). In one of its functions, the Land and Claims Commission determined the terms of compensation to be paid to uprooted Chamorro landowners, restitution that averaged only 6 percent of the land's appraised value ("Navy to Buy Land," 1948, p. 1). Frank Perez testified to visiting US Congressmen in 1949 that for 160 acres of his farm upon which the US Naval Hospital was built, he received $100 per year ("Land Disposition . . . ," 1949, p. 1). Another landowner reported that his 14 acres on a most desirable site on Guam were leased to the Navy for only $14.10 per year ("Guam Suggestions . . . ," 1950, p. 1).

Guam Congress members struggled to help their constituents with these crucial land matters. In an attempt to understand the power of the naval government regarding the land condemnation procedures, members of the Assembly called upon the attorney general for legal clarification. In the 4th Regular Session of the House of Council, Attorney General Vivien McConnell confirmed that "the government is authorized to condemn lands for the rehabilitation of Guam" (GCHC, Sept. 11, 1948, p. 5). Council member Bordallo voiced concerns about the rights of landowners and speculated "since lands can not be condemned unless it is for the benefit of the public, there may be legal technicalities involved." McConnell explained that "there are no legal technicalities involved at all because the government is authorized to condemn lands" (GCHC, Sept. 11, 1948, p. 5).

Despite their ostensible powerlessness, legislators attempted different strategies to alleviate the situation. When the army moved to condemn 60 hectares of Tumon Beach in 1948, members of the Guam Congress held conferences with the governor and with the officer in charge of the Land and Claims Commission. Council member Bordallo reported to the Guam Congress that the naval officers (the governor and the Land and Claims Commission Officer) felt that "they didn't have the power to reduce the area acquired by the Army because they had a directive from high authorities in Washington, D.C." (GCHC, Sept. 11, 1948, pp. 2–3). This prompted a September 11, 1948, cablegram to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal from members of the House of Council. Testimony from the 4th Regular Session of Council reads:

> TO THE HONORABLE JAMES FORRESTRAL SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE: REQUEST KIND RECONSIDERATION OF US ARMY RECREATION BEACH AT TUMON AREA NOT TO INCLUDE THE HOMES OF NINE FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN. FAMILIES URGENTLY REQUEST TO REMAIN IN PRESENT HOMES AND PROPERTIES INHERITED FROM PARENTS. (GCHC, Sept. 11, 1948, p. 2)

In debate on the floor of the Council, members questioned whether it was necessary to seek the intervention of the secretary of defense. The cablegram was agreed upon as a desperate measure, which is reflected in the testimony of Council member Simon Sanchez who argued that

> All of them [evicted families] have been reared from the soil and this land was inherited from their parents and these people have a strong

> sentiment for the soil. It is my belief that this is our last appeal and whether he will consider it favorably or not, it is worth trying. (GCHC, Sept. 11, 1948, p. 3)

The cablegram nonetheless failed to save the Tumon land from military bulldozers.

Another congressional tactic intended to alleviate the land crisis was legislation to abolish the Superior Court. Prior to World War II, land cases were heard in the Island Court and appeals of those decisions went to the Court of Appeals on Guam. Following the war, an important element in the court system changed with the creation of the Superior Court of Guam. The Superior Court was given jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the naval government or the United States of America was a party, which included jurisdiction over land condemnation cases. Under this new court system, Chamorros who were dissatisfied with compensation terms set by the Land and Claims Commission were directed to take their cases to the Superior Court, whose judge was appointed by the secretary of the Navy. Appeals of Superior Court decisions were sent to the secretary for final deliberation. In the view of the Guam Congress members, the Land and Claims Commission, the Superior Court, and the appeals process to the secretary of the Navy blatantly favored military interests and effectively prohibited Chamorros from formally contesting the decisions of the Land and Claims Commission. In the House of Assembly's December 11, 1948, session, Judiciary Committee member Joaquin C. Perez stated:

> The Secretary of the Navy maintains his office, shall we say, nine thousand miles away, and it is very obvious that a party desiring to appeal cannot economically be present at a hearing. . . . A man is entitled to present his case in the best possible manner. A man is entitled to present his case face-to-face. Robbing a man of that privilege is certainly robbing him of a portion of the justice due him. (GCHA, Dec. 11, 1948, p. A7)

Council member Perez interviewed Island Court judges, who conceded that the Island Court was willing to and capable of handling the Superior Court caseload (GCHA, Dec. 11, 1948, p. A15). Congressional legislation to abolish the Superior Court was vetoed on January 3, 1949, by Governor Pownall who stated in a letter to the Guam Congress that "the Superior Court fulfills a definite need in the judicial structure for Guam. . . . There is a large volume of land cases requiring the attention of the Superior Court" (Pownall, Jan. 3, 1949). The controversial appeals process to the secretary of the Navy

was not repealed until the administration of Guam was transferred to the Department of Interior in 1950.

In a memorandum to the Guam Congress, Governor Pownall chastised members of the Congress for meddling in land affairs, saying "a mistaken idea exists in the minds of some of the members of the Guam Congress, with respect to land condemnation" (Pownall, July 20, 1948). Pownall wrote:

> The Governor appreciates the interest of the Guam Congress in such matters but believes that the proper solution of matters of this nature should be left to the determination of that branch of government charged with the responsibility of hearing and determining rights of individuals under law.

THE NON-LEGISLATIVE LEGISLATURE

The first postwar election for the Guam Congress took place on July 13, 1946. Following the induction of the first postwar Congress, Guam's new naval governor, Admiral Charles Pownall, spoke encouragingly of increased self-government for Chamorros. Pownall, in a May 27, 1947, letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, wrote that "a great deal of the current unrest among the peoples of Guam has been the fact that the Governor's power is plenary and that the Guam Congress is merely an advisory body" (Zenor, 1949, p. 62). Indeed, Chamorro leaders were excited by the 1947 proclamation of Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan granting limited powers to the Guam Congress. Members of the Congress looked favorably upon this proclamation as a step forward; it seemed as if previous lobbying efforts for self-government were paying off at long last.

Secretary Sullivan's proclamation (1947) reads, in part, as follows:

> Whereas the citizens of the Island of Guam, through the Guam Congress, have expressed a desire for American citizenship and an organic act for that island with self-government; and Whereas the United States Government reposes faith, trust, and confidence in the people of Guam and desires to give to them a greater share in their own Government; Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in the Secretary of the Navy by Executive Order 108-A dated 23 December 1898, it is hereby proclaimed:
>
> No change or changes shall be made in nor new provision or provisions added to the Penal Code of Guam, Civil Code of Guam, Code of Civil Procedure, Probate Code, the Civil Regulations With the Force and Effect of Law in Guam . . . except as in the manner hereinafter provided.

> Such changes or additions may be proposed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Guam Congress. Such proposals shall be conveyed in writing to the Governor of Guam by the chairman of each House of the Guam Congress, and the proposals shall be signed by the chairman certifying the necessary vote.

This proclamation was met with great enthusiasm and excitement among Chamorro leaders, but by 1948 Guam Congress members began realizing the inadequacies of the proclamation. At the request of the House of Council, Attorney General McConnell attended the 3rd Regular Session on September 4, 1948, to provide legal clarification on the terms of the proclamation. Governor Pownall had earlier forwarded a proposed bill to the Council for their enactment, and Council members wondered what would happen if such a bill were ignored or if passage failed. McConnell replied that "a bill . . . has to be introduced by a member of Congress" (GCHC, Sept. 4, 1948, p. 5). The attorney general added, however, that even without the consent of Congress, the governor could issue an executive order, having the effect of law, until the Guam Congress took favorable action. If the Guam Congress took unfavorable action, the order would go to the secretary of the Navy for a final decision. In the meantime it would remain law unless disapproved by the secretary of the Navy (GCHC, Sept. 4, 1948, p. 5).

In practice, Pownall maintained the same posture as had previous governors, despite assuring Congress members of their legislative powers. Assemblyman Taitano summed up a common feeling among Guam legislators when he said:

> I came into this House of Assembly last June [1948] with high hopes. I had read the Proclamation granting this Congress legislative powers. . . . After seven months as an Assemblyman, I have discovered that we haven't got those powers. . . . I can't see that this Congress is anything more than an advisory body. (GCHA, Mar. 5, 1949, pp. 6–7)

Perhaps in this new era of Cold War politics, Governor Pownall worried excessively about the potential political resistance of Chamorros, as cautioned in a 1942 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) report (Maga, 1988, p. 176) to the president regarding a postwar government on Guam. Maga's review of the previously top secret report reveals OSS admonitions of radicalism among Chamorros in the Guam Congress. The OSS characterized the Guam Congress as an "uncooperative component of the navy's 'democratic machinery.'" The report further recommended that "post-liberation rewards to the Guamanians should be limited to honorary functions and

colorful statements, for greater political authority might lead to radical policies and threats to America's strategic position in the western Pacific" (Maga, 1988, pp. 176–177).

HELP FROM ABROAD

Despite local Navy opposition to political reform on Guam, the island's political interests were promoted on the US mainland by the independent lobbying and publicity efforts of friends of Guam such as the Washington, DC–based Institute of Ethnic Affairs, anthropologist and Chamorro rights advocate Laura Thompson in conjunction with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and New York attorney Richard Wels. Studies by presidential and naval committees rendered their recommendations to the nation's political leaders. These studies voiced support for citizenship and a civilian form of government for Guam.

The Institute of Ethnic Affairs was created by Laura Thompson and other civil rights activists in Washington, DC, to help the people of Guam remedy their political situation (Thompson, 1991, p. 85). John Collier, president of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs (who was also a former US Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the husband of Laura Thompson), worked closely with the Guam Congress in transmitting the political desires of the Chamorro people to a wider US mainland audience. This was undertaken primarily through publication of the *Guam Echo,* a newsletter that detailed both local and national political developments regarding the US colonies. Members of the Guam Congress specifically transmitted parts of their congressional proceedings to the staff of the *Guam Echo* for their information and dissemination. In addition to utilizing the *Guam Echo* for publicity purposes, members of the institute touted the Guam cause by writing articles for various magazines and newspapers, delivering lectures, and holding conferences (Thompson, 1991, pp. 85–86).

Laura Thompson's involvement in Guam affairs followed her employment in 1938 as Consultant on Native Affairs to the naval governor of Guam, and, by the outbreak of World War II, this fieldwork experience had already spawned several monographs, articles, and books on the archaeology, culture, and life of the Marianas. Following her critical disclosure of naval practices on Guam, she was barred by the Navy from returning to the island. Through her writings and public appearances, Thompson generated support for the Chamorro political cause. Employing her personal knowledge of the

Guam situation, Thompson was an occasional guest of Richard Wels on his radio program, the "Court of Current Issues," in New York on ABC network (R. Wels to R. Underwood, personal communication, June 8, 1982). Testifying before the US House of Representatives, she represented the ACLU in hearings regarding Guam before the Committee on Public Lands and referred to the naval government of Guam as a "rapidly rotating personal dictatorship" ("Laura Thompson," 1983, p. 6A). The ACLU strongly recommended citizenship, an organic act, and civil government for the island of Guam.

Attorney Richard Wels became an advocate of political rights for the Chamorro people following his return to the US mainland in 1946, subsequent to active duty in the US Naval Reserve in which he served 16 months on Guam as a US attorney during the war crimes trials. Wels began a letter-writing campaign to *The New York Times,* reporting of the Chamorro people's inadequate political situation. In correspondence with Chamorro historian Robert Underwood, Wels recalled attending a meeting called by Editor Foster Hailey of *Time* with Gilbert Cant (another *Time* editor), author Pearl Buck, and Buck's husband Richard Walsh, publisher and editor of *Asia* magazine, in which they discussed ways of using their connections to publicize the plight of the Chamorro people under US Navy rule (R. Wels to R. Underwood, personal communication, Jan. 31, 1977; Mar. 28, 1977). As Wels recalled:

> *The New York Times* was generous with its help, and there was scarcely a week in which it did not publish several letters on Guam, many of which I wrote. *Time Magazine,* CBS radio, and many other papers and magazines, were also won over and lent their support. Joseph Farrington, the Delegate to Congress from Hawaii, also worked closely with us and was most helpful. *Asia* also ran several articles of which I wrote two. (R. Wels to R. Underwood, personal communication, Mar. 9, 1977)

President Truman responded to the postwar clamoring of territorial supporters by appointing a committee of the secretaries of state, war, the Navy, and the interior to study the status of the Pacific territories (Guam, Samoa, and the numerous Micronesian islands administered as the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands). Regarding Guam, Truman's committee recommended on June 18, 1947, that organic legislation be enacted to provide a civil government, American citizenship, legislative powers, and a bill of rights for Guam; however, the committee also recommended that the Navy Department continue to administer Guam until the island's transfer

to the jurisdiction of a civilian agency of the government (Bordallo, 1982, p. 160–161).

Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal in 1947 appointed a team of civilians to study charges of Navy mishandling of government duties in Guam and American Samoa. The report of the committee members, Ernest Hopkins (Chair), Maurice Tobin, and Knowles Ryerson, corroborated Chamorro allegations of excessive land alienation abuse, inordinate wage discrimination, and arbitrary practices of naval officers. The Hopkins committee recommended citizenship, organic acts, and a civilian form of government for both US colonies, but the committee also recommended continuation of naval control for an indefinite time period (Collier, 1947; Hopkins, Tobin, & Ryerson, 1947).

THE SUBPOENA ISSUE

Despite the significance of various committee studies and lobbying efforts in the United States, members of the Guam Congress still faced the daily paradoxical struggle of a legislative body under military rule. From the earliest sessions of the 9th Guam Congress in 1948, both Council and Assembly members questioned the limited legislative powers supposedly granted them in the 1947 proclamation. In only the second session of the House of Assembly, Congress members questioned whether they enjoyed the "inherent subpoena powers and power to administer oaths" held by legislative bodies (GCHA, Aug. 14, 1948, p. 9).

To resolve the representatives' uncertainties about the extent of their limited legislative powers, Assembly member Leon Flores introduced a bill to grant subpoena powers to the Guam Congress. In the proposed bill's wording, the penalty for disobeying a subpoena would be punishable as contempt of the Guam Congress, with imprisonment for a term of between 5 and 30 days (GCHA, Aug. 14, 1948, p. 9). This bill was vetoed by Governor Pownall on October 1, 1948, because, according to Pownall, the Guam Congress' legislative powers already allowed them to conduct and authorize investigations (GCHA, Oct. 2, 1948, p. 3). Pownall assured the representatives that legislative bodies possessed certain inherent powers, but he failed to address specifically the issue of subpoena powers. Still uncertain about the scope of their "inherent powers," the House of Assembly sent the rejected subpoena bill back to its Judiciary Committee for further study.

In the next session of Congress, on October 9, 1948, only 8 days after Pownall's veto of the subpoena bill, Speaker Won Pat reported the results of a meeting with Pownall in which they discussed the Congress' legislative powers. Council member Ismael Calvo of Sinajana began the discussion by directly asking the Speaker, "Is the Guam Congress still an advisory body, or do we have any legislative powers?" (GCHA, Oct. 9, 1948, p. 4). Won Pat referred to the 1947 proclamation's declaration of "limited legislative powers," and reported that, according to Pownall, the Congress has "implied subpoena powers over the residents of the island" (GCHA, Oct. 9, 1948, p. 5). Speaker Won Pat's answers failed to assuage the doubts of skeptical Congress members; Calvo replied, "we are only a puppet Congress. There is no use wasting my time here if I am not to represent my people" (GCHA, Oct. 9, 1948, p. 5).

The vetoed Bill on Subpoena Power, which had been returned to the Judiciary Committee for further investigation, was resubmitted to the floor of the House of Assembly on January 8, 1949. Judiciary Committee members Enrique Untalan, Joaquin C. Perez, Vicente Bamba, Leon Flores, and Jose Leon Guerrero presented a report that determined that, according to their evaluations and the reports and opinions of the attorney general of Guam, the Congress and its committees had the power to enforce subpoenas; they therefore recommended dropping the issue. Assembly member Leon Guerrero, however, added

> I wish to ask all committee chairmen to use the implied powers of Congress to subpoena such persons as they may deem necessary for investigations conducted on any matters referred to them. That would be the only way this Congress can find out the extent of our powers. (GCHA, Jan. 8, 1949, p. 12)

Jesus Okiyama, Chair of the Commerce and Trade Committee, was the first committee chair to take up Leon Guerrero's challenge. His committee was immersed in a study of violations of the postwar naval administration economic policy that mandated that business licenses on Guam could be attained only by Guamanians or permanent residents and persons domiciled on Guam for at least 10 years. This policy was implemented by Governor Pownall to protect the indigenous people from outside exploitation during the postwar economic rehabilitation period; the policy was also intended to prohibit outside business interests from competing against local enterprises. Okiyama's committee was "conducting an extensive investigation relative to violations of the existing policy of the Naval Government. The formal investigation will be conducted on Thursday, January 20th, by subpoenaing

several witnesses accused of violations of this policy" (GCHA, Jan. 15, 1949, pp. 9–11).

Abe Goldstein, a Navy clerk who operated the Guam Style Center, a woman's clothing shop, was the first to be subpoenaed by Okiyama's committee. Congress members questioned Goldstein, who refused to answer their questions; he replied to Okiyama and other committee members, "I hereby respectfully question the authority and jurisdiction of this committee and of the Guam Congress to inquire into that matter" (GCHA, Feb. 5, 1949, p. 4).

Intense discussion followed Goldstein's refusal to testify in the February 5, 1949, session. Assembly member Leon Guerrero asserted, "I believe it is time for us to have the real test as to whether this Congress has the power to subpoena a witness in connection with the administration of our Island laws" (GCHA, Feb. 5, 1949, p. 7). Member of the Assembly Taitano commented:

> If we suspect any violation on the Island of Guam, on mere suspicion, it can be investigated. I think this is very important because it is actually putting to a test this inherent power which we have, according to the Administration. . . . We are in a peculiar situation. We are being governed by the Navy and this interim power the Navy has given us is shaky. (GCHA, Feb. 5, 1949, p. 6)

Nine days after Goldstein's refusal to testify, the House of Assembly issued a warrant of arrest for contempt of Congress. Joaquin C. Perez assured his colleagues, "I, on my own, consulted the Attorney General regarding our intended move. The Attorney General is of the same opinion that such an individual is guilty of contempt" (GCHA, Feb. 5, 1949, p. 8). Pownall, however, ignored the warrant and the Goldstein issue went unresolved. One week later, Assembly members debated their options, and opinions to dissolve the Congress were expressed. Okiyama addressed his colleagues, "If that warrant of arrest is not honored and Goldstein is made immune to the laws of Guam, gentlemen, we might as well dissolve this Guam Congress" (GCHA, Feb. 12, 1949, p. 9). Frank Perez added, "If it is within our jurisdiction to handle this matter, well and good. If not, we might as well fold up the Guam Congress and go home—we have failed our people. We want courtesy" (GCHA, Feb. 12, 1949, p. 10). The Assembly members voted that Speaker Won Pat should discuss the matter personally with Governor Pownall.

Won Pat met with Pownall and reported to the Assembly that "the Guam Congress has no grounds whatsoever to act, although there are implied

powers inherent" (GCHA, Mar. 5, 1949, p. 5). Because Goldstein was a Navy employee, the governor believed that the Guam Congress did not have jurisdiction over his actions. Rather, Pownall said, this was a case for the executive branch of government. Pownall's response did nothing to clarify the powers of the Guam Congress, and the Congress members responded in unison on the floor of the Assembly.

> *Frank D. Perez:* I am of the honest opinion that it would be best for us to adjourn until such time when we can do some good for Guam and our people and the government. . . . Let us not hide behind doors, but let us come right out and tell our people that we cannot do things they wish, because we have somebody to tell us what to do. I don't know about the other members but I am of the opinion that it is time to adjourn until we can be of service to our Guam people and to the government.
>
> *Carlos P. Taitano:* I think the gist of the whole thing was this. We had been given to believe that we had certain powers and we went ahead and put it to a test. We found that we haven't got those powers. . . . The embarrassing thing about this, which I pointed out at the Council Meeting, is that in the beginning, the Executive Branch encouraged the members of the Commerce and Trade Committee to continue on with their investigation and then, at the crucial moment, when we decided to issue a Warrant of Arrest, the Attorney General gave us his blessings. Then, everything was stopped short and we are left hanging out on a limb. The Executive Branch pulled away and left us dangling. I can't see that this Congress is anything more than an advisory body.
>
> *Concepcion Barrett:* How can one man be the supreme Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Power? What kind of government is that? (GCHA, Mar. 5, 1949, pp. 6–10)

Before adjourning from their March 5, 1949, session, members of the Assembly voted unanimously on the Bill to Provide an Organic Act and Civil Government for the Island of Guam (GCHA, Mar. 5, 1949, p. 11) to be transmitted to the US Congress. In passing their own version of an organic act for Guam, the members of the Guam Congress sought to identify the walkout as a clear call for US citizenship and civil government rather than as a rejection of the American presence. Following its passage, Antonio C. Cruz introduced the walkout motion:

> I move that the House of Assembly adjourn at this time and not to reconvene until such time as this body receives a reply or the action of the Congress of the United States relative to the Organic Act for Guam as passed by both Houses of the Guam Congress. (GCHA, Mar. 5, 1949, p. 14)

Cruz's motion passed unanimously, thus beginning the walkout.

One week later, on March 12, 1949, protesting Assembly members were conspicuously absent from a Special Joint Session of Congress convened by Governor Pownall to discuss the walkout. Pownall addressed the Council representatives and expressed his dismay over the Assembly's adjournment. Pownall remarked:

> I know of no instance in which it can be said that the Governor has restrained the legislative authority of this Congress except by lawful exercise of the veto power. . . . I express the hope that there is now a clear understanding of the legislative powers and responsibilities of this Congress. (GCHC, Mar. 12, 1949, pp. 6–8)

Following Pownall's address, Council member Francisco B. Leon Guerrero commented:

> An unusual occasion has recently occurred which could have very well been avoided if our island and people had received the attention of the Congress of the United States. I am citing basic principles and facts. We are now in the second half century period since the signing of that treaty that has caused the transfer of the Island of Guam from the sovereignty of Spain to that of the United States. . . . The fact remains that without organic legislation there is no security for ourselves and our posterity. (GCHC, Mar. 12, 1949, p. 8)

Following a lengthy debate that raised issues similar to those the Assembly had itself raised prior to adjourning, the Council members voted to recess until resolution of the Assembly walkout.

WALKOUT REVITALIZES CITIZENSHIP DRIVE

Whether or not Pownall understood that the walkout was more than a protest of the subpoena issue, to the Chamorro legislators the subpoena issue was only a superficial catalyst in their protest. Assembly Speaker Won Pat, in a letter to Governor Pownall, expressed the views of the protesting Congress members:

> It must be emphasized that the Assembly action was not based upon any single incident, but upon a series of actions which have occurred with increasing frequency since the issuance of the Proclamation of August 4, 1947. Definition of the scope of its powers has become, in the opinion of the Assembly, a matter of interpretation of individual actions of the Congress by the Executive Branch of the Government

> without observance of any uniform rule. This has created an atmosphere of uncertainty as a result of which the Assembly does not feel that it can determine its mission. . . . It is believed that a similar feeling of uncertainty exists in the minds of the people concerning the status of the Congress. The members of the House of Assembly consider that the powers of the three branches of government must be defined ("Mr. Won Pat . . . ," 1949, p. 1).

Assembly member Taitano expressed his belief that the walkout emerged out of "three major grievances: (1) Arbitrary rule by the Naval government; (2) Lack of a constitution guaranteeing civil rights; and (3) Lack of a court of appeals beyond the Secretary of the Navy" ("Taitano brings . . . ," 1965, p. 13). Taitano's experience of naval rule on Guam had shown him the discrepancies between American democracy and arbitrary rule.

The walkout brought the issues of citizenship, civil government, and civil rights to a head. When the Guam legislators ended the walkout and returned to their seats in the Congress only 1 month later, their message had already been successfully transmitted across the United States. National media coverage of the walkout, coupled with independent lobbying and publicity efforts by friends of Guam (such as Thompson, Collier, and Wels), undoubtedly contributed to bringing about political changes on Guam within several months of the incident.

On May 21, 1949, just over 2 months after the walkout, President Harry Truman called upon the secretary of the Department of the Interior to begin planning immediately for Guam's transfer from the Department of Navy. This implication of a civilian form of government was a political development for which Chamorros had waited long and for which the great majority of Guam Congress representatives were grateful, despite hesitation on the part of some Assembly members who objected to Guam's relegation to the Department of the Interior. Concerned members of the Assembly voiced their apprehension regarding the interior department's "poor record in the Virgin Islands and on the American Indian Reservations" (Bordallo, 1988, p. 222; see also GCHA, June 4, 1949, pp. 10–12). Despite these expressed reservations, a congressional resolution recognizing Truman's move to remove naval rule and requesting Chamorro participation in the administrative transfer preparations passed by a majority vote.

One month later Governor Pownall announced his retirement, revealing that in his place a civilian governor would be appointed ("Governor Pownall," 1949, p. 1). That civilian would be Carlton Skinner, and he would work in unison with the Guam Congress in seeking citizenship for the Chamorro people.

CITIZENSHIP SENTIMENTS

After nearly 50 years of lobbying and petitioning for citizenship, legislators had certain perceptions of what citizenship would mean for Guam. The events leading up to the walkout provide useful insights into their understandings of citizenship. Some members of the Guam Congress emphasized the idea that citizenship would accord the Chamorro people a measure of equality, thus protecting them from discrimination. Many Chamorros believed that US citizenship would remove many of the existing discriminatory practices. Others viewed citizenship as a means of safeguarding their land and property; Chamorros believed that the US government would not arbitrarily condemn the lands of its own citizens.

In coming to an understanding of the citizenship movement on Guam, it is impossible to ignore the impact upon the Chamorros of the Japanese wartime occupation. As Robert Underwood describes, (1987, p. 181),

> The experience left a psychological legacy of fear of non-American control and helped generate a relationship of gratitude and debt as far as the Chamorros were concerned. On the one hand, there was gratitude for being rescued, but there was also a debt owed them by America on whose behalf they suffered. In keeping with this, the war experience subsequently became the main rhetorical basis for the acquisition of U.S. citizenship.

The fears expressed by Underwood compare with those expressed in 1926 after the Philippine House of Representatives passed a resolution to annex Guam. The idea that Guam's political status was so ambiguous as to invite annexation by foreign countries kindled a citizenship drive then too (Bordallo, 1982, pp. 93–97).

The postwar pro-American sentiments of those who endured various forms of brutalization were expressed by a large majority of the population and were inevitably communicated to and by the members of the Guam Congress. In the sentiments articulated in congressional sessions, the problematic issues such as land alienation, discrimination, and unfair government practices were all the more disturbing in light of a war experience so fresh and brutal.

Members of the Guam Congress shared diverse perceptions and understandings of citizenship, but despite the variety of arguments employed, they agreed unanimously that citizenship was not merely desirable, it was necessary.

> *Mariano Santos:* At present, the wage scale for the Guamanians is very low. If we have this Organic Act and our political status changes, I am sure a lot of things will be changed for the better, too. At present, again, we have the Army and the Navy here as representatives of the President of the United States. If we should have this Organic Act and our political status changes we would be dealing directly with the President of the United States and not his representatives.
>
> *Carlos Taitano:* We are outside the family now. How can we demand our rights if we do not belong? We have not the right until we have been granted citizenship. After you belong, then you can demand your rights.
>
> *Frank Perez:* Do we want to be forever wards of the United States of America—we, and our children after us? Certainly we don't want it. The definition of a ward is a person who is incapable, having no initiative but just to be led by a guiding hand, telling you to face right and left. Do you want to be in that status forever? Do we want to be pushed around?
>
> You have seen all of the discrimination going on, depriving us of our rights. Do you want to let this thing go on for another century until we lose everything we have?—until we having nothing to fall back on? What will be our economic situation in the days to come? No land, no money, no home. Where is our security? Have we any secure spot anywhere on these 225 square miles? I say, no.
>
> *Antonio C. Cruz:* We would like to be secure in our homes and free from fear and condemnation of our property. We would like the privilege and freedom of planning our own homes. . . . Our land is fast being condemned and there is little available land for agriculture now. (Guam Congress Joint Session, 1948)

Ironically, Congress members such as Mariano Santos believed Guam's representatives would deal directly with the US president. Others, such as Frank Perez and Carlos Taitano, assumed that discrimination would end and civil rights would be guaranteed, and Congress members such as Antonio Cruz believed that land injustices would be corrected.

In their sessions prior to the walkout, both Assembly and Council members questioned the authority of the naval governor. In their perception, the judicial branch of government was little more than an arm of the governor, and its appeals process to the secretary of the Navy seemed improper and unfair to Chamorros. From their experience it was also evident that the legislative branch lacked power; the "limited legislative powers" granted by the 1947 proclamation failed to provide them with a means of alleviating the island's problems. This fundamental lack of a balanced three-branch system of government became fundamentally unacceptable.

Plagued by critical land injustices, discriminatory pay practices, and other problems rendered unresolvable owing to insufficient judicial and legislative leverage, Guam's Congress members challenged the US government to live up to its ideological rhetoric. Finally the US Congress and administration responded with the appointment of a civilian governor, the termination of military rule, and the passage of an organic act for Guam with citizenship for the Chamorro people.

Carlos Taitano was privileged to attend the signing of the Organic Act on August 1, 1950, in Washington, DC, by President Truman (the act passed after the previous failure of 29 House and Senate bills and resolutions; Zenor, 1949, pp. 283–294). Taitano vividly recalled accepting the congratulations of those in attendance. It was a major victory won for the Chamorro people, he was told, especially because the Navy desired to maintain complete control over Guam in the light of the escalating conflict in Korea. White House staff and Department of the Interior personnel communicated to Taitano that the Guam Congress walkout, in an age of decolonization, was an embarrassment to the US government and drew attention to the urgency of Guam's situation. Taitano particularly valued the words of those in attendance who confided to him that "the walkout did it" (Carlos Taitano, personal communication, Nov. 29, 1993).

Just as surely as the walkout was a multidimensional episode, so surely was the Organic Act's passage one of multifarious causes. The influence of various Chamorro and other lobbying efforts, the impact of national publicity and international embarrassment, and the effect of the Hopkins Committee report all had influences on members of the executive and legislative branches in the nation's capital. The pressures of being a world leader in an era of decolonization, along with postwar modifications in military operations and styles of leadership, undoubtedly factored into the act's passage. But for the members of the Guam Congress and to the people of Guam, attributing credit to any one force was immaterial as they began immediately the task of appropriating to themselves the Government of Guam.

A LEAP BACK TO THE PRESENT

Amid Guam's contemporary political struggles—in the battle for commonwealth status and in the quest for Chamorro self-determination—the aspirations and achievements of my grandfather, *si difuntun* Joaquin Cruz Perez, and his colleagues in the Guam Congress seem especially worthy of inquiry.

Though our island has changed so much, and though our people have ostensibly achieved so much, it is ironic that the hopes and dreams of previous generations—for sovereignty, self-reliance, and freedom from land alienation—provokingly linger.

In a 1986 interview, Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo commented,

> It was a sad day for the people of Guam when the Organic Act was signed. . . . The Organic Act is not designed to enhance the dignity of the indigenous people. It was designed to enhance the colonial authority of the United States. (Stinson, 1986, p. 4)

But just as Governor Bordallo's father, Guam Congress member Baltasar Bordallo, struggled long and hard to transform Guam's political status, so too do succeeding generations fight their battles in the struggle for political justice. Listening to the deliberations and emotions articulated in the records of the 1949 Guam Congress, I am struck by their similarity to today's political discourse. As we near our centennial mark as an American colony, I wonder where we, *i man Chamoru,* are as a people in our homeland, what the US government has done to and for us, and what we have made of our Government of Guam.

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Changing Migration Patterns in the Federated States of Micronesia

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This article traces the changing role of migration in the Federated States of Micronesia during the twentieth century. We begin with a brief geographical, historical, and cultural overview of each state in the country, summarizing demographic change over the past 70 years and providing a foundation for understanding much of the area's past and present human mobility. Attention then turns to migration within the Federated States, focusing on data from censuses conducted in 1930, 1973, and 1980 and using supplemental information when possible. Emigration to destinations outside the country is examined briefly. Finally, we discuss potential causes and impacts of mobility in this emerging island nation.

Of the many changes that have occurred in Micronesia since the arrival of European explorers nearly five centuries ago, few have had the broad repercussions of demographic change. The first demographic shift was depopulation, which occurred in different parts of the region at different times, but which almost always was caused by diseases introduced by European and American explorers, traders, whalers, and missionaries. Eventually the decline in population ceased, and throughout the twentieth century most of Micronesia has experienced demographic growth—primarily as a consequence of modern health care and medical technology, which also were introduced from beyond Oceania. In recent years population growth has been

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accompanied by another change of equal importance, namely shifts in the spatial distribution of population. Although the causes of shifts in the geographic arrangement of people include variability in the natural demographic growth in different places, the main mechanism underlying these developments is *migration.*[1] An increase in migration has produced important changes within the region, often in the form of emerging population centers at the expense of rural places; it has also resulted in movement to other parts of Oceania and to more distant destinations. The consequences of increased migration—including changes in the geographic distribution and demographic composition of the population, and sociocultural and economic expansion to other, more distant areas—have important implications for the future of the affected islands.

This article examines the changing role of migration in the most geographically and culturally complex island nation in Micronesia, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). We begin by describing briefly the geographical, historical, and cultural characteristics of the four separate states in the FSM to provide a foundation for understanding demographic evolution and current migration patterns in this nation. We then examine population change experienced in each state by exploring data collected in censuses conducted during the twentieth century and statistical analyses of these data. Attention turns to an examination of selected data on mobility from censuses conducted in 1930, 1973, and 1980, supplemented by other information when available, in an attempt to document the role of migration in each state over the past 90 years. We briefly explore migration to destinations outside the FSM—to other parts of Micronesia and to destinations beyond the bounds of Oceania. Finally we examine the impacts of migration in the FSM, considering the socioeconomic repercussions and cultural adjustments that have accompanied shifts in mobility patterns.

AN OVERVIEW OF GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL, AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FSM

The FSM, an island nation lying in the western Pacific Ocean, consists of four states. From west to east they are Yap, Chuuk (formerly Truk), Pohnpei (formerly Ponape), and Kosrae (formerly Kusaie; Figure 1).[2] Each state is unique, and certain states incorporate noteworthy internal differences (Connell, 1983, pp. 1–4; Haglelgam, 1992, pp. 6–7). Because of this complexity, we provide the following overview of the geographical composition of each



Figure 1. *The Federated States of Micronesia*

state and its basic historical and cultural background to assist readers in understanding FSM demography and the role played by migration in population change.

Contact Between the FSM and Non-Micronesian Cultures

Spanish and Portuguese explorers came upon portions of the Caroline Islands during the early sixteenth century, the former claiming the area as part of Spain's growing Pacific empire (Shinn, 1984, pp. 325–326). But apart from brief visits by Europeans and Americans during the early nineteenth century, inhabitants of these islands interacted little with non-Micronesians until the mid-1800s. The first frequent visitors to the Carolines were whalers in search of water, wood, and other resources. However, with the exception of missionaries, beachcombers, and traders who lived on some of the islands, few non-Micronesians resided in the Carolines until a series of colonization efforts began in the late 1800s. In response to growing economic competition in the area from other nations, Spain established small settlements on Pohnpei and the Yap Islands during the second half of the nineteenth century. But the first serious attempt to colonize (or, perhaps more accurately, *colonialize*) the islands that currently compose the FSM was made by Germany, which purchased the Carolines from Spain in 1899 following the Spanish-American War (Brown, 1977). After Germany (1899–1914), Japan (1914–1945) and the United States (1945–1986) administered the area. These three nations were active in the FSM, though fundamentally different interests in the area led each to establish a markedly different presence. In May 1979 four island groups in the Carolines united to form the FSM. Despite increasing FSM independence over the past decade, a major US presence remains in the area—through funding and other interrelationships prescribed by a Compact of Free Association established between the FSM and the United States in 1986 (Bank of Hawai'i, 1989, p. 7; Compact of Free Association, 1982; Firth, 1989, p. 78).

Interaction with non-Micronesian cultures brought new ideas and material culture and produced substantial demographic changes in the FSM. Primarily during the nineteenth century, visitors from other countries introduced several diseases that decimated many of the populations in the FSM (see Gorenflo, 1993a; in press; Gorenflo & Levin, 1991, 1992). More recently, the introduction of modern medical practices has helped reduce

mortality, producing rapid population growth throughout the nation. As the populations of states in the FSM increased, their geographic distribution began to change. The precise nature of the changes in the size and distribution of the populations in each state is in large part explained by their unique geographical and cultural qualities.

Yap State

Yap State, the westernmost state in the FSM, consists of 12 inhabited island units scattered across a broad expanse of the Pacific (see Figure 1). As in the past, today the Yap Islands dominate the politics and economy of the state. In 1987 about 66 percent of the state population resided on this cluster of high islands, which also contains the capital of Colonia and most of the modern amenities in Yap State (Table 1).[3] To assess the nature of changes in the regional distribution of population, an earlier study examined demographic data with selected spatial statistics (Gorenflo & Levin, 1991; for information on the analytical methods employed, see Gorenflo, 1990). The results of a statistical comparison of population distributions between census years revealed a relatively strong correspondence between the population of individual places over time—an indication of local consistency in the arrangement of people during much of the twentieth century. This local consistency contrasted sharply with the absence of any systematic pattern of regional organization of population, such as the emergence of subregions.

During precolonial times the islands composing Yap State were, in a sense, integrated regionally, forming a sphere of interaction called the Yap Empire (Bellwood, 1979, p. 285). Chiefdoms (ranked societies with inherited social positions) were the basis of this empire, each of which comprised one or more communities on the Yap Islands and each Outer Island. The internal composition of settlements and the separate settlements themselves also were stratified, and this ranking guided certain types of interaction (Alkire, 1965, pp. 32–38; Lessa, 1950, 1966, pp. 32–38; Oliver, 1989, p. 32). Every 2 years or so an exchange of tribute and allegiance flowed throughout the Yap Empire by means of a canoe fleet that began at the easternmost components of the empire (in the Western Islands and Namonuito Atoll of modern Chuuk State) and which then sailed westward along a prescribed route, gathering representatives and tribute from other members of the empire along the way. Tribute passed between particular chiefdoms, with much of the tribute ultimately flowing to a high chief in Gagil, Yap. Interaction also

Table 1 *Proportional Distribution of Yap State Population (in percent by municipality on Yap and major Outer Island: selected census years)*

	1920	1925	1930	1935	1958	1967	1973	1977	1980	1987
Total Population	8,338	7,366	6,486	6,006	5,540	6,761	7,870	8,480	8,100	10,139
Yap Islands	64.5	63.2	62.0	61.5	58.5	59.5	65.3	64.6	64.1	65.6
Dalipebinaw	3.7	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.6	2.3	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.6
Fanif	N/A	5.9	5.8	6.4	6.4	5.8	4.7	4.4	4.8	4.5
Gagil	10.1	8.4	8.9	8.3	7.2	5.2	6.8	7.1	7.6	7.0
Gilman	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.1	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.7	2.8	1.8
Kanifay	4.0	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.7
Map	8.0	7.6	7.2	6.5	5.4	4.5	4.3	3.8	3.9	5.1
Rull	10.6	10.2	10.2	10.0	9.5	13.9	18.6	20.0	17.7	18.3
Rumung	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.4	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.0
Tomil	8.7	8.9	8.1	7.9	9.1	8.0	8.5	7.6	8.8	8.3
Weloy	12.7	8.2	8.6	10.0	9.3	11.8	13.0	12.0	11.4	14.2

Outer Islands	35.5	36.8	38.0	38.5	41.5	40.5	34.7	35.4	35.9	34.4
Eauripik	N/A	1.4	1.7	1.7	2.5	2.2	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.0
Elato	3.0	1.2	1.1	1.2	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7
Fais	12.2	6.4	5.7	5.2	4.2	3.2	2.7	2.3	2.6	2.5
Faraulep	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.2	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.8
Ifalik	N/A	4.0	4.7	4.2	5.4	4.8	4.0	4.2	4.8	4.7
Lamotrek	1.1	2.8	2.5	2.9	3.1	3.6	3.0	2.4	3.0	2.7
Ngulu	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3
Satawal	3.5	3.4	3.9	4.4	5.1	5.8	4.5	4.5	4.8	4.6
Sorol	N/A	0.1	—	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	—
Ulithi	5.4	6.9	6.9	6.8	8.3	8.1	9.0	10.1	8.8	8.4
Woleai	7.7	7.4	8.3	8.7	8.8	9.5	7.7	7.9	7.9	7.8

Note. In 1920, population data for Fanif and Weloy were grouped together (listed above under Weloy); similarly, data for Eauripik, Ifalik, and Sorol were grouped with Fais (and listed above under Fais). Population data for 1920–1935 are for Pacific Islanders only; remaining population data, except 1977 (de jure), represent de facto population. Because the 1970 census erred in assigning the population of Yap State to geographic area of residence, we do not present the 1970 census data in this table. N/A = not available; a dash (—) = a percentage that rounds to zero. Sources: Nan'yō-chō (1927, 1931, 1937); OCC, (1975); OHC, (1959); School of Public Health (n.d.); US Bureau of the Census (1983a); Yap OPB (1988).

occurred between proximal island units, usually in a more egalitarian manner and more frequently, as that documented by Alkire (1965) between Lamotrek and Elato Atolls and Satawal Island.

Chuuk State

Chuuk State consists of 23 inhabited island units (divided into 35 municipalities) near the geographic center of Micronesia (see Figure 1). The islands in Chuuk Lagoon presently dominate Chuuk State economically, demographically, and politically. Following an undetermined amount of depopulation in Chuuk State during the nineteenth century, the population has increased rapidly since mid-twentieth century and has become ever more concentrated on islands in the lagoon (Table 2). A statistical examination of regional demographic evolution revealed a strong correspondence between the populations of individual municipalities measured over successive census years (Gorenflo, in press), evidence once again of locally consistent demographic change similar to that found in Yap State. The changing distribution of population in Chuuk State also revealed a persistence of subregional population concentrations through time, though the statistics indicated no notable changes in this organization.

A highly fragmented political order characterized indigenous Chuuk society. The island units composing this state had chiefdoms and each island or atoll typically contained one or more separate polities (Fischer & Fischer, 1957, pp. 170–171). Although legend holds that in the past a single chief ruled each high island in Chuuk Lagoon, there is little evidence for such organization, and from the beginning of the German administration in 1899 most of these islands contained more than one polity. More detailed information on sociopolitical organization prior to foreign influence may forever be lost. Early in the German period, administrators appointed chiefs for individual island units, thereby producing a political environment that featured fewer indigenous leaders to negotiate with colonial rulers (Fischer & Fischer, p. 172).

Pohnpei State

Pohnpei State consists of volcanic Pohnpei Island and eight coralline atolls located in the Eastern Caroline Islands (see Figure 1). One indication of the

dominance of Pohnpei Island in the state is the distribution of population: Pohnpei Island contained more than 90 percent of the state population in 1985 (Table 3). As with Yap and Chuuk States, a statistical analysis of changes in the geographic distribution of population indicated a strong correspondence between the populations of individual municipalities in Pohnpei State over successive census years in the twentieth century (Gorenflo & Levin, 1992). In contrast, complementary analyses revealed little evidence of any identifiable statistical trend in the regional arrangement of population, such as the presence of subregional population centers.

The results of a spatial statistical analysis conducted with demographic data from Pohnpei State are consistent with the absence of centralized sociopolitical organization in the state during earlier times. Occasionally a single family ruled Pohnpei Island polities—the best known period of unification occurred between roughly A.D. 1000 and 1600 under rulers called the *Saudeleurs* (Hanlon, 1988, pp. 9–21). But for most of its history the high island contained separate political entities. At the time of European contact, several polities inhabited Pohnpei Island, each consisting of a single chiefdom. These polities were predecessors of the modern municipalities found there today. Similarly, each outlying island was home to an individual chiefdom.

Kosrae State

Kosrae State, the easternmost state in the FSM, comprises an archipelago consisting of 15 islands within a fringing reef (see Figure 1). Prior to European contact, Kosrae State was home to the most centralized sociopolitical system in Micronesia (Hezel, 1983, p. 111; Peoples, 1985, pp. 32–41). The center of this system was Lelu Island, which lies immediately east of the main island of Ualang and was in former times the home of the nobility and their retainers. The remaining commoners, in turn, resided on Ualang. In modern times Lelu Island continues to dominate Kosrae State, with Lelu Village being both the capital and largest community in the state. The remaining population resides in the five municipalities (including part of Lelu Municipality) on Ualang Island. The current geographical distribution of Kosrae State inhabitants is the result of population growth throughout the twentieth century following one of the most dramatic instances of depopulation anywhere in Micronesia during the preceding century (Ritter, 1978; Sarfert, 1919, p. 49). Despite rapid population growth over the past several

Table 2 *Proportional Distribution of Chuuk State Population (in percent by municipality in Chuuk Lagoon and the outlying island: selected census years)*

	1920	1925	1930	1935	1958	1967	1973	1980	1989
Total Population	14,788	14,961	15,200	15,129	20,124	25,107	31,609	37,488	47,871
Chuuk Lagoon	66.4	65.7	66.9	67.3	70.0	72.3	76.6	75.6	80.1
Eot	N/A	N/A	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.6
Fanapanges	N/A	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.7
Fefen	11.0	7.8	8.0	8.2	7.7	8.1	7.8	8.2	8.2
Parem	N/A	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7
Romonum	3.0	2.0	1.9	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.4
Siis	N/A	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9
Tol	15.4	16.1	16.5	15.6	18.0	17.9	17.2	17.9	17.4
Tonoas	9.1	9.7	9.5	12.7	7.6	8.0	8.1	8.6	8.1
Udot	4.4	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.1	3.5	2.9	2.9	3.2
Uman	6.2	5.7	6.4	6.4	7.1	6.5	6.0	6.1	6.0
Weno	17.4	17.0	17.2	15.9	21.7	23.6	30.3	27.6	31.9
Outlying Islands	33.6	34.3	33.1	32.7	30.0	27.7	23.3	24.4	19.9
Fananu	N/A	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5
Murillo	N/A	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.9	0.6
Nomwin	N/A	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8
Ruo	N/A	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.8
Ettal	N/A	2.1	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.2	0.8	1.2	0.9

Kuttu	N/A	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.0	1.2	1.3	0.9
Lukunoch	N/A	4.2	3.3	3.1	2.4	2.2	1.6	1.8	1.6
Moch	N/A	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.1	1.4	1.7	1.3
Namoluk	2.2	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.2	1.2	0.8	0.9	0.6
Oneop	N/A	2.5	2.2	2.7	2.0	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.1
Satowan	N/A	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.6	2.0	1.8
Ta	N/A	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.8	0.6
Losap	N/A	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.3	1.8	1.4	1.6	1.0
Nama	N/A	2.6	2.6	2.7	3.4	2.1	2.2	2.7	1.9
Piis-Emmwar	N/A	1.3	1.5	1.6	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7
Makur	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Onanu	N/A	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Onou	N/A	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
Onoun	N/A	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.1
Piherarh	N/A	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3
Houk	N/A	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.2	1.2	0.8	0.5	0.7
Pollap	N/A	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.7
Polowat	N/A	1.9	2.4	2.2	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.0
Tamatam	N/A	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5

Note. In 1920 Fefen included Parem and Siis, and Tol included Fanapanges; in 1920 and 1925 Udot included Eot; in 1925, 1930, and 1935 Onoun included Makur. Data for 1920-1935 comprise de facto Pacific Islanders; remaining data are de facto population. US Dept. of State (1981) reported 1958 population of Chuuk District as 19,924. N/A = means not available. Sources: Nan'yō-chō (1927, 1931, 1937); OCC (1975); OHC (1959); OPS (1992a); School of Public Health (n.d.); US Bureau of the Census (1972, 1983a).

Table 3 *Proportional Distribution of Pohnpei State Population (in percent by municipality on Pohnpei Island and major outlying island: selected census years)*

	1920	1925	1930	1935	1958	1967	1970	1973	1980	1985
Total Population	5,748	6,597	7,051	7,596	11,253	15,044	15,270	19,263	22,081	28,671
Central Munic.	72.5	75.1	75.5	75.8	83.0	85.6	86.0	89.6	90.7	91.4
Kolonia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	15.3	19.9	17.3	24.9	25.1	21.5
Kitti	23.0	21.2	20.0	19.7	16.8	15.7	16.0	12.6	15.4	13.9
Madolenihmw	13.3	13.5	15.1	16.2	15.9	17.1	14.1	13.6	15.3	15.1
Nett	13.6	15.4	14.8	15.8	9.5	9.1	10.9	12.2	10.1	17.6
Sokehs	10.8	13.4	14.5	14.0	14.8	14.1	16.3	16.7	16.4	14.2
U	11.9	11.6	11.0	10.0	10.6	9.8	11.5	9.5	8.4	9.0
Outlying Islands	27.5	24.9	24.5	24.2	17.0	14.4	14.0	10.4	9.3	8.6
Kapingamarangi	5.2	5.2	5.4	5.2	3.6	2.8	2.4	2.0	2.3	1.8
Mwoakilloa	4.3	3.6	3.8	3.4	3.0	2.6	2.5	1.7	1.3	0.9
Nukuoro	2.8	2.8	2.4	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.4
Oroluk	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Pingelap	10.5	9.1	9.0	9.1	5.6	4.3	4.3	3.3	1.7	2.6
Sapwuahfik	4.7	4.3	3.9	3.9	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.1	2.5	2.0

Note. Data for 1920–1935 comprise de facto Pacific Islanders; remaining data are de facto population. Kolonia recorded as part of Nett in 1920, 1925, and 1935; Nett total for 1930 includes Kolonia population, or 357 persons. Population of Ant and Pakin Atolls recorded as part of Sokehs Municipality. N/A = not available; a dash (—) = percentage that rounds to zero. Sources: Nan'yō-chō (1927, 1931, 1937); OCC (1975); OHC (1959); OPS (1988); School of Public Health (n.d.); US Bureau of the Census (1972, 1983a).

decades, the distribution of inhabitants has remained remarkably uniform among the municipalities in Kosrae State (Gorenflo, 1993b; Table 4). Because Kosrae State in effect comprises a single island, the challenge of interaction between places is trivial compared with the remaining states in the FSM; thus we conducted no spatial statistical analysis of changing population distribution over time.

MOBILITY AND MIGRATION WITHIN THE FSM

Migration currently plays an extremely important role in the demography of island nations throughout the Pacific (Connell, 1984a, p. 175), producing rapid changes in the geographic arrangement of population. Four types of migration have been defined for the Pacific: migration from mountainous areas to more accessible coastal areas, migration away from small islands, migration toward urban areas, and migration to other countries (Connell, 1990, p. 2). Today, the last three types can be found in the FSM, where they have occurred in varying degrees since World War II.

Human mobility, including migration, is not new in Micronesia, and voyaging over short or long distances is an important part of customary behavior patterns in many parts of the region. Europeans documented impressive examples of mobility as early as 1696 when several canoes from the Carolines arrived in the Philippines (Hezel, 1983, p. 102). Such early occurrences were not unique: Canoes from the Central Carolines frequently sailed to Guam during the eighteenth century in search of metal brought by the Spaniards (Kotzebue, 1821/1967, Vol. II, pp. 240–241). Movement occurred historically to escape overpopulated conditions (Levin, 1976), to search for employment (Lessa, 1962, pp. 328–335), to flee the ravages of droughts and typhoons (Alkire, 1978, p. 229; Lieber, 1968, p. 7), and merely to visit other places (Flinn, 1992, p. 11; Gladwin, 1970; Hezel & Levin, 1990, p. 43; Marshall, 1979, p. 7; Ritter, 1980). But *migration* during the pre-European era was usually of short duration and often *circular*, with most migrants eventually returning home (Alkire, 1965; Gladwin; Levin & Gorenflo, 1994, p. 127; see also Bedford, 1980; Chapman, 1981; Chapman & Prothero, 1983). With increasing frequency, migration throughout the contemporary Pacific in general and the FSM in particular occurs over greater distances and with increasing permanence (Flinn, 1992; Hezel & Levin, 1990; see also Ahlburg & Levin, 1990; Connell, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1987, 1990; Hayes, 1985; McPherson, 1985; Shankman, 1976; Xenos, Gardner,

Table 4 *Proportional Distribution of Kosrae State Population (in percent by municipality: selected census years)*

	1920	1925	1930	1935	1958	1967	1973	1977	1980	1987
Total Population	786	886	990	1,189	2,367	3,260	3,266	3,989	5,491	6,607
Lelu	N/A	35.2	34.9	36.2	N/A	31.9	50.5	34.7	36.3	36.7
Malem	N/A	21.0	21.7	20.5	N/A	21.5	17.2	19.8	19.9	20.5
Tafunsak	N/A	30.6	30.7	30.7	N/A	23.8	17.0	24.6	24.4	23.7
Utwe	N/A	13.2	12.6	12.6	N/A	17.1	15.3	17.5	16.6	16.3
Walung	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.4	2.7	2.8

Note. Data for 1920–1935 comprise de facto Pacific Islanders only; remaining data are de facto population. Total for 1967 includes 184 persons whose place of municipality of residence was "Not Specified." N/A = not available. Sources: Nan'yō-chō (1927, 1931, 1937); OCC (1975); OHC (1959); OPS (1989); School of Public Health (n.d.); US Bureau of the Census (1972, 1983a).

Barringer, & Levin, 1987). Because clues to modern mobility patterns in the FSM can be found by examining previously established patterns of interaction and migration, we briefly summarize key aspects of these established mobility patterns in the area.

As discussed above, more systematic interaction occurred in Yap State during earlier times than in any other state in the FSM, with interaction following sociopolitical guidelines established within the Yap Empire. However, the aim of most interaction among empire components probably was to establish and maintain socioeconomic ties through which the Outer Islanders could receive assistance in times of environmental fluctuation or natural disaster (primarily typhoons; Alkire, 1965, pp. 135–174). The proximity of certain Yap Empire components affected the nature of interaction. Representatives from all Outer Islands congregated every 2 years or so and eventually reached the Yap Islands to exchange agricultural goods and handicrafts and reestablish social, economic, and political relationships (Alkire, 1977, p. 51). Proximal island units, in contrast, tended to interact more often than did the entire Yap Empire. For example, Ulithi Atoll and the Gagil Municipality on the Yap Islands exchanged goods annually (Oliver, 1989, p. 581); Elato and Lamotrek Atolls and Satawal Island traded food and handicrafts even more frequently (Alkire, 1965). Moreover, proximal Outer Islands such as the last three established strong social ties built primarily on kinship, with individuals from one island unit marrying into families from another and relocating—once again providing a safeguard against local environmental fluctuation. Long-distance migration occurred in Yap State before the twentieth century, such as when Yap State Outer Islanders relocated to the Spanish colony on Guam during the early nineteenth century (Hezel, 1983, p. 105).

Interaction among individual island units in Chuuk State during former times occurred both within each of the five main island groups in the state (Chuuk Lagoon, the Western Islands, Namonuito Atoll, the Hall Islands, and the Mortlock Islands) and between Chuuk Lagoon and the outlying island groups (OCNO, 1944a, pp. 21–22). The former was feasible because of the proximity of island units in each group and desirable for the purposes of maintaining economic and social relationships among the inhabitants of each main group. The impetus for the latter interaction was also both economic and social—the outlying Islanders provided many handicrafts, primarily in exchange for high island resources and the assurance of potential refuge in times of trouble (Peltzer & Hall, 1946, p. 3). Interaction occurred among sociopolitical entities (individual chiefdoms) and among families. Apparently,

frequent movement occurred between Chuuk Lagoon and the Hall and Mortlock Islands, as suggested by kinship ties and certain linguistic and cultural similarities (Gladwin & Sarason, 1953, pp. 37–38; Peltzer & Hall, pp. 17–18). Interaction between islands in the lagoon and the Western Islands was much less frequent because ocean currents made travel by canoe between these two areas difficult and because the island units in the Western Islands were part of the Yap Empire (Fischer & Fischer, 1957, p. 170; Lessa, 1966, p. 39). Namonuito Atoll, also part of the Yap Empire, apparently interacted less with Chuuk Lagoon than with other components of the empire. Like the Outer Islanders in Yap State, inhabitants of Chuuk State occasionally relocated to other islands. The best-documented examples of such movement involve Polowat, an atoll in the Western Islands that was an integral part of a multi-island system and whose residents interacted with and occasionally married people from other island groups (Gladwin, 1970; Peltzer & Hall, p. 18). Instances of migration from outlying islands to Chuuk Lagoon to flee typhoon damage tested the social connections established for such situations (e.g., Peltzer & Hall, pp. 18, 27). Imposed movement also occurred in Chuuk State, such as instances of labor recruitment practiced by Europeans who took residents from Namonuito Atoll to the Northern Marianas in the 1860s (Ibanez del Carmen & Resano, 1976, p. 19; Spoehr, 1954, p. 71) and residents from the Mortlocks to Samoa during the early 1870s (Doane, 1874, pp. 203–204; Finsch, 1893, pp. 299–300; Sturges, 1874, p. 244).

Little interaction occurred between separate polities in Pohnpei State prior to the modern era (Poyer, 1990, p. 128). Individual outlying Islanders contacted each other infrequently, owing in part to a lack of the formal social ties that often foster such interaction, in part to an absence of economic impetus (all atolls possessed similar resources), and in part to the difficulty in traveling the great distances that separate the island units in this state. Interaction was similarly infrequent between separate polities on the high island. As was the case with the outlying islands, one reason for the sociocultural isolation on Pohnpei Island was probably a lack of economic necessity because each polity had access to nearly all the same resources. Another probable reason for the lack of interaction between high island political units was their independence from one another. With the possible exception of limited contact between Pohnpei Island and certain nearby atolls (notably Ant and Pakin Atolls—their populations are currently recorded as part of Sokehs Municipality on Pohnpei Island), interaction between polities was infrequent in Pohnpei State (Bascom, 1965, p. 140). As one would expect, instances of relocation also were rare.

In contrast to the other three states in the FSM, travel between places in Kosrae State was a much simpler matter. On Ualang Island, movement between municipalities and between villages in those municipalities occurred either by foot over land or by canoe along the coast. Movement between the main island and Lelu Island was by canoe over the narrow, shallow channel that separates them (Lütke, 1835/1836, Vol. I, p. 346; Peoples, 1985, p. 30)—a means of transportation made obsolete by the causeway built between the two islands after World War II. The flow of tribute from the commoners on Ualang Island to the nobility on Lelu Island, and the flow of administrative guidance in the other direction, characterized the highly stratified, centralized sociocultural system found in Kosrae at the time of European contact. The relocation of people to other portions of Kosrae State, on the other hand, apparently was much less frequent. Long-distance travel was even more improbable; in addition to the constraints placed upon the resident population by the political hierarchy, Kosrae is isolated geographically, and by the time of European contact its residents apparently had ceased traveling by canoe over open seas (Lewis, 1949, p. 2). Some immigration occurred from other places, but apparently this too was infrequent. For example, about 50 Ocean Islanders migrated to Kosrae in the 1870s to escape a drought, and at about the same time a "large number" (Hezel, 1983, p. 241) of Nauruans fled to Kosrae after staging an unsuccessful uprising on their home island. Individuals from the Marshall Islands also visited Kosrae during precolonial times, in some cases staying for extended periods of time (OCNO, 1944a, p. 22). However, most immigrants who did not marry into Kosrae's society eventually returned to their home islands.

TWENTIETH CENTURY MOBILITY AND MIGRATION IN THE FSM

Between 1899 and 1914 Germany administered the islands that currently compose the FSM. As noted above, the Germans were the first colonial power to take an active interest in the Caroline Islands, one that focused on economic development primarily through the promotion of a copra industry. The industry mainly took the form of expanded coconut production on planned plantations, which required little relocation of people, though "moderate numbers" (OCNO, 1944b, p. 169) of laborers from outlying islands (such as Hatohobei and Sonsorol in Palau) were relocated to main islands (such as Yap) to work for copra traders. Germany also began to mine

the phosphate deposits on Nauru and Angaur. After a failed attempt to use Nauruans in the mines on their own island, German administrators imported laborers from elsewhere, usually from other Micronesian islands. By 1913 about 650 non-Nauruan Micronesians (primarily Marshallese, but also individuals from Pohnpei and Kosrae State) worked in the mines on Nauru (Underwood, 1989, p. 7; Wilson, 1968, p. 34). After an economic survey revealed phosphate deposits on Angaur, a German company began mining operations in 1909 with the help of 98 imported laborers from Yap and its Outer Islands (OCNO, 1944b, p. 29). Eventually the number of Islanders laboring on Angaur grew to roughly 200, with about 120 from Yap and its Outer Islands and another 80 from parts of Palau (Hezel, in press).

Other than the economic impetus for relocating large numbers of people during the German period, the greatest movement of Islanders in the FSM usually occurred for political reasons or disaster relief. The most notable example was the exile of 426 individuals from Sokehs Municipality, on Pohnpei Island, to Palau in 1911 following an indigenous uprising. They were replaced by about 1,250 individuals from Mwoakilloa and Pingelap Atolls (their home islands had been devastated by a typhoon in 1905), Kapingamarangi Atoll and the Mortlock Islands (both areas were devastated by a typhoon in 1907), Nukuoro and Sapwuahfik Atolls, and Chuuk Lagoon (migrants from this last group of islands were mostly individuals who had resisted German rule; see Fischer & Fischer, 1957, pp. 8, 58; Gladwin & Sarason, 1953, p. 41; OCNO, 1944a, p. 20). German ships relocated hundreds of Islanders from Ifalik, Ulithi, and Woleai Atolls (in Yap State), Pingelap Atoll (Pohnpei State), and Nomwin and Piherarh islets (Chuuk State) to several high islands following devastation from a typhoon in 1905 (Hezel, in press). Similar relocation occurred following the 1907 typhoon when individuals were relocated from the Mortlocks to Saipan (Hezel, 1991, p. 123). Other instances of Islander relocation during the German administration of the FSM were limited, both into and out of the area and within and between the four component states.

The Japanese administration strongly controlled mobility patterns of Islanders in the FSM between 1914 and 1945. Early in this period, considerations of economic development generally guided the movement of people in the mandated territory. Given the relatively small numbers of people scattered across the Pacific, large projects frequently required labor recruitment from distant islands (Peltzer & Hall, 1946, p. 4). In some parts of the FSM, relocation to provide labor for various Japanese projects was almost universal among male residents. The emphasis was on moving people

to less geographically remote island units (see Carroll, 1975, pp. 168–169; Nason, 1970, p. 217). Dominant trends included the relocation of residents for public works projects, such as the recruitment of laborers from Kosrae to Pohnpei Island to construct roads (Ritter, 1978, p. 296); the relocation of Islanders to work in phosphate mines on Angaur and Fais, primarily from the Yap Islands, Chuuk Lagoon, and assorted outlying islands (e.g., the Mortlock Islands, and Namonuito and Ulithi Atolls; Hunt, Kidder, & Schneider, 1954, p. 31; OCNO, 1944b, p. 169; Purcell, 1976, pp. 191–193; Thomas, 1978, pp. 33, 44); and the recruitment of laborers for large-scale agricultural endeavors, such as importing workers from Chuuk Lagoon and Pohnpei Island to Saipan to work on plantations (OCNO, 1944a, p. 142).

It was during the Japanese administration that the first detailed data on mobility became available, collected as part of a census of the mandated territory and based on *place of registration.* These data indicate that despite instances of relocation during the first 16 years of the Japanese occupation-administration, the mobility of Pacific Islanders in the FSM remained limited. Based on the 1930 census data, the four FSM states can be divided into two groups: those with fewer than 20 percent of their populations registered in some place other than the municipality of residence in 1930, consisting of Chuuk and Yap States, and those with more than 20 percent of their residents registered in some other municipality, namely Kosrae and Pohnpei States (Figure 2). Much of the apparent mobility in Pohnpei State in 1930 resulted from the Japanese repatriation of individuals exiled to Palau by the German administration following the Sokehs Rebellion. Additional movement to Pohnpei Island drew in part upon links established with other parts of Micronesia early in the German administration when the island became an enclave for small populations who (usually) had fled storm damage or drought in their home islands. Migration to Kosrae in part concerned Japanese development requirements on this small island and in part reflected the establishment of small ethnic communities from certain outlying islands (e.g., Mwoakilloa Atoll; Fischer & Fischer, 1957, p. 158). Unfortunately, the 1930 census does not provide adequate data on destinations of emigrants from the FSM. It is known that the Japanese continued the German practice of recruiting laborers for the phosphate mines on Angaur, primarily from the Yap Islands and Chuuk State, and that the annual total was generally 300 to 425 persons who worked on 6-month to 2-year contracts (if data from the mid-1930s are representative of patterns during the 1920s; see Decker, 1940, pp. 145–150; Nason, 1970, p. 217; OCNO, 1944b, pp. 169–170;



Figure 2. *Pacific Islander population in states of the FSM, according to place of registration: 1930*

Purcell, 1967, p. 192; Yanaihara, 1940, pp. 286–287). Complementary census data from Angaur generally support this magnitude of relocation: Of the 708 Pacific Islanders residing on Angaur in 1930, only 25.3 percent were registered on that island; 17.8 percent were registered elsewhere in the Palau District and 52.4 percent (371 persons) were registered elsewhere in the mandated territory (Nan'yō-chō, 1931, Vol. II, p. 564).

The mobility data for each state in 1930 reveal some variability.[4] For the three multi-island states, the differences are most obvious in the contrasts between the main islands and the outlying islands—the latter showing evidence for relatively fewer immigrants than the former. This is particularly so in Pohnpei State, which since German times was a destination for outlying Islander relocation and during Japanese times a source for plantation workers (Hezel, in press) and where, in 1930, 41.5 percent of the main island residents were registered in a municipality other than the one in which they

resided (compared with only 2.3 percent of those living in the outlying islands; Nan'yō-chō, 1931, Vol. II, pp. 570–572). The distinction between main islands and the outlying islands was much less dramatic for Chuuk (89.0 versus 11.0 percent of the Pacific Islander population, respectively) and Yap States (83.9 versus 16.1 percent; Nan'yō-chō, 1931, Vol. II, pp. 558–570). Most of the residents of Pohnpei Island, Chuuk Lagoon, and the Yap Islands who were registered elsewhere came from another part of each respective district, *probably* indicating migration from outlying islands to main islands (combined with some movement between municipalities on the main islands or within Chuuk Lagoon). Certain municipalities on the main islands contained particularly large numbers of persons who were registered elsewhere, such as Sokehs (Pohnpei State), Tonoas (Chuuk State), and Weloy (Yap State)—the first municipality containing former exiles repatriated from Palau as well as ethnic enclaves from other islands, the last two representing major areas of development in their respective districts under the Japanese administration. With the exception of these few places, however, the 1930 census data indicate limited migration throughout most of the islands currently composing the FSM.

As World War II approached, the Japanese administration began to move Micronesians around according to increasingly military considerations. Although the need to recruit labor continued, during the early years of their administration the Japanese had developed an unfavorable impression of the Micronesian work ethic (Peattie, 1988, pp. 100–101). As a result, people from outside Micronesia (mainly Okinawans) were imported to supply labor, both for ongoing endeavors such as the sugar industry and for various specific development projects (OCNO, 1944a, p. 142). It was only when the need for additional laborers became desperate that the Japanese once again turned to Micronesians. For example, at various times immediately preceding and during World War II, the Japanese brought laborers to Chuuk Lagoon from Nauru, Kiribati, Ocean Island, and assorted outlying islands in Chuuk State to work on selected projects (Fischer & Fischer, 1957, p. 63; Hezel, 1991, p. 159; Peltzer & Hall, 1946, p. 12; Reafsnyder, 1984, p. 104; Underwood, 1989, p. 11). Similar relocation occurred from Barnabas, the Ellice Islands, and Kiribati to Kosrae, from Mwoakilloa and Pingelap Atolls to Pohnpei Island, and from the Yap Outer Islands to the Yap Islands (Berganza, 1947, pp. 71–72; Peoples, 1985, pp. 56–57; Richard, 1957, Vol. II, pp. 47–54). Conscription methods generally were the same as those used to recruit labor for the phosphate mines on Angaur and Nauru: The Japanese determined a quota for each island and left it to local chiefs to sort out the actual

recruitment (Hezel, in press). In other cases Micronesians were evacuated from their home islands to make way for dense Japanese development (such as when the Japanese moved residents of Tonoas and Weno to other islands in Chuuk Lagoon—see OCNO, 1944a, p. 142), to escape the ravages of war (such as when the Japanese evacuated residents of Polowat Atoll to Houk Atoll—see Gladwin, 1970, p. 8), or to make way for Japanese troops (such as when the Japanese relocated residents of Kosrae's coastal villages to the interior mountains of Ualang—see Lewis, 1949, p. 46). Although the movement of Micronesians late in the Japanese administration is of much importance and often involved relatively large numbers of individuals, available data do not provide detailed descriptions of this movement.

Immediately following the war the US government began to repatriate most of the people who had been moved about by the Japanese administration in Micronesia, including Japanese nationals, citizens of mainland Asia, and Micronesians (Richard, 1957, Vol. II, pp. 26–54). Little development occurred in the early years of the US administration of the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), and at this time many Islanders returned to the lifeways that were typical of the period preceding the Japanese administration (Peoples, 1985, pp. 13–15). During the early 1960s financial investment and other types of development assistance from the United States increased considerably, leading to substantial changes in much of the TTPI (e.g., Gorenflo & Levin, 1989). Data on migration collected in the 1973 census, which recorded people by home area compared with usual place of residence, provide important insights on the relocation that accompanied the initial surge of US-sponsored development in the FSM. But these data contain certain limitations. Because Kosrae was part of the Pohnpei District of the TTPI, the 1973 census treated the former as a single unit rather than as a collection of municipalities, thus hindering any attempts to examine mobility in Kosrae with data from this census. Moreover, because the 1973 data are for TTPI-born persons only, few individuals in any of the FSM states considered some place outside the TTPI as home or their usual place of residence. Despite their shortcomings, data from the 1973 census do provide some insights on mobility patterns in the FSM. Considerable movement occurred *within* each state, with residents of Pohnpei and Yap States being the most mobile (Figure 3). Although information on mobility for Kosrae State as a separate entity is limited, available data indicate that more than 98 percent of theTTPI-born persons who usually resided in this state in 1973 considered it their home district (OCC, 1975, p. 130).



Figure 3. *TTPI-born population in states of the FSM, according to municipality of usual residence and home district: 1973*

As was shown by the 1930 data, substantial variability existed in the mobility patterns found in different portions of the FSM states in 1973. Once again, larger proportions of main island populations were from other places, with immigrants coming from within each respective state, from elsewhere in the TTPI, and from beyond the bounds of the TTPI. As in 1930, the main island versus outlying islands distinction was greatest in Pohnpei State: 28.8 percent of Pohnpei Island residents considered some place other than that island their home district, which once again suggests migration from outlying islands (OCC, 1975, pp. 129–130). Although the contrast between main islands and outlying islands was less in Yap and Chuuk States, the distinctions nevertheless are noteworthy: 33.6 percent of the residents of the Yap Islands considered somewhere else home (compared with 13.1 percent of the Yap State Outer Island residents), and 19.3 percent

of Chuuk Lagoon residents came from elsewhere (compared with 8.3 percent of Chuuk State outlying island residents; OCC, 1975, pp. 130–134). The places with the largest immigrant populations in 1973 tended to be those that were experiencing the greatest amount of development. For instance, relatively large numbers of persons from other places resided in Kolonia (Pohnpei State), Weno (Chuuk State), and Rull and Weloy (Yap State), all locations of urban development.[5] The reasons for migration to these places tend to involve the modern amenities found there, including wage employment, advanced education, and Western medical treatment, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Certain outlying islands also had relatively large numbers of residents who called somewhere else home, including Ulithi Atoll in Yap State (32.4 percent from elsewhere) and Satawan (37.1 percent from elsewhere) and Ulul Atolls (36.9 percent from elsewhere) in Chuuk State (OCC, 1975, pp. 132–133). Each of these places had begun to emerge as a *central place* for the outlying Islanders in their respective areas. A high school in Ulithi and junior high schools in Satawan and Ulul (Connell, 1983, p. 25) provided strong impetus for the immigration of selected residents from other outlying islands.

The 1980 census collected limited data on mobility, recording only short-term migration patterns based on residence in 1975 (US Bureau of the Census, 1983b). Because the two censuses discussed above focus on lifetime migration, it is difficult to compare the 1930 and 1973 mobility data with 1980 census data. Nevertheless, the 1980 census provides additional insights on migration in the FSM. Over the short term, the human movement in each state in the FSM was markedly similar. Most notably, 90 percent or more of the population in each state resided in the same municipality in 1980 as in 1975 (Figure 4). With the exception of Kosrae State, most of the remainder of the FSM population consisted of individuals who resided in some other part of their respective states in 1975; in Kosrae State, 6.2 percent of 1980 state residents lived in another portion of the TTPI or outside the TTPI 5 years earlier.

In 1980 the clear distinction between main Islander mobility and outlying Islander mobility largely disappeared for the three multi-island states in the FSM. Only in Pohnpei State does the previously established tendency for the main island to contain relatively more immigrants persist, with 8.8 percent of high island residents living in another place 5 years earlier compared with 0.9 percent of the outlying island residents (US Bureau of the Census, 1983b). In Chuuk and Yap States, a larger proportion of the *outlying island* population consisted of persons from other places than did the main



Figure 4. *Population in states of the FSM, according to place of residence in 1975: 1980*

island populations—6.3 percent (Chuuk Lagoon) versus 12.7 percent (Chuuk State outlying islands) and 8.8 percent (Yap Islands) versus 11.3 percent (Yap State Outer Islands). These tendencies should not be taken to indicate that *a large number* of outlying island residents relocated from elsewhere, for the percentages cited represent proportions of relatively small populations. Nevertheless, a decrease in the rush of outlying Islanders to main islands and an increase in the movement to outlying islands are evident. This change possibly resulted from outlying Islanders returning home rather than facing the increasing unemployment that occurred on main islands late in the 1970s or from outlying Islanders returning home rather than pursuing formal education, which had become increasingly expensive and failed to guarantee employment after graduation (Hezel & Levin, 1990, pp. 53–56; see also Connell, 1983, pp. 39–41). Although differences in the composition

of their populations exist at the level of individual municipalities, the degree of variability was much less in 1980 than in previous years.

Data on the timing and geographic patterns of movement within the four states of the FSM indicate three phases of migration. The first, occurring during the German and Japanese administrations, involved relatively little mobility. The main exception, Pohnpei Island, was largely because of the repatriation of citizens who had been forcibly exiled during the German administration. Migration generally occurred to promote German economic endeavors, or Japanese economic or military interests, and tended to focus on the high islands in the FSM. Within the constraints imposed by our limited ability to compare data collected by three markedly different censuses, the mobility documented by the 1973 census appears greater than that recorded in 1930. An apparent influx of people from outlying islands to population centers on the main islands accounts for much of the mobility recorded in 1973. The lure of modern amenities, education, and employment—proposed by other authors as the underlying reasons for migration during the 1970s (see Connell, 1986; Hezel & Levin, 1990; Hezel & McGrath, 1989)—provides a *possible* explanation for the increase, but the data examined here do not enable an assessment of underlying reasons. Finally, mobility in 1980 apparently declined from 1973 levels. A return of larger percentages of migrants to outlying islands may represent a response to increasing unemployment on main islands—possibly a consequence of reduced US funding prior to termination of the TTPI (Hezel & Levin, 1990, pp. 53–56).

In addition to data on the origins of migrants in the FSM, the 1973 census also collected data on destinations of the TTPI-born population of the four states—defined by birthplace compared with usual district of residence *within the Trust Territory.*[6] Pohnpei State once again had the greatest mobility, with 30.4 percent of its TTPI-born residents living in a municipality different from their place of birth, though most persons who relocated had moved to another municipality in that state (OCC, 1975, pp. 103–104). Similarly, the data show a clear distinction between Pohnpei Island (74.3 percent of TTPI-born residents living in the municipality of birth) and the outlying islands (49.2 percent of TTPI-born residents living in the municipality of birth), although a relatively large number of the persons born in Kolonia (probably at the hospital) had moved to other portions of the state. The general emigration trends for Pohnpei State also hold for Chuuk and Yap States. In both of the latter states, most persons who no longer resided in the municipality of their birth lived in another municipality of their re-

spective state in 1973. As was the case for Pohnpei State, it is possible to distinguish clearly between Chuuk Lagoon or the Yap Islands and the outlying islands of each state. In 1973 the population centers in Chuuk State apparently retained most of the persons born in those places (notably the islands of Tol, Tonoas, and Weno), while Rull and Weloy municipalities (together containing Colonia) on the Yap Islands experienced emigration similar to that noted for Kolonia.

The most recent censuses of Yap, Pohnpei, and Kosrae States provide scant information on mobility (see OPS, 1988, 1989; Yap OPB, 1988). In contrast, the 1989 census of Chuuk State does contain data on recent migration trends in this portion of the FSM (OPS, 1992a). The available data define mobility in terms of "legal residence" and thus are similar to the 1930 data in employing an administrative definition of origin. Data from the 1989 Chuuk census indicate a distinction between Chuuk Lagoon (16.1 percent of the population not legal residents of their municipality of residence) and the outlying islands (3.9 percent not legal residents). Weno Island especially stands out in these data in that the continued flow of people toward this main center in Chuuk State produced a population in which 36.8 percent had a legal residence elsewhere in the state.

MIGRATION BEYOND THE FSM

As of 1985 few citizens of the FSM had migrated beyond the bounds of their nation (Hezel & Levin, 1987). By 1989 this situation had changed dramatically. Increasing numbers of people were relocating from the FSM to other portions of the Pacific and to the United States (Hezel & McGrath, 1989). The surge in emigration corresponded with the implementation of the Compact of Free Association, which enabled unconstrained movement between the FSM and both the United States and the US territories (Compact of Free Association, 1982, Title I, Article 4; see OPS, 1992b, pp. 40–41, 98)—an important safety valve built into the Compact in the event that economic development faltered in the FSM (Hezel & McGrath, p. 48; see also Connell, 1983, p. 48). Unfortunately, the recent movement of FSM citizens to other countries is not well-documented quantitatively. The topic deserves much more study, although the *1990 Census of Population and Housing*, conducted by the US Bureau of the Census (1992a, 1992b), provides important basic information for certain destinations.[7]

Preliminary studies indicate that the majority of emigrants from the FSM tend to choose two Micronesian destinations: Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). By early 1988 slightly more than 1 year after the implementation of the Compact, an estimated 1,600 FSM citizens had migrated to Guam (Hezel & McGrath, 1989, pp. 49–50). By the fall of the same year, the estimated number of FSM migrants to Guam had grown to approximately 1,700. Using enrollment data from the Guam Community College and the University of Guam, an estimated 62 percent of these migrants were from Chuuk State, 19 percent from Pohnpei State, 10 percent from Yap State, and 9 percent from Kosrae State. In April 1990 the US decennial census recorded 2,964 residents of Guam who were born in the FSM (US Bureau of the Census, 1992b, p. 15). Of this total, 62.2 percent came from Chuuk State, with the remaining three states providing relative shares similar to those estimated for 1988 (22.3, 10.2, and 4.6 percent, respectively). A recent study of the 1990 Guam census data indicates that the rate of migration from the FSM increased at the end of the 1980s and estimates that more than 6,000 FSM citizens resided on the island at the end of 1991 (Rubinstein & Levin, 1992, p. 381).

FSM citizens who relocated to the CNMI, in turn, totalled about 1,400 by 1988 (Hezel & McGrath, 1989, pp. 56–57). An estimated 50 percent of the CNMI total came from Chuuk State, 36 percent from Pohnpei State, and 14 percent from Yap State (migrants from Kosrae State composed fewer than 1 percent of the 1988 total). By April 1990 the total number of migrants to the CNMI from the FSM had increased slightly, reaching 1,817 persons (US Bureau of the Census 1992a, p. 16). The relative contributions of each FSM state were similar to the 1988 figures, with the shares from Chuuk, Kosrae, and Yap States (53.3, 1.6, and 15.0 percent, respectively) growing slightly at the expense of the percentage from Pohnpei State (29.8 percent).

The third important destination of migrants from the FSM is the United States, a trend consistent with the tendencies for seven of nine Pacific Island nations surveyed during the 1980s (Greenwood & Stuart, 1986). In 1980 about 1,400 persons residing in the United States were born in the FSM, with roughly 370 from Yap State, 540 from Chuuk State, 380 from Pohnpei State, and 110 from Kosrae State (Barringer, Gardner, & Levin, 1993, p. 286). Detailed results from the *1990 Census of Population and Housing*, due to become available soon, probably will indicate a substantial increase in FSM migrants to the United States.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION FOR THE FSM

As we have indicated, the roles of mobility and migration as mechanisms of population change in the FSM have varied throughout the twentieth century. Population change frequently has many consequences, including shifts in economy, ecology, and social structure. The potential repercussions of human movement in the FSM thus are several, affecting both the origins and destinations of those who move. Some authors and government officials argue that the costs of migration, such as the loss of valuable human resources from emigrant origins, outweigh such benefits as the provision of an outlet for excess population (see Ahlburg & Levin, 1990; Connell, 1987; Fawcett & Carino, 1987; Hayes, 1985). Others argue that the consequences of migration in the Pacific are much more complex than generally acknowledged and can vary considerably between places, thus providing a valuable though not always fully understood means of adaptation and economic evolution in the face of changing adaptive challenges throughout much of the area (e.g., Chapman, 1991). In this section we discuss the most important repercussions of the mobility of FSM citizens during the twentieth century. The need to base this interpretation largely on census data—which provide *snapshots* of mobility in one form or another but offer few details on the circular, repeat, or short-term types of migration that play key roles in modern human movement in much of the Pacific (see Hayes, 1991, p. 6)—severely limits what can be said about this complex process. To provide additional insights, where appropriate we appeal to case studies of aspects of migration in selected parts of the FSM.

The causes of mobility and migration in the FSM not only are several, but also have changed over time. As discussed above, many places experienced a substantive transition in mobility with the appearance of colonial powers in the region, at least insofar as establishing and maintaining social ties with islands other than those to which they were linked traditionally. The social and kinship ties that emerged, both in precolonial times and more recently, established *channels* of movement for the future—for reasons of social obligation, pleasure, and necessity (e.g., in times of trouble caused by local environmental fluctuation). With the influx of outsiders came different reasons for movement. One of the most important has been *labor.* The advent of phosphate mining on Angaur and Nauru during the early twentieth century provided the first large-scale opportunity for wage labor in Micronesia, an opportunity taken advantage of by many. The demand for

labor, though often manifested as forced recruitment, continued to promote human movement in the FSM throughout the twentieth century. After a brief hiatus early in the US administration following World War II, opportunities for wage labor in the TTPI increased substantially during the Kennedy administration. As a result, large numbers of people in the FSM moved from rural places to population centers. When the rapid economic expansion experienced in Micronesia during the 1970s slowed dramatically during the 1980s, many of what had become an increasingly educated (and demanding) population looked elsewhere for employment. People either migrated beyond the bounds of the FSM to such places as Guam (Hezel, 1989) or returned to their rural homes. The main impetus for migration to both Guam and the CNMI has been employment, fueled primarily by expanding tourism and other labor-intensive industries (such as textile manufacture; Rubinstein & Levin, 1992, pp. 362–363). The role of employment persists in the evolution of this movement, which shifted emphasis from the CNMI to Guam in 1986 when the latter emerged as an alternative destination with higher wages and less competition from foreign workers.

In addition to the search for wage labor, people in the FSM travel and relocate for a host of other reasons. Among the most frequently cited are access to Western medical services, schooling, specialized training, foreign goods, modern entertainment, travel to the world beyond Micronesia, and visits with friends or relatives for periods varying in duration (Alkire, 1993, pp. 32, 44; Connell, 1983, p. 8; Connell, 1986, pp. 46–47; Flinn, 1990, pp. 74, 106, 118; Hezel, 1976; Hezel & Levin, 1990; Peterson, 1979, p. 37; see also Alexander, 1978; Connell, 1984b; Gorenflo & Levin, 1989; Maude, 1965). The reasons for movement vary for both specific origins and specific destinations. For example, Colonia (Madrich) in Yap State contained immigrants who had relocated for reasons that, though varying in relative importance over time, emphasized employment (Alkire, 1993, p. 44). On the other hand, emigrants from Pollap Atoll (who moved mainly to Weno Island) relocated primarily to seek education; movement for employment was only about half as prevalent in comparison (Flinn, 1990, p. 118). Despite the advent of modern purposes for mobility and migration, many people in the FSM still travel for what are fundamentally the same reasons they always did (Levin & Gorenflo, 1994, pp. 126–127), returning after a time in a form of circularity similar to that experienced in the region for centuries.

Within the FSM the migration that occurs affects two types of places: destinations, especially the communities on main islands that receive the majority of in-migrants, and origins, particularly outlying islands, where

population size and demographic structure can change dramatically with the emigration of a few inhabitants. Destinations can experience problems of a sort generally associated with *urbanization,* an elusive concept that we use here to signify the process of community growth in which the relatively rapid concentration of an area's population produces characteristics usually associated with cities. We do not consider any of the larger communities in the FSM to be cities, although the process of urbanization is affecting some of the nation's communities—particularly Colonia (Yap State), Kolonia (Pohnpei State), and Weno (Chuuk State). Population increase in these places yields some positive impacts, including a concentrated work force, which results in an increase in localized productivity potential, a reduction in the need to distribute goods and services in a region where distribution is a challenging endeavor (Gorenflo, 1993a), a localized tax base, and increased access to educational and employment opportunities unavailable in rural settings. But urbanization can also introduce problems associated with growing numbers of people residing in a concentrated area. Increased demands on the local economy, housing, public finances, and public services (schools, transportation, utilities, medical services, etc.) present potential difficulties. Moreover, social changes such as the breakdown of indigenous structures of authority, increased crime, and conflicts arising from juxtaposing formerly separate cultural systems can also accompany urbanization (as found elsewhere in Micronesia—see Alexander, 1978).

Despite the possible consequences of population growth, the major recipients of migrants in the FSM have remained remarkably resilient, managing to retain key components of their sociocultural composition. Places such as the Yap Islands are best known among the high islands of Micronesia for stubbornly preserving many of their ancient traditions in the face of considerable opportunities for acculturation, including the opportunity that accompanies immigration. But even Pohnpei Island, long the recipient of immigrants from elsewhere in Micronesia, has retained much of its cultural foundation (see Petersen, 1979, 1990). Research on this island indicates that this cultural persistence has resulted from a deliberate attempt to preserve traditions. As the societal relations of production have persisted on Pohnpei Island, so too has the customary interdependency between political economy and culture (Petersen, 1990, pp. 187–189). Although the specifics of the impacts of immigrants on Pohnpei have not been fully explored (e.g., Lieber, 1968; Poyer, 1990), the persistence of cultural patterns in the face of such a population influx testifies to the strength of Pohnpei tradition.

One component of the migration equation that many do not consider when evaluating the impacts of long-term mobility are the origins of migrants. As with migrant destinations, it is possible to identify positive and negative effects of migration on the origins of emigrants. The decrease in the total number of inhabitants reduces the demand on local resources (which can often be desirable on the small coral islands and atolls that compose much of the FSM) and also reduces the strain on rural island economies to provide sufficient employment (Hezel & Levin, 1990, pp. 42–43, 54–60; Hezel & McGrath, 1989, pp. 52–55; see also Fawcett & Carino, 1987, p. 12). Moreover, many emigrants who gain employment in a cash economy provide remittances to relatives who remain on their home islands, thereby increasing the cash available at the emigrant source (see Ahlburg, 1991). On the other hand, the migration from outlying islands in the FSM tends to involve disproportionate numbers of working-age residents, particularly males between the ages 15 and 34 years (see OPS, 1985, p. 110). In general, no community can continually serve as an incubator for male workers (Yusef & Peters, 1985, p. 22). Removing a particular portion of a population can have several effects on the local sociocultural system, the most notable of which is that an excessive burden is placed on the economy and social structure to provide adequately for those who remain (Carroll, 1975, pp. 374–375; Marshall, 1979, p. 10). Examples of outlying islands in the FSM that have experienced such impacts include Eauripik Atoll in Yap State (Levin, 1976; Levin & Gorenflo, 1994) and Ettal (Nason, 1975) and Namoluk Atolls in Chuuk State (Marshall, 1975)—the last of which was seen in the 1970s as having become a combination day-care center and old folks home (Marshall, 1979, p. 3). Similarly, main islands can suffer negative impacts from emigration, such as when the loss of skilled labor and tax revenues becomes exacerbated as emigration becomes increasingly permanent. Moreover, although remittances in the FSM have not received careful study, preliminary indications are that they are becoming smaller as more and more emigrants acquire low-paying jobs and must retain most of their earnings to survive (OPS, 1992b, p. 43). Much of the money that is sent to the home island fuels consumption rather than investment—as elsewhere in Oceania—which limits the economic effect of remittances and *possibly* (though not necessarily) increases the inequality between households (see Ahlburg & Levin, 1990; Carino, 1987; Lipton, 1980; Reichert & Massey, 1982; Shankman, 1976) while undermining patterns of traditional obligation and authority (Connell, 1983, p. 43).

One important consideration when examining the impacts on outlying islands is another form of cultural maintenance—despite, and perhaps even in specific response to, seeming geographic disruption of their populations through emigration. This is obvious in the organization of the migrants who relocate to population centers. Although in some cases the FSM outlying Islander migrants disperse when they relocate (e.g., people from Sapwuahfik Atoll who move to Pohnpei Island; see Poyer, 1990, p. 141), in other cases they establish a well-defined community. Examples of the latter pattern include the Kapingamarangi community of Porakiet on Pohnpei Island (Lieber, 1968), the Pollap village of Iras on Weno Island (Flinn, 1990, 1992), and the Outer Islander village of Madrich on the Yap Islands (Alkire, 1993). Such circumscribed communities usually preserve much of the culture of their inhabitants' origins. In the case of Iras, the village serves as a conscious extension of Pollap Atoll, enabling individuals to leave the atoll without cutting ties and thereby minimizing impacts on both the migrants *and* the home community (Flinn, 1990, p. 122; Flinn, 1992, pp. 73–96). In the case of Madrich, the presence of Outer Island customs extends to immigrant Islanders both in the preservation of relationships established on each island *and* in the preservation of the *sawei* relationships between places. (Sawei describes traditional patterns of interaction and responsibility among members of the Yap Empire.) The spatial arrangement of migrants within Madrich maintains home island distinctions (Alkire, 1993, pp. 40–52, 55–57), as does the structure of leadership within the multi-island community, with individuals from different places being accorded status consistent with that of their Outer Island home (Alkire, 1993, pp. 52–55). Given the importance of adapting to changing opportunities and constraints, such adaptive measures seem to enable the expansion of an outlying island economic *catchment* while helping to minimize much of the disruption of outlying island culture from these places.

Potential impacts on the three main migrant destinations beyond the FSM (Guam, the CNMI, and the United States) are the same potentially *negative* effects as for main destinations within the FSM (increased demands on the economy, housing, public services, etc.); these are countered by potentially *positive* effects, such as an increased labor pool and growing tax revenues. As noted above, the effects on these places are not well understood primarily because of data inadequacies and a lack of systematic study. We can say with some certainty that the degree of impact will correspond generally with the relative numerical magnitude of migrants in the total population. Thus, the effects of these immigrants on the United States would

be inconsequential in almost any geographic area, for their numbers are minuscule compared with the US population. In contrast, the relative increases in the population of portions of Guam and the CNMI are much greater, and their impacts thus much more noteworthy. The precise nature of the effects of FSM emigrants on other countries, particularly Guam and the CNMI, and the nature of the communities of FSM residents in these two places have not yet been studied.

As a final thought on the causes and consequences of mobility and migration in the FSM, it is appropriate to consider recent insights on these processes in other parts of the Pacific. One study of migration in Polynesia casts doubt on several prevailing explanations for the reasons and ramifications of such movement and on the ability of census data to provide any more than minimal insight on the situation (Hayes, 1991). Another study of Pacific Islander migration indicated that migration can often be understood only in the context of the complex kinship connectivities that have evolved over several generations, the role that migration plays as a conscious adaptive strategy of modern families (exercised with varying degrees of success), and the persisting influence of tradition in molding mobility behavior (Chapman, 1991). Similar considerations probably hold for the FSM, a part of the Pacific where the challenges of understanding the causes and consequences of mobility are twofold. First, researchers are faced with particularly complex mobility patterns that in many cases are rooted in centuries-old traditions, and in all cases the patterns demonstrate adjustment to the challenges of survival and adaptation in a rapidly changing world. But researchers have too little data on the dynamics of mobility in the FSM to understand the reasons and repercussions of movement in this complex island nation. This article has attempted to describe empirical patterns of movement throughout the FSM and beyond, based on available data for the nation; a more thorough understanding awaits studies that focus on the specific causes and consequences of movement as it has evolved over time.

CONCLUSION

We have explored migration as a mechanism of demographic change in the FSM, a small island nation in the west central Pacific that has experienced rapid population growth since World War II. Using available data, we have drawn two main conclusions. The first is that *in general* migration has played an important role in the geographic distribution of the FSM's population

during the twentieth century. The second is that despite its general importance, the impact of migration has changed over time, both in the type and the amount of demographic change it has generated.

To explore the changing role of migration in the FSM over time, we examined data on migration from censuses done in 1930, 1973, and 1980, considering supplemental information for other times in the twentieth century when available. Although the census data did not record equivalent information across time, the data do enable rough comparisons. In Pohnpei State, migration was important in state demography in both 1930 and 1973 and focused primarily on movement to Pohnpei Island, thus contributing substantially to the populations of some of the high island's municipalities. By 1980 the impacts of relocation within Pohnpei State had diminished markedly, although relocation still exceeded that documented for the other three states in the FSM. Ironically, these mobility patterns are largely a product of the twentieth century, for relatively little interaction occurred between the separate components of what is now Pohnpei State during premodern times. For Kosrae State, census data on migration are available only for 1930 and 1980. Indications are that mobility contributed a relatively large number of state residents in 1930 but played a much smaller role in 1980. In the states of Chuuk and Yap, migration was relatively unimportant in both 1930 and 1980, but it did increase during the 1960s and early 1970s. In both of the latter two states, migration primarily took the form of people moving between locations within each respective state, particularly from outlying islands to main islands. This type of behavior is consistent with earlier patterns of cultural activity, which featured substantial interaction between places and the general dominance of high islands. Data for all three multi-island states in the FSM support the notion that the rural–urban migration currently occurring in these jurisdictions has a history that stretches back at least into the early part of the twentieth century.

It has been argued that migration is "the major regulator of demographic change in many of the small Pacific nations" (Connell, 1984b, p. 175). Our findings partially support this general thought although, at least where the FSM is concerned, considerable variability in human movement characterizes these particular island groups. In the midst of substantial overall demographic change in the FSM over the past 90 years, migration has fluctuated both in importance and in the types of movement involved. The relatively rapid turnover of three colonial powers, each with a different agenda where the resident Micronesians were concerned, had much to do with this variation. The observation that probably comes closest to explaining

mobility in the FSM in general terms is that the migration of Micronesians in modern times represents not so much a fundamental change in indigenous culture as a modification of behavior in response to new constraints and opportunities (Flinn, 1992, p. 12). But as additional employment and educational opportunities become available or disappear, as legal constraints on relocation increase for one potential destination and decrease for another, as kinship networks become established in different places, and as citizens of the FSM develop different visions of their own futures, the underlying decisions concerning if, when, where, and how long to migrate become increasingly complex. In the past, migration served as an important potential means of adaptation, a function that appears essentially in place today. Ultimately, given the considerable changes in mobility documented over the past 90 years, little can be said that is definite about future mobility in the FSM—apart from the almost certain continuation of its *potential* to modify the demography of this emerging island nation.

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Notes

1. The assertion that mobility is the dominant cause underlying the distribution of population in the Pacific is widely accepted. Unfortunately, data that would rule out the key roles of fertility and mortality, thereby leaving mobility as the main mechanism of geographic change, are often not particularly reliable for much of the region, making support for this assertion elusive. For the island groups considered here, detailed examinations of demographic change reveal some geographic variability in fertility, but the small populations on many outlying islands and rural parts of high islands, coupled with other potential sources of confusion (e.g., whether to name birthplace as one's home island or the location of a hospital where birth took

place) limit the insights to be gained from these data (see Gorenflo, 1993a; in press; Gorenflo & Levin, 1991, 1992). It is also unfortunate that reliable mortality data, which are habitually underreported, are unavailable for geographical components of the FSM states.

2. To avoid geographic confusion, regardless of the time frame we refer to each FSM state by the current name of that state. Thus, we discuss *Chuuk State* prior to World War II although, strictly speaking, the *state* did not exist officially until May 1979. We use current (1993) names and spellings of state, island, and municipality names throughout, even when referring to an earlier period when the name or spelling of a particular place may have been different.

3. For the period of the Japanese administration, we focus primarily on Pacific Islanders, both in discussions of overall demographic characteristics of the FSM and in examining mobility patterns. Tens of thousands of people immigrated from outside Micronesia to the FSM, particularly during the last half of this period, and we do not wish to imply that these movements were unimportant. However, because our primary interest is the mobility of Pacific Islander residents of the FSM, we exclude non-Islanders during this period of FSM history when the influx of Japanese nationals (especially to Chuuk Lagoon and Pohnpei Island) dwarfed other migration figures.

4. A complete presentation of pertinent data on FSM-related mobility from the 1930, 1973, 1980, and 1990 censuses would require more tables than are generally practical to include in a journal article. For the sake of brevity, we discuss noteworthy characteristics of those data, citing specific numbers or calculations when appropriate, instead of presenting the tabular descriptions in full. Interested readers can find much of the appropriate data in selected publications (Gorenflo, 1993; in press; Gorenflo & Levin, 1991, 1992) and in the census publications themselves (which we cite, as appropriate).

5. Beginning in the 1950s, most Yap State Outer Islanders visiting the Yap Islands have resided in Madrich, a small area reserved for them in the Rull portion of Colonia (Alkire, 1993). They include both long-term (e.g., persons employed on the Yap Islands) and short-term residents (e.g., persons visiting the hospital in Colonia), the total usually ranging between 150 and 275 people (Alkire, 1993, p. 42).

6. In general we have avoided examining mobility defined by place of birth because of the potential confusion this definition introduces. Increasingly during the past several decades, women from rural places in the FSM have come to the few hospitals in the country to give birth. Then mother and child have returned to the rural home of the mother. Thus, an individual born in a population center but claiming as usual residence an outlying island often does *not* indicate migration. We use place of birth to examine emigration in 1973 only because we have no other data available and wished to consider this half of the migration equation.

7. The US Department of the Interior funded two special censuses of Micronesians on Guam and in the CNMI in 1992 and 1993, respectively, but the results of these censuses have not yet been published. Preliminary indications are that migration from the FSM to Guam continued into the early 1990s, with the total number approaching 5,000 and the majority coming from Chuuk State. Migration from the FSM to the CNMI during the early 1990s was less pronounced: roughly 2,000 individuals, with about half coming from Chuuk State.

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Possession and Trance in Chuuk

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This article describes and analyzes some 40 case reports of contemporary spirit possession in Chuuk. The possession-trance complex of today shows continuity with distinct features of the now defunct status of the medium *(wáánaanú)*: trance, calling the spirits of deceased kin, and spirits descending and addressing the assembled kinfolk through the changed voice of the host. But recent spirit possession is not possession-trance on demand; it is spontaneous and sudden, arising from the felt stress of the individual. Family problems are the focus of today's cases. We view the possession-trance complex as culturally sanctioned communication of prohibited expression about family and kinship problems. As a response to stress, cases of female possession appear positively functional when compared with male drinking. Contemporary Chuuk possession-trance is, therefore, a remarkable adaptation of former ways applied to new situations, functioning as a kind of family therapy.

One cannot live for any time in Chuuk (formerly Truk), the most populous state of the Federated States of Micronesia, without hearing tales of spirit possession. These possession stories, in turn, often include descriptions of trancelike states. This article examines contemporary possession-trance as behavior that is rooted in a traditional institution of Chuuk society, but it is behavior that has been modified over time to serve new purposes. If the spirit world of Chuuk has changed over the past century,

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so too has the way in which the people of Chuuk interact with it. Against this background, we describe how the experience of possession-trance itself has been transformed into a mechanism that serves essential functions in Chuuk society today.

Most of the data for this analysis come from a 1989 collection of case reports made by Cathy Hung, then a Peace Corps Volunteer in Chuuk. Within 2 months she collected through interviews with Chuuk women accounts of 57 spirit encounters, more than 40 of which could be called spirit possession. Had it not been for limitations of time and access to informants, she could easily have collected twice this number of reports; we have collected over a dozen more since her work. It is apparent to us that, despite Cathy Hung's dedicated efforts, we have done no more than skim the surface of a deep pool of such cases in Chuuk. All but two or three of the possession case reports involved females. An undeniable bias toward women characterized the collection techniques because the investigator was herself a woman and so had greater access to female informants. On the other hand, the choice of a woman to do the interviewing was prompted by the strong association the people of Chuuk make between spirit possession and women. A deliberate effort on our part to elicit case reports of male possession may have yielded a few more instances of episodes among men, but the strong gender imbalance almost certainly would have remained.

The compiled case reports on possession-trance are admittedly shallow. Usually there was only one informant for each incident and he or she was asked to provide information on an event that in some instances occurred years earlier. Our own interviews confirmed that contemporary Chuuk inhabitants who are not close kin of the trancer tend to recite a skimpy pattern of detail. Consequently the description is often sparse and lacks the rich detail that would be more desirable. Where we have later built up enough interviews to generate a detailed case study, we are wary about the possibility of revealing the identity of the family. Nonetheless, what the case files lack in texture they compensate for in quantity. And it is precisely the quantity of cases that reveals the highly patterned behavior and local interpretations of possession-trance. These patterns in turn describe important functions in contemporary Chuuk society.

The additional reports we collected demonstrate the same patterns found in Cathy Hung's reports. Sometimes we interviewed the same trancers or onlookers in cases described by Cathy Hung. Unfortunately, we had the serendipitous opportunity to witness only one possession-trance episode. Basque anthropologist Beatriz Moral, however, who saw multiple episodes,

confirmed the authenticity of the reports we received (personal communication, January 5, 1994, and July 20, 1994). We base our work, however, mostly on reports, not observations.

Chuuk, one of four states in the Federated States of Micronesia, is situated in the geographic center of Micronesia and includes a large lagoon containing a dozen inhabited high islands, with outlying atolls to the east and west. Contemporary Chuuk offers an interesting amalgam of traditional island folkways and foreign influences. It is populated by approximately 50,000 people and, to judge by the stories these people tell today, at least as many spirits. In 1992, 97 percent of the 47,871 people were Christian; at least half of the work force in any region were in the cash-wage economy; and most of the eligible youth were enrolled in school (OPS, 1992, pp. 70, 80–90). Most of the individuals described here are from the area of the main lagoon, although several families came originally from outlying groups, such as the Mortlocks.

The spirit beliefs that early writers recorded over a century ago have proved remarkably resistant to change, despite the conversion to Christianity, formal Western-style education, and a monetized economy (see Kubary, 1878–1879, p. 23). These spirits resist easy classification, as anthropologists have frequently noted (Alkire, 1989; Lessa, 1987, p. 498), but they are part of a cosmos that Chuuk inhabitants, like most other Micronesians, still see as populated by gods, spirits, and living humans (Bollig, 1927/1967, p. 39). The gods and the spirits (whether human or nonhuman) are known by the single term *énú* (Mahony, 1969, p. 133).

A word is in order on the quality of the older ethnographic sources, especially those of Jan Kubary (1878–1879), Max Girschner (1912–1913), Laurentius Bollig (1927/1967), and later, Frank Mahony (1969). Kubary, a Polish-born naturalist and longtime resident of Micronesia, had a keen eye for ethnographic detail and apparently a talent for learning languages. His descriptions of Chuuk possession-trance episodes come mostly from a 3-month stay in the Mortlocks in 1877. Max Girschner was a colonial government physician during the German period before World War I. Like Kubary, he was headquartered in Pohnpei and conducted interviews with Chuuk inhabitants from the Mortlocks. His detailed ethnography, published in 1912–1913, describes possession-trance behavior that he apparently observed. Laurentius Bollig, on the other hand, was a German Capuchin missionary assigned first to Pohnpei in 1912, then reassigned to Chuuk from 1913 to 1919 (Hezel, 1991, pp. 115, 185). His ethnography, published in 1927, reveals the same linguistic interest and detail as found in Kubary and

Girschner and demonstrates the lexical continuity between the possession-trance complex before World War I and the contemporary reports. The 1969 date for Frank J. Mahony's doctoral dissertation belies his long and deep involvement with Chuuk culture. Having worked as a Trust Territory official in the period just after World War II, he was able to draw on this background to write one of the few monographs (alas, an unpublished PhD dissertation) on Micronesian medical anthropology. His work bridges the testimonies of Kubary, Girschner, and Bollig and the contemporary reports, and it places the possession-trance complex within the Chuuk categories of spirits and medicine. We should add parenthetically the 1915 handwritten German manuscript "Some Remarks About the Religious Views of Our Islanders," by an anonymous Liebenzeller (?) missionary. This work corroborates the possession-trance description given by writers from the same period. It is difficult to assess the reliability of these sources. All that can be said is that their ethnographic detail is considerable and they do not contradict one another. Only Mahony was a trained ethnographer.

THE CHUUK SPIRIT WORLD

Certain spirits were believed to inhabit the sky and they have long been cult figures. The trinity of spirits regarded as the oldest and most powerful were Anulap (Great Spirit), the uncreated spirit who lived remote from mortals and their affairs; Lukeilang (Middle of Heaven), son of Anulap and lord of all in the realm of spirits and mortals; and Olofat, the eldest son of Lukeilang, a trickster god and the subject of a cycle of popular tales. But these gods were the stuff of myth and had little to do with human affairs; only Inemes, goddess of love (Bollig, 1927/1967, pp. 39–40), still regularly intervenes in human affairs. Spirits of old and today, on the other hand, fall into the two broad categories of nature spirits and spirits of the dead. The nature spirits are those identified with places or events: mountain-dwelling spirits, woodland sprites, and ghosts of the sea. The origin of this group of spirits is lost in the mists of the past, although some Chuuk people knowledgeable in traditional lore maintain that these spirits were once human spirits. Some are still believed to inhabit a particular place, a mountaintop, a spring, or the sea—like the sea spirits (*oos*) that come to shore to sleep and attack unwary humans, or the lagoon spirits (*chénúkken*). Other spirits seem to wander freely. Some were associated with life crises: For example Bollig (p. 12), writing about experiences from 1913, described *kir*, a nasty spirit

that is still believed to dry up the breasts of nursing mothers. One of the best known and most feared of these spirits was Anumwaresi, the spirit of the rainbow, which is still thought to afflict pregnant women (Anonymous, 1915, p. 4). The innumerable nature spirits, wrote Bollig (p. 12), could be classified only in the most generàl way, but they share as a common trait their potential danger to people.

The focus of this study is on spirits of the dead (*énú,* or *énú aramás;* sometimes *soope;* Bollig, 1927/1967, pp. 21–22), particularly of ancestors, which intervene more directly through the communication of possession-trance. Formerly, inhabitants believed there were two spirits in each individual: the good spirit and the bad spirit. At death the bad spirit hovered around the grave of the deceased, sometimes taking the form of a fruit bat or another animal and terrorizing those who lived nearby. The bad spirit attacked people and bit them, the effect of which was to darken the victim's mind or cause temporary insanity (Mahony, 1969, pp. 134–135). But any harm the bad spirit could do was limited because the bad spirit remained in the immediate vicinity of the grave, stalked only at night, and could be frightened off by light. If the spirit became too annoying, a sorcerer was called to drive it into the earth to rejoin the body of the deceased (Bollig, pp. 20–22). The good spirit, which had the power to roam more freely than the bad spirit before it eventually drifted up to its abode in the sky, could be a source of blessings for its former family. This spirit, if well disposed toward the family, revealed to its kinfolk a wealth of valuable information on such things as new kinds of medicine, ideas for dances, and the location of good fishing grounds. On the other hand, the good spirit became a scourge for the family unless it was treated with proper respect and placated with gift offerings (Mahony, p. 137). When angry with the family, the good spirit caused serious illness and, oddly enough, was more of a threat than the bad spirit. We will later elaborate on the ambivalent nature of good spirits, because it was with the good spirit that Chuuk families attempted, in years past, to establish communication after the death of one of their members.

Thus, Chuuk Islanders today assume the existence of nature and ancestor spirits and their intervention in human events. Although many people might disavow a belief in spirits when asked directly, especially by a church minister, their behavior indicates otherwise. They are uncomfortable walking alone in the woods in the evening and avoid places associated with the more notorious nature spirits. People continue to use traditional medicine *(safei)* to ward off malevolent spirits even as they still believe in the efficacy of love

potions *(omwmwung)* to win the affections of those whom they find sexually attractive.

Although belief in spirits exists in Chuuk today, it is limited compared with the past. Islanders no longer make offerings or prayers of propitiation to the spirits, neither to natûre spirits nor to the spirits of the dead. In this way, most have satisfactorily integrated their belief in the spirit world with their Christian faith. Christian teaching, after all, recognizes the reality of a spirit world of its own populated by demons and angels. The panoply of spirits that shares the universe with Chuuk Islanders is regarded as a potent but lower order of beings subordinate to the Christian god. Hence, the spirit world of Chuuk might be seen not as a rival of Chuuk Christian beliefs, but as a substratum of this professed Christianity, even when it is devoutly embraced. Indeed, the Christian god is often called upon to counter the destructive influence of these spirits.

SPIRIT ENCOUNTERS AND CONTEMPORARY POSSESSION–TRANCE

There is no doubt, then, that Chuuk Islanders today see the influence of the spirits in their lives—in misfortune, in accidents, and even in the suicides of kin. People continue to report direct encounters with the spirits, that is, seeing ghosts, or being bitten by ghosts, or experiencing possession events through the spirits of deceased kin. But people do not trouble themselves with fine distinctions in their typology of spirit encounters. It is often difficult to know whether they considered the individual "possessed"—that is, whether the spirit in question has actually occupied the body of the victim—or whether the spirit acted as an external force on the person. The Chuuk term *awarawar énú,* "the coming of the spirit," suggests simply an encounter with a spirit, while the word *wáánaanú,* "the vehicle of the spirit," implies actual possession. The people of Chuuk often use the terms interchangeably and few attempt to distinguish them.

The following four case descriptions show the range of behavior and belief associated with spirit encounters. The first two illustrate spirit encounters; the second two describe cases of spirit possession.

Not many years ago a woman in her early 30s, with a group of other women from her village, was net fishing in the shallow water just offshore. As she was hauling in her section of the long fishing net, she became entangled in it. While struggling to free herself, she saw in the deep water a

big, naked black man advancing toward her. Upon freeing herself from the net, she ran toward the house screaming in panic. An adult male relative of the woman intercepted her on the way, but the woman threw him to the ground with apparent ease. While the woman cowered in the house over the next several days, an expert in medicine *(sousafei)* was summoned from another island to treat her. After applying his remedies and relieving the woman's distress, he explained that the woman had been afflicted by Soumwerikes, the ghost that troubles women who have recently given birth. The woman had just delivered her sixth child a few weeks before the incident.

Another story is told of a 16-year-old girl, from a different island in Chuuk, who was pregnant and soon due to deliver. One night as she was preparing to go to sleep, she saw a stout man, clad entirely in yellow, who lasciviously clutched at her dress. She fought off the man with remarkable strength while the household looked on in astonishment at her wild thrashing. Members of her family saw no assailant, but they noticed that the girl seemed to be pulled toward the door and resisted violently, screaming all the while. She calmed down later that evening, but more episodes occurred during the next few weeks. The family called the Catholic priest to assist them, and the incidents stopped when the girl delivered. This girl, like the woman in the previous case description, was unmarried when she became pregnant.

Both of these women were said to be agitated by an encounter with a spirit, and the Chuuk informants were quick to attribute their abnormal behavior to the work of the spirits. However, they could not say whether the spirit was actually "on" the individuals. The informant for the second case inclined to the view that the young girl did not experience true possession because there was no change in her voice.

Quite different are the next two case descriptions. In both of these the individuals were thought to have been possessed by the spirit of a relative.

Marie (pseudonym) was about 40 years old when the first incident happened. On this occasion Marie's brother was drunk in the house, so her husband and daughter asked him why he brought alcohol into the house. The brother answered that he would not talk to them but would talk only to Marie's daughter's husband, who was out at that time. The brother then stomped out of the house, and Marie started crying as she sat on the living room floor. During the night the ghost of Marie's mother came upon her and remained until morning. Marie's voice changed to that of her deceased mother and the mother's spirit told her son—the brother who had left the house—to hold her hand because it hurt (the mother had died of an illness that involved pain in her right arm). The ghost showed everyone that she

believed in her son and trusted him because she asked him alone to relieve the pain by holding her hand. The informant thought this meant that the ghost was slighting the daughter, Marie. The ghost said she loved and pitied her son. She said she was angry with Marie and scolded her for being selfish and without love for the brôther. The mother's ghost called in her sister (the aunt of Marie) and her brother.

Marie's family wanted to take her to the hospital, but she refused and went to another island. There she experienced a possession episode every night for a week, although during the daytime she was her normal self. At night she would awake shouting and crying, talking and acting like her mother. She once threatened to pick out and eat her son's eyeballs and even started to hurt the boy physically. The family had to pull her away from him. Sometimes she was unusually strong and wanted to run around outside. She would clutch her throat as though the ghost were choking her.

The family called in local people who knew Chuuk medicine. They told her to stay in one house and not move, but after she experienced possession in that house she wanted to move. The family used holy water and Lourdes water, but this calmed her down for only a short time. The Chuuk medicine experts then took her to a stream to bathe. Again she was temporarily better, but the family continued to think that she might die.

The informant also believed Marie would die, suffering a painful death. He believed the ghost was real and explained the situation in terms of family problems:

> Marie's husband is having a difficult time with all this and is trying to find the right medicine people for Marie. Maybe there is love in their marriage, but they don't talk to each other about their feelings. Also, Marie had a sexual relationship with a cousin. She liked him. That was when Marie's husband and brother started getting drunk and causing problems.

The next case description is the story of a woman we will call Anna. She was about 25 years old when she went to visit her adopted father, who was seriously ill. When she lay down by her ailing father, she began to moan and cry. Then her voice changed to that of her father-in-law, who was still alive. When her husband started to ask her questions, she used bad language. The voice from Anna told everyone to leave the sick man because he hated them. Observers said she shouted loudly and was so strong that it was difficult to restrain her. Neighbors brought Chuuk medicine that they rubbed on her arms; the family sprinkled holy water on her face and body. The informant, however, thought that Anna was "lying."

These four case descriptions indicate the range of detail in the accounts and the difficulty in distinguishing what are only spirit encounters from spirit possession. Accounts are often too vague or incomplete to permit assigning them to one or another category with confidence, but accounts do reveal recurrent behavior indicative of spirit possession: changes in voice, unusual displays of strength, and the use of language prohibited between kin. Both Chuuk medicine and Catholic holy water were used to calm the person, implying that the onlookers saw the incident as an illness episode or at least as behavior that is potentially dangerous. The last case (Anna) is an anomaly because it is the only one we know of in which the possessing spirit was that of a living person. Both of the possession cases described here evidence another important feature: that is, the family as the focus of the episode, as the intended audience of the spirit's talk, and as the party intervening to resolve the situation. Finally, the reports about Marie and Anna, like so many others, indicate that what the people of Chuuk find significant is that the spirits speak about problematic family relationships.

The case descriptions of Marie and Anna reveal the patterns characteristic of most other possession descriptions. Most of those who experience possession are female; two of our informants thought male possession to be highly exceptional. A possession episode frequently begins with a severe pain, often a persistent headache or abdominal pain, or with a bout of illness. One woman's episode was preceded by a sore throat and laryngitis; another started with a pain in the chest that continued despite all the remedies she tried. The individual regularly then takes to a sleeping mat as the rest of the family gathers around her to look after her in her illness.

Next, the person typically experiences a violent bodily upheaval, perhaps yelling and screaming, sobbing hysterically, flailing her arms at those around her, or convulsing and shaking in what resembles a seizure. This often takes the form of an assault on those who are in the household—one girl suddenly grabbed her grandmother and began to throttle her; another picked up a broom and struck an older relative standing nearby. One woman (Marie) suddenly began beating her young son, all the while threatening to pluck out his eyeballs and eat them. Sometimes the individuals experiencing possession chased people around the house, throwing things at them and grappling with them, occasionally even wrestling them to the ground. Repeatedly informants commented on the remarkable strength of the afflicted woman, who was often capable of besting a much heavier grown man. But it is also noteworthy that the violence exhibited by those experiencing possession was controlled violence, much as a young man on a drunken rampage

in Chuuk will carefully moderate his violence, despite appearances to the contrary. The relatives of an afflicted woman may be scratched and sore from restraining her, but there is no instance to our knowledge of anyone having received a serious injury from someone who was experiencing a possession episode.

Individuals experiencing possession demonstrated other sorts of unusual behavior, some of it flagrantly transgressing the code of propriety in Chuuk society. Much of the time the afflicted persons simply moaned unintelligibly or babbled nonsense, but at times there was a sharp edge to their speech. Some wantonly insulted those around them and even used vulgarity that women of Chuuk under ordinary circumstances would never dream of speaking in the presence of their brothers and other male relatives. At times there was a sexual tenor to their remarks, as when they described to the full circle of relatives the sexual fantasies they experienced. One woman hitched up her skirt and scratched her pubic area while her family tried to cover her and pull away her hand. Another young woman, after telling some older relatives how ugly they were, made sexual overtures to preteenaged boys standing nearby.

In roughly one third of the case reports we have collected, informants recalled that persons experiencing possession demonstrated a strange prescience. One woman, for example, seemed to know who was about to come into the room and often announced the person's arrival before the person appeared. Others were sometimes able to point out exactly where lost or hidden objects were to be found. One young girl gave detailed instructions on where a pistol belonging to a recently deceased relative might be found. Before his death the man had concealed the pistol in a house in a distant village; it was found in the exact spot the girl indicated. Many years ago another woman in a possessed state predicted that a group of men who had gone to a distant island to work on a plantation would be back very soon. They did return a week later. The same evening that the woman had made her prediction, as her kinfolk later learned, the men were boarding the ship that would bring them back to Chuuk. One woman allegedly told her family that a boy who had been missing for a few days had hanged himself in the bush, and she told her family where they might find his body. At times the clairvoyance takes threatening forms. Women experiencing a possession episode have been known to predict deaths of relatives and to announce publicly the intimate details of the personal life of family members, including clandestine sexual relationships. For this reason the family members of someone who is experiencing possession are usually guarded in their dealings with

her and do everything possible to avoid provoking an angry outburst, another indication of the ambivalent nature of even the good spirits.

Although one of the most dramatic and telling signs of possession is the change in voice that occurs when the "spirit" begins speaking, the transformation involves more than this. A woman in a possessed state usually takes on the very persona of the spirit that is upon her, and the timbre and tone of her voice and her speech patterns become that of the dead person. A corresponding change in gestures, facial expressions, and other mannerisms also occurs. When one stooped, elderly woman began speaking in the voice of her brother, she walked around the house ramrod straight—the first time anyone could remember her doing so—and began smoking, just as her brother had done during his lifetime. In the instance of Marie, described above, in imitation of her deceased mother's painful hand, Marie held her own hand as if to favor it and asked her "son" to massage it to relieve the "pain." Another woman stroked her throat while speaking, just as her mother had done during her lifetime, and conversed in the same soft, strained voice her mother had used.

At times persons in a possessed state may speak as more than one spirit during an episode. Recently a young girl, in a virtuoso performance of characterization, took on the speech and mannerisms of four different spirits during a single episode. There are other instances in which the afflicted person adopted the personae of two or three spirits in an evening.

Although the change in persona is usually brief, lasting only a few minutes at a time, the entire episode has a much longer duration. Individual episodes may range from a day or two to 2 weeks, with a few continuing sporadically for 2 or 3 months. One elderly woman was said to have experienced possession from the time of her paralysis through the last year of her life. Sometimes it is difficult to tell precisely when one episode ends and another begins, for some of the afflicted individuals have such a long and continuous history of possession experiences that they can be considered to be in a chronically possessed state. Two younger women have had a series of incidents that began in the early 1980s and continued intermittently until 1990. One informant, whose sister-in-law first experienced possession in 1980 at the age of 15, said that in recent years the afflicted woman has been exhibiting the symptoms of possession every 3 months.

Although we found definite patterns in the behavior of individuals who experienced possession, we were unable to discover similarly clear, distinct patterns in their backgrounds—except that they were almost exclusively women. The ages of the women appear to cluster; at least 20 were in their

teens or twenties at the time of their first episode, but most information on ages is only an approximation. The ages range from one instance of a 7-year-old to an elderly woman whose first possession episode occurred when she was already 71. Chuuk spirit possession today occurs overwhelmingly among females, mostly young females.

The socioeconomic status of individuals experiencing spirit possession ranges from low to high. The profile includes persons with little or no formal education, university students, those with no experience away from Chuuk, and those who have spent time working or studying in Hawai'i or Guam. No correlation appeared between the strength of Christian beliefs and the incidence of possession; episodes occurred in the households of Protestant ministers and Roman Catholic catechists. Nor did any clear pattern emerge regarding marriage—about half were single and half married, and several were divorced persons. Although biographical data are far too incomplete to demonstrate significant statistical associations, when these limited data are viewed alongside information about kinship relations, a clearer association appears that links possession cases to some sort of family problem.

At least eight of the possession experiences were occasioned by a death in the family—for example, the suicide of a relative (4 cases), the recent death of a cousin, a father's death, the funeral of a sister, and the drowning of an uncle. Deaths and funerals were associated in former times with possession by relatives. Bollig (1927/1967, p. 16) encountered this cultural pattern around 1912; Goodenough (1963, pp. 132–133) recorded the link during his fieldwork after World War II:

> The deceased's family and near kin watch the grave for four successive nights in order to give his good soul an opportunity to possess one of them. . . . If the good soul has not possessed a kinsman in the four days preceding its ascent, then no more will be heard from it. By possessing a kinsman, however, it serves notice of intention to maintain contact with its surviving relatives. The person possessed becomes a medium for the good soul, which in turn now belongs to a special category of beneficent spirit. Symptoms of possession are moaning, violent shaking, and speaking in a special tone of voice, which signifies that a spirit rather than the medium is really doing the talking.

Other occasions noted in the case histories centered around life crises such as pregnancy, recent or illegitimate childbirth, parents' disapproval of a boyfriend, or a recent marriage. Other occasioning events were as vague as "bad family feelings" or as specific as a family feud over landholdings.

The link between contemporary Chuuk possession-trance episodes and kinship is unmistakable. Most often the possessing spirit, the person experiencing spirit possession, and the audience addressed by the spirit were all close kin. The most common outcome of the episode was family reconciliation or at least a family meeting. A reminder here is that most of the reports we received were already culturally processed, and remembered details were probably selected to match the cultural expectations. If the Islanders thought of possession-trance episodes as family affairs, chances are that strangers coming and going and other culturally extraneous detail would not be remembered and reported.

Even the casual observer of Chuuk society would not be surprised at the close connection between spirit possession and kinship concerns. Kinship still plays an important role in Chuuk society, as Hezel (1985, 1987, 1989) has maintained in his study of social problems in Chuuk and elsewhere in Micronesia. Goodenough (1963, p. 138) saw this a generation ago: "It is impossible to live independent of one's kinsman without loss of almost all of one's rights, privileges, and immunities within the social order." Earlier, Gladwin and Sarason (1953, p. 145) had noted that the security of close kin relations is a double-edged sword for the Chuuk inhabitants, that is, close kin relations can also be a source of anxiety: "While the lineage or other kin group provides a large degree of economic and undoubtedly psychological security for the individual, the possibility of rejection by the members of such groups must be a source of serious anxiety."

During the period between Goodenough's (1963) and Gladwin and Sarason's (1953) writings and those of Hezel (1985, 1987, 1989), the shift from a subsistence to a cash economy has altered kinship relations, attenuating those of lineages and placing different burdens on parents. Although the economically independent nuclear family of postindustrial societies is not characteristic of Chuuk today, the movement to a cash-based economy has placed new strains and demands on the roles of mother and father (see Hezel, 1989).

Despite the deep historical roots for the association between kinship and possession as a culturally valued event, spirit possession is still perceived by Chuuk Islanders as dangerous or at least potentially so, and they lose no time in seeking treatment for an afflicted person. Spirit possession is considered dangerous for several reasons. First, it moves both the entranced person and the onlookers into the spirit world. True, there are good spirits, but Bollig (1927/1967) noted long ago, and Gladwin and Sarason (1953) more recently, that people are just plain afraid of ghosts or spirits. Moreover,

the nature and identity of the spirit may not be known. Is this a bad or helpful spirit? Is this merely an encounter where the spirit bites and causes injury, or is it one that will result in illness or even death? Chuuk Islanders attribute all sorts of misfortune to spirit intervention and see any encounter with the spirit world, even with good spirits, as ambiguous at the least and therefore potentially dangerous. Second, the wild actions and words of the afflicted person threaten injury to the one exhibiting the symptoms and to those around her. Recall the case where the mother threatened to gouge out the eyeballs of her son. Third, women experiencing possession often defy the cultural canons that govern social conduct in Chuuk. Women flaunt their sexuality in the presence of male relatives, they voice publicly what ought to go unspoken, and they flail verbally and often physically at those to whom they are expected to show respectful restraint. In short, possession episodes are potentially dangerous because they unleash the spirit world and threaten violence to physical well-being and social equilibrium.

It is not surprising then that Chuuk Islanders continue to view possession-trance as within the realm of illness and medicine. In earlier times the Chuuk concept of illness was broad and embraced what we might call the physical, psychological, and social dimensions of life. The people of Chuuk looked to the spirit world as both cause and cure for disturbances to physical well-being, healthy psychological functioning, and good social relations. Today they still use local medicine to find out which spirit is afflicting the person, why the person is so afflicted, and what treatment will cure the problem. We know that the spirits, communicating through possession, were once a source of new medicines (Bollig, 1927/1967; Mahony, 1969), and we have interviewed one medicine expert who claimed that she received new medicine through spirits in a dream. And just as the Islanders have managed to integrate Christianity and spirit beliefs, so too have they integrated Chuuk medicine and hospital medicine (Mahony, pp. 34–35). Each type of medicine has its place.

Because possession continues to be seen as illness, the afflicted individuals usually return to their sleeping mats in a weakened condition and are treated by the family as ill. They typically then turn to healers for medicine that combines local plants, roots, and leaves, accompanied by chants. Although the practice of chanting has declined (we could elicit very few examples, perhaps because the chants are treasured family secrets), villagers still recognize local specialists or experts (sousafei) in medicine for specific problems. According to our reports and interviews, however, the family and onlookers more commonly seek treatment by turning to Chris-

tianity, praying over the afflicted family member or sprinkling holy water on her. If the episode continues for more than a day or two, someone usually summons a Catholic priest to assist the afflicted person, even if the family is Protestant. Part of the attraction of Catholic services no doubt lies in the ritual, often conducted with litanies, candles, religious medals or relics, and abundant ablutions with holy water. There are instances, though, when Catholic families have turned to Protestant faith healers for treatment, especially when the healers are known to use chants and more theatrical techniques. The Christian ritual, which is often a combination of a natural ingredient like water and chanting or prayers, is similar to the treatment provided by the sousafei. Inhabitants may even think of the ritual as within their own category of medicine; certainly, as Mahony commented (1969, pp. 137, 143–144), illness, spirits, and possession are intimately related.

The early reports of Kubary (1878–1879), Bollig (1927/1967), and Girschner (1912–1913) agree on the essentials of spirit possession, which normally occurred in the lineage meeting house in which was hung a model double-hulled canoe *(nään)* that served as a vehicle for the descent of the spirit. Smeared with fragrant perfume, a spirit medium, known as a *sou awarawar* or *wäätawa,* was seated in the midst of the family, and as the family chanted the name of the dead relative with whom they wished to speak, the medium "mumbles to himself, begins to moan, breaks several times with his mouth wide open, and then lapses into convulsive trembling" (Anonymous, 1915, p. 8). Often his head jerked back and forth, his neck bent "under the weight of the spirit" (Bollig, 1927/1967, p. 61) and his hands began to quiver. As the trembling became more violent, the family, recognizing that the medium was in a state of possession, began asking questions of the spirit. Although the voice of the medium might not change, his response was spoken in a special "spirit language" that had to be interpreted by someone especially knowledgeable in this form of speech (Girschner, p.190).

HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF CHUUK POSSESSION–TRANCE

The spirit possession described in the older literature, although generally similar in form to the type of possession occurring today, was significantly different. First, possession was once purposeful: It resulted from a deliberate attempt to communicate with the spirits of the dead (nature spirits and gods

could not be summoned). When serious illness befell someone, the family would typically gather to summon the spirit of one of their deceased members in the hope that the spirit would reveal the nature of the illness. At other times of family crisis—during a famine or confrontation with another family, for instance—the lineage group might call on a spirit to provide the crucial information needed to survive unharmed. The spirits were also consulted on the whereabouts of missing valuables or about what would happen in the future. Shortly after the death of someone in the family, the relatives would communicate with the spirit in the hope of gaining access to knowledge—the knowledge hidden from the living—that might have value for them.

Second, in former times the medium in spirit possession was, ideally at least, someone from within the inner family group who showed a sensitivity to the movements of the spirits. The chief requirement for mediums, in the words of a German doctor who observed possession incidents during the first decade of this century, was that they "have a nervous sensibility, increased by continuous auto-suggestion, so that they can easily go into a hypnotic state" (Girschner, 1912–1913, p. 190). Anyone might be "chosen" as a medium—man, woman, or child. Bollig (1927/1967, p. 67) recorded that those whom the family regarded as its leading candidates were placed upon mats and told to relax; eventually one of them would suddenly jump up with a shout, signifying to all that he or she was the one selected by the spirit as its medium. If Bollig's report (p.70) of 90 mediums on Fefan Island is to be believed, there was no dearth of individuals able to serve as spirit mediums in former times. Almost every lineage would have tried to cultivate its own medium, and many lineages apparently had more than one person able to communicate with the spirits. Finally, although females could and did perform this function, the literature describes only cases of male mediums.

Spirit possession in Chuuk, then, appears to have undergone a substantial transformation in this century. The possession incidents described in the early literature were intentional, were aimed at obtaining important information from ancestors, and were mediated by males or females. (We admit to the possibility, however, that early writers missed or failed to record the more spontaneous and involuntary type of possession-trance.) Given the available evidence, the possession incidents recorded today are different. They are involuntary, occur mostly at times of family stress when so perceived by the afflicted individual, and involve mostly women. It is difficult to date this change with precision, but we must assume from the case reports we collected that the newer form of possession became increasingly common

after World War II. That all four cases of unambiguously intentional possession in our records date back to the 1930s or 1940s supports this assumption. The older form of intentional possession seems to have gradually declined during this century, with incidents of this kind occurring only rarely in the postwar years. The model double-hulled canoe (náán) that was once suspended from the Chuuk meeting house to facilitate spirit communication could no longer be found after World War II, although it was remembered by older informants (LeBar, 1964, p.181–183). By the late 1960s or early 1970s, as spirit calling became rare, the type of involuntary possession that is the subject of this article was commonplace.

One of the major reasons for the disappearance of voluntary spirit possession was the growing influence of Christianity in Chuuk, as can be seen in Bollig's descriptions (1927/1967). What might be called "possession on demand" was discountenanced by a society that had enthusiastically embraced Christianity. Anything that might be interpreted as spirit worship, including offerings to the spirits or supplication for assistance, was bound to be judged by missionaries and early native pastors as incompatible with Christian practice. The dividing line between "heathen" and Christian was drawn across such practices as voluntary spirit possession and the active solicitation of help from the spirit world. It was one thing to acknowledge the power of the spirit world and distinctly another to seek help actively from this realm. Chuuk Christians might retain a fearful respect for the pre-Christian spirit world and attempt to counter the ever-present threat of these beings, normally by an appeal to the higher powers that Christianity put at their disposal, but they would not initiate contact with the spirits to secure their assistance. Christianity, therefore, did not eradicate the belief in spirits among Chuuk converts any more than it did among the first century converts in Asia Minor; it simply eliminated, over time, the propitiation of these spirits.

Seen from a slightly different perspective, the historical transformation of possession in Chuuk has been a change in status. The earlier literature attests to the existence of a highly institutionalized form of possession-trance in the person of the *wáánaanú,* a recognized status like that of a medium. The medium as a distinct person and recognized position has disappeared, but the behavior continues, as does some recognition of that behavior as "possession." Formerly, spirit possession was the mark of a distinct person, the wáánaanú, or medium; today it is a type of behavior, an illness.

In summary, Chuuk spirit possession manifests beliefs about the spirit world, especially beliefs about the intervention of spirits of the dead in the

affairs of living kinfolk. The precipitating events are most often family-related problems, but family problems as they are felt and experienced by the individual who experiences possession. Although possession-trance has deep historical roots and was once a sought-after experience, today it is viewed as a potentially dangerous illness calling for the medicines that the spirits themselves reveal. Formerly, possession-trance was on demand in service to the family and occurred in the person of a medium, the wáánaanú; today the possession-trance is involuntary, spontaneous, and although it still occurs in service to the family, it is triggered by the family problems as felt by the individual who experiences possession.

POSSESSION–TRANCE: ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The Chuuk phrase for what we have called spirit possession is *emén soope a téétá wóón,* meaning "a spirit is on" the person. The most important indicator of possession is the person's speech, by which the spirit manifests itself. The heart of the matter for the Chuuk Islanders is the spirit being "on" the person (which we gloss as "possession"), not the ecstatic behavior; the behavioral manifestations, such as shaking or gestures of wild abandon, are only symptoms of spirit possession. Perhaps it would be more precise to say that the Chuuk concept of possession focuses on the spirit speaking.

Anthropological studies of possession, on the other hand, have focused on the distinction between the possessed person's behavior and ordinary, daily action, labeling the former behavior trance, hysteria, dissociation, or altered state of consciousness. Some writers find it helpful to distinguish between trance and possession, hence the term "possession-trance." Bourguignon (1968, 1974, 1991) has stressed the crucial distinction between the phenomenon itself and the interpretation of the phenomenon. One person may look at the wild behavior of Chuuk trance and call it possession; another may call it hysteria. In this article we prefer a classification for the phenomenon that is relatively neutral and that carries a minimum of interpretive baggage. We have adopted the popular term, trance, or its technical twin, altered state of consciousness (ASC), as best identifying the phenomenon with a minimum of interpretation. As a working definition of ASC, we offer Ludwig's description (1968, pp. 69–70):

> those mental states, induced by various physiological, psychological, or pharmacological maneuvers or agents, which can be recognized

> subjectively by the individual himself (or by an objective observer of the individual) as representing a sufficient deviation, in terms of subjective experience or psychological functioning, from certain general norms as determined by the subjective experience and psychological functioning of that individual during alert, waking consciousness. This sufficient deviation may be represented by a greater preoccupation with internal sensations or mental processes than is usual, by changes in the formal characteristics of thought, and by impairment of reality-testing to various degrees.

Several implications of this description are worthy of comment. The behavior that can induce this state and characterize its onset ranges from sleeplike states to hyperactivity. In Chuuk the onset of ASC is often marked by hyperactivity: shouting, running, or unusual displays of strength; but other trances begin when the person is lying in bed or sleeping. The pattern can thus be one of hyperactivity followed by calm or quiet followed by a phase of intense activity. In cases of the calm-then-hyperactivity pattern, we can only speculate that the triggering mechanism may be a combination of prolonged meditation and inactivity, as Henney (1968) found among the trancers of St. Vincent in the West Indies. There is no evidence that Chuuk trance is brought on by liquor or drugs. Whatever the cause, the Chuuk cases display an increase in activity, frequently with heightened emotional behavior. Ludwig (pp. 72–73, 76) specifically cites spirit possession states, depersonalization, and hysterical conversion reactions as examples of ASC characterized by increased activity. He also notes that in revivalist religious cults having possession beliefs, the behavioral manifestations include jerks, laughter, rolling, barking, spinning, shaking, quaking, convulsions, whirling and howling, running and leaping, and shouting and crying. Prince (1968, pp. 121, 127) finds similar manifestations in ASC, such as a brief period of collapse or inhibition at the onset of the episode followed by a period of hyperactivity with tremors of head and limbs, even jerks. The return to normal, alert consciousness is followed by sleep or exhaustion and amnesia regarding events during the episode. Among the Chuuk cases, only one person reported remembering the events; eight others had no recollection of what had occurred; all other case reports omitted mention of memory. Both Bourguignon (1991) and Ludwig (p. 83) regard personality changes and even identity change as characteristic of ASC. The changes in voice mark the identity shifts in the Chuuk cases, at least in the recent cases.

The Chuuk cases, old and new, thus fit into a widely observed behavioral pattern described as an altered state of consciousness. ASC is a convenient, nonjudgmental characterization of the phenomenon. Possession is not the

phenomenon; possession is *an* interpretation of the phenomenon, hence the designation of possession-trance. Another advantage in using ASC as a label for the phenomenon is that detailed descriptions of ASC, such as that offered by Ludwig (1968), suggest reasons for why possession interpretations are mobilized. ASC is often characterized by shifts in personality and identity and a lessening of the boundaries between self and others. Because possession belief is already an available choice within Chuuk culture, the interpretation of the cases as possession is even clearer. The person experiencing possession consciously or unconsciously has selected a form of behavior in which she can transcend the limitations of her own personality and self. The behavioral manifestations of ASC are culturally learned and thus culturally specific to a given society. The remarkable similarity exhibited in the trance behavior of the Chuuk cases confirms that the patterns of action and speech are learned behavior, even though the participants are outside normal consciousness. Part of the similarity may also be due to the selective, culturally patterned remembering of the informants. In any event, that the trancers' friends and relatives witnessing the behavior, and the informants, have a shared understanding of its meaning also suggests that the behavior is culturally learned and shaped. The ASC thus conveys meaning in a culturally encoded act of ritual communication that other members of the culture understand.

FAMILY CONFLICTS AND CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

For all their reliance on the possession interpretation, island informants were well aware of another, more "this worldly" dimension to spirit possession. One informant pointedly mentioned that, apart from the few cases in which the victim violated a strict taboo, spirit possession was usually brought about by family problems. When told of an incident of possession, people routinely will ask what precipitated it. The first suspicion is that a family problem, perhaps a serious quarrel or tensions that have smoldered for several months, occasioned the possession episode. For example, one young girl who had experienced episodes was understood to enter a possessed state just an hour or two after a noisy drunken fight had broken out in her house. Other kinds of stress may also bring on possession-trance, such as the death of a family member or a dispute about family land. In general, the data indicate that the person nearly always has experienced

considerable stress associated with friction in the family. Sometimes that individual plays a direct part as a protagonist in the dispute and is cast in the role of tormented observer. Overall, there is little doubt that stress is a major factor contributing to the possession-trance episodes. We propose that possession-trance is an outcome of that stress, functioning as a socially sanctioned release of culturally inhibited expression, perhaps even as a redirection of aggression.

The connection among culturally inhibited expression, possession-trance, and culturally accepted or tolerated patterns of expression has been widely documented across cultures (Bourguignon, 1968; Dobbin, 1978; Foulks, 1972; Kleinman, 1980; Metraux, 1972; Parsons, 1985; Wedenoja, 1990). In Chuuk society, the tendency toward inhibition and repression of emotional expression has been noted, as in Gladwin and Sarason's description (1953, p. 227):

> What the Trukese individual thinks and feels is not likely to reach overt expression in a spontaneous or direct manner. This would be especially true in the expression of strong feeling, particularly aggressive or hostile feeling. One might almost say of the Trukese that one of their rules of behavior is that what is strongly felt should not be expressed. If we bear in mind that in the face of novel, conflictful, or problem-solving situations the Trukese tend to react passively and dependently rather than aggressively or actively, and add to this their strong inhibitory tendencies, our conclusion would be that the Trukese outward passivity is a kind of learned defense against strong aggressive tendencies. In fact, one might say that perhaps one of the most crucial problems which faces the Trukese is that of expression of aggression.

Elsewhere Gladwin and Sarason (1953, p. 241) concluded that aggression rarely reaches the level of direct aggression, but that it is disguised in such indirect forms as gossip and sorcery. They also found situations within family and close kin relations that were characterized by a high potential for hostility but where it was impossible to express the felt aggression in a direct manner. For Gladwin and Sarason the kin group was the "security system" of the individual Islander.

Both Spiro (1950, pp. 105–106) and Lutz (1988, p. 194 inter alia) recorded a similarly strong cultural prohibition of direct expressions of hostility and aggression on nearby Ifalik. And Black (1985, p. 272), describing the folk psychology of Tobi Islanders, associates the prohibition of direct hostility with the nature of small-island life:

> Tobian everyday social life is pleasant in the extreme. People are highly skilled at constructing pleasant and rewarding interactions out of which can come the cooperative behavior on which life on this island, as it is presently constituted, depends. This pleasant tone is the product of strict adherence to the social norm that demands it while prohibiting direct expressions of hostility. It also depends, in this extremely small-scale society, on the intimate knowledge available to each person about the biography and personal attributes (especially those which are best called "foibles") of every other person. . . . The disputes and divisions are associated with a good deal of interpersonal hostility and other negative feelings, many of which arise from the inevitable frictions of a life lived in constant and inescapable intimacy.

Like Black, Spiro (1972, pp. 480–481) found the ethic of nonaggression to be a functional adaptation to life on small islands, but he also linked the strong sanctions on Ifalik against aggression with culturally sanctioned beliefs in ghosts and possession. Possession beliefs thus served to channel culturally prohibited expression. Elsewhere, Spiro (1950, pp. 103–104; 1965, p. 480) writes that little overt aggression is seen in interpersonal relationships among adults, but he also cautioned that this does not mean there are no aggressive impulses; these impulses are either few or repressed. Spiro has indicated that the resultant anxieties and repressed aggression would become unbearable were there not some socially sanctioned alternative to overt and direct aggression. The Ifalik belief in spirits or ghosts that are thought to cause evil and illness—including possession—acts as a balancing mechanism for redirecting antisocial drives (Spiro, 1965, p. 479). This belief makes it possible for the Ifalik to displace their own aggressive thoughts away from themselves and against a common enemy, the spirits (Spiro, 1965, p. 482). Spirit belief and possession interpretation thus become acceptable outlets for forbidden aggression.

This interpretation would seem easily applicable to Chuuk, where similar spirit and possession beliefs provide meaningful outlets within a similarly inhibitory culture. But the transfer is not that simple. As Lutz (1988, p. 195) observes, Spiro's approach may be too mechanical: The "person becomes not an agent but a passive reactor to internal emotional forces." True, Spiro's model does not explain individual agency, that is, why some individuals use possession-trance and others do not. On the other hand, possession-trance involves by definition the passivity of the individual who experiences possession and the activity of the spirit. Lutz also finds Spiro's interpretation overly individualistic in depicting Ifalik fears as primarily of their own violence rather than that of others. She argues that the causes

of Ifalik fear are broader than their own selves and that belief in the spirits and spirit possession is a way of defining the problem of violence for oneself and for others.

The combined insights of Spiro, Black, and Lutz throw light on Chuuk spirit possession. The relationship between what is repressed and what is expressed is not automatic; a symbolic communication occurs among the entranced individual, the possessing spirits, and the observing kin and friends. The Chuuk cases are, as Lutz (1988) found on Ifalik, talk about what is right and wrong, especially regarding proper relationships among kin. What Lutz (p. 95) wrote about Ifalik might apply equally well to Chuuk:

> As Spiro also remarked, the spirits personify danger, give it a face. By so doing, they allow for more complex explanation and rehearsal of danger and community response to it. The drama of the spirits on Ifaluk communicates that the anger of others, whether spirit or human, should produce fear, not angry counterattack. This, the drama says, is our path to safety, at least for now, at least here.

One longtime resident of Chuuk claimed that the possession-trance episodes were just ways for young girls to get attention. The episodes are that, for they did generate considerable attention, but they also offered advice and potential solutions to family disputes. Although the trance behaviors appear bizarre even to inhabitants, the communication is not gibberish; they are instead goal oriented and thus may serve a useful function (see Van der Walde, 1968, p. 67).

Chuuk possession-trance sometimes promotes greater domestic tranquility—siblings are reconciled, kin admitted to neglect of other kin, the neglected are helped. But the data do not indicate any outcome, positive or negative, for many cases—hence the impossibility of determining the success rate. Perhaps the mere outburst and release are therapeutic in themselves. The case histories strongly suggest that the person who experiences possession must offer verifiable predictions, advice, and demands about the network of kin relationships for the episode to be considered authentic, that is, adaptive, within the Chuuk ethos (on maladaptive expressions of ASC, see Prince, 1968, p. 86).

Contemporary Chuuk possession-trance works not only as a culturally approved outlet for prohibited expression but also as a new way of handling problems of individualized and personal stress caused by family relationships. The mobilization of possession-trance to handle family problems shows remarkable continuity with the past, but the focus on the personal stress of

the one who is experiencing possession is a new feature. In the older cases described by Kubary (1878–1879), Girschner (1912–1913), and Bollig (1927/1967), the possession-trance episodes served family or lineage interests by offering solutions to a crisis facing the group, such as a famine, bad weather, or a family squabble. The wáánaanú of old was clearly in the service of the group. Contemporary possession-trance, on the other hand, springs from the feelings or perceived stresses of the individual trancer who draws on the model of the now defunct wáánaanú as a coping mechanism. The Chuuk cases demonstrate the extent to which the perception and evaluation of stressful stimuli are culturally shaped, as is the selection of possession-trance as a coping mechanism (see Kleinman, 1980, pp. 146–148). Possession-trance as a coping mechanism is universally available but culturally legitimized only in certain societies or contexts. In Chuuk it continues to be culturally sanctioned even though it is considered by Chuuk observers to be dangerous and to require attention. By interpreting trance as spirit possession, the people of Chuuk legitimate this behavior as a sanctioned alternative. Calling in a priest or minister—who sprinkles holy water, performs exorcisms, or attributes the trance to the work of Satan—also serves to validate their belief in spirit possession.

Why do family problems seem to be such a powerful source of personal stress today, unlike at the turn of the century? The obvious answer—albeit one difficult to prove—is that it is because of the impact of rapid social change on the family and lineage (see Kleinman, 1986, pp. 107, 125, 140ff.). Studies of alcohol use and epidemic suicide in Chuuk also point to postwar social change, especially in socialization and family roles, as the cause of social problems (Hezel, 1989; Marshall, 1979; Rubinstein, 1995). The words of the recently spirit-possessed women offer additional clues in this direction. While in trance, the women spoke with a problem-solving authority that formerly might have been held by a lineage elder or even a chief, and in so doing they effectively substituted for absent lineage authority. Moreover, if we accept the thesis that aggressive drunken comportment is the young men's outlet for defunct male roles (Marshall, 1979), then female possession-trance may be seen as a corrective to the family disruptions caused by widespread alcohol abuse by both the youth and adults in Chuuk. While Chuuk males have adopted an imported resource, alcohol, to deal with role expectations, females have drawn from resources of old to handle new problems.

SOCIAL DRAMA AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

The significance of the spirit communication must be understood in the context of the actors, gestures, voice changes, and action that create a cultural drama. The principal dramatis personae include the entranced individual who has suffered some stressful personal crisis, the ancestor spirit speaking with the voice of authority, and the family or friends who witness and respond to the possession-trance. The episodes are processual, developing in stages; they work changes in social relations and effect a resolution of the social conflict or problem (see Turner, 1974, pp. 37–38).

In a typical scenario of Chuuk possession-trance, stress caused by mounting family turmoil increases to a point at which one individual in the family explodes in a barrage of words and wild activity. As the trance behavior continues, the family tries to learn the identity of the spirit and determine whether it is good or bad. Possession-trance draws attention to the plight of the afflicted woman and brings the family together at her bedside. Her words carry a special significance and authority. The sorts of messages communicated by the entranced person to the family are usually a plea, or a command, to care for the neglected members of the family so as to resolve whatever conflict is dividing the family. The process often ends with a family meeting, with family members crying, sobbing, and promising to change their ways. The pattern of these dramas conforms generally to Turner's (1974, pp. 37–38) proposed stages of ritual social drama: first a break in social relations followed by mounting crisis, then redressive action and reintegration. Precipitating stimuli are events such as fighting in the family, alcohol problems of a relative, or neglect of some family member, or in Kleinman's terminology, the external "stressors" (see Kleinman, 1980, 146–148) cause the break and trigger the possession-trance. The trance event itself begs redressive action, for the spirit voice brings into the open the perceived injustice and demands redress. Reintegration occurs after the possession-trance episode: Relatives cry, plea for forgiveness, or call meetings to reconcile differences. Possession-trance breaks the status quo and creates a new set of relationships (Turner & Turner, 1978, p. 249). As a cultural drama, then, Chuuk possession-trance serves not only as a cathartic release of stress caused by family problems but also as an attempt to redress the existing problematic family situation.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

If there is one theme that unites both the Chuuk understanding of possession-trance and that of outside analysts, it is communication. Even the earliest reports of Micronesian religious beliefs and practices pointed to the role of communication. Father Juan Cantova (1722) found that the Carolinians paid more attention to their ancestral spirits than to the gods and that they used mediums to communicate their needs to the ancestors. Contemporary Chuuk inhabitants also focus on communication: The spirit speaks with a changed but calm and recognizable voice. Observers—especially those with a psychological bent—might infer that the possessed host is communicating her innermost, subconscious thought and that the spirits are a means or vehicle for externalizing an interior state. Both understandings have recourse to spirit belief, but the people of Chuuk approach the spirit communication somewhat differently. For them the human host is, as the wáánaanú was of old, a vehicle between the spirits of old and the family of today; for a psychologically-oriented analyst like Spiro, the spirits are the vehicle for repressed communication.

We have seen that the spirit communication is goal oriented—it moves toward a solution to family crises. The often bizarre opening events of a possession-trance episode belie the effectiveness of the communication and language used. For Chuuk participants, the event may indeed be craziness or illness, but only the ongoing drama will tell whether this is illness or important communication. The people of Chuuk appreciate the effectiveness of the communication, such as when a sister was possessed by her deceased mother: The voice was that of the mother, and the mother's spirit lectured her son about his alcohol abuse and child neglect. The mother did have grounds for chiding her son; words from her were proper and effective in a way they could not have been if coming from the sister. Within Chuuk culture, a sister dare not speak to her brother so directly and aggressively. The spirit communication is culturally patterned as an outlet for repressed expression and is thus comprehensible to the Chuuk people. Communication through possession-trance in Chuuk fits a worldwide pattern of socially acceptable expression for socially prohibited or repressed feelings.

Chuuk possession-trance is comprehensible communication because it flows from traditional Chuuk spirit and possession beliefs. This communication does not use high ritual as much as it does drama to convey the message of social tension. The change of persona in the person experiencing possession legitimizes and sanctions a message that consciously or uncon-

sciously is perceived as forbidden communication through normal means of discourse.

A deeply social and moral dimension attaches to the words of the spirits. The trancers speak about what is good and bad in concrete situations, although sometimes from selfish, self-serving motives. They provide relief from the stress and friction arising from family relationships. The possession-trance satisfies more than just the individual's needs and wishes. It addresses group needs, especially those of kin.

The communication theme of Chuuk possession-trance produces what might be called a kind of family therapy. The entranced individual role plays, and a drama of family problems unfolds during and after the possession episode. The outcome is frequently a family discussion or meeting, a confession of mistakes and wrongs. The Chuuk experience of possession belief and trance behavior works like the impartial therapist. Of course, Chuuk possession-trance as family therapy is only an analogy, but the basis for such a comparison is the focus on family: The possessing spirits are frequently those of the ancestors, the spirit words are about family, and the family often discusses the problems that surfaced during the episode. Contemporary Chuuk women exhibit a behavioral complex that is both ancient and modern, one that is remarkably similar to what happened in the meeting houses a century ago and one that also takes place today in a therapist's office.

The most obvious feature of contemporary Chuuk possession-trance is also its most puzzling aspect—that it is a woman's role. The cross-cultural data show possession-trance to be a predominantly female role across the globe (Bourguignon, 1968, 1991), so the mere fact that Chuuk women experience possession might be expected. The question is why should a male or female status of former times become a female gender role today. Another question is what precisely does this communicate about Chuuk gender roles. At first glance, two answers seem plausible. First, the mostly female trancers could be said to constitute a protest movement against male-generated problems such as alcohol abuse and male dominance. Second, female possession could be the functional equivalent of male drinking. There is little doubt that male authority roles dominate in contemporary Chuuk culture, but the experiences of female possession-trance do not coalesce into an anti-male cult or movement, such as the Zar cult identified by Lewis (1971) in Ethiopia. Nor is it a protest movement against colonial and outside influences, as in Palau's Modekngei (see Barnett, 1949; Yaoch, 1966). Participants in the Chuuk possession-trance episodes and the medicines they use demonstrate

a curious coexistence with Christianity, not a break with it or wholesale readaptation of its teachings. Our observations do not support the idea that Chuuk possession-trance is a protest movement or cult, but the accounts do point to something less obvious, to a more subtle and indirect note of protest against the helplessness of female gender roles. Mahony (1969, p. 246) was the first observer to comment on the strong association among the Chuuk spirit world, spirit-caused illness, and women:

> It is rather interesting to note how many of these [spirit powers] are concerned with restraining, controlling and channelling the behavior and activities of women, either by threats to their own health, or to the health of their children. The spirits seem to be supporting established social authority which, of course, has always been in the hands of the men.

We suggest that in a cultural system where the spirits communicate the social structure, women are consciously or subconsciously using the spirits to break through the social structure. Turner (1974, pp. 172–173), as noted earlier, sees ritual drama, especially that involving trance and spirit possession, as breaking through the status quo in a type of antistructure. Paradoxically in Chuuk as elsewhere, the trancers use traditional beliefs about spirit possession to defy traditions of proper communication between the sexes. This is not so much a protest as it is a statement of affliction and pain (cf. Lewis, 1971, pp. 66–99). The Chuuk examples, however culturally sanctioned, do not rise to the level of an organized cult or movement of the afflicted and oppressed, as Lanternari (1965) describes in *Religions of the Oppressed.* Although it is culturally appropriate that possession-trance be selected as a way of expressing the affliction and stress, we cannot explain precisely why only women select a role that was earlier taken by both women and men. Perhaps a clue lies in the way males express their stress.

Could possession-trance serve for females what the consumption of alcohol serves for males? This too seems plausible at first glance. The people of Chuuk do make the comparison: Drunks are possessed by alcoholic spirits. Marshall (1979, pp. 51, 54, 127) put it more poetically: The possessing spirits are bottled, imported, and purchased. At a deeper level, such a comparison would hold that just as the role of the male is to project an image of bravado and violence, so the woman must project her central role in the matrilineage. The male gets drunk to express a warrior's machismo (Marshall, 1979, p. 99); the female experiences spirit possession to express family and domestic needs. The logic of comparing male drinking with female possession is attractive, but the analogy fails. Male drinking is a regular

social routine; possession-trance is not everyday behavior. The prevalence of male drinking is far more widespread in the population compared with female spirit possession (which is less than 100 cases, granted the limitations of Cathy Hung's convenience sample from the Chuuk Lagoon and our interviews). If Marshall is correct, males drink to fulfill the lost status and role of warrior. Female possession, on the other hand, is not a replacement role even though the domestic stress on contemporary females may be new, different, or greater. Perhaps a case could be made for the function of male drinking as "letting off steam," but male drinking certainly does not have the therapeutic potential in family disputes that possession-trance does. On the contrary, male alcohol abuse is often the precipitating event that leads to a possession-trance episode.

In short, possession-trance has become a female gender role. As such, possession-trance responds, in part at least, to the situation of Chuuk females in a society that favors male authority. Like male drinking, female possession-trance also responds to personal stress, but unlike males, the stress females respond to arises from family and kinship problems. In one sense, female possession-trance operates like the male alcohol complex by allowing for a period of time-out from the daily cultural rules. In another sense, it is a special time-in for communicating what would otherwise be impossible. Selection of possession-trance is particularly appropriate because trance is a time-out, or liminal, period between what has been and what will be. The contemporary use of possession-trance shows distinct continuity with the old Chuuk religion, especially in the person of the entranced medium, the wáánaanú. This speaks of the resilience and adaptability of Chuuk culture. Both the wáánaanú of old and contemporary possession-trance are in the service of the lineage or family, but the contemporary cases are spontaneous, not on demand, and stimulated by personal stress.

Why do certain women of Chuuk, however subconsciously, select possession-trance? At a societal level, the selection is possible because it is culturally available. At a gender level, the selection is today more appropriate for females. But at the individual level, neither data nor explanatory models answer why a given female experiences possession-trance. The case histories do not give enough information to answer this question. Many of the subjects are described as normal, healthy, and functioning well within Chuuk society. Their entranced behavior itself may be considered an illness or a potentially dangerous condition, but there is no correlation between inadequate or neurotic personalities and the incidence of possession-trance.

The explanation we offer here is only part of the answer. Chuuk possession-trance has survived the onslaught of intense modernization not only because it is culturally available and culturally understood, but also because it works. It does communicate family problems as felt by individuals. Although we have described the historical shift from possession-trance as a mostly male (wáánaanú) experience to a mostly female experience, we have not adequately explained it. We are tantalized by the possibility that the female gender role of keeper of the matrilineage is now being served by possession-trance. We suspect that more specific data on the kinds of family and lineage problems associated with possession-trance will show us a clearer link between possession-trance as a medium of communication and Chuuk gender roles.

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Nan Madol's Contested Landscape: Topography and Tradition in the Eastern Caroline Islands

GLENN PETERSEN

Nan Madol, a large, ancient complex of monumental stone architecture on Pohnpei, serves to make a series of political points. It is contested landscape symbolizing a host of tensions essential to the cultural life of Pohnpei. Embodied in Nan Madol's mythohistory are important lessons concerning both internal and external political relations. Current disputes over control of the site verify the existence of precisely the threats Nan Madol warns against: the dangers of big government.

"The ownership is blood conquered," averred the paramount chief; "it is proper that if Nan Madol is overthrown, it must be by war" (Whaley, 1993, p. 3). Dialogue from a novel about medieval knights errant? A passage from a nineteenth century account of imperial expansion? No, these are lines from a current news item in Guam's *Pacific Daily News.* Nan Madol, the site at issue, is a large complex of monumental architecture located on Pohnpei, in the Eastern Caroline Islands, now part of the Federated States of Micronesia. Despite its antiquity Nan Madol continues to play a significant role in Pohnpei's cultural and social life.

Massive stoneworks rise from the shallow waters along Pohnpei's easternmost shore at the lone spot where the island's protective barrier reef sweeps landward and turns briefly into a stretch of fringing reef. There, the modern Pohnpei's ancestors built an array of artificial islets and canals and erected upon them temples, crypts, fortresses, and other edifices. The site

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lies within what is today the Madolenihmw chiefdom, and *Nahnmwarki* Ilten Selten, Madolenihmw's paramount chief, is attempting to defend it from a series of encroachments. Thus it happens that in April of 1993, more than a century after Pohnpei first came under the rule of Europeans and a decade after the Micronesians voted to become once again self-governing, a group of Pohnpei were speaking seriously of war.

Nan Madol, known variously as the Pacific's mysterious "city of stone" or an Oceanic "Venice," has been contested landscape from the outset, and in some ways not much has changed in the thousand years or so since work first began there. The demiurban complex symbolizes—in eminently material terms—much of what it means to be Pohnpei, but it is a mistake to think that because of this it belongs to all Pohnpei, a misapprehension that seems to lie at the root of current controversies. Indeed, most of Nan Madol's significance lies in the political messages with which it is charged; these stress the importance of decentralization and local autonomy. Nan Madol encapsulates, among other things, much of the Pohnpei's mythohistory, ethos, and basic views about foreign relations. Current controversies over it are merely the latest in a long history of disputes, a history that can tell us a great deal about politics, power, and reading a cultural landscape.

This essay is grounded in some of Carl Sauer's (1925, 1963) ideas about the cultural meanings of landscape and in David Lowenthal's (1985) treatment of the widespread tendency to view the past as a foreign country. I intend to explain how modern-day Pohnpei read their island's natural and cultural landscapes as commentaries not only on the past and its many vicissitudes but also as a guide to contemporary political life: on the island, within their new republic, and in the world at large. They believe their history provides them with moral guidance, and they read that history in Nan Madol and in every square foot of the island their families have inhabited for 2,000 years or so. The landscape of Pohnpei is contested. Indeed, it encompasses many contests, some of which play a part in my consideration of current tensions on the island. There are distinct contradictions among the multiple versions and variants of Pohnpei's mythohistory; there are oppositions between ethnographic and archaeological interpretations of these oral traditions; there are marked contrasts in the Pohnpei's cultural attitudes toward the center of the island and the reef where Nan Madol sits; there are idiosyncrasies of competing local interests; there are deeply etched oppositions embedded in Pohnpei political theory itself, which juxtaposes the processes of centralization and decentralization that Nan Madol signifies; and finally there are the confrontations that now trouble the Pohnpei, that

is, the polarities between their own indigenous notions of what proper government should be and the ideas of well-meaning foreigners who assume that Anglo-American democratic, utilitarian theory is equally and universally applicable to all the world's societies.

POHNPEI

Pohnpei is the largest of the Eastern Caroline Islands. Its population in 1990 was more than 33,000. Before the first Europeans arrived with an array of new diseases (ca. 1830), the population was perhaps a bit smaller than it is now; a long period of population decline finally reached its low point and began to reverse itself at the turn of the century when only about 3,000 Pohnpei survived (Riesenberg, 1968, p. 6). Pohnpei is now the site of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) capital. Many people from other Micronesian islands have come to the island to work for the FSM government and live in or near Kolonia, the island's only town, but most Pohnpei families continue to live on and cultivate their rural farmsteads, sending one or more of their members into town on a daily basis to work for the government, the island's primary source of wage labor.

The town of Kolonia, the state of Pohnpei, and the FSM as a whole—each has an elected government and a bureaucracy. Outside of town, the island is still divided into five *wehi,* the paramount chiefdoms, which have hereditary chiefs and multiple lines of political titles of varying rank and status. These chiefdoms are also chartered as municipalities and have elected governments, but daily political life within them makes little differentiation between traditional and elective office. Within these paramount chiefdoms are numerous *kousapw,* or local chiefdoms. Until the onset of colonial administration (in the 1880s), the paramount chiefdoms waxed and waned in number, size, and strength; certain areas of the island have, since ancient times, claimed and often exercised effective autonomy from the larger chiefdoms in which they are now included. Pohnpei's political life entails endless maneuvering within and among all these regions and chiefdoms. These complex, competitive political activities are the stuff of social life on this rich and fertile island, where making a living takes up relatively little of people's time.

Pohnpei dealt successfully with the whalers, traders, and missionaries who provided links to the rest of the world through most of the nineteenth century. In 1886 Spain established a garrison there, but it had little impact

on life outside the fortress. Germany, which had long been cultivating commercial interests in the area, purchased the islands after Spain's 1898 loss of the Philippines and immediately set about implementing a series of economic and political changes. The Germans forcefully put down a 1910 rebellion by the Sokehs chiefdom, and it was at this point that the Pohnpei had to begin acknowledging, even if they never truly accepted, foreign control over their island. The Germans lost the islands to the Japanese and their League of Nations Mandate following the First World War, and the Japanese were in turn replaced by the United States and its United Nations Strategic Trusteeship over Micronesia following the Second World War. After decades of negotiations, the Federated States of Micronesia finally began governing itself under the terms of a Compact of Free Association with the United States in 1986.

POHNPEI'S LANDSCAPE

To provide insight into how the landscape of Pohnpei is contested, I first describe that landscape, particularly as the Pohnpei experience it.[1] The island is volcanic in origin, though active vulcanism has long since vanished. It is roughly circular and large, by the standards of the Eastern Caroline Islands, encompassing 334 km^2. The surface rises steeply in a series of ridges and crests to a pair of 750 m peaks near the center. The rugged topography is everywhere cut by streams and scarred by precipices and scarps. Rainfall is heavy, approximately 500 cm per year at the weather station, which is sited in a drier part of the island, and the weatherman (a Pohnpei) believes that it may reach nearly 1200 cm per year at certain windward points in the higher elevations. At this tropical latitude (7°N), there is very little seasonality. Average daily temperatures remain at about 28°C (82°F) throughout the year and the two "dry months," January and February, receive about two thirds the rainfall of the wetter months. With a few minor exceptions the island is densely vegetated.[2] To begin to understand Pohnpei, one must first grasp the impact of this relentless lushness.

Travel on the island is always difficult. For reasons I shall address shortly, the Pohnpei are not given to a great deal of trail building or maintenance. The steep inclines, heavy vegetation, roaring streams, slippery outcroppings, and ubiquitous mud make overland travel difficult and unpopular. Though they are not accomplished open ocean navigators like their neighbors on the surrounding atolls, the Pohnpei have generally preferred,

whenever possible, to sail around the island's perimeter, safely inside its protected lagoon. The circumferential road, variously constructed and deteriorated during the island's multiple colonial regimes, has once again been completed, and with the advent of relatively cheap light trucks and cars, the Pohnpei now eagerly move around the island itself.[3]

The impenetrable density of the island's vegetation is not quite as it seems to the untrained eye. Though native forest still grows in the island's most interior reaches, the woodlands in all inhabited parts of the island are actually carefully cultivated stands of food-bearing or otherwise exploitable trees, a mix primarily of breadfruit (the staple foodstuff), coconut, banana, mango, and other fruits along with utilitarian growths of ivory nut and nipa palms, kapok and hibiscus, and the all-important kava, the roots of which provide a very mild narcotic used for both ritual purposes and everyday relaxation. The understory is planted in taros, yams, manioc, a few other rootcrops, and myriad ornamental plants. The Pohnpei cut back weedy growths often enough to prevent them from taking over, but infrequently enough to make much of this cropland look like jungle. People here are particularly given to planting boundary areas densely, both to serve as screens and to impress passersby with their industriousness, a valued trait in this highly competitive society.

The settlement pattern is pronouncedly dispersed. While matrilineages and bilateral extended families tend to occupy large plots of land (known as *peliensapw*), individual households tend to be composed of smaller family units.[4] Some Pohnpei say of themselves that they do not like to *dokpene* (loosely, "collide"), and that it is for this reason that they do not live in aggregations or nucleated settlements; others say that the pattern represents a long-established means of preventing raiding parties (coming up from the shoreline) from attacking more than a handful of people at once. The Pohnpei place an extremely high premium on privacy and concealment, as part of a complex of cultural values known as *kanengamah* (Petersen, 1993a). Their settlement pattern, in combination with the dense vegetation, means that the landscape itself mirrors this cultural emphasis; from a distance all life on the island is thoroughly concealed. As one approaches Pohnpei from the sea, much of it appears uninhabited: All that can be seen are the crowns of the breadfruit and coconuts.

Though Pohnpei lies just east of the western Pacific's typhoon belt, it is occasionally hit and damaged by these storms; however, the island's torrential rains have a more frequent and nearly irresistible impact. It is not uncommon to find trails deep in surface runoff (and to encounter eels con-

tentedly exploring them). Despite the heavy vegetation, there is continual erosion. Nearly all construction is undertaken atop the stone platforms (*pehi*) that give the island its name: "Pohnpei" translates literally as "upon a stone platform." These foundations are themselves subject to undercutting, root heaves, and the unremitting ravages of age and gravity. Wind, rain, humidity, and a panoply of industrious insects ensure the rapid disintegration of any and all organic construction materials used atop the stone bases. In short order, structures collapse and trails wash away; vegetation quickly swallows everything that is not actively defended from it. Pohnpei's cultural landscape is at heart an accommodation to the forces of nature. Nearly everything crafted by human efforts is thought of as temporary, and people undertake little maintenance; most trails seem ephemeral; things fall apart and are then raised anew, usually on a different site.

On one hand, then, there is little in sight that is "natural." All the inhabited lands are draped in cultivated crops. But the Pohnpei are not inclined to struggle futilely against the forces of nature: They seek to impose little permanent change upon the face of the land.

The density of the vegetation and the consequent sense that natural growth is always looming have their impact on the Pohnpei's world view. In their mythology, the center of the island is frequently associated with evil, or with antisocial behavior: It is the place where demihuman cannibals abide (or once did), where the earlier inhabitants ate rats and broke incest taboos. Moreover, the Pohnpei sometimes speak of how much they enjoy getting away from the land and onto the lagoon, where fresh breezes can reach them and where they feel less closed in by the land. The Pohnpei love their land dearly, and know it intimately—every plot, even the smallest worksite, is named and bears its share of tales and associations—but they also feel a degree of ambivalence about it. That which is so familiar, so dear, can at times also seem oppressive.

Nan Madol, built with massive stoneworks strong enough to resist storm and tide and only marginally affected by the growth of heavy tropical vegetation, sits out on the water itself, partly immersed at high tide (easily accessible by canoe, the favored means of transport) and away from the stultifying embrace of the land. It stands in marked contrast to the familiar, everyday landscape dominated by nature's profligacy. It is in almost every sense a statement about the Pohnpei's triumph over nature. Both in pure material fact and in rarified symbolic aura, it is different, remarkable, indomitable.

Nan Madol was constructed with naturally occurring columnar basalt blocks of a sort also encountered in such sites as the Giant's Causeway in Ireland and California's Devil's Postpile. The columns were transported to the reef site from some distance and used, along with coral fill, to create a series of artificial islets, separated by canals, covering a total area of approximately .75 km^2. Structures, some of stone, were then erected atop them. The name Nan Madol (literally, "in the space between things") refers to the spaces between the islets, reflecting a particularly Pohnpei emphasis on that which is not: not to be seen, not to be heard, or simply that which is not there, like the silences between the notes of Miles Davis's music or the spaces between the objects in Giorgio Morandi's later still lifes.[5] In the same way that Nan Madol represents, at one level, an openness that can be gained only away from the cloistering ambiance of the island itself, the site's very name calls attention to the openings between the structures the Pohnpei built rather than directly to the structures themselves.

NAN MADOL: THE MYTHOHISTORY

We are fortunate to have available to us a large corpus of Pohnpei's mythohistorical accounts. Close study of this material tells us that one of the few generalizations we can make about these accounts is that they are highly contradictory. At times it seems as if every rendition of a tale has its equal and opposite version, and the Pohnpei themselves say that as a consequence of these variations, the truth of any matter is, like a fallen coconut, "lost in the weeds" (Petersen, 1990a). Or, as David Hanlon (1992, p. 26) has phrased it, "all knowledge of the past on Pohnpei is contested." Although the details of the island's mythohistory are perpetually in dispute, we can tease some general patterns from it.

Pohnpei's "modern" polity (i.e., the current system of chieftainship) traces its roots back to events purported to have taken place at least several generations before the arrival of the first Europeans and the start of written history on the island. These events in turn draw upon earlier historical episodes, running, in some versions, back to the very earliest occupation of the island. In summary: After the island itself had been built up out of the water by people who journeyed there from the south or east and had been provided with food, shelter, fire, and so forth by other travelers, construction of a center for islandwide religious worship was undertaken. Led by local savants or voyagers (or both) from the west, the people built Nan Madol as

a site for islandwide religious rituals. In time, Nan Madol became the seat of a dynasty of tyrants, the Sau Deleurs, who ruled the entire island. Eventually, local discontent and the intervention of deities provoked an invasion by the culture hero Isokelekel, who—though son of one of these Pohnpei deities—had grown up in Upwind Katau, a legendary land to the east (often identified as Kosrae, but see Goodenough, 1986). It is important to stress here that most of the Pohnpei's mythohistorical accounts are marked by variant traditions; there are few elements in this summary that do not have contrasting or contradictory versions, including, for instance, the notion that the entire island was under the sway of the Sau Deleurs. In the current context these variants need not be examined, but they have been explored in detail elsewhere (Petersen, 1990a).

Isokelekel and his troops overthrew the last Sau Deleur and presided over the dismantling of Pohnpei's centralized political system. Following much deliberation, the island's new and remaining leaders instituted the modern system of multiple, autonomous paramount chiefdoms. Today's Madolenihmw chiefs trace their ancestry back (matrilineally) to Isokelekel, and all the modern chiefdoms are organized around principles of decentralized government. Unlike some Polynesian polities, in which the chiefs claim to be foreigners, the Pohnpei believe their leaders to be indigenes, but they suggest that the political system itself, which they hold in the greatest respect (*wahu,* the term for respect, can in some contexts refer to the entire political system), was in part shaped by a foreign intervention.

Several themes can be distilled from these cycles. One is especially relevant in this context, encapsulating as it does some basic Pohnpei political theory. Originally there was anarchy; then the people organized themselves in the process of constructing Nan Madol; they then created a system of centralized government; this deteriorated into tyranny; the tyrant was overthrown and his regime was replaced by a decentralized set of locally autonomous chiefdoms. The modern polity, then, is in part the result of trial and error, as it were, and in part a product of deliberate, carefully considered decisions about the proper nature of government. It is viewed as now having withstood the test of time. Good government is decentralized and provides for maximum local autonomy.

To be sure, these themes are themselves contested. Some chiefs, clans, and matrilineages have sought to expand their landholdings or spheres of authority and to assert their rights to do so. Some leaders abuse their authority. But in the flow of daily Pohnpei social life these proclivities are

dealt with in a manner that keeps such contests from erupting into open challenges. As I have explained elsewhere (Petersen, 1993a, pp. 347–348),

> At their kava sessions and feasts, the Pohnpei repeatedly comb through the minutiae of daily life. And across the vast expanses of time they devote to this eminently political act, over and under and through the cracks of *kanengamah,* people come to grasp not simply the sentiments of single individuals but the sense of the community. The truth thus becomes that which the community is willing to move upon: it is pragmatic—what works. And because it is never expressly articulated, it always remains contingent. No one can be sure that his or her views have carried the day. No one can convert the structure of power—chieftainship—into the fact of power, because in a society that discounts the likelihood of learning the truth, those with credibility are those who assert nothing.

Having lost the truth, as it were, "in the weeds," the Pohnpei must seek moral guidance in their shared experience of equality, the more obvious hierarchical aspects of their polity notwithstanding. This is a pattern that is characteristic of all chiefly societies in the Carolines (Petersen, 1993b).

Nan Madol, perched out on the island's windward shoreline, facing the rising sun, is by all Pohnpei accounts a religious and ritual site with significant martial overtones. Mythohistorical accounts largely agree that it was built as a place of worship and only then subverted into a military cantonment occupied by the tyrants who perverted its original purposes. The culture hero who overthrew the evil despots returned Nan Madol to its original role. Ethnohistorical sources seem to verify this final stage. When Europeans first arrived in the mid-nineteenth century, Nan Madol was occupied by just a few people and used only occasionally for rituals (Fischer, 1964).

NAN MADOL: THE SCHOLARS DEBATE

Among those who contest the meaning of Nan Madol are anthropologists and archaeologists. Paul Hambruch, a German ethnographer who worked on Pohnpei in 1910 and was the first to map the area accurately, said that of all the impressions one might gain of Pohnpei, Nan Madol is the most enduring, but he also found it "a puzzle whose solution has become ever more difficult and will perhaps never be completely revealed" (1936, p. 3). More recently, American archaeologists have been working at the site. They make use of Pohnpei's mythohistory to interpret it, but they tend to misuse

this material, unsystematically pulling it apart and applying individual accounts out of context.

Pohnpei's mythohistory clearly associates Nan Madol with the Sau Deleurs, the tyrants who ruled over the island from their seat on Nan Madol's Pahn Kedira islet. One of the few things about which accounts are fairly consistent is that the Sau Deleur dynasty was established as a consequence of the work done at Nan Madol, that is, the first Sau Deleur is reckoned to have begun his reign *after* the bulk of the work there was completed. Although oral accounts are vague about the island's earliest times, there seems to be some agreement that the people responsible for building the complex were, by today's standards, politically unorganized: They were without chiefs (Petersen, 1990a, pp. 17–25).

Archaeologists, however, take the association of the site with the Sau Deleurs as unequivocal evidence that these powerful rulers were able to mobilize the labor that raised Nan Madol by means of coerced labor. Athens, for example, writes that "Oral accounts identify Nan Madol as the center of a polity ruled by a paramount chief who bore the title of Sau Deleur. . . . The authority of the Sau Deleurs was absolute" (1983, p. 52). Then, commenting on the "staggering" amount of labor that went into the project, he adds, "Oral accounts leave no doubt as to the social differentiation that existed between the ruler and the ruled. The power to command the labor obviously existed" (1983, pp. 59–60). Saxe, Allenson, and Loughbridge (1980, p. 93) discuss the "centralization of power embodied in the unification and subordination of previously independent polities." Bath (1984, p. 1) refers to the "political hegemony" of a "theocratic, centralized" kingdom.[6]

In every case, archaeologists use mythohistorical accounts about the powers of the Sau Deleurs to explain how the Pohnpei were able to mobilize the labor that went into constructing Nan Madol, despite the fact that these oral traditions consistently describe such powers arising only after the complex was built. In short, archaeologists find these tales about the formidable powers of the Sau Deleurs much too enticing to resist and do not let chronology interfere with an otherwise good story.

If the issue were simply a matter of chronology, it might be argued, I suppose, that in the process of oral transmission through generations of telling and retelling, the sequence somehow became inverted. But the entire corpus of mythohistorical traditions requires qualification. The dramatic struggle between the hero Isokelekel (a classic sky-god type) and the last Sau Deleur (a classic earth-demon) can be mapped onto any number of epic tales found in cultural repertoires from all parts of the globe. I am not

suggesting that no historical figures existed around whom these tales grew up, but that the themes embodied in them tell us far more about basic sociocultural issues than they do about Pohnpei's past (Petersen, 1990a, pp. 77–78).

Ample ethnohistorical evidence demonstrates that in the nineteenth century, long after carbon dates and oral traditions indicate that Nan Madol was completed, the Pohnpei were still undertaking monumental stone masonry (Christian, 1899/1967, p. 217; Gulick, 1857; Hambruch, 1936, pp. 3, 65; Petersen, 1990a, pp. 60–64). Competitive public works lie at the core of Pohnpei's political life; community feasting and the construction of community feast houses mobilize large amounts of labor, even though chiefs today generally lack physically coercive powers. I am inclined to interpret the complex at Nan Madol as the product of a series of essentially competitive construction projects carried on over the course of centuries. The Pohnpei, as they organized themselves in the nineteenth century (and much as they remain today), were capable of doing the stonework that went into Nan Madol's construction. Clearly, vast amounts of labor *were* necessary to complete it. Excepting only the magical powers that the Pohnpei believe were essential to Nan Madol's construction, the evidence from oral traditions, ethnohistorical sources, and ethnographic research suggests that it certainly *could* have been built with competitive—rather than coerced—labor.

The ancestors of the modern Pohnpei constructed Nan Madol over a long period of time. Athens (1984, p. 23) summarizes radiocarbon dates indicating that the site was occupied as early as the first or second century A.D. and that megalithic construction on the Pahn Kedira islet began before A.D. 1200. Ayres, Haun, and Mauricio (1983, p. 128) have obtained radiocarbon dates suggesting to them that construction on Pahn Kedira began circa A.D. 900–1000 and as early as the eighth century A.D. on Usendau islet. Given the amount of time available to them—that is, a millennium or so—there is no reason to suppose that a great amount of labor had to have been mobilized in a short burst of creative energy. The complex may have been built in stages, slowly and sporadically, perhaps sometimes cooperatively and at other times under forms of more domineering leadership.[7]

Nan Madol's location, greeting the rising sun, is considered profoundly sacred. Evidence overwhelmingly indicates that it was primarily a ritual center. Though oral traditions significantly—sometimes radically—differ in their details, there is a marked degree of accord about the special character of the location where Nan Madol was finally sited. Some of the mythohistorical cycles describe a long search for an appropriate spot, others merely

emphasize that this section of reef, identified as Sounahleng (roughly, "sun-in-heaven"), faced the mythologically important, spiritually charged area known as Upwind Katau. In one version we learn that the people who built Nan Madol settled at the site because they were "constantly afraid of the people of the center of Pohnpei," both the various demihuman, cannibalistic creatures and "real people" who resided there (Silten, n.d., pp. 13–15).

We confront an elementary contradiction in Pohnpei's landscape themes here. The site lies out in the open, on the fringing reef, well away from the sometimes enervating closeness of the island's steep valleys, tall peaks, and dense vegetation. Nan Madol represents a degree of openness and freedom. At the same time, it seems best known as the abode of both the Sau Deleurs and Isokelekel. The Sau Deleurs symbolize all that is evil in the eyes of the Pohnpei—they were greedy, ruthless, imperious, and without love—and yet they started out as a decent, honorable line established by the builders of Nan Madol. Indeed, one of them, before the dynasty became corrupted by its own power, was responsible for ridding the island of its cannibal-like creatures. The message here is clear: Absolute power corrupts absolutely. Among the many things Nan Madol is about, one that stands out is the Pohnpei's fear of the island's center and of centralization. Isokelekel symbolizes the end of tyranny and the decentralization of island political life. The island's physical landscape, both in natural and in horticultural terms, matches its symbolic and cultural landscape in its complexities and contradictions. On one hand, the Pohnpei tend to prize the privacy and concealment their dense vegetation provides. On the other, they feel at times oppressed by it. They constructed Nan Madol out on the reef, where it faces the rising sun and the refreshing trade winds. It was in a sense a tribute to openness. The oral traditions, however, report that it was in time compromised, having lent itself to an unacceptable accumulation of power. The Pohnpei, aided by the gods and with help from the spirits of Upwind Katau, were able to overthrow their oppressors. Nan Madol thus stands as a marker of the dangers too much unity can pose.

The Pohnpei have learned they can effectively defend themselves not by banding together as a centrally organized, islandwide unit, but through the acts of individual communities. When we focus closely on what the Pohnpei say when speaking to one another, we hear them emphasizing the importance of local autonomy. Though Nan Madol appears to outsiders—that is, to those who might threaten the island—as evidence of an effectively centralized, tremendously powerful political system that should be capable of defending Pohnpei's shores against intruders, it is charged with a mark-

edly different message for the Pohnpei themselves. If my hunch about the essentially competitive character of the work that went into constructing Nan Madol is correct, then it exemplifies the Pohnpei's ability—seen for instance in their dance performances (Petersen, 1992a)—to make intensely local competition simultaneously serve the island as a whole.

SOME MODERN MEANINGS OF NAN MADOL

To appreciate properly Nan Madol's importance to modern Pohnpei, we must place it in the context of modern Pohnpei's society and culture, which are complex and contradictory. It would be folly for an outsider to say categorically that Nan Madol is this or means that, and yet it *is* some things and not others and *has* some meanings and not others. When Europeans first arrived on the island, the Pohnpei were rather reticent about the complex, and it was sometimes reported that they did not know who built it. For many reasons, some no doubt having to do with the Pohnpei having accustomed themselves to Europeans and others, perhaps, with a certain lessening of fears of supernatural sanctions, some people have grown more willing to talk about Nan Madol. It is possible, however, that the change is mainly owing to the simple matter of finding the right people. Most of what we know about Nan Madol's history comes from a few Pohnpei historians who are charged (through their clan and lineage status) with preserving its history (Bernart, 1977; Hadley, 1981); others are not inclined to speak about what is not theirs to tell (Hanlon, 1992; Petersen, 1993a).

Depending upon what part of the island they are from, their clans and matrilineages, their age and gender, their education and upbringing, and their own personalities, individual Pohnpei have widely different knowledge of and attitudes toward Nan Madol. Many people refer to it as Nan Dowas, which is the large fortress-crypt that dominates the principal entrance into the complex, and when they speak of excursions to the area, which they sometimes make, they literally mean a visit to the fortress—that is, to the complex's most secular precinct and the site charged with guarding it. Few Pohnpei are eager to travel much farther into Nan Madol; few ever visit even Nan Dowas. In my experience most Pohnpei relate not so much to Nan Madol's physical presence as they do to the original processes of constructing it. Throughout the island one encounters large, often fractured, columnar blocks of basalt lying on the ground. These are likely to be described by locals familiar with them as having fallen to earth while the magicians who

built Nan Madol were flying them into place there. In areas along the island's western and northern shorelines, various spots are pointed out as sites where unsuccessful attempts were made to construct the complex before it was ultimately sited in Madolenihmw.

The images and feelings Nan Madol evokes are multiple. For some it is a place of pure awe or respect. For others it retains the largely evil aura associated with the tyrannical Sau Deleurs. For many, Nan Madol is a matter that concerns primarily the Madolenihmw chiefs and people, and so it has only peripheral relevance for the rest of the island. For others, it is a symbol of all that their ancestors were capable of, a somber reminder that people today no longer possess the knowledge and skills of the ancestors. Though Nan Madol is certainly promoted in Micronesia's scant tourism materials and has drawn a good deal of scientific attention, the Pohnpei do not employ it as a public symbol for the island or the state. Pohnpei, as a whole, is symbolized officially either by Dohlap, better known as Sokehs Rock, a massive volcanic headland (resembling Honolulu's Diamond Head) that rises beside the island's harbor and only town, or by a coconut-shell kava drinking cup, representing the Pohnpei's cultural and spiritual values. Nan Madol is both a specific place and a cultural artifact, and as such it belongs to a specific community: the people of Madolenihmw. Any attempt to appropriate or expropriate it would run strongly against the grain of the Pohnpei's respect behavior.

This brings us, then, to the intersection of respect (wahu) and territoriality. Together, these two concepts or themes combine to embody what I think is the most salient modern meaning of Nan Madol. Archaeological and linguistic evidence tell us that Pohnpei's society developed in situ, beginning perhaps 2,000 years ago. There is no evidence that the population has ever been replaced or displaced (which is not to imply that it was never threatened with these possibilities). As in many Pacific Island societies (Rodman, 1992), emotional bonds to the landscape are not simply individual or familial; they run through the totality of social life and culture. Every feature has a name (or several names) and evokes scores of stories. Every vicinity and community has multiple names, layered one atop the other, each representing an epoch and its history. To speak of a place is to make reference to a vast historical archive and to call up century upon century of memories. Pohnpei historiography is much more territorial in its organization than it is chronological. And control over land is not just a question of mere assets but of a people's soul. In recent years an emphasis on what we now speak of as "the invention of tradition" (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Linnekin,

1983) has taught us to view much of what people represent as timeless as actually of relatively recent vintage. But we must recognize that the Pohnpei, who are certainly capable of inventing traditions, have run emotional taproots deep into their land.[8]

Lying at the core of the many meanings of Nan Madol, I think, is a complex message about the importance of decentralization, that is, the notion that the chiefdoms must remain autonomous. The Pohnpei's attachments to their own soil are matched by a larger theme insisting that the attachments of others be equally respected. By Pohnpei lights, Nan Madol was built as a cooperative act of worship, but this process of cooperation led to political centralization. That centralized government is now thought of as symbolizing all that is evil. It was the Sau Deleurs' abuses that ultimately led the gods to conspire against them and thus the Sau Deleurs' downfall was provoked.

THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY

In *The Past Is a Foreign Country* David Lowenthal tells us the notion that "they do things differently there" (1985, p. xvi) is of recent vintage. "Only in the late eighteenth century did Europeans begin to conceive the past as a different realm, not just another country but a congeries of foreign lands endowed with unique histories and personalities" (Lowenthal, p. xvi). He acknowledges, however, that his conclusions refer only to European and European-derived cultures: "Oriental and African views on the past and ideas of heritage are to me virtual *terrae incognitae,* for which equivalent studies might reach radically different conclusions" (p. xxvi). My own study of a large corpus of Pohnpei-language mythohistorical accounts (Petersen, 1990a), and fieldwork conducted over the course of 20 years, convinces me that the Pohnpei have long been inclined to view their past as something that is much like a foreign country, in the sense that many modern Pohnpei view the people and society of ancient Pohnpei as having been distinctly different from the people of today. They recognize these people as their ancestors, to be sure, and trace numerous continuities, but they also believe that their society has changed repeatedly since the island was first settled.

The bulk of these changes took place before Europeans ever arrived on their shores: Most of today's older Pohnpei see themselves as having remained much like their nineteenth century predecessors, despite the many transformations they do see taking place. Moreover, in comparing mythohistorical materials collected in 1910 with accounts set down by the Pohnpei

in the 1920s, 1930s, and the 1970s, there is scant evidence of systematic change in the ways in which the past is represented. Pohnpei's mythohistory remains an essentially oral tradition.[9]

In the early 1970s I had a long conversation about Nan Madol with a high-ranking man in U chiefdom who had done linguistic work with John Fischer, an anthropologist who served in the Trust Territory administration in the early 1950s. This man, Gregorio Donre, told me he had heard explanations of how Nan Madol might have been constructed through the use of rafts, inclined planes made of rubble, and wooden rollers. It all seemed very reasonable, he said, and no doubt could have happened that way. But then he continued, insisting that that was not how the place was built. People in those days were different from the modern Pohnpei, he said. They had much more knowledge and they were endowed with magical powers now lost to their descendants. They were able to fly the materials into place. I believe most Pohnpei of my acquaintance would agree with his assessment.

Another historian (*soupoad*), Ioakim David, has often spoken to me of Pali, a legendary hero (or group of heroes) whom he describes as a man with a "master plan." Pali appears in many Central and Eastern Carolinian tales. His skills and talents vary according to their provenance, but on Pohnpei he is associated with the construction of Nan Madol. Similarly, Silten (n.d.), a Pohnpei who wrote down his own mythohistorical accounts in the 1920s, referred to those who built Nan Madol as "master builders" or "professors" (Petersen, 1990a, pp. 17–19). Nan Madol was constructed, then, with the use of both highly technical skills and magical powers, neither of which now exist to the same degree, say contemporary Pohnpei.

In the "congeries of foreign lands endowed with unique histories and personalities" (Lowenthal, 1985, p. xvi) that Pohnpei's past contains, Nan Madol does serve as something of a constant. The dramatis personae change, their motivations and outlooks change, the functions of the site change, the political systems change, but in the middle of it all Nan Madol stands steadfastly. It serves as a reminder of all these historical changes. To see it—or merely to be reminded of it—is for Pohnpei an event that ratifies the importance of these changes. Perched there on the reef facing each new day, Nan Madol betokens the island's remarkable mythohistory of political experimentation: first anarchy, deliberately replaced by a centralized polity that quickly deteriorated into tyranny, which was in turn forcefully overthrown and replaced by modern Pohnpei's system of decentralized local autonomy.

Colin Williams and Anthony Smith (1983, p. 509) observe that "architecturally impressive ruins . . . are filled with holy memories and charged with collective emotions that far surpass their actual role in history." In this same vein, Lowenthal (1985, p. 245) suggests that relics, ruins, and physical remains can provide unmediated impressions of the past: "Seeing history on the ground is a less self-conscious process than reading about it: texts require deliberate engagement, whereas relics can come to us without conscious aim or effort." On Pohnpei, where nearly every historical account is opposed by a variant tradition, the issue is not so much the mediation of texts as it is the weighing of competing oral accounts. Nan Madol reminds people not only of what their ancestors had to contend with, but also of historical contingency itself.

Nan Madol's landscape tells first of contests—of struggles for an acceptable form of government. The modern system of autonomous chiefdoms was not easily achieved and it is, as a consequence, that much more highly valued. Nan Madol reminds the Pohnpei of what they have to lose, of what threatens them, and of how to hold these threats at bay. They must be ever vigilant about the dangers of centralization and regularly remind themselves that, as an elderly chief once said to me, "One man cannot rule a thousand" (Petersen, 1982).

But even this generalization can be contested. In the same way that some Pohnpei might like to expand their holdings or influence at someone else's expense, others might well be inclined to argue that centralization is a good thing. Indeed, Pohnpei's people confront a classic political problem: how to organize themselves well enough to deter external threats to their freedom without simultaneously creating domestic conditions that threaten those very freedoms (Petersen, 1993a, p. 347). Pohnpei's political life is marked both by well-developed hierarchies and by an ethos of decentralization. Neither pole is supreme; there is endless tension between them.

Framing their own past as a "foreign country," and using the site as a reminder of that past, contemporary Pohnpei now use the lessons of Nan Madol as guidelines in their dealings with foreign countries. In a sense, they reverse the paradigm, regarding foreign countries in the same suspect—or at least problematical—manner they view their own past. In doing so, they illustrate a phenomenon Lowenthal (1985, p. 46) recognizes, that is, that "the past is most characteristically invoked for the lessons it teaches." But while Lowenthal believes "ruins and tombstones" evoke "associations between the observer's own impending demise and the transience of all life . . . and the irretrievability of the past" (p. 375), it is precisely the possibility

of retrieving lessons from Pohnpei's past that gives Nan Madol its immediacy.

This becomes evident as the Pohnpei grow increasingly uncomfortable with the Federated States of Micronesia's (FSM) national government. At first glance, their attitude toward the national government seems entirely unwarranted. Given their strong feelings about local autonomy, nothing would seem more appropriate than an end to American rule and the beginnings of Micronesian self-government. The problem, however, is that Micronesia remains an artificial, essentially colonial category. To the extent that these islands are governed by "Micronesians," they are not being governed by Pohnpei or Kosrae or Yap; that which binds them together is their shared *colonial* history. Moreover, the demography of the FSM is such that more than half of its citizens are from Chuuk State, and the FSM Congress is widely perceived as being controlled by the delegation from Chuuk. The FSM's relationship with the United States, known as "free association," also remains problematic. It is clearly not the independence that a majority of Pohnpei have long pursued.[10] Many Micronesians believe that the free association agreement continues to accord the United States ultimate authority over their islands.[11] Indeed, Pohnpei frustration over the independence issue led their delegates to the 1990 FSM Constitutional Convention to propose an amendment to the constitution that would have added an article permitting secession. When asked if there were Pohnpei who wanted to leave the federation, one of the Pohnpei delegates responded, "All of them."

In the course of this Constitutional Convention, the Pohnpei delegation also proposed other changes that were either of little or no importance to most of the FSM states or that were truly perceived by the others as threats. In particular, the Pohnpei delegation wanted the FSM states to be assigned direct control over land law and immigration, which in effect would have granted them the right to exclude other Micronesians from either moving to Pohnpei or purchasing land there. These proposals are relevant in the present context because they illustrate an attachment to the land that may not be matched by most of their neighbors.[12]

NEW CONTESTS

Following a century of colonial rule and two decades of political status negotiations with the United States, the Pohnpei still do not see themselves as having regained control over their own island. It is in this context that

the current controversy about Nan Madol arises. The Madolenihmw chiefdom is confronting several different challenges to its traditional authority over the site. The Nan Madol Foundation, headed by a former Peace Corps Volunteer (who prepared an excellent historical brochure on Nan Madol in the early 1970s), has been argüing that the site is far too important to Micronesia and humankind to be left solely in Madolenihmw's charge and that to ensure that it is properly maintained and administered, greater oversight must be established. (Compare "'We are preserving these buildings for *mankind*,'" cited in Lowenthal, 1985, p. 285). Pohnpei's former governor, Resio Moses, maintained that as the state's chief executive he had final authority over Nan Madol. Bureaucrats within the constitutional system recognize the site's value as a tourist destination and continue to assert the state's right to assume control over it (Whaley, 1993, p. 4). As Lowenthal observes (p. 46), "Many governments today nationalize their nations' past." And Nan Madol remains on the United States *National Register of Historic Places* (1989), the only one (of 10 listed sites on the island) that was constructed by the Pohnpei themselves rather than by colonial administrations. Although inclusion in the *Register* "does *not* give the federal government control over private property" (and more than three quarters of all sites in the *Register* are privately owned), regulations specify that "federal agencies must review any of their actions that may affect National Register properties, and allow the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, an independent federal agency, an opportunity to comment" (*National Register of Historic Places*, pp. x–xi). It appears that Nan Madol remains at least partly under US supervision.

When we examine the rationales for claims being asserted over Nan Madol, we find that they focus on two factors: upkeep and the charging of fees. Nan Madol, it is claimed, is in danger of falling into disrepair. In his interview with Mr. Whaley, a reporter from Guam, Madolenihmw's *Nahnken* (a sort of secular high chief who reigns in tandem with the more sacred Nahnmwarki, or paramount chief) defended his community's right to retain control over the area. As Whaley describes it (1993, p. 4),

> The ruins are crumbling in parts with thick mangrove swamps growing in the canals that connect different parts of the city. Jungle vines grow within the rocks and dead foliage is scattered throughout the megaliths. Last year, the Nan Madol Foundation was formed to assist in fund-raising efforts for the restoration and maintenance of the area. But that group, headed by an American, did not consult the Nahnmwarki on how the sacred site would be handled.

> "For outsiders, they would say Nan Madol is neglected," said Nahnken Hadley. "But not for us. For us, it is sacred. We do not touch it."

The Nahnken went on to defend the collection of a $3 fee from visitors. "This is not a fee, as such, it is an expression of the ownership by the Nahnmwarki. It informs visitors that our claim is genuine" (Whaley, p. 4). Many readers will probably find these arguments self-serving, but as I have been trying to demonstrate in this essay, Madolenihmw's claims are indeed genuine.

The Pohnpei *are* inclined to allow such overgrowth. It is in the nature of their relationship with the land and their understanding of what Pohnpei's landscape is. Nan Madol is sacred ground, even—perhaps especially—for the Madolenihmw chiefs, and attempts to turn it into a well-trimmed, thoroughly domesticated park or garden constitute a fundamental threat to its essence. Furthermore, much of Nan Madol's meaning derives from its extraordinary ability to weather the elements on its own: It is the only cultural artifact on Pohnpei that can withstand the island's rigorous environment and climate. To undertake regular maintenance procedures would be an affront to much that the site stands for because such procedures would ignore some of Nan Madol's many different meanings for the people of Pohnpei, would wrench the whole out of context, and would impose an essentially Western or American set of values in place of those of the Pohnpei.

Although most Pohnpei continue to practice subsistence farming, they have also been engaged in commercial dealings with the outside world since the 1830s when whalers first began to visit the island for reprovisioning. Over the last 30 years, the vast sums of money that the United States has poured into Micronesia have partly transformed the island's economy. A $3 charge is nominal in Pohnpei's current economy, not an economic imposition. Because the Japanese alienated nearly 70 percent of the island's land during their occupation of the island (1914–1945), and because the US administration long insisted on retaining control over these so-called "public lands," establishing title to the land is tremendously important to the Pohnpei. The paramount chief's fee does serve to demonstrate, in a simple, clear-cut fashion, that Nan Madol is the property of Madolenihmw's paramount chief; it is not public property. Given the emotional resonance of land on Pohnpei, this is an entirely understandable gesture. It also returns us to the central theme of this essay.

CONCLUSION

Among the many things Nan Madol symbolizes is an essentially political point. It is a concrete manifestation of a Pohnpei notion that good government must be small and decentralized. It serves to remind the Pohnpei of the evils attributable to powerful, centralized rule. Madolenihmw's right to control its own territory is absolutely essential to the entire Pohnpei world view. This of course runs thoroughly against the grain of most European political thought and particularly challenges the American ethos that only in unity is there strength. Those who would wrest control of Nan Madol away from Madolenihmw are verifying exactly the threat that the site warns of: the dangers of big government.

Nan Madol is contested landscape; it is also, in Jonathan Smith's phrase, "moral landscape" (Smith, 1994). On one hand, a small community of Pohnpei people assert their right to true local autonomy. But bureaucrats and preservationists want to ensure the viability of Nan Madol as a revenue-generating tourist destination and mount a guard over its architectural heritage in the name of all humankind. Nan Madol reminds the Pohnpei about the dangers inherent in taking on any political form that shifts power away from the local communities, and the current controversy demonstrates the acuity of this advice: The site is threatened by exactly the political processes it warns against. The entire contest is, in a sense, contained within Nan Madol's mythohistory. Foreigners and foreign institutions pose a threat; a proper Pohnpei response to that threat is summed up by the very monument they seek to protect.

Today, Nan Madol serves not only as a marker of an older contested landscape, reminding the modern Pohnpei of mistakes once made, and of mistakes they must continue to avoid, but also as a warning to others about the Pohnpei's willingness to do battle in defense of a cherished way of life. When Madolenihmw's paramount chief says that Nan Madol can only be overthrown by war, he should not be taken lightly.

Notes

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1. My touchstones are Carl Sauer's work, particularly his pioneering "The Morphology of Landscape" (1925) and his *Land and Life* (1963), and the work of the so-called "Berkeley school" he is credited with founding (Price & Lewis,

1993). This approach has recently been described as an "atheoretical abyss of empiricism" (Warf, 1991, p. 705). I trace my own lineage in geography to this tradition and this perhaps helps to explain why I have long considered myself an unrepentant empiricist.

2. In some parts of the island there are open, grassy areas known locally as *mals*. Whether these occur naturally or are the products of human activities has not yet been established.

3. During earlier colonial regimes, road building was an important administrative activity that was rather effectively resisted by the Pohnpei, who appreciated their opponents' lack of mobility.

4. The effects of European influences, especially of Congregational missionaries from Boston, along with German-instituted changes in land tenure, brought about shifts in the Pohnpei's patterns of postmarital residence and land inheritance. Today a tendency toward a male bias is seen in these areas.

5. To offer a more *recherché* comparison, the fox tells Saint-Exupery's Little Prince, "Whatever is essential is invisible to the eye" (Saint-Exupery, 1943/1971, p. 87).

6. Other scholars have written along similar lines; I discuss in detail my objections to this work in Petersen (1990b).

7. Peter Bellwood (personal communication, 1990) has argued that if separate groups of the Pohnpei had built different parts of Nan Madol at different times, they would have been inclined to appropriate stones from previously built structures. But there is great continuity within and among the Pohnpei's communities. Members of a community whose ancestors raised a structure would view it as the product of their own efforts. Were members of another community to make use of materials removed from a previously existing structure, they would run the risks of antagonizing those who built it and, more significantly, of gaining little or no credit for their labors. They would have failed to demonstrate their ability to do the single, most daunting portion of the work entailed in the construction process—that is, move materials to the site.

Michael Graves has suggested that the Lelu site on Kosrae (the nearest high island to the east of Pohnpei), which possesses similar but much less extensive stoneworks, might have been built as part of an "authoritarian, but noncoercive" process that minimized "divisive economic and territorial competition" (1986, p. 12; cf. Cordy, 1993, p. 287). While we share a viewpoint concerning the possibility that the work was accomplished without coercion, we differ in our evaluation of the role played by competition.

8. I have argued that the Pohnpei are much more inclined to draw variant traditions from their vast corpus of historical accounts than they are to "invent tradition" (Petersen, 1992b).

9. Though nearly all Pohnpei are literate in their own language, the only books published in the Pohnpei language are Protestant and Catholic versions of the Bible. Theirs remains an essentially oral tradition.

10. The Pohnpei have consistently called for independence, even though they have been willing to accede to the FSM's majority vote in favor of free association with the United States (Petersen, 1985).

11. The actual political status of the freely associated Micronesian states (the FSM, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau) remains a matter of some debate. Some claim they are independent, others deny this. This issue has been addressed by Michal (1993) and Petersen (1993c).

12. It is important to acknowledge that as the site of the FSM capital, Pohnpei draws far more outsiders than any of the other FSM islands, and this exacerbates tensions there.

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Forum

TIME FOR CHANGE

Joseph F. Ada

This article was the keynote address given at the first US federal–insular area relations conference, "A Time of Change: Relations Between the United States and American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands," held in Washington, DC, February 8–11, 1993.

Good morning, everyone, I am Joseph F. Ada, the Governor of the American colony of Guam. Yes. That is right, the American *colony* of Guam.

Today, I will not engage in the farce of calling Guam's status by other than its rightful name. I will not, at least for today, engage in the gentle deception designed, no doubt, to relieve the guilt felt by a democratic America playing in an imperialist age of expansionism at the beginning of this century. I will not engage in the deception of calling Guam an unincorporated territory. "Unincorporated territory" is such a meaningless term because it can mean anything. But the *truth* of our status is clear. And to the extent that the term "unincorporated territory" clouds the issue and sows confusion as to the *true* nature of Guam's status—to that extent it is a *disgrace* to both Guam and the United States and a *disservice* to truth.

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Therefore, Guam is a colony of America, with all that the term implies. We are a colony, one of the last, in a world which for the most part has turned away from the idea that colonies should or shall exist.

At the end of World War II, more than a hundred colonies were recognized, with America owning a mere 3 or 4 percent of the world total. Today, only 18 colonies are recognized by the United Nations, and America controls about 20 percent of the total, including Guam.

"Colony" is a word that grates against the ear, especially when one uses it in the context of American political action. Because if any nation should realize how repulsive the maintenance of colonies is, it is this American nation, the great achievement of men who were themselves victims of colonialism, victims who overcame their oppressors. If any government on earth should be embarrassed to practice colonialism in the twentieth century, it is the federal government, the child of men who would not tolerate colonialism in the eighteenth century.

Guam exists in circumstances not unlike those borne by America's ancestors who lived, hundreds of years ago, in 13 colonies belonging to the [British] empire, on the Atlantic seaboard of this continent. For example, Guam has not failed to prosper under the American reign. Frequently our prosperity is used by those who oppose self-government for Guam as a means of justifying the colonial nature of our current status. There are those, in circles of federal bureaucracy and elsewhere, who believe that for us to seek self-government and self-determination demonstrates ingratitude to America. They believe that we don't know how well off we are. They believe that we should be satisfied and stop complaining. After all, they believe that America is the *only* reason Guam has anything at all. In short, if you love America, learn to love being a colony.

The claim that Guam owes its prosperity to its colonial status is, of course, *ridiculous.* It is as ridiculous as a similar claim that the [British] empire once made against the 13 colonies in America because, more than 200 years ago, the English colonies in America were prosperous, even under a colonial system. Philadelphia, Boston, and New York were already great cities. Tobacco plantations throughout the South produced great wealth for Americans who would one day lead their nation. America was the brightest diamond in the English crown, and many prominent English statesmen and thinkers believed that America was vital to English wealth and prosperity.

And yes, the English statesmen of the day wondered what the colonies in America were complaining about. They also noted the prosperity of America, her natural abundance. They considered the prosperity of colonists in

America to be due to the protection and contributions of England, and they wondered about the lack of gratitude of the American colonists. How could the Americans be so ungrateful to their mother country, England?

The prosperity of the thirteen colonies did not make them any less eager for freedom. Why shouldn't the same be true of Guam and the modern colonies?

There are other similarities between Guam and the 13 colonies. As another example of such similarity, consider that Guam retains a strong affinity and affection for the United States, despite almost 100 years of American colonial rule. Enemies of self-government and self-determination for Guam use this fact as well, claiming that such affection must preclude the existence of injustice in our relationship. Yet the American colonists maintained deep affection for England in the years immediately leading up to 1776. It took decades of English insensitivity and arrogance to drive from the Americans their natural love for, and loyalty to, England.

When England first passed the Stamp Act in 1758, the American colonies objected strongly. They asked to be allowed to tax themselves and then pass the revenues on to England, as opposed to the English desire to directly tax the colonists. In their formal protests—asking for this simple grant, a simple recognition of their right to some degree of sovereignty—they made clear their abiding loyalty to England and their desire to continue a close relationship with England. But the English ignored this, and stubbornly held on to what they viewed as their organic right to dispose of the colonies as they saw fit. The principle of unlimited power over their colony was more important than any practical consideration of maintaining good relations. I would be misspeaking if I did not say that I have noticed precisely this attitude in several sectors of the federal government in this day and age. And of course, history records the result of England's insensitivity.

If America's love for England could not dissuade Americans from their struggle to be free, why should Guam's affection for America be expected to divert us from ours? We have affection for America, but that affection should not be taken for granted.

We in Guam are asking for the simple recognition of our right to be self-governing. It is a right so basic, so intrinsic to the condition of being human, that it requires no justification; indeed, justifying that we deserve this right is insulting.

For almost 300 years—ever since that fateful day when the [Spaniards], who wanted our land for their own, ever since the conquest of our ancestors—we have been denied self-government. Nothing has changed this. In the past

three centuries, we have been ruled by Spanish governors appointed by Madrid, Japanese naval and army officers chosen in Tokyo, US naval captains and appointees of the United States president selected in Washington, DC. This has been so because every power to administer us, including the United States, has simply looked at us as property.

Guam is a colony. It is ultimately ruled by a government that we have no part in constituting, namely the federal government of the United States. The federal government rules us without our consent. We are not even provided an opportunity to give consent. Indeed, our right to consent at all is not recognized by the federal government. This makes Guam a colony, and it makes the US administration of Guam colonial.

The federal government has unlimited power over us. It can do what it wishes with our land. It can throw us off our land. It can condemn it in large quantities. It can use it for its own purposes. And what we feel about it, in the end, doesn't matter. They have the power.

We know this to be true because it has happened to us. For those of you who are unaware, one third of Guam is in the hands of the federal government, in the form of military bases. The military previously held even more land. The areas condemned by the military were not virgin, unsettled lands. Guam has always had an indigenous population, the Chamorro people. In order to build the bases, many of our people lost their homes and farms. And today, even with the end of the Cold War, even with a massive reduction in the military presence in Guam, even though the military does not use thousands of acres of property it has taken, the federal government is slow to return our land to us. This is not entirely surprising because Guam has always been and remains today, to the federal government, property.

Guam has no recognized rights to the resources of its own oceans, despite the fact that our Chamorro people have used these resources traditionally for many centuries. The federal government retains all that but, again, from their perspective that makes sense, doesn't it? They believe our oceans are their property.

The powers of the federal government over our people are just as broad, just as unlimited, as their power over our land and seas. It is the federal government alone that reserves the power to determine all our political rights, all our human rights—all of them. That is why for 50 years a naval captain ruled our people like a medieval prince. His word, *just his word,* was our law. If he didn't like people whistling on Sundays, then that was illegal. That is not a joke. That really happened. That is why for an additional 20 years a civilian appointee of the same federal government enjoyed powers

almost as broad over us and why even today—although we go through the motions of electing our own legislature and governor—the federal government reserves to itself the right to overrule all our laws, overthrow our government, and unilaterally establish any law over our people that it wishes, without restriction. Numerous federal court decisions, from as early as the insular cases beginning in 1901 right up to the past year, make it clear that this is true.

Tomorrow, if it chose to, the federal government could take away our civil rights, abolish our elected government, restore us to navy rule, even tear up our US passports and sell us, lock, stock, and barrel to another nation. But again, from their perspective, that all makes sense because they believe our *people,* like our land and our seas, are their property.

The true federal interest in Guam is clear. It is the same interest the federal government has always had, since the very beginning, since the day that Guam was included as a spoil of war in the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish-American conflict. That interest, then, now, and forever, is purely strategic—purely military in nature.

What did the federal government see in Guam in 1899? [It saw] a coaling station for the coal-fired naval vessels common at the time, a coaling station, in the middle of the western Pacific, valuable to a navy interested in projecting power into Asia. Later, coal was replaced by oil, and Guam's importance diminished as a military base. So much so that in the years leading up to World War II, America refused to make any provisions for the defense of Guam. Guam was surrendered to the Japanese without a single American shot fired. The only defense offered was by our own Chamorro Insular Guard.

In 1944 America recaptured Guam while skipping over other islands in the Pacific. Why? Because American bombers could strike Japan from airstrips in Guam. The bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were launched from our sister Marianas Island of Tinian, only a hundred or so miles to the north of us.

In the immediate postwar period, the new federal global superpower needed Guam again as a major western Pacific military base in its sworn mission to stop the expansion of communism in Asia. Much of our island was simply taken, as I said earlier, often against the wishes of our people, who were displaced. [Land was taken for] naval bases for servicing and provisioning ships, communications stations and espionage listening stations, a strategic air command base complete with its complement of hydrogen bombs—all set to destroy Siberia or China or wherever else they might be sent. Underneath our very beds were enough nuclear weapons to kill billions.

In the interests of America, our small island, our people, became a prime target for nuclear attack. Guam was once again strategically important and of value to the federal government—as always, a strategic piece of property.

The primary interest of the federal government has always been military. It surely wasn't cultural [because] American policy in the first 60 years seemed designed to eradicate our native language and remove the cultural distinctions that make of our Chamorro people a nation. It wasn't economic. America has never invested much in the development of Guam's economy. Private investment by American companies is notable only in its absence. Federal policies [have been economic impediments, such as] the maintenance of a security clearance requirement for anyone entering Guam, a clearance lifted only in the '60s, a security clearance that required even of returning Chamorros military approval to come home, a clearance that made us prisoners in our own land. This, together with trade policies which have made trade between Guam and America virtually impossible—and [which] have indeed destroyed two manufacturing industries in Guam—[and] the simple economic strain of having so much of our land in federal hands, all these have been impediments to our development, not a catalyst for growth. Indeed, today our people have found a way to build a prosperous private economy independent of our relationship with America, with scarcely any American involvement at all.

No, it was never economic. The military, in correspondence during the '50s and even the early '60s, argued against the development of a private economy for Guam as being against the primary interests of the United States, which were identified in writing as strategic. Indeed, the military views expressed at the time simply bore greater witness to that recurring truth. Guam's value to America, and America's primary interest in Guam, was real estate. The existence and the activities of the Chamorro people of Guam, who had lived there for centuries, were viewed as a nuisance if not a threat to that military purpose. Bill Donovan, the great OSS spy and father of the modern CIA, wrote in the late forties that the people of Guam should even be denied citizenship until at least the year 2000.

We all recognize that the primary federal interest in Guam is military. There is no use debating it. Indeed, it truly doesn't bother us anymore. Let us accept this and move on. We understand the federal interest. It is time for the federal government to understand ours. It is simple. We wish to build our *own* prosperity. And we wish to be self-governing and free.

I believe we can meet both our interests. And that is what commonwealth for Guam is all about. We can guarantee America's strategic interest

in Guam *only* if [America] will guarantee our interest in self-government and *only* if [America] will provide our Chamorro people with the opportunity to exercise self-determination, both of which are necessary to create a stable political and economic environment in Guam.

How can the federal government guarantee this? We don't want or need billions in federal money; that's not what we need. We need the federal government simply to limit its unilateral power over us.

The crux of commonwealth to us is a relationship of mutual consent: a relationship where the power of the federal government unilaterally to change our status, change agreements we arrive at, and impose unilateral federal law upon us is restricted. We just want an equal right to agree. Only by giving us the right of consent can our people truly be empowered.

Guam, unlike our friends from Puerto Rico, has no hope of ever becoming a state in the Union, at least not in the foreseeable future. Thus, we have no possibility of ever achieving full and equal representation or participation in the federal government. Nor would we be satisfied with less than full and equal representation. We have no desire to institutionalize our second-class status by agreeing to a scheme of representation that makes someone from Guam less represented than someone from California. If we cannot achieve full representation, then *no degree* of representation at all is the answer.

Our options are three. We can remain a colony. But *that we will not do,* under any circumstances. Or we can be fully independent. That is not what we seek at this time, nor does it reflect, we believe, the desires of the federal government. There is only one other alternative: a partnership, a relationship of mutuality, a *covenant* between us describing our relationship and protected by a contractual agreement that neither party will unilaterally change the relationship or impose its will on the other without mutual consent. Mutual consent is the core of the new and unprecedented relationship that we call commonwealth.

We cannot make this any more basic. For us the essence of commonwealth is mutual consent. Without it, no autonomy for our people exists. Without it, our people are sovereign citizens of no land, only subjects of the federal government. Without it, there is no stability to our relationship and [we experience] great difficulty in our efforts to continue to build our economy on our own. Without it, we remain a colony.

One way or another, we will not remain a colony.

The need for mutual consent was hammered home to us again by our treatment at the hands of the previous administration's task force [when it

looked] at our status change initiative. Over the course of 2 years, we worked out agreements with them on many important points in our quest for a new political status. In a report, released just hours before the end of that administration, this federal task force reneged on agreements we had reached. They made proposals to change our draft Political Status Act, [proposals] we had never even seen before, and they misrepresented our position on a number of issues.

We will not go through that again.

We need mutual consent. If an agreement between Guam and the federal government can change in just a few months, what assurance can we have over the course of years?

We are calling on President Clinton to appoint a direct and personal representative to conduct future discussions with Guam. We must know that the federal representative we speak to does have the ear of the president and can represent his views. No collection of midlevel bureaucrats will suffice. I am pleased to announce that Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbit agrees with this and has agreed to help us obtain just such an appointment. I have met him four times now in the past few weeks, and I wish to thank him for [his] graciousness.

President Clinton has captured the imagination of the nation and the world with his recognition of diversity and his call for inclusion, his belief in the empowering of people. What could be a greater recognition of diversity than the recognition of the political and cultural rights of our Chamorro people, which have been ignored so long by the federal government, as well as recognizing the Chamorro people's right to self-determination? What could be a more meaningful inclusion than the inclusion of the people of Guam in the process of deciding our own future and the laws and policies that affect us? What could be more empowering than giving us the power to govern ourselves?

Although these remarks may seem cynical in tone, I am at heart an idealist. I believe that President Clinton, once he becomes aware of the territorial plight, aware of the continuation of colonial practice at the hands of the government he is president of, will be compelled by his decency and compassion to act. I believe that the rank and file of America, if only they knew the colonialism practiced by bureaucrats upon us, would support our cause. I believe that America is too great a nation not to rise to the demands of its heritage and human decency and set us free.

It is our curse that we are small in number and easily overlooked. It is easy to oppress the invisible and the unheard. Few know that we exist,

much less our history. I ask all of you in attendance today to help us carry the message of our history to every American. Let us be free.

This conference is called "A Time of Change." Had I named it myself, I would have called it "A Time *for* Change," because change is desperately needed. One way or another, colonialism for Guam and the other territories must and will end.

America has spent the precious blood, the young unfulfilled lives of its sons, and ours, to purchase liberty for people in foreign lands. Yet America denies liberty to Guam, even though the achievement of it will only require the stroke of a pen. America has, in its own way, taught its colonies the history of its own struggle for freedom from a colonial master. We have observed and learned well, and must have it for ourselves. We are not ungrateful for some of the good things America has done, but no self-respecting people would make the loss of their liberty the price of their gratitude. We are not ungrateful, but we are *unwilling to remain a colony.* It is incumbent upon the federal government to insure that the ending of colonialism occurs in a manner that meets both its needs for security and our need to be stable and free.

This conference will be examining options. For us in Guam, that process is over. We have conducted plebiscites. Our people have spoken. We know what we want. We have examined the options and we have made our proposal. It is good for us. It is truly good for America. I hope that proposal is accepted, and soon. As always we will work with men and women of good faith, in America and elsewhere, to achieve this. I, as governor of Guam, our Congressman Robert Underwood, the members of the Guam Commission on Self-Determination, the elected representatives of our people in the legislature (regardless of political party)—every Guam patriot is dedicated to winning this struggle for justice for the people of Guam.

But we cannot be engaged in a process forever. We *will not* be engaged in a process forever. We cannot just talk about this forever. Change requires more than discussion. It requires *action.*

The time for action is now.

One way, or another.

ISSUES FOR THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC INSULAR AREAS: THE CASE OF GUAM

Wilfred P. Leon Guerrero

John C. Salas

This article is adapted from an oral presentation given at the conference, "Looking to the Future: The 2nd National Conference on Relations Between the United States and American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Micronesia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands," that was held in Washington, DC, May 24–27, 1994.

We express our appreciation to the organizing committee for the invitation and the opportunity to make a presentation at this national conference on relations between the United States and its insular areas.

Our approach in presenting the Guam case is one of personal perspectives. We thought this approach would add to the diversity of the conference and provide greater insight into the issues at hand. This is after all a conference on relationships between people, and it seems quite appropriate to have presentations on personal perspectives.

Both of us were born in the 1940s. We grew up in post–World War II Guam. At the time we were growing up, the Cold War was in full swing. In addition, the war in Korea broke out in the early 1950s and later, in the 1960s, the war in Vietnam erupted. In all three of these wars the United States viewed Guam as an important military outpost vital to the security of the United States. We were thus greatly influenced by a military environment.

We believe that our perspective is typical of other Chamorro perspectives, particularly those who grew up in post–World War II Guam. Admittedly, we are not typical Chamorros in that both of us have obtained advanced

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degrees. Nonetheless, our perspective is based on our experiences growing up in military Guam at a time when US national security was a major concern.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

We begin our presentation by familiarizing you with our island's history, particularly as it relates to our quest for a better political status.

It has been estimated that when Ferdinand Magellan came to our island in 1521, there were as many as 100,000 Chamorros on Guam. Self-government was in place through a three-tiered caste system. Membership in a caste was determined by birth. Those belonging to the highest caste governed everyone else.

The subsequent arrival of a Spanish administration not only ended Chamorro self-government but also greatly reduced the Chamorro population—eventually to about 5,000 people.

Guam became a spoil of war as a result of the Spanish-American War. In 1898 the island was ceded to the United States and remained under US control until World War II. Japan invaded and occupied the island in December 1941 and held it until the Americans returned in July 1944.

In the 1930s the Chamorros sent a delegation to Washington, DC, to request US citizenship. There was no response to the request, perhaps because the US military had strong objections to Chamorros becoming US citizens.

In 1950 the Organic Act of Guam was enacted into law. The act provided US citizenship to the people of Guam. It also designated the island as an unincorporated territory of the United States.

From the very beginning of this new relationship with the United States, Guam's leaders began working to make changes in the Organic Act and to attain increased self-government. Among the issues that were brought up early on were compensation for property taking and access to confiscated property. These two items have yet to be resolved.

Among the more successful efforts was the change in the US Navy's "closed port" policy. In 1962 President Kennedy lifted the naval security clearance required of all who were entering our island. This change made it possible for Guam to develop a tourist industry because, without this change, the island's economy would still probably be totally dependent on US spending.

Another important change instigated by island leaders was an amendment to the Organic Act that allowed the people of Guam to elect their own governor. This was accomplished in 1970.

Still another event of significance occurred in 1976 when the people of Guam were allowed to draft a constitution for Guam. The constitution itself was voted down by the people because many were offended by the US Congress having supreme authority over local constitutional process. What was important was that the Guam constitution issue crafted an awareness on the island of the need to address the issue of political status.

A Commission on Self-Determination was created by Guam law. This commission, whose presence is obvious at this conference, has been given the task of obtaining commonwealth status for Guam.

Now we would like to present our personal perspectives.

PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES

We grew up as Americans. Or rather we grew up thinking we were full-blooded Americans. Never mind that we couldn't vote in presidential elections. Never mind that we didn't have a representative in the US Congress. We were after all only a territory. Those things could come when we become "politically mature."

Our culture was a modified version of motherhood, apple pie, Pepsi-Cola, and Chevrolet. We knew we were not mainstream Americans. But that was because we were 6,000 miles from the US mainland. Note that we referred to the United States as the US mainland. We viewed ourselves as being part of a nation called the United States of America.

Just about anything we did was in relation to the US mainland. Right after World War II, we lived in quonset huts. Thus the mainland was the land of giant quonset huts. Standards came from the US mainland. For example, our educational test scores were compared annually with the mainland test scores. Of course, we were always below the norm.

At some point it was concluded that deficiency in the use of the English language was a major impediment to the process of the Americanization of the Chamorros. Hence a mandate was issued prohibiting the use of the Chamorro language on all school grounds. Any students speaking their native Chamorro language were subjected to paying fines. Chamorro was out and English was in.

The history of Guam and its people was largely ignored. To be sure, we did learn that Guam was "discovered" by Ferdinand Magellan in March 1521. And we were taught that Guam was a *territory* of the United States, not a *possession* as some encyclopedias would have you believe. This distinction was and still is an important one. We guess that someone had decided that young Chamorros should not grow up thinking that they were owned by the US government.

Our idols and inspirations, be they in the world of entertainment, the political world, or the academic world, were mostly to be found on the US mainland. We were extremely proud of Alan Shepherd's flight into space. We knew we could beat the Russians if we put our mind to it. We were very saddened and touched by the tragic death of James Dean. Looking back we can't explain why we were so touched by Dean's death. James Dean typified a personality that is foreign to young Chamorros. We enjoyed John Wayne movies. We particularly enjoyed the cowboy and Indian movies that always had a happy ending when the Indians were defeated.

When the conflict in Vietnam erupted, the great majority of our friends and classmates enlisted in the military services; this pattern followed one set earlier by our older brothers and friends who had enlisted during the Korean conflict. We were and still are very patriotic. On a per capita basis, Guam suffered more casualties during the Vietnam conflict than any other ethnic group. But that was the price we paid for protecting the American way of life.

In 1962 we were shocked and surprised to learn that a naval clearance was needed to enter our island. With the passage of the Organic Act of Guam in 1950, we had assumed that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had jurisdiction over migration to Guam. But for 12 years after we became Americans, the US Navy was controlling who could and could not enter our island. The control was complete. It was not limited to non-US citizens; the clearance requirement was also extended to US citizens, including returning Guam residents.

Employment opportunities were limited to government employment either in the government of Guam or the federal government. A private sector economy was almost nonexistent. The private companies that did exist catered mostly to the military activities and were brought in by the military. Consequently, career opportunities were limited and restricted to employment within a government-financed economy.

We grew up in an environment where the American concepts of entrepreneurship and individualism were missing. Indeed, we grew up in a

consumptive society where almost everything we consumed was brought to the island from elsewhere. We depended on the government (federal and local) for employment and on the shipping lines for goods. Very little was produced or manufactured locally.

The work force pattern was such that we had our adequate share of managers and professionals, most of whom were mainlanders. We also had a limited number of skilled and highly trained technicians who were mostly from the Philippines. The great majority of the work force, who were Chamorros, were semiskilled and unskilled workers. Thus, young Chamorros were handicapped by the lack of role models and had generally low levels of aspiration in terms of career choices.

The Americanization of Guam resulted in Chamorros enjoying a higher standard of living compared with our neighboring islands. Democratic ideals were instilled in the minds of the Chamorros. We succumbed to the American sense of justice. By and large we accepted it and believed that it was a better form of government. We particularly subscribed to the "openness" form of society associated with the democratic ideals of mainstream United States.

Unfortunately, the concept of openness was totally ignored in the Americanization of Guam. In the Americanization process we almost lost our identity. For example, we refer to our brothers and sisters from our neighboring islands as "Micronesians." We do not think of ourselves nor do we refer to ourselves as Micronesians. Guam, however, is part of Micronesia.

A new term, "Guamanian," was concocted to describe the natives of Guam. We were brought up with the belief that Chamorros were no longer in existence and that we were a mixture of Chamorro, Spanish, Mexican, Filipino, and American. In fairness to the US military, many Guam residents, particularly those with strong Spanish heritage, also encouraged the thinking that Chamorros were extinct.

The denial of the existence of Chamorros, together with the emphasis on the use of the English language mentioned earlier, almost caused Guam the loss of its Chamorro identity. We were led to believe that we had no culture of our own.

Land taking was another instance in which the federal government via the military was less than candid in its dealings with the people of Guam. Immediately after Guam's recapture in World War II, approximately 40 percent of the island was occupied by the US military. Understandably, there was no resistance to the land taking on the Chamorros' part. The war with Japan was, after all, not over yet.

The great majority of landowners were under the impression that the land occupation by the military was temporary. It should be noted that in the Chamorro culture, allowing others temporary use of your land is a common practice. Regrettably, much of the land has yet to be returned.

In the case of one of us, property belonging to in-laws was only partially condemned; however, what was not condemned, which is about 48 hectares, was landlocked inside a military base. The family, who have been paying taxes on the land for nearly 50 years, still do not have access to their property. The father died with this question unanswered: How can a government that stands for "justice for all" deliberately and intentionally condemn and landlock properties? To this day the family has still to work out a solution with the federal government.

Ironically, the Chamorros demonstrated their loyalty to the United States throughout the Japanese occupation of Guam; this family was not an exception. In fact, the family members were awarded the Medal of Freedom (the highest recognition for civilians) for harboring a US Navy man during the Japanese occupation.

The federal government was also less than open in regard to our economic development potential. We were led to believe that, other than through federal spending, there was no possible way that our island could develop economically. Indeed, we do not have any natural resources to speak of. So we had resigned ourselves to accepting the idea that federal spending was the only way our island could get new money. Also, we had resigned ourselves to the idea that, because of a lack of investors, our island was destined to be a welfare community depending on the federal government for handouts.

We now know this is not going to be the case. In fact we know that it would be better for both Guam and the US government if Guam were to have an economy separate and independent of federal spending. After the lifting of the naval clearance in 1962, the island's economy started to improve. We discovered that there are investors who are willing to invest on Guam. We are also convinced that the strategic location of the island that made it important from a military standpoint would be equally important in such areas as transportation, communication, and so forth.

The island is already doing very well in its tourist industry. Many of Guam's visitors come from Asia, particularly Japan. It is one of the few places where Japan's trade surplus with the United States is being offset. It would be good for both Guam and the federal government if the United States, in its dealings with Pacific rim countries, promoted Guam's strategic

location with respect to trade, transportation, and communication, among other activities. We urge adoption of policies and practices that encourage Guam to continue to be self-sufficient. We believe that with economic growth and economic development, Guam residents will be empowered.

We understand Guam's importance to national security. We believe that the best way to protect US military interests is to ensure that Guam has a strong economy. The practice and policy of keeping Guam dependent on federal government spending only ensures that certain bureaucrats maintain their demagogue status. The United States does not need to create and maintain a welfare state to protect its national interest.

The people of Guam have already established a record of being able to manage their own local government. Since the creation of the Government of Guam by the US Congress in 1950, the people of Guam have operated their government without subsidy from the federal government. What the people of Guam need is the removal of restrictive laws and regulations impeding the island's growth and the elimination of condescending attitudes.

We value highly our US citizenship. We believe, however, that our US citizenship status is on shaky ground and would like to have it protected.

We were granted US citizenship unilaterally by the US Congress in 1950 by the passage of the Organic Act of Guam, which designated the island as an "unincorporated territory" of the United States. The unincorporated territory status gives the US Congress almost unlimited power over Guam, including the US citizenship status of the people. Presumably, the US Congress can unilaterally terminate our US citizenship.

One of the things that the proposed Commonwealth Act of Guam will do, if enacted into law, is that it will ensure that our US citizenship will be based on a covenant between the United States and Guam. Our citizenship, then, would not be subject to the whims of Congress.

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BYE BYE MS. AMERICAN PIE: THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CHAMORROS AND FILIPINOS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM

Vicente M. Diaz

This article is adapted from an oral presentation given at the "Charting Guam's Future Conference" sponsored by the University of the Philippines Alumni of Guam, February 20, 1993, Palace Hotel, Tamuning, Guam.

> There we were all in one place
> a generation lost in space.

This couplet from a stanza of Don McLean's popular 1970s ballad, American Pie, aptly describes a moment at the closing night of the "Time of Change," a national conference on federal–colonial relations held in Washington, DC, last week. In the foyer outside the closing banquet hall, amidst the mingling of delegates from America's "insular" areas of Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, there we were, "all in one place," six displaced Filipinos from Guam and Hawai'i, wondering what the hell we were doing at a conference spirited by indigenous calls for self-determination by people of the islands that we call our homes. Although we could legitimize our presence with various excuses, such as scholarship or political affinity or even professional careers, each of us would also confess to personal histories of discomfort and ambivalence among the Chamorros and Hawaiians on whose lands we have been allowed to live.

The charges levied throughout the conference called out an ongoing American history of colonization, something that threatened many people,

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especially people in the federal government.[1] Perhaps a part of the uneasiness felt by me and my *magkababayan* stemmed from a recognition of a certain complicity in America's colonial legacy in these "insular" areas. It is, after all, through a history of American imperialism and colonialism—through federal policies of immigration, through congressional enactments—that we gained the privilege of citizenship in places like Guam and Hawai'i and the Northern Mariana Islands. It is a history of imperialism and colonialism still unresolved and still vile for indigenous inhabitants such as the Chamorros, such as the Hawaiians, who have never exercised any true right to determine freely the kind of status they would enjoy in the international arena. There is a deeper history, of course, than that which simply allowed us to become privileged travelers to Guam, Hawai'i and Washington, DC, for our very residence in troubled American spots such as these, driven by our parents' and grandparents' desires for the better life that America is supposedly all about, is itself a product of European and American imperialism and neocolonization.[2] The migration to a better, more prosperous, more dignified life—the promises of America—has much to do with Euro-American imperialism and hegemony and their social and cultural upheavals abroad. Hence, the travels and travails of the oppressed and the dispossessed in troubled spaces in America—the colonized and the neocolonized inside and outside America and the status of "America" itself—are the threads by which I want to have us rethink the nature of relations between Filipinos and Chamorros this morning. Indeed, the bid not of a change, but *for* a change in political status (as Governor Ada renamed the conference) in fact challenges some of the deep-rooted self-definitions of what America is all about. And the bid for a change helps us understand the nature of the tension between Chamorros and Filipinos who, I suspect, have more in common than is known or admitted. I say this with full acknowledgment of the real and rich differences in the cultures and constructed "nationalities" between the two.[3]

I begin my presentation on historical relations between Chamorros and Filipinos with this scene in Washington, DC, and this particular song about the disillusionment of the American dream, because they help clarify the emotional tension between Filipinos and Chamorros in the troubled Americanized island of Guam, especially because this tension is framed within the context of Guam's quest for commonwealth status. The current political movement to exercise Chamorro self-determination and greater political autonomy that is expressed in the Commonwealth Bill before the United States Congress raises the troubled issue of relations between Chamorros

and non-Chamorros, issues that have yet to be handled in productive and inspiring ways. I do not pretend to be able to resolve the tensions, but I offer a commentary enabled by formal study of colonial history and struggles for decolonization, and informed by living, literally, in the borders between Chamorro and Filipino legacies in the American colony of Guam.

My presentation focuses particularly on the historical relations between Chamorros and Filipinos in Guam at two levels. First I will provide a cursory outline of the bigger picture that sets the stage, that is, of the prehistorical migrations in and out of Southeast Asia and the history of Spanish and American colonial rule that have shaped and contorted the relations. Second, I will give a sense of the tension surrounding this history; more important, I hope to illustrate some moments that provide what we can call "counter-colonial" struggles. Essentially, I want to contextualize briefly the terms of the relations between Filipinos and Chamorros in Guam along an ongoing colonial legacy, to provide a sense of the complexity of the relations. Finally, I will close with some anecdotes from that legacy that leave us with some tactics for addressing some of the tension and for seeking moments of solidarity in the ongoing process of Chamorro self-determination and Guam's quest for political autonomy and economic prosperity for everybody.

OVERVIEW OF PREHISTORICAL AND HISTORICAL RELATIONS

Here I want to give a general sense of the bigger picture that has shaped the local relations between Chamorros and Filipinos. In fact, Chamorros and Filipinos have common ancestral origins in Southeast Asia. Chamorros descend from traders and seafarers from Southeast Asia who passed through Indonesia, Malaysia or the Philippines and who decided to settle in what has come to be called the Marianas archipelago. Chamorros and Filipinos—and other Asian and Pacific peoples—speak languages that share a common origin and they share common ceramic traditions and navigation and maritime technologies, including the use of the outrigger. It is certainly plausible to say (and there is increasing evidence to support it) that there was prehistorical traffic in people, ideas, and products long before the Europeans stumbled into this region. Long before the Chamorros saved Magellan's life in 1521 (so that the Filipinos could have the distinction of taking his life soon after), Filipinos and Chamorros engaged in a commerce of ideas and products and genes. This multiple kinship would continue in historical times, revealing

multiple moments of solidarity and contention, now under the yoke of Spanish, American, and Japanese masters.

In historical times, as can be surmised from their names, the people from what has come to be called the Philippine and Marianas archipelagoes also maintained common kinship in their respective bids to maintain their senses of peoplehood against encroaching systems that were determined to subjugate if not eradicate them. Chamorros and Filipinos are also cousins in colonial and neocolonial struggles, respectively under Spain and the United States and Japan. The administrative machinery under the Spanish *imperio* enlisted and forced Filipino soldiers and assistants to help protect and maintain its desires over the Chamorros from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twentieth century. The Marianas were the site of voluntary and forced Filipino "labor" in the service of missionaries and civil authorities (who backed the missionaries) against rebellious Chamorros. Many lay Filipinos died in the service of establishing the mission: In fact, Father Juan Ledesma, the American-Filipino Jesuit historian who wrote the deposition on which the 1985 successful beatification of San Vitores rested, told me that he is trying to push for the canonization of the Filipino martyrs of the Marianas mission station.

And yet, the history of Filipinos among the Chamorros at this time reveals individuals who also went against the established grain. There were Spaniards and Filipinos who posed, according to Padre Francisco Garcia, "great harm" to the efforts to save the *Indios* (Higgins, 1939a, p. 123). This should not surprise us, for as Vicente Rafael (1988) shows us, the history of a conversion to Catholicism in the Philippines was itself a complex series of what we might call "mutual but unequal appropriation" between colonizer and colonized. In the annals of the mission story in Guam, moreover, we find equal complexity and ambivalence: In one particular case we find a Filipino dubbed as "a treasure" to the missionaries for his "return" to the church after falling from grace (Higgins, 1939a, p. 123). This Filipino arrived with the missionaries and served as a translator, only to "go over to the side of the infidels" for 8 years and "live among them as if he were not a Christian" (Higgins, 1939a, p. 123). According to Garcia, this native was placed by God "in our hands although he himself was reluctant" (Higgins, 1939b, p. 30). He eventually repented, says Garcia, and the padres forgot the past and embraced him "as if he were another prodigal son" (Higgins, 1939b, p. 30). I wonder just what the "reluctance" was and wonder, too, about the circumstances surrounding that "repentance."

After the Chamorro-Spanish wars of the seventeenth century, which featured Chamorros who refused to submit to Spanish Catholicism against missionaries and their Chamorro and Filipino agents, other Filipino men were imported to the island to help rejuvenate a fledgling Chamorro society. The historical records read as if the Chamorros were but helpless, passive objects of external activities. Filipinos and other men were brought in to intermarry with local women. But it would be more appropriate to say that Filipino men were among those other foreigners who, in marrying Chamorro women, were the objects acted upon. For everybody knows who rules the home. Chamorro women married non-Chamorro men (for it is commonly said that the Chamorro men died out) and proceeded to bear Chamorro children who spoke the Chamorro language. In their roles as mothers, particularly as protectors of the family, writes Laura Souder (1987, p. 3), Chamorro women earned the privileged distinction as the makers and shapers of Chamorro history and cultural continuity. Thus were Filipino men incorporated into the body of Chamorro society by the protector of what has come to be called *kustumbren Chamorro.* Outsiders were used for insiders' purposes. But even earlier, during the height of the wars between resilient Chamorros and encroaching outsiders, Chamorro women and Chamorro mothers of these women who were married to non-Chamorro men played active roles in history. An example of this is found in what the French Jesuit LeGobien (1700/1949, p. 143) called a particular "deceit" by Chamorro women who sought to sway a Filipino commander and his Filipino troops who were themselves married to Chamorro women. The mothers of these Chamorro wives had gone to the fortress in Agaña under the pretext of bringing refreshments to their daughters. Their real purpose was to "corrupt" their Filipino sons-in-law. The Filipino commander, a certain Masongsong, was approached by his Chamorro mother-in-law who proceeded to lecture him about how shameful it was for Filipinos to be the slaves of the Spaniards, to work for people who had "subjected their country and placed their nation in irons" (LeGobien, p. 143). The woman also noted that the time was favorable to "shake off the yoke" (LeGobien, p. 143) and that it would not be right for him and his wife, the woman's daughter, to die in disgrace, that is, in the service of Spain. She told him that he should kill the governor and "unite with the Marianos who would regard him as their liberator" (LeGobien, p. 143). What does Masongsong do? He goes straight to the governor and narcs[4] on the conspiracy. Other Filipinos under him, however, defected. Masongsong warned the governor: "I have only one bit of advice to give you. Distrust the Filipinos in your service, for they may

allow themselves to be corrupted. Double your guard. Hereafter, entrust the safety of your person only to Spaniards" (LeGobien, p. 144). Masongsong's mother-in-law was promptly arrested.

By the end of the nineteenth century and even after, the Chamorros played host to Filipino troublemakers who challenged Spanish authority. There was, as one might imagine, ambivalence in the relations. Some Filipinos acquiesced and were assimilated into Chamorro society; others tried to instigate local uprisings. Some Chamorros agreed with them in the quest to overthrow the imperio, others were just as quick to frustrate the efforts. In the 1880s the governor of the colony was assassinated in what looked like a failed political coup by certain Chamorros. It was thought that they were influenced by Filipino political exiles. Yet the first Chamorro priest, *Pale* Palomo, denied any kind of political basis to the event, saying instead that the whole incident was the act of a single individual and, more important, it was blown out of proportion by a succeeding administration that wanted to show its abilities at counterinsurrection.

Relatively speaking, a kind of lull occurred in Filipino–Chamorro relations during the period of US Navy government of Guam from 1898 to the Japanese invasion and occupation. There was, however, a massacre of some 60 Filipino exiles in Agaña in 1897 by what appears to have been panic-stricken Chamorro guards on duty.

During the first decade of the American administration of the Philippines, naval officials continued the practice of exiling political rabble-rousers to the Marianas. In 1902 a group of political agitators was concentrated in a camp in Asan. Some became assimilated peacefully into the local community and even took oaths of loyalty to the United States and held high-level jobs. These Filipinos are grandfathers and great-grandfathers of many Chamorros today. Other Filipino prisoners, such as the famous *Ilustrado* Apolinario Mabini, refused to capitulate and were eventually returned to the Philippines or were exiled elsewhere. In the mid-1920s an interesting moment of local commotion occurred when the Philippine legislature passed a resolution seeking Guam's annexation. This was milked by local naval officials, who used it as an occasion to massage American loyalty among the Chamorros. The Chamorros had, since 1902, been clamoring for a clarification and improvement of their political status with the United States—the push for commonwealth today continues that trajectory with new vigor and articulation. Incidentally, this push has alternately been ignored and openly blocked by the US Navy. Anyway, through the *Guam Recorder* (1926), which was their local organ of expression, the naval officials used the opportunity

to sponsor an essay competition on why Guam should not be annexed by the Philippines. The contest seized on the Philippine legislature's political faux pas and played it off against existing Chamorro sentiments for a clarification of their political status. In this manner did they incite an anti-Filipino sentiment in an effort to consolidate American hegemony in Guam, particularly one that did not include citizenship. Of course everybody in this room is aware of the US Navy's historical desire to maintain control of Guam and the Philippines.

The postwar period of militarization and reconstruction marks the beginning of some of the most profound shifts in Chamorro–Filipino relations. Without getting into details, the effort to reconstruct the devastated island (most notably to transform it into a huge forward military base to secure immediate victory and, later, to insure America's newly found global superiority and relieve its Cold War anxieties) translated into the importation of thousands of Filipino laborers. The arrival of laborers, the complaint of adverse effects, and the subsequent relaxation of immigrant quotas prompted a vexed history of federal policies and local interventions to address national security and local growing pains. Policies on unfair labor practices, adverse wages, and other immigration issues that had an impact on both local and "alien" individuals were penned in Washington, DC, and remained the preserve of various federal departments and agencies and stateside lobbying interests. At different times, quotas were implemented or relaxed. The lifting of a security clearance requirement, the emergence of a local tourist industry, the in-flow of private and public capital for industry and public infrastructure—spurred on by supertyphoons in the 60s and 70s—themselves spurred on massive economic growth and brought cheap foreign labor and more immigrants to settle among earlier post–World War II immigrants and settlers. It is in this postwar local context of population explosion and growth that the fear of Chamorro cultural extinction first began to articulate itself locally, though the historical literature is filled with foreign visitors who have lamented the extinction of the Chamorro people starting as early as 1700. In light of the emergence of new nations (former colonies of European powers that have divested themselves of old garments), including the emergence of neighboring microstates in Micronesia (who seem to have gotten better deals with the United States than Guam has managed to get throughout its history of loyalty), Chamorros in Guam began to articulate the old questions of status in terms of internationally recognized principles of self-determination, culminating in the present movement for commonwealth with the United States to replace the current status. In other words, the move-

ment for commonwealth status, with roots going back to shortly after the Spanish-American War and every decade since, becomes articulated in the late twentieth century in light of economic development and constraints and threats to the environment, but especially the rapidly expanding presence and encroachment of non-Chamorros led by Filipinos. All this within the fear of the marginalization and displacement of Chamorros in their own island. This is born out in what has been described as the Filipino rally in the 1980s to defeat an act that included provisions threatening to their presence. Thus the emergence of a Chamorro campaign to push those provisions through, provisions in a status that was itself once feared to have already compromised the exercise of Chamorro self-determination amidst multitudes of non-Chamorros. Indeed, one particular way to understand the history of the relationships between Filipinos and Chamorros is to understand the close proximity that they have had to each other and to question the determination of selves and collectives. One might argue that in prehistorical times, those people we now know as the Chamorros are those who have traveled far from their homes, passed through others, and maintained strategic and commercial connections in the interest of charting and maintaining new lives—a new sense of peoplehood that for this reason or that could not be sustained in their places of origin. In historical times, the relationship between Filipinos and Chamorros in Guam was marked by European and American colonial interests coupled with Filipinos' and Chamorros' fierce sense of themselves. I hope to describe shortly a certain political asymmetry that characterizes Euro-American colonial and neocolonial relationships with Filipinos and Chamorros and, as a result, a certain asymmetry that also characterizes the relationship between Filipinos and Chamorros in Guam.

ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONS: EURO–AMERICAN, FILIPINO, AND CHAMORRO

Issues such as local control of immigration and the protection of Chamorro self-determination have been especially associated with the post–World War II influx of Filipino laborers and immigrants and the resulting adverse consequences for a fledgling Chamorro society. The fear of Chamorros becoming a minority in their own quickly diminishing land base has given way to the shock of its realities in the last 5 years. The fact is, Filipinos lead a procession of other non-Chamorro residents of Guam who have taken up previously Chamorro-owned plots of land. For every Filipino who arrives in Guam, said

one politician in the early 1970s, a Chamorro loses a chair in a classroom, a house in a subdivision, a job in the market, a bed in the hospital. What was overlooked, of course, was that Filipino and other non-Chamorro labor built the classroom, the house in the subdivision, built a market, the hospital. What has been seldom spoken about and never analyzed properly in the discussion of relations between Chamorros and non-Chamorros, however, is an ongoing American colonial history that has orchestrated relations and growth in Guam, a troubled legacy that has unfortunately and unwittingly pitted indigenous Chamorro against non-Chamorro residents. It was, for instance, the American military, the US Departments of Interior and Justice, and the US Congress that have systematically (some would say ineptly) dictated the terms of immigration, the profile of labor, and the manner of economic and political growth that have given us the kind of troubled growth and social situations we currently face.

The Chamorros' struggle to maintain their peoplehood and their land confronts immigrants who seek a piece of the mythical American pie but who steadfastly refuse to abandon their own notions of identity and culture. The confrontation, occurring largely since the end of the war but especially in the last two decades and certainly throughout earlier periods of documented history, often results in subtle or open hostility and violence. For example, in the 1970s, Chamorro Week in the public school system was as much an occasion—however ghettoized—to express pride in one's Chamorro heritage as it was an open season to beat up individuals labeled "Tagaloos." My build, my cultural silence, and my athletic abilities always saved me during those particular days in March. And I am always "different" from those other Filipinos for the best of my well intentioned friends and colleagues who realize that I am not Chamorro. "Oh but he's different."

Filipinos, on the other hand, are not innocent bystanders, poor helpless immigrants, who want only to live a life of dignity often denied back home. Many Filipinos look down on Chamorros as not as culturally rich as people in their mother country, even as they look to Guam as a wonderful place to have the best of both worlds. Filipino pride at the expense of the uniqueness and treasures of Chamorro identity and culture has found expression in academic studies too: For instance, the nationalist Filipino historian, Domingo Abella, practically described Guam as but an "appendage" (1962, p. 2) or a "replica" (p. 5) of the Philippines. In this historian's book, the Chamorro was exterminated "by the 1800s" (p. 5). Filipinos are to the Marianas as the Spaniards are to the Antilles, proclaimed Abella (rather proudly). The force of his pronouncement was that present-day Chamorros

are, after all is said and done, displaced Filipinos. No wonder there is a generation of Chamorros angry at Abella and the like-minded.

Many Filipinos often deride elements of Chamorro culture as only "borrowed" from the Philippines, as if there ever were a culture that never borrowed things from others for its survival. Another possibility is that to Filipinos, the Chamorros are in fact threatening in the sense that they are living reminders of what Filipinos have been made to deny and be ashamed of: their indigenous legacies. For mestizos from the Philippines, Chamorros are almost like the *provincianos,* or the indios from the provinces—uncouth, dirty, backward savages. In my studies of Spanish and American imperialism in Asia and the Pacific, I hazard this definition of mestizos: those who oppress the indio in themselves.

I straddle the margins between Filipino and Chamorro and other cultures in Guam: I take great pride in my mestizo roots in the Philippines and Pohnpei—for Filipinos, as we all know, have lots of pride . . . pride rice, pride pish [fish]. I was born and raised among Chamorros, who have opened up their homes and hearts to me. The tension between Chamorros and non-Chamorros is painful because for me and many others in this room the violence is literally among family members who have been hurt historically and who lack the language and the expression to identify the multiple causes. And whether you are from Guam or the Philippines or from the islands of Micronesia, you know that the family is sacred. But you also sense that family members are different. And as the *familia* must always be respected, so too for differences within the family.

Straddling the spaces between cultures in contention in Guam, I suggest that mutual respect can go a long way, provided that a particular historical asymmetry is recognized. This asymmetry is the unequal way by which Chamorros and Filipinos in Guam get to exercise survival within the terms of a Spanish and American colonial history that continues to wreak havoc on the Chamorros in Guam and a neocolonial history that continues to drive people away from the Philippines. Chamorros have the right to decolonization, and the Filipinos themselves have yet to be truly decolonized. Incidentally, it is particularly useful to compare the struggles of the Filipinos in Guam with the struggles of Chamorros in the States: Both flee, it can be argued, from the indignities of colonial exploitation even if they consciously understand themselves to be pro-American and seek to "expand" their opportunities. People from exploited places who seek refuge and opportunity in the United States are also fleeing from American-backed exploitation abroad. But it is also interesting to compare the status of Filipinos in Guam

and Chamorros in the States with the political struggles of Native Americans, who have continued to assert their autonomy and voice their plight of displacement by American colonial policies, a displacement compounded by the unwitting participation of immigrants from Europe and the Americas and Asia and the Pacific. From the Native American vantage point, Filipinos and Chamorros in the States are unwitting accomplices to ongoing histories of genocide that are the other story of American history. Of course, this is not the history we have been fed in our American-style education. If we—Filipinos and Chamorros alike—have been misinformed about our own histories, we can be sure we will be even more ignorant of other histories that constitute America.

As I have asserted, the history of relations between Chamorros and Filipinos is one deeply rooted in struggles toward human freedom and dignity. I have suggested a way to conceive prehistory—as if history begins only when Europeans and the technology of writing stumble, literally, upon our shores. Conceive of Chamorro prehistory as the distance a group of people travels, the commerce they maintain in the interest of a better life, perhaps as freedoms not possible in the homes of their origins. In more recent times, I suggest, one can understand the relations between Chamorros and Filipinos as kin of different colonial struggles. Besides the ancient ties in home region, language, and material culture, Chamorros and Filipinos also share a common history-in-struggle, an asymmetrical solidarity in their respective struggles to maintain and develop their own stories of peoplehood in the face of Euro-American encroachment. This history is asymmetrical at various levels, for besides the imbalances in techniques of war and the domination between colonizer and colonized, we can also identify imbalances within each domain. A history of our peoples that does not center exclusively on the activity and the perspective of outsiders forces us to consider the complexity and range of indigenous responses on the part of both colonizer and colonized. There was mutual but unequal appropriation in that legacy, and within the colonized ledger as well, for not all colonial subjects were oppressed equally. In fact, many "colonized" natives actually benefitted and profited—and continue to benefit and profit—tremendously from the Euro-American colonization and neocolonization just as many others suffer accordingly. This is precisely the story of the historical development of national and countercolonial consciousness that historians such as Renato Constantino (1975) have written about.

A latent national Chamorro consciousness is surfacing in Guam, and Filipinos and other non-Chamorros are very much a part of it, even if by

opposition. The politics of culture and identity, and of national consciousness-in-formation, must be understood in relational and historical terms: The context is a historical and ongoing bid to redress centuries of external rule, and at stake is the survival and development of a sense of Chamorro peoplehood. Filipinos and other non-Chamorros have unwittingly and often involuntarily been accomplices within this colonial context. Fortunately, however, the lines need not be so hastily drawn, the divide need not be so great. The recognition of a common history and struggle for the expression of a peoplehood should provide us with a sense of mutual respect and self-critique. To fellow Filipinos: Acknowledge an ongoing history of colonization that has yet to allow the Chamorros their inalienable right to self-determination, their sense of local control over issues that have a profound impact on this people's livelihood, and their privileged position as the *taotao tano.* We are guests recruited and protected by a history of imperialism that denies those same luxuries to our hosts here.

To my Chamorro hosts: Your Filipino neighbors are brothers and sisters who can teach something about struggle within and outside the fold of the United States.

Indeed, let us keep in mind the history of and the historical making of other Americas. I often dwell on memories of friendships with other Chamorros and Filipinos in the States who have discovered, contrary to what they have been taught, that America is not all that it is made out to be. The 1992 uprisings in America that were downplayed by the media as isolated, inner-city Los Angeles racial strife, the clamoring for transformations in the educational systems, the multiculturalism, and indeed the call for change from the District of Columbia to the Caribbean to the Pacific and within the continental United States are not simply about an American melting pot of immigrants. It is about the reincorporation of America in fundamentally different cultural and political terms: When Congressman Robert Underwood announces in Washington, DC, that it is time for the United States to come to grips with its legacy of imperialism and does not get kicked out of the meeting, there is something going on of a much wider scale than a parochial quest for Chamorro self-determination. It is too early to tell right now. Last week the Guam delegation served notice. The Chamorros wait and see.

CONCLUSION

In the late seventies my Chamorro friend Jose Munoz and I used to delight ourselves in a particular rendition of Don McLean's song, American Pie,

that signalled something of an affectionate teasing and banter that also characterizes relations between Chamorros and Filipinos in Guam. The rewritten chorus went something like this:

> Bye, Bye Miss Mabuhay,
> Drobe my chebby to the lebby
> but the lebby was dry.

It was just a silly sing song that mocked the Filipino in me, but it was okay because we sang it together.

Sing together. Belt it out with our different accents. For if the history of relations between Chamorros and Filipinos is one of a shared struggle within colonial and neocolonial realities, then it is *we* who should be orchestrating the history, not allowing it to play us.

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Notes

1. In his keynote address, the Honorable Joseph Ada, Governor of Guam, put it succinctly: Guam is not a territory, Guam is a colony (see Ada, this volume).

2. Washington, DC, is in fact a troubled place in America. Like residents of the "insular" colonies, residents of Washington, DC, are second-class American citizens insofar as they cannot vote for the president and have no representation in Congress. I believe that when we analyze these insular territories within the case of other troubled spots in America (Native American and Hawaiian nations within the nations; the "other" Americas found in inner cities; within the boundaries of marginalized classes of gays and lesbians, people of color, the homeless, etc.), we will indeed find the need to remap and reconfigure all of what America is all about.

3. For a sense of the "constructedness" of Filipino and Chamorro national identities see Rafael (1989); Constantino (1969, 1975, pp. 151–170); Schumacher (1991); and Diaz (1993, 1994).

4. Used as a verb, the slang "to narc" is a derogatory term for submitting an individual to police authorities by providing allegedly incriminating information about that person. To narc is regarded as an act of betrayal in the

sense that the informant is usually a confidant or associate of the person turned in to authorities. The term "narc" is appropriated from the term "narcotics officials," a law-enforcement squad that specializes in busting drug rings. As a verb, "to narc" is also closely associated with another (perhaps more colorful, if more derogatory) slang, "to squeal," as one might communicate in like fashion to "the pig" (police).

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Book Reviews

The Prehistoric Exploration and Colonisation of the Pacific, by Geoffrey Irwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. viii + 240 pp, figures, tables, bibliography, index. Cloth, US $54.95; paper, US $17.95.

Only once in a long while are books written that are destined to change forever the way we think about the prehistory of the Pacific. This book by Geoffrey Irwin of the University of Auckland represents such a contribution. In it, Irwin summarizes from archaeological investigations the current understanding we have of the temporal and spatial patterns of prehistoric settlement of the Pacific. This ranges from the Pleistocene settlement of Greater Australia and nearby islands to the more recent settlement during the late Holocene of the most remote (i.e., most easterly) islands of Polynesia. For readers of *ISLA,* there is also a chapter summarizing the prehistoric settlement of Micronesia. What most distinguishes Irwin's volume are the views on prehistoric voyaging that he develops and then tests against the archaeological record and through computer simulation.

Over the past 40 years Pacific archaeologists have increasingly rejected Sharp's (1953) hypothesis that the Pacific voyaging was characterized more by accident than by design. Several researchers have played a part in this, most notably David Lewis (1972) and Thomas Gladwin (1970), and so have the Polynesian voyages of rediscovery reported by Finney (1979, 1985, 1988; Finney, Kilonshy, Soursen, & Stroup, 1986). While this anthropological research has documented greater navigational abilities among Pacific

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Islanders than heretofore appreciated in Western scholarship, it has been difficult to translate the findings into models that can be tested archaeologically. Thus, for the most part such models have remained plausible accounts for the region's prehistory.

At least part of Irwin's great achievement in this book is the manner in which he develops propositions regarding voyaging and colonization in the Pacific that are amenable to empirical test. The assumptions made by Irwin about voyaging are relatively simple and direct: (a) that voyaging emphasized survival rather than the fastest rate of advance; (b) that sailing upwind is the safest direction because it is easiest to return downwind and find the original point of departure (an especially important consideration if new land was not discovered); and (c) that the tradition of voyaging into the Pacific involved a learning component. These assumptions have associated correlates. For the first two, Irwin proposes that the discovery of islands was a function of the ease of the return voyage. And for the third assumption, he stipulates that new methods were employed to discover and colonize successfully the islands in the more remote portions of the Pacific Ocean. Finally, Irwin distinguishes exploration and discovery from colonization and argues that they represent distinct components of the settlement process.

A few variables are identified by Irwin as being important in the settlement of the islands of the Pacific. These are: intervisibility, angle of the island target, number and size of overlapping island targets, and the relative accessibility of island groups. Because the ratio of land to ocean decreases from west to east in the Pacific (and the distance between islands increases and weather patterns diverge), the variables useful for predicting settlement trajectories in the western Pacific (e.g., intervisibility) are replaced by others (e.g., accessibility) in the eastern Pacific.

Irwin employs both simulation and analyses of early prehistoric radiocarbon dates as means of testing the relative importance of these variables in the Pacific. Further, he develops a series of expectations for the relative sequence in time or the approximate date at which different sets of island groups in the Pacific were first reached by Oceanic colonists.

Several important and, to some extent, unanticipated conclusions emerge from Irwin's model and his examination of the early prehistory of the Pacific. First, the colonization of near (i.e., western) Oceania was probably achieved by sequential voyaging between intervisible islands or island groups along one or two arcs involving the islands of eastern Indonesia. Second, there was no pause in the prehistoric settlement of eastern Polynesia. Instead, given the earliest dates now accepted for the colonization of remote Oceania,

the rate of voyaging must have increased in order to search larger ocean areas for proportionately smaller lands. Third, voyaging to the most distant and inaccessible islands of Polynesia probably involved two-way and possibly three-way voyages prior to colonization. Fourth, given the rate of successful search and advance posited for Polynesia, sailors voyaging from the west into eastern Polynesia probably reached the west coast of South America by 1000 B.P. Accordingly, his view is that Polynesians introduced South American cultural and biological traits into Polynesia on return voyages from the continent, which is a view in marked contrast to the views of Heyerdahl. Fifth, the decline of voyaging that is documented in both the archaeological and ethnohistoric records of Polynesia can be linked in part to the success of earlier voyaging: Nearly all the habitable land of the Pacific was discovered and colonized. From this and his third assumption, it follows that the tempo of voyaging would diminish as it was realized there were few new lands to locate and settle.

Irwin also devotes a section of the book to the topic of islands that either lack evidence for prehistoric colonization or that were not inhabited (but contain archaeological evidence of former habitation) when they were located by European voyagers. These islands are characterized by similar physical traits, including inacessibility and relatively small size. Irwin hypothesizes that some regions of Oceania (particularly the southeastern islands of Polynesia) may have been on a trajectory toward abandonment at the time of European contact.

This book is provocative and upsetting. It systematically questions many of the assumptions archaeologists and anthropologists have held about the nature and competence of traditional voyaging in the Pacific. Irwin adopts the view that voyaging is neither universalistic nor rare, but rather that it was responsive to the changing environmental conditions posed by the geography of the Pacific Ocean. Thus, Irwin suggests that it is now within our reach to explain the variable discovery and colonization of Pacific Islands through time and space.

With that said, it is unfortunate that the summaries of the archaeological and computer simulation evidence pertaining to the discovery and colonization of Micronesia are the weakest of the volume. This is partly the result of our geographically variable and temporally uneven understanding of the earliest prehistory of Micronesia. Consequently, models of the region's colonization are still drawn from comparative linguistics, not archaeology. As linguistic research in Melanesia suggests, distinguishing time from geography in contemporary lexical distributions may be problematic. The sig-

nificance of archaeological research in Micronesia as a means to solve this problem is therefore clear: Inasmuch as archaeological remains have both a historical and spatial dimension to their stylistic variation, it should be possible to analyze these materials from early prehistoric contexts and provide an independent test of models for the region's colonization. Clearly, this topic should repay additional investigation, especially as the tempo and distribution of prehistoric colonization within Micronesia is confirmed through additional field research in archaeology. The models Irwin developed for Micronesia could then be tested against an empirical and historical archaeological record.

Irwin's book is a tour de force and belongs on the bookshelves of anthropologists, geographers, archaeologists, biogeographers, sailors, and everyone else interested in understanding better how the islands of the Pacific came to be occupied during prehistory. This is a remarkable piece of scholarship and is destined to have a lasting impact on Pacific archaeology.

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A World Perspective on Pacific Islander Migration: Australia, New Zealand and the USA, edited by Grant McCall and John Connell. Sydney: The University of New South Wales Centre for South Pacific Studies in association with the Bureau of Immigration Research, Pacific Studies Monograph No. 6, 1993. xii + 386 pp, references, appendixes. Paper, A $20.00.

This book is a collection of 36 papers presented at the first Conference of Pacific Island Migration and Settlement, held in Sydney, Australia, in 1990. The editors are correct in their abstract in calling the book a panoramic puzzle of Pacific Island migration. It includes papers of variable length (some are 2 pages long, others 50) from a diverse group of people including company directors, members of Parliament and the Ethnic Affairs Commission of New South Wales, a migrant counselor, members of ethnic communities, private consultants, a medical doctor, country consuls, government officers, a bishop, and university professors and lecturers. I mention this at the outset because the table of contents does not include the names of the authors, and it took me some time to work out who wrote what. Given this variety of contributors, it is not surprising to find a similar diversity in the substance and form of contributions. However, this reflects the range of perspectives from which migration in the Pacific is viewed: from the strictly demographic view based on analysis of US census data to the personal views of the individual migrants in a new country. It is not clear whether the organizers of the conference, and editors of this volume, were seeking such a mix or it just happened this way. Nevertheless, what is missing is a conceptual framework that provides an understanding of the many dimensions of the migration experience in the Pacific—an exercise the editors are particularly well qualified to have attempted.

In their haste to publish these proceedings, the editors have overlooked many annoying editorial details, such as not a single map is included in the book, a careless index omits the names of the published works of contributory authors but includes personal communications (Nero is not in the index, but Naich is), authors' notes to the editors appear on the same page as the figure the note refers to, and tables titles appear on one page and the main body on another.

For the benefit of *ISLA* readers, this review confines itself to those papers concerned with Micronesian migration. However, the book also in-

cludes migration studies of Pacific Islanders in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America.

In their paper titled "Pacific Islanders in the United States Census Data," Levin and Alberg present an array of tables (extracted from the 1980 US census) that compare Hawaiians, Tongans, Samoans, Guamanians, and other Micronesians. Even though Micronesians are included in the tables, they are rarely mentioned in the text and are absent from the 23 summary points at the end. The credibility of this paper for Micronesian scholars is further undermined by the authors' first main summary point, which is that "motivation for migration is clearly economic" (p. 137), referring to Tongan, Samoan, and Fijian migration to the United States. But not only are census reports notoriously inadequate for inferring motivation for demographic behavior, but also earlier in the paper the authors describe the cultural concept of the "trip" and the importance of education in migration, concepts raised by others analyzing Micronesian migration patterns in this volume.

In their contribution titled "Pursuing the Dream: Historical Perspectives on Micronesian Movement Patterns," Nero and Rehuher trace the historical antecedents to contemporary emigration from Palau and the Marshall Islands. Particular attention is given to emerging patterns of migration to the United States and to the differences between family-based Marshallese communities in the United States (Marshallese enjoy open migration policies under the 1986 Compact of Free Association) and dispersed Palauan migrants (who, as US Trust Territory citizens at the time this book was published, were allowed limited entry for educational reasons only). Given the different cultural patterns of mobility of the Marshallese and the Palauans, this type of study raises some interesting issues. The authors conclude that although most migrants from both Palau and the Marshalls would rather return home, the state of home economies plays a more important role in their remaining abroad than do external government policies.

Rubinstein addresses the huge out-migration of people from the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) to Guam since the 1986 Compact of Free Association with the United States was implemented, which allows FSM citizens the right to enter the United States freely. In his brief paper, "Movements in Micronesia: Post–Compact (1987) Micronesian Migrants to Guam and Saipan," Rubinstein focuses on cultural reasons for the great outflow, arguing that the "cultural motivation for migration is deeper than the quest for employment" (p. 260). He compares recent Micronesian migrations to Guam and to Saipan, contrasting the relatively better socioeconomic position of FSM migrants on Saipan. This he explains is because

Micronesians enjoy an ethnic privilege on Saipan that is based on their common Carolinian ancestry, a situation that does not obtain on Guam. Instead, migrants from the FSM on Guam are considered to be more of a social liability, even though they assist in easing the labor shortage then currently experienced there.

Bettis' paper, "Colonial Immigration on Guam: Displacement of the Chamorro People Under US Governance," discusses the effects on the Chamorro people of immigration and social change on Guam in the last few decades. He focuses on the period since the Second World War and the role of the US military, who were concerned with securing land and a cheap labor force. It was during this period that in-migration and a subsequent naturalization of aliens occurred on Guam, with a resultant out-migration of indigenous Chamorros from Guam, much of which was as members of the US armed services. Although this paper provides interesting historical information, it is poorly structured around similar subheadings that detract from the main argument.

Tongianibeau's brief paper, "Kiribati: Development and Internal Migration," provides fascinating details of the government's plan to resettle the I-Kiribati to the northern Line Islands. Given the growing call for resettlement of people living on low-lying islands in the Pacific, because of an impending rise in sea level, this exercise, stimulated by a high population density on Tarawa, will be important to monitor as a case of planned resettlement. The criteria used to select settlers for Washington and Fanning Islands provides interesting details about the relative merits and demerits of life on small atolls, as perceived by Pacific Island government agencies.

In "Movement Networks and 'Relative' Economies in Samoa and Micronesia," Franco provides a useful beginning for a comparative analysis of the experience of Micronesians in the United States, based on his research on Samoan movement to the United States. This is a promising direction in which to conduct further work, especially once the category "Micronesians" is disaggregated into its component but distinct ethnic groupings. His concept of "relative economies" is appealing, but it is not explored fully in this general paper. I await a more systematic discussion. His conclusion that it is necessary to go beyond the demographic pressures to understand patterns of Micronesian movement should be heeded, as should his call for more locally focused holistic research.

In general, the weakness of all of these papers is the too frequent apologizing for limitations in data. Although empirical evidence is an important component of migration research, more innovative perspectives on

Pacific Island population mobility should be encouraged. Furthermore, theory building can been done with minimal empirical evidence, but greater attention must be given to the relationship between cultural, political, social, and economic forces. Pacific migration studies are in dire need of rejuvenation. From a macrolevel perspective, what can be said about the expanding frontiers of the international "labor market"? Are countries in the region so rigidly oriented toward the rim countries that regional migration flows are never probable? What then of comparative studies? We all know that Pacific Islanders were great travelers in the past, but we have failed to develop tools and concepts that will help us understand contemporary migration patterns. In Micronesia, unlike other parts of the Pacific region, the extent of influence of earlier colonizers and the impact of twentieth century colonizers place these countries in a situation different from that of countries in the South Pacific, and more should be written about this.

If you thought we were making progress toward removing the impasse in migration studies in the Pacific, then this publication will prove you wrong. Most papers are in the mode of general empirical reports, and little consideration is given to bringing greater clarity to the study of migration in the Pacific. In conclusion, this is a mediocre publication, but if you like books on the Pacific, you will probably find some useful things in it. Given the price of A$20.00, I recommend holding out for the better papers to reappear elsewhere. I think the editors did a disservice to those authors who did present their research findings, and there are far more creative ways to present conference proceedings than this.

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Footsteps in the Sea: Christianity in Oceania to World War II, by John Garrett. Geneva: World Council of Churches; Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1992. xvi + 514 pp, maps, photographs, notes, glossary, bibliography, index. Paper, US $15.00; F $8.00.

This is a remarkable book, the second completed work of John Garrett's planned trilogy on the history of Christianity in Oceania. Unlike *To Live Among the Stars: Christian Origins in Oceania* (Garrett, 1982), which spanned the four centuries from Magellan to the twentieth century, this volume covers only the 40 years from 1900 to World War II. Like *To Live Among the Stars,* it includes the vast geographic expanse of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. What is truly remarkable is that Garrett manages to avoid both the one extreme of an encyclopedia of unconnected articles on each island group and the other extreme of a merely cursory summary. He offers good detail for the individual story of each region and each denomination. The book is also remarkable in that he can cover so much and still be fair to the often competing denominations; his sources and careful descriptions of people and events show that fairness. Because this book chronicles so many separate histories, it can be difficult to read in a few long sessions; perhaps it is best read in short sessions and limited to the chapters about one region. At the end of most chapters is a summary paragraph or two (good reading by themselves) that convey Garrett's sensitivity to the trials and tribulations of the early mission efforts.

Garrett's organization is a simple chronology, region by region, but distinct themes do emerge from the chronology to provide a unity to the many and somewhat disparate histories and give the work its distinct flavor. Garrett writes as more than a historian or chronicler, almost as a theologian presenting the story of faith in the Pacific. The themes are evaluations of the missionary work and the growth of Christianity, but they are evaluations as one might read in the first century Acts of the Apostles or the letters of Paul to the Christians of Corinth, Ephesus, or Galatia. And precisely here is the rub for the many who, on the one hand, understand the important role of the missions and churches in the Pacific but who, on the other hand, cannot embrace the theology that spurred on the evangelizing pioneers. Anthropologists especially are famous for a condescending thanks or two to their favorite missionary, only to end their ethnographies with a broadside

to the churches for destroying the old ways. Garrett, it seems to me, confronts every serious student of the Pacific Islands with the argument that the Islanders willingly abandoned the old ways and have so interiorized Christianity that it is now impossible to understand the islands without also understanding Christian values. Garrett presents a challenge to historians, anthropologists, and area specialists who might prefer to see the Christian churches as something of a sideshow to the main event of economic and political change. He insists that whatever else Christianity did to the old religions and cultures, the converted Islanders themselves preserved a sense of the sacred that continues to permeate their existence. In the forthcoming third volume he will undoubtedly complete this argument.

What really happened? Did the churches destroy the old religions and cultures, did Christianity make only surface conversion, or did the old religions and cultures become syncretized within the new? Garrett sees the process of Christianization as far more intricate and complex than one religion destroying the other or one only superficially assimilated by the other. But is he correct, or has he at least made a good case? I doubt that this volume will sway the revisionist historians. Suffice it to say that Garrett's somewhat theological assumptions (the truth and worth of the Christian message, for example) may not sit well with readers who do not share his faith. But then he is chronicling the movement of faith, not presenting a critical analysis of either the Christian faith or the missionizing endeavor.

It would be wrong, however, to think that Garrett presents only an edifying and star-studded story. He portrays the missionaries with all their foibles, failings, eccentricities, personality defects, and ethnocentrism—with their warts, as he says. There will be no need for revisionist historians to demythologize his portraits of the missionary pioneers.

The one dominant and recurring theme that emerges from this chronology is more of a cycle than a theme. The theme is the success or failure of the church, but success or failure judged by that measure already used in first century Christianity, that is, the localization or indigenization of the church. It is cyclic because the local population first embraces the foreign symbol set of doctrines and rituals only to have the foreign symbols transformed and reinterpreted within the indigenous culture. The indigenization Garrett traces across the Pacific should be seen in the broader context of the history of Christianity because the degree of indigenization is one of the major controversies and friction points in Christianity and has been since the churches first embraced non-Jews in the Roman Empire. The question, put too simply perhaps, is the extent to which adaptation to and adoption

of indigenous symbols is acceptable and desirable. This is another one of those theological preoccupations that will appear secondary to economic development specialists; however, the topic is important to any history of Christianity. Historians will recall that the indigenization of symbols was once a mighty controversy in Southeast Asia as Jesuits de Nobili in India and Ricci in China sought to reinterpret European Christian symbols with Indian and Chinese symbols. They were squashed and the European symbols carried the day. Garrett nicely shows us a replay of the same controversy, centuries later, in other denominations, in lands far from India and Imperial China. Although he shows the controversy over indigenization as it appeared throughout the Pacific, I think his best description comes from the struggle among German Lutherans in turn-of-the-century New Guinea.

He also sees the Roman Catholic problems with generating a local clergy when the rule of celibacy and European-style asceticism appeared so contrary to the local culture. I suspect, however, that Garrett will be hard pressed to explain in his third volume why an indigenous Roman Catholic clergy and sisterhood arose after World War II to supplant American and European missionaries. The rule of celibacy has not changed. There must be another causal variable at work. It may be that as the level of Western-style formal education rose in the population, more native vocations were prepared to survive the rigors of the seminaries.

Although Garrett sees the conflict between Catholic celibacy and Protestant-Puritan asceticism versus the island cultures, he does not address more extensively the question of the mesh or appropriateness between indigenous beliefs and the dogmas of the particular denominations. I would have been interested to read, for example, how the antiritual, bible-based doctrine of the New England Congregationalists of Micronesia was able to build on the indigenous beliefs or moved to a frontal assault with the indigenous priests. Was it "God versus gods," as Hanlon (1984, pp. 87–112) put it in his monograph on Pohnpei? To what extent was the highly ritual life of the Roman Catholics better suited to the indigenous belief system? Maybe space considerations eliminated this important subtheme, but it seems crucial to a discussion of Garrett's professed interest in the indigenization of Christianity.

For a book of such geographic breadth and denominational diversity, how well does Garrett control the sources? His sources are, necessarily I think, a mixed bag. Sometimes he uses primary sources, such as the letters, journals, and reports from the London Missionary Society or the archives of the Marist Oceania Province. He has ferreted out many unpublished

memoirs and diaries from personal visits to small and regional libraries. He spices up the stories with anecdotal details gleaned from the popularized mission accounts, as from Bruno Hagspiel's *Along the Mission Trail* (1926), which narrated the trials and fortune of the Society of the Divine Word (SVD) in New Guinea. But it is difficult to determine why Garrett turns exclusively to secondary and even tertiary sources for some regions. For Catholicism in Yap and Palau in Micronesia, for example, he clearly states that his main source is largely F. X. Hezel's *The Catholic Church in Micronesia* (1991). My question is not about the reliability of Hezel's work, but about the bypassing of primary sources. Whether the sources are primary or secondary, most are ecclesiastical accounts and not independent, critical studies of the mission effort. Where Garrett is able to compare both the ecclesiastical sources and the records from government officials, he gives valuable information not only on the growth of the congregation but also on the often testy relationship between colonial officials and colonial missionaries, a needed reminder, I think, that the cross was not always protected by the crown or an imperial frigate. Put the local population, the foreign missionaries, and the colonial officials at one another's throats and you have the makings for great reading. This is not a boring book about dull church meetings and hymns; it is about plain people, failed people, saints and sinners. Garrett is good at keeping the story alive and interesting with the interaction of saint and sinner, cross and crown, black and white, offering at the same time a readable sociology of the mission.

If this book has serious shortcomings, they owe largely to the mass of disparate materials scattered across the Pacific. Any critique of Garrett's omissions must be counterbalanced by the enormous geographical and cultural diversity that he has compacted into this single volume. He had to make hard choices on what to include, but I think some features deserve greater attention.

Sometimes Garrett goes back to the Euro-American origins of the mission groups to explain the missionizing goals and style of the individual missionaries. He does a fine job, for example, of showing the German background of the SVD missionaries in New Guinea and the New England background of the Congregationalists in Pohnpei and Kosrae. But why not more on the Roman Catholic French Marists, who were far more influential across the Pacific than the SVDs? Garrett does trace the relationship of French Marist efforts to metropolitan French politics and ecclesiastical squabbles, but he devotes little space to the somewhat peculiar religious ideology of the Marists.

Garrett also devotes little space to the nativistic movements that reacted against foreign influences—the cargo cults of New Guinea, Modekngei in Palau, and movements in the Gilbert Islands and in the Mortlocks Islands of Chuuk. I trust he leaves that description to the anthropologists, but he does thereby miss the important theme of rejection, some of it violent, that characterizes so much of the early twentieth century, as in the Boxer Rebellion in China.

Garrett gives only passing glances to the interaction between anthropologists and missionaries. This is unfortunate because we know of some of the pre-Christian beliefs and religious practices of the Pacific only through the writings and ethnographic interests of missionaries. That voracious reader, Sir James Frazer, recognized this when he wrote *Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead* (Vol. 3): *The Belief Among the Micronesians* (1968); the volume is filled with references to missionary-produced ethnography. Descriptions of the pre-Christian religions of Micronesia, for example, would be impoverished or nearly absent without the writings of missionaries, especially those from the German period at the turn of the twentieth century. For example, little would be known today about the religion of the Marshallese without Father Erland's *Die Marshall-Insulaner: Leben und Sitte, Sinn und Religion eines Südsee-Volkes* (1914). Missionaries provided many of the dictionaries and grammars that anthropologists used later. And anthropologists such as Pater Wilhelm Schmidt influenced the mission vision of native peoples. He gave young missionaries a new interest in chronicling indigenous culture and passed on to the New Guinea missionaries a new respect for the local culture. The interaction between anthropologists and missionaries in the Pacific has received significant attention (e.g., Boutilier, Hughes, & Tiffany, 1978).

I would also have liked to read more about the language policies adopted by the mission groups, especially policies for the schools. The period between World War I and II set the stage for the nationalism and political independence of the post–World War II period. The new island place-names that emerged after independence are ample evidence of language as an important symbol of that nationalism. To what extent did missionary adoption of New Guinea Pidgin lead to this becoming a lingua franca and eventually the national language of Papua New Guinea? The translations of the Bible into the languages of Kosrae, Pohnpei, and the Marshall Islands facilitated the growth of literacy in these societies. In other places the story is more complicated. Garrett rightly sees the role of the Catholic church in preserving the Chamorro language in the Marianas. I hope his next volume

makes the ironic link between the church's decision to embrace Americanization and the prohibition of Chamorro in the Catholic schools. Language is too important to nationalism and indigenization not to receive fuller attention.

Finally, a small but irritating omission: maps. The reader who is only superficially familiar with the Pacific will bog down in the extensive geographical narratives that either lack maps or are accompanied by nearly unreadable maps. Maps are critical to this volume, and where they do appear, they are simply static maps of places; there are no maps showing the spread of denominations or the denominational geography of each region.

I am eager to read the final volume in the Garrett trilogy, for he has left us in this volume with several questions. First, how will the missions and churches handle their newfound power and influence? Second, will the Pacific churches eventually face the curse of all organizations described by Max Weber as "the routinization of charisma" (Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. 48–65)? In other words, will the new churches lose their pioneering fire and be replaced by bureaucratic concerns? This has certainly happened before in and outside of the history of Christianity. Will the Pacific churches break out of this historical mold? These are, I think, important questions and remind us that *Footsteps in the Sea* is only the second volume in the trilogy.

And who should read this volume? In my criticism of Garrett's somewhat theological approach, I noted that certain groups—historical revisionists and anthropologists perhaps—would not be satisfied with the volume. That does not mean they should not read it; my position is quite the opposite. Anyone seriously interested in the Pacific Islands should read the book. It seems to me that Garrett has demography on his side, that is, the islands have become overwhelmingly Christian, and if some readers say the churches are unimportant or irrelevant, the burden of proof rests with them. If Garrett is correct in saying that the Christian churches have become an integral part of Pacific Island life, then even the devout pagans and atheists among the Pacific area specialists need to heed this remarkable volume. In the same vein, it would be interesting to read a critique of this book by a Marxist sociologist or conflict theorist for whom religion is only epiphenomenal to the material reality of economics and politics.

Readers do not have much choice if they want to read the story of Christianity in the Pacific. To my knowledge no other book or series of books covers the chronicle of all the denominations. Most works are ecclesiastical studies or they are limited to a single region. *Footsteps in the Sea,* especially when seen as part of a trilogy, is unique.

In the broader context of the history of Christianity, *Footsteps in the Sea* provides the Pacific story of the millennia-old question within Christianity about indigenization and the validity of adapting European symbols to indigenous symbols. For the Christian churches that, since the Nicean Creed of 325 C.E., have proclaimed themselves to be universal, *Footsteps in the Sea* retraces the struggle in the Pacific. Thus, for the faith descendants of the people whom Garrett describes here, this work is a fine reminder that the scenery, the cultures, and the languages are different in the Pacific, but the underlying problems and questions are shared with other peoples and times.

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The Catholic Church in Micronesia: Historical Essays on the Catholic Church in the Caroline–Marshall Islands. by Francis X. Hezel, S.J. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1991. vii + 294 pp, maps, illustrations, summary, tables. Paper, US $7.00.

In years to come Father Fran Hezel will be credited with being the great chronicler of the Roman Catholic Church in Micronesia because he has, almost single-handedly, rescued the past from indifference and the ravages of time. *The Catholic Church in Micronesia* consists of a series of self-contained historical essays on the several Roman Catholic missions that labored in Yap, Pohnpei, Chuuk, Palau, and the Marshalls from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the latter part of the twentieth. It is a tale of travail, tenacity, and triumph told in a straightforward, matter-of-fact manner. Hezel lets the record speak for itself. Thus, if anything, this is more a chronicle than a history, more an unadorned record of accomplishments and defeats than an exercise in historical argumentation.

Crosscutting the geographical division were four broad periods: Spanish to 1899, German to 1914, Japanese to 1945, and American thereafter. Each change in metropolitan control brought with it not only fresh challenges but also marked changes in mission personnel. For example, the sale of the Carolines and Marianas (excluding Guam) to Germany in 1899 resulted in the substitution (in 1903) of German Capuchins for their Spanish brethren. Subsequently, when the Japanese occupied Micronesia in the autumn of 1914 (exploiting the opportunities afforded by the outbreak of World War I and their alliance with Great Britain to engage in imperial expansion of their own), they reintroduced Spanish missionaries, this time representatives of the Society of Jesus. It was Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the future architect of the Imperial Japanese Navy's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, who undertook an embassy to the Vatican in 1920 to petition for Spanish religionaries to resume work in Chuuk. And in 1945 it was the American military who campaigned to have the Spanish Jesuits in Chuuk replaced by American personnel.

Throughout the century, missionaries faced a host of problems: entrenched resistance on the part of the Islanders eager to safeguard their cultures, rivalry from the several Protestant missions, the corrosive effects

of modernization and secularization, inadequate resources, natural disaster, imperial agendas that conflicted with mission priorities, changes in metropolitan control, and the constraints of geography.

The degrees of resistance to the missionary message were difficult to predict. The Yap Islanders, for example, were characterized as cool, aloof, and "stubbornly resistant to change" (p. 6). Indigenous priests and magicians discouraged church attendance, and one of the pagans informed Father Espriella that "he did not want to be converted because that would make it more difficult for him to go to hell where he hoped to meet his parents after death" (p. 28). In the case of Pohnpei, the highest chief in every kingdom except Madolenihmw had become a Roman Catholic by 1897. Some 16 more years elapsed before the chiefs of Madolenihmw finally relented and allowed the Catholics to erect a school and a church there. Similarly, within Chuuk, Moen was a longtime holdout against conversion.

In many instances an element of serendipity entered the conversion process. Resistance was overcome on Moen when a Jesuit priest was perceived to have cured a sick woman in the community. Ramon, the chief of Lamotrek (where the people were receptive to mission teaching), refused to allow menstruating women to attend church until he experienced a severe asthma attack and then relented. The inhabitants of Nomwin in Chuuk were open to conversion because a Japanese vessel carrying Catholics from the Mortlocks had fetched up on the island by accident.

Intense rivalry between the Protestant missionaries and the dreaded Papists, as the former viewed them, characterized the beginning of the period under review. American missionaries had succeeded in converting most of the Marshallese before the German Sacred Heart missionaries arrived there in 1898. The Germans found little opportunity for making conversions, and their Spanish Catholic successors (Jesuits) were confronted in the early 1920s by what they described as "tenacious Protestantism" (p. 262). Similarly, the Spanish Capuchins encountered mistrust and outright hostility on the part of the Protestant missionaries at work on Pohnpei in the late 1880s. Open violence between members of the two groups occurred a decade later, but by the end of World War II a new mood of ecumenism had begun to prevail. Father Donohoe, an American Jesuit, observed in the late 1940s that the battle in the Marshall Islands was not against Protestantism but against "the principalities and powers . . . [and] against the devil and all his works and pomp" (p. 275).

As the century unfolded, the Catholics' greatest concern was, arguably,

the undermining effect of modernization. The Japanese occupation of Micronesia accelerated the monetization of Micronesian societies, and in the interwar years Catholic missionaries, deeply disturbed by growing signs of materialism and avarice among their parishioners, denounced the "thirst for money" (p. 220) that had begun to manifest itself. The secularization of Micronesian society raised developmental and social justice concerns that the Roman Catholic Church, animated by the Vatican II reforms that emphasized greater cooperation with other churches and indigenization, sought to address. Thus in the 1950s and beyond, American Jesuits such as Father Hugh Costigan, with his Ponape Agricultural and Trade School, and Father Tom McCarthy, with his emphasis on training young Marshallese in the arts of carpentry, navigation, and electronics, became the norm rather than the exception.

Most of the time the missions operated on the smell of an oily rag, making do in the most ingenious ways. Mission funding was generally scarce although, paradoxically, the Germans and the Japanese were often relatively supportive of Catholic missionaries who were not their own nationals. However, that support, particularly in the case of the Japanese, was relatively short-lived. During the 1930s the Japanese began to impose more and more restrictions on the Catholic missions, curtailing their freedom of movement, demanding that church schooling be in Japanese or that church students transfer to Japanese public schools, and recruiting parishioners for forced labor battalions.

The Japanese were ambivalent about the Catholic missions. When Japan was awarded a Class C Mandate over Micronesia at the end of World War I, the Japanese saw the missions as useful vehicles for pacifying their new colonial subjects. Subsequently, however, the Japanese began to perceive church membership in terms of divided loyalty and chose to sequester church property for military purposes. Accordingly, many church buildings were used for storehouses, barracks, radio stations, and command centers. Catholic missionaries were frequently prevented from undertaking their pastoral labors during World War II, and Jesuits on Palau and Yap were taken away and shot in 1944.

The language restrictions imposed by the Japanese were part of a much larger linguistic problem that Catholic missionaries had to face over the years. Not only was there the problem of mastering the various Micronesian tongues, but also changes in metropolitan control meant that Spanish missionaries found themselves answerable to German administrators or Japa-

nese officials. In the late 1930s Jesuits such as Father Gregorio were dispatched to Japan to learn Japanese. The Japanese catechist, Miguel Kimura, came the other way, arriving in Pohnpei in 1942 to act as a translator and intermediary.

Mastery of local languages manifested itself in a spate of publications that emerged over the years, cementing conversions and capturing Micronesian tongues in print. In the 1880s Father de Valencia published a Yap grammar. German missionaries translated and published several books and pamphlets in the language of Pohnpei prior to World War I, including an illustrated Bible history. After the war Father Espinal prepared a book of prayers in the language of the Mortlocks, and as late as 1977 a Palau dictionary was published by Fathers Salvator Walleser and Edward McManus.

Command of language was central not only to the conversion process but also to education. All of the Catholic missions placed enormous emphasis on education. The most important school in the Marshalls at the turn of the century was the Roman Catholic school even though most of its students were Protestants. The first Capuchins reached Palau in April 1891 and described their mandate as bringing "a new teaching and a new way of life diametrically opposed to [that of the Palauans]" (p. 197). Roman Catholic nuns made vital contributions in schooling by operating dormitory schools, such as Margarita School on Fefan (Chuuk), throughout the islands.

The construction of such schools was a major challenge for the Catholics. Indeed, a Sisyphean quality attaches to the history of church construction in Micronesia. Church structures were at the mercies of termites, typhoons, and the terrors of war, and church members engaged in a constant process of building and rebuilding the physical presence of the church. Some of the churches (one on Ngerchin in Chuuk was little more than a cave) were rudimentary affairs: "a couple of rows of posts stuck in the ground and covered with a roof" (p. 128), as one missionary described a church on Chuuk. Others, however, were impressive—tributes to the ingenuity and vision of the early religious. Father Espinal believed that a beautiful church building constituted a powerful attraction to nonbelievers, and there did seem to be a nexus between the presence of churches and church adherence. Brother Arizaleta began constructing a 100-by-40 foot church in Chuuk by digging the foundations with the one tool he had on hand—an iron frying pan. An impressive Romanesque church was erected in Kolonia, Pohnpei, on the eve of World War I, but heavy bombing by the Americans during World War II left only the bell tower and part of the domed roof.

Not the ravages of war but, instead, natural disasters sent indefatigable mission builders like Father Espriella (who had constructed an octagonal church on Yap from steel he had salvaged from an old German cable station) back to hewing coral blocks. Typhoons swept the islands repeatedly over the years, destroying church buildings and much else that had been painstakingly and lovingly erected. A fierce typhoon devastated Pohnpei in 1905 and forced the missionaries to rebuild. In the same year a typhoon swept Jaluit, leaving everything in ruins. In at least one case, however, the church itself was the savior rather than the victim when, in 1960, the people of Ulithi sought refuge from a tropical storm in a newly constructed concrete church.

The Catholic missions experienced a major sea change after World War II. Having sought for more than a half century to resist local cultures, they now sought to enlist them in the pursuit of indigenization. But several constraints within the culture of the Catholic church itself had tended to discourage the production of genuine Islander churches where Micronesians would no longer be the led but, instead, the leaders. Nevertheless, in 1948 Father Paulino Cantero of Pohnpei was ordained as the first Micronesian priest. He was followed in 1964 by Gregorio Ramarui, the first Palauan priest, and by Amado Sanro, who was installed in 1987 as the first Micronesian bishop.

The Catholic Church in Micronesia is a thoughtful, judicious, and valuable account. It highlights the universality of the calling, the bonds of fellowship linking Spanish, German, American, and even Japanese clerics in their efforts to honor God. At the heart of this work are the ways in which the men and women of the church and their parishioners triumphed over adversity. Unfortunately though, an anodyne quality adheres to this chronicle. The valedictory character of these contributions to the several Catholic churches of Micronesia no doubt discouraged the author from making critical comments about the shortcomings of the church, even if his natural humanity did not. One searches almost in vain for the failings and foibles of the actors on this insular stage. We know that Father Lorenz had a fiery temper, that Father Feeney was an urbane Bostonian, and that Father Costigan—if only by implication—was entrepreneurial and bigger than life, but little else. Perhaps not surprisingly, Fran Hezel himself is almost invisible. Modesty aside, that is a shame because there is another history to write here, and when it is written it will no doubt be based on this masterly survey, and Father

Hezel's own remarkable contributions to the church and Micronesian affairs will be cast in bold relief.

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Collective Works of Hijikata Hisakatsu: Society and Life in Palau, edited by Endo Hisashi. Tokyo: The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 1993. 273 pp. color and black-and-white plates, tables, figures, drawings, glossary, maps. Cloth, no price. Available from Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 3–12–12 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan 108.

This volume, the first in a projected series of English translations of the collected works of the Japanese ethnographer and artist Hijikata Hisakatsu, contains two major and five minor published papers dealing with Palau. The book also contains a group of miscellaneous unpublished manuscript notes concerning many villages and customs. These ethnographic writings are based on Hijikata's extensive field research in Palau in 1929–1931 and in 1939–1942. The rather chaotic, breathless nature of these pieces is the result of at least two factors: the lack of an overall analytical perspective on sociocultural phenomena and the amazing rapidity of the write-up process. All the papers translated here appeared in Japanese journals between 1940 and 1942.

As the principal authority on Palau during the period of the Japanese occupation of Micronesia, Hijikata was, to some degree, constrained in his research by the needs of the colonial administrators, whose interests ran to practical topics such as land tenure and economics. But Hijikata spent a great deal of his ethnographic energy pursuing more "esoteric" topics, such as folklore and material culture. His antiquarian fascination with what he perceived as the rapidly disappearing "old Palau" (p. vii) led him to neglect the various transformations in the culture and society that were taking place under his eyes. Especially, his report that the Islanders showed no interest

in the stories and stones of "old Palau" belies the extensive anticolonial revitalization movements that were springing up at the time in several villages; both chiefs and religious authorities systematically concealed their spiritual life from the inquisitive Japanese researcher. His total failure to carry out his research with reference to the magisterial published work of Kubary and Krämer makes it difficult to use Hijikata's corpus as a point of triangulation between the period of great German scholarship and the period of modern ethographic study beginning after World War II.

Students of Palau and Micronesia will appreciate most the substantial mini-monographs from 1941 that make up the bulk of this volume: "Palauan People Observed Through Their Legends and Artifacts" (pp. 1–83) and "Social Organization of the Palauan Islanders" (pp. 85–189). Although Hijikata redid the first of these studies in 1956 (translated in 1973 as *Stone Images of Palau),* the earlier version included here is of some interest as a "period piece" in that it organizes traditional stories and stone remains into mythological sequences (Children of Chuab, Children of Milad, Children of Lild) and then into cultural settlement classifications (Earthenware People, Stonework People, Woodenware People, Ked [Hillside] People, Forest People, Rock Island People, and Rock Painting People). On the grounds of the evident disjunction in the material and style of artifacts, Hijikata argues that these different classifications reflect several unrelated population groups that migrated into the archipelago, concluding that "Almost all of the numerous myths and legends that exist today were brought from somewhere else by these people, and planted wherever they went as if they were making their footprints on the earth" (p. 76). Here Hijikata has taken the local interpretive rhetoric as a scientific result, and in doing so he overlooks the synthetic principles that link these mythological eras and cultural strata.

The piece on social organization (containing a lengthy section that appeared in 1973 translation as *Palauan Kinship)* reflects Hijikata's penetrating understanding of the complexities of customary practices, settlement patterns, and the linguistic labeling of groups and relationships. Although his attempt to construct an ideal pattern of village structure underestimates the role of contextual variation, his demonstration of the basic principles in terms of data from Koror is exemplary. And he is certainly correct in noting that both kinship and clanship are tied essentially to the system of monetary exchange that dominates Palauan social life. The minor pieces on marriage, play, dances, calendar, and currency add little to the more extensive writings of Kubary and Krämer. The brief description of the death and funeral of *Ibedul* Tem (in 1939) provides an eyewitness account of an important mo-

ment in Palau's history and also supplies several details that are useful for the comparative study of funeral practices.

Hijikata's nostalgia for the past continually leads him to miss the resilience and flexibility of the culture, even in the face of the massive immigration, economic oppression, and militarization that characterized this colonial period. His personal quest for "old Palau" is matched by his unproblematized ethnocentrism. Modern scholars, visitors, and Islanders alike will be surprised to read: "Even the full-blood Palauan is on the way to extinction. When I hear the legends and see many ruins which correspond to these legends, I see their current villages as corpses, and I am profoundly saddened by it" (p. 126). Despite these analytical, scholarly, and ideological shortcomings, Micronesianists should welcome this and subsequent translations of Hijikata's works. And how appropriate that, at last, ethnographic writings on Palau are brought into orthographic consistency and linguistic accuracy, thanks to the collaborative contribution of Kempis Mad, a young Palauan scholar.

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The Ngatik Massacre: History and Identity on a Micronesian Atoll, by Lin Poyer. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993. xiii + 298, maps, tables, notes, references, index. Cloth, US $49.00; paper, US $17.95.

What do you do if you and your community are descended from murderers and rogues? One of the things you do is loosen up on the importance of "blood" ties for determining your own personhood. Another is to imagine your past in terms of a moral narrative that recasts history

as a drama of darkness and light, sin and redemption. Such are the lessons of history to be learned from the atoll society of Sapwuahfik (formerly Ngatik), which is near Pohnpei in the Caroline Islands. In her book *The Ngatik Massacre: History and Identity on a Micronesian Atoll,* Lin Poyer presents a fascinating and intricately researched portrait of one of the Pacific's most interesting cases of modern-day identity making.

Pacific ethnographies have exerted a preponderant influence on the "historical turn" in anthropology. This book is a good example of why this is the case. When Poyer went ashore to do an ethnography of Sapwuahfik in June of 1979, she quickly encountered the force of history. Small island communities with local histories richly inscribed in the landscape and in oral traditions have a way of doing that to ethnographers who go to them. Sapwuahfik (formerly referred to as Ngatik, the name of its largest islet) is a society indelibly marked by the history of a single pivotal event: the 1837 massacre of all of the island's men (perhaps 50 from an estimated population of 120 to 250) by a shipload of ruthless traders looking for the atoll's stash of turtle shell. Given the multiple ways in which Sapwuahfik people have told the story of that event ever since, it is perhaps inevitable that it would become the title and expository strategy for Poyer's book itself. (As an index of the objectification of this episode of Sapwuahfik's mythic history, Poyer recorded no fewer than 11 accounts in the Sapwuahfik language of the massacre.)

In social terms, it is not the massacre but the subsequent resettlement of the island by members of the marauding crew, people from Pohnpei, and others that constitutes the formative event for Sapwuahfik people today. Immediately following the massacre, Sapwuahfik society was reinvented by a few dozen settlers—European and American men together with men and women from Pohnpei—and Sapwuahfik women and children. It is this convulsive destruction and reconstruction that has subsequently become the reference point for discourses of identity and difference: "Why do the Sapwuahfik people speak English, have such varied personal characteristics, or own particular pieces of land? The answers, as local people see it, go back to the fact that the atoll was depopulated and then repopulated by immigrants" (p. 50). That these events are within reach of oral history and, to some extent, documentary evidence make the Sapwuahfik experience a tailor-made opportunity for exploring the forces that shape cultural self-understanding.

For Ngatik, as for much of the Pacific, history during this century has been largely framed by the Christian narrative of conversion and progress—

the benefits of Christian "light" contrasted with heathen "darkness." The significance of Christian identity, related in stories of conversion and its consequences, is intimately coupled with the meanings of the massacre. In Ngatik history, the moral polarities of Christian conversion work not only to transform heathen darkness, as is common throughout the Pacific, but also to redeem the atoll's European ancestry.

Despite the 1837 catastrophe, Sapwuahfik today is a relatively well integrated, cohesive community that projects a confident and coherent sense of self-identity. This apparent puzzle provides the starting point for Poyer's investigation: "How did the biologically mixed population in the chaotic situation of postmassacre Ngatik produce the culturally coherent community that I met in 1979–80?" (p. 7). But pursuing this question leads to a critical reflection on taken-for-granted assumptions about concepts of ethnicity (assumptions also explored in Poyer's coedited volume *Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific,* 1990) and, specifically, on what people mean when they talk about being a *mehn Ngatik* (a Ngatik person). The book provides multiple and not always consistent answers to this question.

For Americans accustomed to fixing ethnic identifications in stable and exclusive categories, and concerned to get them right in a political environment that increasingly legalizes and bureaucratizes its classifications, Ngatik provides some instructive lessons. As Poyer notes, mixed identities in American popular culture have historically been regarded as marginal, problematic, unstable, or mixed up—identities in need of repair, usually by privileging one aspect of the self to the exclusion of others. Poyer's ethnography of what it means to be fully mehn Ngatik suggests that the Sapwuahfik people think about identity in terms that do not privilege notions of biological descent or ancestral purity. Nearly all of the earliest recorded marriages on Ngatik after the massacre involved immigrant partners, and none of the various groups present on the atoll (Ngatik, American, British, Pohnpei, Kiribati) showed any interest in endogamy. As Poyer writes, "Within a generation, they merged into a new Ngatik population, and narrators of oral accounts in 1980 spoke of this historical population as mehn Ngatik" (i.e., as Ngatik persons; p. 94).

Poyer's argument is that in the Sapwuahfik scheme of things, membership in identity categories is "accessible through behavioral choices" (p. 148). *The Ngatik Massacre* gives extensive examples of the importance of factors other than "blood" as markers of Sapwuahfik identity (especially notions of place and social practice). However, we also see numerous instances where metaphors of blood do signify something important about

mehn Ngatik. We overhear, for example, references to attributes associated with "White blood" (not "lazy", p. 147), with "Gilbertese blood" ("like to fight", p. 140), and with American ancestry (generosity). And the concept of "true Ngatik," in the sense of "full blood," also persists, even if only in comments that there are none (p. 128). Such comments reflect the continuing force of the indigenous. Although Poyer writes "No one claims to be indigenously Sapwuahfik" (p. 243), being more or less "indigenous" does seem to matter, as in claims to political status that refer to the degree to which one is born of outsiders and as in one individual's description of the first postmassacre chief as having been "a 'true' (that is, aboriginal) Ngatik man. . . . not an outsider," despite evidence that the individual may have been "half white" (p. 88).

The reader does not know enough about local conceptualizations to grasp the force of these attempts to revalorize the indigenous. Although the prevailing narrative of migration and mixing would seem to undercut such moves, other developments described by Poyer, such as the gradual transformation of Sapwuahfik identity into a kind of ethnicity in the context of Pohnpei political development, suggest that primordialist concepts are finding a place in Sapwuahfik understanding.

One of the features of the Sapwuahfik past that Poyer and her informants agree about is that much of it is missing. Having worked in another Pacific community marked by a turbulent history of violence (Santa Isabel in the Solomon Islands), I found the comment by one Sapwuahfik man familiar: "The people of Ngatik have lost all that . . . . Because foreigners used to come and carry away the people of Ngatik, come and massacre the mehn Ngatik of long ago" (p. 37). Poyer agrees, but adds that the transmission of cultural knowledge also depends upon people's willingness to pass it on and receive it. What is missing here is a politics of memory, an account of the stakes of recollection that might show how relations of power shape what is said in what circumstances, to what effect. In a situation of such massive disruption, cultural knowledge that once worked to reproduce traditional structures of authority, particularly regarding the relations of people to land, would be inconvenient, if not dangerous, to the interests of the settler society. Here the self-conscious identification of many Sapwuahfik people with egalitarian principles of social order, in contrast to the Pohnpei notions of hierarchy, indicates that "forgetting" might be more systematic than a simple by-product of disorder and disinterest.

Despite this inevitable wish for more context, for more information about the personal and political stakes of Sapwuahfik identity making, *The*

Ngatik Massacre manages to weave together a remarkable range of cultural and historical material. With only occasional lapses (as in the obligatory chronology of successive colonial regimes), the book artfully retains its focus on identity talk to unfold its own story of stories, developing an increasingly complex account of the Sapwuahfik social world without giving in to the kinds of simplification that plague many works on cultural identity.

Poyer is particularly good at letting her readers know that the histories she describes are themselves historical—they are narratives adapted to Sapwuahfik's contemporary circumstances that will inevitably shift as those circumstances change. One of the obvious indicators of this is the renaming of the atoll from Ngatik to Sapwuahfik, an act occasioned by the writing of a constitution in 1985. Even though Poyer had not even heard the name "Sapwuahfik" during her stay in 1979 and 1980, by 1989 it was in regular use. The name change, along with the act of formally defining Sapwuahfik citizenship in a constitution, reflects the emergence of an increasingly self-conscious politics of culture and tradition, especially in the context of relations with the people of Pohnpei.

The most distinctive aspect of Sapwuahfik identity is that it draws extensively from at least three major models: local (Sapwuahfik), regional (Pohnpei), and international (American). These are not merely abstractions; they are connected to persons as ancestries, one of which entails descent from powerful murderers. (Noting this multiplicity in the ancestral past should not, however, obscure the fact that these are not equal in effect: One can be "truly" Sapwuahfik, the "same as" the Pohnpei, and "a bit" American/foreign, p. 235.) Although such complexities are not unusual, what is noticeable in the Sapwuahfik situation is the relatively balanced acknowledgment of coparticipation in multiple ancestries, such that none is disavowed or submerged.

Sapwuahfik people apparently have little need to "present this as a paradox or simplify their ancestral background into a unity" (p. 226). Instead, they express ambivalent perceptions toward each group of ancestors. Though the aboriginal Islanders were innocent victims, they are seen as unenlightened. And although the American-European crew were guilty of murder, they are classed as enlightened (p. 226). This, it seems to me, is a narrative waiting to be transformed, to have its moral valences transposed by late twentieth century visions of rapacious European colonialism. What are likely to be the effects upon Sapwuahfik historical memory as America is seen less and less as a force of enlightenment? Whereas today no type of historical marker about the massacre exists, we might speculate that Poyer, returning

to Sapwuahfik in the year 2000, possibly in the company of a tourist excursion flying out of Pohnpei, will find herself recording rites of remembrance at a new cement memorial dedicated to the victims of the massacre.

In sum, this is an exceptional book, one that puts both culture and history in motion in ways that few ethnographies have been able to do. It deserves a wide reading, in Pacific studies and beyond.

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Notes and Comments

THE MICRONESIAN RESOURCE FILE

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Research data, scholarly writings, and other informational resources and materials on Micronesia have long languished for the lack of the comprehensive touch of bibliographers, indexers, and compilers. This extensive corpus of material, much of which has accumulated during the post–World War II era, has never before been as accessible to the Micronesia scholar as it is now with the advent of automated databases and computer-based catalogs. These powerful bibliographic indexing tools have ushered in a new information praxis in which vast stores of information can quickly and easily be canvassed and harnessed for specific use. Riding the crest of this innovation in information access for resources on Micronesia is the Micronesian Resource File, the newly developed automated catalog located at the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Library of the University of Guam.

Until the recent arrival of the computer-based bibliography, all bibliographical tools that compiled the findings and results of the numerous research endeavors conducted throughout the Pacific were published in print form. Aside from the tedious and time-consuming aspects of a printed bibliographical compilation to develop a list of selected sources, the possibility of unwittingly bypassing potentially vital source material always loomed large. Because of the inherently obscure nature of the physical printed item (often published in restricted numbers, thus insuring a limited and invariably regional distribution), not all research bibliographies have shared a similar

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degree of accessibility. Even such factors as the inevitable deterioration of the physical item over time (owing to constant handling and use) have figured heavily in the long-term availability and viability of the bibliographical tool as an information source. But now, computer technology permits the genesis of a new order of automated bibliography that far surpasses the functional limitations of its predecessors.

The three prominent, printed, and comprehensive bibliographies of scholarly literature for Micronesia are, in the order of their appearance upon the landscape of literature guides, the *Bibliography of Micronesia* (Utinomi & Bushnell, 1952), *Micronesia 1944–1974: A Bibliography of Anthropological and Related Source Materials* (Marshall & Nason, 1975), and *Micronesia 1975–1987: A Social Science Bibliography* (Goetzfridt & Wuerch, 1989). As intrinsically useful as each of these well-crafted bibliographic compilations is, their inherent shortcomings become apparent when they are compared with the performance of a modern, computer-based bibliography with the same literature citations. These shortcomings include a requirement that the user be familiar with the scope and detail of execution of each bibliographic work to be able to extract essential but frequently inconspicuous or incongruously categorized citations. The user must also know the derivation of lists of citations based upon subject, author, title, chronology, key words, or other access points. The computer-based, automated counterpart of these three Micronesia bibliographies would supersede these limitations and offer the researcher such powerful features as boolean logic, combined multiple-access-point searching, key word truncations, and other strategies.

The Micronesian Resource File signals a turning point for bibliographic access to the information resources of Micronesia, from traditional print format to the emergent automated technology. The Resource File follows on the heels of the recently inaugurated UnCover computerized database, which is located in the University of Hawai'i's (Mānoa) comprehensive Pacific region periodicals index for Hawaiian and Pacific periodical materials. The Resource File is a computerized database of bibliographic citations for articles and chapters gleaned from numerous sources, including texts, scholarly journals, popular periodicals, monographs, edited collections of scholarly papers published in monograph form, privately circulated technical reports, and unpublished papers and speeches. The Resource File database is nested within the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Library's DYNIX software-based OCEAN automation system. Software modification of one of the standard system bibliographic records templates was required to accommodate the

unique data display requisites of the Resource File material. The bibliographic data for these materials are bonafide OCEAN system records, so that a given search query will provide results that reflect the entire library's OCEAN database holdings for that particular topic.

An array of data fields comprise a detailed screen display for a Resource File entry, which includes an OCEAN system call number and the author and title of the article or chapter. A *FROM:* designation describes the parent material from which the article or chapter has been acquired and includes additional authors, corporate author, other title (which contains the title of the parent material, volume number, issue number, and pagination of article or chapter), publication data, and subject headings, which are constructed according to Library of Congress subject heading principles for correctness. A detailed screen display is shown in Figure 1.

Resource File materials are searchable by the authors, titles, and subjects assigned to each entry, either in full term or key word format. For

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27 OCT 94          UNIVERSITY OF GUAM    ttv25    04:10pm
                   CATALOGING SYSTEM

CALL # RFK RES MRF 0004
  Author   Alkire, William H.
   Title   Technical knowledge and the evolution of
           political systems in the Central and Western
           Caroline Islands of Micronesia.

           FROM:

   Title   Canadian Journal of Anthropology v.1, no.2.
           Winter 1980. pp. 229-237.

Subjects   1. Micronesia.
           2. Caroline Islands.
           3. Navigation, Primitive--Caroline Islands.
           4. Yap (Micronesia)--Interisland relations
           5. Ceremonial exchange--Yap

                        - - - - End of Title Info - - - -
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Figure 1. *Sample array of data fields for a Micronesian Resource File screen display, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Library, University of Guam.*

example, a user wanting to know what the RFK Library's OCEAN holdings are for works authored by William H. Alkire would key in an author search with the full terms, *Alkire, William H.*, or the key words, *Alkire W.* OCEAN would supply the user with a list of selected Alkire titles, including the longer monographs and also the shorter and sometimes more obscure articles and chapters written by him and held in the Resource File database. Similarly, a researcher wishing to determine the extent of OCEAN materials relating to the topic of navigation in the Caroline Islands or Yap would enter into OCEAN a subject search employing the full Library of Congress subject terms, *Navigation, Indigenous—Caroline Islands,* or a subject key word search with the subject key words *navigation Yap.* A list of entries would display that includes, among the monographic works, the shorter articles and chapters and even unpublished reports associated with this topic (the Alkire article being a component of this list). Thus one of the most noteworthy advantages of using the Micronesian Resource File database is the ability to excavate through strata of obscuring, bibliographic detritus to gain access to a wide-ranging gamut of Micronesia-focused data and information in article and book chapter format, among others.

The Micronesian Resource File was conceived by faculty of the Micronesian Studies Program, University of Guam. The project concept grew out of a need to provide students in the program with scholarly material and required readings that either were not available or not easily accessible in the University of Guam collections. The Resource File materials collection has been augmented through the acquisition of papers and other literature provided by Micronesian Studies faculty members, the University of Hawai'i (Mānoa) Pacific Collection, and scholars in Micronesia. The accumulation of this uniquely diverse body of Micronesian information resources has led to the establishment of a contemporary subject authority on Micronesia. This authority addresses the often inconsistent, archaic, or inappropriate rendering of subject headings and subdivisions currently being used to describe the region. The results of this pioneering project will be available to libraries and special collections within the boundaries of Micronesia, the Pacific, and beyond.

The Micronesian Resource File project is currently codirected by Arlene Cohen, Systems Librarian, and me, as Cataloging Librarian, both of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Library. Arlene Cohen oversaw the OCEAN system bibliographic template modification, which supplied the footprint for all Resource File bibliographic entries. Both of us, with input from other librarians, hammered out the technical specifications that formed the data

fields in the File's bibliographic template. By the end of Spring 1995, over 1,000 Resource File materials will be accessible through OCEAN. A file arrangement containing the photocopied Resource File materials will be maintained in the RFK Library's Periodicals/Reserve Collection, and users will be able to have access to the materials there. As an added boon to researchers, the Resource File database, being a subset of the RFK Library's OCEAN automation system, is accessible to information users in Guam, the rest of Micronesia, and the world at large through the University of Guam's Internet node.

The Micronesian Resource File is one of the first ventures coming from Micronesia itself that marries current information access and interchange technologies with an acquisitions priority that is focused on the literature of Micronesia. The Resource File will supply a vital link to the growing network of automated databases and indexes covering the entire Pacific region.

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In Memoriam

SAUL HERBERT RIESENBERG (1912–1994)

Saul Herbert Riesenberg, one of the pioneers of American anthropology in Micronesia, passed away at the age of 82 on May 21, 1994, at a hospital in Miami, Florida, following complications from heart surgery.

A native of Newark, New Jersey, Riesenberg served as a captain with the US Army Air Corps in Europe during World War II. He earned a bachelor of arts degree from the University of California at Los Angeles and, in 1950, received his PhD in anthropology from the University of California at Berkeley.

As a graduate student at Berkeley in the late 1940s, Riesenberg joined the first cohort of American anthropologists to conduct field research in Micronesia. Under the auspices of the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA), Riesenberg went to Pohnpei in 1947 to study political and social organization. Had it not been for the US government's interest in investigating and administering the newly acquired Micronesian islands, Riesenberg would have pursued his originally intended doctoral research project, which was a "salvage" study among the few remaining members of a Native American group living in the Tehachapi Mountains of southern California. Instead, the opportunity to travel to Pohnpei with the CIMA team resulted in Riesenberg's dissertation, "The Cultural

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Position of Ponape in Oceania," and led him to a lifelong interest in the peoples of Micronesia.

Riesenberg's CIMA report, "Ponapean Political and Social Organization," was later published by the Smithsonian Institution Press as the *Native Polity of Ponape* (1968), a work that stands among the classics of Micronesian ethnography.

After completing his doctoral work, Riesenberg took a position in the anthropology department at the University of Hawai'i where he taught from 1949 to 1957. During this period he also spent 1 year (1953–1954) as Staff Anthropologist for the US Trust Territory of Pacific Islands and another year (1955–1956) as an advisor to the government of American Samoa. In 1957 he left university teaching and devoted the rest of his career to the Smithsonian Institution's Museum of Natural History in Washington, DC. Riesenberg worked in the museum's Division of Ethnology (which later became the Department of Anthropology) and he served as Director of the Cultural Anthropology Division, Chair of the Anthropology Department, and Curator of Pacific Ethnology. As curator, Riesenberg oversaw the installation of the permanent exhibition in the Pacific Hall and did much to build up the Smithsonian's Micronesian holdings. He was active in anthropological associations and was a past president of the Anthropological Society of Washington.

Although Riesenberg's primary research was on Pohnpei political and social organization, his interests ranged broadly and included folklore, language, material culture, art, navigation, and history. His published contributions to Micronesian studies demonstrate a meticulous and thorough attention to ethnographic detail and accuracy, especially in his papers describing Pohnpei loom-weaving (Riesenberg & Gayton, 1952), a Caroline Islands script (Riesenberg & Kaneshiro, 1960), and the mnemonics of navigation knowledge on Polowat (Riesenberg, 1972a).

Riesenberg's interest in ethnohistory prefigured a much later historical turn in anthropology. His careful combing of Pacific Island archives throughout the world is evident in his authoritative editing of James O'Connell's *A Residence of Eleven Years in New Holland and the Caroline Islands* (1972b) and in his collaborative translation and editing (with J. Fischer and M. Whiting) of the manuscript produced by the Pohnpei historian Luelen Bernart (Bernart, 1977; Fischer, Riesenberg, & Whiting, 1977).

After retiring from the Smithsonian Institution in 1979, Riesenberg and his wife Mildred moved to Miami. Saul will be remembered fondly by his many friends and colleagues, especially those of us who, as younger

students of Micronesian studies, benefitted from his generous and gracious assistance. In addition to his wife, he is survived by three sons, Jared, of Cincinnati; Daniel, of San Diego; and Thomas, of Arlington; a brother, Eugene, of Bethesda; and six grandchildren.

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The Editor
with information from
Mrs. Saul Riesenberg
and Glenn Petersen, PhD

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Manuscripts must follow the prescribed guidelines; it may be necessary to return manuscripts that do not conform to requirements. A manuscript must be typed on 8½″ × 11″ or A4 nonerasable white bond paper, with *ample nonjustified margins* on all sides (4 cm), and should not exceed 30 typed pages in length. *The entire manuscript—including abstract, block quotations, endnotes, acknowledgments, references, figure captions, and tables—must be double spaced.* Please submit three complete sets. NOTE: Authors from countries where access to copying facilities and style guides is limited may submit one copy; in such cases the services of *ISLA*'s editors are available for preparing manuscripts for publication. Authors should prepare manuscripts according to the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (4th ed.), supplemented by *The Chicago Manual of Style* (14th ed.). The spelling guide is *Webster's Third International Dictionary.* For spelling of placenames, refer to *Pacific Island Names* (L. S. Motteler, 1986, Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press); however, place-name spellings currently in use in the islands are preferred when they differ from the Motteler reference.

Title (page 1)
Include the title (no more than 9 words), the running head (not more than 45 characters, including spaces), name and affiliation of all authors, mailing address, telephone/fax numbers, and BITNET or INTERNET address of the corresponding author.

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Abstracts should be double spaced in a single block format paragraph of 75 to 150 words, with right margin unjustified.

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Use a 5-character paragraph indent. *Do not justify right margins.* Use metric units for all physical measurements.

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Footnotes are not permitted in the text. (NB: This is a departure from the APA manual.) If necessary, use superscript numbers consecutively in text and list Notes on a separate page before References.

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All references cited in text should be listed, in alphabetical order and double spaced, on sheets separate from text and other matter. Names should be inverted, giving surname and initials. Give publication date (in parenthesis). Give article, journal title and volume number (both underlined), and inclusive page numbers; or for a book, give book title and publication information. Use a 3-space indent for the second and succeeding lines of each reference.

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