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## United States Policy Toward Micronesia, 1945-1972.

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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD  
MICRONESIA, 1945-1972

DISSERTATION

Submitted To The Graduate School  
of  
West Virginia University  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For  
The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

David Michael Lynch, M.A.

Morgantown  
West Virginia  
1973



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## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), sometimes referred to as Micronesia (which means "tiny islands"), is administered by the United States as a strategic trusteeship under the provisions of the United Nations trusteeship system.

### BACKGROUND

Micronesia's contact with the Western World began in the sixteenth century when Spanish and Portuguese explorers, the first Westerners to enter the islands, discovered the area. Subsequent contacts came with expeditions of explorers, traders, and whalers from Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States.

The nineteenth century conflict in the Western Pacific between Germany, Spain, and Great Britain finally resulted in German control over the Marshall Islands and Spanish dominion over the Caroline Islands. United States involvement in the area officially began when Guam was acquired as a result of its victory over Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Spanish presence ended with the sale of the rest of its Pacific possessions to Germany in 1899.

The period of German administration (1899-1914) saw the encouragement of trade and copra production. Japan ended Germany's hegemony at the beginning of World War I by sending naval squadrons to the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands. In 1920 Japan's administration was formalized as the area became an International Mandate within the League of Nations International Mandates System.


During World War II, Micronesia became a focal point of military activity. American administration of the area began following Japan's surrender in 1945. By 1947 the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands (except Guam) had become a "strategic" trusteeship under the United Nations Trusteeship System, with the United States designated as the Administering Authority.<sup>1</sup>

Many of the problems currently plaguing the United States can be traced to the physical configuration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. (Figure 1 provides a map of the trust territory.) Encompassing a vast three million square mile expanse of the Pacific Ocean, an area as large as the continental United States, Micronesia lies between 1 degree to 22 degrees north latitude and 130 degrees to 170 degrees east longitude. Of the 2,141 islands and atolls in the area, only 97 are inhabited. The primary island groupings are the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, and the Mariana




Figure 1


Map of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands




Source: United States, Department of State, 21st Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 336.

Figure 1  
Map of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands





# TRUST TERRITORY of the PACIFIC ISLANDS



Islands. Micronesia's total population was 114,645 in 1972, while the total land area is 701 square miles.<sup>2</sup> Population and land area distribution over the six districts are shown in Table 1. The largest island of the Mariana chain, Guam, is an unincorporated territory of the U.S. and hence is not a part of the trust territory.<sup>3</sup> The primary political subdivisions of the territory are six administrative districts: Yap District, Mariana Islands District, Palau District, Ponape District, Marshall Islands District, and Truk District.

Table 1

Land Area and Population Distribution in the Districts of  
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

District	Land Area	Population
Truk District.....	46 square miles.....	32,732
Marshall Islands District.	70 .....	24,248
Ponape District.....	178 .....	23,723
Palau District.....	178 .....	13,025
Mariana Islands District..	183 .....	13,381
Yap District.....	46 .....	7,536

Sources: United States, Department of State, 21st Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 1; United States, Department of State, 25th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1.

American administration of Micronesia has been conducted by two agencies, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Interior. At the outset, the Navy was assigned both military and civilian administrative responsibility for the entire trust territory. But in 1953 the Department of the Interior was designated to handle civil administration in Micronesia, with the exception of Saipan and Tinian in the northern Marianas which remained entirely under Naval jurisdiction.<sup>4</sup> On May 7, 1962 civilian administration was consolidated under the Department of the Interior when Executive Order Number 11021 relieved the Navy of the responsibility for civilian administration of Saipan and Tinian.<sup>5</sup>

#### MAJOR QUESTIONS

The basic contentions of this study are: (1) that despite its commitment to the principle of national self-determination, the United States has been remiss in carrying out its responsibilities as the administrator of the TTPI; and, (2) that military considerations or perceived requirements for U.S. national security have been most influential in shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory, that these considerations have probably eliminated independence as an acceptable alternative for Micronesia, and have largely determined the future status

or form of association between Micronesia and the United States.

The study will first examine the beginnings of the trusteeship, noting especially the strategic and military legacy of World War II which largely determined the "strategic" nature of the relationship between the United States and Micronesia. What military actions of World War II established Micronesia's strategic value in the minds of U.S. policy-makers? What were the positions of the various Cabinet level agencies regarding the area's disposition after the War? What were the positions taken by the defense establishment on the one hand and the civilian agencies (the Departments of the Interior and State) on the other, and what emerged as the compromise solution? What exactly is a "strategic trusteeship" and what are the obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter?

The next chapter will examine any progress the United States has made in promoting "the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, and their progressive development toward self-government or independence."<sup>6</sup> These goals were explicitly accepted by the United States when it joined the U.N. and again in 1947 when it signed the Trusteeship Agreement (in Article 6). What have been

some of the specific achievements and failures of American policy in the fields of political, economic, social, and educational development? What trends are discernible in over-all U.S. policy toward Micronesia?

Following this evaluation of U.S. policy, the investigation will turn to an assessment of the influence which military and security considerations have had on U.S. policy. As the Cold War developed following World War II, what U.S. military activities occurred in Micronesia? What developments resulted from the birth of the atomic and nuclear age? Micronesia's continuing strategic significance has been accentuated by such recent developments in American foreign policy as the Nixon Doctrine, announced by the President in July of 1969, which promised a decreased U.S. military presence on the Asian mainland. What role could Micronesia be expected to play, given a perceived need for alternative military outposts? Has the reversion of Okinawan sovereignty to Japan contributed to a perceived need and, subsequently, the strategic importance of Micronesia? What role have these military and security factors played in the U.S.-Micronesian negotiations regarding the future political status of the trust territory?

Chapter 5 will examine the wide range of options regarding future political status which have been con-



sidered by the Micronesians, ranging from the most cautious, continuing the trusteeship, to the most far-reaching, independence. Between these alternatives lay free association and commonwealth status. What kind of relationship between the two sides is implied by each proposal? And what is the U.S. position on each? Finally, an attempt will be made to assess the impact of the military and security influence on the alternative status which will finally be chosen.

The primary contribution of this study is partially to fill a void in the research which has been conducted concerning United States policy in Micronesia. Most work done in this area relates to specific aspects of U.S. policy within a relatively brief time framework. The material presented here will examine American policy regarding political, economic, social, and educational development over the entire trusteeship period. Furthermore, this study will indicate that, despite a limited detente between the East and the West on the international scene, the U.S. military continues to have an impact on U.S. foreign policy.

#### RELEVANT LITERATURE

The sources examined for this study examine U.S. policy in general and military and security influences

on it. Regarding U.S. policy in the fields of political, economic, social, and educational development, the best treatment is provided by articles in scholarly journals (e.g. Foreign Affairs, Current History, Asian Survey). However, these articles consider specific aspects of U.S. policy within relatively short time periods. Hence the bulk of the information in this part of the study is provided by primary sources, especially such government documents as the annual reports provided by the United States to the United Nations.

Military and security considerations in U.S. policy have been examined in some scholarly journals, while newspaper and magazine articles provide the data necessary to evaluate current developments. The attitude of the defense establishment is vital to this phase of the study, and it has been discerned by examining statements made by ranking members of the Armed Forces and the Defense Department in newspapers, service publications (e.g. Army and The Marine Corps Gazette), and Congressional hearings. Lastly, one important source of data are the transcripts of negotiations between American and Micronesian representatives regarding the future political status of the trust territory.

## APPROACH

The study of United States policy in Micronesia, focusing on the strategic and military influences on it is perhaps most amenable to traditional, descriptive research techniques. This study is not concerned with constructing a theory or model of United States-Micronesian relations. Rather, it is an attempt to determine what these relations are, and to analyze the primary factors which affect them.

This is not to exclude quantitative data, however. Charts and tables comparing various numerical data will be used, especially in the description of political, economic, social, and educational development. But these data are descriptive, not predictive.

## FOOTNOTES

1. United States, Department of State, 21st Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 5.

2. United States, Department of State, 25th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1.

3. United States, Department of State, 20th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 1.

4. Jack W. Hopkins, "Toward Self-Government in the Trust Territory," Philippine Journal of Public Administration (April, 1964), p. 132.

5. United States, Department of State, 20th Annual Report to the United Nations, p. 9.

6. United Nations, Charter, Chapter XII, Article 76(b).

## Chapter 2

### MICRONESIA IN WORLD WAR II

This chapter will be concerned with the effect American military actions in Micronesia during World War II had on post-war strategic planning. A brief description of action in the Pacific Theater will highlight the tremendous military significance of this area for the U.S. war effort--and it provides insight as to why the military establishment demanded some kind of formal U.S. control of the islands.

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Some of the heaviest fighting in the Pacific Theater occurred in the Marshall and Mariana Islands. The initial phase of the American counterattack in the Pacific began in February of 1942, when U.S. naval forces bombarded Japanese fortifications and facilities on the atolls of Wotje, Maleolap, Kwajalein, and Jaluit in the Marshalls.<sup>1</sup> Taking heavy casualties, American forces continued head-on attacks directed toward various enemy positions in the Pacific. U.S. military planners intended to capture islands in Micronesia to use as staging areas and take-off points for attacks on other Japanese bases and ultimately the home islands themselves.<sup>2</sup> In January and February of 1943, the Marshall Islands were taken

after long and bloody battles.<sup>3</sup>

Similar efforts by the American military were directed at Guam, Saipan, and Tinian in the Marianas group. The intensity of the fighting is demonstrated by the fact that for these attacks the Americans amassed over 600 ships, about 2,000 planes, and over 300,000 men.<sup>4</sup>

Occupation of the Marianas was a key element in American strategy. The capture of Guam and Saipan in August of 1944 meant that for the first time in the war, U.S. B-29 bomber planes based on these islands could reach Japanese industrial centers. It has been estimated that these raids destroyed almost one-third of the entire Japanese capital plant.<sup>5</sup> Guam, Saipan, and Tinian also served as major supply bases for the Americans. The actions which ended the Pacific War, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were initiated in Micronesia. The Enola Gay, the American plane which dropped the bombs, took off from an airfield on Tinian.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of their experience in Micronesia during the war, the Navy and armed forces emerged with perhaps an exaggerated sense of the strategic importance of these islands. For example, it was widely contended that too much "American blood and treasure" had been expended ever to allow Micronesia to fall into enemy hands again.<sup>7</sup> (The attitudes of specific individuals

within the military will be examined later in this chapter). By December of 1945, 179 officers and 862 enlisted men remained to occupy the former Mandated Islands.<sup>8</sup>

While the intentions of United States policy-makers concerning the disposition of the Micronesian islands specifically remained rather vague during the war, the overall American position on the acquisition of territory was stated repeatedly in the form of communiques issued jointly by the major allied powers. For example, on August 14, 1941 the United States and other Allies issued the Atlantic Charter in which they pledged to "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other."<sup>9</sup> This pledge was reiterated in the Cairo Declaration of November 1943, when the Allies pledged that they coveted "no gain for themselves, and have no thought of territorial expansion."<sup>10</sup> The Declaration included a proposal for stripping Japan of any and all islands acquired after 1914 as well as any other territorial gains achieved by violence. On December 1, 1943 the United States and the Allies issued the Cairo Declaration which asserted that "the Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion."<sup>11</sup> It was not until

February of 1945 at Yalta that the Allies agreed on the kinds of territories which might become trusteeships. In general, it was agreed that territory taken from the enemy as a result of the war as well as former mandates of the League of Nations could become trusteeships, if all those involved agreed.<sup>12</sup> According to Byrnes' memoirs, Churchill indicated, "if it is a question solely of dealing with enemy territory acquired during the war, it might be proper to put them into some form of trusteeship under the United Nations."<sup>13</sup> As an example of the type of territory suitable for this trusteeship status, he referred to "the Japanese mandated islands."<sup>14</sup> On July 20, 1945 President Truman asserted, "we are not fighting for conquest. There is not one inch of territory nor one thing of monetary value that we want out of this war." This promise was reaffirmed on October 27, 1945 when the President again pledged, "we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory any place in the world."<sup>15</sup>

These pronouncements may have reflected the honest feelings of the Allies during the war, but they had to be attuned to specific perceived American security needs in Micronesia following the war, which requires a consideration of the impact that American military operations in the Pacific war, especially in the Micronesian area, had on post-war strategic thinking and planning. This impact can perhaps best be assessed by determining



the position of important military and civilian officials who were involved in the status debate which occurred following the war.

There was virtually universal acceptance within the United States that legitimate American security interests in Micronesia should be protected. The divergence of opinion occurred over the best means to accomplish this objective. The defense establishment, including the Departments of War and Navy, as well as some members of Congress, favored outright annexation--i.e. they contended that only unilateral security measures would assure the country's safety. The civilian attitude, expressed by the Departments of State and Interior, favored an international trusteeship which would be administered multilaterally along the lines espoused by the then late Franklin D. Roosevelt. The United Nations Charter provided a compromise solution which was finally accepted in 1947, "strategic" trusteeship status which will be considered in detail below. Until late in 1946, then, the issue was debated heatedly.

The Secretaries of State, War, Navy and the Interior were instructed by President Truman in 1945 to assess Micronesia's future political status.<sup>16</sup> This committee maintained an existence separate from the already established State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee which was charged with U.S. political and

military policies in occupied areas.<sup>17</sup> The "strategic trusteeship" proposal finally submitted to the Security Council in November of 1946 was produced by the Coordinating Committee.<sup>18</sup>

The Navy and its Congressional supporters shrank from the prospect of a trusteeship for Micronesia, partly due to a false impression that such a status would give the United Nations, rather than the United States, ultimate control over the area.<sup>19</sup> Late in the summer of 1945, in testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee, Admiral Ernest J. King stated the military's demand for effective unilateral American control over Micronesia in the post-war period:

Obviously, sovereignty is to be preferred; but as far as the Navy is concerned, whatever diplomatic arrangements will promote co-operation among the nations of the world and will insure our having control of the essential bases in the name of the United States, will suffice for us. They can call it a trusteeship or anything they like.<sup>20</sup>

In a report of August 1945 a Subcommittee on Pacific Bases of the House Committee on Naval Affairs recommended that the U.S. should retain at least dominating control over the former Japanese mandated islands-- in the interest of the security of the United States as well as the entire Western Hemisphere.<sup>21</sup>

The attitude of the military establishment was further articulated on September 5, 1945 (less than one

month after the close of the Pacific War) in a public statement made by Assistant Secretary of the Navy, H. Struve Hensel, which indicated what the military considered the "absolute minimum" number of bases necessary in the Pacific. He included only "those we should intend to maintain and which are susceptible to defense." The list, which named such vital strategic areas as Hawaii and the Philippines, included the Guam-Saipan-Tinian area (regarded as one base.)<sup>22</sup>

The military's attitude persisted until the strategic trust was agreed upon. In a high-level meeting on October 22, 1946 called by President Truman with top members of the State, Navy and War Departments present, Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, gave his opinion on Micronesia's strategic value. The gist of his statement, recorded in the diary of Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, was that continued American control over Micronesia was essential to U.S. security in the Pacific. According to Forrestal, Nimitz' "considered opinion" was

. . . that the sovereignty of the ex-Japanese mandates should be taken by the U.S., . . . that the ultimate security of the U.S. depends in major part on our ability to control the Pacific Ocean, and that these islands are part of the complex essential to that control, and that the concept of trusteeship is inapplicable here because these islands do not represent any colonial problem nor is there economic advantage accruing to the U.S. through their ownership . . . .<sup>23</sup>

Forrestal himself, fearing that the islands would be given away, spoke for the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he said "we must maintain strong Pacific bases . . . permitting full exploitation of mobility of forces which was such a vital factor in victory in the Pacific."<sup>24</sup>

It is true that some members of the civilian establishment reflected a view not totally opposed to the military's position. For example, Francis B. Sayre, Woodrow Wilson's grandson and the U.S. representative to the United Nations Trusteeship Council writing in 1948, indicated:

. . . the strong desire that these non-self-governing territories should play their part in the maintenance of international peace and security. The lesson of the Second World War bit into our souls. After the war we were determined that never again should Pacific islands be allowed to serve as bases for aggression by militaristic nations. In so far as they possessed potential value as military or naval bases, they must be utilized for the common defense of the United Nations fighting for human rights and never for the aggressive designs of any single state acting in its own interests.<sup>25</sup>

Further explaining his view of Micronesia's military potential, Sayre continued, "they (the Micronesian islands) are of tremendous strategic value . . . It was their interlocking network of naval and air bases that in the late war prevented sending early and effective support to China except by circuitous and highly difficult routes."<sup>26</sup>

However, the dominant civilian attitude was

represented most adamantly by Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes. It was at his insistence that on October 20, 1945, President Truman established the State-Way-Navy-Interior Committee to study the situation and present policy recommendations for resolving the status question. It is interesting to note however that the Department of the Interior was excluded from most of the formal and informal discussion and investigation undertaken by the Committee--leaving the State Department outgunned and outmaneuvered.<sup>27</sup> Incidentally, Ickes vigorously opposed the "strategic trusteeship" alternative, arguing that it represented only a technical concession by the annexationists which deviated little from outright American sovereignty over the area.<sup>28</sup> The anti-annexationists outside the government worked through the Institute of Ethnic Affairs headed by John Collier, the publisher of Collier's Weekly.<sup>29</sup>

The State Department's position was that America's international obligations dictated a trusteeship solution. They hoped to honor the pledge of the Atlantic Charter opposing annexation. As a supporter of the United Nations, the U.S. was necessarily obliged to support its offspring, the trusteeship system. Finally, the State Department maintained that the islands should fall under international supervision since they were made mandates under the League of Nations.<sup>30</sup>

The difference between Nimitz and Forrestal on the one hand, and the Interior and State Departments on the other reflected the battle which raged within the U.S. government for many months after the war. The military demanded outright annexation to assure maximum protection of U.S. security, while most civilians favored an international trusteeship of the type envisioned by the then late Franklin D. Roosevelt. President Truman attempted to arbitrate among these conflicting interests within his administration by remaining as flexible as possible. As late as January 15, 1946, in an "off-the-record" press conference, he indicated that those areas in Micronesia which were considered absolutely vital by the military would be retained under a unilateral trusteeship arrangement, while the remainder would fall under the jurisdiction of a multilateral trusteeship administered presumably by all nations involved in Pacific security.<sup>51</sup> It was not until November of 1946 that the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee reached agreement on the "strategic trust" status referred to earlier.<sup>52</sup> On November 6 (1946), Truman stated that "the United States is now prepared to place under trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese mandated islands . . . ."<sup>53</sup>

HOW THE U.S. GOT THE U.N. TO ACCEPT STRATEGIC  
STATUS FOR MICRONESIA

Once debate had been resolved within the United States Government, the remaining problem was to secure acceptance of this solution by the United Nations. By the time the trusteeship agreement for Micronesia was being discussed (summer of 1947), the Cold War had already begun--so that the primary obstacle to acceptance of the document was Soviet intransigence. How the Soviets were induced not to block the agreement is a matter of some dispute. John Foster Dulles, then the U.S. representative to the Trusteeship Council, has indicated in his memoirs that the Soviets tried to extract various concessions from the U.S. in exchange for their co-operation, e.g. U.S. support for Russian designs on a colonial base in the Mediterranean. Dulles writes that he and Byrnes flatly rejected all such suggestions.<sup>34</sup> Thus, Dulles was very much surprised when the agreement was approved by the Security Council on April 2, 1947, without any Soviet objections. Apparently, according to Dulles, the Soviets feared outright American annexation of the islands if the Russian veto was exercised in the Security Council. He reasoned as follows:

Somewhat to our surprise, the Soviet Union did not exercise its veto power to block the agreement.

It presumably realized that if this trusteeship agreement were blocked by a Soviet veto, the result would be outright annexation of the islands by the United States. Also, the Soviet Union had never shown a great interest in the Japanese mandated islands except as a basis for bargaining. It had much more concern with North African trusteeships, and with a possible trusteeship of Okinawa in the event that the United States should 'assume responsibility' for it . . . . .<sup>95</sup>

The view expressed by Dulles was formed in large part, no doubt, by his relations with the Soviet representative, V.I. Molotov.

Byrnes explained these events in a somewhat different manner, referring to his negotiations with Molotov, even before the first session of the Trusteeship Council. The two were debating a provision in the Charter which indicates that each trusteeship agreement must be approved by the "states directly concerned." Gromyko insisted that the USSR was a state directly concerned with the Micronesian trusteeship. He indicated that there would probably be no Soviet opposition if it was agreed formally that all five permanent members of the Security Council were "states directly concerned" with each trusteeship agreement. He explained that a formal exchange of letters to this effect would facilitate organization of the Trusteeship Council. In his reply, Byrnes linked Soviet cooperation regarding the Micronesian trusteeship to U.S. agreement to Russian control over the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands:



Such a definition of 'states directly concerned', I replied, was a matter of charter interpretation within the United Nations itself, and should not be the subject of a bilateral arrangement between our two governments. I then added that I would bear his (Molotov's) position in mind when considering the ultimate disposition of the Kurile Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin. This brought a very quick response. The Soviet Union, he said, did not contemplate a trusteeship arrangement for the Kuriles or Sakhalin; these matters had been settled at Yalta. I pointed out to him that Mr. Roosevelt had said repeatedly at Yalta that territory could be ceded only at the peace conference and he had agreed only to support the Soviet Union's claim at the conference. While it could be assumed that we would stand by Mr. Roosevelt's promise, I continued, we certainly would want to know, by the time of the peace conference, what the Soviet Union's attitude toward our proposal for placing the Japanese mandated islands under our trusteeship. Mr. Molotov quickly grasped the implications of this remark. When the United States trusteeship agreement was voted upon later by the Security Council, I was delighted, but not surprised, to see that the Soviet representative voted in favor of our proposal.<sup>96</sup>

The trusteeship agreement, which had been submitted to the Trusteeship Council on February 27, 1947, was approved on April 2. Article 1 of the Trusteeship Agreement designated the territory as a "strategic" area. Under the authority of this provision the United States could shift policy debates to a more manageable environment by removing the discussions from the Trusteeship Council, where the U.S. has only one vote, to the Security Council, where it has a veto. Article 13 of the Trusteeship Agreement is also relevant to an analysis of American security interests. It states that:

The provisions of Articles 87 and 88 of the (United Nations) Charter shall be applicable to the trust territory, provided that the administering authority may determine the extent of their applicability to any areas which may from time to time be specified by it as closed for security reasons.<sup>37</sup>

The provisions referred to, Articles 87 and 88 of the United Nations Charter, describe the functions and powers of the Trusteeship Council. Article 87 provides that:

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

- a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
- b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
- c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
- d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.<sup>38</sup>

Article 88 further directs that:

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.<sup>39</sup>

It would appear that Article 13 of the Trusteeship Agreement allows the United States considerable freedom of action in military and security matters. Specific instances when this freedom has been asserted will be

noted below.

Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement defines more specifically the rights that the U.S. government enjoyed in Micronesia.

In discharging its obligations under Article 76(a) and Article 84 of the Charter, the administering authority shall ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority shall be entitled:

1. to establish naval, military and air bases and to erect fortifications in the trust territory;
2. to station and employ armed forces in the territory; and
3. to make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for the local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.<sup>40</sup>

Perhaps another question remains to be considered, that is the broader issue of the American commitment to various alternative future political statuses for Micronesia. When the United Nations Charter was being debated, the United States was the only major power which insisted on including the option of designating a trust territory as a "strategic" area, in addition to the provisions of Article 5 noted above. Given the security fixation of the United States, the question remained: would the United States ever agree to the maximum goal of Article 76(b) of the Charter:

. . . to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive developments towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement . . . .<sup>41</sup>

#### SUMMARY

A brief summary of the background and environment of the U.S. presence in Micronesia may be useful before moving to the detailed analysis of American policy between 1945 and 1972 provided in Chapter 3. The Second World War created a climate of opinion in the American foreign policy community which virtually dictated some continued U.S. presence in the postwar period. Opinions diverged on the degree of international involvement to be allowed in administering the area. What has been characterized here as the preponderant civilian opinion was to place Micronesia under some kind of multilateral international control to be administered through the United Nations. The military, on the other hand, insisted that legitimate American security interests could be adequately protected only if the area were placed directly under U.S. control, perhaps in the form of an unincorporated territory or some similar arrangement. The compromise which was struck was the "strategic" trusteeship which combined elements of both positions. However, given the nature of this

"strategic" arrangement, as described earlier in this chapter, the international character of the trusteeship appears to have been overshadowed by the provisions which protect American security interests.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Herold Jacob Wiens, Pacific Island Bastions of the United States (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 44-45.

2. Ibid., p. 45.

3. Ibid., p. 48.

4. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

5. Ibid., p. 49.

6. New York Times, May 9, 1971, p. 12.

7. Wiens, p. 41.

8. Dorothy E. Richard, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, vol. III (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), p. 135.

9. Quoted in Francis B. Sayre, "American Trusteeship Policy in the Pacific," Academy of Political Science Proceedings, January, 1948, p. 410.

10. Quoted in Francis P. Sheridan, "Why Strategic Areas? A Study of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands Administered by the United States of America" (unpublished Master's thesis, Columbia University, 1954), p. 13.

11. Sayre, p. 410.

12. Ibid.

13. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. x.

14. Ibid.

15. Rupert Emerson, et. al., America's Pacific Dependencies (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949), p. 119.

16. Sheridan, p. 44.

17. Emerson, p. 120.
18. Elizabeth Converse, "United States as Trustee," Far Eastern Survey, November 2, 1949, p. 260.
19. Ibid.
20. New York Herald Tribune, January 6, 1946, quoted in Converse, pp. 260-61.
21. Emerson, p. 119.
22. New York Times, September 6, 1945.
23. James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, edited by Walter Mills (New York: Village Press, 1951), p. 214.
24. Quoted in Marvin L. Duke, "Micronesia: Western Line of Defense," Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1969, pp. 39-42.
25. Sayre, p. 407.
26. Ibid., p. 411.
27. Emerson, p. 120.
28. Converse, p. 261.
29. Emerson, p. 120.
30. Eugene P. Chase, The United Nations in Action (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950), p. 301, quoted in Sheridan, pp. 23-24.
31. Converse, p. 261.
32. Ibid.
33. Quoted in Sayre, p. 410.
34. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 82-83.
35. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
36. Byrnes, pp. 220-21.
37. United States, Trusteeship Agreement, Article 13.

- 38. United Nations, Charter, Article 87.
- 39. Ibid., Article 88.
- 40. United States, Trusteeship Agreement,  
Article 5.
- 41. United Nations, Charter, Article 76(b).



## Chapter 3

### ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF U.S. POLICY IN THE TRUST TERRITORY

The focus of this chapter will be an examination of United States policy in Micronesia with specific reference to progress in the areas of political, economic, social, and educational advancement and how these developments promoted independence or self-government.

When it signed the treaty accepting membership in the United Nations, the United States committed itself to the goal of the Trusteeship System (as did the powers which administered the other trusteeships) as established in Chapter XII, Article 76(b) of the U.N. Charter, namely "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory and their progressive development toward self-government or independence."<sup>1</sup> At the very least the success or failure of American policy can be measured by the standards which the United States imposed on itself in the Trusteeship Agreement (Article 6) when it accepted the obligation "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the territory."<sup>2</sup> With this explanation in mind, specific sections of the Trusteeship Agreement

dealing with each area of development will be the criteria used to evaluate U.S. policy.

While it is beyond the scope of this study (and in fact this area could possibly be the subject of a separate research undertaking), some reference to the Japanese effort in Micronesia under the League of Nations International Mandates system may provide an added dimension to the analysis of U.S. policy during the trusteeship period. As noted in Chapter 1, Japanese administration began formally in 1920 with the initiation of the League of Nations mandates system. Much of the population of the islands was composed of Japanese who had emigrated to the area--of a total population of 64,819 in 1930, 21,422 were Japanese.<sup>3</sup> By way of comparison, in 1972 only 1,077 American civilians were working in Micronesia.<sup>4</sup>

The Japanese succeeded in building an elementary infrastructure for the Micronesian economy that, according to some observers, the Americans have failed to maintain.<sup>5</sup> Many of these facilities which survived World War II were allowed to fall into disuse. For example, on the island of Dublon in the Truk Islands District, an exemplary water system has rusted away,<sup>6</sup> and fleets of fishing vessels were scattered throughout the islands.<sup>7</sup> The Japanese also constructed ports, hospitals, and paved roads. Many of these roads paved by the Japanese have

been swallowed up by the jungle as was, for example, the road on Babelthuap that had been used to transport the goods of copra farmers and fishermen to market.<sup>8</sup> Many useful facilities and activities which were destroyed or disrupted by the war were never rebuilt or restored. On Saipan, in the town of Garapan, the Japanese had set up a series of sugar mills that were wiped out in heavy ground fighting.<sup>9</sup> Koror, a resort city for the Japanese, a vacation spot for visitors from the home islands, complete with geisha houses, excellent restaurants, and Shinto shrines, was the capital of the mandate and the site of fish canneries and a pineapple industry. The town was demolished during the war and has never been rebuilt fully.

Under Japanese direction, the islands' primary exports were pearls, phosphate, sugar cane,<sup>10</sup> fish, and pineapples. Under the American administration, of these products, only fish is being exported. In 1972, the primary exports were copra, fish, and handicrafts.<sup>12</sup> A quantitative comparison is provided in Table 2 which indicates the level of Micronesian imports and exports under both Japanese and American administration. Under the Japanese a trade surplus was created, with exports consistently exceeding imports. The reverse has been true under the United States since 1951. A more detailed analysis of the American record will be provided later

Table 2

Comparison of the Level of Micronesian Imports and Exports  
under Japanese and American Administration

Year	Japan*		Year	United States	
	Exports	Imports		Exports	Imports
1932	\$12,399,225.57	\$ 5,877,621.79	1948	\$ 894,509	\$ 731,870
1933	16,066,316.24	7,725,836.68	1950	1,644,181	1,347,901
1934	17,742,638.54	12,489,224.94	1952	1,750,162	1,848,885
1935	23,915,008.27	13,802,113.86	1954	3,342,789	2,258,326
1936	22,912,332.17	17,307,223.47	1956	1,605,446	2,763,091
			1958	2,286,687	3,451,789
			1960	1,722,336	3,030,745
			1962	1,765,343	3,140,762
			1964	2,644,105	5,685,585
			1966	3,008,159	8,916,617
			1968	3,025,571	13,572,052
			1970	4,176,003	20,920,318
			1972	2,636,735	26,334,062

Sources: United States, Department of the Interior, Annual Reports to the Secretary of the Interior, for each respective year--1950, p. 147; 1955, p. 20; 1956, p. 12; 1958, p. 14; 1960, p. 24; 1961, p. 31; 1962, p. 28; 1967, p. 21; 1968, p. 16; United States, Department of the Navy, Information on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Transmitted by the United States to the Secretary General of the United Nations (1947-48) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 88; United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective Fiscal year--1971, p. 270; 1972, p. 271; and Tradao Yanaihara, Pacific Islands Under Japanese Mandate, A Report in the International Research Series of the Institute of the Institute of Pacific Relations (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 51.

in this chapter.

However, the conclusion to be drawn from this comparison is not entirely clear. Did economic activity thrive under the Japanese or was the area being exploited economically by a colonial power? The economic success of the Japanese effort may be coupled with the fact that over one-third of the islands' population was Japanese. With virtually all the exports being sent to Japan, perhaps the least that can be concluded was that Micronesia's economic growth which was promoted by the Japanese also aided the Japanese economic situation.

It should be pointed out that following World War II, the United States summarily collected the 122,482 Japanese still in the islands and deported them to Japan.<sup>13</sup> Besides eliminating the Japanese military presence, these deportations had the effect of removing the most able and active elements in Micronesia's economic system. Although it is difficult to determine precisely what the Micronesian attitude is toward the Japanese, one islander working under the American government observed that "the Japanese were horrible people but they did so much; Americans are wonderful people but they do so little."<sup>14</sup>

Unfortunately for comparative purposes, the kinds of basic quantitative and qualitative data which are available from the United Nations regarding the American experience are simply not available from League of Nations

records. Annual reports from the mandatory powers were published in only one year, 1924. Statistics for other years were compiled for some of the mandates. However, annual reports were required only from those powers administering Class A mandates. Since Micronesia was a Class C mandate, Japan was under no compulsion to file any reports with the League Secretariat. Japan's secrecy regarding her Pacific possessions before World War II is well known. So is her increasing disenchantment with the League which was climaxed by her withdrawal in 1938. For these reasons Japan was not inclined to provide detailed data regarding economic development in Micronesia, especially after the first few years of administration. For this reason a more detailed comparison of Japanese and American administration of Micronesia will not be attempted here.

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

As explained above, Article 6, Section 1 of the Trusteeship Agreement provides a yardstick for gauging American policy in the field of political development. It charges that the United States shall:

. . . foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory and shall promote the development of the Trust Territory toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and the freely expressed wishes of

the people concerned; and to this end shall give to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory a progressively increasing share in the administrative services in the territory; shall develop their participation in government; shall give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the territory; and shall take other appropriate measures towards these ends . . . .<sup>15</sup>

Before proceeding to an analysis of the various indicators of political development, a thumbnail sketch of the policy of each of the five American presidents who have administered Micronesia may prove useful.

Under Harry S. Truman the trusteeship idea that had been envisioned by earlier American presidents was modified and implemented. As a more detailed examination in Chapter 5 will show, military factors were probably the overriding considerations involved in the formation of the trusteeship. One compelling indication of this emphasis on security was the designation of the Navy, a military agency, to rule the area as a "strategic" trust territory.

Dwight D. Eisenhower's terms as president saw a partial conversion to civilian administration (under the Department of the Interior), with Saipan and Tinian remaining under military control. It may be appropriate to characterize this period as being motivated by a "caretaker" philosophy; i.e. the American Congress appropriated barely enough money to cover administrative costs and only a very limited and select number of

development projects. It should be pointed out, however, that a precursor to the Congress of Micronesia was born during the Eisenhower years.

When John F. Kennedy became President, he appointed a commission to analyze U.S. policy in Micronesia to make policy recommendations for its improvement. On the basis of the "Solomon Report", as the report of the Commission came to be known, a policy reassessment occurred in 1962 which resulted in the initiation of sweeping changes in all fields. These trends will be noted in each section of this chapter. Symptomatic of the change was Kennedy's request to Congress, which was honored, to increase the appropriations for the territory.<sup>16</sup> Some observers have associated the policy change in Micronesia with the increase of American involvement in Viet Nam.<sup>17</sup>

Several developments occurred during Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency. Both the authorized ceiling and the actual level of appropriations continued to rise. In 1965 the first territory-wide legislative body, the Congress of Micronesia, was established.<sup>18</sup> President Johnson proposed the establishment of an American commission to study the alternative future political statuses open to the Micronesians with a view to conducting a plebiscite in the territory by June of 1972. The measure was passed by the Senate on May 29, 1968, but it



died in committee in the House of Representatives.<sup>19</sup>

During the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, the Micronesian people have become more and more politically conscious. Through their legislative body, the Congress of Micronesia, and its agent, the Joint Status Commission, they are demanding a resolution of their political future. In response to these demands, President Nixon established an Office for Status Negotiations headed by Ambassador Arthur Hummel. A series of negotiations occurred between the American and the Micronesian representatives. The outcome of these negotiations is not entirely certain, and they will be the focus of analysis later.

#### Legislative Branch of Government

Has the legislative branch of government in the Trust Territory been an instrument of political development? Has United States policy been successful in promoting the "self-government or independence" prescribed by the United Nations Charter? These questions provide the focus for analysis of the indigenous legislature in Micronesia.

Area-wide political consciousness has developed very slowly in Micronesia, due in large part to the separation of the 2,000-odd islands by vast expanses of ocean. Although it is relatively small in terms of

actual land area, the trust territory covers an expanse of ocean nearly as large as the continental United States. The resulting isolation is intensified by poor transportation<sup>20</sup> coupled with parochialism which makes inhabitants of one group of islands, atoll, or even a single island, look on all other Micronesians as foreigners. The existence of nine major languages in the territory testifies to a history of inter-island isolation.<sup>21</sup>

The primary vehicle for the development of any "territorial consciousness" among the islanders has been the Congress of Micronesia, the body currently responsible for political status negotiations with the U.S. It is composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Two Senators are elected on an at-large basis from each of the six districts. The twelve members of the Senate serve four-year terms. Representation in the House of Representatives is based on population. The current apportionment of the twenty-one Representatives is as follows: Mariana Islands District, 3; Marshall Islands District, 4; Palau District, 3; Ponape District, 4; Truk District, 5; and Yap District, 2.<sup>22</sup> Representatives are elected for two year terms from single-member election districts that are approximately equal in population. Congressional elections are held biennially in even-numbered years.<sup>23</sup>

Although the Congress of Micronesia was not formed until 1965, its roots grew from a beginning in August of 1956 when the Inter-District Advisory Commission was created.<sup>24</sup> The IDAC developed slowly with the creation of three committees in as many years: a social committee in 1959,<sup>25</sup> an economic committee in 1960,<sup>26</sup> and a political committee in 1961.<sup>27</sup> These groups parallel three of the four policy areas which the U.S. was pledged to promote. Significantly, 1961 was the first year in which the IDAC members were elected by the public.<sup>28</sup> This was early in the Kennedy Administration, a period that saw the implementation of policy changes set in motion by the recommendations of the Solomon Report. Although the report was not submitted to the President until October of 1963, this development in the legislative sphere suggests that Kennedy was considering the change even before the report reached his desk. Public election of IDAC members is not in itself indicative of a policy change, but it does represent political development toward the U.N. goal of independence or self-government. The IDAC changed its name to the Council of Micronesia,<sup>29</sup> and, in a special session during March of 1965, it recommended to the High Commissioner the structure of a proposed territorial legislature.<sup>30</sup>

The Future Political Status Commission was created by the Congress of Micronesia during its Third Regular

Session in August of 1967.<sup>31</sup> The Commission, chaired by Senator Lazarus E. Salii of Palau, held its first meeting on Saipan in November of 1967. Since then it has represented Micronesian aspirations for a resolution of the political status dilemma in six rounds of status negotiations with American officials. The Commission, as reflected in its composition (4 Representatives and 8 Senators), is a joint endeavor of both houses of the Micronesian legislature. Indeed, the Commission has, during the course of the status negotiations, changed its title to the "Joint Committee on Future Status" to reflect this fact. The Committee has acted under broad powers delegated by the Congress. The act creating the Status Delegation authorized it to "actively seek, support, and press for an early resolution and determination of the future political status of Micronesia."<sup>32</sup>

An evaluation of U.S. policy in the legislative sphere would be incomplete without noting the rather severe restrictions under which the Congress of Micronesia operates. The powers of the Congress extend "to all appropriate subjects of legislation."<sup>33</sup> What constitutes an "appropriate subject" is defined by the United States according to the order of the Secretary of the Interior which created the Congress. Limitations on the powers of the indigenous legislature are quite specific.

. . . No legislation may be inconsistent with treaties or international agreements of the United States; laws of the United States applicable to the Territory, Executive orders of the President of the United States and orders of the Secretary of the Interior, or Sections 1 through 12 (Bill of Rights) of the Trust Territory Code. Further, the Congress may not impose any tax on property of the United States or of the Territory, nor may it tax the property of nonresidents at a higher rate than that of residents.<sup>34</sup>

Furthermore, the appropriation power of the Congress is restricted to funds raised by the territory through local taxes, including export and import duties, and does not extend to funds granted by the American Congress. These funds are under the direct and exclusive control of the High Commissioner, the chief executive of the Territorial Government who has always been an American appointed by the President. Besides having this monetary restriction, the High Commissioner is empowered to veto any and all actions of the Micronesian legislature.<sup>35</sup> It is true, however, that his use of the veto has been somewhat restrained. Within these rigidly enforced boundaries, the Micronesian legislature has remained relatively autonomous.

In terms of political development, the evidence suggests that the Congress of Micronesia has become the primary vehicle for the expression of indigenous desires for a change in the territory's political status. Growing slowly from its beginnings as an advisory body in 1956,

the Congress was formally established as a legislative body in 1965. It does operate under some confining restrictions, especially its limited budgetary powers and the High Commissioner's broad veto powers. However, by creating and directing the Future Political Status Commission, the Congress has fulfilled its potential, at least to a degree, for promoting political development and for defining the territory's future political status. Since the United States established the initial advisory body in 1956 and promoted its development into a full-fledged legislative body, it must be concluded that in the legislative branch of government, American policy has, on the whole, successfully promoted political development.

#### Executive Branch of Government

Has the United States promoted political development and self-government or independence through its actions regarding the executive branch of government? Has the directive of Article 6, Section 1 of the Trusteeship Agreement to give the Micronesians "a progressively increasing share in the administrative services in the territory" been fulfilled?


American policy has been to replace nonindigenous employees in the executive branch with indigenes as rapidly as possible.<sup>36</sup> In the years before 1962 the number of Micronesians so employed ranged between 1,500

and 1,900.<sup>37</sup> Although the number of Americans working for the Trust Territory Government has increased, Micronesian employment has increased at a greater rate. By 1972 indigenes accounted for just under 90 per cent of total government employment in the territory.<sup>38</sup>

Given the fact that Micronesians occupy most government positions, is their participation uniform throughout all levels of the administration? The District Administrators, who are the chief executive officers in each of the territory's six districts, are Micronesians who have been appointed by the High Commissioner. However, the evidence suggests that at the territorial level policy-making in the executive branch is still controlled largely by Americans. Figure 2 depicts the organization of the High Commissioner's Office. According to American reports to the United Nations, this group of individuals functions collectively as a de facto cabinet, advising the High Commissioner on "matters of policy and program."<sup>39</sup> For the most part, the highest officials in each department or office are Americans, while the directors of various divisions within a department are quite often Micronesians. For example, the Department of Public Affairs is headed by an American, N. Neiman Craley, while Micronesians hold positions as Deputy Director and administrators in charge of community development, legislative liaison, and civic affairs. This suggests that

Figure 2

## Organization of the Executive Branch of Government



Source: United States, Department of State, 24th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 23.



while Micronesians are occupying some positions of responsibility and are receiving invaluable and necessary experience, top level policy decisions in the executive branch are still largely influenced by Americans.

As noted above, the High Commissioner himself has always been an American who is appointed by the President of the United States with the concurrence of the Senate. The first three High Commissioners were admirals in the Navy,<sup>40</sup> a further indication of the military value attached to the islands after World War II. On January 8, 1951, Mr. Elbert D. Thomas became the territory's first civilian High Commissioner.<sup>41</sup> Since then, five other individuals have filled that position. None have been career civil servants or have had any particular expertise in island administration. For example, William R. Norwood, a newspaper executive, was appointed in 1966, and according to some observers he was "respected by most Micronesians."<sup>42</sup> Currently the position is held by a Nixon appointee, Mr. Edward E. Johnston, formerly an insurance executive and a high ranking member of the Republican Party in Hawaii. The chief executive officer in other territories of the United States (which admittedly have different relationships with the United States) are natives. For example, in American Samoa he is a native appointed by the President, while in Guam he is popularly elected.<sup>43</sup>

The position of the High Commissioner vis-a-vis the Congress of Micronesia is a strong one in light of the fact that he has been given a function usually considered to be legislative in nature. As noted above, he, not the indigenous legislature, controls the annual appropriation from the U.S. Congress--a sum which Table 3 indicates usually constitutes about 70 per cent of the Territory's total operating funds, although that figure had climbed to 95 per cent in 1971. In other words, the native lawmakers control at most only 30 per cent of the funds spent by the Trust Territory Government annually. It is true that appropriations from the American Congress have risen dramatically, especially in the years since 1962, but the evidence suggests that this situation has materially increased the powers of the High Commissioner--not those of the Congress of Micronesia.

However, a detailed analysis of the history of U.S. appropriations for Micronesia may provide some indication of the strength of the American commitment to development in the territory. During the period between July 1, 1951 and June 30, 1960, the U.S. allocation for administration and capital improvements in Micronesia totalled \$165 million. Between 1952 and 1962 annual appropriations ranged from a low of \$4,271,000 to a high of \$6,304,000. The upper limit on appropriations during this period, as established by Congress in 1954, was

Table 3

United States Allocations as a Percentage  
of the Total Micronesian Budget

Fiscal Year	United States Appropriation	Total Funds Available	Percentage
1964	\$15,000,000	\$22,087,769	67.91
1965	17,500,000	23,507,736	74.44
1966	17,344,000	23,755,638	73.01
1967	19,201,000	26,436,205	72.64
1968	30,200,000	37,997,947	79.48
1969	30,000,000	41,252,410	72.72
1970	48,112,000	52,894,456	90.96
1971	59,864,000	62,916,094	95.15
1972	59,980,000	73,569,885	81.51

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1968, p. 206; 1971, p. 264; 1972, p. 265.

\$7,500,000. As indicated in Table 4, the authorized ceiling doubled in 1963 and increased consistently throughout the remainder of the 1960s and the early 1970s. In 1970, 1971, and 1972 the amount actually appropriated came very close to the authorized ceiling. The American commitment to Micronesia, as indicated by annual appropriations, remained relatively constant until 1962. But in that year, a dramatic jump in the level of appropriations signalled a change in the American attitude which has

Table 4

Comparison of Authorized Ceiling for  
United States Appropriations  
and Actual Appropriations

Fiscal Year	Budget Ceiling	Actual Appropriations*
1956 . . . . .	\$ 7,500,000 . . . . .	\$ 5,000,000
1957 . . . . .	7,500,000 . . . . .	4,800,000
1958 . . . . .	7,500,000 . . . . .	6,150,000
1959 . . . . .	7,500,000 . . . . .	4,862,000
1960 . . . . .	7,500,000 . . . . .	5,225,000
1961 . . . . .	7,500,000 . . . . .	5,925,000
1962 . . . . .	7,500,000 . . . . .	6,304,000
1963 . . . . .	15,000,000 . . . . .	15,000,000
1964 . . . . .	17,500,000 . . . . .	15,000,000
1965 . . . . .	17,500,000 . . . . .	17,500,000
1966 . . . . .	17,500,000 . . . . .	17,344,000
1967 . . . . .	25,000,000 . . . . .	19,204,000
1968 . . . . .	35,000,000 . . . . .	30,200,000
1969 . . . . .	35,000,000 . . . . .	30,000,000
1970 . . . . .	50,000,000 . . . . .	48,112,000
1971 . . . . .	60,000,000 . . . . .	59,864,000
1972 . . . . .	60,000,000 . . . . .	59,980,000

\* Includes appropriations and direct grants by the United States Congress.

Sources: United States, Congress, Senate, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 1153, Regarding the Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, May 28, (legislative day, May 27), 1968, p. 8; Charles Leppert, Jr., Personal Letter, May 29, 1969; United States, Department of the Interior, Annual Report to the Secretary of the Interior, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1956, p. 29; 1957, p. 36; 1958, p. 41; 1959, p. 42; 1960, p. 66; 1961, p. 85; 1962, p. 71; 1967, p. 43; and United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1971, p. 264; 1972, pp. 41, 265.

been reflected in the other policy areas which have been and will be discussed. The reasons for this change will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 4.

It may be constructive at this point to provide a comparative perspective for American funding in Micronesia by analyzing comparable statistics for other political systems operating under similar conditions. What levels of funding by other administering authorities in other trust territories of the world promoted a degree of development that made self-government or independence possible? The Trust Territory of Nauru and the Administrative Union of Papua and New Guinea were both administered by Australia under the United Nations Trusteeship System; both are situated in the Western Pacific near Micronesia. Since Nauru became independent on December 31, 1968, the level of expenditures provided by its administering authority might indicate what levels of appropriations are needed before Micronesia can consider self-government or independence. In as much as the Administrative Union of Papua and New Guinea has not achieved independence, appropriations there may also be instructive.

Table 5 shows that U.S. per capita expenditures in Micronesia have consistently outdistanced similar Australian expenditures in Papua and New Guinea. But the Australian effort in Nauru until its independence exceeded U.S. figures. Since then, however, the American per capita

Table 5

Comparison of Per Capita Administration Expenditures  
in Micronesia, Papua and New Guinea,  
and Nauru, for Selected Years

Fiscal Year	Micronesia	Papua and New Guinea	Nauru
1960	\$ 68.89	\$22.74	*
1961	76.04	20.99	\$236.25
1962	77.85	25.19	*
1964	170.02	35.97	335.19
1966	187.77	47.45	295.43
1967	209.99	*	*
1968	318.62	*	*
1969	306.09	*	*
1970	470.53	*	*
1971	559.19	*	*
1972	523.18	*	*

\* These data are not available.

Sources: Australia Yearbooks--No. 49 (1963), pp. 159, 160; No. 51 (1965), pp. 123, 124, 130, 137, 138; No. 53 (1967), pp. 62-66, 141, 143, 147, 149, 153, 155, 157; United States, Department of the Interior, Annual Reports to the Secretary of the Interior, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective year--1960, p. 66; 1961, p. 85; 1962, p. 71; 1967, p. 43; and United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective year--1963, p. 188; 1968, p. 170; 1971, pp. 250, 214, 217; 1972, pp. 1, 265.

expenditure has matched and surpassed this level. The obvious implication is that American policy has been successful in terms of per capita expenditures when measured against the last trust territory in the world to achieve the U.N. goal of self-government or independence. It should be noted that the parallel is by no means precise, witness the large differences in the size of the population. Nevertheless, the trend is significant.

Micronesia's involvement in the budgetary process is one indication of the territory's deep dependence on the United States. The trust territory's annual budget is compiled by the Director of Budget and Finance. He proceeds by gathering recommendations and estimates from a variety of administration officials, including the High Commissioner's "cabinet". After the High Commissioner approves the estimates, the Director prepares a preliminary budget report. The Congress of Micronesia does participate to a limited degree in considering those areas of the budget which involve U.S. appropriations. It may make non-binding recommendations in these areas which it presents to the High Commissioner. Should the High Commissioner refuse to incorporate these ideas into his budget proposal, they are forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior who has final authority in the matter.<sup>44</sup> Proposed programs are reviewed by the Secretary's Advisory

Committee. The Territory's budget is incorporated into the Office of Management and Budget hearings and is ultimately included in the President's budget which is approved annually by the American Congress.<sup>45</sup>

The American record concerning progress and political development in the executive branch of government appears to be mixed. In terms of sheer numbers, the U.S. goal of replacing nonindigenes with indigenes seems to be moving toward success. But when the level of Micronesian participation is analyzed, it appears that policy-making in the executive branch is still, to a very great degree, controlled by Americans. Although the six District Administrators are Micronesians, the High Commissioner and most of his "cabinet" continue to be Americans. The question of control of U.S. appropriations illustrates the reluctance of American policy-makers to allow the Congress of Micronesia to act autonomously, for the High Commissioner, not the indigenous legislature, controls that segment of the territory's budget provided by the U.S. Congress.

The change in U.S. policy which occurred around 1962 is illustrated by the dramatic increases recorded in the level of American appropriations for Micronesia. The annual allocation doubled between 1962 and 1963, rising steadily in subsequent years. Even in comparative terms, the American record has improved, as indicated



in Table 5.

However, an analysis of budgetary considerations does indicate the existence of a dilemma for U.S. policy-makers, a dilemma which may be unsolvable. On the one hand, should the United States fail to maintain and increase funding, it can be charged with retarding, or at least with not adequately promoting, development. But, on the other hand, when such funding has been made available, it can be charged that this has made Micronesia more and more dependent on the United States and has, therefore, frustrated the goal of self-government or independence. The fact that over 70 per cent of the territorial budget comes from the U.S. Congress illustrates the problem. It is unlikely that American lawmakers would continue to provide this level of aid if Micronesia chose to become independent. It is further even more unlikely that a new Micronesian government could function adequately on a budget only one-third its previous size. Thus, Micronesian dependence on U.S. financial support may be influencing the direction of the area's future political status.

#### Judicial Branch of Government

Article 6, Section 1 of the Trusteeship Agreement stipulates that the role of the judicial branch of government in promoting political development shall be to

"give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the territory."<sup>46</sup> Basic laws (civil, criminal, etc.) are a combination of the Trust Territory Code, custom, and native laws. In attempting to abide by the appropriate provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement, the United States has empowered the Congress of Micronesia to alter the Code to meet local circumstances.<sup>47</sup> In terms of political development, the indigenous legislature is participating in establishing a legal framework and a system of jurisprudence that will be adaptable to local conditions.

The degree of Micronesian participation in the judicial branch is indicative of the extent of progress toward the goal of self-government or independence. There has been a conscious effort on the part of American policy-makers to encourage Micronesian involvement in the judicial branch below the highest level. Indeed, Section 183 of the Trust Territory Code directs that, subject to retaining proper administration. Micronesians should be employed in the judicial system as much as possible.<sup>48</sup> The court hierarchy consists of three tiers--the High Court, district courts, and community courts. The High Court is presided over by a Chief Justice, two Associate Justices, and a panel of three temporary judges--all Americans appointed by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior.<sup>49</sup> Micronesians are employed rather

extensively at most of the lower levels, that is in district and community courts. However, it is interesting to note that even at these levels, Micronesian participation may be restricted, even eliminated, in areas the U.S. considers strategically important. For example, all the community courts are staffed by Micronesian judges except at the Kwajalein Test Site<sup>50</sup>, where an American presides. In general, though, Micronesian participation is extensive at the lower levels, but the apex of the judicial system is controlled by Americans.

#### District Government

Micronesian participation in government at the district level is both broad and far-reaching. As noted above, the district administrators, the local chief executives, of all six districts are Micronesians appointed by and responsible to the High Commissioner. It is interesting, however, that it is only within the last decade that indigenes have occupied these levels. District legislatures also provide for exclusively Micronesian participation. But no provision for indigenous involvement in policy making at the district level existed until 1955--the year in which the Palau Congress, the Territory's first district legislature, was chartered.<sup>51</sup> Gradually, over a period of eight years, a legislative body was formed in each district.<sup>52</sup> The evidence suggests,

then, that the United States has promoted extensive Micronesian participation in both the executive and legislative branches of district government.

However, like its territorial counterpart, the district legislatures are subject to extensive restriction. Although the district administrator's veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the legislators, the High Commissioner's veto is final.<sup>53</sup> The territorial analogy is also pertinent when the budgetary process is considered. The budget is prepared annually by the district administrator and submitted to the legislature. Although suggestions may come from individual legislators, the series of appropriations bills designed to enact the budget are usually based on the executive's recommendation. Either the district administrator or the High Commissioner can veto any appropriation enacted by the local legislature.<sup>54</sup> Just as at the territorial level, American control over district legislation can be overriding.

An interesting trend becomes apparent when district and local government revenues are examined. Such revenues have remained rather stable in recent years, and appear limited in comparison to Territorial Government revenues as Table 6 indicates. These figures show that the revenues available to district and municipal governments are limited. However, an interesting relationship surfaces when the

Table 6

Comparision of Total Municipal and District  
Government Revenues with Total  
Trust Territory Revenues

Fiscal Year	Total Municipal and District Government Revenues	Total Trust Territory Government Revenues
1964	\$ 980,085	\$22,087,769
1965	891,393	23,507,736
1966	969,600	23,755,638
1967	934,872	26,436,205
1968	1,065,083	37,997,947
1969	1,455,103	41,252,410
1970	1,827,288	52,894,456
1971	2,515,680	62,916,094
1972	2,658,274	73,569,885

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1968, pp. 201, 206; 1971, pp. 259, 264; 1972, pp. 258, 265.

revenues which can be raised independently from outside sources (that is, U.S. appropriations and grants) are compared; in other words, if U.S. funds were halted, which might well occur should Micronesia choose independence as its future political status, the budgetary situation would be entirely different. Table 7 presents the revenue each of the levels of government raises through taxes, from sources independent from the United

Table 7

Comparison of Revenue from Taxes  
for Territorial, Municipal,  
and District Governments

Fiscal Year	Territorial Taxes	Municipal Taxes	District Taxes	Total Municipal and District Taxes
1966	\$ 432,418	\$184,193	\$ 666,482	\$ 850,675
1967	361,533	177,137	462,584	639,721
1968	579,764	185,713	713,811	899,524
1969	694,302	240,612	1,140,381	1,380,993
1970	835,487	406,616	1,420,676	1,827,292
1971	877,622	401,548	2,156,272	2,557,820
1972	1,795,694	521,002	1,903,310	2,424,312

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1966, p. 279; 1967, p. 228; 1968, pp. 205, 213; 1969, pp. 211, 219; 1970, pp. 237, 241, 242; 1971, pp. 264, 267; 1972, pp. 269, 270.

States. Although municipal funds still remain below territorial figures, district taxes yield well over one-third more revenue than territorial taxes. When municipal and district taxes are combined, the total figure is over twice the territorial sum. This consideration may influence deliberations by Micronesian leaders concerning their future political status. Should independence be chosen, it is unlikely that the American Congress could be persuaded to continue to provide appropriations and

grants at their current levels, if at all. This appears all the more significant in light of the parochial attitude referred to above which still permeates the islands, at least to a degree. Again, should independence be the option selected, would the disparate districts willingly provide the financial support which the new central government would sorely need? How would this affect cooperation among the component parts of such a newly independent state? This may be one among many reasons why the Mariana Islands District has begun separate talks with the United States to negotiate a future status distinct from the rest of Micronesia.

As in the central legislature, the members of the district legislatures have become conscious of the political power they possess beyond the formal grants in their charters. For example, the first session of the First Mariana Islands District Legislature, in Resolution Number 9-1969 introduced by Daniel T. Muna of Saipan, attempted to pressure the U.S. into providing increased financial aid for economic development, by directing this resolution to the Soviet Union via the United Nations Security Council.<sup>55</sup> The United States handled the problem by ignoring it, but it is indicative of the kind of action that district legislatures can initiate to aid in political and economic development and placing pressure on the United States.

Political development has generally proceeded more rapidly at the district level than at the territorial level. By 1963 all districts had functioning legislative bodies, while the Congress of Micronesia was not formally established until 1965. By 1972 all district administrators were Micronesians, while at the territorial level Americans still held the top policy-making positions. Although it is true that the scope of district government functions is more restricted than its territorial counterpart, the local level has provided more complete training and experience in the overall policy-making process. Thus, despite the fact that American control over the output of District government can be complete, the evidence suggests that Micronesian involvement at this level is promoting a limited degree of political development.

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Consistent with the reasoning advanced at the beginning of this chapter, the standard for evaluating American policy in terms of economic development is provided by Article 6, Section 2 of the Trusteeship Agreement, which indicates that the United States shall:

. . . promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants, and to this end shall regulate the use of natural resources; encourage the development of fisheries, agriculture and industries; protect the inhabitants against the loss of their



land and resources; and improve the means of transportation and communication . . . .<sup>56</sup>

The central question, then, becomes: How and to what extent has the United States promoted economic development and economic self-sufficiency? While it is beyond the scope of this study to describe all economic development projects, an overall assessment of U.S. policy in the economic sphere will be attempted.

The most basic and underlying causes of Micronesia's economic problems may be a lack of capital coupled with poor economic development potential. The two primary sources of capital in Micronesia are U.S. appropriations and, secondarily, private American investment. The history of U.S. allocations for the territory has been depicted in Table 4. It is evident that before 1962 the funds actually appropriated fell well under the \$7.5 million maximum imposed by the American Congress. After 1962, the budget ceiling as well as the actual appropriations jumped considerably. The implications this held for economic development were clear. Before 1962 appropriations barely covered administrative expenses, the result being little or no economic development.<sup>57</sup> President Kennedy's policy reassessment is reflected in the budgetary increases noted above. The U.S. has emphasized this policy shift in its annual reports to the

United Nations:

In 1962, a major shift in the direction and scope of the Administering Authority's commitment in Micronesia led to increased appropriations from the U.S. Congress to facilitate more rapid development. Accordingly, the previous ceiling of \$7.5 million was raised to \$17.5 million. An accelerated program was set in motion for emerging construction and staffing of school facilities along with efforts to improve health standards and provide a general upgrading and integrated development of essential public services embracing transportation, communications, water and power resources.<sup>58</sup>

The effects of this policy alteration can be demonstrated by describing the changes recorded in the U.S. position regarding industrial and business development in Micronesia. Before 1962, U.S. policy was aimed at establishing industries manned by indigenes who were to be trained in management skills and encouraged to take over completely as soon as possible. Only businesses financed by Micronesians or by the government were acceptable since all foreign investments, including those of U.S. citizens, were banned. But the policy shift in 1962 allows private U.S. capital to be invested, subject to government controls which ensure Micronesian participation in employment, management, and investment opportunities.<sup>59</sup> Other foreign investment (non-U.S.) is still excluded, while the total ban on foreign purchasing of land (including the U.S.) has been continued.<sup>60</sup> The policy change indicates that the United States is officially

interested in initiating and encouraging economic enterprises which Micronesians will eventually own and operate. Thus private American investments are a major source of capital in Micronesia. The level of U.S. investment may be indicative of the extent of the territory's financial dependence on continued American involvement in the islands. According to testimony given by the High Commissioner before the U.S. Senate, the figure was about \$28 million in 1972.<sup>61</sup>

The second basic cause of Micronesia's economic problems may be its poor economic development potential. Since World War II, scrap metal has been one of the territory's leading exports. But, since the supply is diminishing, the income derived from its sale is decreasing rapidly. Obviously, an economy which is even partially dependent on a resource whose supply is so limited needs alternative sources of income. Has American policy been directed toward developing such alternatives with the ultimate goal of bringing the area's economy to a state of self-sufficiency?

U.S. economic objectives for Micronesia have been provided in its annual reports to the United Nations. The American administration has pledged to promote development in food production, transportation and communication, tourism, wages and employment conditions, resource

development, native businesses, and investment in private enterprises. A succinct statement of these objectives was provided in the 1971 report to the United Nations:

. . . increasing food production through improvement of crop farming and encouraging use of local materials for house, school and dispensary construction, furniture and handicraft.

. . . developing transportation and communications systems to overcome community isolation, increase educational opportunity, promote higher standards of family and community life and provide adequate and uninterrupted air-and-sea logistic support of the island communities.

. . . encouraging development of tourism together with personnel and facilities needed for tourism.

. . . maintaining a wage structure and employment conditions consonant with the advancing social and economic conditions of the Trust Territory; this structure to be based on periodic economic surveys and cost-of-living studies.

. . . reserving to the inhabitants their land and resources by applying appropriate controls and constraints so that land use plans and patterns will achieve optimum use of land resources.

. . . providing the basic physical and resource developments necessary for economic growth expanding a Trust Territory-wide construction program which includes rehabilitating and building roads, airports, and harbor facilities; and improving and expanding water, electrical, sanitary and other basic utilities.

. . . encouraging Micronesians to establish their own business enterprises by providing them with necessary technical assistance and long-term loans. These enterprises include establishment of cooperatives, small home industries, expanded production of handicrafts, search for markets, and instruction in modern methods of production.

. . . providing for capital participation in economic enterprises which are otherwise beyond the financial capacity of local investors by providing an economic climate which will allow business, commerce, and industry a profit while providing productive employment opportunities for Micronesia's growing population. Enterprises which may require such participation include commercial transportation, hotel and travel facilities, fisheries, large-scale tropical agriculture production, food processing, and small fabricating and manufacturing industries.<sup>62</sup>

One indication of deepening American interest in economic development came in 1967 when the U.S. Government commissioned a private consulting firm, Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., to analyze Micronesia's economy and recommend measures it felt would assure economic growth. The Economic Development Plan for Micronesia, more commonly called the "Nathan Report", was published in February of 1967. The parameters which influenced the report were "the political future of Micronesia, policies related to outside investment, land ownership and use, the quality and the quantity of the existing labor force and the attitude and organization of the administration."<sup>63</sup> The report recommended broad changes throughout Micronesia's economy including the development of an improved infrastructure, particularly transportation. Since qualified personnel were seen as absolutely essential, it was recommended that skilled labor should be imported if necessary. The report indicated that since indigenous and U.S. capital were inadequate, foreign capital--and, for

that matter, foreign labor and management--should be imported to stimulate enterprises which would otherwise not be viable. Land ownership should be opened to foreigners. Education should be geared to an understanding of the importance of economic growth to development as a whole. Transportation needs to be improved. Present resources should be developed and utilized.

"There must be high priority emphasis to direct economic stimulation; more intensive management assistance; more liberal loans and loan guarantees; more experiments with selected pilot and demonstration enterprises; more encouragement of outside investors."<sup>64</sup> The report recommended administrative reorganization of the High Commissioner's office along lines which would facilitate the implementation of the recommendations noted above.<sup>65</sup> The administrative suggestions were quite specific, but none of these recommendations have been implemented.<sup>66</sup>

It should be pointed out that American policy-makers have successfully promoted the development of Micronesia's leading export, copra. The Copra Stabilization Fund, as it is now called, was initiated in 1952 when the United States contracted a private American firm to operate the service. Originally financed by a U.S. grant, the fund was established to control or subsidize prices paid to copra producers with a view toward protecting them from the vicissitudes of world market prices.

Micronesians were gradually encouraged to participate in the operation and management of the fund, and by 1966 a corporation which was 60 per cent owned by Micronesians received the contract to operate the fund.<sup>67</sup> In that same year each of Micronesia's districts gained representation on the Board.<sup>68</sup> This is one area where U.S. policy has been notably successful in that the fund is now self-sustaining; i.e. if Micronesia becomes independent, the personnel and monies needed to operate the fund would be present even without U.S. support.

Tourism is one area that has been singled out by U.S. policy-makers as possessing great development potential. Indeed, in 1970 tourism replaced copra as the territory's largest export income earner. The tremendous growth of the tourist industry is recorded in Table 8 which depicts the number of entries into Micronesia from 1965 to 1972. About two-thirds of the tourists came from the United States, while the other one-third originated their journeys in Japan.<sup>69</sup> The stated American goal is to ensure that the tourist industry "be developed in line with the desires of each District and that the dollar return to Micronesia is more than just for hotel employees or boat owners."<sup>70</sup> Micronesians themselves look on the tourist boom as a mixed blessing. They understand that the exploitation of this "natural resource" is an important, even compelling,

Table 8  
Tourist Entries Into the Trust  
Territory, 1965-1972

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Calendar Year	Number of Entries
1965 . . . . .	4,100
1966 . . . . .	5,700
1967 . . . . .	9,000
1968 . . . . .	13,000
1969 . . . . .	20,600
1970 . . . . .	26,700
1971 . . . . .	31,891
1972 . . . . .	36,199

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Source: United States, Department of State, 24th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 51; and United States, Department of State, 25th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 45.

step along the path to economic development and self-sufficiency. But some islanders have expressed fears that much a course will inevitably result in the "Americanization" of the territory.<sup>71</sup> They fear that their indigenous culture may be trampled under commercialized efforts to make Micronesia more attractive to tourists. Nonetheless, tourism does possess great potential for the territory's economic development. It accounted for \$2 million of the \$63.8 million Gross Territorial Product in 1970.<sup>72</sup>



However, these positive observations should be balanced by a consideration of the growing trade deficit which exists in the Trust Territory. Before the policy change in 1962 the value of exports and imports were roughly equal (although there has been some trade deficit every year since 1956.) The value of imports has since grown dramatically, from \$3,140,762 in 1962<sup>73</sup> to \$26,334,062 in 1972.<sup>74</sup> The value of exports also increased, but at a slower rate, growing from \$1,765,343 in 1962<sup>75</sup> to \$2,636,735 in 1972.<sup>76</sup> Tables 9 and 10 indicate how these exports are distributed according to the product and the country to which it was sent. According to Table 9, copra is by far the territory's leading export, all of it being sold to Japan. Fish, a very distant second, is shipped primarily to the United States. Total exports are approximately evenly divided, with about half going to the U.S. and half to Japan. On the import side, Table 10 indicates that over half of Micronesia's incoming trade is with the United States, while about one-third is with Japan. The territory relies heavily on outside sources for both processed food and grain, getting almost twice as much from the U.S. as from Japan. Manufactured goods, machinery, building materials, oil products, and assorted beverages account for the remainder of Micronesia's imports.

Table 9

Quantity and Value of Commodities Exported by Country of Destination  
From the Trust Territory, July 1971-June 1972\*

Commodity	Japan		U.S. and Other	
	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value
Copra (short tons)	10,739,503	\$1,317,542	-	-
Scrap metals (short tons)	-	16,981	-	-
Handicrafts and shells	-	28,075	-	\$ 76,183
Trochus (Pounds)	204,975	25,827	-	-
Vegetables (Pounds)	-	-	364,430	51,079
Fish (Pounds)	397,551	26,943	-	859,442
Crabs and lobsters (Pounds)	-	-	2,954	2,559
Black spice peppers (Pounds)	-	-	12,477	6,674
Fruits (Pounds)	-	-	44,723	4,378
Meat (Pounds)	-	-	218,147	76,398
Other	-	-	various	76,496
<b>Total</b>	-	<b>\$1,415,368</b>	-	<b>\$1,155,209</b>

\* Commodities exported to other districts within the trust territory are valued at \$66,158.

Source: United States, Department of State, 25th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 273.

Table 10

Estimated Value of Imports by Commodity and by Principal Country  
of Origin to the Trust Territory, July 1971-June 1972

Commodity	U.S.	Country of Origin		Total
		Japan	All Other	
Food:				
Rice.	855,572	\$ 618,010	\$ 283,099	\$1,756,681
Flour.	516,102	74,580	16,970	607,552
Sugar.	205,947	123,871	357,384	687,202
Canned meat.	773,827	230,348	293,383	1,302,558
Canned fish.	143,383	1,107,473	53,852	1,304,708
Other foods.	2,480,520	730,080	454,509	3,665,109
Total foods.	\$4,980,231	\$2,884,262	\$1,459,197	\$9,323,910
Petroleum, oil and lubricants.				
Petroleum, oil and lubricants.	\$ 620,667	\$ 32,056	\$ 657,228	\$1,309,951
Tobacco and tobacco products.	1,197,425	53,288	125,877	1,376,590
Clothing and textiles.	745,251	910,596	423,452	2,079,299
Building materials.	1,805,260	748,204	464,749	3,018,213
Boat parts and gears.	249,928	120,281	41,233	411,442
Machinery.	426,696	1,048,130	21,494	1,496,320
Beverages:				
Alcoholic.	362,357	104,605	56,458	523,420
Beer.	769,379	318,773	77,735	1,165,487
Milk.	566,358	92,757	154,981	814,096
Other beverages.	462,953	63,527	51,644	578,124
All others.	1,720,170	1,748,445	768,595	4,237,210
Grand Total.	\$12,906,295	\$8,125,024	\$4,220,643	\$26,354,062

Source: United States, Department of State, 25th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 272.

The significance of the \$23.7 million trade deficit lies in how it is absorbed. According to the Nathan Report, sources of income flowing into Micronesia, at estimated annual rates for the years 1965 to 1967, totalled \$12.3 million annually. About 73 percent of this amount (\$9 million) was accounted for by direct Trust Territory Government expenditures (net). Copra exports accounted for \$2.5 million annually, while all other exports accounted for \$760,000 annually. The last component was the \$70,000 annually which resulted from expenditures of travellers in those years.<sup>77</sup> Thus, the growing trade deficit is being financed by the United States through the annual appropriations from the American Congress noted earlier.

What impact could this situation have on Micronesia's political future? The probable unwillingness on the part of the U.S. Congress to continue to appropriate funds for an independent Micronesia has been described earlier. Since the U.S. has seemed reluctant to provide money when the Trusteeship Agreement and the U.N. Charter imposed some obligation on it, it is doubtful that the Congress would remain willing to continue appropriations should the obligation be removed. In such a situation, trade could not be continued at the present level. Since the funds necessary to pay for imports over

the value of exports would no longer be available, the level of imports would of necessity be drastically curtailed. Therefore, as a result of the trade deficit which has developed under American administration, Micronesia has become more dependent on the United States.

It is further possible that American tariff policy has, whether intentionally or not, restricted Micronesia's economic development. As noted above, foreigners cannot own land in Micronesia. But since 1962 they have been permitted to establish businesses and corporations and make investments in the territory, provided certain conditions are met which are intended to protect the Micronesians. Such conditions include providing adequate opportunities for Micronesian employment and management in these enterprises and allowing Micronesian capital to be invested. The reasoning of the administration is that each new enterprise should not only materially contribute to Micronesia's economic development, but also should play a role in ultimately promoting economic self-sufficiency. The Van Camp Sea Food Corporation has attempted to meet these conditions by training and employing Micronesians. But the tariff policy alluded to above has stalled the development of processing plants and fish canneries in Micronesia--processed fish are subject to a tariff when leaving the trust territory while

unprocessed fish are not subject to tariff. In order to avoid the tariff, Van Camp merely freezes the fish in Micronesia and then ships it tariff-free to other ports outside the territory for processing and canning.<sup>78</sup> This suggests that while the stated U.S. objective is to compel foreign firms to promote economic development, it inhibits these efforts by imposing this tariff policy.

One measure of the level of activity in any economy is its gross product, the total value of all goods and services available for consumption and investment. Because of measurement problems arising from the subsistence nature of some segments of the Micronesian economy, the Gross Territorial Product (GTP) had not been compiled before the Nathan Report was issued. At that point the GTP was analyzed at estimated annual rates over the period from 1965-1967. The authors of the Nathan Report concluded that the average annual GTP from 1965 to 1967 was \$38.3 million (or \$24.7 million excluding net additions to capital facilities.)<sup>79</sup> They indicated that the U.S. Government contributed 47 percent of this total figure.<sup>80</sup> By 1970 the GTP had grown to \$63.8 million (not including net additions to capital facilities.)<sup>81</sup> According to the 1971 report to the United Nations, the increase from 1965-1967 to 1970 was ". . . primarily brought about by an increase in government expenditures."<sup>82</sup>

This discussion of the GTP indicates that the United States is directly responsible for a major part of the activity within and growth of the Micronesian economy, and that continued American involvement is essential if the economy is to continue to grow at its present rate.

Perhaps another indication of activity and expansion within the Micronesian economy is the territory's national income. The figures shown in Table 11 were provided by the administration only through 1969, due to a measurement problem caused by the fact that a large portion of Micronesia's population (28,000 people) are engaged in subsistence agriculture.<sup>83</sup> According to the 1972 report to the United Nations, "... since so much of the income of the people of the Territory is computed on a subsistence basis, statistics tend to be somewhat meaningless."<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless, the data in Table 11 have been included to provide an overview, however limited, of the Micronesian economy. Between 1952 and 1962, the territory's national income increased by only \$3.8 million. In the period following the policy change in 1962 until 1969 when these data were no longer reported, the increases totalled about \$11 million. Although these increases are indeed significant, a proper perspective can be maintained and a better understanding of the problem achieved by remembering that U.S. investments in 1972 amounted to \$28 million.

Table 11

National Income of the Trust Territory  
of the Pacific Islands, 1952-1969<sup>1</sup>

Fiscal Year	National Income (in dollars)
1952 <sup>2</sup>	2,340,000
1953	2,163,100
1954	2,305,400
1955	3,181,745
1956	3,234,172
1957	3,456,000
1958	3,720,000
1959	3,660,000
1960	4,559,671
1961	5,538,100
1962	6,138,000
1963	7,589,120
1964	7,589,000
1965	10,257,000
1966	10,746,000
1967	11,370,000
1968	14,904,672
1969	18,247,872

1. These data do not include United States employees' salaries.
2. Data for 1952-1959 do not include figures for Saipan.

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective year--1956, p. 53; 1963, p. 48; 1968, p. 42; 1969, p. 44.



By way of summary, the evidence indicates that despite large increases in U.S. appropriations and notable success with the Copra Stabilization Fund, American economic policy, rather than promoting self-sufficiency for the Micronesian economy, has actually increased the territory's dependence on continued American administration of the islands and on some political status which would insure its economic viability in the future.

#### SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The general standard that will be used to evaluate this phase of American policy is that section of Chapter XII, Article 76(b) of the United Nations Charter, which charges the United States and all other member-states administering trusteeships to promote the social development of the inhabitants. A more specific standard is provided by the obligation the United States imposed on itself when it signed the Trusteeship Agreement. Article 6, Section 3 of that document states that the United States shall:

. . . promote the social advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the population without discrimination; protect the health of the inhabitants; control the traffic in arms and ammunition, opium and other dangerous drugs, and alcohol and other spiritous beverages; and institute such other regulations as may be necessary to protect the inhabitants against social abuses . . . .<sup>85</sup>

Several components of this pledge can be dispensed with immediately. No information is available regarding the control of the traffic in arms and ammunition. Important drugs to be used for medical purposes must be channeled through the district director of public health, but no drugs at all are produced within the territory.<sup>86</sup> Although no alcoholic beverages were imported under the Japanese administration before World War II, the Americans had allowed the incoming trade in beer and alcoholic spirits to climb to a level of \$1,688,907 by 1972.<sup>87</sup>

The Micronesian economy and culture have traditionally relied on subsistence agriculture. Western attitudes of free-wheeling competition and private enterprise are alien to many of the islanders. Indeed, as noted above, according to 1971 government estimates, approximately 28,000 Micronesians rely on subsistence agriculture for their livelihood,<sup>88</sup> while less than half that number is engaged in employment for wages.<sup>89</sup>

Ethnically, most of the people of the territory are classified as Micronesians, with the exception of 1,000 Polynesians who inhabit Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro Islands. Differences in custom do exist, as testified to by the existence of nine major languages.<sup>90</sup> But a certain cultural homogeneity is exhibited throughout the territory. However, it should be pointed out that under

American administration, some of the native culture appears to be breaking down. For example, many of the islanders have succumbed to Western influences and foresaken their traditional island housing of grass huts for corrugated metal shacks in shanty towns surrounding concentrations of American population, especially in the district centers.<sup>91</sup> Some Micronesians maintain that the indigenous culture in these areas has been jeopardized by the American impact. According to Philip W. Quigg, some indigenous leaders feel that the U.S. is:

. . . irreparably affecting their society--almost unthinkingly and often without consulting them. They feel overwhelmed by the impact of America and the Americans. Their poignant hope of preserving their culture while achieving the good things of the modern world will not be realized; they know that the outcome will be a fluid and unsatisfactory compromise, but they would like to feel that they have some control over their own destiny.<sup>92</sup>

In an attempt to bring representational democracy to the islands, the United States has altered the pattern of traditional authority. By supplanting indigenous chieftans with elected representatives at all levels the United States has taken long steps toward implementing this goal.

Some observers feel that these developments are having an adverse effect on the territory's youth. For example, one authority indicated that "they're starting

to grow up in a pseudo-American fashion. The reason why crime and juvenile delinquency is on the increase is that we are breaking down an archaic but efficient social system that has served for centuries and we're not replacing it."<sup>93</sup> Another official observed that "regretfully, the youngsters are so fascinated with mimicking us (the Americans) that few of them have bothered to acquire their fathers' skills as fishermen, or ropemakers, or even as good islanders."<sup>94</sup>

In the field of social development, American efforts have been directed primarily toward improving public health. A succinct summary of public health policy has been provided by the U.S. Government in its 1971 report to the United Nations:

The public health program of the Territory is intended to improve and maintain health and sanitary conditions, to minimize and eventually control communicable disease, to establish standards of medical and dental care and practice, to encourage scientific investigation in the field of health, and to supervise and administer all Government-owned hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, and other medical and dental facilities.<sup>95</sup>

What elements of American policy could provide a measure of the success or failure of U.S. efforts in the area of public health? Two such indicators are the levels of personnel involved in public health and the financial support provided for these projects. As can be seen in Table 12, the level of indigenous employment has

Table 12

Nonindigenous and Indigenous Public Health Personnel  
Employed by the Trust Territory  
Government for Selected Years

Fiscal Year	Nonindigenous	Indigenous
1950 . . . . .	52 . . . . .	259
1955 . . . . .	21 . . . . .	327
1960 . . . . .	22 . . . . .	485
1965 . . . . .	19 . . . . .	600
1968 . . . . .	125 . . . . .	762
1971 . . . . .	55 . . . . .	1,023
1972 . . . . .	54 . . . . .	1,140

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1950, pp. 74-75; 1955, p. 81; 1960, pp. 223-24; 1965, pp. 301-02; 1968, pp. 248-49; 1971, pp. 304-06; 1972, pp. 315, 317.

increased steadily, but the level of non-indigenous employment, after remaining steady over many years, experienced a sharp increase in 1968, although the number had dropped somewhat by 1971. The second indicator, the level of expenditures on health, medical, and sanitation services, is depicted in Table 13. As in most other areas examined, a change in American policy after 1962 resulted in a sharp increase in the American commitment to public health as demonstrated by the levels of financial support provided.

Table 13

Trust Territory Government Expenditures on  
Health, Medical, and Sanitation  
Services for Selected Years

Fiscal Year	Trust Territory Government Expenditures
1950 . . . . .	\$ 295,811 <sub>1</sub>
1955 . . . . .	646,758 <sub>2</sub>
1960 . . . . .	886,715 <sup>2</sup>
1965 . . . . .	1,955,074
1968 . . . . .	3,437,427
1971 . . . . .	5,805,000
1972 . . . . .	7,432,000

1. Does not include construction costs for hospitals.

2. Exclusive of Saipan.

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1950, p. 71; 1955, (1956 report), p. 155; 1960, p. 203; 1965, p. 298; 1968, p. 245; 1971, p. 301; 1972, p. 312.

American efforts in environmental health (that is, directed toward the condition of living areas rather than toward specific individuals) have been restricted to projects in water supply and sanitary sewage disposal. In terms of sanitary sewage disposal, the primary project has been the waterseal toilet program, begun in 1965. Although each district currently has the capability of producing this toilet and providing it to its residents at

a minimal cost,<sup>96</sup> its use is restricted to district centers like Saipan and Kwajalein.<sup>97</sup> The success of such projects can be measured by the extent to which the entire population has public health services. Table 14 indicates that the use of protected water supplies and sanitary sewage disposal is by no means widespread.

Another indicator of progress in social development is the condition of labor in the trust territory, i.e. the level of indigenous employment for wages. Labor occupies a critical position in the modernization of the Micronesian society and economy. The area's economy is only slowly shifting from a dependence on subsistence agriculture to a reliance on employment for wages. This changing emphasis is reflected by the growing number of indigenes employed for wages in the territory. If the economy is to become self-sustaining, which it must as independence or self-government approaches, the position of labor will become more and more critical. Table 15 provides an overview of the position of labor, both indigenous and nonindigenous, in the trust territory. These figures indicate that Micronesian employment is increasing, both in absolute terms and in relation to nonindigenous employment. In 1972, 13,913 Micronesians were employed for \$28,911,808 in annual wages, or the equivalent of \$2,078.83 per person working. It should

Table 14

Population with Protected Water Supply  
and Sanitary Sewage Disposal

Fiscal Year	With Protected Water Supply		With Both Protected Water Supply and Sanitary Sewage Disposal	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1964	14,800	16.77%	2,900	3.29%
1965	15,000	16.56	2,900	3.21
1966	15,100	16.34	3,050	3.30
1967	15,500	16.96	7,000	3.49
1968	20,940	22.16	7,500	7.41
1969	21,720	22.16	7,510	7.66
1970	21,720	21.24	7,510	7.35
1971	25,670	23.98	7,510	7.02
1972	28,834	25.15	8,824	7.70

Source: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1964, p. 273; 1965, p. 307; 1966, p. 310; 1967, p. 264; 1968, pp. 170, 254; 1969, pp. 172, 261; 1970, pp. 190, 283; 1971, pp. 214, 310; 1972, pp. 1, 322.

be pointed out, however, that this includes only a little more than ten percent of the total population. As noted above, about 28,000 other Micronesians were engaged in subsistence agriculture, which is well over half the total working age population (men and women from 20-64 years of age--58,587 in 1972.<sup>98</sup>)

However, before the success of U.S. labor policy



can be assessed, the extent to which the American Government provides employment must be considered. As indicated in Table 16, the Trust Territory Government, which is funded preponderantly by the United States, accounts for almost 50 percent of Micronesian employment for wages. The implication, of course, is that U.S. action regarding labor has increased Micronesia's dependence on continued American administration of the islands. It is further interesting to note that a different salary schedule is employed for indigenes as opposed to nonindigenes working for the Trust Territory Government. Nonindigenes are paid according to the same scale as civil service employees of the U.S. Government on the mainland. But Micronesian salaries range from a low of \$1,260 per year to a high of \$19,847 per year.<sup>99</sup> Even this may be deceptive, in that only 88 Micronesians earned over \$10,000 in 1972, while 429 earned over \$5,000.<sup>100</sup> In other words, only 7 percent of the Micronesians employed by the trust territory government were paid at a rate of \$5,000 a year or more in 1972.

A capsule evaluation of U.S. social development policy is difficult. There have been some notable successes. For example, the number of Micronesians employed in the area of public health has slowly but consistently increased at a much greater rate than non-indigenous employment. Government expenditures on

Table 15

Number Employed for Wages in  
the Trust Territory

Fiscal Year	Nonindigenous		Indigenous	
	Number	Annual Wages	Number	Annual Wages
1955 <sup>1</sup>	413	\$ 138,125	949	\$ 378,265
1960	106	394,440	4,273	3,220,455
1965	386	1,325,023	7,502	7,104,741
1968	396	843,656	8,450	11,924,101
1969	259	851,399	9,214	14,741,099
1970	339	1,352,741	12,436	20,550,544
1971	410	*	13,866	24,213,409
1972	1,077	1,701,534	13,913	28,911,808

\* Annual wage figures were not provided in 1971.

1. Does not include employees of the Trust Territory Government.

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1955, p. 180; 1960, p. 221; 1965, p. 205; 1968, p. 243; 1969, p. 249; 1970, p. 271; 1971, pp. 30, 299; 1972, pp. 307, 308.

health, medical, and sanitation services rose dramatically following the overall policy change in 1962. But there have also been failures, witness the small portion of the population, most living in areas with a large number of Americans, enjoying a protected water supply and sanitary sewage disposal. The level of Micronesian employment for wages has also increased dramatically since 1962.

Table 16

Total Number of Micronesians Employed for Wages  
and the Part of This Total Employed by the  
Trust Territory Government

Fiscal Year	Total Number Employed for Wages	Number Employed by Trust Territory Government
1955	2,639	1,410
1960	4,273	1,832
1965	7,502	3,530
1968	8,450	4,233
1969	9,214	4,578
1970	12,436	5,114
1971	13,866	6,211
1972	13,913	5,996

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1955, p. 180; 1960, p. 221; 1965, pp. 253, 295; 1968, pp. 199, 243; 1969, pp. 249, 205; 1970, pp. 271, 231; 1971, pp. 30, 257; 1972, pp. 307, 252, 257; and United States, Department of the Interior, Annual Reports to the Secretary of the Interior. From 1956 Report, p. 5; from 1960 Report, p. 13.

But even successes like the rising employment levels are flawed, since their effect has been to increase Micronesia's dependence on continued American administration. In conclusion, the evidence suggests that United States policy has not been consistently directed toward the kind of Micronesian social development which would prepare the territory for self-government or independence.

## EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

As was the case with regard to political, economic, and social development, the U.N. Charter enjoins the administering authorities of all trust territories to promote the educational development of the inhabitants of the territory with a view toward self-government or independence. The standard that the United States imposed on itself is provided in Article 6, Section 4 of the Trusteeship Agreement where it pledges that it shall:

. . . promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall take steps toward the establishment of a general system of elementary education; facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of the population; and shall encourage qualified students to pursue higher education,<sup>101</sup> including training on the professional level.

The United States has made the standard even more specific by promising to establish " . . . a universal free public education system from elementary through high school, with advanced training in the trades and professions for those who can profit by further schooling."<sup>102</sup>

However, U.S. policy has not been consistently directed toward educational development. As in other areas examined, 1962 seems to mark the turning point. Before that year only local funds--i.e. funds raised through local taxation--supported elementary education

(although the administering authority has always funded intermediate education). Beginning in 1962 the central government began to share the financial responsibility for supporting elementary education,<sup>103</sup> and by 1965 it assumed total responsibility.<sup>104</sup> Table 17, which compares expenditures for elementary schools by local government, missions, and the Trust Territory Government, indicates this trend clearly. As noted earlier in this chapter, over 70 percent of the funds used by the territorial government are supplied directly by the United States. This, too, indicates that American actions have increased Micronesia's dependence on the United States. Again, if Micronesia chose independence and consequently the American Congress cut off aid, most of the funding for education would stop. Therefore, if educational activities are to continue at present levels, Micronesia must continue to be affiliated with the United States in some way.

The payment of teachers' salaries followed a similar pattern. The salaries of intermediate school teachers have always been paid by the territorial government, but until 1963 elementary teachers were paid by their district governments. In 1963 the central government paid a portion of elementary teachers' salaries.<sup>105</sup> But under the Micronesian Title and Pay Plan begun in 1964

Table 17

Comparison of Expenditures for Elementary Schools  
by Local Government, Missions, and the Trust  
Territory Government, 1961-1972

Fiscal Year	Local Government	Missions	Trust Territory Government
1961	\$201,644	\$124,798	\$ 103,406
1962	249,458	74,533	157,185
1963	261,339	97,478	312,505
1964	249,563	70,963	889,499
1965	22,850	105,836	1,932,997
1966	19,457	142,596	2,050,548
1967	28,365	64,838	2,056,175
1968	21,718	136,002	2,140,306
1969	38,962	16,093	2,683,046
1970	40,159	146,227	3,085,000
1971	62,030	258,794	3,910,000
1972	140,336	228,954	4,766,900

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1961, p. 230; 1962, p. 270; 1963, pp. 273-74; 1964, p. 299; 1965, p. 332; 1966, p. 334; 1967, p. 286; 1968, p. 277; 1969, p. 286; 1970, p. 310; 1971, p. 333; 1972, pp. 349, 350.

the administration assumed total responsibility for all teachers' salaries including, of course, elementary teachers.<sup>106</sup> However, nonindigenous teachers are paid approximately twice as much for the same work as their Micronesian counterparts.<sup>107</sup> There is an educational factor which should be taken into account in this regard.

In order for a Micronesian to become "certified" as a teacher, he need only complete his secondary education or get the equivalent of a high school diploma, while nonindigenous certification requires a college degree. As Table 18 indicates, the number of nonindigenous teachers has remained relatively constant over the last decade and a half, while the number of Micronesian teachers has increased considerably. But despite this development, the educational system has become more "Americanized". For example, the administration has made English the language of teaching and instruction and has instituted a formal program designed to make English the lingua franca (i.e. the language of communication and instruction) throughout all of Micronesia.<sup>108</sup>

The United States has conducted other efforts in teacher training beyond the normal high school education. They include scholarships for study on Guam and at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii and training sessions held each summer within the territory.<sup>109</sup> In 1963, the Micronesian Teacher Education Center (MTEC) was established and integrated with the public high school in Ponape. The curriculum was a combination of high school work with a special emphasis on teacher training.<sup>110</sup> During fiscal year 1970, MTEC was replaced by the Community College of Micronesia (CCM)--also located on Ponape. The

Table 18

Number of Indigenous and Nonindigenous Teachers With  
and Without Trust Territory Certification,  
for Selected Years

Fiscal	Indigenous		Nonindigenous	
	Certifi- cation	Noncertifi- cation	Certifi- cation	Noncertifi- cation
1954	112	263	67	10
1956	271	198	22	98
1958	236	285	59	29
1960	355	255	94	2
1962	425	340	123	1
1964	543	138	163	5
1966	447	489	270	3
1968	427	631	284	3
1969	925	128	249	6
1970	1,072	174	247	12
1971	1,045	262	241	22
1972	1,319	182	303	87

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1954, pp. 167-68; 1956, p. 194; 1958, p. 236; 1960, p. 238; 1962, p. 267; 1964, p. 294; 1968, p. 272; 1969, p. 279; 1970, p. 303; 1971, p. 330; 1972, p. 345.

CCM is a two-year institution offering an Associate of Science degree in Elementary Education. The first 13 degrees were awarded in August of 1971, and an additional 36 graduated in June of 1972. The total enrollment in 1972 was approximately 100 students.<sup>111</sup>

Perhaps another measure of the U.S. effort in the



educational field is the number of schools and the number of children attending school. Table 19 provides this information for selected years. Since the 1967-1968 school year, attendance has been mandatory for children between the ages of 6 and 14 or until graduation from elementary school.<sup>112</sup> In 1972 there were 208 public and 19 private elementary schools with a total enrollment of 28,939. Until 1961, the entire public secondary school system consisted of only one high school.<sup>113</sup> But by 1972 a total of 5,585 students were involved in secondary education, with 4,217 attending the 9 public high schools and 1,368 enrolled in the 9 nonpublic secondary schools. The number of public intermediate schools in the territory has increased from 6 in 1950<sup>114</sup> to 7 in 1972, when 4 nonpublic institutions were operating. The total number of students in intermediate schools was 1,417, 1,348 in public schools and 69 in nonpublic schools.

Although, as Table 19 shows, the absolute number of children attending school has risen, the administration effort has not kept pace with population increases. For example, in 1956 the number of school age children who were attending elementary school was 94.5 percent,<sup>115</sup> but by 1971 that statistic had decreased almost 5 percent to 89.6 percent.<sup>116</sup>

Another indication of the importance (or lack of it) attached to education by the United States is the per

Table 19

Types of Schools and Enrollment in the Trust Territory for Selected Years

Type of School	Number of Schools	1955		1968		1972	
		Enrollment	Number of Schools	Enrollment	Number of Schools	Enrollment	Number of Schools
Elementary							
Public	149	6,737	188	22,597	208	26,025	
Private	16	1,354	20	4,666	19	2,914	
Total	165	8,091	208	27,263	227	28,939	
Intermediate							
Public	6	528	-	-	7	1,348	
Private	10	428	-	-	4	69	
Total	16	956	-	-	11	1,417	
Secondary							
Public	1	123	8	3,054	9	4,217	
Private	0	123	11	1,224	9	1,368	
Total	1	123	19	4,278	18	5,585	
Total Schools							
Public	156	7,387	196	25,651	225	31,844	
Private	26	1,782	31	5,890	32	4,351	
Total	182	9,169	227	31,541	257	36,195	

Sources: Annual Reports to the United Nations, for each respective fiscal year--  
1950, p. 78; 1955, pp. 185-87; 1968, p. 263; 1972, p. 334.

capita government expenditure for education. While it is true that government expenditures in the field of education have increased substantially over the period of the trusteeship, the per capita expenditure has remained fairly constant, varying from \$227.29 in 1952<sup>117</sup> to \$248.17 in 1962<sup>118</sup> to \$247.62 in 1966<sup>119</sup> to \$239.96 in 1972.<sup>120</sup> Of course, if inflation is taken into account, the per capita expenditure has actually declined.

The United States has made some effort to conform to that portion of Article 6, Section 4 of the Trusteeship Agreement which charges it to " . . . facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of the population . . . ."<sup>121</sup> Although no separate vocational school existed until the Micronesian Occupational Center (MOC) was established in Koror, Palau, in 1969,<sup>122</sup> some vocational training was included as part of school curricula as early as 1948.<sup>123</sup> However, it was not until 1959 that 2 years of mandatory vocational training were required of all students attending the single secondary school in the territory.<sup>124</sup> In 1965 a "full-fledged vocational school" was incorporated into the public high school in Palau.<sup>125</sup> The latest development, the establishment of the MOC allowed a total of 304 students to receive vocational training in 1972.<sup>126</sup> Its first graduating class (15 students) left the MOC in August of 1971.<sup>127</sup>

Although the operation of the MOC is a positive U.S. effort to provide vocational education, the scope of the problem can be illustrated by comparing MOC's enrollment (304) with the total number of school children in 1972 (36,195).

In the area of higher education, Micronesian students do attend, in addition to the CCM, institutions of higher learning outside the trust territory. Table 20 depicts the number of Micronesian students studying abroad for selected years. In 1972, of the 778 students involved, 342 were in Guam, 193 were on the U.S. mainland, and 172 were in Hawaii.<sup>128</sup> The remainder were located in Fiji, the Philippines, and Papua-New Guinea.<sup>129</sup> About 40 percent of these Micronesian students living abroad were studying either in the field of liberal arts or education, while about half that number were concentrating in business, health services, or trade and vocational skills.<sup>130</sup>

There is evidence which suggests that the United States is painfully aware of its limited success regarding educational development. It has attempted to disguise some shortcomings by distorting certain data in its annual reports to the United Nations. Specifically, definitions, classifications, and data bases have been changed from year to year--an action which has made comparisons over the entire trusteeship period difficult,

Table 20

Micronesian Students in Higher Education  
by Sex, 1959-1972

Fiscal Year	Male	Female	Total
1959	107	12	119
1960	103	14	117
1961	118	14	132
1962	113	13	126
1963	145	16	161
1964	168	28	196
1965	228	49	277
1966	205	52	257
1967	235	57	292
1968	274	77	351
1969	351	94	445
1970	441	154	595
1971	469	195	664
1972	564	214	778

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1959, p. 242; 1960, p. 237; 1961, p. 226; 1962, p. 264; 1963, p. 263; 1964, pp. 284-286; 1965, pp. 317-20; 1966, p. 323; 1967, p. 278; 1968, p. 267; 1969, p. 274; 1970, p. 301; 1971, p. 324; 1972, p. 339.

if not impossible in some cases.

#### SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to summarize and evaluate United States policy in Micronesia, specifically in terms of political, economic, social, and educational development. Although a more detailed analysis

will be provided in the concluding chapter, it may be useful to note trends at this point.

American policy in Micronesia has developed through a series of phases or stages. The beginnings of the trusteeship saw a division of responsibility for civil administration between the Navy and the Department of the Interior. The first fifteen years of U.S. administration resulted in little development in any area. Appropriations from the U.S. Congress, a fairly accurate barometer of the American commitment to Micronesia, remained at a consistently low level below the authorized ceiling. In the 1962-1963 period a positive decision to promote development in all areas was taken. The best quantitative evidence of its implementation is the dramatic and steady increase in the level of U.S. appropriations for Micronesia.

The problem which must be considered when evaluating U.S. policy is whether these increasing appropriations really resulted in development. The qualitative assessment provided in this chapter suggests that in many areas this was not the case. A detailed evaluation of these areas will be provided in Chapter 6. For the moment, however, it must be pointed out that the financial aspects of U.S. policy have made Micronesia more dependent on the United States. The problem is whether this was intended or not. This is one of the unresolved and perhaps unresolvable

Questions regarding American policy in Micronesia;  
i.e. given the 1962 decision to proceed with development  
in the areas examined, there may have been no alternative.

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## Chapter 4

### MILITARY AND SECURITY FACTORS

This chapter is intended to explain Micronesia's military and strategic importance to the United States. Initially, the classified and formerly unpublished portions of the "Solomon Report" will be examined as will their implications for American policy in Micronesia. The significance of the trust territory will then be examined with regard to past and present U.S. military activities. While great reliance has been placed on statements of military spokesmen, the fact that their positions reflect actual U.S. policy will be demonstrated in the last part of this chapter. Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams was appointed by President Nixon to resolve the status question. (Indeed, his title at the status negotiations is the "President's Personal Representative.") The positions he takes, and the statements he makes, are authoritative declarations of American policy. Since an examination of the congruity between the military position and the posture assumed by Ambassador Williams are vital to an analysis of the central hypothesis tested here, a series of statements made by Williams which demonstrate this connection will be examined in the last part of this chapter. Also included will be a consideration of

several recent developments in U.S. foreign policy, e.g., the Nixon Doctrine, the growing resentment abroad against U.S. bases in Japan and the Philippines, and the reversion of control over Okinawan sovereignty to Japan, and their implications for U.S. policy. Bearing directly on the military significance of Micronesia are the projects which the Defense Department has planned for the territory and some very specific land needs it has expressed. Finally, this chapter will consider various indications of Micronesia's continued strategic importance as perceived by elements in the executive branch of the U.S. Government and reflected by the American position presented at the status negotiations.

#### THE SOLOMON REPORT

In May of 1963 President Kennedy commissioned a study group to go to Micronesia to analyze and review U.S. policy there. The group was chaired by Professor Anthony M. Solomon of the Harvard Business School. After the report was submitted to the President on October 9, 1963, those parts of it dealing with economic, social, and educational aspects of American policy were declassified and released. However, the first part of the report remained classified. But, in March of 1971, a group of Micronesian students in Hawaii calling themselves "The

Micronesian Independence Advocates" published what they maintain is the first part of that report, which includes (according to the Independence Advocates) "the mission of the team, its underlying purposes and recommendations, and the action plan on the future political status of Micronesia . . . ."<sup>1</sup> It is of interest to note that Francisco T. Uludong, a leader in the Micronesian student movement in Hawaii and a recipient of a U.S. scholarship, was denied renewal of his academic grant following publication of the classified portion of the report.

One of the initial contentions of the report is that President Kennedy ordered a change in American policy in 1962 designed to assure that Micronesia would associate itself permanently with the U.S. in the future. The report asserts that:

despite a lack of serious concern until quite recently, Micronesia is said to be essential to the U.S. for security reasons. We cannot give the area up, yet time is running out for the US in the sense that we may soon be the only nation left administering a trust territory. The time could come, and shortly, when the pressures in the UN for a settlement of the status of Micronesia could become more than embarrassing.

In recognition of the problem, the President, on April 18, 1962, approved NSAM No. 145 which set forth as US policy the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the US within our political framework. In keeping with that goal, the memorandum called for accelerated development of the area to bring its political, economic and social standards into line with an eventual permanent association.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, the Solomon Report disclosed President Kennedy's confidential memorandum which indicated a change in U.S. policy and called for determined efforts to promote Micronesia's political, economic, and social development with a view toward achieving, not the U.N. goal of self-government or independence, but "a permanent relationship with the US within our political framework." The Report further linked this policy change to U.S. security interests. The relationship between the military and security value attached to Micronesia and the U.S. position at the status negotiations will be examined below. As noted in Chapter 3, changes were implemented by the United States beginning in 1962-1963 in all the areas enumerated in the Kennedy memorandum.

The focus of the Solomon Mission's investigation and findings are related to determining precisely what actions the U.S. had to take to achieve the desired end. It endeavored to answer three sets of questions:

a. What are the elements to consider in the preparation for, organization, timing and favorable outcome of a plebiscite in Micronesia and how will this action affect the long-run problem that Micronesia, after affiliation, will pose for the US?

b. What should be the content and cost of the minimum capital investment and operating program needed to insure a favorable vote in the plebiscite, and what should be the content and cost of the maximum program that could be effectively mounted to develop the Trust Territory most rapidly?

c. What actions need to be taken to improve the relationships between the current Trust Territory government and Washington and to insure that it can implement any necessary political strategy and land development program with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness?

The writers of the Solomon Report acknowledged certain problems that are inherent in the Micronesian situation. Perhaps most important was the realization that "the US will be moving counter to the anti-colonial movement that has just about completed sweeping the world . . . ." <sup>4</sup> The Report noted the fact that, should its recommendations be followed, Micronesia would be the only one of the original eleven U.N. trusteeships which would not gain independence or some kind of self-governing association with the administering country, but would remain in a territorial non-self-governing association with the administering authority. A further problem might arise from Micronesia's status as a "strategic trusteeship". The Security Council would preside over the formal ending of trusteeship status. If this new status was vetoed in the Security Council, "the US might have to decide to proceed with a series of actions that would make the trusteeship agreement a dead issue, at least from the Micronesian viewpoint." <sup>5</sup>

By way of summary, the Solomon Report recommended that the policy adopted by the American Government should

result in " . . . having the Trust Territory affiliate permanently with the US . . . ." <sup>6</sup> The Mission proposed a five year plan which was to culminate in a plebiscite which would result in Micronesia's permanent association with the United States. Although this timetable has not been followed precisely, the Independence Advocates contend that " . . . the basic plan, and its policies, still go on in Micronesia today." <sup>7</sup>

The American Government has reacted to the release of this document by the Independence Advocates by claiming that it does not represent official U.S. policy, but rather it is one of a series of contingency plans for Micronesia. <sup>8</sup> This qualified disclaimer, however, can be placed in proper perspective and the authenticity of this document judged by comparing American policy before the report was issued with policy following its issuance. The evidence examined in Chapter 3 clearly indicates that a very definite change occurred after 1962-1963 in all four facets of U.S. policy considered, i.e. political, economic, social, and educational. This change is congruent with the recommendations of President Kennedy's confidential memo of April 1962 which were alluded to in the Solomon Report. Although this is not positive proof of the authenticity of the classified portion of the Solomon Report, it does indicate that a dramatic

change in policy similar to the one recommended in the report occurred in 1962-1963. The position of the U.S. in the future status negotiations, considered in Chapter 5, is also in keeping with the recommendations of the Solomon Commission. The American negotiators have consistently opposed independence for Micronesia and have pushed, instead, for a continuing association between the U.S. and the territory.

#### MICRONESIA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S.

The strategic significance of Micronesia in the eyes of American policy-makers during and immediately following World War II has been described in Chapter 2. The United States was determined to deny the use of this area to any potentially hostile foreign power. Leaders then, as now, acknowledged that the trust territory's geographic position was one of its more important qualities, together with the dispersion of the islands over three million square miles of ocean. One spokesman for the Department of Defense recently stated that Micronesia " . . . remains a strategic area in the central Pacific, astride our principal lines of communication to allies with whom we have treaty ties."<sup>9</sup> The geographic significance of the territory's position has been noted by many others in the defense establishment.<sup>10</sup>

Some observers have maintained that the development of the nuclear and missile age has increased the need for widely dispersed bases from which retaliatory missile strikes could be launched against any offensive action from a hostile foreign power. They maintain that the existence of such bases would deprive an aggressor of the element of surprise since any sneak attack could not possibly destroy all these dispersed bases at once (if there were enough of them).<sup>11</sup> Island bases would serve an additional function, i.e. they could function as staging areas for nuclear submarines and vessels with atomic missiles which could attack virtually anywhere in the world.<sup>12</sup> In terms of logistics, island bases are regarded by military officials as indispensable in limited wars like Korea and Vietnam.<sup>13</sup>

During World War II, military, air force, and naval installations were operated by the Japanese at Saipan, Tinian, the Palaus, and Yap in the west; and Ponape, Jaluit, Eniwetok, Kwajalein, Wotje, and Maloelap in the east.<sup>14</sup> Many of these bases, especially those in the Marshalls and Carolines, were not of sufficient importance to be included in the American post-war global defense system. However, some of the installations taken over by the United States after the war were reconstructed and put back into operation. For example, a former



Japanese Kamikaze airstrip became the site for the present Yap airport. However, many facilities which were extensively damaged were not repaired. The docking facilities on Truk, one of Japan's principal naval bases in the Pacific, were virtually destroyed by American bombing during the war and were not rebuilt.<sup>15</sup>

However, from the very beginning of its administration of the territory, the U.S. did develop and expand military facilities in the area. A series of three Coast Guard installations were established in 1944 and operated after the war through an agreement with the Navy.<sup>16</sup> The function of each is to serve as a LORAN [LO(ng)RA(nge) N(avigation)] transmitting station; i.e. they constitute a long range navigation system through which the position of ships and aircraft are recorded by measuring the time intervals between radio signals transmitted from a network of related ground stations. These stations are on Rongeron Atoll, Pontageras Island in Ulithi Atoll, and Kwadack Island in Kwajalein Atoll,<sup>17</sup> occupying in toto some 500 acres of land.<sup>18</sup> The existence of these facilities indicates that there may be considerably military traffic in the area, in the form of ships and aircraft.

Nuclear testing was conducted in Micronesia early in the trusteeship period. The "strategic" character of the trusteeship which allowed the U.S. to close off areas

of Micronesia for security reasons made the trust territory a suitable test site, at least from the American viewpoint--so suitable that the Defense Department's Western Pacific Test Center was headquartered in eastern Micronesia.<sup>19</sup> Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls were chosen as test sites because they were characterized by a degree of geographic isolation and a downwind position that reduced the danger of fallout to other islands.<sup>20</sup> Bikini was closed for security reasons in January of 1947 as was Eniwetok on December 1, 1947 and again in the spring of 1951.<sup>21</sup>

Other military activities were initiated in Micronesia as the Cold War developed. For example, on Saipan the Central Intelligence Agency established a training program for Nationalist Chinese guerrillas.<sup>22</sup> In the late 1960s, at the direction of former Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel, the CIA installation was converted into a \$600,000 "Civic Action and Public Safety Center."<sup>23</sup> Such an action was initially suggested by Marine General Lewis Walt while he was on an inspection tour of the trust territory. He envisioned a civic action program similar to the one that had been used in the "I Corps" in Vietnam by Marines and Navy Seabees. According to one military source, "a program of this type could do wonders in helping to develop the Trust Territory

where lack of communication and transportation has isolated the islanders from one another as well as the rest of the modern world. Military engineers could help build bridges both figuratively and literally."<sup>24</sup> One "civic action team" was sent to the island of Rota in the Marianas, where they built a slaughterhouse, a merry-go-round, a schoolyard flagpole, and a community barbeque pit. Although most of the islanders appreciated these efforts, some wondered whether the team was in reality a group of public relations ambassadors whose intent was to pave the way for future agents of the Department of Defense.<sup>25</sup>

Perhaps the single most important military facility in Micronesia is the one on Kwajalein Atoll. An indication of the importance attached to this base is the fact that the Department of Defense has spent about one billion dollars building it up.<sup>26</sup> This figure is all the more significant when it is remembered that the largest annual U.S. appropriation for the entire trust territory was less than 60 million dollars (see Table 4 in Chapter 3). The strategic significance of this base was explained by a spokesman for the Department of Defense when he testified before a Congressional hearing. Mr. Dennis Doolin stated, ". . . we have important missile testing facilities in the Marshall Islands, which contribute greatly to the deterrent posture of this country, and for that reason are

important also for the continued peace and security of other nations of the free world."<sup>27</sup>

The base is engaged in a variety of activities. For example, when John F. Kennedy became President, he pushed the Nike-Zeus missile program ahead. Kwajalein became an interceptor site for multi-warhead rockets fired from the U.S. mainland.<sup>28</sup> However, the Nike-Zeus system was made obsolete by the Nike-X defensive missile system.<sup>29</sup> Kwajalein is the site of the \$165 million Missile Site Radar System (MSR), an integral part of the ABM arrangement. In this capacity it is involved in more than 15,000 operations a year, serving as the eyes of the Spartan and Sprint missiles, both part of the ABM system.<sup>30</sup> The ABM system is a very vital element of American foreign policy and is playing an important role in the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation talks. Kwajalein's participation in developing and testing the ABM system is a positive indication of the strong strategic value attached to Micronesia by U.S. Defense Department officials.

Another indication of the intensity of military activity on Kwajalein is the size of the payroll issued to Micronesians working there--over \$2.5 million annually. Although Micronesians are employed there, no indigenes live on the island. They commute daily from nearby Ebeye Island. The only activities conducted on Kwajalein are those related to the U.S. military establishment. As

a result of all U.S. operations on the island, the Trust Territory Government collects about \$2 million annually in sales and income taxes.<sup>31</sup> This suggests that the U.S. presence on Kwajalein may have made Micronesia more economically dependent on the U.S.

Military sources indicate that radio stations are located on Ponape and Palau<sup>32</sup> which participate as communications relay networks for the Far East.<sup>33</sup> A satellite tracking station is situated on Truk.<sup>34</sup> It has been reported that the Navy maintains a Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarine base on Kwajalein.<sup>35</sup> One other type of military installation is reportedly active in Micronesia. Sabo Ulechong, editor of Didil-a-Chai, a Palauan newspaper whose publication has been banned, reported in August of 1969 that a chemical and biological warfare testing center was operating on one of the islands in Kwajalein Atoll. This same individual has reported more recently that on Ngerchelongs Atoll a "top secret military installation has been in operation for nearly a year and a half . . . no one actually knows what kind of military project is being conducted." However, Ulechong did observe that "there are a lot of Green Beret types out there."<sup>36</sup> Despite several attempts to contact this man for the purpose of acquiring more detailed information, I have been unable to locate him. Incidentally, it was the High Commissioner who prohibited any further publication of

Didil-a-Chai.<sup>37</sup> Although no positive inferences can be made from this fact, it does imply that the United States ,au voew secirotu cpmssoderatopms as a kistofocatopm fpr restricting freedom of the press in Micronesia.

#### FUTURE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MICRONESIA

Some recent developments in U.S. foreign policy have, in the eyes of defense officials, materially increased the security value of Micronesia. One of these developments is the Nixon Doctrine, announced by the President on Guam in July of 1969. According to President Nixon's statement, it provides:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.<sup>38</sup>

In subsequent statements by the President, the Nixon Doctrine was explained further. It provides that although the United States intends to honor all its existing commitments in Asia, it will not undertake any new formal obligations there.<sup>39</sup> The U.S. will, when necessary, give economic aid to Asian nations to obtain social and economic

reform in order to eradicate the base for guerrilla activities.<sup>40</sup> But American ground forces will not be committed to suppress a domestic insurrection in Asia. According to President Nixon, "the defense of freedom is everybody's business--not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened."<sup>41</sup> Peace in Asia depends mainly on Asian solutions to Asian problems. At least in theory, the Nixon Doctrine projects a sharp disengagement from the Asian land mass.<sup>42</sup> In an address on February 25, 1971, President Nixon restated and interpreted the Nixon Doctrine:

That policy . . . represents our basic approach to the world:

We will maintain our commitments, but we will make sure our own troop levels or any financial support to other nations is appropriate to current threats and needs.

We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

But we will look to threatened countries and their neighbors to assume primary responsibility for their own defense, and we will provide support where our interests call for that support and where it can make a difference.<sup>43</sup>

Huge cuts in defense spending are directly related to the Nixon Doctrine. Priority attention for the closing of military bases abroad is being focused on the "forward defense line" which the U.S. established after World War II

from South Korea to the Philippines. The withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam is seen as just the beginning of the process of turning from the Asian mainland. Abroad, there is growing sentiment against U.S. bases in Japan and the Philippines. Okinawa, once regarded as the single most important defense position in Asia, was returned to Japan in 1972.<sup>44</sup>

Some American strategists are convinced the U.S. must make other arrangements for military bases. The geographic proximity of South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan to Russia and China is possibly one reason for American reluctance to build new bases there or to strengthen already existing facilities. Some observers have speculated that Micronesia presents one logical alternative as a fallback position for the American defense system, if indeed other bases in the Far East are terminated. For example, Senator Henry Bellmon has indicated that "the strategic importance of the Trust Territory is now greater (since the reversion of Okinawan sovereignty to Japan) and is likely to grow rapidly in the months ahead."<sup>45</sup> Congressman Don H. Clausen echoed these sentiments when he said, "Certainly, this (the trust territory) is one of the key elements of our security in the Pacific. . . ."<sup>46</sup> Commander Harry W. Bergbauer, writing in the Naval War College Review, explains that Micronesia would be a central



element in any new defense line in the Western Pacific since its political condition would be more reliable than that of American bases in Japan and the Philippines.<sup>47</sup> On this same subject, Commander Marvin L. Duke, writing in the Marine Corps Gazette, also alluded to this possibility when he said that "since our grasp of the strategically important Western Pacific is obviously less substantial (than the American hold on Micronesia), far-sighted planners are looking more and more at American holdings in Guam and the U.S. Trust Territory in Micronesia as a possibly future line of defense."<sup>48</sup>

If American policy-makers decide, as the evidence suggests they may, that the fallback from the "forward defense line" should be to Micronesia, such a decision would be consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. The territory would conform, at least in some respects, with the primary dictum of the Nixon Doctrine--i.e. it is not in Asia. However, it is close enough to the Asian mainland that it could function as a staging area for any American military operations the President might deem necessary to fulfill U.S. treaty obligations to some Asian government. It is instructive to point out that Guam, which is physically but not legally part of Micronesia, has served as a take-off point for B-52 bombers headed for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Former High Commissioner William R. Norwood has indicated that some of the increased military interest in Micronesia, as evidenced by the presence of planning parties from various branches of the military establishment, has "been construed by both Micronesians and Americans as related to the possible withdrawal of the United States defense establishments from Okinawa and the need to redistribute American military capability in the western Pacific following the end of the Vietnam war."<sup>49</sup>

It has been contended in U.S. defense quarters that Micronesian bases would not be subject to the same restrictions as are some of our other bases. Nuclear weapons are, according to the terms of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, prohibited in U.S. bases in Japan. No American military operation can be mounted from there without prior consultation with the Japanese Government. Defense planners seem to assume there would be no such restrictions on Micronesian bases. According to one military authority, "U.S. forces from this important area could provide a nuclear umbrella for our Pacific allies without the restraint of any security treaty. The Pueblo was a perfect case in point where retaliatory forces could not be launched without prior permission from the Japanese government."<sup>50</sup>

At the time of Okinawa's reversion to Japan the

United States agreed to remove certain materials related to chemical and biological warfare from the island. The controversy which arose over the transport and future destination of these materials left an indelible impression on American policy makers. Some observers have speculated that Micronesia would be the logical place to store such materials--after the trusteeship is ended. Micronesian leaders have demanded assurances to the contrary from the American representatives to the status negotiations. At a minimum the islanders propose that prior Micronesian consent be required before any such materials could be stored in the area. But they have been rebuffed abruptly. Throughout the status negotiations, U.S. spokesmen have insisted on overriding these Micronesian objections.<sup>51</sup>

There is additional evidence to substantiate the contention advanced in this study that military considerations have influenced U.S. policy and the outcome of the future status negotiations. There have been a number of specific American plans for future military activities in Micronesia, all of which assume not only a continued American presence but also some residual authority which would allow freedom of action to meet future military contingencies. In the fall of 1969 General Lewis Walt, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, stopped in Micronesia to look over the

islands of Babelthuap and Peleliu in the Palau Islands District on his way home from Vietnam. Walt was looking for a site for U.S. Marine counterinsurgency training bases. He explained his preference for this area. "Palau's proximity to Vietnam made its swamps greener. It's 500 miles from the Philippines, 1,000 miles from Australia, and there are hundreds of islands around for amphibious maneuvers . . . . It might be just what we want."<sup>52</sup> However, this proposal was strongly opposed in a resolution adopted by the Palauan District Legislature. According to one military source, "the mere mention of the military in this area (Palau District) received an almost immediate response from many Palauans who indicated that the coming of the military would introduce a whole new chapter of difficulties even while many problems caused by the last war still have not been solved."<sup>53</sup> Another observer has indicated that General Walt and his staff blamed this rejection on a Peace Corps lawyer who they thought influenced the district legislators. A colonel traveling with Walt overheard the lawyer as he denounced the Vietnam War, which made him suspect in Marine eyes.<sup>54</sup>

Despite the fact that Walt's plan was opposed by the Palauan District Legislature, the Department of Defense has continued to show an interest in the Palau Islands District, especially in Babelthuap. During the third

round of status negotiations between U.S. and Micronesian representatives, Captain William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, spokesman for the Defense Department, indicated American plans in that area when he said:

We would require an option that will permit assured use of land on Babelthuan to build structures and store material. We do not have any immediate needs for such a site but agreement as to availability of such land will be necessary to safeguard our contingency requirements. Current site planning is only general, and the exact location would be subject to later negotiations.<sup>55</sup>

The Air Force plans a series of bomber bases for Micronesia at a cost of about \$100 million apiece, specifically bases for the following types of aircraft: B-52, F-B1-11, B-1A, and the Lockheed C-5 bomber. Furthermore, there are plans for making Micronesia a part of the "Safe-guard" ICBM missile system.<sup>56</sup> The Department of Defense proposes to install a naval support facility in Malakal Harbor which would be designed to service naval ships in the Palau area.<sup>57</sup> The military is very insistent that a Use and Occupancy Agreement, which is currently being negotiated with the Trust Territory Government regarding Farallon de Medinilla Island, be concluded.<sup>58</sup> The Department of Defense further requires an option to hold military maneuvers in Micronesia.<sup>59</sup> This same department has also expressed a desire to use a civilian airport already in existence on Babelthuan for military purposes.

An alternative acceptable to the military is the construction of a new "reef airport" in the Koror/Babelthup vicinity, which would also be shared with the civilian population.<sup>60</sup>

Perhaps the best summary of the military value attached to Micronesia can be found in a statement made in the U.S. Senate in support of President Johnson's resolution (S.J. Res. 106) of May 8, 1968. At that time Admiral Lemos explained that the Department of Defense considers Micronesia important to U.S. security because of its geographic location, its use as sites for military bases, and its facilities for weapons testing. According to Admiral Lemos:

There are essentially three reasons why the Department of Defense considers the TTPI important to our national security. The islands are strategically located, they could provide useful bases in support of military operations and they provide valuable facilities for weapons' testing. Our continuing strategic requirements in the Pacific and our need to further develop United States missile capabilities will make the TTPI increasingly valuable to United States security interests in the area . . . .

The strategic value of the islands of Micronesia is, of course, based on their location. They cover a vast area in a central portion of the Pacific Ocean which lies astride or adjacent to our line of communication to important allies and valuable bases in the Western Pacific. The islands are a natural backup to our forward bases in East Asia. Our major commitments in Asia and our deployments in the Western Pacific make it important that these islands be denied to potential enemies. The lessons of the Pacific War are clear on this point . . . .

The islands of the TTPI also support facilities that have direct and positive utility in terms of

United States military operational requirements. Communication stations, navigation aids, storage areas, active air and harbour facilities and test sites for operational and developmental-type missiles and critical studies and tests in support of the ballistic missile defense program are a few of the reasons why the United States Government considers it important to maintain a military presence in the area . . . . .

Lastly, the islands provide a potential for meeting a wide range of possible military requirements that could develop under various contingencies. As a matter of prudent military planning, we are examining such contingencies on a continuing basis.<sup>61</sup>

#### DEFENSE DEPARTMENT LAND NEEDS IN MICRONESIA

The land used by the military in Micronesia is part of the total land holdings of the Trust Territory Government, referred to collectively as "public lands". According to the Trust Territory Code, "public lands" are defined as "those lands . . . which were owned or maintained by the Japanese Government as government or public lands, and such other lands as the Government of the Trust Territory has acquired or may hereafter acquire for public purposes."<sup>62</sup> The courts in the trust territory have ruled that this definition includes land owned formerly by Japanese individuals, agencies, and corporations.<sup>63</sup> Land occupies a central role in Micronesian culture and folklore. The importance attached to land ownership may result from the fact that land is so scarce in the islands--the total land area is only 701 square miles spread out over 3 million square miles of ocean. Since the natives of Micronesia are

deeply attached to their land, the portion held by the Trust Territory Government as public lands becomes increasingly important. Throughout the territory about 60 percent of the total land area is classified as public land. The government holds as public land sizable portions of many of the large islands in Micronesia (for example, Ponape, Saipan, and Babelthuap). The proportion of the total land in each district held as public land is as follows: 4 percent of the total land area in Yap, 13 percent in the Marshalls, 17 percent in Truk, 66 percent in Ponape, 68 percent in Palau, 90 percent in the Marianas.<sup>64</sup> These data are significant since such public lands could be turned over to the military.

An even more interesting figure is the percent of the total land area of Micronesia that currently is either "used or retained" by the U.S. Department of Defense--3.8 percent.<sup>65</sup> A district by district survey of the U.S. military land holdings in Micronesia is relevant to the central problem being considered here. Captain William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, the Defense Department representative on the U.S. delegation, has stated flatly that "there are no lands being used or retained for defense purposes in the districts of Truk, Ponape, Yap, or Palau."<sup>66</sup> The United States holds a total of 13,824 acres of military retention lands in the Marianas Islands District, divided between Tinian (8,381 acres) and Saipan (4,943 acres).<sup>67</sup> The



military has indicated that it intends to restrict the future expansion of military facilities in the Marianas to the island of Tinian. An example of such projected activity is the proposed refurbishing of some of the old airstrips on the island as well as building suitable support facilities.<sup>68</sup> Presently, the surplus on Tinian from World War II includes four B-29 bomber fields, four fighter strips, as well as old unused docking facilities.<sup>69</sup> In the Marshall Islands District the military has Use and Occupancy Agreements for a total of 3,051 acres, specifically in the Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Bikini Atolls.<sup>70</sup> The Department of Defense stresses the strategic significance of its land holdings in the Marshalls. Again, according to Captain Crowe:

... we have a continuing need for the existing missile range facilities in the Marshalls. They are an important and integral part of the military research and development effort and significantly contribute to the free world's defense. There is no prospect that the need for missile testing will disappear, or even diminish, in the near future.<sup>71</sup>

Although the figures given above are the present Department of Defense land holdings, the total was higher earlier in the trusteeship. Specifically, 21,140 acres have been returned to the Trust Territory Government, but not to the Micronesians.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, the military does allow civilians to use some of the land if currently holds; i.e. 4,441 acres, about 25 percent of the total land

reserved for the military is currently licensed for "civilian use."<sup>73</sup> It should be pointed out, however, that this land can still be recalled for military use.

#### INDICATIONS OF MICRONESIA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE DURING THE STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, great reliance has been placed on statements of military spokesmen. That their positions reflect actual U.S. policy can be determined by analyzing statements made by the "President's Personal Representative" to the status negotiations, Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams. Williams, President of the Asia Foundation of San Francisco, was appointed by President Nixon in March of 1971 and empowered to resolve the question of Micronesia's future political status.<sup>74</sup> Thus, the positions he takes and the statements he makes are authoritative declarations of American policy.

Ambassador Williams has indicated that strategic considerations are influencing the thinking and actions of his government. During these negotiations, he has made repeated and pointed references to Micronesia's strategic geographic location.<sup>75</sup> For example, in the Third Round of the status negotiations, he said:

. . . it is undeniable that the wide expanse of the Pacific embracing your (Micronesian) islands is

indeed a strategic area. This has been formally recognized by the United Nations, and the history of this century has already recorded that in fact the area has been used for strategic purposes to control the sea lanes of the Pacific and as staging and jumping-off points for armed aggression against neighboring Pacific nations. The United States, as a founding member of the United Nations, as the administering authority of the TTPI, and as a member of Pacific and Asian regional security arrangements, has an obligation for the maintenance of international peace and security and to guard against the Pacific Ocean area being used in the future as a base for aggression against the people of Micronesia or against other friends or allies. We have this obligation.<sup>76</sup>

Williams has indicated that security reasons provide the rationale for American involvement in any future decisions Micronesia might make regarding its political future; i.e. the United States must be a partner in "any decision which might have the effect of altering the stability in the area which we hope to maintain in your interest as well as in the interest of others, including our own."<sup>77</sup>

At various points during the negotiations Ambassador Williams has related Micronesia's position to America's broader and more fundamental security interests in the world. He has indicated that the United States cannot and will not ignore its obligations in the Pacific and to many Pacific nations during the status talks.<sup>78</sup> In a more positive light, it is maintained that Micronesia can help deter aggression and participate in preventing future wars. The U.S. negotiators maintain that "an important part of this effort is an effective U.S. military

posture. It is not our intent to use the land of Micronesia for aggressive action against anyone. It is our intention to maintain a posture that offers the best prospect for deterring a major conflict. Surely, Micronesia can make a contribution to this worthwhile effort."<sup>79</sup> The American Government, in achieving this goal, intends to exclude other foreign powers from Micronesia. The American negotiators insist that these U.S. strategic goals coincide with those of the United Nations. They reason that since the objective of the trusteeship system is to strive for international peace and security, and since the Trusteeship Agreement (sanctioned by the U.N.) specifically acknowledges the strategic significance of Micronesia, the United States is obligated "to ensure the Trust Territory shall play its part, in accordance with the Charter, in the maintenance of international peace and security."<sup>80</sup>

The Nixon Doctrine, the reversion of Okinawan sovereignty to Japan, and the growing resentment abroad against American bases in Japan and the Philippines have all influenced the thinking of members of the American negotiating team. They point out that these developments compel the United States to insist on being a partner to any change in status for the territory, whether now or in the future.<sup>81</sup> During the status discussions, the U.S. has demanded certain reservations, certain assurances, that

must be provided if the trusteeship is ended. As might be expected, the U.S. maintains that it needs full authority to handle Micronesia's foreign affairs due to America's international responsibilities. This need was clarified by Ambassador Williams in the Fourth Round of the status negotiations when he said:

We believe that our clear authority in the foreign affairs area is necessary in order for the United States to carry out its Pacific Ocean and World responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security and to serve and promote your own interests in the international community. A clear understanding of this point is also required to avoid the possibilities of future misunderstandings and possible conflict between our policies and your international activities."<sup>82</sup>

The U.S. has expressed similar reservations in the realm of defense. American negotiators are suggesting that the defense agreement reached between the U.S. and Micronesia should be formalized in a separate security pact or lease that would continue even if the political arrangement between the two entities were dissolved.<sup>83</sup> Ambassador Williams has been quite forceful on this matter, saying ". . . we do require the assurance that our land needs be met in a manner that would be enduring through the terms of the leases so that our continuing security responsibilities in the Pacific could be carried out."<sup>84</sup> On another occasion, he again indicated that ". . . the United States must have assurance that its basic defense interests

survive any unilateral termination of the Compact."<sup>85</sup>

During the status negotiations, the United States has linked Micronesia's economic relations with the rest of the world to American security interests. For this reason, the U.S. insists that it must control Micronesia's economic interactions with foreign countries. American negotiators have indicated that, contrary to Micronesian perceptions, "economic relations" concern more than promoting trade and economic development. Rather, it may touch on vital American security interests. Again quoting Ambassador Williams:

Seemingly innocent trade or economic agreements could conceivably . . . provide opportunities for political penetration and the presence of foreign elements which could threaten world peace and stability, as well as U.S. defense arrangements in Micronesia. As an example, although an extreme one, the British Government recently had to expel a large percentage of the Soviet Trade Delegation AMTORG because they engaged in espionage and political activities in the United Kingdom.<sup>86</sup>

In other words, to give some future Micronesian Government the right to conclude such things as trade agreements would be to give them the power to pursue policies ". . . that could possibly subvert U.S. security considerations."<sup>87</sup>

Perhaps reiterating a few other statements made by Ambassador Williams will summarize the position taken by the United States during the status negotiations. Referring

specifically to what he calls "strategic rationale,"

Williams has asserted that:

the United States has security responsibilities that relate to the realities and imperatives of its broader role in the Pacific, its United Nations obligations, and its other international commitments. The central thrust of U.S. foreign and security policy for the last two decades has been to deter and prevent a major international conflict . . . . Although the specific provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement which made Micronesia a "strategic" Trust Territory will some day be terminated, this does not change the fact that the area will continue to be strategically significant, and that security in this critical area will remain important to international peace. Similarly, the United States basic obligations to the United Nations to strive for peace do not end with the trusteeship. Therefore, we believe that it would be to our mutual benefit for the United States to continue to have the responsibility for the security of the area.<sup>88</sup>

One other statement made by Ambassador Williams is vital to this summary. It represents concisely the primary contention of this study, namely that strategic, military, and security considerations will be vital, even compelling, factors in the final determination of any future political status for Micronesia. "We have attempted to make it clear," Williams said,

that our interests and obligations in the Pacific are ones that will continue after the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and, for that matter, beyond a possible revocation of a Compact which we both might enter into. Therefore, it is essential from our point of view that our basic interests survive any future termination and change in your status.<sup>89</sup>

## SUMMARY

Although detailed conclusions will be drawn in Chapter 6, a brief overview of this chapter is in order here. The evidence suggests that the United States attaches a great deal of military and strategic importance to Micronesia. President Kennedy's confidential memorandum, indicating that American policy was to secure a permanent relationship between Micronesia and the U.S., and the Solomon Report, proposing a plan to achieve this objective, were followed by definite changes after 1962-1963 in U.S. efforts to achieve political, economic, social, and educational development. Past and present American military activities in the trust territory have enhanced Micronesia's value to the United States. The Department of Defense has indicated during the status talks that future military activities requiring definite sections of land are being planned for the area.

Recent international developments, such as the Nixon Doctrine, reversion of control over Okinawan sovereignty to Japan, and the growing resentment abroad toward U.S. military installations in Japan and the Philippines have caused American policy makers to consider alternatives to the "forward defense line" in Asia established after World War II. One alternative that has been mentioned



repeatedly by military spokesmen is Micronesia. The evidence suggests that these statements do reflect actual U.S. policy. President Nixon's personal representative to the status negotiations, Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams, has been empowered by the President to resolve the question of Micronesia's future political status. Therefore, Ambassador Williams' statements do represent official U.S. policy. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that this policy is congruent with the statements of the military spokesmen noted above. The American position during the status talks as enunciated by Mr. Williams is influenced by Micronesia's military, strategic, and security value to the United States.

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## Chapter 5

### FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TRUST TERRITORY

This chapter will describe and analyze each alternative future political status that has been considered by both sides in the U.S.-Micronesian status negotiations. The American and Micronesian delegations have met for six rounds of talks since they first began in the fall of 1969. (Table 20 lists the full membership of each delegation.) As of May 1973, a formal agreement has not yet been concluded although a concensus on some basic principles was finally reached in the fall of 1972. It has been agreed that "free association" is the political status that will eventually emerge from the talks. Several basic issues to be included in the Compact, the agreement that will formalize this status, are still to be resolved. Table 21 depicts the chronology of the status talks and the places where they were held.

The alternatives considered throughout the course of the negotiations include continuing the trusteeship, commonwealth status, independence, and "free association." The Micronesian delegation has always expressed a preference for free association, or as a second alternative, independence.<sup>1</sup> During the second round of the negotiations,



Table 21

Membership of Micronesian and U.S. Delegations  
to the Status Negotiations

The Micronesian Joint Committee	The U.S. Delegation
Sen. Lazarus Salii (Chairman)	Amb. Franklin Haydn Williams
Rep. Ekpap Sili (Co-Chairman)	Capt. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN
Sen. Andon Amaraich	Mr. Stanley Carpenter
Sen. Isaac Lanwi	Mr. Franklin Crawford
Sen. Tosiwo Nakayama	Mr. Adrian de Graffenreid
Sen. Bailey Olter	Mr. Lindsey Grant
Sen. Edward Pangelinan	Mr. Herman Marcuse
Sen. Roman Tmetuchl	Capt. G. J. Schuller, USN
Sen. Petrus Tun	Mr. Ronald Stowe
Rep. Herman Guerrero	Miss Mary Vance Trent
Rep. John Mangefel	Mr. Thomas Whittington
Rep. Olter Paul	

Source: United States, Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, Future Political Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: Proceedings of the Fifth Round of Status Negotiations, Washington, D.C., July 12-August 1, 1972, p. 2.

the United States offer of Commonwealth status was rejected by the Micronesians.<sup>2</sup> Beginning with the third round of negotiations, free association is the proposal which has been given the most serious consideration.

Table 22

## Chronology of the Future Political Status Talks

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Date	Round of the Status Talks	Place
Sept.-Oct., 1969	First Round	Washington, D.C.
January, 1970	Informal "Executive Meetings"	Saipan
May 4-8, 1970	Second Round	Washington, D.C.
October 4-12	Third Round	Hana, Maui, Hawaii
April 2-13, 1972	Fourth Round	Koror, Palau
July 12-Aug. 1, 1972	Fifth Round	Washington, D.C.
Sept. 28-Oct. 6, 1972	Sixth Round	Barbers Point, Oahu, Hawaii

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Sources: Congress of Micronesia, Third Congress, Third Regular Session, Report of the Political Status Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia, July, 1970, pp. 1-4; United States, Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, Future Political Status of the Trust Territory, Official Records of each respective round of negotiations, Third Round, pp. 1-2; Fourth Round, pp. 3-5; Fifth Round, pp. 20-21; Sixth Round, pp. iii-iv.

## CONTINUED TRUSTEESHIP

Of the original eleven trust territories administered under the United Nations trusteeship system, Micronesia and the Administrative Union of Papua and New Guinea are the only ones whose political status remain unchanged. As a result, American policy has become the object of much criticism as well as a great deal of pressure to resolve

the status question. Attacks on the United States have come from relatively recently independent nations of the "Third World", whose newly won freedom from colonial domination does not generate great sympathy for the U.S. position in the trust territory. These countries have found an able and willing spokesman in the Soviet Union. The Soviets use meetings of the U.N. Trusteeship Council as arenas for launching vitriolic attacks against what they claim to be American "colonialism" and "imperialism". Mr. Ustinov, the Soviet representative to the Trusteeship Council, has charged that ". . . the Territory was being treated in the classical manner as a guaranteed outlet for industry and a source of colonial raw materials which provided substantial profits for 'surplus' United States capital."<sup>3</sup> These "monopolies" are exploiting Micronesia's human and natural resources.<sup>4</sup> The Soviets further contend that U.S. activities and plans are designed to make the territory ". . . a base for aggression against the liberation movements for the peoples of South-East Asia, and particularly Viet Nam."<sup>5</sup> Kwajalein's conversion into a missile test site and a radar installation designed to intercept inter-continental ballistic missiles, coupled with the eventual expenditure of one billion dollars on this installation, are viewed as proof of United States intentions. The Soviets hold that America has subordinated

Micronesian interests to its own strategic and military concerns.<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, the USSR has proposed the elimination of military installations and activity within the territory, pointing to General Assembly resolutions which asked administering authorities to refrain from establishing new military bases and facilities in colonial territories and to dismantle their old ones.<sup>7</sup> The Russians are further incensed by the American refusal to allow Micronesian students to accept educational fellowships from other member-states of the United Nations.<sup>8</sup> In 1967 the Russians announced that students from Saipan had been offered scholarships to attend People's Friendship University in Moscow. The Soviets view education as a necessary element in the process of political self-determination:

The problem of education was directly connected with that of independence, since the Administering Authority was citing as a pretext for delaying independence the fact that the population was not ready. It was obvious that the Administering Authority was deliberately retarding the intellectual development of the Territory's inhabitants in order to maintain its rule over them . . . .<sup>9</sup>

Finally, the Soviets have voiced consistent opposition to any future political status which would result in closer ties with the United States, including both annexation or integration--whether through association or integration (e.g. commonwealth status)--and statehood for Micronesia.<sup>10</sup> The Soviet position may have been directed against Senator

Hiram Fong of Hawaii who in 1965 advanced a proposal calling for Micronesia's integration with Hawaii, which would result in statehood for Micronesia. Because many influential islanders feel that such an action would result in the loss of a "Micronesian identity" in both cultural and political terms, the proposal has received no attention from either delegation at the status talks. Consequently, the Soviets pressed hard for the establishment of a specific date for the administration of a plebiscite to determine the territory's future political status.<sup>11</sup>

The point of the foregoing survey of the Soviet position is to indicate that there is, and has been for some time, a great deal of international pressure directed toward the United States to fulfill the pledge it made in 1947, i.e. to ". . . promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory toward self-government or independence . . . ." <sup>12</sup> In other words, some change in status must be made if the U.S. desires to bring its policy in Micronesia into line with the overwhelming anti-colonial sentiment of the international community of nations.

There is, however, some sentiment in Micronesia, especially in the Mariana Islands District, for a continuing close association with the United States. For example, J. C. Tenorio, a Saipan merchant, has indicated that "most

people don't want independence. We're better off the way we are. On our own, our economy would be so weak that we'd wind up like the Philippines--no stable government and lots of corruption." Rather, Mr. Tenorio has expressed a preference for "going with the United States. Lots of us want to. We like the U.S."<sup>13</sup> Indeed, at least since 1967 the Marianas District Legislature has expressed a desire for some kind of permanent association with the United States, even at the expense of seceding from the rest of Micronesia. In 1969 a plebiscite was conducted in the Marianas which indicated an overwhelming desire (3,200 for--25 against) to affiliate with Guam in an expanded U.S. territory.<sup>14</sup> The District Legislature voted unanimously in March of 1971 to secede from the trust territory "by force of arms, if necessary."<sup>15</sup> There has been no attempt, as yet, to implement that resolution.

During the fourth round of the status negotiations, held at Koror, Palau, in April of 1972, the representatives to the talks from the Mariana Islands District presented a position paper in which they expressed a desire for ". . . a close political relationship with the United States of America."<sup>16</sup> They indicated the reasons for this position quite cogently and concisely:

We advocate our present position for the sole reason that we desire membership in the United States political family because of the demonstrated advantages

of such a relationship. More than any other nation with which we have had contact, the United States has brought to our people the values which we cherish and the economic goals which we desire. Continued affiliation with the United States offers the promise of the preservation and the implementation of those goals. . . ."<sup>17</sup>

To achieve their end, the representatives from the Marianas District proposed that they negotiate separately and independently from the rest of the Micronesian delegation regarding their future political status.<sup>18</sup> Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams, the President's Personal Representative and head of the American delegation, agreed to this proposal, subject to one limitation: "our policy of moving toward a termination of the Trusteeship Agreement simultaneously for all of the districts will remain in effect."<sup>19</sup> Williams promised to keep the other parties to the negotiations informed as to the progress achieved in these separate talks.<sup>20</sup> One peripheral consequence of this pro-American sentiment in the Marianas is already in evidence. There is speculation that the "capital" of the territory will be moved from its current site on Saipan (which is in the Marianas group) to Truk or some other more appropriate site when the trusteeship is ended.<sup>21</sup>

#### COMMONWEALTH STATUS

One alternative proposed by the United States is for Micronesia to assume "commonwealth status", something

akin to the position of Puerto Rico. Under this plan, the Commonwealth of Micronesia, as the area would be known, would be self-governing with a constitution to be drafted by a representative convention and approved by the Micronesians themselves. However, the constitution would be required to remain consonant with the enabling laws passed by the United States Congress.<sup>22</sup> Norman Meller, an expert on Micronesian affairs at the University of Hawaii, has provided a capsule definition of commonwealth status:

It (commonwealth status) would allow the continuation of a Micronesian identity, while keeping the region amenable to control of the United States. Presumably, it would be associated with special benefits, akin to the tax treatment now enjoyed by Puerto Rico, so that economic, social, and political advancement could continue at a pace compatible with the various cultures of Micronesia. It could even be accompanied with United States citizenship and free access to the mainland of the United States for all wishing to emigrate.<sup>23</sup>

In other words, this status lies somewhere between that of a state and that of an unincorporated territory.<sup>24</sup> American spokesmen have pointed out that commonwealth status does not imply a link between two independent political powers or units, but rather a consolidation whereby Micronesia would actually become a part of the United States.<sup>25</sup> Mutual advantages could accrue from such a union. "... The protection provided for Micronesia in the U.S. offer will insure permanence, protection, and stability to the people of Micronesia. Micronesia--whose



history has demonstrated its strategic importance to many nations--will know, as will the world, that it is assured of U.S. defense whenever needed at no cost to itself."<sup>26</sup>

In a commonwealth, there would be a division of powers and functions between the Micronesian and the U.S. Federal Government.<sup>27</sup> The Commonwealth government, acting through the Congress of Micronesia, would have broad powers, especially in the area of internal affairs. Indeed, the Micronesian Congress would have full legislative authority "in the absence of U.S. or Micronesian Constitutional limitations or applicable U.S. law . . . ."<sup>28</sup> That is to say, in all areas not claimed by the Federal Government, the Commonwealth would be free to act. In terms of governmental structure, Micronesia would be expected to establish ". . . a republican form of government, with three separate branches and a bill of rights for the protection of the people."<sup>29</sup>

One important feature of the Commonwealth proposal, at least from the American viewpoint, is that foreign affairs and defense would be controlled by the Federal Government.<sup>30</sup> This is explicitly stated in the American proposal:

The President is responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy for all of the United States--the states, the territories, and Puerto Rico. This would be true of Micronesia as well. The

President, using the power and prestige of the United States as a whole, seeks to follow a policy or policies which will bring benefits to the people as a whole.

Although this power is reserved to the federal government, this does not mean that Micronesia would be cut off from the outside world or forbidden direct contacts with foreign individuals and officials: quite to the contrary. So long as Commonwealth interests in such contacts are consistent with U.S. national policy, the federal government would assist and encourage the Commonwealth government.<sup>31</sup>

The U.S. offer of commonwealth status was rejected in a 57 page report of the Future Political Status Commission. The report, severely critical of the American proposal, was approved by the Congress of Micronesia during its regular session in August, 1970. The Congress, backing its negotiators, insisted on a much looser relationship with the United States, "free association."<sup>32</sup> The Micronesian report gave several reasons for this rejection. It indicated that commonwealth status falls "well below the minimum standards of self-government acceptable to the Congress of Micronesia, the people of Micronesia, and the United Nations."<sup>33</sup> The report contends that "under our present quasicolonial system, the identity, individuality, and dignity of the people of Micronesia are being suppressed."<sup>34</sup> The report continues:

American power and influence are currently so dominant that Micronesia and its people are becoming "Americanized" at an ever increasing rate. This is having a tremendous effect upon all aspects of Micronesian life and society and it will be impossible to

control this influence until the people of Micronesia can establish their own government.<sup>55</sup>

Some members of the Congress of Micronesia indicated other reasons for rejecting commonwealth status. These included fears that a conflict might develop between U.S. laws and Micronesian customs; that such a relationship would bind future generations; that the fifty percent of Micronesia's people who still function in a cashless subsistence economy would be dominated by foreign investors. There was also growing anxiety over the racial issue. One senator expressed his fear, apparently held by others, that Micronesians might become "the newest, smallest, remotest non-white minority in the U.S. political family."<sup>56</sup> One Marshallese congressman remarked bluntly, "I do not want any kind of American citizenship. I am already a Micronesian."<sup>57</sup>

The report further noted growing concern over the military issue. "Security interests in Micronesia seem to be the overriding consideration" in Washington's offer of commonwealth status.<sup>58</sup> One observer has commented on the perceptiveness of Micronesian leaders when it comes to the American military interest in Micronesia:

Micronesian leaders have developed an uncanny instinct for the incongruities and conflicts of the American presence. They recognize, almost more than Americans, the U.S. military interest in Micronesia. They know that the Americans came in war, that they

are engaged in war in Asia and that, upon leaving Okinawa and Vietnam, and perhaps the Philippines, Americans might again pass through the islands. Micronesians know that they are a strategic trusteeship, which the US may use for military purposes at any time, as it rather unambiguously demonstrated with nuclear tests at Bikini and Eniwetok. Although they would quite likely yield some land for American military use, and would surely deny other powers access to the area, Micronesians bridle at any political status that doesn't recognize their ultimate sovereignty.<sup>39</sup>

## INDEPENDENCE

Afioga Afofouvale Mismoa of Western Samoa, the only indigenous Pacific islander to become Secretary General of the South Pacific Commission, recently observed that "independence is the 'in' thing today."<sup>40</sup> Micronesia appears to be no exception to this general rule. There are at least some elements active in the islands' social and political system which clearly maintain that this is the only legitimate status for a future Micronesian government. Early in 1971 a nationalistic faction of the Congress of Micronesia, claiming 11 of the 53 members of the legislature as adherents, organized a nascent political movement which calls itself the Independence Coalition. Reference has been made earlier to another group with similar goals, namely the Micronesian Independence Advocates, a group of Micronesian students centered in Hawaii. An American group, the Friends of Micronesia, was recently organized and headquartered in

Berkley, California. It is composed largely of academic activists and former Peace Corps volunteers who hope to aid the independence movement, in large measure through their publication, The Young Micronesian.

During the second round of the status talks, the Micronesian delegation, acting under instructions from the Congress of Micronesia, presented independence as one possible alternative future status. In a report to the Congress, the Status Commission made the following relevant observations:

It should be noted, however, that there are precedents in history, not least of all in the history of the United States, in which a people, reacting to an intolerable situation, has declared Independence unilaterally and outright. If such an unfortunate situation were to arise in Micronesia, it is unlikely that the Micronesian people would heed the restraint of a Trusteeship Agreement in which they had no part, and which compromised their position to accommodate the national interests of the Administering Authority.

Surely, an outright declaration of Independence would make more difficult an already taxing change of status. But your Delegation believes that such a declaration is not impossible. There are precedents and justifications for action outside of the Trusteeship System and your Delegation believes it should record its awareness of them.<sup>41</sup>

There is some doubt, however, as to whether the Micronesian Status Commission considers total independence a viable status, either politically or economically. A reading of the transcripts of the negotiations suggests that independence may be viewed more as a bargaining point to be used

to prod the U.S. into making concessions at the negotiating table rather than as a totally credible alternative.

The American reaction to the suggestion of independence was unequivocal and immediate. A U.S. spokesman summarily dismissed the proposal as totally inappropriate, saying that ". . . the United States does not believe that independence will be a realistically appropriate status, considering the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory, for some time to come; and the United States would be remiss in its responsibilities to say otherwise."<sup>42</sup>

#### FREE ASSOCIATION

"Free association" is the political status that was agreed to in principle during the last rounds of the status negotiations. As with most other problems, of a political nature, the precise definition of free association status is still a matter of some dispute. Obviously, the hard bargaining taking place between the United States and Micronesia will operationalize any conceptual description provided. As a take-off point, however, it is instructive to note a definition proposed by the United Nations in Resolution 1541 of the 15th General Assembly:

(a) Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed by informed and democratic processes. It should be one which respects the individuality and the cultural characteristics of the territory and its

people, and retains for the peoples of the territory, which is associated with an Independent State, the freedom to modify its status through the expression of their will by democratic means through Constitutional processes.

(b) The associate territory should have this right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free association agreed upon.<sup>43</sup>

Very early in the status negotiations, as far back as May of 1970, the Micronesian delegation expressed its preference for this alternative. The primary purpose of free association, according to the Micronesians, is to allow the indigenous residents to:

advance from a colonial status to a new and free status which satisfies their basic aspirations to rule themselves and protects their individuality and cultural characteristics, while recognizing the practical considerations which must apply to a territory of small population and limited resources. The greatest advantage in this arrangement is that it in no way hinders a further move either to closer association with the former administering authority, to association or federation with neighboring states or territories, or to sovereign independence.<sup>44</sup>

The United States delegation maintains that while such a definition may be acceptable to the Micronesians, it has no formal legitimacy since it is neither "a United Nations definition or a commonly accepted interpretation of the term."<sup>45</sup> The American contention is that the resolution referred to is simply a "recommendation" of the U.N.

General Assembly which imposes no binding commitments on any of its members.<sup>46</sup>

In very basic terms, the agreement which is emerging will be concluded with both sides signing a formal "Compact" stating the rights and duties of all parties involved. The Micronesians clearly intend to gain broad authority in internal affairs. The new government will be empowered to propose a Constitution with few or no restrictions in this area. The primary responsibilities or privileges which the United States insists upon will be in the areas of foreign affairs and defense. Indeed, the American negotiators have insisted on "full authority" in these two areas. This fact reinforces the primary contention of this study, i.e. that American policy is, and has been, influenced by perceived security requirements and the military value attached to Micronesia.

Another provision of the proposed agreement is relevant to this matter, and that is the question of terminating any compact which may be concluded. Throughout the negotiations the islanders have steadfastly maintained that "unilateral termination" by either side at any time is the only legitimate provision agreeable. The United States has been even more adamant in its contention that the pact cannot be ended unless both sides agree to such a step. American representatives maintain



that only this alternative will insure that legitimate American military and strategic interests in the area can and will be protected and preserved.

A more detailed explanation of the "foreign affairs" and "defense" functions as they would be described in the Compact will illuminate the nature of the free association relationship. Considering defense first, the American side has indicated rather unequivocally its fundamental objective; it is "to promote stability and peace in the Pacific"<sup>47</sup> and to fulfill U.S. "... security responsibilities that relate to the realities and imperatives of its broader role in the Pacific, its United Nations obligations, and its other international commitments."<sup>48</sup> In order to operationalize this objective, the United States has demanded broad authority in these three areas:

(1) The defense of Micronesia, its people and territory, from attack or threats thereof.

(2) The right to prevent third parties from using the territory of Micronesia for military purposes; and

(3) The use of United States military bases which are established in Micronesia for the security of the United States, and to support its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>49</sup>

The scope of authority the United States considers essential in the field of defense is suggested by references to similar provisions in the West Indies Act of 1967 which describes the responsibilities of the British Govern-

ment in her dependencies in the West Indies. In the language of the Act, the British Government shall have separate authority for "any matter which in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is a matter relating to defense. . . ." <sup>50</sup> In other words, the United States is insisting on "full authority" in the area of defense.

The provision insisted upon by American negotiators in the field of "foreign affairs" is equally broad. It stipulates that "the Government of the United States shall have full responsibility for and authority over all matters which relate to the foreign affairs of Micronesia. . . ." <sup>51</sup> In response to a Micronesian question regarding the relationship of the islanders' interests and U.S. authority in foreign affairs, Ambassador Williams was almost brutally frank:

You have in your statement expressed difficulty in understanding the rationale for our requirement that the Compact should vest plenary foreign affairs authority in the United States. I believe that you are asking why from your point of view we are seeking plenary authority in terms of Micronesian interests. In fact, we are proposing that we need such authority primarily--but not exclusively--in terms of our own interests. <sup>52</sup>

When the United States demands "full authority" in the field of foreign affairs, Williams continued, it means specifically that:

the U.S. would be responsible for Micronesia's foreign relations and that the U.S. would represent Micronesia in all official government-to-government relationships and in international organizations and conventions which

required official government representation and participation. It would also suggest that future Micronesian policies and positions in areas touching upon foreign affairs would have to be consistent with or at least not in conflict with American foreign policy.<sup>53</sup>

It should be noted that the United States has indicated that the Micronesian government could participate in some limited and controlled way in the field of foreign affairs. In certain specific cases, the indigenous government could even exercise a veto on various actions and commitments, e.g. international airline routes in Micronesia.<sup>54</sup> Since tourism from Japan and the United States is a vital element in Micronesia's economic development, the Micronesians feel it important to retain the freedom necessary to promote various components of the tourism industry as they see fit, notably air travel. Furthermore, Micronesia would be free to seek economic aid from other nations besides the United States, "so long as those agreements did not constitute government-to-government arrangements."<sup>55</sup> Examples of such actions considered appropriate by the United States might include "commercial or foreign assistance agreements with government-owned or private trading banks and corporations, development banks, technical assistance agencies, or export-import banks when these do not involve direct inter-governmental obligations."<sup>56</sup> Under these foreign affairs arrangements, Micronesia would be encouraged to seek

economic and technical aid from various United Nations agencies.<sup>57</sup>

But American negotiators are very concerned about problems which could arise as a result of an unclear division of responsibilities in foreign affairs. They have used "hypothetical" scenarios to illustrate their fears. "What if", they conjecture:

a future Micronesian Government should sign a financial agreement with a foreign power, which it could not meet? We might well be obligated to that foreign power. How would we fulfill that obligation without interfering intolerably in your internal affairs?

What if your tariff revenues, for instance, were to be put up by your future government as collateral for a financial loan, something which governments have done before--could we tolerate another government getting such control over your affairs in the event of default or massive indebtedness?<sup>58</sup>

Such illustrations indicate why the United States feels compelled to demand "full authority" in the field of foreign affairs. A single foreign policy problem could (and probably would) be approached through different perspectives by American and Micronesian Governments. The United States has world-wide foreign policy concerns which could be adversely affected by independent Micronesian actions. Therefore, in the American view, it is necessary to retain total control over foreign affairs.<sup>59</sup> Ambassador Williams has summarized the American position succinctly:

One of the prime interests is to maintain peace and stability in the Pacific. Our obligation under the United Nations Charter and other international treaties for insuring that the area of the world that embraces Micronesia not become an area of international conflict, will continue after the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. The ability to meet this ongoing obligation will be enhanced by making our responsibilities for the overall foreign relations and defense of the area clear to all. We feel that by retaining this responsibility, we will be contributing to our mutual protection and security, to stability in the Pacific Ocean Area which is necessary to your development and well-being, and to the general prospects of world peace.<sup>60</sup>

The Micronesians have tentatively agreed that, in exchange for broad authority over internal affairs, the United States can have the full authority it demands in the areas of foreign affairs and defense. These are the principles alluded to at the beginning of this chapter on which agreement has been reached. However, several other issues are still to be resolved, notably termination, a sticky issue which could hold up final agreement for some time, and transition procedures to govern relations between Micronesia and the U.S. during the changeover from the trusteeship to free association status.<sup>61</sup> These and other issues will be the subject of much hard bargaining before a final Compact establishing the free association status can be signed.

#### SUMMARY

Each political status considered by both sides during the six rounds of the U.S.-Micronesian status

negotiations has been described and analyzed in this chapter. These alternatives include continuing the trusteeship, commonwealth status, independence, and free association. Although Micronesia's political status has remained unchanged since the trusteeship began in 1947, some movement has been prompted by the overwhelming anti-colonial sentiment that exists among the international community of nations. There is, however, considerable sentiment in the Mariana Islands District for a continuing close association with the United States. Separate talks are underway to explore this possibility.

Commonwealth status, something similar to the position of Puerto Rico, was proposed by the United States and rejected by the Micronesians. Under the terms of the American proposal, the Commonwealth of Micronesia would actually become a part of the United States. This consolidation would allow foreign affairs and defense to be controlled by the U.S. Government, while internal affairs would be directed by the Commonwealth government. Because this status does not imply a link between two independent political units, but rather a consolidation, it was rejected by the Micronesians as unsatisfactory.

Conversely, independence was proposed as one possible alternative by the Micronesian delegation acting under instructions from the Congress of Micronesia. The

United States rejected it immediately as being totally inappropriate for Micronesia.

Free association, which lies somewhere between commonwealth status and independence, has been agreed to in principle by both sides. It would retain Micronesia's identity and autonomy as a distinct political unit. The new Micronesian government would be empowered to propose a new Constitution and regulate the area's internal affairs, while the United States would retain full authority over foreign affairs and defense. While these issues have been settled in principle, such other problems as the transition process and termination procedures remain unresolved.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Congress of Micronesia, Third Congress, Third Regular Session, Report of the Political Status Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia, July, 1970, pp. 1-2.

2. Ibid., p. 7.

3. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 34th sess., 1311th meeting, 1967, p. 87, para. 2. In future references, these reports will be referred to as TCOR.

4. TCOR, 33rd sess., 1293rd meeting, 1966, p. 135, para. 11.

5. TCOR, 34th sess., 1319th meeting, 1967, p. 127, para. 15.

6. TCOR, 34th sess., 1311th meeting, 1967, p. 88, para. 3.

7. TCOR, 34th Sess., 1319th meeting, 1967, p. 127, para. 15.

8. TCOR, 33rd sess., 1275th meeting, 1966, p. 29, para. 60.

9. TCOR, 34th sess., 1311th meeting, 1967, p. 91, para. 34.

10. TCOR, 34th sess., 1319th meeting, 1967, p. 128, para. 20.

11. TCOR, 33rd sess., 1273rd meeting, 1966, p. 135, para. 12.

12. United States, Trusteeship Agreement, Article 6, Section 1.

13. "Micronesia: A U.S. Ward That Wants To Go Its Own Way", U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 1972, p. 81.

14. Ibid.



15. E. J. Kahn, Jr., "A Reporter at Large: Micronesia Revisited", The New Yorker, December 18, 1971, p. 102.

16. Congress of Micronesia, Joint Committee on Future Status, Report of the Joint Committee on Future Status on the Fourth Round of Negotiations in Koror, Palau, April, 1972, p. 61. Hereafter referred to as Fourth Round Report.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 63.

20. Ibid.

21. U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 1972, p. 81.

22. New York Times, July 26, 1970, p. 7.

23. Norman Meller, The Congress of Micronesia: Development of the Legislative Process in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1969), p. 392.

24. Congress of Micronesia, Third Congress, Third Regular Session, Report of the Political Status Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia, July, 1970, p. C-2.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., pp. C-1-C-2.

27. Ibid., pp. C-2-C-3.

28. Ibid., p. C-5.

29. Ibid., p. C-3.

30. Ibid., pp. C-9-C-10.

31. Ibid.

32. Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1970, p. 14.

33. New York Times, August 23, 1970, p. 14.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1970,  
p. 14.
37. Ibid.
38. New York Times, August 23, 1970, p. 14.
39. Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1970,  
p. 14.
40. New York Times, September 27, 1970, p. 13.
41. Congress of Micronesia, Report of the Political Status Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia, July, 1970, p. 27.
42. Ibid., p. 29.
43. Ibid., p. 9.
44. Ibid., p. 10.
45. Ibid., p. 19.
46. Ibid.
47. Fourth Round Report, p. 20.
48. Ibid., p. 19.
49. United States, Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, Future Political Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: Proceedings of the Fifth Round of Status Negotiations, Washington, D.C., July 12-August 1, 1972, p. 27. Hereafter referred to as Fifth Round Reports.
50. Quoted in Fourth Round Report, pp. 19-20.
51. Fifth Round Report, p. 24.
52. Fourth Round Report, p. 31.

53. Fourth Round Report, p. 15.
54. Ibid., p. 18.
55. Ibid., p. 17.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 16.
59. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
60. Ibid., p. 16.
61. Fifth Round Report, pp. 20-21.

## Chapter 6

### CONCLUSIONS

As noted in Chapter 1, the basic contentions of this study are twofold. First, despite its commitment to the principle of national self-determination, the United States has been remiss in carrying out its responsibilities as the administrator of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and second, that military consideration or perceived requirements for U.S. national security have been most influential in shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory, that these considerations have probably eliminated independence as an acceptable alternative for Micronesia, and have largely determined the future status or form of association between Micronesia and the United States.

#### ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF U.S. POLICY IN THE TRUST TERRITORY

As for the first contention of this study, the American commitment to Micronesia has been spelled out in the Trusteeship Agreement. Parts of this document, dealing with the development of political, economic, social, and educational goals, provide a yardstick for measuring U.S. policy. As pointed out in Chapter 3, at the very

least, American policy can be measured by the standards which the United States imposed on itself in the Trusteeship Agreement. Furthermore, when the United States accepted membership in the United Nations, it committed itself to the goal of the Trusteeship System as specified in Chapter XII, Article 76(b), namely "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory and their progressive development toward self-government or independence." These, then, are the standards by which U.S. policy in Micronesia will be evaluated.

Turning first to political development, the primary political institution fostered by the administering authority which could aid in the achievement of independence or self-government is the Congress of Micronesia. Its antecedents extend back as far as August of 1956 when the Inter-District Advisory Commission was created, with a view toward stimulating Micronesian participation in the political system. A series of developments culminated in the establishment of the Congress of Micronesia in 1965, almost two decades after the beginning of U.S. administration of the area. The Congress has become the proving ground for the territory's indigenous leadership as well as the primary vehicle for espousing Micronesian aspirations at the U.S.-Micronesian status negotiations.

The executive branch of government, however, is still dominated by the U.S. despite its efforts to increase the level of Micronesian participation, especially by

appointing indigenes to head each district in the territory. However, it is the High Commissioner, still an American, who can exercise an absolute veto over all legislation enacted by the Micronesian Congress. Furthermore, the High Commissioner dispenses that portion of the budget appropriated by the American Congress. The Congress of Micronesia, then, has very limited powers in the financial area, an area which will be vital to any indigenous government when a change in status occurs.

In the judicial branch of government, a similar pattern of Micronesian involvement has developed. At the lower levels, Micronesian participation is extensive. But the apex of the system is still dominated by Americans, as are those courts whose jurisdiction extends to areas of U.S. military activities.

As noted above, Micronesian participation in district government is particularly extensive, both in the legislative and executive branches of government. The restrictions occur, then, not in terms of personnel, but in terms of authority. Any decision taken at the district level is subject to review and veto not only by the District Administrator, but also by the High Commissioner. However, it is evident that the experience gained by Micronesians at the district level has been particularly broad. When the capacity of the various governmental levels to raise funds through indigenous sources (that is, inde-

pendent of the United States) was compared, it was found that such funds raised at the district level outdistance those raised by the central government. Should a future Micronesian government find itself cut off from American aid, it might be difficult to persuade the disparate districts to willingly provide the financial support needed by the central government. This parochialism has surfaced at the status negotiations, as evidenced by the separate talks being held between representative of the Mariana Islands District and U.S. negotiators. But it does appear that the other five districts working together via the Congress of Micronesia have begun to overcome, or at least submerge, these divisive factors.

An overall assessment of U.S. policy in the area of political development must conclude that the most notable success has come through the institution and growth of the Congress of Micronesia to the point where it has finally become a vital and active force in the Micronesian political system. It is from this body that the leaders of any future Micronesian political entity will emerge. The executive branch of government has seen a gradual increase in indigenous participation, but the ultimate decision-making authority has not been turned over to Micronesians. A similar conclusion must be drawn when the judiciary is considered. Micronesians have

gained some experience but the United States has retained final authority when it seemed expedient for American interests, especially in areas where U.S. military installations are involved. Micronesians have been given broad experience in district government, but the scope of their authority has been restricted. Although some progress has been made, it must be concluded that the United States has not consistently and successfully promoted Micronesia's overall political development toward independence or self-government.

In the area of economic development, American policy followed the same lines as U.S. policy in general; 1962 marked the turning point with, however, mixed results. This can be demonstrated by reference to Table 4 in Chapter 3. Appropriations before 1962 fell well under the budget ceiling established by the U.S. Congress. Following President Kennedy's policy reassessment in 1962, both the authorized and appropriated levels rose dramatically. The implications this held for economic development are clear. The level of financial support before 1962 was adequate only to meet administrative costs, resulting in little or no economic development. But the increased financial support recorded after 1962 has had the effect, whether intended or not, of increasing Micronesia's dependence on continued American adminis-



tration of the area. As noted in Chapter 3, should Micronesia choose independence, aid from the U.S. Congress would be drastically curtailed. Since U.S. appropriations have constituted over 70 percent of the territory's budget, an independent Micronesia would probably be forced to operate on a budget only one-third its former size--at best a very difficult situation.

Another indication of the shift in economic policy relates to foreign investments in Micronesia. Before 1962 only businesses financed by Micronesians or directly by the U.S. government were allowed. After that date, private American investment was allowed and encouraged in an attempt to promote economic development in the territory. The substantial level of that investment is a further indication of the deepening dependence on the continued American presence noted above. However, other foreign (i.e. non-U.S.) investment is still prohibited. One other area of importance to economic development concerns the recommendations of the Nathan Report examined in Chapter 3. It is significant to note that these recommendations, made in 1967, have not yet been implemented on any broad scale. Indeed, none of the administrative reforms suggested in the report has been put into practice.

In other specific areas, there have been some

notable successes in relation to economic development. Tourism has been selected by American policy-makers as having great development potential. Indeed, in the course of its tremendous growth, it has replaced copra as the territory's largest export income earner. Another U.S. economic achievement in Micronesia is the Copra Stabilization Fund. Its significance is due to the dependence of Micronesia's export trade on a single crop, copra. As explained earlier, the fund is designed to protect the territory from the vicissitudes of price levels in the world copra market. In this area, the United States has been very successful. The fund is now financially self-sufficient. Should the United States leave the area, the fund would be able to continue with no further support of any kind from the Americans.

However, the encouragement of a single crop for export, despite the Stabilization Fund, seems subject to question, particularly since other segments of the economy have not been as successful. For example, the growing trade deficit in the territory is a cause for some concern. The deficit, now being subsidized by the United States, has resulted in increasing Micronesia's need for continued dependence on the U.S. of some kind. In addition, American tariff policies have been short-sighted at best. Other economic indicators, such as the Gross Territorial

Product, suggest that whatever economic growth has occurred has, in large measure, resulted directly from increased U.S. appropriations. Taking this and other evidence into account, one can only conclude that American economic policy has actually increased Micronesia's dependence on a continued American presence in the islands, or some form of association which would insure the economic viability of the territory in the future.

With respect to social development, the central thrust of American policy has been in the field of public health. Financial support has followed the trend evidenced in other policy areas, i.e. a sharply increased commitment after 1962. American efforts in environmental health have been directed toward improving the water supply and sanitary sewage disposal. The success of projects in these areas has been meager, as indicated by the portion of the population which enjoys a protected water supply and sanitary sewage disposal, which is still under ten percent. Critics are quick to point out the concentration of these projects in the district centers, areas where most Americans live.

Another indication of progress, or the lack of it, is the level of employment for wages in the territory. If the area is to become independent or self-governing, its population must be self-supporting to a substantial extent.

Although many of the islanders still function in a subsistence economy, the level of Micronesian employment is increasing, both in absolute terms and relative to non-indigenous employment. However, a difference exists between the level of wages paid to indigenes as opposed to nonindigenes. Micronesians who work for the Trust Territory Government and those who are school teachers are paid according to a separate salary schedule, which is considerably lower than the schedule used for nonindigenes. Furthermore, the American Government is directly responsible for almost 50 percent of Micronesian employment for wages. United States administration of the islands has actually increased Micronesia's dependence on a continued American presence there.

As noted in Chapter 3, a summary evaluation of U.S. policy regarding social development is difficult. There have been some notable successes. For example, the level of Micronesian employment in the area of public health has slowly but consistently increased at a much greater rate than nonindigenous employment. Following the general policy change in 1962, government expenditures on health, medical, and sanitation services rose dramatically. However, the emphasis of American policy appears to have been somewhat misdirected. If independence, or even self-governing status, had been the goal

of U.S. policy, it seems reasonable to suggest that emphasis should have been placed on developing independent programs that would decrease Micronesia's need for direct American involvement, control, and direction. This has not been the case. Therefore, United States policy has not been consistently directed toward the Micronesian social development which would prepare the territory for self-government or independence.

Educational development has followed the same pattern as development in all areas surveyed, i.e. 1962 marked the turning point. Although intermediate education has always been supported by the administering authority, it was not until 1962 that the Americans assumed responsibility for elementary education and the salaries of elementary school teachers. The administration did not become actively involved in teacher training efforts until the general policy change. As an outgrowth of the Micronesian Teacher Education Center, the Community College of Micronesia was established in fiscal year 1970 and has specialized in training elementary school teachers. Other natives are pursuing higher education abroad in a wide range of academic disciplines. While some attempts had been made to provide vocational training early in the trusteeship period, it was not until 1969 that the Micronesian Occupational Center was established in Koror, Palau.

Another measure of the success of U.S. educational policy might be the number of children attending elementary and secondary schools. In absolute terms the number has certainly increased, but, when the number of school age children is compared to the number attending school, this assessment must change. This proportion has actually decreased in recent years. As many critics have pointed out, the entire public secondary school system consisted of only one high school until 1961. Overall government expenditures in the field of education have increased over the years, but the per capita expenditure has remained relatively constant. In general, then, American policy has not been consistently directed toward Micronesian educational development.

The evidence examined in this study suggests that, in the areas of political, economic, social, and educational development, United States policy has not been successful in promoting Micronesia's self-sufficiency and independence. President Kennedy's decision in 1962 to expand substantially the American commitment has not resulted in the achievement of enough development to promote the goals of the Trusteeship Agreement and of the United Nations Charter, namely self-government or independence. Despite some notable successes in each of the areas examined, the overall effect has been to deepen Micronesia's dependence

on a continued American presence in the islands and probably to rule out independence as a viable future political status. An understanding of the rationale behind this trend lies in an explanation of the perceived military and security value attached to Micronesia by U.S. policy-makers.

#### MILITARY AND SECURITY FACTORS

President Kennedy's confidential memorandum (NASM No. 145) of April 18, 1962 indicated that for military and security reasons, U.S. policy was to be redirected toward bringing Micronesia "into a permanent relationship with the US within our political framework." He instructed Professor Anthony M. Solomon to conduct an investigation and submit a plan for improving Micronesia's political, economic, and social development with a view toward achieving a permanent association with the United States when the trusteeship ended. The Solomon Report not only verifies what Chapter 3 indicated about U.S. policy, namely that a significant change occurred in its direction in the early 1960s, but also what Chapter 4 explained as well, that military considerations or perceived requirements for U.S. national security have been most influential in shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory.

One major reason for the area's perceived strategic value is its geographic position in the central Pacific.

This simple fact, combined with an international situation in which the U.S. has adopted a "low profile" in Asia as suggested by the Nixon Doctrine and in which some American bases in the Far East have been jeopardized, account for the importance of the military facilities which have been built in Micronesia. The territory's geographic position further explains the fact that it is being actively considered as an alternate for the "forward defense line" in the Far East as the American position in old established strategic bulwarks like Okinawa, the Philippines, and Japan becomes more and more untenable. The evidence provided in Chapter 4 clearly indicates that Micronesia is at least being considered as a viable alternative by the defense establishment.

The fact that the military position reflects actual U.S. policy has been demonstrated by noting its conformity with the posture assumed by Ambassador Williams during the status negotiations. Since Williams was appointed by President Nixon and is acting under his instructions, his positions are authoritative statements of U.S. policy. According to Williams and these military spokesmen, Micronesia is directly related to America's broader and more fundamental security interests in the Pacific area and in the world.

This contention is further substantiated by the series of plans for new military facilities in the area



being proposed by the Department of Defense. Its very specific and quite tangible land needs as expressed in the status negotiations are a further indication that the Defense Department does envisage some future potential need for expanding facilities in the islands. Indeed, Ambassador Williams has insisted that such land needs and defense arrangements that are negotiated be formalized in an agreement that would be separate from and independent of a Compact describing a political settlement. This separate defense agreement would continue even if the Compact were terminated--an indication that, in the eyes of American policy-makers, the long term strategic value of Micronesia will not decrease.

The very reason for American involvement in any decision Micronesia makes regarding its future political status is strategic. During the status negotiations, the United States has insisted that it must retain "full authority" in the areas of foreign affairs and defense. American negotiators maintain that, should control over these functions fall into any other than American hands, the broader U.S. security interests noted above would be endangered. The U.S. further insists on similar reservations regarding Micronesia's economic relations. The possibility that unrestricted trade with any foreign powers might imperil vital American security interests compels the U.S.

to insist on the right to restrict this phase of the islands' external relations.

By way of summary, military considerations or perceived requirements for U.S. national security have been most influential in shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory. The position taken by U.S. representatives at the status negotiations indicates that strategic, military, and security factors are vital, even compelling, elements in the determination of Micronesia's future political status.

#### FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TRUST TERRITORY

Each alternative future political status that has been considered by both sides during the U.S.-Micronesian status negotiations has been described and analyzed. These include continuing the trusteeship, commonwealth status, independence, and "free association".

Some change in Micronesia's political status has been prompted by the overwhelming anti-colonial sentiment that exists among the international community of nations, especially members of the Third World and the Soviet Union. Aside from the Administrative Union of Papua and New Guinea, Micronesia is the only one of the original eleven United Nations trusteeships whose political status remains unchanged.

Some strong sentiment does exist, however, in Micronesia, especially in the Mariana Islands District, favoring a continued close relationship with the United States. Indeed, efforts to achieve this end have resulted in separate negotiations between representatives from the Marianas and the U.S. delegation.

One of the initial American proposals was that Micronesia become a Commonwealth and assume a status somewhat similar to that of Puerto Rico. The implementation of this plan would result in a consolidation of the territory with the United States, with Micronesia actually becoming a part of the U.S. This proposal was particularly suited to American military and security interests since foreign affairs and defense would be controlled directly by the United States. Although internal affairs would be administered by the Commonwealth Government, commonwealth status would fulfill the American national security requirements and military considerations which have played a dominant role in U.S. administration of the trust territory and in the status negotiations. But the proposal was rejected by the Micronesians since it did not imply a link between two independent political units, but rather a consolidation.

Although the Micronesian delegation proposed independence as one possible alternative future political

status, it may view this suggestion more as a bargaining point, a tool for prodding the U.S. into making concessions at the negotiating table, than as a fully credible alternative. However, other elements in the islands are actively promoting total independence as the only legitimate resolution of the status question. The Independence Coalition of the Congress of Micronesia, a group of Micronesian students centered in Hawaii calling themselves the Micronesian Independence Advocates, and an American group, the Friends of Micronesia, are part of the minority who hold this position.

But Micronesian independence is not compatible with the American national security interests cited by military spokesmen and by Ambassador Williams during the status negotiations. U.S. involvement in Micronesia following World War II was designed to prevent any foreign powers from using it as a base for future aggressive military action against the U.S. and its allies. During the status negotiations, the United States has reasserted this objective. But, as illustrated in Chapter 4, Micronesia has a more positive role in the American defense effort. The possible fallback of the "forward defense line" in Asia caused by growing resentment abroad toward U.S. bases and the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine have, in the eyes of military spokesmen and U.S. policy-makers, made

Micronesia a vital element of American security. The United States rejected the suggestion of independence immediately as being totally inappropriate for Micronesia.

Free association has been accepted in principle as the alternative which satisfies these U.S. military and security requirements as well as the Micronesian desire to retain the islands' identity and autonomy as a distinct political unit. Although both parties have not come to terms on a precise definition of this status, agreement has been reached in the areas of foreign affairs, defense, and internal affairs. In the Compact or agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of each party, Micronesia would gain broad authority in internal affairs, with the indigenous government setting up a Constitution to regulate such matters. In retaining "full authority" over foreign affairs and defense, the U.S. negotiators maintain, as indicated in Chapter 5, that "we will be contributing to our mutual protection and security, to stability in the Pacific Ocean Area . . . , and to the general prospects of world peace". This demonstrates the validity of the central contention of this study, namely that military considerations or perceived requirements for U.S. national security have been most influential in shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory and that these considerations have largely determined the future status or

form of association between Micronesia and the United States.

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## Appendix A

Summary of Trust Territory Government Employment,  
for the Period from 1948-1972

Fiscal Year	Indigenous	Nonindigenous	Total
1948	1,708	129	1,862
1949	*	*	*
1950	1,050	154	1,204
1951	1,539	280	1,819
1952	1,564	296	1,860
1953	*	*	*
1954	1,262	261	1,523
1955 <sup>1</sup>	1,410	207	1,617
1956 <sup>2</sup>	1,613	225	1,841
1957	1,842	288	2,130
1958	1,927	265	2,192
1959	1,885	252	2,135
1960	1,852	256	2,068
1961	1,920	244	2,164
1962	1,895	220	2,113
1963	2,622	250	2,852
1964	2,979	319	3,298
1965	3,685	318	4,005
1966	3,686	501	4,187
1967	4,071	467	4,538
1968	4,233	740	4,973
1969	4,578	405	4,983
1970	5,114	556	5,670
1971	6,211	632	6,843
1972	5,996	669	6,665

\* These data are not available.

1. Does not include 330 employed for special projects (280 indigenous and 50 nonindigenous).
2. Does not include 608 employed for special projects (544 indigenous and 64 nonindigenous).

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations of the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1948, pp. 78-82; 1950, pp. 65-69, 73; 1951, pp. 81-87;



## Sources for Appendix A (continued)

1954, pp. 119-23; 1963, p. 242; 1964, p. 264; 1965, p. 295; 1969, pp. 205, 198; 1970, pp. 231, 223; 1971, pp. 257, 249; 1972, pp. 252, 257; and United States, Department of the Interior, Annual Reports to the Secretary of the Interior, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective fiscal year--1954, p. 11; 1956, p. 5; 1958, p. 7; 1960, p. 13; 1962, p. 15; 1966, p. 45; 1967, p. 41; 1968, p. 34.

## ABSTRACT

The basic contentions of this study are twofold. First, despite its commitment to the principle of national self-determination, the United States has been remiss in carrying out its responsibilities as the administrator of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and second, that military considerations or perceived requirements for U.S. national security have been most influential in shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory, that these considerations have probably eliminated independence as an acceptable alternative for Micronesia, and have largely determined the future status or form of association between Micronesia and the United States.

The study of United States policy in Micronesia, focusing on the effect of military and strategic influence, is perhaps most amenable to traditional, descriptive research techniques. This study is not concerned with constructing a theory or model of United States-Micronesian relations. Rather, it is an attempt simply to describe these relations and to analyze some of the primary factors which affect them.

The standard for evaluating the U.S. effort is provided by the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement, both documents in which the United States

pledged itself to promote political, economic, social, and educational development with a view toward achieving independence or self-government for Micronesia. American attempts to accomplish these goals have advanced through a series of phases or stages. The first fifteen years of U.S. management resulted in little development in any of the four areas examined. Appropriations from the U.S. Congress, a fairly accurate barometer of the American commitment to Micronesia, remained at a consistently low level. In 1962 President Kennedy made a positive decision to promote development in all areas for the purpose of ensuring that Micronesia would ultimately become permanently associated with the United States in a way that would protect vital American security interests. The best quantitative evidence of the implementation of this policy shift is the dramatic and steady increase in the level of U.S. appropriations for the territory. However, despite some notable successes in each of the areas examined, the overall effect has been to deepen Micronesia's dependence on a continued American presence in the islands and probably to rule out independence as a viable future political status.

The U.S. and Micronesian representatives to the status talks, which began in 1969, have examined each alternative political status available including continuing

the trusteeship, commonwealth status, independence, and "free association". Some change in status has been prompted by the overwhelming anti-colonial sentiment that exists among the international community of nations, especially members of the Third World and the Soviet Union. However, the President's personal representative to the negotiations has indicated that any status which does not recognize and protect American military and security interests in the islands is unacceptable. Although the United States has consented to allow the Micronesians to retain a certain amount of control over internal matters, it has consistently demanded that it retain complete authority in the areas of foreign affairs and defense. Despite early indications that the Micronesians were considering total independence, they have finally agreed in principle to "free association", a status which would fulfill American security requirements.

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