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ENTITLED IMAGES IN PERSPECTIVE: JAPANESE PERCEPTION OF THREAT IN THE PACIFIC IN THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1921 - 1922

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IMAGES IN PERSPECTIVE:

JAPANESE PERCEPTION OF

THREAT IN THE PACIFIC IN THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE,

1921 - 1922

BY

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INTRODUCTION

Japan, Great Britain, and the United States scrapped vast amounts of naval tonnage following the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. They halted their competition in naval building which was requiring ever increasing sums and in the minds of many Japanese posed the threat of war, particularly war between Japan and the United States. Strategists of the Plans Division of the American navy thought of Japan as the principal potential enemy of the United States, while Japanese naval strategists considered America to be their ptincipal potential enemy. The agreement between Japan and the United States to limit capital ships ended a building race in a type of vessel considered to be "offensive" and channeled that race into other areas, such as cruisers. One must remember that people considered one of the lessons of the First World War to be that arms races, particularly naval races lead to war. Therefore, the Five Power Treaty on Naval Arms Limitation, which was signed on February 6, 1922, seemed to most contemporary observers to bode well for the future of the Pacific region and the avoidance of future conflicts. The Pact of Paris, which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, was also signed by numerous nations during the decade of the 1920s, including Japan, Great Britain, and the United States.

During the course of the arms reduction negotiations held at Washington in late 1921 and early 1922, the Japanese presented their perception of the defensive needs of the empire to justify their positions. These defensive needs were in large measure a reflection of their perception of the offensive capabilities of the United States. This perception was integrally related to Japanese fear of the power of the U.S., and desire to be treated as an equal among the major world powers. These fears of and attitudes toward American naval programs were very similar to the fear of encirclement which engulfed the leaders of the Japanese nation in 1941 and made them feel it necessary to strike out before it was too late. These same fears and the desire for equality were regularly expressed in the press.

In this paper I am asking and hope to provide an answer to the following questions. What were Japanese press images of American naval policies immediately preceding, during, and with the conclusion of the Washington Conference? How did these images relate to the changes in American policy, that is were the editors well-informed? What were their views on Japanese naval expansion? Does their often repeated desire for disarmament seem to be more related to fear of the U.S., or to the desire to cut naval expenditures and decrease the intragovernmental power of the military in general, and the navy in particular? What were the attitudes of the opposition and the parties in power, toward these same

issues? In the statements of governmental figures is there evidence of a relationship between images of American policy and positions taken? What type of propaganda battle was waged to defend the navy's positions? I will attempt to ascertain these opinions through statements published in the English language dailies, the interpellations and responses to interpellations in the Diet published in those same papers, and the records of the Washington Conference.

I argue that there was a very fine line between those American naval policies which were not deemed too frightening by the press, the political members of the government, and the navy, and those which were seen as a challenge to Japan's ability to defend herself, and thereby incited fear in the hearts of these people. When American naval policies crossed that line and were implemented in tandem with diplomatic opposition to Japanese programs and policies in the Far East, Japanese felt that their sovereignty and their rights in Asia, specifically in China, were being attacked. These same type of fears engulfed persons in 1940 and 1941 and did not allow them to make what we in the West would call rational decisions, particularly the decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

Hara Kei, the Prime Minister of Japan wrote in a 1920 issue of the Outlook:

> We are told to "do unto others as we would they should do unto us." But unless we first learn how "others" wish to be treated before we proceed to put the golden rule into practice I am afraid it may prove to be even a source of trouble and misunderstanding. There is a distinct possibility of finding that others

> are not like ourselves and setting out to know how others wish to be treated, let us fix in mind that just as one man is different from his neighbor, so one nation is different from another in wants, views, and outlook on life. . . .[1]

There is an underlying principle of human behavior which makes me feel a study which emphasizes images and impressions is a valuable one. Decisions are based in large part on accumulated cultural baggage which shapes one's method of thinking, first hand experiences, knowledge obtained vicariously, and impressions of the policies of others. These impressions are treated as truth by the person concerned. The Japanese press often saw naval bogeymen where none existed; this can in part at least be attributed to the propaganda campaign waged by the navy, which was designed to instill a fear of American naval policies in the hearts and minds of the editors and the people. To examine the images and impressions which the press and public figures had of American naval policies is to try and understand why some people were afraid of the United States, why others were more trusting, and the way in which they wanted to protect their rights.

Both during World War II, and in retrospect as well, most Americans have viewed America's part in the Japanese-American conflict as a just one. But it would be a strange thing for the victors in a war to claim it was unjust. Even if there were some abstract, objective standard by which one could easily discern the "just" side in a conflict, it would

still be necessary to examine impressions of the events which were the main areas of contention in order to understand the decisions which led to conflict and later were looked back upon with a suspicious eye. It is often suggested that one reason why the leaders of the Soviet Union feel it necessary to maintain powerful military forces is their fear of being attacked that is based on their remembrance of the massive loss of physical property and human lives of World War II. In a very real sense the Soviet leaders are probably afraid of the United States. By looking at the images held by the Japanese who were afraid of the United States, it may be possible to learn some of the principles by which nations translate imagery into behavior.

CHAPTER 1

PRE-WASHINGTON CONFERENCE: NAVAL IMAGES AND THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

The Japanese-American Naval Problem 1898-1914: An Overview

For 50 years before the arrival of Perry's "black ships" there was a debate carried on in Japan concerning the resumption of foreign contact, a debate which usually took the form of a discussion of maritime security.[2] After the defeat of the Russian Navy, in 1907 Japanese generals, admirals, and politicians met to determine the military resources necessary to ensure the defense of the empire. They agreed these would be 25 army divisions and 16 capital ships. The capital ships were to be eight battleships and eight battlecruisers all under eight years of age the "8-8" plan.[3] The 8-8 plan remained the official goal of the Japanese navy until the stirrings for disarmament began in late 1920 and spread through the three major naval powers of the world, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, during 1921. Admiral Baron Katō Tomosaburō, the Minister of the Navy, explained the 8-8 plan in an interview with an AP correspondent in April 1921.

> In formulating the 8 unit fleet, the Imperial Japanese Navy had no imaginary enemy in view. The scheme was laid down only on the conviction that it was the minimum capable of being constructed and maintained by this

> Empire, adequate for the effective defense of this nation against all possible future complications in the Far East.[4]

Japan adopted the 8-8 plan after America had acquired Western Pacific possessions. The Spanish-American War of 1898 resulted in an altered naval balance of power in the Western Pacific. The United States annexed the Philippines and Guam, and during the same year annexed Hawaii. The goal of American naval men and their supporters in Congress became to maintain a "fleet second to none but that of Great Britain."[5] Since from 1904 to 1914 Germany had the second most powerful navy in the world, the standard for the desired strength of the American navy was that of the German navy. According to Akira Iriye the Japanese were relatively pleased with the annexation of the Philippines by the United States as it was considered a friendly power.[6] Nonetheless the American acquisition of the Philippines and Guam formed the basis for a later American naval challenge to Japan and consequently a Japanese naval challenge to the United States. The Philippines, lying a great distance from the continental United States and Hawaii, were very difficult to defend without a powerful fleet. A fleet powerful enough to defend the Philippines was also powerful enough to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy in the waters of the Northwest Pacific whose defense had been determined vital to the integrity of the empire. A relatively weakly-fortified Philippines would be easy for Japan to conquer, but if fortified would be highly

defensible and thus could be used as a base for an attack on the Japanese Empire. Theodore Roosevelt realized the vulnerability of these islands and the problems which that vulnerability posed. He wrote in 1904: "If we are not prepared to establish a strong and suitable base for our navy in the Philippines then we had far better give up the Philippine Islands entirely."[7]

Great Britain and Germany engaged in intense naval competition from 1904 to 1914. The introduction of the Dreadnought class of battleship by Great Britain not only rendered the predreadnoughts of Germany obsolete, it rendered the predreadnoughts of England obsolete, placing Great Britain and Germany at an approximately equal starting point in dreadnought construction.[8] Germany's intensive naval construction program, with its avowed aim of smashing British power, forced Great Britain to concentrate the bulk of its fleet in the North Sea in order to be ready at any time to meet the German fleet with overwhelming force. By August 1914 the British Grand Fleet had 20 dreadnoughts compared to the 13 dreadnoughts of Germany's High Seas Fleet.[9] Britain was by far the supreme naval power in the world and intended to remain that way using Germany as one power in its two power standard of naval strength. This two power standard provided that Great Britain would maintain naval strength greater than that of the next two naval powers.

In Asia the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in place to protect British and Japanese interests. It had originally

been negotiated to localize conflicts and defend against Russian aggression. Japan fought under its protection in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 in which the Japanese navy destroyed the Russian fleet at Tsushima in one of the most decisive battles in military history. Great Britain and Japan renewed the pact during the Russo-Japanese War. The terms of the new agreement provided that the powers were obliged to assist each other in case of an attack by a single third power. Adding this renewal to the destruction of the Russian fleet gave Japan naval security in the Northwest Pacific. American naval security decreased because there were no Russian ships in the Pacific capable of seriously diverting the Imperial Japanese Navy. At that point it would have required a fleet at least three times the size of Japan's to defeat her.[10] The alliance was renewed again in 1911 with Germany as the potential enemy in mind. It provided for the maintenance of peace in East Asia and India, the preservation of the territorial integrity of and equal opportunity in China, and the maintenance of the territorial rights and special interests of the contracting powers in Eastern Asia and India. Both powers were obligated to assist each other in case of an unprovoked attack or aggressive actions. Article 4 of the alliance stated:

> Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shal entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.[11]

The United States in August of 1911 signed a treaty of general arbitration with Great Britain but the Senate refused to ratify it. Obviously, even though Britain was bound literally by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to assist Japan in case of conflict with the United States, the original intention of the agreement was that she would not be, and as I will explain later this was the interpretation made by the British and Japanese governments in the years immediately following World War I.[12]

World War I and the Deterioration of Japanese-American Relations

With the conclusion of the First World War there was a major shift in the naval balance of power. German naval power was destroyed and a large part of the German fleet was sunk by its own men at Scapa Flow.[13] The navy of Great Britain was no longer faced with a major naval challenge in the North Sea and could afford to deploy its ships in other areas as it saw fit. In 1918 in actual fighting ships Britain's 42 dreadnoughts, 109 cruisers, 13 aircraft carriers, 527 destroyers and torpedo boats, and 137 submarines comprised a fleet which was greater than those of the other Allied and Associated Powers combined.[14] The trident remained in the hands of the British, subject to the completion of the American 1916 building plan. France ceased to be a major naval power as its shipyards engaged in the manufacture of munitions for the armies of the Allies all during the war,

to the neglect of naval construction.[15] The two other nations whose naval power was enhanced by the conflict were the United States and Japan.

American naval expansion plans were embodied in the 1916 building program which authorized the construction of 10 battleships, 6 battlecruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 torpedo boat destroyers, 9 ocean submarines, 58 coastal submarines, 3 fuel ships, 1 repair ship, 1 transport, 1 hospital ship, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 submarine tender, 2 ammunition ships and 2 gunboats.[16] However, the American government suspended work on the capital ships during the war so that resources could be concentrated on the construction of destroyers, which were necessary to combat the German submarines that were inflicting huge losses on the Allied merchant fleets. By the conclusion of the war the American fleet had added a large number of destroyers and a few battleships but the 1916 building program was far from fulfillment.

The Imperial Japanese Navy also saw action and was expanded during the war. It transported 500,000 troops from Australia to Europe, and Japanese naval squadrons worked in the anti-submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, took over patrol duties in Australian waters, and seized German islands north of the equator in the Pacific.[17] In 1915 Admiral Katō Tomosaburō became Minister of the Navy and Admiral Shimamura Hayao became Chief of the Naval General Staff. They worked

together for naval expansion. Prime Minister Ōkuma was convinced to complete the funding of three battleships which were under construction, and agreed to fund four more capital ships in the winter of 1915-1916 as the first step toward attaining the long desired 8-8 fleet. Hara Kei, who led the opposition Seiyūkai Party to victory in the Diet elections in the spring of 1917, worked out a plan to raise new taxes so that work could be started on additional battlecruisers for the 8-8 fleet. Yet in 1918 Admirals Shimamura and Katō both concluded that it was necessary to examine the results of the war more carefully before embarking on further naval expansion. The implications of the Battle of Jutland were not yet completely clear, the United States was not yet implementing its huge 1916 building plan, and the effectiveness of submarines and aircraft needed to be examined.[18]

In the fall of 1918 Hara Kei became Japan's first party Prime Minister. The financial state of the empire was poor; during September riots over increasing rice prices had sprung up all over the home islands. Hara, hoping to alleviate financial conditions and placate the services at the same time, reached a compromise over expansion with the service ministers and general staff chiefs. Hara had his Finance Minister Takahashi compose a stopgap budget without major increases for arms expansion. In exchange Hara pledged to find funds for completing the 8-8 plan beginning in fiscal 1920. The expansion of the army was to occur during the

later years of the 8-8 plan when the funds necessary for naval expansion would be smaller, thus freeing up funds for army expansion. He also pledged to increase government revenues if necessary to fund these expansion plans.[19] Hara made a strong commitment for the expansion of the Japanese navy regardless of the fate of the American 1916 building plan.

Besides the proposed expansion of the Japanese and American fleets a number of other factors contributed to the changed naval situation of the post-war Pacific. These included the destruction of Russian and German power. With the Russian Revolution, Russia no longer loomed as an immediate naval threat to Japanese interests from the North. German power was totally removed from the Pacific. Japan seized German Pacific islands north of the equator during the war and acquired German rights in the Chinese province of Shantung. Great Britain acquired the German islands south of the Equator. During the war Britain and the United States removed nearly all of their naval forces from the Pacific allowing Japan to become the dominant naval power in the Northwest Pacific. However, with the destruction of German power the United States and Great Britain were free to redeploy their fleets and the threat which had motivated the second renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ceased to exist.

The improvement of certain weapons, such as the submarine and the airplane, left naval policy in many nations

in an unsettled state and was a major factor in the changed balance of naval power. The development of the submarine in particular improved the position of those nations which most likely would be engaged in defensive battles. The value of these weapons to many was proven by the vast amounts of merchant tonnage lost by the Allies to German submarines. At the Washington Conference, French naval representatives argued the most vehemently that the value of submarines lay in their use as coastal defenders and their ability to increase the efficiency of the communications of a nation at war; but the French position was in large part supported by Italy, Japan, and the United States.[20] Since many considered the use of submarines to sink unarmed merchant shipping without warning as one of the horrors of the war, their value as commerce destroyers was not touted in the arguments for their retention. It would however be foolish to believe that this value was not part of the reason for the desire to retain submarines. The development of the airplane also improved the strategic position of the defender in naval warfare. Planes based on land could be used to defend against an attacking fleet, as could shore guns, but were mobile and had rapidly improving technical capabilities. In the opinion of one naval strategist submarines and aircraft improved the capability of shore defense dramatically.[21]

The development of defensive weapons contributed to the controversy which arose in British naval circles over the

efficacy of the huge battleship in light of the experiences of the war. Some naval men argued against the construction of battleships. They claimed that since the British Grand Fleet had spent most of the war at Scapa Flow and in its only major battle with the German fleet at Jutland was damaged by much smaller battleships, the maintenance of huge battleships was a waste of money.[22] Yet it came to be the standard opinion of the naval general staffs of great Britain, Japan, and the United States that the battleship was still the main strength of a naval force.[23] Admiral Katō spoke to the Japanese Diet on December 21, 1919: "The more we study the lessons of the war, the stronger does our conviction grow that the last word in naval warfare rests with the big ship and the big gun."[24] The lessons to which Katō referred were embodied in the design of a new type of battleship, the superdreadnought. Far from denying the principle of big ships and big guns it emphasized it. The superdreadnought had

> guns of heavier calibre: massive armour protection to protect vital parts--including thick steel decks to resist projectiles fired at long range, and therefore descending at a steep angle; and a more complete system of bulkheading to localise the effect of underwater explosion; this method of minute subdivision being associated in some ships with external bulge protection.[25]

The most convincing evidence which exists for the belief that the general staffs of the powers were convinced of the usefulness of the battleship was that their naval building programs all had the capital ship as their backbone.

Post War Diplomatic Disputes

Between the end of the Great War in November 1918 and the invitations issued by the government of the United States in the summer of 1921 by which the powers were invited to the Washington Conference, many diplomatic disputes arose between the United States and Japan. These disputes followed and in some cases were directly related to disputes which occurred during the war. The United States strongly opposed the imposition of Japan's 21 Demands on China even though Japan withdrew the most offensive group. The United States refused to recognize the legitimacy of the acquisition by the Japanese of German rights in Shantung. The U.S. also became opposed to the retention of Japanese troops in Siberia after the withdrawal of American forces. However the United States and Japan did conclude a bilateral agreement in 1917, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, in which the governments recognized that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous [Manchuria]."[26] But the United States and Japan interpreted these special rights differently. In August of 1919 Secretary of State Robert Lansing claimed that the special interests that the U.S. had recognized were not political but economic. Japanese argued that the United States had recognized Japan's special political rights in

China. In fact, Ishii Kijūrō claimed that if the interests which the U.S. had recognized were economic, this would contradict the remainder of the agreement which set forth the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity.[27]

There were also serious racial issues. When Ishii visited the United States he had another purpose besides attempting to have the United States recognise Japan's special interests in China. He also was to achieve an agreement on the status of Japanese nationals in the United States. This was to be a five point agreement as follows: 1) Japan and the United States were to accord the other most-favored nation treatment as regarded the acquisition, enjoyment, exercise, and inheritance of rights; 2) the principle of most-favored nation treatment was to govern employment rights; 3) companies and organizations composed either wholly or in part of Japanese or U.S. nationals in regards to matters of acquisition, enjoyment, and expressing of rights pertaining to real estate were to enjoy most-favored nation treatment; 4) the agreement was not to affect existing legislation; and 5) the Japanese government was to reserve its position in regard to the California Land Law.[28] The U.S. did not agree to these provisions.

The Japanese attempted to have a provision concerning racial equality inserted in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Their original proposal, which did not get past Colonel House of the American delegation, stated that "the

High Contracting Parties agree that concerning the treatment and rights to be accorded to aliens in their territories, they will not discriminate, either in law or in fact, against any person on account of his or their race or nationality." Colonel House did approve Japan's proposal B by which the powers were to agree to accord equal treatment to aliens without making any distinction on account of their race or nationality. Japan failed to achieve the insertion of this clause in the Charter of the League of Nations largely due to the intransigence of Australian Prime Minister Hughes. The United States continued to block the flow of Japanese immigrants under the terms of the Immigration Law of 1907; the Japanese had also agreed to restrict the flow of immigrants by the Gentlemen's Agreement of the same year. To add insult to injury, Californians strengthened the Alien Land Law in 1920 by forbidding those persons who had no possibility of becoming citizens from purchasing land in the names of their children who often were American citizens. The Japanese government protested these acts in a memorandum to the State Department.[30]

Another post-war controversy was over the island of Yap, a major Pacific cable station which was mandated to Japan by the Treaty of Versailles along with the other formerly German islands north of the equator in the Pacific. The American Senate did not approve the treaty; the American government maintained that, at the Paris Peace Conference,

President Wilson had not agreed that these islands were to be held in mandate by Japan and reserved the right of unlimited access to the use of Yap as a cable relaying station. The American press also questioned the motives for the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and by the time it was set to expire if not renewed, in the summer of 1921, it had become a controversial issue. Moreover the American Senate's failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which allowed the American government to oppose post-war Japanese policies which other powers had already recognized, was viewed as a lack of sincerity by America in honoring her international commitments.

Disputes and the Possibility of War

With the expansion of the American and Japanese fleets, the controversies over Yap, Shantung, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Siberian Expedition, and immigration disputes, the possibility of an American-Japanese war was bandied about in many quarters in both Japan and the United States. In 1917 the Imperial Japanese Navy formally adopted the policy of viewing the United States as its most likely enemy. In the view of Admiral Katō war might be possible because of 1) the Monroe Doctrine, 2) restrictive immigration policy, 3) the Open Door policy in China, 4) opposition to Japanese possessions in the South Seas, and 5) continued naval expansion.[31] The U.S. Navy in the immediate post-war period considered adopting Japan as its most likely enemy and

the advocates of a big navy in Congress did not hesitate to paint a dire picture of the result of a clash between the two nations. There was a conflict within the American navy over which nation, Great Britain or Japan, loomed larger as a potential enemy. The General Board feared the dominance of the navy of Great Britain. Chief of Naval Operations Benson agreed that even though strength equal to that of Great Britain would overwhelm Japan, since Britain was historically more aggressive in trade and naval competition than Japan, the strength of Britain had to be matched. The Plans Division of the U.S. Navy determined by autumn of 1919 that Japan was the most likely enemy of the United States and worked out a three-stage battle plan of seizing and strengthening islands in the Eastern Pacific, moving on the Philippines through the mandated islands, and then strangling Japan. Many officers of the General Board disagreed with this plan as they thought it a threat to their authority.[32]

In his book Sea Power in the Pacific published in 1921 before the Washington Conference, Hector C. Bywater, an associate of the Institute of Naval Architecture, compared the strengths of the American and Japanese fleets and the possible strategies and results in the event of a conflict. Bywater maintained that Japan could easily seize the Philippines and Guam in two weeks, long before the American Pacific fleet could be brought across the ocean. The permanent Asiatic Fleet of the U.S. in February of 1921 consisted

of three cruisers of obsolete design, eight patrol vessels, 13 destroyers, and 10 auxiliaries. Eighteen destroyers were on the way there. This fleet could easily have been destroyed by the Japanese Navy.[33] However, the U.S. Fleet, which included 19 dreadnoughts, had much greater firepower than that of Japan. The main battle line of the Japanese fleet consisted of six dreadnought battleships and four battle cruisers. Two of these battleships were of post-Jutland design.[34] To American naval strategists the Philippines would be relatively easy to seize due to the inadequacy of their fortification. Fortifications had been improved significantly around Manila Bay and in 1920 some twenty destroyers, twenty submarines, and four kite balloons were based there. Yet Congress refused to appropriate the funds necessary to move the dry dock Dewey and in the view of an American naval officer:

> The Philippines are there for Japan whenever she likes to take them, and nothing can prevent her from seizing them when she feels to do so. As at present circumstances, we could do nothing whatsoever to protect them in time of war . . .[35]

The U.S. did not appear to have the capability to defeat Japan in a short war in the Western Pacific. The actual empire defenses were virtually unassailable. Japan was invulnerable from the Sea of Japan side; the straits of Shimonoseki and the northern entrance to the Sea of Japan could be easily blocked. The only part of the empire which was vulnerable to an American attack was Formosa, where

Japan obtained a large rice crop, coal, and copper. The Japanese plan was to engage the U.S. battle fleet after it crossed the Pacific. But the American fleet would not have sufficient auxiliary craft to serve the needs of the fleet operating at such a long distance from its bases. The Japanese navy would hold four distinct advantages in such a conflict: 1) it would fight at no great distance from its bases with its ships at their maximum fighting efficiency, that is, their hulls would be free of fouling so as to maximize their speed and the supply lines would be short and secure; 2) it could use all of its serviceable heavy ships, cruisers, and destroyers while the U.S. could only bring a portion of its destroyers; 3) its four battlecruisers of the Kongo class would be at least 6 knots faster than the American battleships, as the U.S. did not expect to complete any battlecruisers before 1923; and 4) it would have a large number of submarines available for use. Though the United States could bring much greater firepower to bear than Japan, the Japanese could use their speed to avoid a fight to the finish and a materially indecisive battle would confirm the Japanese fleet's mastery of the Western Pacific.[36]

The United States could, by fortifying Guam, make itself capable of defeating Japan in a fairly short war. If Guam were properly fortified and dredged it would be impossible to attack and a fleet sent across the Pacific could be based there. From Guam the recapture of the Philippines

would be relatively easy, and from bases in the Philippines the United States could make sporadic attacks on the Japanese coast, blockade Japan, and effectively force its surrender.[37] Of course in a prolonged war there was no question of the ability of the United States to create such an overwhelming preponderance of naval strength as to be able to defeat Japan. This idea was the basis of the strategy adopted by the Plans Division of the U.S. Navy. In light of the tradeoffs made at the Washington Conference, Bywater's view of the strategic importance of the fortifications of bases in the Western Pacific is most interesting. Bywater's opinion on the outcome of war between America and Japan was shared by Admiral Katō and Captain Mizuno, a naval propagandist, who stated in an article in the Chugai Shogyo in late 1921, that war with America would be futile even though Japan could possibly win in the short run. He stated that since America could not be really defeated, such a war would continue for a long time, and Japan would not improve her position. Also, if Japan were to lose she would probably lose possession of Taiwan and have her communications with the rest of the world cut.[38]

Between the conclusion of the armistice in November of 1918 and the issue of invitations to the Washington Conference the United States engaged in a number of naval actions which affected Japanese imagery. In 1919 the United States split its fleet into two of squadrons of equal

strength, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific.[39] In 1921 four of the most powerful new oil-burning ships of the American navy were placed in the Pacific Fleet, which was stationed on the West Coast of the United States. The government examined and spent money on bases on the Pacific Coast to enable them to serve as bases for the American fleet. Yet from 1919 to 1921 the Congress voted no funds for building beyond the completion of previously authorized programs, except for funds provided in 1919 for naval aviation. It authorized no new combat ships between November of 1918 and the Washington Conference, and the ships which had been authorized were being completed only very slowly due to the lack of funding by the Congress.

> In January 1921 only one of the ten battleships authorized back in 1916 was approaching completion; only three were as much as 50 percent along; six were less than 20 percent. The battlecruisers were still less advanced, ranging from 1 to 11 percent of completion.[41]

Nonetheless the money spent on construction was still substantial. In 1920 the navy spent $170,000,000, including $49,000,000 for battleships, battlecruisers, and scout cruisers, and in 1921, the Congress appropriated a total of $155,896,585.96, including $100,471,869.99 for the above mentioned categories.[41]

The navy was quite interested in fortifying Guam, the Philippines, and Pearl Harbor. A navy board of inspection went to Pearl Harbor in 1919 and concluded that its dock, repair, and magazines were totally insufficient for the

needs of the Pacific Fleet in time of peace "and, of course, totally inadequate to take care of the whole Fleet in any movement, offensive or defensive, across the Pacific." It could provide anchorage for only three capital ships, eight scout cruisers, and thirty-one destroyers. The board proposed the following to be completed within 5 years: the construction of two concrete piers, one 1800 and one 1000 feet long, the erection of large foundries, machine and boiler shops, magazines, oil fuel depots, and harbor railways, the creation of complete air and submarine bases, and the dredging of an area to provide anchorage for eight battleships.[42] In 1921 $890,000 was appropriated for work on Pearl Harbor. During the same year, the navy requested $1,499,000 for the fortification of Guam. Yet Congress appropriated no money for this fortification, as they did every time that the navy requested money for Guam from November 1918 through the Washington Conference.[43]

The American navy in 1921 was quite powerful. It included 17 battleships of the first line, 6 of the second line, 8 armored cruisers, 4 first class cruisers, 4 second class cruisers, 14 third class cruisers, 298 destroyers, and 87 submarines, but it was undermanned. Its authorized strength was 160,000 men but the actual total was 20,000 to 30,000 less than this, partially due to the relatively low wages.[44]

In Japan, Hara made good on his pledge to expand the fleet. The Diet passed his 1920 budget in July; the budget

included ¥398,811,538, approximately $200,000,000 in 1921 dollars, for naval expansion to get the 8-8 program underway. One hundred and three ships were to be constructed including 4 battleships, 4 battlecruisers, 12 cruisers, 5 gunboats, 32 destroyers, 28 submarines, 2 aircraft carriers, and 6 fuel tankers.[45] In 1921 Hara's budget once again included vast sums for the expansion of the navy. In its original form the total budget was ¥1,562,000,000 and was approved by a vote of 266 to 152 on February 12, 1921 by the Lower House of the Diet. On March 5 the government presented a second additional budget request of ¥60,000,000 of which the army and navy were to receive ¥49,178,890 the navy requesting ¥7,066,705 for extraordinary expenses and ¥2,818,075 for ordinary expenses. The government explained that the need for more money was due to the rising cost of manufacturing war vessels. The Lower House approved this request on the eighth. Tsuhara Takeshi of the Kenseikai, the main opposition party, expressed fear at the increasing needs of the navy. He felt that the requests for naval expenditures indicated that the navy would take up an increasing share of the budget in the future. The House of Peers approved the budget in its final form on March 23; a total of ¥762,000,000 was appropriated to the military, ¥273,000,000 of which was to go to the continuation of the 8-8 program.[46]

The government expressed both its fear of naval expansion and desire for disarmament from the very beginning

of 1921. Baron Hayashi, the Japanese ambassador to Great Britain, said in an interview in January 1921 that Japan hoped to stop the threatened naval race in the Pacific, explained Japanese fears of the United States, and spoke of Japan's own harmless motives.

> How could we [sic] a fleet only half the size of the American fleet cherish aggressive designs against the United States? The United States has no aggressive designs any more than we have, but they are building a fleet so powerful that it will relegate all others to the position of mere ciphers, enabling America to dictate her conception of justice. Political exigencies and national dignity alike demand that as a naval power we shall not consent to place ourselves at the total mercy of another fleet.

Since Japan this year will spend £70,000,000 on her navy and the U.S. proposes to spend around £200,000,000 ". . . the ratio of superiority of the American fleet over the Japanese fleet is . . . incomparably higher than that of the British over the German fleet in 1914."[47] Other politicians outside of the government also feared the American plans. Marquis Ōkuma Shigenobu, Prime Minister of Japan from 1914 to 1916, characterized the American naval buildup as aggressive and thought it was necessary for the U.S. and Great Britain to reach an agreement on disarmament first and then only would Japan be able to follow the other powers' lead in disarmament, since her weapons were defensive.[48]

Japanese naval views of American expansionism in the immediate post-war years were tempered by a desire to know the facts of American plans. In the spring of 1919 both the General Staff and the Navy Ministry agreed that Japan's

position had deteriorated as a result of the war. Both Great Britain and the United States had expanded their fleets and if their ongoing expansion plans were completed the relative position of the Japanese Fleet would only deteriorate further. The Navy Ministry received reports of the improvement of American Pacific coast bases but Admiral Katō was not completely sure of American intentions, except he did believe that the U.S. would complete its 1916 building program.[49] Throughout the year of 1921 when the cry for disarmament reached a fever pitch, and while there was the inauguration of a new president in the U.S., the Japanese navy tried to make its position known through articles and interviews in the press. Concerning the naval buildup of the United States, certain officers pointed out that it most assuredly was being undertaken with Japan as a possible enemy and that as long as this buildup went on Japan would continue to build vessels in defense. According to Captain Mizuno,

> The situation between Japan and America today is like that which existed between England and Germany before the World War. Not contenting herself with her powerful navy, America is contemplating a program, the realization of which would place her in a position infinitely superior to Japan in naval power.

To another officer the completion of the American naval program would result in war.[50]

Many members of the press and the navy viewed the American naval buildup as a justification for the completion of the 8-8 fleet; the navy also presented a different

justification for the completion of the plan. In order for the former justification to exist, in the view of the Japan Advertiser, the American daily in Japan, the superiority of the American fleet in future years had to be proven. The Japan Advertiser challenged the position that the American fleet would be superior in the future in a series of articles in March of 1921. It presented and refuted the arguments which Japanese government officials and naval officers made for the completion of the 8-8 plan. The ideas of Japan's leaders were presented quite succinctly at least as those stood prior to Baron Katō's March 24 statement that the 8-8 plan was negotiable.

> Whatever agreement for the limitation of armaments is entered into, Japan must be allowed to complete her eight-eight program.
>
> This eight-eight program is an old scheme of naval expansion, for defense only, demanded by the necessity of protecting the ocean borne commerce of Japan and the coasts of the Empire.
>
> The completion of this program will still leave Japan far behind the United States . . . in naval power even though the United States completes only the expansion program of 1916.[31]

The Advertiser challenged all the points of the Japanese arguments. First it refuted the contention that the American navy would be materially superior to the Japanese navy upon the completion of the 8-8 plan in 1928. It argued in the following way. The Nagato was the only battleship completed by 1921 considered a part of the 8-8 plan. The Mutsu was almost complete and due to be commissioned in 1921. In 1928 Japan would have 16 post-Jutland capital

ships eight of which would have been designed after 1922 when the last ships of the American 1916 building plan were to have been designed. The United States would have 18 post-Jutland capital ships, in 1928, but eight of the Japanese ships, since they were to be designed later, would probably be more powerful than any ships in the United States Fleet.

The Advertiser refuted the argument that Japan needed the fleet to protect her trade. Since America's national income was approximately eight times that of Japan, if she were to spend the same proportion of that income on her naval forces as Japan did on its naval forces she would build a 64-64 fleet. American foreign trade was six times greater than that of Japan so America would need a 48-48 fleet on that basis. The Advertiser stated that in real terms Japan was spending twice as much on its navy as Germany spent in 1914-1915, the years of its greatest war preparations. The paper pointed that in real terms Japan in 1921-1922 was to spend ¥310,000,000 on naval building, the United States ¥180,000,000 and Great Britain ¥126,000,000. Japan was to spend 73% more on construction than the United States. (Of course this ignored the fact that the American appropriations were not near enough to complete its authorized building plan.) The Advertiser maintained that in ships already authorized in 1921, by 1928 the actual first line fighting strength of the two navies would be as follows, assuming

that the length of service of a ship in the first line was eight years.[52]

	America	Japan
Battleships	12	8
Battlecruisers	6	8
Light Cruisers	10	20
Destroyers	120	85
Submarines	60	80

The Japanese navy responded to these charges of the Advertiser through an article written in refutation by Captain Hidaka Kinji, a naval publicist, and published originally in the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo Jiji and in translation in the Japan Advertiser. Captain Hidaka explained the purpose of writing this refutation.

> These articles [the Japan Advertiser articles] were clearly written as propaganda. Intelligent Japanese readers, I firmly trust, will not be misled by such propaganda and begin to doubt the defense plan on which our country has decided. But even rain drops, dropping from the eaves may wear a hole in a stone. Unable to remain silent because of my patriotism, I have decided to write this article in order to point out the mistakes of that paper and at the same time to ask for reader's criticism.[53]

The Captain did not choose to refute the author of the Japan Advertiser articles point by point. He explained the way in which the plan to construct the 8-8 fleet had been determined, why its construction was still necessary, and the misunderstanding of naval strategy by the Advertiser. Once he proved that the 8-8 fleet was necessary for the defense of

the empire, he believed that Japanese would support the program whatever the cost.

> The eight-eight program was planned by our navy immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, but the underlying ideas of it had been conceived long before that. When the Sino-Japanese War was over, Russia, joined by Germany and France menaced our country by means of her powerful fleet, thereby depriving our country of the fruits of victory. . . . Then Russia seized the Liaotung Peninsula, overran Manchuria and her evil hand threatened to stretch out to Korea. Our northern frontiers were seriously menaced. Thereupon, our naval authorities . . . decided upon a modest plan sufficient . . . to repulse an enemy in the neighboring seas, assisted by our geographical advantage, not intent upon taking the offensive, because we had no such power at our command. For that purpose it was deemed sufficient only if the newest and best unit from the strategical point of view was completed. The six-six unit plan which we had at the time of the Russian war was then decided on. The eight-eight plan of today was born of the same ideas that produced the six-six plan.

He wrote that the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War and the development of naval technology provided that a unit of eight capital ships was the most efficient fighting unit.[54]

To him the 8-8 fleet was necessary to defend the trade of Japan. The argument that America's fleet should be larger than the Japanese fleet in the same ratio as the volume of American trade to Japanese trade was without merit.

> There have been examples without number in history of attaching war vessels to a merchant fleet of a certain number as a convoy in order to protect commerce. But that plan invariably has been a failure.[55]

Admiral Mahan, whose doctrines dominated the strategic thinking of the American navy, taught that the best method of protecting commerce either was to destroy the other fleet or bottle it up and obtain command of the seas. Convoys

protected by cruisers were used effectively in the Great War but only as protection from submarines, against capital ships they would be useless. Japan was import-dependent especially in foodstuffs. "The greater portion of foodstuffs imported is rice and other grains, the staple foods of the people."[56] Raw materials such as cotton, rubber, petroleum, and iron were also imported. Since Japan imported these goods from Annam, Burma, China, the Dutch East Indies, Formosa, India, Korea, and the United States it was necessary that the sea power in the area east of the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and the South Seas be controlled.

> The area of these seas is very extensive and the routes of trade cross each another [sic]. Consequently, one unit of eight-eight is not sufficient to control these seas effectively. Much less would it be effective if the unit were smaller than that.[57]

To this naval publicist the 8-8 plan was indispensable to the very existence of the Japanese Empire. He learned the lessons of international existence from the Triple Intervention: if Japan were to claim her rights in East Asia merely being in the just position was insufficient, it was necessary to safeguard those rights with military power to which the nations of the West would yield and which was a legitimate means of furthering the national interest. He was convinced of the support of the Japanese public as long as it could be proven that the 8-8 plan was necessary to safeguard the security of the empire.

Japanese government officials did support the completion of the 8-8 fleet just as the Japan Advertiser asserted. Baron Hayashi declared on December 29, 1920 that Japan had to complete her 8-8 plan and that even then she would only have half of the naval strength of America.[58] Hara Kei in an interview which was in complete agreement with the later statements made by the naval publicist stated that the 8-8 plan was an old program and that its purpose ". . . is to defend our coasts and commerce nothing more. Our experts have decided that our present sea force is insufficient for this. Hence we must keep building."[59] Viscount Katō Takaaki, the leader of the opposition Kokumintō, said he was in favor of disarmament but "Japan's program of eight and eight, which is purely defensive should be exempted if Great Britain, the United States and Japan agree to limit naval armaments."[60] Baron Sakamoto Toshiatsu, a member of the House of Peers, compared the 8-8 plan to the two swords of the samurai:

> . . . the plan of the eight and eight fleet ought to have been proceeded with long ago; it is an indispensable attribute of the national existence of Japan just like the two swords of samurai. England and the United States have more than one pair of the indispensable swords of samurai and yet they want Japan to part with the necessaries.[61]

One more oft-expressed justification for the completion of the 8-8 fleet was the detrimental effect which a stoppage in shipbuilding would have on the naval yards and the capacity for Japan to build in the future. Admiral Sato Testutaro, the commandant of the Maidzuru Naval Station,

followed Ozaki Yukio, the disarmament advocate, in speaking to 1000 people at a rally in Kobe. He explained the need for building ships:

> . . . Japan has only four berths capable of turning out big warships, while England has more than 30 and America 16. In case of an emergency England can lay keels for 30 big warships at the same time and America for 16. Until Japan increases her naval shipbuilding to an extent that she can keep pace with either of these two Japan must keep on building at normal times.[62]

Images and Positions

The Japanese press was both very interested in and afraid of American naval policies from 1919 to 1921.* The cry for disarmament in the Japanese press finally grew to a fever pitch after the introduction of the Borah resolution in the U.S. Senate in late 1920. This called for a reduction of 50% in the naval building programs of the major powers and requested the President to call a disarmament conference.[63] The press reported the movements of the American fleet. Attitudes toward the armaments race were colored by fear, fear of the power of the U.S. stemming from a lack of confidence in the benevolence of America, fear of the expenditures necessary to maintain the Japanese fleet at a level capable of defending the empire in light of the huge projected buildup of the American fleet under the 1916 plan, fear of the resulting tax increases, and of neglect of other

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*The articles and editorials from Japanese language newspapers and periodicals were translated in the English language Japanese dailies. Each day the main editorials from the major Japanese dailies were published in translation.

areas of need such as education, which would be caused by the buildup, and fear of being shut into the home islands of Japan with neither an outlet for a burgeoning population nor markets for exports. The motivation for disarmament was thus twofold. The first motivation was the fear of war resulting from an armaments race--to most people this was the lesson to be learned from the naval race of Great Britain and Germany. They remembered the carnage and destruction of the war, at least as they experienced it vicariously, and were determined to avoid it. Secondly there was a desire to cut expenditures. The two services by 1921 were absorbing half of all government spending and the completion of the 8-8 fleet along with the subsequent army expansion were to keep defense spending very high for a long time to come.

American naval programs were considered unjustifiable, particularly in light of the lessons of the war. According to the Hochi the American building plans placed America in the same place as Germany before the war. The Yorodzu compared President Wilson to Kaiser Wilhelm, "who was generally regarded as the incarnation of militarism, and yet spoke of Pacifism for nearly thirty years after his accession, thus concealing his real ambitions."[64] There was a tendency among some papers to listen to what Americans, particularly Secretary of the Navy Daniels, were saying. They tended to believe the espoused plans of American naval officers rather than the actual appropriations made by the

Congress. The editors of these papers did not trust the United States and believed the worst. They did not dig deep enough to find out that the Congress was not appropriating funds for any new naval construction.

In November of 1920 Harding was elected President. During the period when Wilson was a lame duck president Daniels presented to Congress a $390,000,000 plan to construct a total of 69 vessels which would include two battleships, one battlecruiser, and 46 cruisers. Daniels stated during this session that America needed the largest navy in the world because she had the longest coastline in the world. This has been interpreted as a ploy to influence the Senate to vote for the entry of the United States into the League of Nations but it was not perceived so benignly by some members of the Japanese press.[65] The Kokusai Associated Press reported the expansionist statements of people such as Admiral Sims who declared that the United States must have the most powerful navy in the world before disarmament begins. The Hoochi, the Kokumin, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, the Chuo, and the Yomiuri all wrote editorials questioning the naval expansion programs of the United States.[66] The Yorodzu wrote that America was ". . . dragging other countries into armament competition" and that though the United States espoused a desire for disarmament there was an American need to "have a navy large enough to break up an allied navy and this alliance must not be anything else than the Anglo-Japanese

Alliance."[67] The Yorodzu chose to ignore the fact that naval expansion was not faring well in the Congress in the spring of 1921. The House passed an appropriations bill to which the Naval Committee of the Senate added $100,000,000 in additional funds including money for a base on Guam.[68] The Yorodzu predicted that the amended plan was likely to be passed by the Senate thus proving that the advocates of disarmament in America were in a small minority and that "America has no qualification to propose disarmament."[69] The Yorodzu ignored the fact that these increased estimates were later rejected by the House and the fact that any spending bill amended by the Senate had to be approved by the House.

The Yomiuri claimed that America ". . . is the wayward child of the world. While she defends the Western Hemisphere under the banner of Monroeism she assaults the rest of the world with her capitalism and a navy which she claims is the world's greatest."[70] Even before the 1919 and later building plans of Secretary Daniels, Japanese feared the 1916 building plan, which had been designed to give the United States a navy second to none. The Kokumin felt that America was hypocritical in proposing disarmament, that is, she had no right to present the Borah resolution while at the same time continuing her 1916 building plan.[71] While the Nichi Nichi felt that the United States would destroy by its naval policies and restrictive immigration program the goodwill which Japanese had felt for America for fifty years.[72]

The Chuo, which was the government organ, had one of the most warped perceptions of American plans. It editorialized that America had no right to call Japan militaristic for spending 50% of her budget on the military because America was "devoting 90 percent of her revenue to military expenditures."[73]

The Japanese press image of American naval policies improved during the course of 1921. This coincided with the invitation to the disarmament conference issued during the summer of that year. The attitudes expressed early in 1921 by the Jiji and the Tokyo Asahi foreshadowed the line which the majority took later in the year.[74] The Jiji and the Tokyo Asahi took a more detailed look at the actual programs enacted by the American government. This attitude can best be paraphrased as follows. The American building program is reactionary and ignores the lessons of the Great War. The influence of expansionists can be seen in the appropriations added by the Senate Naval Committee to the House naval appropriation bill. Yet there is still hope for disarmament. The Senate did pass the Borah resolution. The American people are peace-loving as is shown in their newspapers. It is necessary to ignore the voices of expansionists such as Secretary Daniels and use the pro-disarmament feelings to facilitate peace between Japan and the United States. If America agrees to limit its building program, a disarmament agreement can be reached. The Hochi even recognized that the House curtailed the naval expenditures approved by the

Senate and stated that "Americans seemingly have wakened from the folly of indiscriminately maintaining their policy of militant offensiveness which has characterized their national attitude in recent years."[75]

The press followed the movements of the American fleet and American strategic programs. It was rumored in January of 1921 that the United States and Canada were discussing the joint patrol of the Pacific. Although Daniels on January 5 denied the report, the damage had already been done.[76] Once again the press perceived the United States to be pursuing an aggressive policy in the Pacific. During March it was reported that the United States had decided to concentrate its fleet in the Pacific. Although the report was not yet substantiated by March 20, the Kokumin had no doubt that the report was true as it believed that American ambitions lay in the Far East, and all naval officers subscribed to the theories of Admiral Mahan. To the Kokumin the concentration would show American aggressiveness and seriously wound the feelings of the Japanese people. The Yomiuri also warned that Japan should pay serious attention to the concentration of the fleet in the Pacific.[77]

The most threatening of all American naval actions were the fortification and expansion of bases on the Pacific Coast of the United States, at Pearl Harbor, at Guam, and in the Philippines. To nearly all members of the press the only possible reason for such fortification was preparation for a

war with Japan. The United States did expend funds on West Coast bases and Pearl Harbor but money was not spent on Guam nor on the Philippines. There were only 173 Marines stationed on Guam but the Marine Corps had through the reallocation of material slightly improved Guam's defenses. Still it could not serve as a base for the Pacific Fleet.[78] The Japanese press reacted to the fact that money was being spent on the West Coast and Hawaii and reacted as if money were being spent to fortify Guam and the Philippines into naval bases. To the Osaka Mainichi, the Osaka Asahi, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, the Jiji, and the Yomiuri, the United States was hastening to completion great naval bases in the Philippines and Guam. The editorial contained in the May 23 Tokyo Nichi Nichi is most representative of this attitude. The paper stated that

> as a matter of fact, America is hastening the completion of fortifications at Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam and is enlarging her fleet. What does all this mean? The day of a psychological menace is past; it is now the day of a concrete menace.[79]

The "concrete menace" of fortifications in Guam and the Philippines was a figment of the imagination of the press.[80]

After the proposal of the Washington Conference the Jiji Shimpō, the Japan Times, and a Kokusai Associated press staff reporter agreed that the removal of fortifications in the Pacific on both the Japanese and American sides was a prerequisite for the achievement of a disarmament agreement. The Kokusai staff reporter proposed that the United States

grant the Philippines independence, thus obviating the need for the fortification of Guam and removing the threat to Japan.[81] The Jiji doubted that an agreement with such an aggressive country even if it were concluded would endure.[82] Even the editorial staff at the Japan Times, which had been owned by an American named J. Russell Kennedy until being sold to a Japanese group on August 16, 1921, feared the establishment of an American naval base at Guam. The Japan Times recognized however that there was no strategically significant base on Guam already. "A naval base at Guam . . . would offer a substantial menace to this country and call for counter-measures of defense."[83]

The fate of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance meant a great deal to the security of the Japanese Empire and the measures necessary to enable Japan to defend its rights and interests in Asia. In December of 1920 the British government publicly assured the United States that since it had concluded the Peace Commission Treaty with the United States in 1914, although such a treaty was generally not considered to be a general arbitration agreement, the British government considered it to fulfill the terms of Article 4 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and thus the U.S. was not a target of the alliance. The Ambassador to Great Britain Hayashi explained in the January 4, 1921 Times of London that the

> United States has never been thought of by the contracting parties as a country which would ever take or contemplate taking any action likely to threaten

> their territorial rights or special interests in the Far East.
>
> It was, therefore never in the mind of the Japanese government to fight the United States.[84]

Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya reiterated this position in his address to the opening session of the Diet in February of 1921 and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Shidehara Kijūrō, quoted the Diet statement of Uchida in a statement in the New York Times of July 4. The government consistently maintained this position throughout 1921. The government, which desired to renew the alliance, sought to calm the fears of Americans in order to have the alliance renewed. They realized the increasing harmony of Anglo-American relations and did not wish to have their interests in East Asia jeopardized because of it.[85]

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was due to expire during the summer of 1921 and was discussed in July in London at the Imperial Conference at which all the Dominions of the British Empire were represented. The Japanese press reaction to the pending expiration of the alliance and the revelation that America was not and had not been a target of the alliance for several years was quite mixed. The Yomiuri urged that the Diet seek information on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It believed that it was not justifiable that neither the British nor the Japanese governments had announced the fact that the British had given notification in 1914 that they would not fight America.[86] There were three basic

positions taken in the press. The most accommodating toward the American point of view was that taken by the Osaka Asahi which urged the abrogation of the alliance in order to alleviate American suspicion. It stated that since Britain would not help Japan anyway in a war and "it is perceived by Americans that she could be attacked under it [the Anglo-Japanese Alliance] it's best to abrogate and negotiate openly for naval arms reduction."[87] The Tokyo Nichi Nichi, the Yorodzu, the Tokyo Asahi, the Kokumin, and the Hochi all urged renewal of the alliance even if the United States were not a target. In general they felt that the alliance had served its purpose in maintaining the peace of East Asia, was not in conflict with the spirit of the League because it preserved peace, and would not only strengthen European-Japanese friendship but as the Yamato asserted could and should become the pivot for American-Japanese friendship.[88] The third position taken concerning the alliance was that it should be replaced with an entente among Japan, Britain, and the United States. This position was subscribed to by the Chuo, the Osaka Mainichi, and the Chugai Shogyo. The Chugai Shogyo maintained that an entente among the three powers taking the Pacific problems as its objective would successfully solve the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.[89] The controversy over the alliance fizzled out during the year of 1921 particularly as the prospects for the successful start of a disarmament conference became brighter and brighter.

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi, the Tokyo Asahi, the Yorodzu, the Hochi, the Yomiuri, and the Jiji all urged during the first half of 1921 that Japan participate in a disarmament conference and that she accept disarmament in principle. They supported the idea that since the naval strength of a nation was relative, if the United States were willing to decrease its naval building it would be possible for Japan to decrease its naval program. The 8-8 plan was not immutable in their eyes. The Yomiuri recognised the principle of disarmament but found it difficult to believe an agreement could be concluded. It felt that if Senator Borah's proposal were undertaken and all the powers limited their building plans by 50%, the relative strength of the navies would remain unchanged and for Japan to do this when she had yet to complete one single fighting unit of the 8-8 plan would be very painful. The only way for disarmament to be a success was for the powers to "diplomatically solve all disputes which may possibly cause war and . . . establish the foundation of international peace."[90]

The belief that naval strength was relative, which made the acceptance of a disarmament conference possible, also implied that so long as the United States expanded its fleet it was necessary for Japan to do so as well. The Chugai Shogyo was willing to accept a proposal whereby the United States would cease construction after completing her 1916 program and Japan would cease construction after

completing her 8-8 plan. The positions taken by the Osaka Asahi and the Jiji neatly outline the reverse sides of the same thinking. The Asahi stated that Japan was feeling menaced at sea and therefore it needed to concentrate on its naval armaments. But it had two doubts about the naval program: 1) it doubted whether the funds appropriated by the Diet would be enough to complete the 8-8 program and 2) it doubted that the navy program was not behind the times when compared to the programs of the other powers. The Jiji on the other hand looked favorably upon the success of the Borah resolution and maintained that the 8-8 program could be altered if a suitable agreement were reached with America and Britain.[91]

Such a suitable agreement would allow naval expenditures to be decreased. These in 1921 were to consume 32% of total national expenditures while over 50% of the budget was earmarked for the military in general. The desire for disarmament, particularly because of a desire to decrease expenditures on non-productive goods, was embodied in the resolution which Ozaki Yukio introduced into the Diet in February of 1921. He called for Japan to take the lead by proposing a disarmament conference. Ozaki, who was a former Minister of Justice and former member of the Kenseikai, from which he was expelled, saw two reasons why Japan should either initiate a disarmament proposal or accept one if it were received. First, Japan spent too much money on the

military, which resulted in the neglect of other areas. For example, "even by adopting a system of double shift, the public schools cannot accommodate the children of school age." Also, since America was spending only 14% of her budget on the navy while Japan was spending 32% of hers, and in absolute terms America was still spending more than Japan, the strategic position of Japan could only deteriorate.[92] The resolution was defeated by a vote of 225 to 38 in the Lower House of the Diet on February 11.[93] To the Japan Advertiser this defeat was not a defeat for disarmament but a personal defeat for Ozaki. The Advertiser believed that the Seiyūkai voted against him because he was their enemy and the Kenseikai voted against him because they had recently expelled him. Worst of all to the Advertiser, the vote would be misinterpreted abroad as a rejection of any desire for disarmament.[94] The interpretation of the Advertiser neglected the statement by Viscount Katō, the leader of the Kenseikai that ". . . if Mr Ozaki means that Japan should take the lead his proposal loses its greatest value, for Japan is not in a position to take the initiative in this matter."[95] Katō was in agreement with the position of the government. Baron Hayashi stated that Japan was waiting for America or Great Britain to take the lead in proposing disarmament.[96]

The Jiji, the Yomiuri, the Osaka Asahi, and the Osaka Mainichi, all basically supported the position of Ozaki. In

January the Jiji had proposed that Japan take the lead in proposing and promoting a plan for disarmament in order to decrease the risk of war and lessen the tax burdens of the people.[97] Therefore when Ozaki proposed his resolution the Jiji welcomed it.[98] The Osaki Asahi once again came out with the most radical position advocating unilateral disarmament since no one knew how much the completion and maintenance of the 8-8 fleet would cost.[99] The Yomiuri, the Japan Times, and the Osaka Mainichi all believed that Japan needed to disarm because armaments were too expensive. The Yomiuri and the Japan Times were the most emphatic in describing the choices which Japan had to face. The Yomiuri felt that the burden of taxes might cause the Japanese people to become Bolshevized and Japan to become another Russia.[100] The Japan Times clearly stated that Japan had a choice of more schools or more battleships.[101] There were some newspapers which were in support of the guns side of the argument. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi believed that at times when the nation was threatened its defense was more important than anything even if it involved national bankruptcy. It was necessary that Japan complete the projects already begun.[102] The Kokumin and the Chuo also felt that it was useless for Japan to take the lead in disarmament when other nations were augmenting their armaments at a rapid pace.[103]

The business community supported the cause of disarmament on the basis that it would help the growth of the

economy. They recognized the close and complementary economic relationship which Japan had with the United States and did not want anything to jeopardize it. In June of 1921 the Chambers of Commerce of Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Nagoya, Okayama, and Moji-Shimonoseki, the major industrial cities, held a conference in Tokyo. They passed a resolution which in part read:

> . . . it is the urgent business of Japan, which has always stood for the upholding of justice and humanity and the maintenance of peace throughout the world, to conclude a proper agreement with the powers regarding disarmament so that international peace may be guaranteed and that more energy may be devoted to the development of industries.[104]

Even Asano Soichiro, president of the Toyo Kisen Kaisha and owner of the Asano Shipbuilding Company, who recognized the loss of business which would accompany a naval disarmament agreement, came out in favor of such disarmament.[105]

Reactions to the Washington Conference Proposal

The desire for disarmament also existed in America. During the summer of 1921 the American government put out feelers to Japan and Great Britain concerning a conference on arms limitation and Pacific and Far Eastern questions. On Monday evening July 11, 1921 the Japanese government responded affirmatively in regard to the proposed disarmament conference but wished to know the nature and scope of the questions to be discussed under the Pacific and Far Eastern problems section of the conference. The government desired that faits accompli and subjects that were of sole concern to

particular powers not be discussed at the conference, i.e., Yap, Shantung, and Japan's special position in Manchuria and inner Mongolia. The United States replied to the Japanese inquiry that it was impossible for America to define the questions to be considered at the meeting because she was only a participant and that she felt the topics to be discussed should be determined by the representatives of the powers at the conference. Bell, the American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Tokyo, asked Foreign Minister Uchida not to press the inquiry into the scope of the questions to be considered but to accept the invitation unconditionally; opinions would be exchanged before the conference. Under these terms the Japanese government accepted the invitation on July 26.[106] According to the Tokyo Asahi the lack of definition of the scope of the conference was in the opinion of some Japanese authorities forcing Japan either to reject the invitation when she really wanted to accept it or to make a leap in the diplomatic dark.[107]

Before the beginning of the conference the Japanese government attempted to solve those diplomatic issues which it did not wish considered at the conference. It made a proposal to China in an attempt to settle the Shantung issue and during the course of the summer made positive advances in negotiations to settle the Yap dispute. The Japanese government acceded on a number of points in order to reach a settlement. It agreed to the transfer of the ownership of

the Yap to Guam cable to the United States, that the United States would have free access to the cables to Guam, that American treaties with Japan would apply to Yap, and that American missionaries were free to go there. In exchange the American government agreed to recognise that Japan held the mandate for Yap and the other islands it held as Class C Mandates under the terms of the League of Nations.[108]

The balance of Japanese naval opinion came to be in favor of arms limitation. The Committee for the Study of League of Nations Affairs maintained that Japan should make its own disarmament proposals in order to head off the possibility of having a plan forced on them by the Anglo-Saxon powers. In July 1921 the committee reported that since Japan's relative position would only deteriorate if the powers continued on their expansion plans, Japan could accept a disarmament plan which would stop building after the completion of ships under construction, that is, the Mutsu, the Amagi, and the Akagi. The only way this was possible was if there were a restriction on fortifications in the Pacific. The committee pointed out that

> the fact that the Imperial Navy today is readily able to maintain the national defense against the United States Navy depends principally upon the fact that the United States has insufficient advanced bases in the Pacific and the Far East. If . . . the [Americans] were to complete the necessary military facilities . . . our strategic relationship would take on a completely new aspect. The disadvantages [for] the Empire would most certainly be unendurable.[109]

Thus, the navy went into the conference with no fixed position on ratios. With Admiral Katō as the chief

delegate and Hara as Prime Minister they assumed that whatever position was taken could probably be enforced. However on November 4 Hara was struck down by an assassin and Takahashi Korekiyō became the new Prime Minister. His control over political power was nowhere near as secure as that of Hara. The navy went in to the conference intending to uphold the principle of the freedom of the seas and to limit or reduce Pacific fortifications. On November 11, the day before the first plenary session of the conference, the Japanese delegation gave its official statement to the press.

> . . . All the nations of the world with their war wounds still sore are clamoring for peace and . . . Japan, in commonplace with all other countries, is demanding relief from the armament burden that threatens to strangle her industrial development. Our delegation, therefore, is here prepared . . . to join the other nations in any just policy that may remove misunderstanding and any program of arms limitation that assures our national security.[110]

Even the navy was willing to disarm as long as Japan was not threatened by the United States.

The reaction to the American invitation to the conference both in the press and political circles was somewhat ambivalent. The reaction to the proposal to discuss disarmament was generally positive but the reaction to including Pacific and Far Eastern problems within the framework of the conference was negative. The Jiji welcomed the proposal as most timely and useful as it believed nothing was more detrimental to the maintenance of peace than armament competition. The Kokumin, the Yomiuri, and the Yamato expressed doubts over American sincerity and the ability to reach a settlement

of and justification for discussing Far Eastern problems at the conference. The Kokumin was particularly distrustful of American intentions since it believed: "The greater portion of the existing international complication is due to America's dubious attitudes on the decisions made by the Supreme Council [at the Paris Peace Conference] in which America herself did participate.[111]

In political circles the reaction had the same sort of distinctions. Ozaki Yukio welcomed the conference as vindicating his position that disarmament was a worldwide movement and Baron Sakatani felt that Japan was "destined to gain considerable benefit from any international agreement designed for the limitation of armament construction." Viscount Katō of the Kenseikai was quoted as welcoming the conference but was doubtful of any agreement as it involved so many complicated questions.[112] The business community, being so desirous of disarmament, of course welcomed the proposed conference. Fujiyama Raita, President of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, stated that although American naval expansion had made the people nervous if the American proposal were backed up with sincerity it would become unnecessary for Japan to keep up such a large array of warships.[113] Immediately before the Washington Conference a group of businessmen traveled to the United States on a good will visit. Viscount Shibusawa, a leader of this group, expressed the belief that Japan desired disarmament because its people

were convinced that the "future of their national development lies entirely along commercial and industrial lines."[114]

Much of the press, politicians, and government officials believed that Japan was a nation that was misunderstood abroad and that if only she were allowed to explain her position people everywhere would recognize its justness. The Kokumin stated in an editorial that the Pacific Conference would furnish Japan "with an excellent opportunity to explain fully her position to the world and disabuse the people of the erroneous notions they entertain about Japan and the Japanese."[115] While the Yamato wrote that the powers must regard Japan as a "'Germany of the East' deeply wedded to Machiavellism in her diplomacy and in her international policy . . . the Conference will be an excellent opportunity for her to disabuse the world of its errors."[116] The government also welcomed the Conference in the same way. Foreign Minister Uchida issued a statement on August 20: ". . . The Imperial Government is only too glad that it finds in the proposed convention an opportunity of giving expression to its cherished aim and policy, so as to contribute towards the promotion of the cause of peace and humanity."[117] Inukai Ki, President of the Kokumintō, and Prince Konoe, who later was the Prime Minister three times, welcomed the conference in the same vein. The conference was a ". . . golden opportunity . . . for removing all foreign misunderstandings and misimpressions about Japan. . ."[118]

In line with the position that the conference was a great opportunity to explain was the desire that Japan be treated as an equal at the conference. Some were afraid that Japan would not be treated equally and that her special rights in East Asia would not be recognized. Marquis Ōkuma stated:

> . . . Japan should reject any proposal that may impair rights legitimately secured in the Far East, with a resolution to secede from the Conference if the situation requires it . . . The most probable fact is that having failed to put as much restriction on the Japanese position in the Far East as she desired at the Versailles Conference the United States has sought a different opportunity in the form of a Pacific Conference.[119]

The leaders of the Kenseikai also expressed their fears at the possible results of the conference and the subservience shown by the government. Taketomi felt that it was very regrettable that ". . . our Government, like one who consults his superior's pleasure, has queried America as to the nature of the proposed conference, its scope and the like because this is beneath the dignity of the Empire."[120] Viscount Katō stated that Japan must insist on justice and fairness even at the price of isolation since ". . . isolation, because of the cause of upholding justice and humanity is at once glorious and noble."[121] These leaders were afraid of the United States particularly afraid that it would use its vast resources to take away those rights for which Japan had worked so hard and spilled the blood of a hundred thousand soldiers to secure.

The government sought to calm the fears concerning the conference with statements such as the one issued by Hayashi Kiroku, a counsellor of the Foreign Ministry, who stated that "Japan's special position in the Far East is clearly recognized by all the powers and it is hardly conceivable that they will approve of a policy that will run counter to Japan's interest."[122] The Japanese approached the Washington Conference with distinct hope for a disarmament agreement to lessen the threat of war, particularly one which would limit Pacific fortifications, with a desire to be treated as an equal by the two predominent powers of the world, and with a hope to use the conference as a venue for explaining the justness of the Japanese position, but with a fear that Japan might be pressured to rescind what they considered her legitimately acquired rights.

Chapter 2
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament began on November 12. Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United States sent representatives. Since the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States were the only major naval powers in the world, they agreed to exclude Belgium, China,the Netherlands, and Portugal from the discussions on the limitation and reduction of naval forces. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, represented Britain in the bulk of the negotiations. The Japanese plenipotentiaries were the Minister of the Navy Admiral Baron Katō Tomosaburō, the Ambassador to the United States Baron Shidehara Kijūrō, and the President of the House of Peers Prince Tokugawa Iesato. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Hanihara Masanao was also a delegate. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes conducted the brunt of the negotiations for the United States.[1]

The American government began the first plenary session of the conference at 10:30 a.m. on November 12 in Memorial Continental Hall.[2] Although at subsequent plenary sessions the delegates generally presented the official agreements reached during the course of the negotiations and the viewpoints of the various governments, this first plenary session of the conference differed from that of most; the delegates did not merely exchange diplomatic niceties as was expected. Hughes used the meeting as a worldwide forum to present a concrete and detailed American plan for the limitation and

reduction of naval forces. Hughes read his proposal to the delegations and members of the press. He proposed a ten year naval holiday and presented four basic principles for naval disarmament: 1) capital ship building was to be halted 2) naval forces were to be reduced by the scrapping of ships 3) reductions were to be made with regard to the existing naval strength of the powers and 4) capital ship tonnage was to be used as a measure of naval strength, with a proportionate tonnage of auxiliary craft allotted. These auxiliary craft included cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.[3] Hughes proposed that the ratio of naval strength between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan be frozen at the existing level. He included in the strength of a navy those ships whose keels had already been laid down, allotting them strength proportionate to the extent to which they had been completed, i.e., a navy, which possessed a 60% completed 35,000 ton battleship, was given 21,000 tons of capital ship strength. He proposed that the powers halt construction on all capital ships and abandon future expansion plans. Furthermore, they were to scrap all predreadnoughts and capital ships of the second line, and predreadnoughts were not to be considered in measuring the existing strength of a fleet.

Japan was to abandon her 8-8 plan. The Kii, Owara, No. 7, and No. 8 battleships and the Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 battlecruisers, none of which had as of yet been laid

down, were to be scrapped. Japan was to scrap three battleships, the Mutsu which had already been launched but which the U.S. claimed was only 98% complete, and the Tosa and Kaga which were under construction. She was to scrap four battlecruisers, the Amagi and Akagi, which were being built, and the Atago and Takao, for which some materials had been assembled. If Japan accepted the American plan she would reduce her navy by 289,110 tons of new capital ships. Also she would scrap all predreadnoughts and capital ships of the second line, up to but not including the Settsu, for a total reduction of 10 older ships of 159,828 tons. In total, she would reduce her capital ship strength by 448,920 tons, the U.S. would reduce its strength by 835,740 tons, and Great Britain would reduce its strength by 583,375 tons. Japan would retain 10 capital ships, the Nagato, Huiga, Ise, Yamashiro, Fu-So, Settsu, Kirishima, Haruna, Hi-Yei, and Kongo, a total of 299,000 tons. The U.S. would retain 18 capital ships of 500,650 tons and Great Britain would retain 22 capital ships of 600,540 tons. As capital ships reached their age limits, Great Britain and the United States would be able to replace theirs with a total of 500,000 tons, while Japan was allotted replacement tonnage of 300,000 tons. The American proposal limited the displacement of individual capital ships to 35,000 tons. The proposal allotted Great Britain and the United States auxiliary

surface combatant craft of 450,000 tons each and Japan auxiliaries of 270,000 tons. Great Britain and the U.S. were to maintain 90,000 tons of submarines while Japan would maintain 54,000 tons. The proposal limited Japan to 48,000 tons of aircraft carriers and Great Britain and the United States to 80,000 tons.[4]

Yamato Ichihashi, who acted as interpreter for Admiral Katō wrote that Prince Tokugawa, Admiral Katō, and Baron Shidehara were surprised at the boldness of the American proposal.[5] American press members wrote that their faces gave away their surprise.[6] However K. K. Kawakami, who often acted as a propogandist for the Japanese viewpoint in his dispatches to the Boston Globe, wrote that a Japanese knowledgeable in naval affairs said: "The American suggestion goes a little further than we had expected, but the discrepance between it and our idea though material, is not great."[7] The proposal, although it did not mention Pacific fortifications, did not differ drastically from the position which the Japanese navy had adopted in the summer.

Tokugawa was nominally the senior Japanese delegate but Shidehara and Katō were intended by the Japanese government to conduct the negotiations. Prime Minister Hara chose Katō as a delegate as he felt that Katō's influence and prestige would help in countering ultranationalistic criticism of an agreement and that he was the most likely to be

able to unite the navy behind new policies.[8] Early in the conference Shidehara became ill and the principal burden of negotiations fell upon Katō. On November 15, Katō accepted the U.S. proposal in principle at the second plenary session of the conference. However, he stated:

> It will be universally admitted that a nation must be provided with such armaments as are essential to its security. . . . A few modifications will be proposed with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement of the various classes of vessels. . . . I know that the American and other delegations will consider them with the same desire to meet our ideas as we have to meet theirs.[9]

Katō expressed no fear that the American plan was an attack on the security of the Japanese Empire but was not willing, as were none of the other delegations, to accept the American proposal in toto. The delegates negotiated for nearly three months before formally concluding the Five Power Treaty on Naval Disarmament, the Nine Power Treaty on China, the Treaty on the Use of Noxious Gases and Submarines, and the Chinese Tariff Treaty. The Four Power Treaty, the agreements reached between China and Japan concerning the relinquishment of rights by Japan in Shantung, and the agreement to settle the Yap island cable dispute were all concluded during the same time period as the conference, but were not discussed formally within the scope of the conference.

In addition to meeting at the plenary sessions the delegates and representatives met in subcommittees. The

minutes of the meetings of these committees and subcommittees were not recorded verbatim and the speakers edited the published text themselves.[10] Outside of these committees and subcommittees, the delegates met at the State Department and the private residence of the Secretary of State. On November 16 the Japanese delegation presented its "few modifications" to the American proposals. The modifications were as follows: 1) Japan's ratio was to be changed to at least 70%, 2) the Mutsu and the Aki were to be retained and 3) Japan was to have parity in aircraft carriers.[11] On the nineteenth Katō met with Balfour and Hughes. He requested that Japan be allowed to maintain 70% of American strength. He emphasized that the ratio had been determined after long study, that it was supported by the public and all parts of the government, not only the navy, and that the government had responded to interpellations in the Diet on the basis that Japan needed 70%.[12] Katō's negotiating style was typical of pre-World War II Japanese diplomats. His options were limited as the proposals which he made were "the end product, in a sense the lowest common denominator, of protracted domestic haggling and debate." His instructions contained "for one or more of the parties to the original decision, something quite close to its minimum or final position." His use of the intransigence of Japanese public opinion was an example of "perhaps the most common argument raised by Japanese negotiators against concessions."[13]

The Subcommittee of Naval Experts examined the American proposal. The American and Japanese delegations disagreed over the method of defining existing naval strength and thus over the existing strength of the Japanese fleet. The Americans maintained that the status quo in the ratios of naval strength was to be fixed while absolute tonnage was to be reduced. To these naval experts, naval strength included not only ships completed but those under construction in proportion to the degree to which they were finished. The Japanese naval experts asserted that the only real measure of naval strength was the number of ships afloat. They maintained that in case of an emergency ships which were not yet completed could not be considered as part of a nation's strength. The Japanese naval experts led by Vice-Admiral Katō Kanji presented the following table which summarized the difference of opinion:[14]

		American strength	Japanese strength	
			Japanese method of classification	American method of classification
(1)	Pre-Dreadnoughts Dreadnoughts Superdreadnoughts	100%	76%	69%
(2)	Dreadnoughts Superdreadnoughts	100%	70%	67%
(3)	Superdreadnoughts	100%	86%	86%

The Japanese naval experts asserted that no matter how capital ships were grouped, even excluding predreadnoughts in the measure of strength as was done by the American experts, Japan had at least a 70% ratio of the existing strength of the American fleet. The negotiations of the Subcommittee of Naval Experts reached an impasse over these problems. It was not a technical dispute for both sides agreed on the calculations; it was a policy dispute for they did not agree on the basis for those calculations.

While the naval experts were in the process of agreeing to disagree, Admiral Katō, on November 23, cabled four possible plans to his government. These were as follows: 1) to stick to Japan's original proposal 2) to push for a 65% ratio and the inclusion of the Mutsu 3) to accept a 60% ratio and include the Mutsu or 4) to accept the American proposal. The government responded on November 28. It urged Katō to achieve plan 1, or if that were not possible to achieve plan 2, or if plan 2 proved to be unattainable to accept a 60% ratio and the Mutsu only if there were an agreement to reduce or freeze Pacific fortifications. The government urged Katō not to accept the American proposal.[15] On December 1, Katō met privately with Balfour in an attempt to find an area of agreement. He did not present Plan 2. He went straight to Plan 3 suggesting that Japan might be

willing to accept the 60% ratio, in exchange for the U.S. agreeing to relinquish its rights of further strengthening of the fortifications in the Phillipines, Guam, and Hawaii.[16] From Katō's point of view, his plan was much better strategically for Japan and was in agreement with the opinion of a number of naval strategists but not all. His naval experts could not agree; Katō trusted his own judgment.

At a meeting on the subsequent day with Balfour and Katō, Hughes, who recognized that the naval experts had reached an impasse, proposed that the chief delegates attempt to reach a solution amongst themselves. Balfour mentioned the proposal which Katō had made on December 1 concerning the exchange of the acceptance of the 60% ratio for a non-fortification agreement. Katō expressed perplexity at achieving an agreement and maintaining the 70% ratio. He explained that the 70% ratio had been decided upon a long time ago and yet the Japanese desire for disarmament was also very real.[17] To the American government Katō's explanation seemed to coincide with the real situation in Japan. Ambassador Warren reported a campaign in the press which he felt was orchestrated by the navy to build support for the 70% ratio.[18] Warren later reported that in meetings with Foreign Minister Uchida on December 3 and 7 Uchida agreed that the delegates had not been instructed to hold firmly to the 70% ratio, and that in a meeting of the Diplomatic Advisory Council Uchida did not actually mention the ratio.

He had merely reported that the government was considering ratios as part of an overall settlement. This implied to Warren that the government was willing to accept the 60% ratio in exchange for a nonfortification agreement.[19]

Reaction in Japan to the American Proposal

Japanese press reaction to the American proposal was approximately the same as Katō had explained to Hughes and Balfour. The opinions split along fairly predictable lines. The newspapers which had been early disarmament advocates generally supported acceptance of the American proposals. Some, which held ambivalent attitudes toward America, were pleased with the proposals and advocated acceptance. Those which were the most nationalistic, although expressing gratitude at American sincerity, became instantly suspicious again when it became apparent that Japan might not achieve all her demands. There were certain anti-military and anti-naval newspapers that urged acceptance of the American proposals. The Japan Times commented:

> The plan is drastic but the situation to be met requires drastic remedies, not mere palliatives. If there has to be an operation on the Big Navy plans of the Powers let it be a major operation, with the knife driven deep to the seat of the trouble.[20]

The Jiji declared that Japan should readily accept the American plan, while the Tokyo Asahi was impressed by the American attitude. The Yamato saw no reason for Japan to hesitate over the American proposition and declared that

there could be no justifiable objection from anywhere. The Hochi and Kokumin were more circumspect in their reactions. The Hochi, although it felt that American sincerity multiplied the possibility of armament restriction, advised that there be cautious investigation before Japan concluded an agreement. The Kokumin, while lauding the American proposal, was anxious that there be more of a balance of naval strength in the Pacific than that outlined by Hughes.[21]

Although the majority of the navy supported an arms limitation agreement, they still attempted to protect their service and the empire in the way they thought best. Some officers took action to counteract the effect of the American proposal on public opinion and were effective in changing the editorial position of some newspapers. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi quoted the reaction of an unnamed naval source to the American plan. Since the navy had decided to agree to a plan which would allow ships under construction to be completed, the officer characterized the proposal to limit the navies to warships only floating as absurd and stated that it was "absolutely impossible for Japan to consent to such a ridiculous proposal." He did admit that America was making a large sacrifice in battleships and battlecruisers under construction, but if these sacrifices were to be compared to those of Japan:

> where two battleships [the Tosa and the Kaga] are on the point of being launched and one half of two battlecruisers have already been

> built, the figures will readily show that the proposal will be far more advantageous to the United States. . . . Judging from the main principle of naval defense whereby a power must possess at least seven-tenths of the naval strength of its supposed enemy, the proposal of the United States affixing Japan's total tonnage to not more than six-tenths of her tonnage. . . constitutes nothing less than a case of a disregard of the fundamental principles of naval strategy, and to which it is impossible for Japan to give any form of consent whatever.[22]

These officers played on the sympathy which would arise for those thrown out of work by the plan. Vice-Admiral Funakoshi, Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, generally welcomed the American proposal and the huge sacrifices which the U.S. was willing to make, but expressed doubt as to whether an agreement could be reached under the American terms. He stated that three battleships, all nearly complete, would have to be scrapped, the Mutsu which was **almost complete** [italics mine], the Kaga which was to be launched on November 17, and the Tosa which was scheduled to be launched on December 20. He stated:

> . . . it would be a most serious problem if they have to be scrapped. . . . a ten year naval holiday would be a disastrous blow not only to the Naval arsenals but also, to the Kawasaki and Mitsubishi Dockyards.[23]

A Kokusai staff reporter wrote of the overtly negative reaction in the naval ports and dockyards to the American plan. He reported that in Maidzuru, the principal naval port on the Sea of Japan, "seven thousand artisans are faced with a critical situation and the prosperous ports

will be thrown back at least ten years." People in Kure and Osaka were shocked at the American proposal. The question was: how will the Osaka Iron Works, the Kujinagata Shipyard, the Osaka Chain Factory, and the Sumitomo Steel Foundry carry on without navy business?[24]

The Japanese navy kept up its push for a 70% ratio. On November 18 Admiral Baron Yashiro advocated that Japan maintain 70% of the strength of the American navy and declared that Japan was justified in her desire to maintain the Mutsu. He also pointed out that disarmament would not be complete until all advanced naval bases were abolished.[25] Vice-Admiral Katō Kanji, who was the chief Japanese naval expert at the conference, on November 29 told an interviewer that the naval ratio question was one of the utmost concern for the security of nations. "I hope therefore," he continued, "that the United States will accept the seventy percent ratio for Japan, as it is the minimum strength demanded to secure her safety."[26] Although Prince Tokugawa publicly announced that Katō's statements were his own opinions and did not represent the decisions of the delegation, Katō and the others were effective in garnering domestic support for the 70% ratio.[27] Vice-Admiral Katō Kanji was only repeating an earlier statement of Admiral Katō Tomosaburō that:

> Japan is unable to accept the ratio of 60 per-cent because she considers it impossible to provide for her security and defense with any force less than 70 percent. She desires to have the proposed ratio modified so that the relative strength of the three navies will be 10-10-7.[28]

The effect of naval propaganda on press opinions was quite strong. The Jiji, which had advocated accepting the American proposal, later expressed hope that an agreement would be reached after a free exchange of opinion. It believed that America was well aware of the importance of a fair distribution of naval strength and would not take such an absolute opinion that the original proposal was unalterable.[29] On December 1 it expressed a desire that Katō Tomosaburō remain firm on the 70% demand.[30] The Nichi Nichi reported that the Maryland was not really complete and since the Mutsu would have been complete two weeks before the opening of the Washington Conference if the dockyard workers had not struck, the scrapping of the Mutsu while allowing America to maintain the Maryland was unfair.[31]

There were some papers which maintained their positive attitudes even in the face of the initial onslaught of naval propaganda. The Yomiuri wrote that 70% of Katō's brain was military and 30% was that of a statesman. It expressed appreciation of his firm stand on the 70% ratio but hoped that he would not push his contention to the breaking point.[32] The Japan Times and Mail consistently editorialized in favor of accepting the American plan. In fact its editors

felt that the ratio problem was settled before the Tokyo agitation, which forced the delegates to hold out for 70%, began. This agitation was based on an attempt to "inculcate the idea in the minds of the Japanese people that in some way, America was dictating to Japan and was arbitrarily attempting to force undue sacrifices upon the people of this country."[33] The Tokyo Asahi wanted an agreement to be reached due to financial considerations.[34] The Chuo, which was the government organ, broached the possibility of accepting Katō's Plan 3. It stated that if the Pacific were neutralised through the abolition of all insular naval bases and fortifications, Japan would be willing to accept the 60% ratio.[35]

The business community's reaction to the American proposal was generally positive. Ideda Kenso, President of the Tokyo Banker's Association, was quoted by the Hochi. "I do not know if Hughes' proposal is fair or not as I'm not a naval expert but if it is I would greatly welcome the idea of a mutual agreement being concluded without delay." If Hughes' proposal materialises, "excepting for a temporary blow to part of the shipbuilding and steel industry, movement of capital would become greatly facilitated, thereby creating a general [improvement] in industrial and commercial conditions and adding to the general welfare of the Nation."[36] The Japan Times reported that numerous organisations and societies adopted resolutions extremely favorable

to disarmament, e.g., the Alumni Club of Nichiren University and the Tokyo Association for the Reduction of Armaments, which included among its members, Ozaki Yukio and Shimada Saburō, both prominent members of the Diet.[37] Labor also supported disarmament. Representatives of 18 labor organizations met on December 13 in Tokyo and adopted resolutions approving Japan's acceptance of naval limitation and urging the abolition of capital ships. They also urged the reduction of the army by 50%, a shorter term of military service, government responsibility for unemployment resulting from the naval holiday, and proper relief for the unemployed.[38]

The opposition political parties seemed to be less concerned with the substance of the arms reduction negotiations than with the opportunity which the conference gave them to attack the government. Viscount Katō at a party meeting on December 7 expressed a lack of understanding of the whole ratio question. "As the United States and Japan are both independent Powers it seems more reasonable to have their strength evenly balanced." Since the U.S. proposes removing the threat of offensive actions, he asked, why are any defensive weapons needed?

> Why doesn't Japan propose the total destruction of all battleships that are capable of travelling a long distance across the sea to attack other powers? This would then prove that Japan is fully sincere in her wish for peace.

The overtly political nature of his motives are illuminated

by the following remarks. He expressed the desire that more money be spent on education.

> The Government Party lays special importance on higher education but education of the people is far more important. The government should provide at least one-half of the salary of primary school teachers which are said to amount to ¥100,000,000, out of the national treasury funds. . . . The Opposition Party will spare no effort at the coming session of the Diet in pushing the Universal Suffrage bill through, so as to give the smaller taxpayers chances of voting equal with those of the middle class and above.[39]

The Original Four Power Pact

While the controversy over the ratio raged in Japan, the negotiators at Washington turned to the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a Pacific entente. The four power consultative pact, that was concluded among Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States, was designed to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was originally proposed by the Japanese as a tri-partite pact which obligated the adhering parties to consult in case of disputes arising in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific. The Japanese government had decided in May 1920 to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and continued to favor its renewal at the beginning of the Washington Conference.[40] They desired its renewal for four basic reasons:

1) In the post-war era of Anglo-Saxon domination the alliance would enable Japan to avail herself of the use of Britain's help in a dispute with a third country.

2) Abrogation would lead to Britain stationing a powerful naval force in the Far East.
3) Since Japan alone among the powers was of a different race, without the alliance other nations might manifest anti-Japanese sentiments more plainly.
4) Britain's major interests in the Far East were economic and not political and she wanted to uphold the economic status quo.
The government wanted to continue the alliance, with the cooperation of the U.S., in order to prevent Japan from becoming internationally isolated and to consolidate her international status. They decided that if it became difficult to achieve these aims because of the situation at the conference, or if continuing the alliance would not accomplish the government's goals, they would not insist on its renewal; instead they would try to establish a new agreement to reflect an understanding among Japan, Britain, and the United States.[41]

In a meeting of December 2 Katō agreed with Hughes and Balfour to include France in the negotiations for a Pacific agreement.[42] In these negotiations Katō expressed no regret at the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Four Power Pact fulfilled the Japanese desires for an entente to replace the alliance. There were, however, a number of points of disagreement which arose during the negotiations

for the conclusion of the pact. One of these points was discussed on December 6 at a meeting of Katō, Hughes, and Balfour. Katō proposed that the delegates insert a stipulation into the body of the pact concerning the free and peaceful development of commerce in the Pacific. He proposed this in order to make clear the harmonious relationship between Japan and the United States and to let the document embody the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity in the Pacific. Otherwise it was thought difficult to succeed in garnering domestic support for the treaty at that time. Hughes suggested that they place the stipulation in the preamble but Balfour refused to accept its insertion anywhere in the body or the preamble, so Katō withdrew his proposal.

On December 8 Hughes, Viviani and Jusserand for France, Balfour, Malkin, and Hankey for Great Britain, and Shidehara, Katō and Saburi Sadao for Japan met at the home of the Secretary of State to discuss the proposed consultative pact. In discussing the term "insular possessions," Baron Shidehara asked whether these terms would be interpreted to include the main islands of Japan. Hughes responded that he thought the terms would have to be interpreted in that manner. Shidehara then said he wished the main islands of Japan to be excluded from the terms of the pact, as the mainlands of none of the other parties were included.

Balfour retorted that Australia and New Zealand were subject to the terms of the pact and that if Japan were excluded these dominions had to be excluded also. During the course of this rather lengthy conversation Shidehara repeatedly emphasized that as long as the Pacific shores of the United States and Canada were not included, it would not be fair to include the main islands of Japan. He wanted Japan to be treated on an equal footing with Canada and the United States. He also made the point that Japanese public sentiment might take umbrage if Japan proper were included.[43] On the next day at the outset of a meeting of the same persons, Shidehara declared that he was willing to relinquish his claim for excluding the main islands of Japan. On December 10 the powers announced the conclusion of the Four Power Pact and on the thirteenth they signed it. At that time they exchanged no notes concerning the scope of the applicability of the term "insular possessions."[44]

The Japanese press reaction to the proposal of a four power agreement was generally positive. The pact had leaked out in the Jiji Shimpō because Prince Tokugawa, not realizing the importance of the document, had left it in his desk.[45] The Yomiuri, the Jiji, the Nichi Nichi, the Hochi and the Yamato all expressed approval of the proposed entente. The Yomiuri wrote that it had repeatedly emphasized the necessity of an entente to replace and embody all the

principles of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the Franco-Japan Convention, and all the other agreements and declarations for the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, the Open Door, and equal opportunity.[46] To the Jiji the conclusion of the entente relieved the naval conflict of its gravity.[47] The Nichi Nichi also welcomed the entente as it would prove the strongest guarantee of peace in the Pacific.[48] The Yamato expressed its approval but stated that the main question was the sincerity of the powers. It believed that if they were sincere in working out the treaty then all Pacific problems would find their own solutions.[49] The Yorodzu dissented from the majority position. It vehemently disapproved of the proposed entente. To it the entente could never take the place of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and it would be better to abandon the alliance than replace it with a make-believe agreement.[50]

The government after approving the pact attempted to present it in the best light possible. Premier Takahashi issued a statement on December 13. "The conclusion of the Quadruple Entente creates an absolute bulwark against war." President Harding "must be congratulated upon the grandest contribution toward peace that has ever been recorded in human history." This profuse praise of the pact can only be interpreted as an attempt to drown out expected criticism. Yet, this criticism was not forthcoming from the leaders of the Kenseikai who expressed their approval.[51]

The Conclusion of an Agreement to Limit Capital Ships

The day after the conclusion of the Four Power Pact Japan and the United States announced a final agreement concerning the Yap problem. The United States agreed to recognize the mandate rights of Japan over the formerly German islands in the North Pacific, in exchange for certain concessions relating to the operation of Trans-Pacific cables many of which landed at Yap.[52] Subsequent to this the subject of conversations between Hughes, Katō, and Balfour returned to the ratio disagreement. Hughes, due to the information he had received from Ambassador Warren, believed that Katō if he were to hold out for a 70% ratio in capital ships would not have the support of the political side of the government. Warren had reported of a meeting with Foreign Minister Uchida, in which Uchida had said that Japan was much more concerned with fortifications in the Phillipines and Guam than one battleship more or less. Warren then secured the Foreign Minister's agreement that he was correct in assuming that the political side of the government was willing to exchange the acceptance of a 60% ratio in capital ships, for the maintenance of the status quo in fortifications on Guam and in the Phillipines.[53]

After the December 2 meeting, in which the delegates had discussed exchanging the 60% ratio for a nonfortification agreement, Katō had cabled his government informing them of the progress of these conversations and asking for

new instructions. He received these instructions on the 10th. He was to propose that the U.S. and Japan, and other powers if necessary, agree to maintain their existing defense positions in Pacific islands lying a distance from their homelands. Japan proper was not to be included. The exclusion of Hawaii was acceptable only if the U.S. strongly opposed its inclusion. He was told that the government wanted the non-fortification principle stipulated as far as possible in the body of either the Four Power Pact or the naval treaty.[54] In a meeting with Hughes and Balfour on December 10, Katō, following instructions, accepted the 60% ratio in exchange for non-fortification and insisted on the retention of the Mutsu, the newest addition to the Japanese fleet, which had been commissioned on December 1 and was one of the most powerful warships afloat. The Americans listed the Mutsu as 98% complete but Katō claimed that at the opening of the Conference the Mutsu was 100% complete, and by December 10 had already steamed 2500 miles on its own power.* Therefore, it was not a candidate for scrapping but should be used in estimating the existing strength of the Japanese fleet and thereby the ratio between

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*There is confusion as to whether this ship was complete or not. Admiral Coontz of the U.S. Navy told Hughes that they had mistakenly listed the ship as incomplete but Vice-Admiral Funakoshi, Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, among other Japanese stated that the ship had not yet been completed (Dingman, Power in the Pacific, p. 204; above, p. 68 .)

it and that of the American fleet. Katō proposed scrapping the Settsu, the oldest ship which Japan was to retain, in lieu of scrapping the Mutsu. Katō also agreed with Hughes that in such a case the United States and Great Britain should be allowed to increase their strength proportionately, in order to keep the ratios of 5:5:3 always allowing for the age factor. To solve this problem required meetings on three more days. If Japan retained the Mutsu, she would have two post-Jutland ships in that and the Nagato. Therefore, the delegates agreed in later discussions that the United States would be allowed to finish two of its Maryland class ships, giving it three post-Jutland ships, and in exchange would scrap the North Dakota and the Delaware. Great Britain agreed to build two new ships and scrap four of her ships of the King George V type.[55]

The most interesting aspect of this controversy is the way in which Katō did in effect yield to the American position, both on ratios and on the calculation of existing strength in order to achieve a nonfortification agreement. Katō, who had agreed to accept the American principles for arms control which included the maintenance of the relative status quo, by accepting the 60% ratio accepted the premise that the strength of the Japanese fleet was 60% of that of the United States. Also, by agreeing that the retention of the Mutsu necessitated a corresponding increase in the

strengths of the British and American fleets, he accepted the 60% ratio. This is in sharp contrast to the position, taken at later conferences by Japanese delegates, that Japan had never accepted the 60% ratio as such.[56]

On December 15 the agreement was announced to the press. The United States was to have 18 capital ships, Great Britain 20, and Japan 10. The powers were to maintain the status quo of the fortifications on their islands in the Pacific, including Hong Kong, and excluding Japan proper, Australia, New Zealand, the coasts of the U.S. and Canada, and Hawaii. The maximum replacement tonnage was 525,000 tons each for the United States and Great Britain, and 315,000 tons for Japan. The Japanese press throughout 1921 had decried the construction of bases in the Pacific by the United States. In November both the Jiji and the Chuo had proposed that the powers reach an agreement to restrict Pacific fortifications. The Chuo proposed that Japan dismantle its fortifications on the Bonin Islands and the Ryukyus in exchange for which the U.S. would dismantle its Hawaiian bases.[57] Before the tentative capital ship limitation agreement was announced on December 15, all the papers, except the Hochi, reported that Japan would unconditionally accept the 60% ratio.[58] The Hochi reported correctly that Japan would accept the 60% ratio in exchange for a nonfortification agreement in the Pacific. It attacked the government for accepting such a plan. The paper declared that the two issues of the

naval ratio and Pacific fortifications were separate and that it was necessary for Japan to insist on a 70% ratio. It wrote that if Japan failed to secure such an agreement, non-fortification would never mitigate the menace to which Japan would be exposed in the future.[59] The press reaction to the agreement was generally positive with a few exceptions. The Kokumin wrote that the government gave in because it feared that insistence on a 70% ratio might lead to the Washington Conference reaching an abortive end, and that Japan would be shouldered with the blame. It stated that this would be the height of absurdity indeed.

> Theoretically speaking the sovereignty and the right of independence of each country must be equal in value, and consequently the strength of armament to defend them should be on an equal footing. . . . Our authorities are surprisingly cowardly in dealing with foreign countries.[60]

The Yorodzu wrote that:

> Japan had better have made no amendment at all, if she is to follow America's dictation after all. . . . The oppression of the Western countries will hereafter be centered upon Japan and other Far Eastern countries, it must be remembered. . . . America has, indeed, made fools of the Japanese delegates. . . . the world will in future [sic] be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon races, and no other race will have a right to meddle with world affairs, either politically or economically. . . .[61]

The business community was generally happy at the conclusion of an agreement between the nations. They desired that taxes be reduced. Fujiyama Raita, president of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, expressed his views on where

the saved money could be used. He said that if the army were reduced in the same proportion as the navy ¥400,000,000 could be saved. He suggested that nearly half be used to abolish taxes, which were considered to retard industrial progress or to interfere with the national well-being. The balance could be used for the development of industry and the improvement of the standard of culture.[62] The political parties and government leaders waited until formalized agreements had been reached and the opening of the Diet before they expressed their opinions on the results of the Washington Conference.

The reaction of the Japanese navy to the conclusion of a capital ship limitation agreement was generally positive. Admiral Katō, who realized that a war with the U.S. had to be avoided, reacted positively to the conclusion of the agreement. According to Katō's interpreter, Katō felt that the agreement removed the basis for distrust among the powers, relieved the burdens of taxation, and that after ten years of freedom from mistrust due to the naval holiday, people might decide to stop the construction of naval armaments completely.[63] Katō's reaction was fairly typical; the balance of opinion in the navy was that bases were the key to the maintenance of the defense of the empire. However, some members of the navy did not react favorably to an agreement which they felt might decrease the size,

power, influence and prestige of the organization. Lt. Commander Ishimaru's opinion is representative of this view. He thought that the treaty hurt Japan. He thought that it gave the United States and Great Britain navies capable of offensive actions but did not give Japan a navy capable of defensive action. He had three basic objections: 1) the ratio made Japan insecure in the Pacific 2) since American ships were better than Japanese ships, the agreement gave Japan a disadvantageous fleet organization and 3) Japan had sacrificed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and under the terms of the Four Power Pact was made a copartner in guaranteeing the security of Guam and the Phillipines. Officers realized that they would be faced with a decrease in the number of naval personnel. An officer stated in December: "We have no illusion as to what is ahead of us. A new era has dawned upon the Pacific and the world. We must ourselves be ready and willing to scrap ourselves."[64]

Controversies: Fortifications and Semantics

Two more controversial issues showed the extent to which the Japanese delegates desired equality of treatment. One was a continuation of a previously settled problem, while the other was a new one. After the conclusion of the tentative three power agreement on capital ship reduction, the powers moved the negotiations for naval reduction to the Subcommittee of Fifteen on Naval Limitation. Here France and Italy presented their positions. When it became apparent

that progress might better be facilitated by having more of the delegates present at the meetings, the powers agreed to move the negotiations to the Committee on the Limitation of Armament. Here they reached a tentative agreement, subject to final drafting of a treaty, in which both France and Italy accepted ratios of 35% of the British and American fleets. Britain in early January had pushed for the inclusion of the Bonin and Amami-Ōshima Islands in the islands which Japan agreed not to fortify. The British delegates proposed to define the area of nonforfication by a map to a limited portion of the Pacific. In effect the area, which it proposed to include, excluded all the British mandate islands south of the equator, including New Guinea, and Singapore. On January 10 the heads of the delegations met to discuss the draft of the treaty. Both Hughes and Balfour wished to define the area of nonfortification in Article XIX of the agreement but Katō refused. He stated that he was willing to make a declaration indicating that the Bonin Islands, the Amami Ōshima Islands, the Pescadores, and Formosa were not to be fortified. However since the Bonin and Amami Ōshima Islands were administered as part of Japan proper, and as it had already been announced in the press that Japan proper was to be excluded from the terms of the agreement, he could not agree to change it. Hughes and Balfour both urged that the area be defined within the treaty. Katō said he would have to consult his government in order to change the body

of the agreement.[65]

In Japan there was a controversy over the British proposal. In December the navy's desire to maintain and improve fortifications in the Bonins and in the Ryukyus had been reported. An unnamed high-ranking naval officer stated that since these islands were a part of Japan proper the improvement of their bases would still be permissible under the terms of the agreement.[66] The army expressed concern at the British proposal for it would halt future southern expansion. It also feared the ongoing shift in the domestic political power balance. "In November the Taiyo, a leading journal of opinion, published a long article which demanded the abolition of separate service ministries and the establishment of a single ministry of defense."[67] In fact Prime Minister Takahashi had also called for the abolition of the general staffs before he became head of the government and the slogan of the Kokumintō was "army retrenchment." Also, they planned to introduce a resolution into the Diet in February calling for a 50% reduction in the strength of the army.[67] Foreign Minister Uchida succumbed to army pressure and accepted its position on fortifications.[68]

Katō received instructions from his government in a series of telegrams. In a telegram of January 14, the government expressed shock at a plan which would have Japan not only maintain the status quo in the defenses of the Bonin and Amami-Oshima islands, but also in islands which ranged

from almost immediately south of Kyushu to the equator. Yet at the same time, the U.S. and Great Britain were trying to exempt their islands

> Midway and the Aleutian Islands in the case of the United States, and New Guinea and all other islands south of the equator in the case of Britain, from the region agreed upon. Anybody can see how unfair this is. Especially in the British case, it will be utterly impossible to convince our people as to the grounds on which such an arbitrary delimitation of area can be based. . . . this problem is now turning out to be a grave matter bearing upon the susceptibilities and morale of the Japanese people.[69]

The government expressed fear at the result of acceptance of the plan in view of the sacrifices which Japan had already made in including Japan proper in the body of the Four Power Pact and in accepting the 60% ratio. If it accepted the plan,

> the Government would lose support and eventually find it difficult to maintain their position. Of course, in view of the seriousness of the situation, what happens to a government may not matter. But to accept the British plan would surely result in inciting public opinion and intensifying our nation's anti-American and anti-British feelings.[70]

Katō then presented a direct challenge to the government: "if Tokyo could not agree quickly on a compromise on island fortification limits, he and the entire delegation would have no choice but to resign."[71] The government, which was faced with domestic political pressure, had to maintain a hard line to shore up its political power, but Katō in the style of most pre-World War II Japanese negotiators was much more

accommodative to foreign powers.[72] Katō convinced the army leaders to change their minds on the issues and subsequently Takahashi and Uchida gave way.[73]

On December 20 the government sent new instructions. These stated that it might be possible to stipulate that the Amami-Ōshima Islands and the Bonins were not to be fortified in the body of the treaty, as long as the delegates made it clear that these islands were a part of Japan proper.[74] With these new instructions it became possible for the powers to reach an agreement concerning Article XIX. In its final form this article named the islands which Japan agreed not to fortify any further, and specified areas for those of Great Britain and the U.S. The United States agreed not to further fortify its Pacific possessions including the Aleutians and excluding Hawaii. Great Britain agreed not to fortify its Pacific possessions, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except those islands adjacent to the coast of Canada, Australia and its territories including New Guinea, and New Zealand. Japan agreed not to fortify the Kuriles, the Bonins, the Amami Ōshima Islands, the Ryukyus, Formosa, and the Pescadores.[74]

All the papers reported that the Cabinet had decided on January 16 that the Bonins and the Ryukyus were not to be included in the scope of the nonfortification agreement unless the United States agreed to maintain the status quo in Hawaii.[75] In fact Katō had mentioned this problem to

Hughes when he first proposed the inclusion of the Ryukyus. Katō stated it would upset domestic public opinion. They did reach a compromise when the U.S. agreed to include the Aleutians. The Kokumin reported correctly on January 23 that Admiral Katō had threatened to resign if the government did not accede on the fortification issue.[76] There was a negative reaction to these reports. The Tokyo Asahi declared that the proposed restriction of Pacific fortifications was nothing less than a restriction of Japanese instead of Pacific fortifications, and that no localized restriction of Pacific fortresses could prove an effective assurance of a lasting peace in the Pacific.[77] While the Hochi after it learned of the decision to agree to the restriction of fortifications attacked it as a "humiliating concession" and a "gross diplomatic blunder."[78]

When the Japanese delegates accepted the inclusion of Japan under the term "insular possessions" of the Four Power Pact, they succumbed to British pressure and ignored the instructions of their government. They cabled for ex-post facto approval but the Japanese government refused in instructions of December 17. The instructions stated that Japan could not consent to being treated differently than the other three powers. They cited an example of a potential problem; if Japan were involved with difficulties in relation to her mainland with a third power, she would be bound to

discuss it with the other three powers, but if one of the other three countries were in a similar situation in regard to their mainlands, they could act without consulting Japan or the other signatories of the pact. The government instructed its delegates to remove Japan from the scope of the treaty, even if this necessitated removing Australia and New Zealand as the British and Americans contended it would.[79]

On January 14 Shidehara met with Hughes to discuss the inclusion of Japan under the terms of the Four Power Pact. Once again he brought up the previously made proposal for an exchange of notes to say that, as far as Japan was concerned, the term "insular possessions" applied to Karafuto, i.e., the southern half of Sakhalin, Formosa, the Pescadores and the mandated islands. Many Japanese considered it insulting that others even make a moral commitment to safeguard the territorial integrity of Japan. To them Japan could defend herself. The Bonin and Amami-Ōshima Islands were excluded as they were definitely considered a part of Japan proper and therefore need be defended only by Japanese. Hughes, recognizing that the Senate might frown upon an agreement which might necessitate the U.S. to come to the defense of Japan, agreed to exclude Japan proper. The powers exchanged notes which defined the islands to be included under the term "insular possessions."[80]

Auxiliaries: A Vexing Problem

Although the original American proposal included a plan to limit the overall tonnage of submarines and auxiliary crafts, the powers were unable to reach an agreement. The irreconcilable differences of Great Britain and France were largely the cause of this failure. The Main Committee on the Limitation of Armament conducted the negotiations for the limitation of auxiliary crafts. At the December 22 meeting of this committee Lord Lee of the British Empire urged the abolition of the submarine. He argued that submarines were a menace to the merchant marine and were not effective in defending a coastline. Furthermore, he believed the use of submarines against the merchant marine to be unlawful and immoral and that they were not good for communication. France, Italy, and Japan all disagreed with the British position on the usefulness of submarines; but Japan and Italy were willing to agree to a limit on their overall tonnage acceptable to the U.S. and Great Britain, France however was not. The Japanese position on submarines illuminates their views on the weapons which they considered necessary for defense. Hanihara Masanao emphasized that Japan considered submarines legitimate weapons of self-defense which were no more atrocious than poisonous gas or air bombs. For an insular nation like Japan they were an effective deterrent because they could be used as movable mines for coastal defense and were relatively inexpensive.[81]

The Japanese argument for the retention of submarines was representative of the post-war controversy over the changing relative value of naval weapons. Since many strategists felt that wartime developments gave advantages to the nation in the defensive position and since the only potential naval enemy of Japan was the United States, it was necessary for Japan to maintain her defensive fighting power as much as possible. Admiral de Bon of the French delegation pointed out that France lost three battleships, five cruisers, and other ships, in all 130,000 tons of warships during World War I to submarines, and that submarines had been used defensively both to protect the coast of Germany and in the Dardanelles.[82]

French and British disagreement over auxiliaries precluded an agreement on their limitation. Sarraut argued that since France was limited to five capital ships of 35,000 tons each, it was absolutely necessary for the defense of the country and its colonies that she maintain 330,000 tons of auxiliaries and 90,000 tons of submarines. Balfour branded the French proposals as unreasonable. He asked if such a large tonnage of auxiliaries were necessary for a fleet with capital ship tonnage of 175,000 tons, what would be necessary for a fleet with 500,000 tons of capital ships? The Japanese accepted the American proposal in general concerning auxiliary craft tonnage. In effect Japan accepted a 60% ratio in auxiliary tonnage.[83]

Although the powers concluded no general agreements to limit the tonnage of submarines and auxiliary crafts, they did reach agreement on a number of points. The delegations agreed that no ship, except a capital ship or an aircraft carrier, was to displace more than 10,000 tons and that these ships were not to be armed with guns with a caliber larger than 8 inches.[84] They agreed to restrict the use of submarines. It was stated that submarines had to obey the prevailing international rules in regard to attacking a merchant vessel. They had to ascertain the character of a vessel and provide safety to its passengers and crew before sinking the ship. In view of the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers in light of the previous stipulations, the powers agreed that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers was binding among them.[85]

On December 30 Hughes again presented the original American proposal concerning aircraft carriers. The substance of which was that total tonnage was to be 80,000 for the United States and Great Britain, and 48,000 for Japan. No power was required to scrap excess tonnage until replacement began. All carriers whose keels had been laid down before November 11 were allowed to be completed. A power could build up to its limit and an aircraft carrier was not to carry guns with a caliber larger than 8 inches.[86] Katō

believed that Japan required three aircraft carriers. He called the attention of the committee to:

> the insular character of his country, the extensive character of her coast, the location of her harbors and the susceptibility of her cities, built of frame houses, to easy destruction by fire if attacked by bombs. All these necessitated Japan's having a certain number of airplanes and "portable airplanes", that is to say, a means of distributing airplanes in such a manner as adequately to meet her local needs. Japan could not have an enormous number of airplanes to be stationed in all places where they were needed because she was economically incapable.[87]

During this meeting Great Britain demanded 135,000 tons, Italy 54,000 tons, and France 60,000 tons of aircraft carriers. Hughes, recognizing that the relative demands of the respective powers were in keeping with the 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 formula, proposed that Britain and the U.S. be allowed to maintain 135,000 tons, Japan 81,000 tons, and France and Italy 60,000 tons of aircraft carriers each. All the delegations agreed to this proposal. Once again Japan accepted a 60% ratio of American strength.[88]

Shantung

The problem which required the longest time to be solved was the Shantung issue. China had refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, insisting upon the direct return of Shantung by Japan. The conclusion of an agreement between China and Japan required three months of negotiations in Washington and the good offices of Hughes and Balfour. The nations signed an agreement on February 4 whereby Japan agreed to transfer the Shantung railway to China and China

agreed to pay for the railway in her own treasury notes within fifteen years. They agreed that the two extensions of the railway should be offered to the Four Power Consortium as a common undertaking, that the mines along the railway were to become the property of a company formed under a special charter of the Chinese and Japanese governments, and that the area of the former German leased territory of Kiaochow would be opened to foreign trade.[89]

Details of these negotiations are outside of the scope of this paper, but attitudes toward China were highly related to attitudes which Japanese held toward the West. The Japanese were extremely sensitive to any interference in their bilateral relations with China. Statements of Prince Tokugawa and Hanihara Masanao were indicative of this sensitivity to interference. On the way to the Washington Conference while in British Columbia, Tokugawa emphasized the desirability of cooperation with the U.S. However, he continued, "generally speaking, I hope that the questions at issue between China and Japan will be kept out of the Conference because it is better to solve these questions between the nations involved, directly."[90] Hanihara in late December 1921 reiterated the position that the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 could only be considered by Japan and China with no outside interference.

> The twenty one demands of the treaty must not interfere with the treaty rights of the United States or other nations. If there is any question concerning the treaty it is one to be dealt with directly between the Chinese and Japanese Governments.[91]

The Japanese felt that they were being treated unfairly in China. The Japan Times, which was decidedly liberal and pro-Western, agreed. It also expressed general approval of the Open Door Policy. All in all:

> it is apparent that everything that may truthfully be charged against Japan in China today may, with equal truth, be charged against almost every other Power, and that, everything considered, the Powers have only done in China what was necessary if any trade with that country were to be carried on. . . . Japan . . . which has the most of any Power to gain from the strict application of the principle of the Open Door, readily agrees to that principle and the principle of territorial integrity for China proper.[92]

Matsuoka Yosuke, future Foreign Minister of Japan, wrote an article in the Manchurian Daily News in which he discussed American-Japanese-Chinese relations. He criticized America for singling out Japan's actions in China. He pointed out that America's hands were dirty too. While she accused Japan of militarism she had

> annexed Arizona, New Mexico, Cuba, and the Phillipines. . . . There can be no comparison between Japan's position in the Far East and that of the United States to the same. The American interests do not go beyond the commercial and industrial limits, whilst those of Japan are closely bound up with her very existence. . . . In this age of strenuous life, power and strength count, and those equipped with the highest shares of these attitudes are entitled to the foremost places in the congress of nations.[93]

The press reaction to the negotiations over and the conclusion of an agreement concerning Shantung, and to the general agreement relating to principles to be followed in dealing with China was mixed. In November it had been reported that the Japanese delegates were willing to agree to Japanese withdrawal from Shantung and Kiaochow, if Great Britain withdrew from Weihaiwei and if the powers recognized the principle that Japan had special interests in Manchuria owing to her nearness and railway investments.[94] The Yomiuri expressed opposition to the return of the Liaotung Peninsula arguing that Japan's lease there was entirely different from Great Britain's lease of Weihaiwei. The paper emphasized that 22% of all Japanese residents abroad lived in Shantung, and that Japan had growing interests in southern Manchuria including railways, mining rights, and trade.[95] The Yamato felt that the Chinese people would receive strong moral stimulus, to say nothing of material benefits, from the abolition of consular jurisdiction and foreign post offices, as well as from the retrocession of leaseholds. It stated that it was the sincere desire of the Japanese people that China become a perfectly independent state but that it depended on the will and action of the Chinese themselves.[96] The reaction to the actual conclusion of an agreement was also mixed. The Tokyo press generally welcomed its conclusion and expressed the belief that it would enable the Chinese authorities to devote more attention to the improvement

of China's domestic conditions.[97] The Nichi Nichi welcomed the agreement although it wondered why the Chinese did not appear to recognize the sacrifices that Japan had made. The Yamato, the Yorodzu, and the Hochi attacked the agreement. The Yamato, changing from its earlier position, said that Japan had been humiliated and treated like a defendant in a lawsuit, while the Yorodzu felt that Japan was now obliged to make huge sacrifices for the sake of America.[98]

Reactions to the Conclusion of the Washington Conference

After the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement the Washington Conference officially closed. Naval competition in capital ships was halted. An agreement was in place to safeguard the peace of the Pacific in the instrument of the Four Power Pact. The United States and Japan had settled all the outstanding diplomatic disputes between them and the powers had, nominally at least, agreed on a joint policy and set of principles to be followed in regard to China. The conference was not as successful as some had hoped but largely accomplished its purpose; it stopped the huge capital ship buildup which was creating such a large drain on the finances of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. Vast amounts of money were freed for new uses. The U.S. and Japan opened a period of calmness in their bilaterial relations; in the minds of the Japanese there could be no justifiable excuse for any Westerners to hold an image of Japan as a militaristic power. She had proven her good faith.

The Japanese Diet began its work in January of 1922. The opposition used the Diet as a forum to attack the policies of the government. Viscount Katō attacked Admiral Katō's acceptance of the 60% ratio claiming that the admiral either accepted a ratio below the minimum required for defense or that he was insincere when he argued that Japan required a 70% ratio. Viscount Katō stated: "If America, as Mr. Hughes declares, has no intention of taking an offensive attitude, what necessity has she for insisting on her naval strength, at the rate of 10 to 6 instead of 10 to 7?"[99] At a January 24 session of the Diet, Mochizuki Kotaro of the Kenseikai attacked the foreign policy of the government. He characterized the Washington Conference, the Dairen Conference, and the Siberian Expedition as complete failures. He said that Japan played a poor second at Washington and lost an opportunity in not insisting on the wholesale destruction of Pacific fortresses.[100]

The government had to secure Privy Council approval of the agreements signed in Washington. Such being the case the Seiyūkai and government officials touted the results of the Washington Conference. Three members of the Seiyūkai, who had returned home from Washington, expressed their approval of the conference. Hayashi Kiroku, a counselor of the Foreign Ministry stated: "As Japan's future diplomacy will probably have to rest to a great extent upon a

mutual understanding with the United States, it is indeed gratifying to feel that a peaceful relationship has been consolidated at the Washington Conference between the United States and Japan."[101] The government responded to Diet interpellations concerning the agreements. Foreign Minister Uchida defended the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by the Four Power Pact. He stated that the "Quadruple Entente is in line with world advancement and enlarges the scope of international friendly relations. The Japanese Government feels greatly satisfied."[102] Premier Takahashi even denied in the House of Peers that the Government had ever insisted on the 70% ratio, or that the ratio had been determined as the minimum necessary to the nation's defense. He stated:

> The Japanese naval experts after finishing their investigations, came to the conclusion that Japan should be allowed a seventy percent ratio; and even though the Government now regards that ratio as more adequate to the nation's needs, it has all along been cognizant of the fact that an absolute stand on this proportion would be ill-advised, if the different Powers concerned were to reach an agreement. And still more ill-advised would it be, in view of the fact that a naval ratio alone could not be regarded as an absolute guarantee of safety and that the desired adjustment might be required in other directions, for example by lightening the national tax burdens through putting a check on the race for unproductive armaments.[103]

Baron Shidehara in a statement to the final plenary session of the conference expressed his opinions on its results.

> Competition in naval armament, ruinous to national welfare and harmful to international peace, is now a matter of the past. The relief from tension is provided by the agreements reached by the Conference for the limitation of naval armament, for the suppression of the brutal practices of warfare, and for the definition of a policy on matters relating to China. . . . Freed from suspicion by frankness, assured of peace by good will, we may devoutly give thanks for the opportunity given by the Washington Conference, which, we believe, ushers into a troubled world a new spirit of international friendship and good understanding.[104]

The naval arms agreement was a success. It improved the strategic situation of Japan by saving the Mutsu, limiting Pacific island fortifications, "and leaving the navy free to build submarines, airplanes, and aircraft carriers."[105] Katō, "showered with praise upon his return to Japan, scarcely three months later . . . became the logical choice of the elder statesmen as Prime Minister."[106] The Finance Ministry proposed huge cuts for the navy in its fiscal 1922 budget. They announced these figures on December 20, 1921. The navy was slated to receive ¥258,492,349 a decrease of ¥92,746,715 from the previous year. This constituted only 16% of total revenue as compared to 32% the previous year. The army was also due for retrenchment. It was to receive ¥56,042,645 a decrease of ¥23,828,546 from the previous year.[107] Katō made statements in meetings with Balfour in Washington that although before the navy could get almost anything for which it asked, the situation had changed. Labor organizations, the opposition parties, newspapers, the government party the public, and business organizations

all had plans for the use of saved funds. Spending on battleships was considered a waste of money unless there were a distinct threat to the empire; this threat was largely removed by the arms reduction agreement. The Nichi Nichi suggested four ways to use the saved funds: 1) national resources should be fostered 2) the labor problem should be attended to 3) industries should be developed, particularly those which engaged in foreign trade and 4) railway rates should be reduced.[108]

CONCLUSION

The images which Japanese held of American policies were varied; these images depended on American actions, the words of American government officials, the Japanese perceptions of their own role in the world, and the position of an individual within Japanese society. These images changed during the year of 1921 in relation to changing American actions and in relation to the changing Japanese domestic situation. The images generally improved during the course of the year and by the end of the Washington Conference were quite positive.

Japanese naval officers felt that they had a duty to ensure the security of the empire. To many this necessitated that the 8-8 plan be completed. After all, the plan had been determined to be necessary to the security of the empire in light of the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, a war which catapulted Japan to the status of an international power. It also had been determined that a 70% ratio of the strength of an attacking fleet was necessary to ensure victory. The completion of the 8-8 fleet would not only improve strategic security, but provide domestic power and prestige for the navy. American naval policies after 1916 improved the possibility of the completion of the 8-8 fleet. Japanese naval men believed that, as the United States completed its 1916 building plan, the strategic situation of Japan would only deteriorate. Therefore as long as Japanese believed that the

United States was continuing its 1916 program and fortifying Pacific bases the 8-8 fleet was necessary.

The press feared American naval construction. Much of the press, since it did not trust the United States, believed the worst. It treated unauthorized plans for naval construction and fortifications as if the fortifications were operational and as if the battleships were afloat. These newspapers represented a segment of opinion which did not understand why the United States needed a navy equal to the world's greatest. Japan was allied with the power which had held the trident and this alliance had served Japanese interests well. Japanese also felt that Japan had served British interests by participating in the Great War and thereby deserved its share of the spoils, i.e., Shantung and the South Seas islands. The papers felt that the U.S. was unwarranted in attempting to change the balance of power. It had no right to desire abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and no need to build such a huge navy. Moreover, a people, who had conquered an entire continent and then were pushing across the Pacific Ocean, had no right to place restrictions on the expansion of a densely populated country by refusing to allow immigration, by interfering in Japan's bilateral relations with China, or by opposing the abolishment of racial discrimination in international relations.

The early disarmament advocates did not approve of the domestic effects of naval competition, a competition which

was due to American belligerence. Ozaki Yukio felt that Japan needed primary schools much more than she needed battleships. When he advocated the convening of a disarmament conference he had the support of such newspapers as the Jiji, the Yomiuri, the Osaka Asahi, and the Osaka Mainichi. Though other papers did not support Ozaki's Diet resolution they, along with labor organizations and the business community, cried out for an agreement which would reduce naval spending.

Thus, before the proposal of the Washington Conference, Admiral Katō, realizing the deteriorating strategic and domestic political situation, had stated that the 8-8 plan was negotiable. American proposals at the disarmament conference were viewed in a positive manner by the government and the business community in particular. Prime Minister Takahashi, Ambassador Hayashi, Ambassador Shidehara, and Admiral Katō all expressed positive views on American proposals for and the conclusion of an arms limitation agreement. These government leaders knew that the future peaceful economic development of Japan rested on a sound relationship with the United States. They were, of course, the ones who had to deal with the increased post-war power of the United States on a practical level; they could not merely attack the policies of America as affronts to Japan, as nationalistic press organs such as the Yorodzu and the Kokumin did. They felt that they could pursue their own policies in Asia as long as they settled outstanding differences with the United States, especially the naval problem,

difficulties over the island of Yap, and policies toward China. Hara Kei, particularly, viewed the American proposal for an arms limitation conference as a boon for him. He would be able to curb defense spending without decreasing security and this would allow him to spend more money on pork-barrel projects, such as education, and silence his critics.

These critics included the business community, which like most business communities, wanted lower taxes. They more than any other group realized the vital importance of the Japanese-American economic relationship and wished for taxes to be reduced so that Japanese products would be more competitive both in China and in the West. Believing this, they worked for the improvement of Japanese-American and Anglo-Japanese relations and interpreted American actions in a positive light. They pushed for disarmament and welcomed it when it came. Viscount Shibusawa's group of leading businessmen, who went to America during the same period as the conference, expressed in as many places as possible, Japanese friendship for the United States and their pure motives of economic expansion which necessitated disarmament.

The majority of the navy was in favor of a disarmament agreement which would ensure the security of the empire. This security depended on the strength of the United States. Therefore officers advocated that Japan maintain naval strength at a 70% ratio of the strength of the American fleet. Some members of the navy did not wish to see the

size of their organization decrease and others were truly worried about the detrimental effect of a naval holiday on shipbuilding capacity. Admiral Katō determined that his plan would guarantee naval security and with his towering prestige due to his actions at the Battle of Tsushima was able to override naval dissension and win approval for his actions. Still, these actions did preserve the option of the construction of submarines, aircraft carriers, and auxiliary crafts.

The opposition political parties expressed suspicion of the United States especially when it served their own purposes. The statements made by Viscount Katō are representative of this. He expressed dismay at the agreement to accept a 60% ratio but also expressed a desire to decrease naval spending, even proposing that the powers agree to abandon offensive capital ships. The government party opposed the passage of the universal suffrage bill but the Kenseikai supported it. The Kenseikai, hoping to garner public support, took positions which both defended Japanese sovereignty and equality with the West and promised to lower the tax burdens of the people.

Japanese sovereignty and equality with the West formed the basic framework from which Japanese viewed the world. From the time they undertook to remove external control of their tariff system in the late 19th century, Japanese strove to define their own position in the world. The

controversies over the fortification issue, the Four Power Pact, the Shantung agreement, and immigration all illuminate the Japanese desire for equality. Admiral Katō, even though he agreed to the inclusion of islands which were part of Japan proper in the Pacific area of nonfortification, found it very difficult to acknowledge that he had within the body of the agreement. He wanted Japan to be, in appearance at least, treated equally by the world powers. The Japanese government would not agree to include Japan proper under the terms of the Four Power Pact. Japanese could not allow the perception to exist that they were being treated differently than the other Pacific powers. This feeling of being treated unequally was prevalent in perceptions of Western, particularly American views of Japanese policies toward China. Japanese felt that they needed a place from which to obtain raw materials and a place to expand. They did not deny the American right to expand in the Western Hemisphere. They only asked for what they believed to be equal consideration. Japan too needed an area where it had special rights. Western opposition to Japan's policies was particularly distasteful in view of immigration barriers against Asians, which existed in Australia and the United States.

Japanese had an image of America which Americans had difficulty understanding. This can be attributed to the fact that this image was based, in part, on factors other than American actions. Domestic Japanese issues in the early 20th century were probably even more of a mystery to the

average American of that period than domestic Japanese issues are to Americans today. Hopefully I have provided, if only in a simple form, the way in which images can be formed and changed rapidly due to foreign actions. Yet one cannot forget that these actions do not and cannot form the entire basis for images of the nation which performed those actions. Therefore, to understand the relations between nations and the effects of actions on others, it is necessary to try and understand how others perceive those actions. Improvement of international relations requires much more than explaining one's position as many Japanese believed, it requires listening.

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