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REPORT
of
Committee on Thesis

The undersigned, acting as a Committee of
the Graduate School, have read the accompanying
thesis submitted by Dorothy Amanda Heinemann
for the degree of Master of Arts.
They approve it as a thesis meeting the require-
ments of the Graduate School of the University of
Minnesota, and recommend that it be accepted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.

Guy Stanton Ford
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May 31 1917

REPORT
of
COMMITTEE ON EXAMINATION

This is to certify that we the undersigned, as a Committee of the Graduate School, have given Dorothy Amanda Heinemann final oral examination for the degree of Master of Arts. We recommend that the degree of Master of Arts be conferred upon the candidate.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

May 31, 1917

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Germany's Policy in the Far East
Especially since 1890.

Chapter I,

The Historical Setting.

World politics was the predominant characteristic of the last half of the nineteenth century. The struggle for nationalism in the leading countries of Europe was completed by 1870 and with its completion came the competition of the nations in every conceivable field of activity. Increased population, increased prosperity, and increased leisure brought about a desire for expansion in territory and with this expansion began the rivalry for colonial empires.¹ All the great countries in the world were involved, excepting, perhaps, the United States, and she, too, was drawn in just as the century was closing. The diplomatic battleground of Europe was the unoccupied areas of the world, Africa, the Orient, near and far, as well as the many islands scattered over the Pacific.²

Of all the great nations which ultimately entered this scramble for world dominion Germany was the last. Up to 1870 she was occupied with the

1. Reinsch, World Politics, passim.

2. Lipman, The States of Diplomacy, passim.

problem of unification. For centuries the Hohenzollerns had been trying first to bring about the supremacy of Prussia among the German states and then having accomplished this to gather the other principalities about her, working with Austria in the beginning, in opposition to her at the end. With the crowning of King William as German Emperor at Versailles, January 1, 1871¹ this purpose was accomplished. Now, Germany having found the remedy for many of her internal difficulties became infected with the spirit of "Welt-politik". Just as France and England had, so now, too, Germany found herself cramped. It was but the inevitable outcome of the penetration into the country of the spirit of national imperialism which led her to expand across the seas.

It is the purpose of this study to show that Germany's policy in the Far East was but a phase of this larger movement, an exemplification of Germany's political policy and World Empire plans.

It was, of course, because her domestic problems were such that expansion overseas was the best solution for them and because she had reached her limit in military development so that only the field of naval expansion remained that Germany so quickly and readily adopted the general tendency of the age.

The rapid increase of population and the resulting fear that she² could not support it alarmed Germany. With her union she seemed to have gained increased vitality. In 1861¹⁶ the states which now comprise Germany

1. Bülow, Imperial Germany, *passim*.
Keller, Colonization, 531 pp.
Reinsch, World Politics, *passim*
Dawson, Evolution of Modern Germany, *passim*.
 Cambridge Modern History, XII. ch. 6.

2. Penslar, Fürst Bülow's Reden I; 90
 Bülow in a speech made before the Reichstag, Dec. 1, 1899.

had a population of 23,103,000; in 1855, 36,114,000; in 1870, 40,800,000; in 1900, 56,367,000, and in 1910, 64,925,000.¹ That is to say the annual increase had risen to 850,000 by 1912.² It would probably have reached 900,000 to-day but for the outbreak of the war.³ The significance of this was recognized by Mr. Rohrbach when he wrote, "This factor (increased population) is the very foundation of our social life".⁴ Germany was now face to face with an economic problem of the utmost importance. Her small territory, her limited supply of raw materials, and her climate made it impossible to support the increased population under the old regime.⁵ Several solutions offered themselves. She might expand upon the continent of Europe. Surrounded by powerful and jealous nations such a scheme would be rendered impossible at the outset. She might send more and more of her people to other countries. But this would mean that Germany would lose thousands of her best citizens forever and that foreign countries would profit by her loss.⁶ Again she might acquire a sufficient number of colonies to take care of her surplus. Theoretically

1. Statistics based on Statesman's Year Books, 1888 ff.

Dawson, 336, Barker, Modern Germany, 116

1816-----	23,103,000	1880-----	45,200,000
1837-----	30,010,000	1890-----	49,416,000
1840-----	32,800,000	1900-----	56,367,000
1850-----	35,400,000	1910-----	64,925,000
1855-----	36,114,000	1914-----	65,000,000
1870-----	40,800,000		

This increase explained by Rohrbach, 71, by the exceptionally low death rate in Germany.

2. Average annual increase as given by Barker - 116

1840-50-----	260,000	1880-90-----	420,000
1850-60-----	230,000	1890-1900-----	690,000
1860-70-----	310,000	1900-1912-----	850,000
1870-80-----	440,000		

3. Dawson, 336

Baker, 116

4. Rohrbach, German World Policies, 70

5. Dawson, 337-339

6. Von Bülow, 17

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 this was possible. Practically it was not. Granting that there were colonies somewhere which she might acquire, such a solution would involve time and something had to be done immediately. She had already intensified her agriculture by offering premiums and bounties to the most successful farmers. 2
 Now the only other possibility was to import foodstuffs. 3 This raised the question of payment. Germany was essentially an agricultural nation in 1871. At that time she had but eight towns whose inhabitants numbered over 100,000. 4
 Indeed fifty percent of her population was agrarian. The inevitable answer was that Germany must become at least partially an industrial nation. She must import not only foodstuff but also raw materials in order that she might manufacture them, thereby increasing their value sufficiently to pay for the foodstuffs brought in. 5 And this Germany did.

Within thirty years the majority of the people were engaged in manufacturing. 6 Cities and towns which had been asleep since the opening of the nineteenth century seemed suddenly to have awakened. 7 They increased in wealth and prosperity to an almost inconceivable degree. "United Germany, after the

1. Dawson, 342.

2. Fife, *The German Empire between Two Wars*, 80-90, passim.

3. Dawson, 337-339

4. Arndt, *International Monthly*, V:527

5. Dawson, 337-339. Von Bülow, 18

6. 1870-----50% of the population was agrarian, 1900, only 30% of the population was agrarian.

Arndt, *International Monthly*, V:527

The greatest increase of population was in the industrial centers such as Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen.

Statesman's Yearbook, 1885 ff.

Dawson, 39

7. *Ibid*, 38.

successful war of 1870 began the greatest era of industrial growth and prosperity that has ever been known in the history of the world....In this old central Europe cities have grown almost over night. Railways have been laid down one after the other, until the whole empire is a network of steel. Mines and factories have sprung into being....¹ By 1905 there were forty-one towns of over 100,000 inhabitants and of these eleven had 250,000, and five, 500,000.² The extent of her industry is shown by the increased amount of raw material imported for industrial purposes. In 1895, 25.0 million metric tons were brought in; in 1905 there were 42.2 million.³

The rise of industrialism resulted in an enormous extension of trade and commerce. In 1880 the imports of Germany were 2.86 milliard marks, in 1907, 9.57; the exports, 2.95 milliard in 1880 and 7.44 in 1907.⁴ Year by year the manufactured goods have formed a smaller part of the exports.⁵

Whereas in 1891 the total trade of Germany was 8,111 milliard marks in 1907 it was 17,011 as compared with that of England which was 15,211 in 1891 and 23,741 in 1907.⁶

As one might expect with the rise of trade and commerce came a rapid growth of Germany's merchant marine.⁷ During the last two decades the tonnage of her marine has increased two hundred fifty percent.⁸ Whereas in 1874 Germany had but 5.2% of the mercantile marine of the world by 1905 she had 9.9%.⁹

1. Gibbons, New Map of Europe, 38
2. Dawson, 38
3. Ibid., 66
4. Rohrbach, 79, see also Dawson, 65-67
5. Dawson, 66
6. Rohrbach, 80-81
7. ~~Schierbrand, The Kaiser's Speeches, 240~~
Gibbons, 52
8. Dawson, 69
9. Gibbons, 52
9. Dawson, 69

In speaking of the development of the German merchant marine one cannot but comment on the work the present Kaiser has done to further this enterprise. Throughout his reign he has displayed great interest in it. In truth there are to-day six times as many German merchantmen as there were when he became Kaiser.

No sooner had Germany begun to engage in manufacturing than emigration which had been growing rather rapidly for some time fell off. "German labor at home (was) fully capable of feeding our people in spite of their increase." The loss was 220,000 in 1881, 22,300 in 1900, and only 18,500 in 1912. Indeed the immigration into Germany more than made up for any emigration in 1912.

Economic conditions such as these created a need for markets where the manufacturer might dispose of his goods. And so German trade turned South, West, and East. There was scarcely a port into which her goods did not find their way. Thus it was that industrialism led to expansion across the seas.

It was about 1890 that Germany definitely embarked upon this new policy of expansion. This is reflected in many of the speeches of the Kaiser. In

1. Dawson, 69
Gibbon, 52
Schierbrand, 240
2. Rohrbach, 138

3. Emigration in	1881-----	220,000	1898-----	22,221
	1886-----	83,225	1900-----	22,309
	1888-----	103,951	1902-----	32,098
	1890--- --	97,103	1904-----	27,984
	1892-----	116,339	1906-----	31,074
	1894-----	40,964	1908-----	19,883
	1896-----	33,824	1910-----	24,921
			1912-----	18,545

Statesman's Year Books, 1888ff
Barker, 116

his address delivered at the banquet, January 1, 1896, in celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Franco-Prussian war and the founding of the Empire he said, "The German Empire has become a world empire. Everywhere¹ in distant quarters of the earth thousands of our countrymen are living----" Again at Cologne, "Neptune with the trident is a symbol for us that we have new² tasks to fulfil since the empire has been welded together..." It was in reply to Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria that the Kaiser said, "...Your Royal Highness has been able to convince himself how powerfully the wave beat of the ocean knocks at the door of our people and forces it to demand its place in the world³ as a great nation; drives it on, in short, to world politics..." October 11 the Kaiser was at Saalburg at the dedication of the Imperial Limes Museum. Then it was that he said, "With the first blow of my hammer I therefore dedicate this stone to the memory of Emperor Frederick III; with the second I dedicate it to the German youth, to the generations now growing up who may learn⁴ here in this restored museum what a world-empire means..."

From such an account of Germany's entrance upon the field of oversea expansion it may seem that it was easy that her statesmen and her people were in the beginning not only reconciled to this as a natural outcome of events but were eager to engage in such a policy. On the contrary it was some time before the government could be persuaded to give even the most reluctant consideration to any phase of such expansion. Then, having been won over, that same government found the utmost difficulty in persuading the people as a whole to join with it. When it succeeded in doing this it still found itself opposed by the Reichstag. Again it may seem that Germany encountered no opposition from other

1. Gibbons, 31.

Gauss, The German Emperor as shown in his Public Utterances, 102.

2. Barker, 124, April 24, 1897

3. Gauss, 162, This speech was made on the occasion of the launching of a ship of the Wittelsbach line at Kiel on July 3, 1900.

4. Ibid., 167.

countries. Quite the reverse is true.

The question naturally arises what was the effective force that carried government and people alike into an aggressive policy of commercial and colonial expansion. The answer is that the growth of trade and commerce resulted in the rise of individuals and companies interested in oversea expansion, in the acquisition of new markets and the development of a merchant marine.¹ Such was the Hamburg house of Johann Cesar Godeffroy und Sohn which made Upolu, the most important island of the Samoan group, its headquarters.² These individuals and companies formed societies, especially in the early eighties.³ and carried on an active campaign to interest the government in colonization.

Chief among them were the "Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwestafrika", the "Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft",⁴ the "Neuguinea-Kompanie", the "Deutsch-Ost-afrikanisch Gesellschaft" and the "Witoggesellschaft".⁵ On April 30, 1886 these societies formed the German "Kolonialverein" so as to enable them to carry on a more active campaign.⁶ They used the press extensively as a means of spreading their propaganda,⁷ especially the "Deutsche Kolonialzeitung". Meetings were held and funds collected, indeed everything was done to force the government from its immobility.⁸ An example of the attempts made to stimulate interest beyond the confines of Germany is illustrated by an anonymous pamphlet which appeared somewhat earlier but which, nevertheless, is typical. It is of peculiar

1. Keller, 535-536.

2. Myer, Das Deutsche Kolonialreich, II:311
Wegener, Deutschland im Stillen Ozean, 4

3. Keller, 536,

4. Prince Hohenslohe was President
Lichtenberger, 154

5. Stengel, Schmoller's Jahrbuch, 1888: 221.

6. Cheradame, La Colonisation et les colonies Allemandes, 32

7. Stengel, 221

8. Cheradame, 31

9. 1871.

interest to us since it treats of the Far East, as its title, "Germany's Interests in the Far East", suggests. The writer urged that a naval station be acquired in the Far East which should serve as an observation station and as a base for operations in case of later intervention. The author regretted that the Treaty of Frankfort had not made Cochin China a German possession. He even went so far as to suggest that the region of Sargoaⁿ would be the most convenient position in Asia as a base for German colonization. He stressed the future importance of the islands of the South Pacific as strategic points and urged the need of prompt¹ action. Writers by the score came to the aid of the expansionists such as Frey, author of "Gebt uns Kolonien", Von Philippson, Wülfing, Fick, Bastian, and Arendt.²

Some of the agitators appealed to the national pride. Quoting from Paul Leroy Beaulieu, "The nation which colonizes most is the first nation; if not today it will be to-morrow."³ They revived memories of the days when the Great Elector had opened the way for overseas expansion by his colonial schemes in Africa and exploited the shame of a nation without a navy. Others pointed to the achievements of German colonists in the United States and elsewhere, laying especial emphasis on the colonizing qualities of the German - qualities which were recognized even in the House of Commons by Sir James Ferguson when he said, "..... The German people formed some of the best colonists in our own possessions, and

1. Cheradame, 32

Frey, Gebt uns Kolonien, Chemnitz, 1881

Von Philippson, Ueber Colonization, Berlin, 1880

Wülfing, Der Erwerb von Ackerbau und Handels-Kolonien durch Deutsche Reich, Cologne, 1881.

Fick, Ist die Welt Vergeben? Frankfurt, 1884

Bastian, Europäische Colonien in Afrika und Deutschlands

Arendt, Ziele deutschen Kolonialpolitik, Berlin, 1885

2. Cheradame, 39

3. Ibid., 40

he did not think it so surprising that the government of Germany, with people spread all over the world should have settled to some extent in colonies of their own..."¹

The attitude of the German government up to 1890 was, of course, the attitude of Bismarck. His indifference in the early years of the Empire amounted almost to hostility.² "Ich bin kein Colonial mensch von Hause aus gewesen", he said in a speech before the Reichstag, January 26, 1889.³ But even Bismarck was forced to take cognizance of the changing economic conditions. The commerce of Germany was increasing with great rapidity. The colonial societies were besieging the government to back their enterprises. One can discern the evolution, very gradual to be sure, but yet quite definite, of Bismarck's ideas on colonization through the medium of his speeches in the Reichstag and of his attempts to render assistance to commerce.

That the government had been interested in overseas expansion to a very slight degree even before union was accomplished is evidenced by the expedition sent out by the King of Prussia in 1860 under the direction of Count Eulenburg and accompanied by four warships to secure commercial treaties with China, Japan and Siam, and also to discover, if possible, a port suitable as a commercial base.⁴ The geographer, Freiherr von Richthofen was probably the most distinguished member of this expedition. The result of his investigation have been embodied in five quarto volumes entitled, "China, Ergebnisse eigener Reisen und darauf ge-

1. Quoted from the London Times, December 18, 1888, in 51 Cong. 1 Sess. House Exec.Doc. I: 1: 183 (Serial 2714)
2. Keller, 539
Cheradame, 31
3. Kohl, Die Reden des Minister-präsidenten und Reichskanzlers Fürsten von Bismarck im preussischen Landtag und im deutschen Reichstag, XII: 577
4. Richthofen, China, I, preface, xxvii.

gründeter Studien" ¹ It was upon the basis of his report that Germany determined ² upon Tsingtau ³ as the most valuable port in the Far East.

In the critical years which followed this expedition nothing further was done until January 24, 1879 when Bismarck, probably due to the efforts of the ⁴ societies and to the pressure brought by the House of Godeffroy und Sohn, which had been extending its commerce over the South Seas since 1850, entered into a treaty of friendship with Samoa. By the terms of this agreement German subjects were to have freedom of commerce in all points and places of Samoa, German war-ships were given permission to enter the harbor of Saluafata for supplies and re- ⁵ pair, and the government obtained the right to erect a coaling station on Upolu. This gave Germany her first naval station.

Insignificant as the Samoan islands may be this was a very great advance on the part of Bismarck and it is interesting to note that the first steps looking toward Greater Germany were in the direction of the Far East rather than toward Africa.

⁶ In 1879 the House of Godeffroy und Sohn was bankrupt. In the liquidation proceedings which followed it appeared that English capital was about to purchase its interests in the South Sea. This was the origin of Bismark's scheme of 1880. He undertook to form a group of German financiers into the "Deutsche Seehandels Gesellschaft". He proposed to make it possible for this company to carry on its

1. Berlin-----1877 to 1911.

2. Often improperly called Kiao Chou.

3. Barker, 134

Hassert, Deutschlands Kolonien, 321

The work written by Richtöffen and published in Berlin, 1898, sets forth the importance of Schantung and of Kiautschow.

Richtöffen, Schantung und seine Eingangsporte Kiautschow

4. Ut supra p. 8

5. British Foreign and State Papers, LXX: 241

6. Meyer, II: 311.

Wegener, 6

operations by asking from the Reichstag a guarantee fund to protect them. April¹ 27, 1880, however, saw the defeat of this project.

The following year Bismarck proposed to subsidize a steam packet line² to Australia and East Asia. Some privately owned company was to receive a subsidy of 4,000,000 marks per annum for fifteen years. These plans were embodied³ in a bill which was introduced into the Reichstag, May 23, 1884. In support of this bill Bismarck argued that both England and France had adopted such a scheme and that the exchange of communication between Germany and Australia and East Asia had increased to such an extent in the last decade as to make the establishment of some adequate means of communication necessary. By providing better facilities for intercommunication the commercial interests of Germany would also be promoted.

Somewhat later in support of the same bill the Chancellor urged that as the question of "Dampfersubvention" was closely allied with the colonial question, as this was the first attempt of the Empire since the failure of the Samoan subsidy bill to enter on a policy looking toward colonial expansion, and as such a policy could only be undertaken with the backing of the nation, for the Reichstag to oppose the government at this time would be a serious matter.⁴ But the Reichstag thought otherwise and it was not until 1885 that it finally passed the bill.⁵ From the time of the passage of this bill one might say that the government had been won over. True it still proceeded very reluctantly and very cautiously but it at least took a rather consistent interest in expansion.

1. Wegener, 6.
Cheradame, 31, 42.
Cambridge Modern History, XII: 160.
2. Ibid.,
3. Kohl, X: 149 ff.
4. Kohl, X: 167, Reichstag, June 23, 1884.
5. Cambridge Modern History, XII: 160

Although he acceded to the principle of oversea expansion Bismarck was not ready to permit the government itself to engage in expansionistic projects, which had for their aim the acquisition of territory for its own sake. "----- it would not be right for us to occupy stretches of land where we have no interest as yet, so as to cause German immigration to go to that place----- it is something different to place those (settlements formed by German citizens in territory not claimed by any nation) under the protection of the Empire-----".¹ He held that it was the duty of the empire to follow such citizens with its protection.²

Bismarck's plan was, in brief, to grant charters similar to the English Royal Charters to private companies, which were to assume the responsibility for the material development of the new regions and to which certain governmental powers were to be conceded. Citizens of any of the European countries were to be guaranteed an adequate protection of law through consular or residential courts,³ for as he repeatedly said, "---our purpose is not to found provinces, but to protect commercial undertakings, including such as exercise a certain territorial sovereignty",⁴ or again, "indeed we do not follow the example of any foreign nation, on the contrary we follow our own merchants with our protection."⁵

1. Kohl, X: 168, Bismarck in the Reichstag, June 23, 1884
2. Ibid.,
Ibid., X: 193, Reichstag June 26, 1884
 XII: 576, Reichstag, January 26, 1889
3. Ibid., X: 196, Reichstag, June 26, 1884 Reinsch, Col. Govt. 139
 X: 168, Reichstag, June 23, 1884
 XII: 560, Reichstag, January 11, 1889
4. Ibid., X: 173, 196, Reichstag, June 23, 1884, June 26, 1884
 XII: 560 January 26, 1889
 XII: 578, January 26, 1889
Reinsch, World Politics, 261 ff.
5. Kohl, XI: 82, Reichstag March 13, 1885

Bismarck had been striving for the backing of the nation from the time he began to show even the slightest interest in colonization. Again and again he urged that a colonial policy was not at all possible unless it was firmly backed by the majority of the nation.¹ But this was a comparatively simple task compared to that of winning over the Reichstag. It seemed as though the Reichstag could never be made to see the seriousness of the situation. It displayed no interest whatsoever in the schemes of expansion.

"The conservatism of the chancellor was radicalism from the standpoint of the Reichstag. This body consistently opposed all colonial schemes....even after Bismarck began to advocate the acquisition of colonies, the Reichstag was not won over."² The attitude of this body toward the Samoan question and the

"Dampfersubvention" has already been alluded to. This same hostility came out repeatedly.³ It was even present as late as 1900 when Germany sent her troops to avenge the murder of Baron Von Ketteler.⁴

Another factor which served to hinder any attempt at colonization was the opposition of the other great powers to Germany's advance. This was particularly true of England.⁵ Bismarck in the year 1885, complained of this attitude on the part of Great Britain saying that "-----at every point at which Germany had endeavored to found a colony England had closed in making new 1.

1. Kohl, X: 167, 275, 380. XI: 53

2. Keller, 540.
Chéradame, 110

3. Kohl, X: 167, 173, 275, 380, 396
XI: 53, 82, 136

Poschinger, Fürst Bismarck und der Bundesrat, V:216

Penzler, Fürst Bülow's Reden, I: 92

4. Ibid., I: 127, Bülow in the Reichstag, Nov 19, 1900

5. Von Bülow, Imperial Germany, 3-127 passim

Hassert, 35

Chéradame, 113

acquisitions so as to restrict Germany's power of expansion?¹ Thus the government found itself opposed not only by the Reichstag but also by foreign countries.

In the meantime came the retirement of Bismarck and the accession of William II with views in many ways more clearly adjusted to the newer world that was taking shape at the close of the nineteenth century. His brother, Prince Henry, was trained for the navy just as he had been for the army. Thus the Hohenzollern house through these sons of an English mother was committed to larger tasks than Bismarck and the old Emperor had conceived.

Any extensive plan of expansion across the seas carries with it as a necessary corollary a scheme to build up a navy as a means of protection. Germany having embarked upon the field of colonization was soon confronted with this problem. After much opposition on the part of the Reichstag the Navy Bill of 1898 was finally passed on March 28, 1898.² But the navy provided by this was not considered adequate for the needs of Germany. "The necessity for the completion and extension of our Navy Bill of 1898 contemplated by the federated governments has been created by the present world situation and by the needs of our oversea policy.

" With regard to our oversea policy the position of the government is by no means an easy one. On the one side we are being urged, and occasionally we are urged in a strong fashion to safeguard our oversea interests with greater zeal; on the other side we hear that we are already too heavily engaged..... If we do not provide a fleet that is sufficient to protect...our commerce, our

1. British and Foreign State Papers LXXVI: 78
Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, Berlin. January 24, 1885

2. Barker, 325.

merchants in foreign lands, our missions...we will endanger the most vital
 interests of the country..."¹ Knowing the temper of the Reichstag the govern-
 ment felt that unless the sentiment of the country, the electorate, could be
 sufficiently aroused to force this body to further action it would have to give
 up its newly adopted policy, "Weltpolitik".² It was for this reason that the
 "Flottenverein" was established shortly after the passage of the first Navy
 Bill. Prince Henry, brother of the Kaiser, was made President. In a note of
 congratulation to him the Kaiser spoke of a powerful navy as one of the pillars
 upon which the prestige of Germany and the growth of her commerce rested.³ Two
 other men of prominence joined the league soon afterward, Prince William of
 Wied, and the Duke of Baden. Men of every station in life were made eligible
 for membership; even the poorest could join. In this manner the "Flottenverein"
 became a powerful organization to promote interest in the enlargement of the
 navy. Its methods and organization have been copied by similar bodies in both
 England and the United States. It especially enlisted the powerful university
 groups. Historians and economists proclaimed the new doctrine to the nation
 through popular lectures, afterwards published and widely circulated;⁴ and
 from the rostrum of their class rooms to the rising generations of the 1890's.
 By July of 1912 it had a membership of over one million and a yearly income of
 F 50,000. Its organ, "Die Flotte" had a circulation of 320,000 copies.⁵

1. Penzler, I, '88 ff. Bülow in the Reichstag, December 11, 1899

2. Ibid.

Barker, 326

3. Von Schierbrand, 189; September 14, 1898.

4. Handels-und Machtpolitik.

Among the contributions are some of the most distinguished university
 professors such as Wagner, Schmoller, Lamprecht, Delbrück, etc.

5. Barker, 325-342.

The interest aroused in increasing the navy reacted very favorably in arousing interest in expansion. It had another result - it hastened the transformation of Germany's policy of expansion from one of indirect to direct participation on the part of the government.

Such was the gradual evolution of Germany's interest in expansion. Influenced by the general world movement and rivalry for colonial empire, arising directly out of the economic conditions which developed after unification and which changed Germany from an agricultural to an industrial nation and consequently increased her trade and commerce, Germany began to expand. In truth, it was, at first, but a very grudging support on behalf of commerce, nevertheless it was expansion. At length, however, her increased commerce and her interest in expansion, as well as her desire for "World Power" necessitated the enlargement of her navy; this in turn, reacted and stimulated her colonial ambitions - made her colonial policy part of her "World Policy".

Chapter II.

The History, Motive, and Method of Germany's
Acquisition of Territory in the Far East.

The history of the acquisition of territory by Germany in the Far East began in 1850 when the House of Godeffroy established itself in the South Seas. As a result of the work of this company a group of men, late in June of 1884, headed by Herr von Hansemann, who later became President of the New Guinea Company, waited upon Bismarck. They prayed protection for an expedition to be undertaken by them to islands of the Pacific not under the sovereignty of any other nation. This was promised in August of that year. As a result the company fitted out an expedition and soon acquired possession of various harbors and points along the coast of New Guinea, with the intention of creating commercial stations. They likewise acquired land from the natives to be used for the raising of Coprah. The government followed its citizens with its protection, in this instance with the warships, "Elizabeth" and Hyäne.

As the company expressed its willingness and desire to establish such political authority as was necessary to maintain peaceful relations with the natives as well as those which would advance commerce, the government

1. Wegener, 8, Chéradame, 109
2. British and Foreign State Papers, LXXVI; 342 ff.
3. Ibid.
Wegener, 8
Chéradame, 116

granted to it, on May 17, 1885, the right to exercise territorial sovereignty under the supervision of the Empire. That is to say it was to have the exclusive right to acquire unclaimed land in the district, of purchasing land from the natives, and of disposing of any land acquired in this way. The regulation of the administration of justice and the direction of the relation of these districts to foreign governments remained in the hands of the government.¹ Such a charter followed the general outline described by Bismarck.²

The territory included in this protectorate comprised that portion of New Guinea known as Kaiser Wilhelms' Land to-day, New Britain Archipelago, renamed Bismarck Archipelago, and various other smaller islands of the north-

1. State Papers, LXXVI: 342-343.
2. Cf. p. 17.

1

eastern coast of New Guinea. It is interesting to note that the names given to the new protectorates were given at instigation of the company and were in honor of the two men in whose hands lay the power of assisting them, the Kaiser and Bismarck.

The granting of this charter followed the completion of the diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain, which had resulted in an arrangement "relative to their respective spheres of action in portions of New Guinea?"

2

The extension of the protection of the empire over these islands marked the entrance of Germany upon the field of expansion in the Far East.

1. The charter granted by the German Empire to the German New Guinea Company

May 17, 1885.

State Papers. LXXVI: 343

"We grant to the New Guinea Company this our letter of protection and confirm hereby our assumption of the sovereignty over the districts in question."

"These districts are--

"1. That part of the mainland of New Guinea which is not under British or Dutch sovereignty.

"This district, which, at the proposal of the Company we have permitted to be called "Kaiser Wilhelms Land", stretches on the north coast of the island from the 141st degree of longitude (East of Greenwich) to the point in the vicinity of Mitre Rock where the 8th degree of south latitude cuts the coast, is bounded on the south and west by a line which follows closely the 8th degree of latitude up to the point where the latter is intersected by the 147th degree of east longitude, and then runs in a straight line in a north-west direction to the intersection of the 6th degree of south latitude and the 144th east longitude, and again in a northwest direction to the intersection of the 5th degree of south latitude and the 141st degree of east longitude and hence follows this line of longitude to the sea.

"2. The islands lying off this portion of the coast of New Guinea, as well as the islands of the archipelago which has up till now been known as the New Britain Archipelago, and is now, at the proposal of the Company, and with our authorization, to bear the name of Bismarck Archipelago, and all the islands northeast of ~~the~~ New Guinea situate between the equator and the 8th degree of south latitude, and the 141st and 54th degrees of east latitude.

2. State Papers. LXXVI: 66, April 1885.

Ibid. LXXIX: 1008.

It was closely followed by the acquisition of the Marshall islands on October 15, 1885.¹

The successor of the House of Godeffroy on the Caroline and Pelew Islands was the Jaluitgesellschaft, which carried on an extensive trade in the South Sea using one of the islands of this group, Jap, as its base.² About the same time that it sent warships to assist the New Guinea Company in maintaining its claim, Germany permitted the "Iltis" to raise the German flag on the island.³ This resulted at once in a conflict with the government of Spain. Bismarck urged the appointment of the Pope as arbiter in the dispute. This was done and as the result of the papal decision the German government recognized the priority of the Spanish occupation of the islands. The Spanish government on its part guaranteed to German citizens freedom of commerce, navigation, and fishing. Germans were also to have the same right of purchasing and cultivating plantations in these groups, of founding agricultural establishments, and of making contracts with the natives as the Spanish subjects had. The German government was given the right to establish a naval and coaling station.⁴ This last privilege Germany renounced the following year.⁵

But Spanish misrule and the attempt to force Catholicism on the natives resulted in discontent and finally in open revolt in 1887 on the island of Ponape.

1. Wegener, 8. Chéradame, 116.

2. Ibid, 74

3. Ibid,

Kohl, XII:216, Bismarck in the Reichstag. January 11, 1887

4. 49th Cong. 2d sess. House Exec. Docs. I, 1:776f (Serial 2460)
Protocol signed Dec. 17, 1885.

5. 50th Cong. 1 sess. House Exec. Docs. I: 1: 1023. (Serial 2532)
Mr. de Murnaga to Mr. Bayard, Spanish Legation, Washington,
Dec. 14, 1886.

Three years later it broke out anew. Then came the Spanish American war and the sale of the Spanish colonial empire. German commercial interests in these islands had increased greatly and so an arrangement for the purchase of the groups together with another small one, the Marianne Islands (with the exception of ¹Guam), was made, February 12, 1899. Germany took over the debt of 16,750,000 marks in exchange and agreed to guarantee to the citizens of Spain equal commercial privileges with those of her own subjects and to respect the religious orders established on the islands. Spain was permitted to retain a coaling ²station in each of the three groups. This brought Germany's third "Schutzgebiet" into her hands.

The history of the acquisition of Samoa is much more complex than that of any of the other possessions of Germany in the South Seas. Just as the story of the acquisition of New Guinea began with that of the House of Godeffroy, so ³its story also began here. The failure of the Samoan subsidy bill in 1880 was followed by an agreement between Germany and Samoa in regard to the jurisdiction ⁴over the German subjects in Samoa. There was to be a Council of State consisting of the German consul, two Samoans and two Germans, which was to deliberate on all laws and regulations concerning the common interests of the Samoan government and the Germans resident in Samoa and to issue ordinances, which were to be legalized by their later reissue by the King and the viceroy, and which would apply to any act of a penal nature of a Samoan which involved a German. Germany,

1. Guam was ceded to the United States,
Chéradame, 120

2. Wegener, 76

Penkler, I:68 ff. Bülow in the Reichstag, June 6, 1899

3. Ut Supra p. 3.

4. 50 Cong. 1 Sess. House Exec. Doc. 28: 238: 5. (serial 2560)
State Papers, LXXV: 508, Nov. 10, 1884.

however, was not the only power interested in these islands. England and the United States both had their commercial interests here. Such a state of affairs resulted in an agreement between the powers which bound the parties to abstain from making any attempt at territorial acquisition on these islands or from doing anything tending to overthrow the independence of Samoa.¹

Of course, the natural consequence of this was a series of changes and counter-charges against the various governments until finally on February 19, 1886 the government of Germany suggested that the complete control of Samoa be given to one or the other of the powers.²³

Conferences were held in Washington June 25 to July 26, 1887. At this time the attempt made by the three powers to come to some agreement upon the matter was without avail.⁴ Germany's plan was to place the combined interests of the powers in the hands of one man who was to be nominated by the power having the dominating interests in Samoa, subject, of course, to the ratification of the other two. Naturally the United States and England rejected such a plan for, without doubt, Germany was the dominating power in Samoa at this time. Being unable to agree, the conference adjourned until fall of the same year when it again met in Berlin.⁵

In the meantime each of the powers had sent commissioners to investigate the conditions in the group. These commissioners made reports to their

1. State Papers, LXXIX: 963 ff

2. State Papers, LXXVI: 778-804, passim.

LXXIX: 963 ff.

50th Cong. 2 Sess. Sen. Exec. Doc. II: 68: 2 (Serial 2611)

President Cleveland's Message to Congress, January 15, 1877

3. State Papers, LXXIX: 974, Earl of Rosebery to Sir E Malet, Foreign Office, February 19, 1886.

4. Ibid., p. 900. Protocols of Conferences, Washington, June 25 - July 26, 1887

5. 51st Cong. 1st Sess. House Exec. Doc. I: 1: 190 (Serial 2714)

governments, each one placing the blame for the unfortunate situation they found upon the others. Only on one point did they agree and that was on the commercial supremacy of Germany in this region.

As a result of the Berlin conferences a general act was drawn up¹ "Providing for the neutrality and autonomous government of the Samoa Islands". The purpose of the treaty as is stated in the preamble, was to secure the life, property and trade of the citizens of the three powers and to do away with any possible chance of misunderstanding either between the governments or between any one and the people of Samoa. Samoa was declared a neutral territory in which the citizens of Germany, United States, and England were to have equal rights of residence, trade, and protection. The independence of the government of Samoa was recognized as well as the right of the natives to chose their own executive. None of the natives were to interfere in the quarrels of the native princes. But this, too, proved to be an impossible arrangement.

Finally, on November 14, 1899, Germany and England came to an agreement by which Upolu and Savaii were given to Germany, Tutuila and Manua to the United States, and Tonga and part of the Solomon Islands to England. December 2,² the United States ratified what had been done by the other two nations.

As a result of these arrangements the German government issued the following decree on February 17, 1900, "Whereas the United States of America and Great Britain have renounced their rights to the islands of the Samoan group, west of 171° west of Greenwich, in favor of Germany, we hereby, in the name of

1. 61 Cong. 2 Sess. Sen Doc. XLVIII: 1576 (Serial 5647)
51 Cong. 1 Sess. House Exec. Doc. 1: 1: 353 (Serial 2714). *June 14, 1889*
2. Penzler, I: 86-7, Reichstag, Dec. 11, 1899.
State Papers, XC: 70, 75.
United States Statutes at Large, XXXI: 2: 70.

the Empire take these islands under our Imperial protection." ¹ It was in this way that Germany gained control of her fourth and last acquisition in the South Seas.

The field for acquisition in the Far East was not limited to the South Seas. There was also a vast extent of territory in Eastern Asia - decadent China. For centuries Europeans had vainly sought to open up this portion of the Orient to the trade of the Occident. ² Finally in 1840 England forced on reluctant China what is to-day designated as the Opium War. It was as the result of this struggle that five ports, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were opened up to foreign trade. ³ Not until 1860, however, did foreigners finally gain access to Peking. This opened up the possibility of greater freedom of trade with the Chinese. It was probably to take advantage of this freedom ⁴ that Hulenberg's expedition was sent to China in 1860.

From about 1880 on, however, although China was apparently at peace with the rest of the world it seemed possible that she might suddenly close her doors to European influence. With her disgraceful defeat by Japan in 1895 any possibility of such an attempt was destroyed.

July 27, 1894 Japan attempted to sink a Chinese transport and ten thousand men off the coast of Korea. Three months later she was master of Liatung and within another month China had sued for peace. ⁵ At the treaty of Shimonoseki China was forced to cede Liatung to Japan as well as the island of

1. State Papers, XCII: 794.

2. Clements, The Boxer Rebellion, in Columbia University Studies, LXVI: 427-434, passim.

3. Ibid., 21, footnote.

4. Cf p. 13.

5. Reventlow, Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik; 82.

Formosa.¹ It was at this time that Germany with France and Russia came to the assistance of China and forced Japan² to retrocede Liatung to her.³ Grateful China proceeded at once to reward these countries.⁴ France obtained Tongking on the border of CochinChina, Russia, having guaranteed China a loan of four hundred million francs received permission to build a railroad as far as Port Arthur. In view of the proximity of Russia to China this was a tremendous concession, and was prophetic of the later lease by China to Russia of "Port Arthur, Talienwan, and the adjacent waters."⁵ Germany on the other hand received but an inconsiderable concession of Tientsin and Hankau, in the province of Chili.⁶ England had already obtained Hong-Kong⁷ and Portugal, Macao. Whatever the significance of these concessions to the western nations may be from a territorial standpoint, they insured the retention of the European privilege to trade and this, after all, was what each of the countries of the Occident was seeking.⁸ What took place between November 8, 1895 and November 1, 1897 will be discussed in another connection. On that day two German Catholic missionaries in the province of Schantung were murdered by a Chinese mob at

1. Treaty of Peace between Japan and China, Shimonoseki, Apr 17, 1895. Supplement, American Journal of International Law, I: 378.
2. Smith and Sibley, International Law as interpreted during the Russo-Japanese War, 13. Deutsche Rundschau, LXXXIII: 473. Reventlow, 82.
3. Convention between Japan and China for the Retrocession by Japan to China of the southern portion of Feng-Tien, November 8, 1895. Hertslet, I: 320. Rockhill, 26.
4. Reventlow, 82.
5. Convention between Russia and China, signed at Peking, March 27, 1898. Hertslet, I: 505.
6. United Empire, III:717, Louis Hamilton.
7. Hassert, 320.
7. Treaty of Nanking, August 19, 1842. Columbia University Studies, LXVI: 433.
8. Cf p. 28-39

the instigation of the Governor of the Province.¹ Two weeks later four German warships under the command of Admiral Diedericks steamed into the bay of Kiautschau.² Following an ultimatum sent to the commandant of the fortress, Tsingtau was evacuated in forty-eight hours. Thereupon followed a series of demands³ for prompt reparation and payment of indemnity for the loss of the missionaries. Two days after the evacuation of Tsingtau the "Kaiser Augusta" was ordered from Crete to China.⁴ It was finally determined to send Prince Henry, brother of the Kaiser, to China to assist the German minister there in obtaining satisfaction and by February 8, 1898 the arrangements were made.⁵ They were substantially the same as those in the convention signed at Peking a month later.⁶

According to the second article of that convention it was "with the intention of meeting the legitimate desire of His Majesty the German Emperor, that Germany like other powers, should hold a place on the Chinese coast for the repair and equipment of her ships, for the storage of materials and provisions for the same, and for other arrangements connected therewith" that the Emperor of China leased to Germany both sides of the entrance of the Bay of

1. 55 Cong. 3 Sess. House Doc. I: 1: 188 (Serial 3743) Reventlow, 108. Denby's Forum, XXIX: 572.
2. Penkler, I: 7, Bülow in the Reichstag, December 6, 1897.
3. These demands were six in number and were embodied in a memorial presented by the Tsung-li-Yamen to the throne. They were in brief as follows:
 - (1). The degradation of Li Ping-heng, Governor of Shantung.
 - (2). The erection of a monument in honor of the missionaries.
 - (3). Indemnity for the loss of the missionaries in the form of two cathedrals.
 - (4). The punishment of the murderers.
 - (5). Guarantee by the Imperial Chinese Government against the recurrence of such an outrage.
- Hassert
Reventlow (6). Decree to be issued to all government officials requiring them to carry out the treaty stipulations to protect missionaries.
4. Ghéradame, 130.
5. Penkler, I: 18 ff. Bülow in the Reichstag, February 8, 1898.
6. Convention between the German Empire and China respecting the Lease of Kiao-Chau. American Journal of International Law, Supplement, IV: 285 ff. April 6, 1898.
British and Foreign State Papers, XCV: 1005.

Kiao-Chau for ninety-nine years. Germany, on the other hand, agreed to construct sufficient fortifications on this territory to protect any buildings which might be erected at Tsingtau. All rights of sovereignty in this territory were turned over to Germany for the term of the lease. Chinese warships and merchantment were promised equal privileges within the Bay of Kiao-Chau with those of other nations. It was also provided that in case Germany should wish to return Kiao-Chau Bay to China before the lease expired, China would refund to her all expenditures which she had made at Kiao-Chau and would at the same time lease a more suitable place to her.

Germany made some further gains in the way of railroad and mining concessions. The Chinese government sanctioned the construction of two railroad lines in Shantung. For the carrying out of this project a Chinese-German company was to be formed with headquarters at some convenient point in the province. German subjects were granted the right of holding and developing property "for a distance of thirty li (2150 yards) on each side of these railways and along the whole extent of the lines."

The effect of this treaty, of course, was to place in Germany's hands her first territorial acquisition in Eastern Asia, an acquisition which she lost¹ at the outbreak of the present war.

Thus in the course of twelve years Germany had obtained four colonies, New Guinea and the Marshall Islands in 1885, and Samoa and the Carolines in 1899.

1. Statesman's Yearbook, 1916: 973.

"August 15, 1914, the Japanese called upon Germany to deliver up the entire leased territory of Kiauchou by September 15th. As no reply was received Japan declared war on August 23, and on August 27 began the blockade of Tsingtau. On November 7, 1914, Tsingtau fell, to Japanese and British forces."

She had also acquired a protectorate, in 1898, on the coast of China. Had she any fundamental motive based on a well-considered policy in acquiring these possessions or was it merely a matter of chance?

That Germany should have attempted anything blindly and without definite a motive for what she did; that she should have extended her protection over New Guinea or purchased the Carolines unless she had some sort of a scheme in mind into which she wished to fit them seems almost inconceivable in view of the scientific nature of the German.¹ She worked consistently for twenty years to maintain her rights upon the Samoan group. Surely there must have been a purpose in this. When the final arrangements for the transfer of the Carolines had been made Bülow said, "Through this acquisition our dominion in the South Seas will be completed. As a glance at the map indicates, our protectorates in the Pacific have up to this time formed a semi-circle, a long drawn out and disjointed line. Through the Carolines and the Mariannes the circle will be closed. The Marianne Islands in the north, the Pelew, the Caroline and the Marshall Islands in the middle, Kaiser Wilhelms-Land and the Bismarck Archipelago in the South now form a coherent whole".² Thus at least the Carolines were acquired for some definite purpose.

The desire for a foothold in China which is evidenced by the Eulen-³berg expedition and the pamphlet which came out in 1871 remained quiescent until the close of the Chino-Japanese war. At that time Germany acquired a very small concession as compared with that of Russia. Yet apparently she was satisfied. The question at once arises, if Germany had a definite motive in her acquisition of territory why did she let so valuable an opportunity as this slip. The answer is, of course, that she was not ready. The hostile attitude of the Reich-

1. Keller, 570.

2. Penzler, I: 73, Reichstag, June 21, 1899.

3. Germany's Interests in the Far East, Chéradame, 32.

stag had not permitted William II to strengthen the German Navy sufficiently as yet. Thus the Empire was forced to miss what seemed a golden opportunity. But she had learned her lesson. Without waiting for the next situation to arise she began her preparations at once in order that she might seize the first opportune moment to gain what she had lost in 1896.

It must, therefore, have been more than mere chance which took Germany first to the South Seas and then to Eastern Asia. What this motive power was which lead her here can only be discovered by examining the various explanations which have been offered at any time by the colonizing nations for what they were doing and then determining whether such explanations are applicable to Germany's acquisition of territory in the Far East.

Greed for gold, silver, and rich stones enticed many a man to America in the sixteenth century. Was it a motive similar to this which brought the German to Samoa, to the Carolines, or the Bismarck Archipelago?

The Caroline group is made up of about seven hundred islands, many of which are exceedingly small. Although some are volcanic, the majority are coral formations with a small population and few valuable products.¹ "Lumpereiere"² Bismarck called them. Although there are five groups of islands included in the Samoan group, the total size is only about that of the Duchy of Luxemburg. By the agreement of 1899 Germany received the two most important groups, Upolu and Sawail. Of the two Upolu is by far the more valuable due to its fertile and well watered soil.³ Both of the groups are, however, volcanic.

1. Wegener, 55-57.

Keller, 592.

2. Kohl, XII: 216. Bismarck in the Reichstag, January 11, 1887.

3. Wegener, 21-28

Kaiser-Wilhelms Land is much larger than either of these other possessions. Its extent is over 180,000 sq. km., or somewhere more than half the area of Prussia. To the casual observer it presents a gorgeous picture with its dense forests and rich tropical vegetation.¹ Yet surely it was not the intrinsic value of these island groups which brought about their acquisition by Germany!

The existence of vast coalfields in the "Hinterland" of the Kiautschou Protectorate, as well as the mineral resources of the province, was, of course, known to the German government in 1898. Yet it seems scarcely possible that any nation would incur the expense necessary to maintain a large garrison at Tsingtau, and to build railroads so as to make these mines available,² because of the wealth she would obtain from the coal and iron. The intrinsic value, therefore, of these possessions could not have been Germany's motive in her Far Eastern acquisitions. It is necessary for this reason to examine other possible motives.

At times nations have expanded over vast territories because they wished to spread their culture. Among Germans there has long been a firm conviction that their race is superior and that consequently it is their duty to spread their culture into all parts of the world.³ To a degree they have succeeded in doing this. "...In ever-widening circles does our speech extend its influence even across the seas. Into far distant lands do our science and research wing their way. There is no work in the field of modern research which has not been published in our tongue, and no discovery in science which we are

1. Wegener, 99, 122.

2. There are no navigable rivers or canals in Shantung. United Empire, III: 718.

3. Gibbons, 29.
Zimmerman, *passim*.

not the first to turn to account, to be subsequently adopted by other nations.
 It is to the empire of the world that the German genius aspires¹. To a limited extent, at least, this desire must have influenced Germany's acquisitions in the Far East. Indeed the very fact that, after she had acquired the islands of the South Seas missionary work was greatly accelerated and educational work begun² is proof of this longing to spread her culture into all parts of the world.

Closely akin to such a motive is the desire to provide a place for surplus population. This has in the past been one of England's reasons for seeking colonial possessions. The rapid increase of population in Germany which resulted in the growth of manufacturing to meet the greater demand for food caused many men to argue in favor of acquiring colonies to provide for this increase.³ With this in mind the government established schools which had as their chief aim the training of men for residence in the colonies. Here the language, geography, history, and commerce of foreign parts are taught so that the future settlers of any given district will have a knowledge of the country, its language and its customs.⁴ But, although this must have influenced Germany in her attitude toward the Far East, nevertheless small coral or volcanic islands in the tropics or a narrow strip on the coast of China do not seem to be favorable locations for extensive colonization. The tropical climate

1. Kaiser in a speech made at Aix, June 19, 1902, as quoted by Gibbons, 30. Gauss, 206.
2. cf. p. 54-55.
3. Chéradame, 29
Barker, 115
4. Louis Hamilton, United Empire, II: 29.
Royal College for Oriental Languages, 1882. Colonial School in Witsenhausen, 1898.
Hamburg Colonial Institute, 1902
Various other subsidiary schools have also been founded.

of the South Sea is very injurious to the health of men accustomed to the temperate climate of Germany. If it was the intention of Berlin to direct the stream of emigrants toward the East the attempt has been a distinct failure. The¹ white population of these colonies has remained very small.

Motives other than the intrinsic value of the colony, the desire to spread its culture or to find a place for its surplus population have influenced the colonizing nations. There has also been the desire to further commerce by acquiring new and better markets. Germany, it will be remembered, had added manufacturing to agriculture and was now in great need of markets for her surplus products. It was this factor which resulted in the creation of commercial companies, and later of colonial societies. It was this factor, too, which first interested Bismarck in expansion overseas. Thus it seems altogether possible that it may have influenced German colonization in the Far East.

Probably the best evidence of the fact that this motive did influence German attitude toward the Far East is seen in the fact that here as in Africa she adopted Bismarck's motto in regard to colonization, "We follow our merchants² with our protection" In other words acquisition followed commerce. The

1. White population.	Territory	1903.	1906.	1909.	1910.
	New Guinea	396	529	671	688
	Carolines	177	173	197	387
	Marshall	79	83	164	179
	Samoa	381	454	468	473

Based on statistics in Chéradame, 466, Dawson, 388, United Empire, I:405; II:634

	1902.	1905.	1908.	1912.
Kiautschou	688	1,225	1,484	1,505

Civilian white population. Based upon statistics in the Statesman's Yearbooks 1904, 1908, 1909, 1913.

2. Kohl, XI: 82, March 3, 1885. Reichstag. Bismarck.

"Wir folgen unseren Kaufleuten mit unserem Schutze."

Ibid., XII: 52, March 2, 1885, Reichstag.

"...Wir haben nicht die Präension die Colonisationsbestrebungen des deutschen Volkes zu führen nach einer bürokratischen Vorschrift und nach einem bestimmten System...sondern wir haben die Absicht, ihnen zu folgen mit dem Schutze des Reiches."

50 Cong. 2 Sess. House Exec. Doc. I: 1: 1: 652. (Serial 2626).

Extract from London Times, September 7, 1888.

very term applied to the possessions indicates this, "Schutzgebiete". When Germany raised her flag in New Guinea the New Guinea trading company was already firmly established there. Indeed it was because of their repeated requests¹ that Bismarck did grant the Charter of 1885 to them.

Commerce had led to the establishment of the House of Godeffroy upon the Samoan islands in 1850; it had led to the treaty of commerce and friendship² in 1879. As German trade with Samoa increased until it was double that of all the other countries put to-gether, the German government began to take active measures to protect it. Before 1885 she was maintaining a squadron of three warships to look after the interests of her merchants here.³ In the second Samoan conference her representatives urged that since Germany had the predominant commercial interests in these islands she ought to have the most weight in the government of them.⁴ As it was not until 1899 that Germany acquired her two Samoan groups, here, too, as in the case of New Guinea, acquisition followed commerce.

What is true of New Guinea and Samoa is equally true of the Marshall Islands,⁵ and the Carolines. In the Protocol made with Spain in regard to the Caroline and Pelew Islands two of the five articles dealt with the commercial privileges of the Germans.⁶ When Spain was ready to sell her islands in the

1. cf. p. 18.

2. cf. p. 11

3. Annual Register, 1885: 408.

4. British and Foreign State Papers, LXXIX:914.

Second Samoan Conference - Washington July 2, 1887. Alvensleben.

5. 50 Cong. 2 Sess. Sen. Exec. Doc. I: 28: 41(Serial 2610) January 9. 1888.

6. 49 Cong. 2 Sess. House Exec. Doc. I: 1:777.(Serial 2460) December 18, 1885. Articles III and IV.

South Seas after the Spanish American War, it was in the furtherance of German commercial interests which had long existed on the Carolines that Prince von Bülow urged that it was the duty of the Empire to see that in the transfer of islands the Carolines became German possessions, and because her merchants were here Germany bought this group in the South Seas.

German merchants had found their way to China long before Tsingtau was seized. Indeed in the preamble of the convention between the German Empire and China respecting the lease of Kiao-chow this phrase is found, "to develop the economic and commercial relations between the subjects of the two states..." which would seem to suggest that advancement of commerce at least entered into Germany's motive in acquiring Kiautschow Protectorate. In his speech before the Reichstag before the arrangements for the Convention had been completed Chancellor Bülow told the deputies that the desire of Germany to further the commercial interests already established here formed part of her motive in seizing Tsingtau. Indeed he urged that since the German exports to China had nearly trebled in the past ten years, it was absolutely necessary that Germany obtain a concession such as France, England and Russia had already obtained. Commerce remained at least one of the motives which influenced Germany's subsequent attitude toward China. "...You made mention of our brothers who have gone to the Far East to protect our interests there. I have confidence in them, that they will succeed in restoring there such orderly and permanent conditions as will permit the

1. Penzler, I: 68, Reichstag, Bülow, June 6, 1899
Ibid., I:73, Reichstag, Bülow, June 21, 1899.
2. Convention between Germany and China, March 6, 1898
British and Foreign, State Papers, XCV: 1005.
3. Penzler, I:23, February 8, 1898.
Questions Diplomatique et Coloniale, V:290.

German merchant who lives and toils there to escape harm and to continue giving adequate and profitable attention to his affairs..." This was part of the Kaiser's¹ speech of September 7, 1900.

Probably the best illustration of the influence of commerce as a motive in Germany's attitude in the Far East is a comment made by von Bülow upon the acquisition of the Carolines. "Both treaties," he said, "the one with China as well as the one with Spain, are guide posts on the same path and links of a chain...(in both instances care was taken) that the new possession was also of value in a commercial way."²

In the light of such evidence it seems fair to conclude that commerce did influence Germany's attitude toward colonization in the Far East and that in every instance acquisition followed the establishment of commercial intercourse with the territory in question.

Germany's desire in this regard was fulfilled, acquisition was invariably followed by increase of commerce.³ Indeed the total commerce between Germany and the South Sea Islands increased from 815,000 marks in 1897 to 13,682,000 marks in 1900. To put it in another way, there was an increase of 6.29% during thirteen years. There are no statistics available which give

1. Schierbrand, 251.
2. Penzler, I: 75. Reichstag, June 21, 1899.
3. German trade with the South Sea Islands (marks)

	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902	1910
New Guinea	157,000	170,000	295,000	443,000	841,000	889,000	4,958,000
Carolines	3,000	11,000	11,000	241,000	80,000	107,000	2,409,000
Samoa	439,000	162,000	284,000	387,000	413,000	764,000	3,428,000
Marshall	216,000	254,000	125,000	234,000	325,000	489,000	2,487,000
Total	815,000	597,000	715,000	1305,000	1659,000	2249,000	13,682,000

Based on Chéradame, 473.

United Empire, III: 971

figures differentiating between German trade with Tsingtau and that of any other country.¹ The figures for the total trade of Tsingtau show, however, that there has been a large increase, amounting to more than 18.16% in six years.

But the colonizing nations of the last quarter of the nineteenth century were interested not only in obtaining new markets but also in obtaining naval stations in order that they might ensure the protection of their merchant marines. This same desire affected Germany. Just as she was led to acquire territory in the Far East because of the increased commercial advantage which would result from it, so she was also influenced by the trend of the times, to seek those districts most suitable for coaling stations.

This was one of the reasons advanced by the pamphleteer of 1871, when he urged that a post be acquired in the Far East.² This desire was also present when the Treaty of Friendship was made between Samoa and Germany in 1879. At this time the Empire acquired the right of entry for German warships into the harbor of Saifata for supplies and repair as well as the right to erect buildings for the storage of coal and provisions for them.³ There is an interesting contemporary comment upon this treaty in a London publication. "In connection with the naval policy of the German Empire, the Samoan Treaty is likely to form a starting point and new departure on the part of the German government in quest of the naval stations required to protect, and possibly to

1. Total trade with Tsingtau, 1901-1907

1901-02	\$9,370,000
1902-03	17,270,000
1903-04	24,770,000
1904-05	32,430,000
1905-06	40,410,000
1906-07	51,590,000

Based on

Jahrbuch u. d. deut. Kolonien, II: 173-4

2. Chéradame, 32.

3. Treaty of Friendship, Apia, January 24, 1879.
British and Foreign, State Papers, LXX:241

promote, the extension of German commerce, rapidly and legitimately extending along the sea-board of the world, owing to the general superiority of the German clerks with which the German education has, for the last thirty years been supplying the firms, not only of their own, but of every other country..."¹

Just as soon as Germany began to expand her navy the desire for naval stations increased. Military men began to preach the uselessness of building up an effective navy unless accompanied by the acquisition of bases.² It would be impossible, they said, to maintain an effective navy to protect Germany's rapidly increasing merchant marine by depending entirely upon foreign powers for coal and provisions. Hoping to persuade the Reichstag to appropriate the necessary money to purchase the Carolines from Spain, Von Bülow pointed out at length the necessity of acquiring these islands upon which were found excellent harbors for maritime purposes. It was of especial importance since there were no good harbors on the Marshall Islands and consequently no possibility of naval stations between New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago on the one hand, and China and Japan on the other, as far as Germany was concerned, unless she acquired these or other equally good islands.³

"...As England, France, and Russia have taken maritime ports in the East, and as Germany has no port as a rendezvous for her vessels and for a coal-ing station, her position is not equal to the other great powers". This was the plea presented to the Chinese government on the behalf of that of Germany in 1898.⁴ In view of the amount of trade between Germany and China it is but natural that the Empire should desire a post in China to enable her to protect that trade.

1. Annual Register (1879), CXXI: 169 ff.

2. Cheradame, 30

3. Pensler, I:75, Bülow, Reichstag, June 21, 1899.

4. 55 Cong. 3 Sess. House Doc. I:1: 189 (Serial 3743), March 9, 1898.

That desire had been present ever since November 8, 1895.¹ Indeed there seems to have been some sort of understanding between the Kaiser and the Czar that should a favorable opportunity present itself Russia would not take it amiss if Germany acquired a Chinese port.² Sometime before February of 1897 Germany had decided upon Tsingtau. The Chinese minister to Germany, Hsu Ching Pheng, had repeatedly informed his government of this fact and finally in February, 1897, the Tsung-li-Yamen petitioned the Emperor to permit Germany to build a dock in the Bay of Kiauchou.³ When the murder of the missionaries was reported Germany took the matter in her own hands and forced the lease of the harbor in question.

The reasons for the choice of this particular port are self evident. First of all, it was sufficiently far away from the leases of England, France, and Russia to prevent any possibility of friction. Secondly the harbor was excellent. It was not only accessible but also so situated as to afford ample protection in case of bad weather. Indeed the Russian government had entered into a secret treaty with China in regard to its lease as a wintering station for the Russian fleet.⁴ In the third place it held a central position between the Gulf of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the mouth of the Yangste, and was for that reason of great value as a base for German merchants. Then its climate was temperate, probably better than that of any other part of China. In the fifth place the opportunity for obtaining coal was excellent. There were vast coal fields in the province of Schantung which could be made accessible by means of railroads. The necessity of having coal fields near a maritime base is too

1. cf. p. 26.

2. Chéradame, 129

Reventlow, 108

Denby, Forum, XXIX: 573ff.

3. 55 Cong. 3 Sess. House Doc. 1:1:186 (serial 3743) March 9, 1898.

4. Chéradame, 129

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obvious to require comment. For all these reasons this port was the best and most available for a naval station.

But there seems to have been in the acquisition of the Kiautschow Protectorate, something more than a mere longing to obtain a naval base or to further commerce, there was also present the desire on the part of Berlin, not to be left out of the race for colonial possessions. The hope that she might obtain a foothold in the East which would enable her to take part in the international diplomacy centered in this portion of the world meant that Germany could not afford to stand idly by and let other nations divide the world among themselves. They could not because they now had interests in all parts of the world.² "In any case we have...won in Kiautschau a strategic and political position which assures us of a distant influence on the future history of Eastern Asia. From this fine position we will be able to await in peace and security the further unraveling of the story..."³

And thus it was not the intrinsic value of the colonies, it was not so much the desire to spread her culture into the Far East that led Germany to expand into the Orient; nor was it so much the hope that she would be able to influence her people to migrate to the South Seas or to Kiautschau rather than to the United States; indeed, the motive which lured Germany here, was the motive which caused her to expand overseas in any direction, the same motive which caused England and France to begin their mad rush to Africa and Asia - the spirit of the age, "Welt politik". This spirit expressed itself in more than one form; sometimes in the desire to find new markets, again in the hope of obtaining naval stations to protect the increased commerce, at other times

1. See Bülow, Penzler, I:21 ~~Reichstag~~, February 8, 1898.
2. Penzler, I:90, Reichstag, Bülow, December 11, 1898.
3. Ibid., I:30, Bülow, April 27, 1898.

in the eagerness to obtain a position of sufficient strategic value to enable the owner to take a commanding position should the fitting occasion arise. These were the reasons for Germany's acquisition of territory in the Far East, taken together they indicate that in her acquisition of territory at least, Germany's policy in the Orient was part of her World Empire plans.

Of almost equal significance with the motive of acquisition is the method employed. At the outset of her attempt to colonize in the Far East Germany found herself confronted with the same difficulty which has confronted most of the colonizing countries of the world - the impossibility of arousing the legislature to a sufficient extent to cause it to contribute the necessary funds to permit the government itself to carry on the colonizing enterprises. And so the German government was forced to resort to an ancient method, that of the private chartered companies. These companies resembled those used in the seventeenth century by England in the settlement of America in that they were private enterprises. They differed from them, however, in that they were not independent organizations for purely commercial ends, but were, rather, subordinate bodies organized for a definitely political purpose.

The charter granted to the New Guinea Company in 1885 corresponded to this general type. Here the Company undertook to govern the colony, received in return the rights of territorial sovereignty and the exclusive privilege of acquiring and disposing of land but did not acquire in any sense independent jurisdiction over New Guinea. What is true of the New Guinea company is equally true of the Jaluit company on the Marshall Islands. In both instances it is evident that such companies were used because the government was not itself ready

1. Keller, 556

2. British and Foreign, State Papers, LXXVI: 341-2, May 17, 1885.

3. Keller, 561-562.

to undertake the work of colonization; the same reason which impelled Great Britain to employ a chartered company as a means in the acquisition of the North Borneo Colony.¹ These chartered companies were of course but the means to an end. The actual method employed in the case of New Guinea was that of occupation² by a private company under the authorization of the government. In the case of the Marshall Islands the existence of two treaties, one made with the Jaluit Chiefs in 1879 and the other in 1885 signed by a German captain, Roettgae, in the name of the Emperor, on the part of Germany, and by the same chiefs, on behalf of the Marshall Islanders, gave the Empire a sort of prescriptive right³ to extend its protection over these parts. Yet the real method employed was practically the same as that used in New Guinea, that of occupation, made official by virtue of the authorization by Berlin.

The Carolines, on the other hand, were acquired by purchase from the Spanish government in 1899.⁴ That is to say, they were acquired by cession. Just what the method was which was used in obtaining Upolu and Sawaili it is rather difficult to say. They were finally obtained it is true, by means of diplomatic negotiations on the part of the governments of Germany, Great Britain,⁵ and the United States, and from this standpoint, were acquired by means of conventional arrangements based upon the prescriptive rights of the treaty powers. From the standpoint of the Samoan tribes, however, it was occupation pure and simple.⁶

1. Colquhoun, The Mastery of the Pacific, 254.

2. Chéradame, 188

3. Ibid., 189-190.

4. cf. p. 22. Chéradame, 188

5. cf. p. 24.

6. For a discussion of this question see Chéradame, 190-191.

Both the Carolines and Samoa were acquired through the efforts of Berlin. Although the original incentive did come from commercial organizations, the final initiative as well as the financial backing were supplied by the central government. This development from acquisition by private companies and at the initiative of private individuals, to acquisition by the central government at its own initiative is but an illustration of the gradual evolution of the idea of colonization which began to broaden after 1890, when the World Empire idea had already penetrated very deeply into Germany. The World Empire¹ idea reached its culmination in the acquisition of Kiautschou. Here the government planned and executed its plan step by step. In no sense was this the work of private individuals. In the final analysis the method employed was that of conquest followed by cession for a temporary period, for the forceful seizure of Kiautschou which was subsequently ratified by the Chinese government, was of course, almost in the nature of a warlike act, although China did not choose to regard it in that light. In this respect it differs from the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei² to England in July and of that of Kuang Chou Wan to France³, January of 1900. Nevertheless in the broader sense there is no real distinction. Each one of these was made possible only by the fact that China was defeated by Japan in 1895. The method employed varied slightly, it is true, nevertheless the underlying motive of each was the same; France and England as well as Germany were merely acquiring commercial and naval stations under the influence of the nineteenth century expansionist movement and in both France and England it was the central government which was concerned just as Berlin was in Tsingtau.

The method of acquisition employed by Germany has by no means been of such a nature as to disregard the rights of the other countries interested in the Far East. In 1884 Bismarck emphasized the fact that it was in those parts

1. cf.;. 26-27. Chéradame, 53.

2. Convention between Great Britain and China for the Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, Hertslot, I, 122, July 1, 1898.

3. Convention for the Lease of Kuang Chou Wan, Rockhill, 55, January 5, 1900.

of the world which were not already claimed by some nation that Germany intended¹ to acquire her colonies.² Three years earlier in discussing Samoa he wrote "...we maintain unaltered the existing treaties and stipulations between us and the governments of Great Britain and the United States with regard to that group of islands, as well as the equality of rights of the treaty powers". The very choice of Tsingtau was made with a regard for the rights of the other nations interested in China.³ On the other hand her attitude was in no way conciliatory. Just as she advanced with a regard to the rights of other nations⁴ she expected those same nations to regard her just claims. When the government of New Zealand made preparations to seize the Samoan Islands in spite of the secret treaty between Germany and Great Britain that the "status quo" be maintained on these islands, Bismarck protested successfully to the British Foreign Office.⁵ When the Samoan question again came to an issue in 1899 Germany determined to uphold her position despite the fact that she had come to realize that after all the Samoan Islands were not worth all the trouble they had caused. She took this position because of the principle involved. Since the trade and property of Germans in Samoa would be endangered should she withdraw, it became her duty to remain in order that she might protect them. Again⁶ should she withdraw her just rights as a nation would be endangered, (the same argument which has had an influence in leading America into the great world war today). "We ask no more in Samoa than belongs to us according to our treaty rights, These rights, however, we cannot and will not permit to be diminished."⁷

1. Kohl, X:168-169, Reichstag, June 23, 1884.

2. 50 Cong. 1 sess. House Exec.Docs. XXVIII: 238:60. (Serial 2560) Bismarck to Alvensleben, August 7, 1881.

3. cfp. 39, 138

4. Cheradame, 110-113

5. Kohl, X:416, Bismarck in the Reichstag, January 10, 1885.

6. Pensler, I: 67, Bülow in the Reichstag, April 14, 1899.

7. Ibid., I:67, Bülow in the Reichstag, April 14, 1899.

Thus within twenty years from the time that the Empire embarked in 1879 upon expansion in the Far East, Germany acquired four island groups in the South Seas and a strip of territory upon the coast of China, led here by the influence of the world movement which inevitably results in the acquisition of territory. Her method of obtaining these possessions, at first indirect, soon came to be directed exclusively from Berlin. And so from this stand point it is possible to regard the acquisition of territorial possessions in the Far East by the German Empire as part of the World Empire plans of that nation.

Chapter III.

The Government and Administration of the German Possessions
in the South Sea Islands and of the Leased Territory in China.

The German colonies do not form an integral part of the Empire and consequently are governed by a different set of laws. According to the colonial law of October 17, 1886¹ which was extended and altered, July 25, 1900, the Emperor exercises the sovereign power in the colonies in the name of the German Empire. This has been called the prime factor in the government of the German colonies.³ It is this principle which has converted the German possessions from mere protectorates into actual colonies for because of it the entire policy in regard to the government and administration of the colonies is directed not by the local officials but by Berlin.

Originally the control of colonial affairs was in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the time of Bismarck's resignation, a fourth division in the Foreign Office was created. To this branch all details of colonial supervision were referred. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, however,

1. British and Foreign State Papers, LXXVII:1290.

2. Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, Ser. 8, III: 354.

3. Ibid., 334.

still controlled matters of general politica relating to the colonies.¹ When Bülow was called to the Chancellorship he began to advocate that the Colonial department be separated from the Foreign Office and instituted into a distinct office.² Finally in the year 1907 the Colonial Office was created and Bernhard Dernburg became the first German Secretary for the Colonies. He was succeeded by Doctor von Lindequist and still later by Doctor Solf.³ This evolution of the Berlin office is an indication of the growth of the colonial idea in Germany. Each stage of its development portends an increase in the world interests of the Empire.

The Imperial Government in the beginning directed its policies in New Guinea through the medium of a chartered company. The typical functions of the state were exercised by this company under the supervision of the government but the regulation of the administration of justice and the direction of relations between these districts and foreign governments remained in the hands of Berlin. The company on its part directed its policy through the "Landeshauptman". This official was subject to detailed directions from the officers of the company who in reality knew very little of the conditions in New Guinea.⁵ As a result the policy of the company was so vacillating that it was soon seen that it was a complete failure. Finally in 1889, owing to financial embarrassment the company appealed to the Chancellor to take over the government. This was done and for three years Berlin directed its policy in these islands through its own officers.

1. Reinsch, Colonial Government, 287.
Penzler, II:130
2. Ibid., II: 130, II: 347.
3. Dawson, 366
Von Bülow, 114-115.
Gibbons, 45
4. United Empire, I:645
5. Keller, 558.

This proved such a drain on the Imperial Government that it finally withdrew and the company again took up its duties. This remained the situation until 1899 when an Imperial commissioner was appointed to take charge of the direction¹ of the policies of the central government in New Guinea.

The medium of government on the Marshall Islands was the Jaluit company which possessed practically the same rights and duties as did the New Guinea² company. It proved to be a more successful experiment. and it was not until 1906 that the central government took over the direction of the affairs of these³ islands.

When the Carolines were acquired by the German government in 1899 they were divided into three groups, the West Carolines and Pelew with Yap as the administrative center, the East Carolines, with Ponape as the center, and the Marianne Islands, with the island of Sarfau as the center. They were all placed under the authority of a deputy commissioner, who received his directions from⁴ Berlin.

In 1902, an imperial commissioner with his headquarters at Rabaul, on the island of New Pomerania (German New Guinea) was appointed to direct the poli-⁵cies of the government in both New Guinea and the Carolines. April 1, 1906⁶ his authority was extended over the Marshall Islands, so that he now governed

1. Statesman's Yearbook, 1900: 620
2. Keller, 562
3. Statesman's Yearbook, 1907
4. Ibid., 1900
5. Ibid., 1903
United Empire, IV: 590
6. Statesman's Yearbook, 1907

all the German Islands of the South Seas save Sawail and Upolu in which the affairs¹ of the German government are directed through a Civil Governor.² Kiautschau Protectorate differs essentially from any of the other German possessions. Its situation on the border of a great empire, far away from any of the other German possessions, but close to Japan, and to the possessions of England, France, and Russia have made it necessary to place it under the protection of the German navy. For this reason it has never come under the direction of the Department of Colonial Affairs but remained under the control of the Navy Department until its fall in³ 1914.

Just as the evolution of the Berlin office is an indication of the growth of the colonial idea so also is the changes from indirect to direct control of the possessions on the part of the German Government. However, even in 1885, Berlin controlled the governmental policy of the German possessions. She has continued to do so to the present day.

Closely connected with the direct control of the colonies through officials sent out by Berlin is the development of a definite system for training these men. In 1904 a separate school for this purpose was established under the⁴ direction of the University of Berlin. Here men were trained in the languages of the Near and Far East, in the essentials of tropical hygiene, in the scientific

1.	New Guinea	Carolines	Marshall	Samoa
1885	Chartered Company		Chartered Company	
1889	Imperial Commissioner		" "	
1892	Chartered Company		" "	
1899	Imperial Commissioner	Imperial Commissioner	" "	Civil Governor
1902		Imperial Governor	" "	" "
1906		Imperial Governor		" "

2. Statesman's Yearbook, 1903

3. Ibid., 1901.
Colquhoun, 408

4. Minerva, 1911:97; 1913-14, 116-117. Though actually founded in 1887, it was given up for a time and was refounded in 1892.

methods of developing the tropics, as well as in the fundamental principles of colonial law. The establishment of such a school is a further indication of the intention on the part of the Empire to participate directly in oversea expansion.

Although the administration of the colonies has varied from time to time, certain features have remained the same. It has always been found necessary to support the colonies by subventions. As long as the chartered companies remained in control of the administration of New Guinea and the Marshall Islands, it was they who made up the deficit created by the failure to raise sufficient funds to pay all the regular expenses of government. As soon as Berlin took over the direction of the government it also took over the problem of meeting the yearly deficit. This meant a considerable expenditure of money for in the year 1900 alone it was necessary to loan 10,778,000 marks to her Far Eastern possessions. A considerable portion of the expense of the upkeep of these colonies was in the military expense necessary for their protection. This was particularly true of Kiautschou. In 1902 there was a garrison of 1500 men stationed in the protectorate. Likewise in the administration of justice the policy of the government has

1. Keller, 562.

2. Bibliotheque Coloniale Internationale, Ser 8, III; 374.

3. Based on Cheradame, 421, 469-70

	1899 1000m	1900 1000m	1901 1000m	1902 1000m	1903 1000m	1904 1000m
<u>New Guinea</u>						
Receipts from taxes	168	212	210	164	214	216
Subvention	587	699	928	940	883	908
Total Receipts	771	822	1028	1022	990	1016
Expenditure	637	696	1029	1072	990	1016
<u>Carolines</u>						
Receipts from taxes	14	181	276	291	102	220
Subvention	365	270	487	505	378	168
Total Receipts	372	417	727	755	429	329
Expenditures	259	212	506	534	429	329
<u>Samoa</u>						
Receipts from taxes		532	650	752	592	702
Subvention		29	169	170	250	235
Total Receipts		245	194	546	541	586
Expenditure		252	505	540	541	586
<u>Kiautschou</u>						
Receipts from Taxes		213				
Subvention		9780				
Total Receipts		9993				
Expenditures		9900				

4. Colquhoun, 408

remained the same.

In the charter granted to the New Guinea company in 1885 the regulation of the administration of justice was reserved for the central government although the company defrayed the expenses.¹ Subsequently it was decreed that the law on consular jurisdiction should be made applicable to this colony.² The consular law was, of course, modified to suit the needs of the colony. Civil and criminal law and judicial procedure in the colonies were to be those of the civil and criminal laws of Germany and of the general Prussian code. Natives were subject to this law only in so far as placed under it by special enactment of the Kaiser. The Chancellor of the Empire appointed the officials who took the place of the consul in administering justice. He was assisted by the court of the colony which was to be composed of two German residents.³

Upon the acquisition of Samoa practically the same provision was made.⁴ At the time those to whom the modified consular law was applicable were specifically mentioned. All residents, temporary or permanent in the protectorate, as well as those who possessed the status of residents within it, were subject to the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. Only those natives specially placed under it were subject to it and it was the governor who was to decide who were native Samoans subject, of course, to the approval of the Chancellor.

1. British and Foreign State Papers, LXXVI: 344
2. Ibid., LXXVII: 1292, June 5, 1886.
3. Ibid., LXXI: 1301. German law respecting Consular Jurisdiction, July 10, 1879. This law was slightly modified on April 7, 1900. Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, Ser. 8: III: 365.
4. State Papers, XCII: 795, February 17, 1900.

There were also courts of a similar nature in Kiautschou. Whereas the decisions rendered in the South Sea Islands were subject to appeal to the German court at Apia the appeal from Kiautschow was to the German consular court at Shanghai.¹

In return for defraying the expenses of government the New Guinea company was granted "the rights implied in territorial sovereignty as well as the exclusive right to take into occupation unoccupied land in the protected territory and to dispose of it, and to conclude contracts with the natives as to territorial titles".² This gave the company the sole right to acquire landed property. This right was, however, to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of Prussian law.³ To prevent the actual dispossessing of the natives an ordinance was made in 1887 which required that a careful inquiry should precede occupation.⁴ In case the natives cultivated or in any way occupied a particular strip of land that land was considered as belonging to the native by virtue of prescription. In case of purchase of land from the natives the cession was to be made in writing in accordance with the native custom. The payment of the purchase price was to take place immediately after the cession and might take the form of money or merchandise. When Berlin finally took over the administration of the colony it also took over the land rights of the company.⁵

By the decrees of January and June 1888 the Jaluit company was given the sole right of acquiring lands in the Marshall Islands subject to the same⁶

1. Colquhoun, 408
2. State Papers, LXXVI: 344
3. Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, Ser 3, I: 678.
4. Ibid., I: 688, Ordinance of July 20, 1887.
5. Zimmermann, 361
6. Ibid., 362
Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, Ser. 3, I: 771.

rules and regulations as laid down for the New Guinea company. In the case of the Marshall Islands as in that of New Guinea, when Berlin took over the governmental functions it also took over this privilege.

In the other colonies the central government has from the time of acquisition controlled the lease and sale of all landed property. In Samoa except in a small area known as the "Plantation District" no European may lease or purchase land from a native. This is the exclusive privilege of the home government. Even in the "Plantation District" itself lease or purchase is subject to the approval of the governor.¹ In Kiaushou Chinese are permitted to sell to the government only.² The government then resells to the European settlers.

Just as Berlin has prevented the spoliation of the natives by greedy land seekers, and just as it has not forced them to submit to law they could not understand so it has in other ways regulated the conduct of its citizens so as to prevent as far as possible the evil effects which inevitably result when the barbarian comes in contact with our modern civilization. Decrees have been passed forbidding the importing of liquor into the colonies, or of its distribution among the natives.³ Yet as a whole the German government has apparently been no more successful in its dealings with the natives than have other countries a factor resulting, no doubt, from the incompatibility of Europeans and the natives of the South Sea Islands.

A phase of Germany's desire to aid the natives is seen in her attitude toward missionary work not only in China but also in the South Sea Islands. What has been Germany's attitude toward religion and religious freedom in her possessions is probably best illustrated in Article 14 of the law of September 10, 1900.

1. Stateman's Yearbook, 1902
2. Colquhoun, 409
3. Statesman's Yearbook, 1901:655
3. Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, Ser. 1: 1: 4.

"Liberty of conscience and religious toleration are guaranteed in the colonies, to members of religious societies recognized by the German Empire. The free and public exercise of worship, the right to build religious buildings and to establish missions of these societies are not subject to any legal restriction¹ or impediment."

Germany had always been actively engaged in missionary work even before she began to acquire colonies. This is especially true of China. Prior to the time that she began to expand overseas, however, the work was that of private individuals and was not furthered by the government to any great extent. As soon as Germany had embarked on her colonial policy she seemed to have realized the importance of missionary work both as a means of uplifting the natives and also as an aid in the spreading of German culture among the uncivilized peoples.² With the German occupation came an increased interest in missionary work. Up to 1884 there were no Christian missionaries in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. The year after New Guinea became a German protectorate an evangelic mission, under the name of "Gesellschaft für innere und ausere Mission in Sinne der lutherischen Kirche.", was founded. The Steyler Mission was a Catholic organization founded³ in 1896 and the "Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft" in 1908. There was a society known as the "Genossenschaft der Missionate vom heiligsten Herzen Jesu" in the⁴ Bismarck Archipelago before Germany acquired possession of it. In the same way

1. Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, Ser. 8, III: 363.

2. Mirbt, Mission und Kolonialpolitik, 75

3. Ibid., 59

4. Ibid., 61

there were German missionary societies in Kiautschou before its seizure¹ but with² the acquisition of these territories missionary work received a great impetus, and by 1909 there were thirteen German missionary societies in the German possessions in the Far East.² By that time these societies had succeeded in obtaining 33,845 converts. Nevertheless despite the increased activity on the part of the Germans,³ the missionary work of other countries was not in the least objected to.

The work of the missions was not confined to the Christianizing of the natives, however. Much of their time was devoted to their educational better-

1. Mirbt. 67

2. Based on Mirbt. 69-70.

Stations Workers Converts

New Guinea, 1909

Kaiser Wilhelmsland

1. "Evangelische Mission"

Neuendettelsauer (1886)

13 35 1826

Rheinische (1887)

6 12 78

2. Catholic

Steyley Missionare (1896)

9 67 1250

Bismarckarchipel.

1. Catholic

Hiltruper (1882)

26 104 16139

Maristen (1899)

3 12 64

Karolinen & Marshall (1909)

1. Catholic

Kapuziner (1905)

10 36 3590

Hiltruper Missionare

6 30 694

Samoa

1. Catholic

Maristen

13 39 6552

Kiautschou

1. Evangelische Mission

Berliner (1898)

4 8 661

Allg. Ev. prot. M.-Verein

2 5 ---

2. Catholic

Steyley (1898)

5 25 2991

3. Mirbt. 71-72.

ment. There were 571 mission schools for natives in 1909 with a total attendance¹ of 15,593 students. The natives were taught how to work as well as instructed in the arts of civilization.

The government had not been satisfied to confine its support in behalf of education to contributing toward mission schools. It has also established² government schools not only for Europeans but also for the natives. The major

1. Missionary schools based upon Mirbt, 134-136. Hassert, 340-341.

NEW GUINEA

Kaiser Wilhelmsland

	Schools for natives	Scholars
1. Evangelische Mission		
Neuendettelsau	13	460
Rhein. Mission	6	275
2. Catholic		
Steyler	14	600

Bismarck Archipelago

1. Evangelische Mission		
Methodisten	184	5022
2. Catholic		
Hiltruper	92	4137
Maristen	5	181

CAROLINES and MARSHALL

1. Catholic		
Kapusiner	14	476
Hiltruper	8	221

SAMOA

1. Evangelische		
Methodisten	77	1757
2. Catholic		
Maristen	71	1353

KIAUTSCHOU

1. Evangelische		
Berliner	13	250
Allg. Ev. prot.	4	138
2. Catholic		
Steyler	70	723

2. Mirbt, 134-136

Bismarck Archipel.

Samoa

Carolines

Kiautschou

	School	Scholars
1	School for natives	27
1	" " "	
1	" " halfbreeds	126
1	" " natives	211
7	" " "	181
2	" " Europeans	134

part of its attention has been concentrated on Tsintau, however. Here there are seven schools for natives. The German-Chinese Highschool which was opened in the fall of 1909 had a varied curriculum. Medicine, law, agriculture, technical subjects, and forestry, besides ¹ gymnasium were taught with the customary German thoroughness.

Christianity and education have not been neglected in the administration of Germany's possessions in the Far East. To the same degree internal improvements have received the careful attention of the government. Even so radical an opponent of anything German as J. Ellis Barker (Elsbacher) has written of the German colonial policy, "It is quite true that Germany has run her colonies at a loss, but this is largely due to the fact that she has not tried to run them for gain. In her colonial policy, Germany has not looked to immediate profit... The German government endeavoured not only to create model colonies, but to found a New Germany across the sea. Where the English government would have been satisfied with a straggling village and a shanty, the Germans built up a substantial town and a Governor's palace surrounded by a park..." ² This has been particularly true of the ^{the} Kiautschou Protectorate. Tsintau has been converted into a model city, "an eloquent example to the Chinese and an object lesson by which the country is bound to profit..." The streets are to-day macadamised and are illuminated with electricity. Trees have been planted along the boulevards. The public buildings of stone and the brick houses have been substantially built yet the aesthetic ³ has not been neglected. There are schools, churches and hospitals; a large ⁴ library and a home where sailors may spend their leisure hours. No European

1. United Empire, III: 722
2. Ibid., VI: 219 (1915)
3. Ibid., III: 722, Louis Hamilton.
4. Hassert, 339

city could be more modern!

As important as the erecting of a model city in the "Decadent Empire" may be, its importance is eclipsed by another work which the government of Germany has undertaken. Scientific and keen in everything, the officials have been quick to learn that what was needed to supply the vast coal mines of Shantung with props was an adequate supply of timber. The Chinese, like our ancestors had laid waste vast timber lands so that much of China became desolate. Starting with the streets of Tsintau Germany began its work of afforesting China. Annually as many as 10,000 trees and shrubs were given away to both natives and European settlers. These consist not only of timber trees but also of fruit trees.¹ To-day this portion of China is regaining its growth. Louis Hamilton has paid a fitting tribute to the work Germany had done here..."...We (English) can learn much from what Germany is doing quietly and unostentatiously in China. Her introduction of order, health, system, education and afforestation are respect-compelling factors which speak eloquently to awakening China of a country which to her is a new world-power risen out of obscurity. She no longer looks upon Kiaochou as a thorn in her side but as a sound spot, from which^{the} health-giving² example of Occidental civilization radiates through the Celestial Empire."

Thus though Germany has entered the race for a colonial empire with great zeal she has not entered upon it with out a true regard for the rights of humanity. Her attitude toward the betterment of the condition of the natives found in the South Sea Islands and China must needs redound to her glory in the future.

1. United Empire, IV: 722

2. Ibid., III: 717

Chapter IV.

Germany's Attitude toward the Situation in the Far East since 1895. Her Eastern Commercial policy.

The Chino-Japanese War opened up the whole situation in Eastern Asia. The attitude of the European nations on this question is the keynote to their attitude on all the problems arising out of the unstable condition of China. It led directly to the seizure and lease of Kiaochou (Tsingtau and the Bay of Kiaochou) by Germany in 1898, and to the subsequent leases of Port Arthur by Russia, of Weihaiwei by Great Britain and of Kwangchowan by France. These leases in turn, coupled with the aggressive attitude of the European nations, an attitude¹ common to all, brought on the Boxer Rebellion late in 1899.

Hostility to foreigners and to Christianity was fomented by two well organized societies, that of the "Ta-tao-huei" (Great Knives Society) and of the² "I-ho-chuan" (Boxer Society). The work of these bodies led to a series of pro-³tests on the part of the European governments and finally to the demand of these

1. For an excellent account of the causes of the Boxer Rebellion cf. Clements, The Boxer Rebellion, Columbia University Studies, LXVI: 427 ff.
2. Rockhill, 87. Imperial Edict of February, 1901.
3. Clements, Columbia University Studies, LXVI: 501-503

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governments for permission to protect their legations with detachments, a re-
 quest which was never acceded to in theory although it was in fact. The German
 government acted with the other nations in securing the enforcement of these
 measures not because she had any intention of mixing up in the internal affairs
 of China, but because it was her duty to protect the lives and property of Ger-
 man citizens, of German missionaries, and of German merchants. This was her
 avowed attitude even in February of 1898. She had never desired the partition
 of China. In speaking of the enforced lease of Kiautschou Bülow said, "I should
 especially like to emphasize that we uprightly desire the welfare of China, and
 we desire the continuance of China. I do not believe that this old Empire of
 yesterday will fall to pieces to-morrow..." and again in April, "...Such a partition
 of China would by no means have been passed by by us, we have, however, prepared on
 the side for this, that we, no matter what may happen, shall not be left out en-
 tirely. We do not, however--that I should like to state with particular emphasis--
 desire that a partition of China should be brought about....." 5

These two speeches are clear indications of the attitude of the government toward
 the whole question of the disintegration of China. What the Empire did, seems
 to prove the sincerity of these declarations. Although Germany did not desire the
 breakup of China yet she was in no way willing that, should the break-up prove in-
 evitable, she should be excluded from those who were to divide the spoils.

For a time after the spring of 1900 it seemed that the trouble in China
 had been allayed. But it was soon found that the activities of the societies had

1. Clements, Columbia University Studies, LXVI: 505-6
2. Penzler, I: 462-463, Bülow in the Reichstag, July 11, 1900
3. Penzler, I: 53, Bülow in the Reichstag, February 28, 1899
4. Ibid., I: 21, February 8, 1898
5. Ibid., I: 30, April 27, 1898.

spread from Shantung to the neighboring provinces. Here Chinese Christians were ruthlessly murdered from time to time. The hope that the Chinese government would take effective measures to quell the disturbance was given up. After much deliberation the diplomatic corps in China determined to send a detachment of European troops on Peking on May 28, 1900.¹

Meanwhile the news of the death of Freiherr von Ketteler, German minister to China, reached Berlin.² The whole nation, and, indeed, the whole world was filled with consternation and horror. The story of his death may be briefly related. The foreign legations were surrounded by Chinese troops. The detachments sent to Peking were unable to relieve them because of the seizure of the railroad³ by the Boxers and^{because} of the huge army stationed at the entrance of the city itself. Hoping to obtain relief for this situation the diplomatic corps petitioned the Tsung-li-Yamen for permission to obtain an audience with it on the morning of the 20th of June. When the corps gathered to receive the reply, it was found that the Tsung-li-Yamen had ignored their request. As a last resort Ketteler offered to go to that body in person in hope of winning them over. And so, accompanied by his Chinese servant, Ketteler proceeded toward the hall in which the legislative body met. He had not proceeded very far indeed when a Chinese soldier began to fire upon him, killing him instantly. The Chinese servant managed to escape, however, and it is upon his report that our knowledge of this episode is

1. Clements, Columbia University Studies, LXVI: 509-511.

2. British and Foreign State Papers, XCIV: 1102

Viscount Gough to the Marquess of Salisbury-Berlin, July 2, 1900.

News of the murder was first heard of by the German Consul at Tient-tsin on the 29th of June. It was not until the 2d of July that the message was communicated to the world.

3. 56th Cong. 2 Sess. House Docs. I: 161 (Serial 4069)

Mr Conger to Mr Hay. U S Legation in China, July 17, 1900.

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based.

Shortly after the murder of the German minister, the entire Chinese army gathered in Peking, surrounded the diplomatic headquarters and fired upon them. It soon became necessary that four hundred foreigners, two hundred of whom were women and children, be crowded into the British legation, in which there already were one hundred soldiers. Within a short space of time the movement which began as an attack upon Chinese Christians turned into an attack
2
upon all foreigners and upon anything foreign.

News of the death of Ketteler had led to what seemed to be well founded rumors that all of the foreign population had been murdered. Simultaneously with this news came the request from the German admiral to the Kaiser asking that an entire division be sent at once. It is in the light of these facts that the Kaiser's speeches of July 2, 1900, made to a battalion of marines about to depart for China must be read.

"The torch of war has been flung into the midst of deepest peace-- --. A crime unparalleled in its insolence, hateful in its cruelty, has been perpetrated upon my tried and trusted representative, and has hurried him to his grave...

"The German flag has been outraged, and the German Empire has been insulted--That demands exemplary reparation and vengeance.

.....

"You will face an enemy who defies death no less than you do. Trained by European officers, the Chinese have learned how to fight with European weapons...

"Thus I send you out there to avenge wrong and enforce reparation. I

1. British and Foreign, State Papers, XCV: 1234
2. 56 Cong. 2 Sess. House Docs. I: 1: 162 (4069)
Mr Conger to Mr Hay. U S Legation in China, September 17, 1900.

will not rest until the German flag united with those of the other Powers flies victorious from the walls of Peking, flies over the Chinese, and dictates the terms of peace to the Chinese".¹

Taken out of its proper setting such a speech must be interpreted as an indication of the militant attitude on the part of the Kaiser, at least, toward the Chinese government but, read with the facts which brought it on in mind, it is not only justified but altogether reasonable. To have taken any other stand would have branded the government as negligent of the just right of its citizens to expect that they will be protected.

Quick action on the part of the allied governments brought China to terms. The combined forces of the foreign powers were placed under the command of the German commander, Count Waldersee on August 18, 1900.² Peking was captured and an allied force marched through the "Forbidden City".³

The next problem which arose was that of the restoration of peace and order.⁴ First of all it was necessary to determine upon a just punishment for

1. Schierbrand, 258, July 2, 1900
State Papers, XCIV: 1106

July 27, 1900 the Kaiser under the influence of much the same news, spoke to the troops about to leave Bremerhaven for China.

.....
"You are to fight against a cunning, courageous, well-armed, and cruel foe. When you are upon him, know this: Spare nobody, make no prisoners. Use your weapons in a manner to make every Chinaman for a thousand years to come forego the wish to as much as look askance at a German..."

Schierbrand, 260.

This speech must be interpreted in much the same way as that cited in the text.

2. British and Foreign, State Papers, XCIV: 1185-1197.
56th Cong. 2 Sess. House Docs. I:1: 330, (Serial 4069)
3. Clements, Columbia University Studies, LXVI: 585
4. For a complete discussion of this subject see Clements, 551 ff.

those responsible for the outrages. In regard to this the German government insisted that, "before entering into negotiations for peace, public opinion in Germany would require that the Government should obtain some satisfaction for the outrages committed in China"¹ It was not necessary that a large number of persons be punished but it was essential that the "Chief instigators and leaders" be severely punished in order that a repetition of these outrages would be made impossible.²

As a result of the negotiations a joint note was drawn up and signed by representatives of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Belgium, Spain, the United States,³ France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Russia. This document embodied the conditions which were to be fulfilled by the Chinese government before normal relations could be restored with her. Chief among these conditions were first the despatch to Berlin of an extraordinary mission, headed by a Chinese Prince, which should express the regrets of the Chinese Emperor for the murder of Baron von Ketteler; secondly, the infliction of a punishment as severe as the crime of those designated warranted; the guarantee to each of the powers of the liberty to maintain a permanent guard for its legation, and the right of military occupation of certain points which would insure the keeping open of lines of communication between Peking and the sea.

China at once agreed to the conditions laid down in this treaty. On September 4, Prince Chun, brother of the Chinese Emperor, delivered the apology⁴ of China to the Kaiser, as the representative of the German nation and three days

1. British and Foreign, State Papers, XCIV: 1277. Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, September 18, 1900.

56 Cong. 2 Sess. House Doc. I: 1: 341 (Serial 4069)

2. British and Foreign, State Papers, XCIV: 1280 ff. Count Halzfeldt to the Marquess of Salisbury, German Embassy, London, September 18, 1900.

3. Joint Note, December 22, 1900. Am. Jour. International Law, Supplement 4:360ff. Rockhill, 63

56 Cong. 2 Sess. House Doc. I: 1: 244-3 (Serial 4069)

4. Schierbrand, 264-65, September 4, 1900. Potsdam.

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later the final protocol was drawn up. This contained the agreements entered into by China for the carrying out of the provision of the joint note.

The Boxer rebellion is extremely interesting in itself. It has, however, a broader and more fundamental significance. Its history contains much which illustrates the existence of the spirit of "Welt politik". This spirit is the foundation stone of the attitude of every one of the nations, it is well exemplified by the German attitude. The desire to take part in any international question which might arise is but an expression of it.² There can be no better evidence of the fact that Germany's attitude toward the Far East was part of her World Empire plan than the fact that although she had no desire to bring about a partition of China yet she was not in the least willing that other nations should divide that country without considering her. Likewise there was nothing militant about Germany's attitude toward the suppression of the Boxers. True she was ready and determined to uphold what she considered her just rights but this cannot be designated as an excessively aggressive attitude.

China had no sooner settled her difficulties than Japan became involved in war with Russia. Not only did Germany maintain a state of strict neutrality throughout this crisis; she was likewise instrumental in forcing the temporary neutralization of China because she feared that unless this were done a world war would result. That she should be instrumental in bringing such a decision about tends to show that Germany was a nation with world-wide interests and that these interests extended even into the Far East.

1. British and Foreign, State Papers, XCIV: 686.
Rockhill, 66, September 7, 1901.

2. cf. p. 2.

As the commerce with the Far East increased the question of the policy which should be adopted with respect to that commerce arose. If the World Empire plans were to be furthered in this portion of the world, commercial intercourse between Europe and its Far Orient must be facilitated. The commercial policy which Germany adopted was that of the "Open Door" until she was forced to abandon it.

Germany had early recognized the importance of commerce as a means of increasing her power. Indeed the desire for a colonial empire in the Far East had been to a large extent the result of her efforts to further her expanding commercial interests. But the mere acquisition of colonies and of commercial bases, together with the naval stations which would make possible the protection of these colonies could not of itself have stimulated commerce to the extent it was stimulated, had it not been for the government's attitude toward commerce.

As early as April 10, 1886 Great Britain and Germany came to an agreement relating to the reciprocal freedom of trade and commerce in the possessions and protectorates of these two countries in the South Seas. The citizens of the one were to have the same privileges of trade as those of the protecting state. The vessels of both countries were to enjoy reciprocally not only equal but also most favored nation treatment. In the same way merchandise imported by the subjects of either of the nations was not to be the object of higher duties than exacted of goods imported by the subjects of the protecting state or of any other state.

When Tsingtau was leased in 1898 it was declared a free port by Germany. The following year provisional customs regulations for this territory were laid down. According to these provisions, goods imported into the German territory.

1. British and Foreign, State Papers, April 10, 1886, LXXVII: 45.
2. Hertslett, II: 1156. Footnote. September 2, 1898.
United Empire, III: 720.
3. British and Foreign, State Papers, XCV: 611. May 2, 1899.

was to be free, with the exception of opium, arms and explosives "and the materials used in the manufacture thereof". Foreign and Chinese commodities exported from the German territory into China proper, which had not already paid import duties at some Chinese port were subject to import duties on exportation.

The German government itself was most emphatic in its assurances that it would maintain its open door policy as long as the attitude of the other nations permitted it. "...The politics of Germany in the extreme Orient are de facto the politics of the open door, and Germany proposed to maintain this principle in the future".¹ Two months later Von Bülow wrote to the American Ambassador,² "...The Imperial Government has, from the beginning, not only asserted, but also practically carried out to the fullest extent, in its Chinese possessions, absolute equality of treatment of all nations with regard to trade, navigation, and commerce. The Imperial Government entertains not thought of departing in the future from this principle, which at once excludes any prejudicial or disadvantageous commercial treatment of the citizens of the United States, so long as it is not forced to do so, on account of considerations of reciprocity by a divergence from it by other governments. If, therefore, the other powers interested in the industrial development of the Chinese Empire are willing to recognize the same principles, this can only be desired by the Imperial Government...."

This declaration of Germany's policy was followed by further evidence of her faith in October of the same year. At that time an agreement was reached³ between the Empire and Great Britain defining their mutual policy in China.

1. 56 Cong. 1 Sess. House Doc. 1: 1: 130-131 (Serial 3898) Mr Jackson to Mr Hay, U S Embassy, Berlin. December 4, 1899.
2. Ibid., 1: 1: 131. Count von Bülow to Mr White, Foreign Office, Berlin, February 19, 1900.
3. Am. Jl. International Law, Supplement, 1: 387.
Hertslet, 1: 591, October 16, 1900
British and Foreign, State Papers, XCII:31

According to the terms of this agreement the ports of Chinese rivers under control of Germany or England were to remain open to the trade and commerce of nationals of all nations without distinction.

Germany was, however, forced to abandon her free trade policy because of the impossibility of competing with Japanese commodities under such a scheme. Consequently she came to an agreement with China whereby goods imported into and exported from the German territory were to be subject to the duties which were laid down in the Chinese regulations for foreign trade. Chinese officers were to collect the duties, twenty percent of which were turned over to the German¹ Government.

In this respect the very commercial policy adopted by the German government was part of her World Empire plans. Since it was necessary to adjust her scheme for furthering commerce to the changing conditions of the age, she abandoned what at first had seemed the best possible plan in order that she might protect the ever widening interests of Germany.

And thus Germany, influenced by the trend of the times, became a

1. Hertslet, II: 1191, German Ordinance regulating procedure in customs matters in Kiao-chow Territory. Tsingtau. December 2, 1905.
Gibbons, 43
United Empire, III: 720

World Empire and gradually began to expand over the seas. Looking about for possible fields for colonization she turned toward the Far East where she found

1. Year	In Germany	Chart to Illustrate Germany's World Policy		
		Oversea Expansion		Other Subjects
		Near East-Africa.	Far East	
1878		Berlin Congress		
1879			Treaty of Friendship with Samoa	
1880		First Moroccan Crisis. Germany supports France	Samoa Subvention Bill	
1884		Togo acquired. Kamerun acquired 1884-1890 Germany Northwest Africa acq.	"Dampfersubvention"	
1885		1885-1890 German East Africa Acq.	New Guinea acq. Marshall Islands acquired.	
1890	4th Division of the Foreign Office Created as the Colonial Division			
1892	School for Colonial Officials definitely founded.			
1893				German-French Russian interference on behalf of China.
1898	First Navy Bill Passed. "Flottenverein" founded		Kiautschou leased	
1899			Carolines acquired Samoa acquired. Boxer Rebellion	
1900	Navy Bill			
1901		1901-1911 Final Moroccan Crisis		
1904				Russo-Japanese War
1906	Navy Bill			
1907	Creation of Colonial Office			
1908	Navy Bill			
1912	Navy Bill of 1912			

four island groups in the South Seas and a strip of territory on the edge of Eastern Asia. At the same time she began to colonize in Africa. Here she acquired Togo, Kamerun, German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa within ¹ six years. The colonies both in the Far East and in Africa were valuable not only as markets for surplus products but also as naval bases by means of which the Empire was able to offer protection to German commerce and to take a commanding position in the international affairs of the age. It was this position which enabled her to play a leading role in the events which took place at the close of the Chino-Japanese War, in the Boxer Rebellion, in the Russo-Japanese War, and in the final Moroccan Crisis.

Hindered by the lack of support on the part of the Reichstag the Empire adopted the only means available for the acquisition of colonies, the ² chartered company. This is true not only of the Far East but also of Africa. As soon as Germany was able to abandon this means she took up the safer and more direct method of colonization through the medium of her own officials. Occupation, cession, and conquest were all employed to aid Germany in her acquisition of territory in the Far East but at no time was her method such as to disregard the rights of others, whether European or native. In the government and administration of her possessions Germany has proceeded with a regard for the just rights of the natives and has gone far in the betterment of their condition. In her international relations in the Far East Germany has never been militant; it has not been her desire to bring about the partition of China in order that she might benefit. On the other hand she has always manifested her

1. Statesmans Yearbook, 1913

2. Ibid., 1913

unwillingness to be regarded in any other light than that of a great World Power whose interests extended even into China. Her commercial policy in the Far Orient which evolved from that of the "open door" to that of tariff has been influenced by her desire to aid her ever expanding commercial interests and also by her larger naval policy which has colored every act of the Empire since the present Kaiser ascended. Indeed Germany's policy in the Far East, whether in respect to the acquisition of markets, of naval stations, or in the securing of her position as one of the great powers in China, has always been so intimately related to her policy in the Near East and Africa, and to her naval policy that it must be considered as but a phase of her larger World Policy, as an exemplification of her World Empire plans.

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





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South Sea Islands July 1914.

- Germany
- United States
- England
- France
- Holland

Russian

Empire

Vladivostok

Japanese Sea

Peking

Tientsin

Taiwan

Port Arthur

Yingkau

Keelung

German

Yellow Sea

Mouths of the Yangtze River

Shanghai

Wingpo

Keelung

Canton

Hong Kong British

Macao Portuguese

Formosa

Hwangchow Wan French

China and Japan, July 1914.

Statute Miles 138-1 inch 400 500