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A Journal of Micronesian Studies



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
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H. I. MANNER, JULY 1991

"The Greatest Hardship": Micronesian Memories of World War II

SUZANNE FALGOUT
LIN POYER
LAURENCE M. CARUCCI

This article discusses World War II in Japanese Micronesia through oral accounts of Islanders who experienced the war years. Although wartime conditions varied throughout the area, most stories refer to World War II as "the greatest hardship" ever endured. The prewar context of Japanese Micronesia and the wartime strategies used by American and Japanese combatants are reviewed briefly, and then we focus on Micronesians' memories of their wartime experiences. Briefly considered in the conclusion are the lessons of World War II for Micronesians 50 years after the war's end.

TOWARD A MICRONESIAN STORY OF THE WAR

Fifty years have now passed since the end of World War II in Micronesia.[1] But the memory of war is still immediate, painful, and intensely personal for those Micronesians who lived through the war years. Half a century later, accounts of those times are still vividly recalled and poignantly told (see Carucci, Hunter-Anderson & Moore, Poyer, and George, this volume).

Our project, conducted in 1990–1991, was designed to capture Micronesians' stories of World War II through the study of oral accounts of

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the war years.[2] Our collection of more than 300 such accounts from the Marshalls (Caruccci), Kosrae and Pohnpei (Falgout), and Chuuk and Yap (Poyer) builds upon our earlier work[3] and collections by other researchers working in the former Japanese and US colonies of Micronesia.[4] The war stories contain a wealth of detail about the variety of wartime activities, local conditions, and social changes throughout the area (see map in the front matter of this volume for locations mentioned in this article.) In addition, the stories embody culturally significant interpretations of Micronesians' experiences and the lessons they hold for the future.

The World War II era—the prewar Japanese military buildup, the conflict itself, and the American occupation and control of the conquered islands—was a watershed time in Micronesia's history. But World War II was not the Micronesians' war (cf. Zoleveke, 1988). Although the Islanders must be seen as active participants whose contributions to the cause were crucial first to Japanese and in some cases later to American successes in the war, their involvement throughout the conflict was as a supporting cast in a drama in a theater of foreign war. They were literally caught in the middle of a bitter struggle for control of the Pacific. Their fates lay in the hands of the major combatants, their fortunes determined by changing Japanese and Allied strategic plans. As the war continued year after year, Micronesian enthusiasm waned and then died. Thus, World War II is an event remembered by Micronesians primarily as the war between the Japanese and American combatants.

Actual wartime conditions varied considerably throughout Micronesia. In most stories, however, World War II is referred to as "the greatest hardship"[5] ever endured. Micronesians, like the Japanese and Americans who fought there, undertook heroic actions and experienced the horrors of war. Losses of Micronesian lives and property in the war were significant. Also significant were the social and psychological changes incubated in those years of hardship. It was a period of almost unrelieved exhaustion, suffering, and fear.

The following overview of World War II in the former Japanese colony of Micronesia situates Micronesian wartime experiences by outlining the prewar context of Japanese colonial rule, the Japanese military buildup on the eve of war, and the American advance through the area.[6] Throughout, we emphasize Micronesians' perceptions and memories of their wartime experiences. Finally, we discuss part of the legacy of the war for Micronesian societies today.

MICRONESIA UNDER THE JAPANESE MANDATE

Japan had been firmly established in Micronesia for almost three decades before the outbreak of the war. Pursuing long-standing sentimental and strategic interests in the South Seas, Japan had taken possession of Germany's Micronesian colonies in 1914; Japan's control of the area as a Class "C" League of Nations Mandate was legally established after the end of World War I (see Peattie, 1988). More careful and intensive colonizers than either the Spaniards or Germans who were there before them, the Japanese and their South Seas government focused on the development of Micronesia as an integral and productive area of the Japanese Empire.

Japanese interest in Micronesia was eventually overshadowed by priorities for economic development for the homeland and resettlement of Japan's burgeoning population. Nevertheless, Micronesians remember Japanese colonial times in some ways as a golden age. Everyday life in Micronesia in the years before the war was characterized by economic boom. Islanders were part of a system in which they had some (although far from equal) access to wage labor and imported goods, schooling, and health care. The stability and efficiency of the colonial administration were also appreciated, despite Japanese restrictions on indigenous political traditions and the methods of strict discipline and harsh punishment that were used to maintain this new order. And, although somewhat segregated from the Japanese, Micronesians could at least partially participate in a wide range of Japanese-inspired activities and become part of a system with regional and global connections (see Peattie, 1988).

Prior to the war, then, Micronesian Islanders' attitudes had been shaped by decades of Japanese colonial efforts to socialize them to be loyal members of the empire. The enculturation of Micronesians as subjects loyal to Japan had been hampered by Japanese ethnocentrism, which literally gave Micronesians third-class status, thereby marginalizing them in their home islands. Nonetheless, an effort had been made, and to some extent it succeeded, to imbue Islanders with a Japanese sensibility, a preference for things and ways Japanese, loyalty to the emperor, and obedience to authority (see Peattie, 1988). Although ambivalent about their feelings toward the Japanese administration (some organized resistance did occur in Palau and perhaps in Pohnpei and Yap), most Micronesians nevertheless saw themselves as members, albeit low-ranked members, of this expanding Japanese Empire.

THE WAR APPROACHES

Knowledge about the impending war reached Islanders in Japanese colonial Micronesia from several sources. Those few who were employed by the Japanese civilian administration or who had Japanese friends or who were students in Japanese or mission schools had already heard about the fighting in other Pacific arenas. Many recall the Japanese announcement of the attacks on Pearl Harbor and Singapore on December 7, 1941.[7] Later some heard news about battles in the Philippines, the southwest Pacific, and elsewhere. At colonial headquarters throughout Micronesia, the Japanese held small celebrations for these early, successful campaigns. In such ways, some Micronesians learned that Japan was the aggressor and strong and victorious in war.

But modern communication and transportation were still undeveloped in the Micronesian colonies, and the Japanese also wished to maintain a level of secrecy about the details of the fighting. The majority of Micronesians who lived in more remote areas or who were less well connected to the Japanese colonists were left to ponder the rumors of war, which traveled extremely slowly and unsteadily through gossip networks. In general, the farther an island's location was from a Japanese colonial center, the less its inhabitants heard about the war.

Islanders who did hear news of the growing global conflict connected it at first with local activity. Even after Pearl Harbor, daily life in most places in the Japanese Mandate continued more or less as usual for months or even years. The war seemed safely distant.

JAPAN PREPARES FOR WAR IN MICRONESIA

Much controversy centers on whether or to what extent Japan had been preparing for war in the Mandate before Pearl Harbor. After all, it was in 1933 that the Japanese had walked out of the League of Nations in response to the League's censure of Japan's involvement in Manchuria; the next year Japan announced its nonrenewal of the Naval Limitations Treaty. Then in 1935 Japan withdrew from the League (Peattie, 1988). Given the strategic importance of Micronesia to the Japanese, it is perhaps surprising that the Japanese did so little prewar preparation there.

As war loomed, however, aspects of the intensifying prewar Micronesian economy segued into war preparations. Changes in the 1930s began with

a program of immigration, economic development, and infrastructure improvement. This program was accompanied by a step-up in contract labor, land appropriation, and relocation of Micronesians. Late in the decade, the expectation of imminent war spurred the construction of offensive air bases and support facilities. By the time of Pearl Harbor, offensive bases had been constructed in the Marshalls, Saipan, Palau, and Chuuk; several of the early Japanese military offensives were staged through these Micronesian locations. In addition, smaller offensive staging areas had been developed in other Micronesian islands. In all though, relatively little other war preparation was initiated in Micronesia before 1941 (see Peattie, 1988).

The initial responses of most Micronesians to these new activities and opportunities were largely unconstrained by thoughts of their own future hardship. The step-up in local activity seemed at first to be part of the Japanese economic development plan that had been initiated early in this colonial administration and that had progressively increased in the decade before the war. In seeing or even participating in such activities, most Micronesians did not read them as obvious danger signals. The war still seemed to be distant, to be something with which most Micronesians were only very marginally or indirectly involved.

Although the war was not a major concern for most Micronesians, they generally expressed a measure of approval of Japan's early wartime activities. In some Micronesian chiefly societies where warfare had in former times been commonplace and culturally valued, many were excited about the news of war. In addition, the Japanese had circulated nationalistic propaganda that often included ridicule of the Allied forces. The Allies, particularly the Americans, were stereotyped as mean-spirited, prejudiced people who were also stupid, disorderly, and weak. Few Micronesians doubted that Japan would win the war, and many gladly joined in the cause.

Some Micronesians even volunteered for special missions in other Pacific locales. Perhaps the best known of the Micronesian volunteers were the men who, in 1942, were recruited from Palau and Pohnpei and sent to Melanesia (Higuchi, 1984; Watakabe, 1972). It is not clear whether they understood they would be directly participating in the war effort, but they did see their efforts as supporting the Japanese cause. Accorded elevated status and extra pay, they anticipated future rewards at the war's end for their hard work and loyalty to the Japanese.

When we asked our informants "When did the war begin?" the answers varied, depending on local circumstances. For most, the war began when "hard times" came to them, times that contrasted vividly with the good life

and thriving economy under civilian Japanese rule. But when hard times came, the Micronesians' sense of the war's distance and their own uninvolvement in it could no longer be sustained.

Some areas that had been chosen early as Japanese offensive military installations were profoundly and suddenly transformed, such as air base locations in the Marshalls. These Marshall Islands bases and those in Saipan even received some brief retaliatory bombing in response to the Japanese attack of December 7. In most other areas where early preparations for war were less extensive, however, the preparations had gone largely unnoticed by the local populations.

For most Islanders in the Japanese Mandate, it was not until the war became a fact of life—that is, not until the Japanese attempted defensive fortification construction in late 1943 and the American bombing that quickly followed—that the massive impacts of militarization dramatically reshaped Micronesian life. And then the change occurred almost overnight. For most Micronesians, World War II (as the Americans called it) or *Daidowa* (as the Japanese called it) is the time when the fighting actually reached their island and the war forcefully intruded into their world. Thus, the time frame for the indigenous experience of World War II in Micronesia varies, must be dated locally, and ranges from the first American invasion in the region, in the Marshalls in November 1943, to the last invasion, in Palau in September 1944.

Whether individual Micronesians were somewhat knowledgeable, a bit suspicious, or completely surprised by the approach of war, when the war finally did arrive nothing in their prior experience could have prepared them for what was to take place in their home islands. Micronesians did not, and could not, know the meaning of a war of this scale, intensity, technological sophistication, or duration. Given this, plus the suddenness (especially in Micronesian eyes) of the war's arrival in their homelands as the American counteroffensive leapfrogged across the islands, they were shocked when the bombing began.

Wartime circumstances across Micronesia varied greatly from one location to another, depending on such factors as the kind of military strategy employed for a locale; the timing of the war's arrival; the nature and length of the campaign; the island type and available resources; the nature and extent of prewar preparation; the population size and composition; the backgrounds and personalities of individual Japanese and American administrators and Micronesian leaders; the indigenous customs then in place; and the ethnic background, age, sex, and status of individual Micronesians.

What follows is an overview of Micronesian wartime experiences. We summarize some of the more dramatic stories, beginning when war was brought to these islands with the American march down a second road to Tokyo, this one through Micronesia, beginning in late 1943.

THE WAR ARRIVES

The American Offensive Strategy

The drive through Micronesia had early been identified (following considerable US Army and Navy debate about Pacific strategy) as crucial to the Allied strategy to reclaim Japanese-occupied areas in the southwest Pacific and Asia and for the eventual advance toward Japan. However, little was known about these islands or about the nature of Japanese defenses in the area. In late 1943 the decision was made to carry out a central Pacific offensive through Micronesia. The plan was to launch attacks against enemy bases in the Marshalls and then move across Micronesia through the Carolines to the Marianas and Palau, where Allies could establish air bases close to occupied areas in Asia and Japan itself (see Richard, 1957).

At first, Allied plans called for seizure of all important Japanese military bases. But lessons learned early in the Pacific campaign taught American military leaders the advantage of less directly confrontational strategies, which became known by such seemingly innocuous terms as blockading, neutralizing, leapfrogging, and bypassing. Islands the Americans could use as forwarding bases in an effort to get as close as possible to Japan, and as quickly as possible, were targeted for earliest attack and invasion. The others were to be bombed and isolated, prevented from coming to the support of the invasion targets, rendered ineffective, and left to wither on the vine (see Richard, 1957).

The Japanese Defensive Response

Just prior to and in hurried preparation for this American advance, in late 1943 the Japanese military administration, along with massive troop reinforcements, began a rush into Micronesia. Typically, this military admin-

istration largely overwhelmed and subordinated the existing civil administration (see Peattie, 1988).

These enormous efforts of the Japanese military proved to be too little and too late. The overly large and overly strict Japanese military presence would place additional burdens on Micronesians as the war continued.

Micronesians in Between

With the arrival of the new Japanese military administration, Micronesians explain, the Japanese stopped caring about them; instead, the Japanese instituted martial law. Japanese laws, which had always been strict, became severe. Any breach of conduct was dealt with swiftly and brutally, through humiliation, beatings, torture, and threats of death.

The rate of change in island lifeways that had begun to build momentum during the years of Japanese war preparations now began to accelerate to a frenzied pitch. Under the Japanese military, Micronesians worked primarily on military construction and on agricultural and manufacturing projects—most often by hand labor (see Hunter-Anderson & Moore, this volume). Micronesians whose homes were in the path of the various Japanese wartime projects were pushed aside. Many people were forced to relocate to different parts of their home islands, or even to other islands, in order to increase the number of people needed for work activities, to remove people from military target areas, or as a means to further local control. Many husbands and wives were separated, and families were severely disrupted. Travel was restricted, sometimes even prohibited. Micronesians who the Japanese feared would attempt to escape to the Allied side were placed under conditions that amounted to imprisonment.

Meanwhile, the Americans continued their military campaign of bombing and blockading the islands. People were frightened and resources were increasingly scarce.

HARDSHIPS ALONG A SECOND ROAD TO TOKYO

The Hardships of Invasion

The Marshall Islands, beginning in late 1943, were at the front of the Allied penetration into Japanese Micronesia. Intense and brutal, the fighting on

the primary Allied strategic target islands of Majuro, Kwajalein, and Enewetak was, nevertheless, mercifully short. The Americans accomplished their main goals in the Marshalls in just over 3 weeks, and the area was considered secure within 3 months.[8] But the recently arrived Japanese forces on Kwajalein and Enewetak defended these islands until the very end. The atolls allowed no escape, and so the Japanese casualties were extremely high. Nearly 200 Marshallese died fighting alongside Japanese soldiers in the assault on Kwajalein. Relief to the occupied Marshall Islands quickly followed in the form of the American Navy, which brought a seemingly endless flow of supplies to their new forwarding bases (see Carucci, this volume).

The next American invasion would be in June 1944, and it was thousands of miles to the west of the Marshalls, in the Northern Mariana islands of Saipan and Tinian. Needed equipment and reinforcements of Japanese soldiers bound for these islands had been destroyed en route by marauding US submarines, and so the Japanese garrisons there suffered a crushing defeat. Although most of the civilians on Saipan had been evacuated into the hills before the invasion began, nevertheless, Chamorro and Carolinian Islanders were among the one third of the civilian population who died from privation, disease, and suicide during this campaign[9] (cf. Peattie, 1988; Sheeks, 1945). In addition, a few unrelocated Chamorros still living on Tinian were caught in the crossfire and died (Ballendorf, Peck, & Anderson, 1986).

Then, in September, the Americans invaded the Palauan islands of Angaur and Peleliu (see George, this volume). Because of the island's topography and nature of the Japanese defenses, Peleliu earned a reputation as the best-defended spot yet encountered and as one of the toughest battles fought in the entire war (cf. Ballendorf, Shuster, & Higuchi, 1986; Nero, 1989; Peattie, 1988; Richard, 1957). Fortunately, Micronesians on Peleliu had been moved to other locations before the attack.

The Hardships of Neutralization

Meanwhile—and until the Japanese surrender nearly 2 years later—the islands in between were subjected to the Allied neutralization plan of blockading, isolation, and repeated bombardment. Rather than invade these islands, many of which were thought to be well fortified, Americans used their overwhelming air power (both carrier aircraft and bombers from the newly established bases in the Marshalls) to prevent any effective Japanese military reaction. This neutralization plan froze out the remaining Japanese bases in

the Marshalls and in the Eastern, Central, and most of the Western Carolines, and the remaining Japanese-controlled parts of Palau and the Marianas (Richard, 1957).

This strategy meant, for Micronesians and for Japanese in these areas, the double hardships of attacks and shortages over a prolonged period of time. Many of these areas had been bypassed precisely because they contained dense concentrations of Japanese soldiers. Once Japanese shipping was blockaded, the soldiers were forced to rely heavily on local resources, which became increasingly inadequate as the war continued. As basic resources such as food, clothing, and medicine ran dangerously low, Micronesians were pressed into hard labor, often without relief or compensation. Eventually this led to the conscription of men, students, and sometimes women and children (even where there were no traditions linking women and children with the performance of such strenuous work). Food came to be strictly rationed according to status, and in some areas Islanders were at the bottom of the Japanese hierarchy for food distributions. Throughout the area Micronesians report eating strange, disgusting, previously defined as inedible, famine foods during this phase of the war. And they remark on the shame, and irony, of resorting to theft of their own foodstuffs from the Japanese who now controlled them (see Poyer, George, this volume).

Throughout the war, those Micronesians who fared best at the hands of the Japanese were members of the traditional or educated elite and those who had kinship or other close personal ties with the Japanese. Micronesians who fared worst were those who, in the minds of the Japanese, were linked with the enemy by virtue of ancestry or past association. In the Marshall Islands, Claude and Carl Heine, half American, half Marshallese brothers who were educated at the mission school on Jaluit, and their spouses, were suspected as spies, jailed, and never seen again (see Carruci, this volume; Heine, 1991). On Pohnpei the Etcheits, a Belgian merchant family, were held captive in several different jails from December 7, 1941, until the end of the war. Spanish priests and nuns, though not technically the enemy, were nevertheless held under close scrutiny.

Islanders who had been relocated and who held no traditionally prescribed rights to resources in their new locations were particularly vulnerable during the war; they were also most vulnerable to confiscation of their property back home. Furthermore, this separation and isolation from family during invasion and attack was especially trying. Lack of information and false rumors about the loved ones so far away compounded felt anxiety. The situation was perhaps worst for those relocated Micronesians from the then

British colonies—Kiribati (then the Gilbert Islands), Ocean Island, and Nauru—who were regarded by the Japanese as prisoners of war.

The food situation was most acute on bypassed atolls that held large numbers of stranded Japanese soldiers.[10] On atolls where Micronesian populations remained, relations among them, the Japanese military, and others became extremely tense. This was notably the case in the Marshall Islands, where atoll resources were extremely limited and where the Allied presence was perhaps just an island away. On the bypassed Marshall Island base of Wotje, the Islanders suspected that the Japanese had resorted to cannibalism of Korean construction workers. At the Mili base some Islanders joined with the Koreans in an ill-fated rebellion; others who attempted to escape to the Americans were executed by the Japanese.

Fearing the spread of gossip, espionage, and even incitement of rebellion, the Japanese prohibited talk about the war. In response, some Marshallese on Jaluit communicated through songs and even developed a form of "whistle speaking."

> You could not talk because if you said anything, they beat you. So then we used to whistle as a way to signal. Two whistles. "Is there food with you?" " Do you have drinking coconuts?" "What are you eating?"
>
> "What is your life like there?" "Are there boats that have come?" Those sorts of things, you would just whistle . . . .
>
> Well, the Japanese did not know what the whistles meant, because these things were just whistles. They thought we were whistling a bit, but really we were communicating [Bwirre Lejmen, Jāl-wōj (Jaluit), Marshalls].

Food shortages were also extreme on several high islands. Although the island of Kosrae is one of the most fertile in Micronesia, its small indigenous population had put relatively little of the island under cultivation before the war. Then, by the time of the Allied attack, a massive population relocation to the island (of Ocean Islanders, Pohnpei Islanders, and particularly Japanese soldiers) had increased the island's population more than sixfold. Especially hard hit were the Ocean Islanders, who were given least preference in foods and who were also housed near mosquito-infested swamps; such practices are believed to have been responsible for the high incidence of yellow fever among this population. In addition, many Japanese enlisted men who were unaccustomed to island foods had degenerated into "walking stick-men," a sight many Islanders can never forget.

Chuuk had served as headquarters for the Japanese Combined Fleet since 1942 and had received additional reinforcements just before the war

reached Chuuk. Then, as the Americans approached, the Combined Fleet withdrew to Palau (cf. Morison, 1975; Peattie, 1988). But the American forces, because Chuuk was thought to be the impregnable bastion of the Pacific, decided to bypass it. The initial bombing and continued neutralization efforts targeted on this area were severe, causing great harm to military and civilian populations, including the indigenous people of Chuuk.[11] This widespread destruction, combined with the dramatic increase in population size created by stranded Japanese troops there, resulted in critical food shortages.

Fortunately, most Islanders in neutralized areas were not at sites targeted in the attacks. But sometimes the planes arrived unexpectedly and people were not always able to find shelter. And in many locations people fell ill and died from the lack of medical treatment. Women continued to give birth, but infants were at risk. And, without adequate food, medical supplies, or shelter, there was the ever-present question of what to do with the dying and the dead.

Deacon Wangko Wasan of Udot, Chuuk, was a young boy working as a communal bath attendant for the Japanese Navy on Dublon during the war. He reflects,

> In the beginning, it was fascinating to watch the soldiers pouring in by the hundreds. But, as time went by, it became unbearable to see dead bodies being unloaded from the ships like stacks of copra. There were endless loads of corpses ferried ashore for eventual cremation. We had the feeling of waste of human lives. There were all kinds of people: civilians, businessmen, and others who just awhile ago were at their various destinations in the lagoon.

The Psychological Toll

The psychological toll that resulted from the repeated bombing and the worsening conditions was enormous. Micronesians everywhere went without lamps at night, cooked only during the daytime, and huddled in bomb shelters, when there was enough time to reach them. But hiding places were in short supply; sometimes people tried to make themselves invisible behind thin coconut tree trunks, under shallow breadfruit roots, or in swampy taro patches.

People who lived in areas that received intensive shelling were sometimes forced to escape to the forests and live in hastily constructed thatch

houses or simple lean-tos. Others lived under trees or rocks or huddled in caves during bombings (see George, this volume). But even those who remained in settlements were always prepared to grab up their children and run for shelter. In Chuuk, people realized that the shelters they had prepared for themselves under Japanese direction provided completely inadequate protection; moreover, even these were subject to confiscation by the Japanese.

> The place where we hid—the Japanese taught us to do this: We dug out the ground, laid the [coconut] logs on top, and buried the logs. I thought it was really good. But when I saw the place where the bombs had dropped—it was no good at all. It would only save us from the spray of the bombs.
>
> For example, a bomb dropped near where we were. Someone was killed from the spray from the bombs. We were lucky that we hid in the foxhole. [But] the second time, the bomb dropped on the hillside; it killed four and buried the rest in the foxhole. After that, we were seriously worried (Anang Samwel, Parem, Chuuk).

One of the most dreaded jobs in Pohnpei was fishing in the lagoon. One fisherman's war song laments:

> There is no place we can hide.
> Those who work making salt and farming are lucky.
> Because on land there are places to hide . . . .
> (Pretrik Ringland, Madolenihmw, Pohnpei).

Throughout the region Micronesians who were subjected to attack speak of the great weight they felt upon themselves; some speak of their inability to sleep throughout the entire war. Some talk of thoughts of surrendering themselves to the eventuality of their death. Repeatedly, people said they no longer thought about the war or what tomorrow might bring; they just lived from day to day, following the Japanese directives. Some became despondent—expecting to die, they no longer even attempted to escape when the American planes arrived.

Hoping for relief, some Micronesians sought divine assistance of any and all sorts. With the cessation of formal church services, they kept praying in small groups or individually. Some turned to the belief systems of their religious traditions; others turned to divinatory practices as a way of finding new hiding places or deflecting an approaching attack (see Poyer, this volume).

The circumstances of war made people callous; but war also called forth superior levels of love, compassion, and sacrifice. Palauans today relate with

pride their sharing of food during the war, even during times of famine when they were forced to live like animals in holes in the forest (Nero, 1989). They reached out to family, friends, strangers, and even to the Japanese to help ensure their survival during these desperate times.

THE END NEARS

For almost 2 years, Micronesians endured the hardships of war. They hoped constantly for relief from their suffering. But thoughts about the war's ending raised other sorts of anxieties.

The loyalty that had been built up between Micronesians and the Japanese during the colonial era had proved generally insufficient in the face of war. As the end of the war neared, relationships between the Japanese soldiers and Micronesian Islanders were severely strained. Mistrust and brutality, if not commonplace, were widespread. Micronesians everywhere suspected that the Japanese were planning to exterminate them, for one reason or another: as a way to alleviate the critical food shortage, as retaliation for their disloyalty, as a way to cheat the Americans of their prize, and as a final means for the Japanese to achieve honor in a lost war. Mass exterminations such as the Micronesians feared did not occur. But reports from areas noted for extreme tensions or even extreme loyalties between Japanese and Micronesians, and where local people did experience executions, murders, or mass suicides at the hands of or at the behest of the Japanese, have served to reinforce Micronesians' suspicions in the postwar period. Today, many Micronesians express their belief that if they had not had a well-placed Japanese military ally to warn or otherwise buffer them against the sterner military forces, or if the Americans had not arrived as swiftly as they did, they would all have been killed (see Carucci, Poyer, George, this volume).

The prospect of an American victory and occupation of the islands was also frightening, for it was the Americans who had subjected many of the islands to repeated bombing and strafing. Also, while the war had raged, Micronesians were told that the American conquest would mean their certain annihilation as enemy collaborators. A few Micronesians who had prior experience with Americans (e.g., with American missionaries or American relatives) attempted to counter these fears. Reports also surfaced about friendly American pilots who avoided targeting Islanders and who even waved as they flew overhead. As things turned out, the propaganda about the

Americans proved to be false. Micronesians, the Americans decided, were to be regarded as "friendly neutrals" who were to be "liberated" by American forces. Nevertheless, in some places where American forces landed, Micronesians were mistreated and, at least in Saipan, were even rounded up and temporarily placed in restricted settlements.

REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR

The Memory of Lived Contrasts

Following the war the former Japanese islands in Micronesia were held by the American military as a strategic colony, first administered by the US Navy (1945–1947), then as a US Trust Territory, continuing first under the navy (1947–1951) and later transferred to the Department of the Interior (1951 to various dates until 1993). (See Friedman, this volume, for a discussion of the politics of the early postwar period.) Just as had occurred during the war, after the war was over, experiences (now with respect to the American presence) varied radically from one island to the next. In some instances the US presence was overwhelming and unavoidable; in others, Japanese absence provided the best clue that the Americans were now in charge. But in every part of the region the American presence provided Micronesians with the means to make comparisons about the changes in their lifestyles within their own experience. Local ways of life under the Japanese were compared with experiences under the Americans; times of peace were compared with those of war.

Now, for the first time in more than 100 years of colonial domination (more than 300 years in the Marianas), Micronesians have been given the right to decide their own political fates. Wartime experiences certainly play an important role in the decisions Micronesians now face. Given the distinct ways in which Micronesians experienced both the war and the American administration in the years that followed, it is not surprising that assessments of the war era are highly varied. In areas where wartime suffering was most intense, the contrast between images of peacetime and wartime is so strong that perceived differences between American and Japanese administrations are slight in comparison. For others, the rift between the prewar life and the present is epitomized by the shift from Japanese to American rule.

Wartime experiences on each island and for the individuals located there were complex, and reflections on the war are riddled with ambivalence,

especially when Micronesians speak of their relations with Japanese and Americans. Nevertheless, today most Micronesians are remarkably generous in their understanding of both the Japanese and the Americans for the hardships they were forced to endure in this foreign war. They speak with genuine affection of their old friendships with Japanese civilians and the golden years they shared together in Micronesia before the war. They often acknowledge the extreme circumstances that led to the harsh measures eventually resorted to by the Japanese military. They cannot forget the actions of some kindly Japanese officers and enlisted men who made life more tolerable during those difficult times.

The Allies and their motives for war were less well known to the Micronesians than were the Japanese and their motives. The nature of the American campaign throughout most of Micronesia—blockading, neutralizing, and bypassing islands—lent an eerie impersonality to the war. Nevertheless, in a conciliatory gesture Micronesians point out that the Americans were at war only with the Japanese, not themselves, and that the death, destruction, and hardship they experienced were accidental. The Micronesians and their islands had merely gotten in the way.

Micronesians often characterize the American administration that followed the war as being extremely friendly. They point out, though, that this friendship is, at heart, hollow. The Americans' limited strategic interests; their "hands-off" policy, especially with regard to Micronesian traditions; the early limits placed on civilian access to the area; and the importation of such cherished American notions as democracy and individualism have served to keep Micronesian-American relations distant, both administrative and personal relations.

In deciding their futures Micronesians must balance two longstanding desires: one for economic development, which the Japanese, and perhaps to a lesser degree the Americans, gave them in times of peace; and the other one a desire for sovereignty, which was heightened during the war and has continued to intensify in the postwar period. Economic development has been a fact of Micronesian life throughout the history of contact. Micronesian elders remember the times of material scarcity during the war, and they have no desire to return entirely to the old traditions. Today, some level of economic participation in the modern world is accepted as a given. The challenge is to decide which traditions to retain and how to change.

The war has also taught Micronesians about the high price of foreign dependency. World powers attract war, and war can follow them wherever they go. Thus war was brought to Micronesia without the Islanders' consent

or even their knowledge. And during the war they were relegated to the role of relatively powerless participants. In the postwar period, Micronesians have remained concerned about the US involvement in conflicts. The implications of a decision to continue their dependency on the United States or on other sources of foreign aid, Micronesian elders know from their wartime experiences, are profound.

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Notes

1. The term *Micronesia* is used throughout to refer to those islands included in what was formerly Japanese Micronesia: the Marshalls, Kosrae, Pohnpei, Chuuk, Yap, Palau, and the Northern Marianas.

2. The experiences and perspectives of the major combatants are contained in most written military histories of World War II. The reader is referred to Crowl (1960), Morison (1975), Richard (1957), and Sherrod (1952) for more extensive coverage of Allied strategic plans, dates, targets of attack, and intelligence data on Japanese activities in Micronesia.

3. See Falgout (1989, 1991), Poyer (1989, 1991), and Carucci (1989).

4. For other collections of war stories from the Marshalls, see Heine (1991); for Palau, see Nero (1988); Ballendorf, Shuster, & Higuchi (1986), and Tellei (1991); for the Northern Marianas, see Ballendorf, Peck, & Anderson (1986); for Kiribati, see Highland (1991); for Nauru, see Pollock (1991); for Guam, see Palomo (1991) and his privately published *An Island in Agony* (1984).

5. This phrase is translated from the Pohnpei term *keieu apwal.* Roughly similar statements about the war occur in most Micronesian societies.

6. We are currently preparing a longer manuscript on World War II in Micronesia. This manuscript contains more detail from both written historical sources and Micronesian oral traditions.

7. The islands of the Pacific span both sides of the international date line. Dates used in this article are standardized to reflect calculations made from east of the date line; however, these dates should be adjusted to 1 day later when calculated from west of the date line.

8. For more information on the Allied attack on these areas, see Richard (1957), Morison (1975), and Peattie (1988).

9. The majority of the civilian population (approximately 10,000 Japanese, 2,300 Chamorros, 1,300 Koreans, and 900 Carolinians) had already given up or were still in hiding and were finally captured or surrendered to the Americans (Peattie, 1988; Sheeks, 1945).

10. For example, the Japanese had fortified the Western Caroline island of Woleai just prior to the war. Even with the removal of the indigenous people, the island's population had been increased perhaps twentyfold. The extreme privation of the Japanese garrison is referred to as the "torment of Woleai," which claimed two thirds of the original force sent there (Peattie, 1988, p. 305).

11. The American neutralization attack on Chuuk, Operation Hailstorm, launched on February 17, came as a great surprise to the Japanese. With only 10 minutes warning, and with pilots located on an island different from their planes, only 40–50 Japanese planes were launched and most were immediately downed (Peattie, 1988). The 2-day losses to the Japanese Navy included 10 warships, 270 planes, 2,000 tons of food, 17,000 tons of fuel oil, and 600 military personnel, not including those who went down with the ships in the harbor (Peattie, 1988, p. 275). The tremendous destruction caused during this attack has resulted in Chuuk Lagoon becoming one of the world's great diving attractions today.

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Yapese Experiences of the Pacific War

LIN POYER

The people of Yap experienced World War II as civilians suffering from bombings and food shortages, as laborers for military projects, and as subjects of military occupation. This article combines documentary sources with oral histories to describe the impact of the war on Yap. Significant wartime experiences in Yap include Japanese military control over daily life; stress on food resources; community disruption; and changes in political leadership. Wartime memories emphasize the suddenness, incomprehensibility, and deprivations of the war, with "suffering" being a common theme of these recollections. Continuing legal contests over war claims, relations with the United States, Japanese interests in the Micronesian nations, and Islanders' awareness of their vulnerability in global conflict reflect the long-term impact of the wartime experience on Yapese, and Micronesian, public memory.

The role of the Western Caroline Islands in World War II is well described in military histories. This article presents Yapese experiences of the war and discusses how the war transformed Yap. The people of Yap were simultaneously citizens of a land under military occupation, laborers for military projects, and civilians suffering from food scarcity, bombings, and military rule. Although they were neither soldiers, partisans, nor participants in the conflict, the Yapese were greatly affected by the war years, both individually and as a community. They experienced the war as a time of intense suffering and deprivation, and they recall its lessons when they

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face challenges today. The war also marked the transition between Japanese and American rule, a transition that had significant effects on the organization of Yapese society.

The past decade has seen the publication of wartime recollections from throughout the Pacific, which helps set Yapese experiences in context (e.g., Laracy & White, 1988; White, 1991; White & Lindstrom, 1989). Following a chronology of the war on Yap, I discuss the major experiences and impacts of the war years. My account relies primarily on interviews (conducted on Yap in 1991) of Yapese individuals who lived through the war years.[1] My goal is to foreground Yapese voices, as they remember this period of their lives.

LIFE BEFORE THE WAR

Awarded the islands as a League of Nations Mandate, Japan set out to establish a civil administration that paralleled those of European colonies. The South Seas government built civic and economic infrastructure throughout Japanese colonial Micronesia, but invested little in Yap and expected little from it, in part because of Yap's hilly terrain and in part because of Japanese perceptions of the Yapese as uncooperative and resistant to change (Labby, 1973, p. 32; Lingenfelter, 1975, p. 186; Peattie, 1988, pp. 89–90; Useem, 1946; US Navy, 1944a, pp. 33–34). The amount of Japanese and Okinawan immigration, the intensity of economic development, and the degree of land alienation were all less in Yap than in Micronesia's other high islands. Elementary schools, vocational training, basic health care, and a police force (most arrests by far were for violations of liquor laws) were other elements of the Japanese colonial order. Education and cultural programs were designed to engender loyalty to Japan (Higuchi, 1987; Peattie, 1988).[2]

Yap's Japanese population was small—about 275 in 1931, under 600 in 1935, and about 1,400 early in the war (Peattie, 1988, pp. 180–181). In the Japanese Empire's colonial order, the Yapese, like other Micronesians, were *tomin* 'third-class people' who ranked behind Japanese, then Koreans and Okinawans; among those labeled tomin, Japanese favored the Chamorros of the Marianas (Peattie, 1988, pp. 111–112). Encouraged to immigrate to Yap, Chamorros became prominent in economic and political life.[3] Okinawans, Koreans, Chamorros, and a few Yapese ran village stores, but Colonia was

the primary market. Nearly all Yapese were listed as farmers in the 1937 census (US Navy, 1944a, p. 144).

CHRONOLOGY OF WAR

Throughout the Mandate the transition from civilian to potentially military activity is not clear cut. Yap lacked the good harbors and natural strong points for a military base (Peattie, 1988, p. 231); it was neither built up as an offensive base nor fortified early for defense. During the first years after Pearl Harbor, when the front lines were far away, life on Yap was affected only by a general tightening of security and creeping constraints on imports. The distant conflict was signaled by increased labor opportunities, which later became demands. Yapese elders recall that near the time of the war, "a lot of work came to Yap"—first in mining, then in making large clearings for gardens, which was followed by airstrip construction. Islanders from nearby atolls were brought to Yap to work on these projects.[4]

During the first years of war, western Micronesia—especially Saipan—became primarily a staging area for offensive operations in the eastern and southwest Pacific (Crowl, 1960, pp. 53–56). But the Allied attack across the central Pacific beginning in November 1943, followed in early 1944 by invasion of the Marshalls, air attacks on Truk (now Chuuk), and the Japanese Combined Fleet's retreat to Palau, forced Japanese attention to the defense of the western Pacific. It was at this point that Yap was actively fortified. The Allies' central Pacific advance continued throughout 1944 to the Marianas and Palau; the western Pacific advance moved north from New Guinea.

The Allies recognized Yap's airfield as a staging area for Japanese planes from the Philippines and southeast Asia, but attacks on it were delayed until the United States had secured bases for aircraft carriers in the Marshalls and for land-based bombers in the southwest Pacific. Japan responded to Allied successes by reorganizing the Pacific command structure and moving troops and planes rapidly into the Marianas–Western Carolines area (Crowl, 1960, pp. 56–57; Ito, 1956, p. 95). February and March 1944 also saw the beginning of an intensive airfield fortification and construction program in Saipan and the Western Carolines while the Japanese Army improved ground fortifications (Crowl, 1960, pp. 60–61).

When Islanders remember the war years, they talk about military labor, the first air attack, and the arrival of garrison troops, all of which they recall as happening in a very short time. Intensified labor for construction of Yap's

air bases and for expanded food production affected many Yapese long before the first attack, especially those living near the first air base, built in Gilman in southern Yap. But few people connected increased labor obligations with military action on the distant front. For most Yapese, then, the war began early in 1944 when the tide of war turned against Japan.

The First Air Attack

The first US move against Japanese forces on Yap was a series of fast carrier strikes in support of the invasion of Hollandia. During the attack on Palau, the Japanese sent fighters from Peleliu and Yap, leaving Yap without air defenses when the US Navy Task Force 58, returning from Palau, hit Yap, Ulithi, and Ngulu on March 31, 1944 (Morison, 1953, pp. 32–33). For people in southern Yap, this was the day the war began.

On that morning, Raphael Gisog went with others to see the plane that had tried to land the previous night. While they were on the landing strip, the drums and siren alerts sounded and they were told to leave the strip. Gisog thought it was because more planes were arriving. Even as bombs fell and planes attacked a nearby building he remembers being unaware of what was happening—he thought the pilots were offloading to lighten the planes for landing. Not until one plane turned to the north and he saw the unfamiliar star emblem did he recognize the unusual. Then the planes dropped very low, and at that point the Yapese ran.

Maria Leemed was home with her family at the time of the attack.

> First it sounded like a strong wind. Then Buchun saw the planes. We thought they were Japanese planes arriving to use the newly made airport. But then Tun noticed the symbol on the plane. It was a star, and we knew that they were not Japanese planes, so we all ran. We hid as best we could—some in pigpens, some in man-made holes, and others in caves. We were all suffering, and we didn't know what was happening. The planes circled around for a while, then left. (Interviewer: Was this just a single attack?) Oh, no! They kept coming back again and again.

Martina La'ew, who was a child at the time, also has clear recollections:

> The beginning of the war [the attack on Yap] started the third month on the 21st [*sic;* 31st] at 7:00 Sunday morning while I was in school. In the morning there were four airplanes; we heard a noise that sounded like a machine gun; we ran and hid. The planes were coming

> from the south, all the way up. We thought, "Oh, those are Japanese planes." We saw something that looked like a star [on the planes; which they didn't recognize], and we thought "Oh, those must be Japanese planes." Four of them came at first; then another group of four, and another four. They made a circle, groups of four circling high up in the sky. When they were circling, they were high up, but then when they dropped their bombs they dropped down low. Then we knew, "Oh, this is an attack." So we started to run away.
>
> When the planes dropped down to attack, they first bombed the airport, those planes called *sentoki.* After that, they dropped other bombs on Colonia. They destroyed some houses, and also Ganir bridge. During that time, we heard all those bombs, so we all ran and hid. After that, we came back to school. A bomb had been dropped on the school, a fire bomb, and burned it. That's when I realized, "Oh, this is what war is, and it is very, very harsh."

Both the airport and Colonia were bombed in the first attack; there are reports of Yapese injuries, but no deaths. Yap was still unprepared for civilian defense; Yapese began digging shelters on their own initiative. Many more air raids would follow, but the memory of the first was ineradicable.

Military Occupation

On March 1, 1944, the Japanese high command decided to build defensive strength in the Marianas and Western Carolines to form a new "Secondary Defense Line" (Dyer, 1971, p. 868). Although it held an airfield, Yap was not garrisoned or heavily fortified until it was included as part of the Japanese plan *A-Go,* which aimed to draw the American fleet into battle close to the home fuel supply and within reach of planes from Yap, Palau, and Saipan (Morison, 1953, p. 215). A-Go preliminary orders were given May 3, and the plan was activated on June 15. Japanese air strength in the Marianas and Western Carolines was bolstered in preparation for the Japanese Navy's anticipated "decisive battle," a high command strategic concept (Toland, 1970, p. 482). Yap was allotted some 7,000 Japanese troops,[5] who arrived in ships that had evaded American patrols. Yap's Japanese civilians, women and children going first, set out on the dangerous trip home on the same ships that had brought the troops.

The Japanese Army on Yap had to provision itself and prepare for possible invasion. Though civil administration remained in place, at least nominally, Yap was under military rule. Venitu E. Gurtmag stated emphat-

ically that during the war there were no longer a civilian government and policemen (who, prewar, had been Japanese, Chamorro, and Yapese), but (in the translator's words) "during the war, the hell with all those, no more, it was all military."[6]

Maria La'ew, a girl during the occupation, summarized the local view in saying "During that time, soldiers came on the island. That's when the war got worse." At first, the soldiers held the attraction of novelty. She recalls her child's eye view:

> You see, when we saw the Japanese soldiers, we were fascinated. They were novel. So I used to go and stand at the fence, and I would bow like the Japanese. I used to bow and bow because I really enjoyed watching them when they were marching, because they wore uniforms, they wore shoes that made noise [as they marched], and they held guns at their shoulders, and they wore hats. But in the end, [despite all this attractive novelty], they turned around and beat people. If they told you to cut grass, you must cut the grass. If you didn't, you might be beaten.

Army headquarters on Yap was at Okaw, Weloy. Local people speak of the island commander as "Ito," and he appears as protagonist in many stories and rumors of his possible role as a spy, or an American agent, or a protector of the Yapese.[7] A smaller contingent of navy personnel was located in Fanif. A few hundred Korean and Okinawan civilian workers also remained.

Although they were already engaged in military labor and had already experienced an air attack, it was when the Japanese Army came that Yapese experienced major disruptions in daily life.

Yap Under Siege

Japan continued to reinforce air power in the Western Carolines in late spring of 1944 as part of Operation A-Go (Morison, 1953, p. 219). At some time before July 1944, a second landing strip was built in Gagil-Tomil. Intense Allied operations against the Western Carolines took place from June through September 1944, involving the US Army, Navy, Marines, and both Central and Southwestern Pacific Commands. Yapese recall a lull after March 31, then a series of regular air raids. What they were experiencing was, at first, Allied operations in support of western Pacific invasions beginning June 1944, one goal of which was to gain American bases for neutralizing the Central and Western Carolines (Dyer, 1971, p. 859).

Yap was targeted during the US invasion of the Marianas because it was one of Japan's routes for funneling air power to forward bases. The Japanese used Yap, Palau, and Woleai to forward planes from the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies (Olson & Mortensen, 1950, pp. 677–678), just as the Yap base had been used to support Palau during the March 30 raid. From the Japanese perspective, the American offensive in the Marianas gave its fleet the chance for that decisive battle with the American Navy. One of Admiral Ozawa's disappointments during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 19–20, was that air support from Yap (as well as from Guam and Rota), promised by A-Go, did not materialize (Morison, 1953, pp. 233, 245, n. 54, 345).

Preassault strikes in support of the Saipan invasion by land-based B-24 bombers from the southwest Pacific hit Yap and Western Caroline atolls beginning June 9, followed by carrier aircraft attacks (Morison, 1953, p. 174), and after D-Day on June 15, additional bombing strikes occurred. Reaching Yap on June 22 with 33 long-range bombers, the 13th Air Force caught more than 40 Japanese planes on the ground, leaving little resistance to subsequent raids.[8]

Yap was originally targeted for invasion at the same time as Peleliu in the next stage of the Allied advance, but evidence that its air power was nearly exhausted altered plans; the force scheduled to invade Yap was switched to help General MacArthur at Leyte (Frank & Shaw, 1968, p. 84, n. 5; Garand & Strobridge, 1971; Morison, 1958, pp. 13, 56). Yap was bombed in support of the Peleliu attack, and US forces occupied Ulithi on September 23, later developing it as a navy anchorage and airfield (Morison, 1958, p. 49). Once American airfields at Ulithi and then Peleliu became operational in fall of 1944, Yap sustained routine air attacks (Sherrod, 1952, pp. 257, 259). The front lines had moved on, but Yap and other bypassed islands continued to be targets of neutralization bombing runs for the remaining year of the war.

For those who lived through those times, recollections of the long series of air raids remain vivid. Remembering the first night bombing, Venitu Gurtmag, then working on the smaller northern airstrip, recounts through an interpreter:

> He can't forget it because it was the first time lighted flares were dropped. It was a night raid, and the plane dropped a light, a flare, that came down. And then the plane left, turned and came back, then started bombing, and that was the end of them. They all ran away. They had moved all the wood—trees they had chopped down—so there

> were fires there, and there, and there, all over the clearing where they had gathered everything up. Then that plane came and dropped a bomb, four flares.
>
> He [Gurtmag] had always thought of himself as being a slow runner. But he remembers [counting] four flashes—he was there, in Toming. Now, his group was not working, he was asleep. Then he and another guy here, they ran. They ran all the way from there to Tagren, across the German channel—and the road then was not as good as it is now. And when they reached here, the last flash was still visible. Then he realized that he had never run so fast in his life.

Yapese became familiar with bombing dangers as Allied planes settled into routine bombing runs from the new bases at Ulithi and Peleliu. As months passed, they adjusted their daily lives accordingly.

> There was a long lull between bombings, many months of no planes. When the second bombing took place, they came in big planes, at very high altitudes, and they just dropped their loads on Yap. And that was constant, one day after another, always at the same time, 11:00 in the morning. There was a first bombing, then a big lull in between, and then bombing raids by bigger planes that came at the same time every day for many, many days. Close to the end there was no more bombing, but there were always planes flying around, if not at this end then at that end of the island—no bombing, just planes (Raphael Gisog).

It is hard to know how many Yapese were killed in Allied attacks. The Japanese-organized relocation of people from high-risk areas preserved many civilian lives. Spoehr (1951) says that no Yapese deaths were attributable to starvation or gunfire; informants we spoke with recalled only a few deaths. Asked to recall Yapese casualties, informants detailed specific circumstances: two women killed when a bomb hit a shelter at Aneth; a man whose arm is still deformed because of a shrapnel wound; a man killed when the grenade he was holding exploded; a woman hurt by bomb fragments as she stood at the entrace to a cave. (People also recalled the deaths of Japanese soldiers, whose bodies were cremated near the shoreline, and we gathered a few stories of the fate of American pilots.)

The place of their island in global strategic concerns was obscure to all but a few Yapese. When we asked Palagia Mitag how the Japanese explained what the war was about, she replied

> They didn't tell us anything about the war. We couldn't really discuss the war. We just knew that there was a war, but we didn't know the reason for the war. So there was much confusion in the people's

> minds, nobody really knew what was going on—why they were bombing—no. As for myself, I thought "Why wouldn't they have the war in their countries instead of ours, because we are really suffering."

The End of the War

In retrospect, Palagia Mitag says, it was clear that the Japanese would lose.

> I didn't think that they were going to win. They couldn't have, because everything was gone long before the end of the war. There was a general understanding that the Americans had much weaponry, but the Japanese had less, and also, their country is small.

Raphael Gisog recalls that throughout the war, "never were they [Yapese] told that Japan was losing the war; they were constantly told Japan was winning the war, there was nothing to be afraid of, Japan would never lose the war." But the war ended, without an invasion of Yap, when Lt. Gen. Sadae Inoue surrendered Palau and all forces under his command, including those on Yap, on September 2, 1945. American task forces then occupied the formerly Japanese-held islands (Frank & Shaw, 1968, pp. 449–450). The Japanese were faced with the problem of admitting their defeat; the Yapese had to face the challenge of reinterpreting the local context of global politics.

Peter Ianguchel heard of the end of the war when he brought some empty drums to the Japanese commander at the village of Gachlaw.

> Word came from Okaw through the telephone and we were able to understand Japanese. There was a Japanese high-ranking officer who had befriended us who came and told us: "Have you heard the news?" The Yapese said "No." He said "Do not tell anyone, or I will be in big trouble. The war has ended and Japan has lost." He said "Even the subway in Japan is damaged. A big and great bomb has been dropped on Japan."

Raphael Gisog recalls that his first indication of the end of the war was when American planes flew low without bombing. Then he heard the Japanese saying that the war had ended (but not saying who had won). A Yapese man accompanied his boss, Ito, and other officers who were summoned to an American ship; they came back with American cigarettes.

> That evening he [Gisog] had finished working, so he went home. There was a family he visited in Okaw village; the Yapese man who had gone with Ito came back and stopped at that family's home and gave away cigarettes, those Lucky Strikes and Chesterfields. And in

> the morning when he went to work he was given cigarettes by the Japanese. You must understand that at that time cigarettes were very, very scarce. And when he went to work in the morning, Ito also gave him cigarettes.
>
> A few days after the planes had flown very low, there was a big party at the commander's house to which commanders from all over Yap came, and he heard also from some of them that the war had ended, not knowing who won—and before the ship arrived maybe they themselves didn't know. And there was a party held at Ito's house because he was the commander in chief of Yap. (Interviewer: Was it a cheerful party or a sad party?) He doesn't know. However, he saw some of the Japanese crying. And there are people who cry when they are happy. But he does not know.

Leon Gargathog heard the news from the soldiers with whom he had become friends and who had looked after his family and shared food with him.

> They're the ones who told me the war was over. They told me, now that the war is over we don't know what will happen to us. So they invited me to go to their house, because they had some of that stuff [C-rations] they wanted to share with me. Those C-rations were taken from the soldiers' homes. There was one particular soldier, he lived by himself in the woods. He is the one who talked about the cases of things brought in. [Because he knew some English, he could identify the contents of food containers, probably GI rations captured in the Philippines and sent to the Yap garrison (Duncan, 1946).] (Interviewer: Were you sad when the Japanese left?) Yes, the ones who were with me! [laughs] I was sad because we had become friends. And they left.

Venitu Gurtmag heard it along with others lined up for morning roll call at Japanese Army headquarters. They were told not that the Japanese had lost, but that the war was going to stop for a while at American request.

> Then, in the evening, they were told to go to the house of the military officers for a party. That evening, they had a party and they were invited. And here they had brewed wine, out of coconut tuba, for the soldiers. So they had that, they all took it and some little food they had, and had a very big party—all the officers, soldiers, and those who were here, including him. Then, the next day, somehow the people went to a ship, including a [Yapese] man named Momtaam [Mo'taap?], and in the evening, they returned. And at that time, some US soldiers came all the way to here.
>
> That was in the afternoon. They came, many people from the ship, the American ship. None of them were carrying a gun, none of

> them carried arms. All they had with them were some kind of rations—not C-rations, but K-rations. And along with them were also some Japanese who were from the Bonins. They came here to Sirebu. And the Japanese soldiers who were here divided those K-rations that were given to them by the US soldiers. And some were even given to them [the Yapese].
>
> When the Americans arrived from the ship, on the same day as Momtaam and the others, the US soldiers came. And remember, they always had roll call here, so they had a bell to ring. All the people gathered together. And they sent word to Ito for a translator, a Japanese who speaks English, to come here and translate for the American officer, who told the people, "No war, no war." But the Yapese did not understand what was said. It is only now, you know, that we understand "no war" [in English] means "no more fighting."

Women, and many men, heard the news less officially as the story spread. Maria Leemed recalled, "People said that the Japanese were leaving because the Americans had won. So we knew from that that the sufferings we had been through were ending."

TRANSFORMATIONS

The war transformed Yap in the obvious sense that colonial control shifted from Japan to the United States. But changes that have taken place since the 1940s, attributed largely to US postwar influences, have their beginnings in the disruptions and pressures of the war years. Chief among these disruptions and pressures are the level of control over subsistence and daily life exerted by the Japanese military occupation, stress on food resources, disruption of community life with accompanying changes in political leadership, and the impact of perceptions of the Japanese military juxtaposed with those of the American forces.

Land and Labor Under Military Occupation

The arrival of garrison troops in late spring of 1944 brought major disruption to Yapese life, with far-reaching physical and social effects. In some areas people were displaced to make room for military installations; in others, soldiers were quartered within the villages. Many people living near the shore were moved inland for security (for example, the inhabitants of Rull

had to leave the town and harbor because of the constant bombing of Colonia); soldiers then occupied their houses and land. Today, memories of dislocation remain strong. Maria Leemed was in Aringel village, Dalipebinaw:

> There were also soldiers here. All the people gathered to live in one house, because the soldiers occupied our own houses. (Interviewer: Did the soldiers ask for permission to use the houses or did they take them by force?) The soldiers just told us to move out. All our belongings were left in our houses, and we all lived in only one house. (Interviewer: Even though you weren't living in your own house, could you still go back to your house and take things out of it?) No! The soldiers seemed to own everything. Plants outside couldn't be taken. If you took anything from the houses, even though it was yours, you were beaten up by the soldiers. They had control over everything. Taro patches and gardens were literally destroyed. (Interviewer: Were the Japanese soldiers occupying only a certain area of Yap?) No! They were everywhere. Some were even living in the woods or by streams in the valleys. They did not always use houses—they had their tents to use. (Interviewer: So the Japanese were living practically everywhere?) Yes, unluckily for people with houses, because after the Japanese finished using your house, the house was torn down. Stone foundations were destroyed as well.

Quartering soldiers, building fortifications, and clearing land for gardens for military use all caused widespread damage. Soldiers destroyed taro patches, cut betel nut trees for buildings and lampposts, cut coconut trees to eat the palm hearts, and used stone money to anchor floating strings of copra. Soldiers lived in churches, and sacred areas were destroyed by searches for firewood or other materials. Outside the main target areas, it was occupation troops, not bombing, that caused most destruction.[9]

From the Japanese perspective, the Islanders' contribution to the war effort would be their labor; this began months before the first air attack. Called by local people *kaikanchi,* the first military-related labor involved men conscripted from throughout Yap to prepare extensive sweet-potato plantations in southern Yap. Raphael Gisog recalls that the Yapese working on the gardens were treated as if they were soldiers. The men lived together in local men's houses, and labor was organized in a paramilitary fashion, with the idiom spurring hard work: They were encouraged to think *my tools are my guns.* Instead of doing battle, they were working for Japan; they should consider work itself as a battle.

> So it wasn't like ordinary work when some days you might slack off, because you were going out as a fighter, and doing it as a fighter—so,

> as on a day of battle, you were to wake up in the morning and start working—and anything that comes in front of you goes, with your tools.

It became clear in hindsight that these fields were to feed the Japanese troops that would soon arrive. The southern part of Yap was cleared (the effect is still visible in the lack of tall trees), and a new road was built from Colonia to Nimgil.

Soon some workers were shifted to construction of the nearby airstrip, which, done largely by hand labor, would continue for months. Women and children joined the first phase of clearing. (Although women and often children took part in war-related labor, villages were most noticeably empty of young men; before the war, they went abroad for contract labor; during it, they spent all day on military projects, or lived away from home.) Peter Ianguchel recalls working from December of 1943 through the following March—night and day and without pay—until the airstrip was usable.

Once Japanese troops had arrived, Yapese labor was integrated into a system hard pressed to sustain the expanded military presence. Air raids interrupted major projects, but work resumed after each attack. When he was working on the gardens at Nimgil, Raphael Gisog recalls that the Yapese workers received food sent by relatives. When they were shifted to airport construction, the Japanese provided one meal: "Very, very little unpolished rice was given to them, only in the morning. And the other two meals they had to fend for themselves." The scarcity signals the shift Yap was undergoing, from civilian peace to military life in a state of siege. Imports were severely curtailed by the effective Allied submarine attack on shipping in early 1944; for example, 1,500 troops of the 9th Expeditionary Unit bound for Yap were stranded on Saipan when their transports were torpedoed (Crowl, 1960, pp. 59–64). Gisog recalls that at the time of the garden and airport work "there were no more stores," except in Colonia, and even those had run out of staples such as cigarettes and rice. Martina La'ew commented that Japanese, Okinawans, and Koreans who had run village stores left "when the war started. . . . So the stores were all gone; we didn't know what stores looked like anymore." Later, carrier strikes associated with the Marianas and Palau invasions sank nearly all shipping in this area.

As food became scarce, large labor groups could not be sustained, and the work force assembled to build the southern airport was soon redirected. Against the threat of starvation, the Yapese planted their own gardens of fast-growing sweet potatoes on their return home.

Under military rule the Yapese were organized into work groups, with some men living and working far from home while both men and women reported for duty nearby. Under military direction they gardened, collected tuba, fished, built houses, made thatch, cooked, weeded, produced salt and coconut oil, and made miso from taro and salt. Martina La'ew recalls the kinds of work assigned:

> There were houses built, the men worked on those. There were those posts in the ocean with wires for trapping boats; there were bomb shelters that needed rocks, so they collected rocks; there were rows of trenches that they were building. When a house was being built that needed thatching, the women and children had to go and weave the coconut leaves. When children reached the age of this child [child present at interview, about aged 10], each had to weave 50 pieces of coconut leaves per day. (Interpreter: Without being paid, I wouldn't do it.) Would you want to be beaten? Only one kick from the soldier and it would end your life.

Women took babies to work; older children accompanied parents; only the most elderly were excused. Unlike before the war, Chamorros were now treated like Yapese by the military. Asked whether caste status made a difference, Leon Gargathog said "No. As long as you were able, you could work, you were called to work. And if you refused, you would be punished. So you had no choice. When they came, they came with rifles." There was no pay, and Yapese workers supplied their own food.

A few men held privileged jobs. Vicente Gilwrol's cement-working skills kept him busy repairing government buildings. Raphael Gisog was one of a few dozen young men who became houseboys for Japanese officers—in his case, the famous commander Ito—after the first raid. Here, he got a wider view of the organization of labor on the island:

> As soon as [people] relocated themselves, they started working for the military where they were staying. Some were put to work in planting gardens, some were formed into fishing parties to fish for the Japanese, some were making salt, some were building houses, and some were even left not really determined what their job was on a day-to-day basis—all they were told was to go find food for the Japanese. Meaning go steal for the Japanese, get whatever you could get your hands on for the Japanese to eat.

Describing Yap at the end of the war, Raphael Gisog said it was "stripped bare of trees. They had turned land into gardens [clearings], all over Yap—the whole of Yap was bare." Asked what Aringel village looked

like when the war was over, Martina La'ew answered "It was a mess. The village was a mess; and also the people were destitute, because they had neither house [*na um*] nor home [*tabinaw*]." Palagia Mitag added "It looked like a storm had hit." "Before the war," said Vicente Gilwrol, responding to the same question, "Colonia had cement buildings, good bridges, and the place looked nice. But when the war came, the bridges were destroyed. Before the war, Yap looked tidy." At the end of the war, Nimgil, Colonia, and Thol were the areas most badly damaged. But most villages had rarely been bombed; in these places the damage came from military occupation.

Social Organization and the Search for Food

The tightening of Japan's defensive perimeter and persistent Allied attacks on shipping made food the critical issue for the fortified islands not invaded. Food rationing was instituted in the Western Carolines in June 1940 for sugar, rice, meat, and fish (US Navy, 1944a, p. 103); certainly by the time garrison troops arrived the situation had gone far beyond merely rationing the most valuable commodities. Under occupation, Yap was divided into military sectors, with civilians as well as troops in each sector under the control of an army commander. People recall strict control of food production and supply, with each local officer telling villagers to "go get food," that is, ordering them to steal from village areas under neighboring commands. Commissary workers had to produce two baskets of food each day, but they were not allowed to get it from gardens in their home military region. They were threatened with punishment whether they were caught stealing in another area or came home empty-handed. As Venitu Gurtmag describes it,

> When they would leave here, in the morning, they were to go get food, in whatever way and wherever, but not from their own place. Because each taro patch had a number, had identification, it was all the property of the Japanese soldiers. (Interviewer: So who ate from the taro patches here?) This was all soldiers' food. (Interviewer: So were they [Yapese] getting food just for themselves, or for the Japanese Army?) For the Japanese, not for themselves. Remember, these were working for the Japanese. For themselves? They stole from their own taro patch. In the nighttime. But remember, [because of] the Japanese you had to come in small numbers because of the two baskets. If you came here with two baskets, you might well be told "Away with you, you have two baskets of some food that's been miss-

> ing." But for a Yapese to steal at night from his own taro patches—you know, one from here, one here—it's not really noticeable. But they would do it at night. In their own taro patch.

The shortage of food marks this time most clearly. Cut off from resupply, troops had to be fed from local gardens and hastily planted sweet-potato fields. Taro patches were numbered for identification, and taro, like all food, was rationed and guarded. [Late in the war, people themselves wore identification tags (Duncan, 1946), indicating close control of civilians.] Even when people were able to steal, they could not cook for fear that the smoke would be seen from the air. Fishing was dangerous because of buried explosives, shore defenses, and, above all, because dynamite was used, which caused several deaths. Martina La'ew said soldiers would steal cooked food left in cooking pots when people were away from home, and that the sound of a coconut being thrown down would alert nearby soldiers who would come running to confiscate it or punish the one trying to gather nuts. Women would hide as they sneaked into their own guarded taro gardens, she recalls; men would hide going fishing, secreting their catch.

> When they planted a garden, they planted it as soldiers' food. When they planted dry taro—[it was] soldiers' food. And when they planted sweet potatoes—soldiers' food. At that time, things were the opposite of how they should be; the Yapese people would go to the soldiers' gardens and steal food and tobacco. When they captured the thieves, they would beat them nearly to death. During that time, Yapese people were thieves, that's what they always did. What they stole from the Japanese gardens was sweet-potato leaves, tobacco leaves, tapioca leaves. During that time the women couldn't go into the taro patches because they were afraid of the airplanes. They didn't have anything to eat because they didn't work the taro gardens, so a woman would steal something from the soldiers for herself and her children.

Americans later observed that Japanese troops appeared to have suffered from malnutrition much more than the Islanders had (e.g., Duncan, 1946). Yapese recognized the hardships of the Japanese troops, commented on their shared suffering, and identified those who were helpful to local people. Martina La'ew recalls the kindness of one group of soldiers in Toway village:

> They didn't beat people like the others. Our grandmother stayed with them and provided food for them. The officer told the soldiers not to go in the taro patch, not to go around picking food, because our grandmother stayed there to provide food for them, so they weren't

> to go around getting food for themselves. So the taro patches were still okay; our grandmother still got taro from them, because the soldiers didn't ruin it. Also, the village [of Toway] was all right. If the leader wanted to eat taro, he sent a message to our grandmother. The messenger would go to see her and say "You are to pick taro, just two," and our grandmother would pick a whole basket of taro [more than she was asked for]. She would get a basket of food and give it to him [the messenger], and she also cooked some and gave it to him [for the soldiers].

Leadership and Community

Reflecting on this time, people recall a sense of being under Japanese control to a much greater extent than during the civilian period of colonial rule. And, although traditional chiefs had lost significant status during the civilian era, the war years permanently dismantled their power. "During the war," Martina La'ew said, "Yap lost its ability to govern itself. The soldiers were the ones who said what would be done." Asked about relations between Yapese leaders and the Japanese, Raphael Gisog said: "The chiefs did not exercise much of their rights at that time. Everything a chief said pertained to what the Japanese had planned. Nothing took place because of a chief's heart, but because of what he was told by the Japanese." Even when local leaders retained some authority, they were unable to help the Yapese because "all the orders came from Japanese soldiers." Chiefs even worked: "They were second in command to the Japanese supervisors." Unlike local leaders in some parts of Micronesia, in Yap most did not speak Japanese and needed translators. Traditional leadership patterns were also undermined when, after bombings began, young men began to roam, stealing and otherwise misbehaving and under no social control because the Japanese and older Yapese were preoccupied. These small groups of young men were from different regions and classes; for them the war provided unexpected freedom and adventure.

Community life was under greatest stress during the period of continual bombing, in areas subjected to it.

> Every person in Yap went into caves. We couldn't even cook food during the day because we were afraid that if the American planes saw the smoke they would bomb us. So we cooked our food at midnight or early in the morning while the American planes were gone. All the

> children learned that when someone said a plane has been heard, they became very quiet and we all ran to the caves.
>
> Later, the Japanese said we were to plant gardens in order to eat. When the American planes would come, everyone working in the gardens ran into the bushes or caves to hide; when the planes left, everyone would come out of their hiding places (Vicente Gilwrol).

Although military occupation drastically restricted the ability of indigenous leaders to guide their communities, Yapese maintained cultural distinctiveness in several ways. Peter Ianguchel states that the Yapese still practiced customs of separate food preparation and eating. As Maria Leemed confirms, "Fear was everywhere! We were afraid of the American planes and the Japanese soldiers. But we kept our customs. The men still used one [cooking] pot and the women and children another." Islanders also continued to create songs and dances about what they were experiencing. Sometimes the Yapese were asked to perform for soldiers, but people also composed for themselves.[10]

Yapese also responded creatively to the challenge of living under military rule. Stories of tricking soldiers are legion, following the model of one in which a Japanese-organized fishing party went out, but the Japanese ended up with the least edible fish. Also, people stole relatively easily from storehouses, for example, by poking bamboo through a bag of rice in the storehouse to funnel the rice into a container. A postwar commentator noted that the Yapese were experts at turning a basketful of harvested rice into a handful (Duncan, 1946).

In the midst of the war, there was some effort to maintain community life. Martina La'ew recalls that school continued, even after the building was bombed: "We didn't have anything. We used to count with stones; that's how we studied." Family and traditional philosophy provided important supports. Roman Catholic missionaries had established congregations throughout Yap, but churches ceased functioning when priests and brothers were sent to Palau and people were occupied with labor and food requirements. Increasing work obligations put an end to traditional religious activities as well, and the Japanese forbade large ceremonial gatherings and destroyed men's houses "supposedly as a means of preventing enemy pilots from locating large population centers" (Marksbury, 1979, p. 37; Useem, 1946, p. 12).

Though hampered in congregational prayer, people sought protection through individual magical practice. Martina La'ew said "people used the little magic they knew, hoping to protect themselves from being wounded

or suffering." Asked whether it was effective, she and Palagia Mitag agreed that it was perhaps effective only because, according to the Yapese proverb, "one's time of death had not yet come," and La'ew recalled "a man who died at the entrance of a bomb shelter in Anoth village, still holding magic in his hand." La'ew concluded,

> I don't know if it was effective or not, but usually at the end of the day, if nothing harmful had happened, then it was believed that the magic had worked. People applied local medicine to themselves, scattered magical medicine within and around the villages, even tied pieces of coconut [*as*] on the legs or feet as protection. It was believed to be effective. Even myself, I believed at that time that it worked.

Loyalties

The US military handbook for the region describes western Micronesian attitudes toward Japanese rule as "apathetic," neither repelled by oppressive rule nor loyally supporting the empire (US Navy, 1944a, pp. 45–55, 121). Perhaps this was true early in the war, but apathy and insulation from the Japanese were impossible under bombing and the threat of starvation. Able men, especially, were directly involved with the Japanese military because of labor demands. Some, like Raphael Gisog, who worked as Ito's houseboy, experienced relatively benign circumstances. Others, such as Peter Ianguchel and Vicente Gilwrol, suffered harsh treatment that changed their lives.

Peter Ianguchel responded in the negative when asked whether Japanese soldiers killed any Yapese, but added

> There were some Yapese that the Japanese wanted to kill. I was one of those people. If you ran away from work or if you did not follow what they told you to do, you would be chosen as one of those to be killed. Those who were chosen to be killed had to go into hiding. One man was killed . . . . The Japanese killed him, yet did not admit killing him. The Japanese said American planes machine-gunned the man.

Ianguchel himself was beaten after he went to pick papaya. "When I came back, one Japanese soldier blamed me for playing around. I beat that one soldier, then four more came. All five of them ganged up on me."

Vicente Gilwrol emphasizes Japanese mistreatment in a long narrative. A skilled cement worker who was called on to build shore gun emplacements

in Tomil, Gilwrol took the job when the governor asked him to, but later suffered for it.

> I got sick because Japanese soldiers tied my feet up, pulled me up about 6 feet from the ground and let go of me. Then I fell upside down and hit my head on the ground.
>
> One day, when we were coming from Ow, we went to the Japanese soldiers' station and I saw all my belongings, and I recognized them. I said "Hey—these look like my things." There were axes, saws, ropes, knives—all my things. They tore down my door. I had accepted the job, yet when I came from work they'd torn down the doors and windows and all my possessions were gone. Next morning I went to their station and told them I quit work. And they asked why. [I answered:] "You said we were going to be friends so we could help each other, and instead you've done terrible things to me. You took my things. You built your house, and you never returned my things."
>
> The commander Kaniko said "Forget about your things." I said "What?!" He said "To me your things aren't as important as the wealth of Japan, the Japanese planes and people who have died in the war. So your things aren't important." I said "I will not work anymore because we Islanders don't know what happened between Japan and America. They [Japan and America] sit down and shake hands, drink coffee and say, fine, they're going to war. We shouldn't be treated this badly, because we had no part in talking about going to war." Kaniko said I was a spy. I said "I don't have a telephone to phone Americans, and I don't even know how to speak English." He said they were going to beat me.
>
> So they grabbed me—there were four soldiers, two were holding my arms and two were holding my feet. They laid me face down on my stomach in front of their building and they began to beat me. They hit me from my feet up to my chest. They said "You are the kind of person who never gives in." I said "I will never give in, because I don't know what Japan and America said to each other about war." He said to me "America had a leader and Japan had a leader; they shook hands and said they'll go to war." I said "But we have nothing to do with the war." They beat me some more, but I didn't care whether they killed me or not. Raboman [chief of Tomil today] told me to apologize or they would kill me. Raboman told me that all houses were being treated like mine, and they would kill me, because it was when the war was at its worst. So I asked him to plead for me. Roboman told the Japanese soldiers to set me free because I was mentally sick. He said this so that the Japanese would think I was just crazy, that's why I was complaining. So they let me go free.

In contrast, Leon Gargathog had good relations with a group of soldiers. "I helped them with meat and fish. So, whenever I went anyplace, I wouldn't

worry, because I was on good terms with them they would come and check my family and see if they were in good condition." Martina La'ew recalls that life in Toway village remained bearable. "The reason Toway life was still good is because those soldiers who stayed in Toway were well behaved, different from some of the other soldiers."

In other garrisoned areas of Micronesia, trade linked troops and local civilians. But, asked whether the Yapese traded with the soldiers, Maria Leemed answered

> No, we wore our own clothing. And kerosene wasn't needed much. We didn't light our lamps at night because of the American planes flying around. As for soap, we never used soap. (Interviewer: What about tobacco?) We grew our own, but sometimes the Japanese would steal it for themselves.

Asked whether Yapese women befriended Japanese soldiers, Palagia Mitag responded: "I don't know. How could they be friends when they were always beating others? Befriending them was impossible." Relations were strained, inhibited by military fears of information leaks and Yapese fears of harsh treatment. But a few overcame the barriers to make friends, and as food resources dwindled, some soldiers tried to establish local ties. Mitag recalls that she gave food to Japanese who asked for it, but usually without recompense.

> Only one of them showed me a little kindness: I gave him some food, and he gave me some perfume. That perfume was something he got from his wife. His wife had given it to him when he left Japan. So [he said] "I should give this perfume to you, because you're the one who gave me food; this is in gratitude for keeping me going." I cooked taro, that's what I gave him.

Apathy might be the best word to describe people's opinion of the war itself. As Vicente Gilwrol's defiant words to his tormentors suggest, Yapese felt they had no stake in the war, that it was none of their concern. A few Yapese were recruited to serve the Japanese military in Southeast Asia. But most took an observers' attitude, at least at first. In recollections, however, we can discern that tension heightened as the Allies approached and Japanese troops prepared for an invasion.

It is from this last period that we find some of the most intriguing war stories, and the hardest to verify: those about spying and—widespread throughout Micronesia—about Japanese plans to kill all Islanders and being prevented from doing so only by the arrival of American troops. Extermi-

nation stories are heard from all parts of garrisoned Micronesia and seem to have been most closely associated with the last tension-filled months of the war. Documentary information neither confirms nor denies the truth of these stories.

After the surrender, the tables were turned. Asked whether Yapese felt sorry for the Japanese soldiers, Raphael Gisog laughed and said he couldn't really say.

> Maybe they were on a personal, person-to-person basis, but on the whole—in general I think there was no grief for the Japanese, because there were instances where Yapese were killed. We also had some very bad people here who took revenge on the Japanese.

It is said there were Yapese who killed Japanese in the aftermath of war, and one story recalls an abusive Yapese policeman who had aided the Japanese and who was later greeted with the taunt, "Where are the Japanese?"

The US military handbook says, for the Western Caroline Islands, under the heading "Attitude toward Americans," "It is believed that the natives will be apathetic at first and that their friendship will have to be won" (US Navy, 1944a, p. 55). At least in retrospect, this did not take long. Japanese soldiers had propagated horror stories about the enemy, but by the time American occupying forces arrived, the Yapese were in desperate need of material aid and, once that was provided, were willing to consider Americans on their own terms. Palagia Mitag recalls her first impressions of Americans:

> When I first saw them—my, my, I wondered if they were humans or something else, because they were so tall, with very white hair. I had never seen anything like them. I first saw them in Dachngar [village in central Rull] on the road in a car, all Americans. I was accompanying my husband on our way to Colonia—he was leaving. Ah . . . ii! [expression of amazement] I was fascinated. I even turned and watched them driving away; they turned and were also watching us. You know, I was ashamed of my appearance, but at that moment when I saw them, I forgot all about myself. I just couldn't believe my eyes. Were they real?

Martina La'ew recalls her childhood memories:

> The first time the Americans came, they stayed on the ship. Sulog [a man] told us kids to go on the ships, to tour the ships. We went to Rull that night and in the morning we were going to Colonia, but I was too scared to go because I had never seen people from that

> country. But when they [the kids] came back, they had flashlights with them. I wished then that I had gone so I could have had some, but I was too scared. The Americans had given them things: chewing gum, and some were blowing balloons, and I wished I had gone with them. I really wanted to have some [things] like them. I couldn't go the first time. We went back to Arow. I was able to go the second time, but I was still scared. I wanted to go, because whenever we met the Americans, they would give us chewing gum.

The task of occupying, demilitarizing, and evacuating Yap and other areas was the responsibility of units of the Fleet Marine Force and small naval surface forces (Frank & Shaw, 1968, p. 450; Richard, 1957, details US Navy civil affairs activities). As soon as American troops occupied a base in the Colonia hospital building (now the administration building), they responded to the devastation on Yap, as elsewhere, by providing food. (Palagia Mitag: "You know, those big cans of corned beef, and some other things.") This generosity immediately created a positive attitude. As Martina La'ew says, "When they gave food to the people, I stopped being afraid. I had been starving for a long time."

If the first symbolically and practically potent American act was to distribute food, it was carried out in a way equally potent—by having Japanese soldiers do the work. As Peter Ianguchel describes it,

> The Yapese did not work when the Americans first landed and the Japanese were still here. Yapese were told that Japanese soldiers should do all the work. The food supply that was taken to Yap was first taken to Okaw where the Japanese headquarters was. From there it was divided into 10 shares, because there are 10 municipalities in Yap. [Food shares were] based on population. The Japanese soldiers were the ones doing all the moving of food supplies for the Yapese while the American soldiers watched. They loaded it on trucks and boats for distribution.

At that point, the recognition that times had changed was complete. The Japanese were on their way out, though they remained briefly to labor under American direction.[11] Japanese troops were first relocated to Colonia, where they were billeted throughout the town, despite its damaged infrastructure. They worked to repair bridges and roads in Colonia and from Colonia to the villages. Then the Japanese left by ship from Colonia. Peter Ianguchel recalls it was a month after the surrender; Palagia Mitag saw them leave.

> When they left, they didn't take anything. I was there when they left. They lined them [soldiers] on the road, and each was given only a

> pack of biscuits, enough for each soldier to eat on the ship. (Interviewer: Any other possessions, such as clothes?) Nothing.

It took the Yapese some time to return to their homes, which in many cases had to be rebuilt. The US Navy handed out free supplies for a time, set up stores only in Colonia, and left those in rural areas to scavenge a while longer. In the villages, empty of troops, people took back what had been confiscated. As to Japanese possessions, Peter Ianguchel remembers

> The chiefs of Yap said that those things left behind by the Japanese became the property of the Yapese on whose land they were located. Historically, war is like a typhoon. After a typhoon, whatever you find on your property becomes yours.

For some, stone military constructions served as foundations for new dwellings, but in most places the soldiers had left little behind. As Martina La'ew said,

> They couldn't leave anything. The clothes they wore were ragged. The soldiers' uniforms were all ragged. They used Japanese cooking pots. Even their pillows were made of dried banana leaves stuffed into cloth bags. So they couldn't leave anything usable to the Yapese.

But one legacy of the occupation proved a boon—until their own gardens became productive again, people lived from the pumpkin, sweet potato, taro, and other vegetables they had planted under Japanese orders. Ordinary life resumed. Children like Martina La'ew continued their education.

> We had gone back to school. When it was math class, we would write the name in Japanese beside each number, because that was what we knew. It was hard for us at that time. There were classes for adults on learning the language [English], but the children had regular classes. Some of those soldiers were our teachers, and some of the Yapese had learned the language.

Men who had labored on Japanese military projects now worked for the US Navy. Vicente Gilwrol, who had been beaten by Japanese troops, turned his skills to new service after the war: "The navy came and asked 'Who knows how to build cement buildings, who knows how to drive, who is a carpenter?' They told us to work for the US Navy." Under American occupying forces, Yapese worked in sanitation cleanup, DDT spraying, clearing Colonia, and filling bomb craters, along with hospital, stevedore, and police jobs. Peter Ianguchel recalls that those not paid in money "were told to go to those quonsets where supplies were kept and take all that they wanted.

If one likes food, take all you want. If one wants tools, take all the tools you want." Raphael Gisog recalls workers exchanging slips, mostly for food, at the Navy PX.

Asked what the Yapese thought of the Americans, Peter Ianguchel replied "They are people who think of other people as human beings. The Yapese were mistaken at first. Yapese were very hesitant to accept the Americans for what they were because of the hardships with the Japanese." Soon the Yapese, especially young men and women, were eager to establish contact, but they were seriously hampered by a language barrier. It was a rare American soldier who knew any Japanese; no Yapese knew English. The best connection was made between older Yapese men schooled during the German era and German-speaking Americans; others resorted to pantomime. Raphael Gisog recalled:

> We wanted to establish friendships, but could not because of the communication barrier between Americans and Yapese. It was evident that people yearned for the relationship, as opposed to Japanese times and during the war. Any way that Yapese could avoid the Japanese, they would. But unavoidably, they came to be friendly, because of the harsh treatment [i.e., that could occur if they were not friendly]. Whereas in this case [with Americans], there is no harsh treatment, you could see right off that people were reaching toward each other, but we had communication problems. There was no way that things could be developed to the extent that everyone wanted.

POSTWAR CHANGES

The early years of American control cannot be examined here in detail, but several changes stand out as important. Chamorros, who had played a significant role in the economic and civic life of prewar Yap, left the island, some repatriated to Saipan after the war, others resettled to Tinian in 1948. Yapese explained their departure to us in different ways. Some diplomatically presented it as the obvious consequence of peace (for example, "When the Americans came, they said everyone should return to their own island. So they returned.") or as a consequence of a difference in customs ("The chiefs of Yap told the naval administration that Chamorros had to leave Yap. They were not Yapese, and they were not practicing the Yapese customs."). But the preferential treatment accorded Chamorros by the Japanese had not been forgotten, and Chamorros were beginning to establish similar privileged

relations with Yap's new governors. Some spoke of these problems, saying that Chamorros "were the first ones who got all the jobs," that "they were successful in school, so the chiefs decided to tell them to leave, or else they would take over, and the Yapese would be second-class citizens." Of some 18 private postwar businesses, Lingenfelter (1975, p. 187) reported "Most, if not all, were Chamorro-run concerns." Useem (1946, p. 24) reported that Chamorros "occupy the best-paying jobs and key positions in Military Government" under the United States. Spoehr (1951, p. 17), writing about the experiences and memories of Chamorros living on Tinian after the war, described their perspectives on the Yap experience and noted that "Today, it is difficult to unravel the web of events that led to the return of the Chamorros to the Marianas." Four postwar typhoons also provided Chamorros with an incentive to relocate (Lingenfelter, 1975, pp. 186, 189).

A second important change was that traditional leaders, whose role had been constrained by Japanese colonial and then military regulation, sought to reestablish authority with the assistance of an administration that aimed to respect indigenous traditions. In part, they succeeded. But American respect for tradition was accompanied by a practical desire to teach younger men English and to work with the most active and ambitious among them, regardless of class status. As a result, a new tension emerged between those who favored the traditional customs and those who favored change, in part a contrast between high and low statuses. For example, the navy opened up use of reef and sea resources without attention to Yapese ideas of ownership. Increased church activity reduced the application of traditional status customs, which diminished chiefly authority according to some local views. But the immediate postwar impression was of a restoration of power; in the July 1946 elections for chief, 5 of 10 chiefs who had been appointed by the Japanese were defeated by higher-ranking traditional chiefs (Lingenfelter, 1975, p. 189). The navy started English classes immediately; the generation we interviewed had attended both Japanese and American schools. Those slightly older had been more strongly affected by Japanese expectations; those slightly younger, by American ones. Tensions between members of generations shaped by markedly different life experiences played a part in struggles to establish a new domestic order under American rule during the late 1940s and 1950s. Traditional status groups, generations, and young people's organizations[12] became embroiled in a complex discussion of who was to lead Yap, and how, during the postwar years (Hunt, Kidder, Schneider, & Stephens, 1949; Labby, 1976; Lingenfelter, 1975; Marksbury, 1979; Price, 1975).

The war's economic impact, its destruction of infrastructure, the removal of skilled Chamorro, Japanese, Korean, and Okinawan workers and businessmen, and postwar failure to reestablish a comparable level of economic activity are undeniably explanations for why Micronesia has had difficulty attaining economic security. The Japanese-American transition also reshaped local economics and politics. Price (1975, pp. 101–109) discussed how the interests of certain Yapese families benefitted from the new American order—those who got in on the ground floor profited over those who continued to think in Japanese-era terms. Despite plans to aid local economic self-sufficiency, the United States paid little attention to Yap from 1945 to 1951, and "the Yapese started rebuilding around traditional patterns" (Price, 1975, pp. 4–5; see also Marksbury, 1979, p. 38) before increased US involvement and economic change began to occur in 1960.

One issue that continues to compel local interest is war claims, which have been dealt with intermittently since surrender but continue unresolved both for politicians and for survivors and their descendants. Many Yapese, like other Micronesians, do not feel they have been fully compensated, despite several legal efforts (Kahn, 1966, p. 54). For example, from December 1976 to December 1978, more than $3 million was awarded to 1,569 Yap district residents as war claims payment (Marksbury, 1979, pp. 286–287). The second generation (the principals have died) is now contesting rights to claim money.

Perhaps the most poignant lesson of the war is that of the unpredictability of the impact of global geopolitics on an individual's own life. Price (1975, pp. 123–124) told the story of a Yapese man whose father drowned during Japanese times while diving for shells to make Yapese valuables for his children; ironically, those have "almost no value" today. His son encourages his own children to learn American skills, but "What if things were to change again," he said, "and what if I end up ultimately being like my father who pursued traditional Yapese valuables? I have a house full of Yapese shell money and today it is almost worthless."

REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR

Although the US Navy civil administration sponsored Liberation Day celebrations after the war, today there are no commemorations of Liberation Day or World War II on Yap. But the war is remembered by those who lived through it and, through their stories, by relatives. Near the end of our

interviews, we asked people to reflect on the memory of the war. This gave them the opportunity to situate it in their memory and, to an extent, in public memory.

Asked to reflect on what people thought the war was about at that time, Leon Gargathog responded

> On our island, Yap, the war here was so sudden, we never comprehended it, or had any idea what the war was like before it came. We had never heard of it, so we could not relate to it, saying, "Oh, this is what we've heard people talk about." All of a sudden it came, and we were so shocked. Some people knew what they were doing, but some didn't. There was so much hardship. After a long time, then people began to realize "Oh, this is what war is all about. We hear that foreigners have war: This is what it is really like." So the war came here because of *kalek* [literally, 'looking for'] the foreigners, not because of us Yapese. The Americans came looking for the Japanese—they were the ones doing the talking, not us. That's why they were coming here, bombing, strafing. That sort of gave us a little peace of mind [knowing that it wasn't us they were after]. Sometimes the Japanese would ask some people to go work with them, and then they would get injured. Then we'd question: There is something to this, people are being wounded. We said "The Americans are here looking for the Japanese, and yet we are also hurt. Now what?"
>
> So everybody was frightened. But we kept persevering. Some people were able to walk, some were not even able to walk. We dug small shelters and kept them there, and fed them there. And some people couldn't even walk because their feet would not carry them [because of their fear]. So we would run, and we would leave that [helpless] one behind. And later, we'd come back and check. And luckily, the person was okay. So this is what we did. Until the time they said "It's finished"; then we finally began to feel secure.

We asked Martina La'ew what things remind her of the war. "One thing that reminds me of the war is *gafgow* [meaning 'suffering,' 'hardship,' 'deprivation']. When I experience suffering now, I reflect back to that time, and I tell myself 'it wasn't like this during the war—it was worse.' " Later she continued:

> Everything reminds me of the war! All the hardships that I experienced make me remember the war. When you had yaws, there was no medication to heal it; you were completely eaten by the sores. If you got sick, there was no medicine. If you wanted to sleep on a mat, there would be no mat. So everything reminds me of the suffering during the war. I ate foods that I didn't know were edible, because

> when I was growing up I had never eaten them, but during the war I ate *dol* [a wild yam not usually eaten], and I thought it tasted so good. I even ate *deday* [another wild yam], and I thought then that it was the best food. I even ate cooked hermit crabs [not considered food in Yap], and at that time it tasted so delicious—I could only compare it to [edible] land crabs.

La'ew concluded, referring to our work, "I really think that the book should serve as a reminder of the war." And when we asked Palagia Mitag what she wanted recorded about the war, she said

> Work, the beatings of the Yapese by the Japanese. There was much suffering during the war. Everything about it was suffering—one could not even eat or bathe. That's the only time I can think of that suffering went to such extremes—all the suffering we experienced during the war. There was nothing to eat, to drink, to smoke—nothing, nothing that could bring a little happiness to anybody during that time.

The United States has also had to deal with Micronesians' memories of the war years or, more important, memories of the prewar era of Japanese governance. A recurring theme in writings about the US Trust Territory from the 1950s concerns Micronesians' comparisons of conditions under American and Japanese rule, comparisons that are unflattering to the US Trust Territory administration (e.g., Allen, 1953). Continuing legal contests over war claims, Japanese interest in both investment and political ties with the new Micronesian nations, and the Islanders' acute awareness of their potential vulnerability in any future global conflicts all reflect the long-term impact of the World War II experience on Yapese, and Micronesian, public memory.

Yap's presentation at the 1989 dedication ceremonies for the Federated States of Micronesia capitol complex in Pohnpei was a chant and dance composed by Joseph-Mary Goofalaan that begins with "a very poetic and profound commentary on World War II and the changes it brought to Yap and the rest of Micronesia" (Pinsker, 1992, p. 46), followed by reflections on the transition to independence. Danced or sung, told to grandchildren at home or to researchers for permanent recording, war memories mark a period of destitution and suffering that Yapese wish to preserve. They intend that these memories act not only as a warning to future generations in their own land, but also as a plea to foreigners who hold the power of global war and peace to consider the cost of conflict to innocent bystanders on the world's battlefields.

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Notes

1. Readers will want to be aware of the implications of an American scholar inquiring into the Japanese era and the war years (see Zeleneitz & Saito, 1986). Some interviews were conducted by me or my American assistant; others by Yapese assistants. All were conducted in Yapese. Translations were done either simultaneously or later, from tape recordings.

2. Peattie (1984, 1988) provides an excellent overview of the Japanese colonial era in Micronesia; see also Hatanaka (1977). For Yap, including immediate postwar conditions, see Hunt, Kidder, Schneider, & Stevens (1949); Schneider (1955); Useem (1946); US Navy (1944a).

3. Informants recalled that Chamorros were perceived as closely associated with Japanese. Most lived in Colonia, working as businessmen, policemen, or in other administrative posts. About 430 Chamorros spent the war on Yap—some early immigrants from Guam, some recently encouraged by Japanese to move from Saipan (Spoehr, 1951). Japanese civilian government gave preferential treatment to Chamorros in employment and evaluated them more positively (Peattie, 1988, p. 330, n. 72; Spoehr, 1954, p. 88). Later, American administrators were not immune to similar ethnic orderings.

4. Several hundred people from Ulithi (mostly) and Ifalik spent the war on Yap; many were young people conscripted for military-related labor. A good number of Yapese men spent the war years as laborers elsewhere in Micronesia; 10 lived through the war in Japan (Cockrum, 1970; Richard, 1957).

5. The US military estimated 10,000 (e.g., Sherrod, 1952, p. 258). The postwar count was 6,500, along with 400 Japanese, Korean, and Formosan civilians (Useem, 1946).

6. Using English language sources, it is difficult to confirm the date on which military government was established in the Japanese Mandate (e.g., Crowl, 1960, p. 69; US Navy, 1944b, p. 23). Our interviews suggest that a skeletal civil administration may have remained in

place throughout the war, but the local experience was overwhelmingly of military rule after troops arrived on Yap.

7. My coverage of Japanese military sources is scanty, and I have little information about the occupying forces. "Ito" may have been a regional or local officer rather than the island commander. A writer who accompanied the US Marines into Yap at the end of the war states that the Japanese counterpart of Lt. Col. William H. Doolen was Japanese Chief of Staff on Yap Lt. Col. Makoto Miyene, whose headquarters were at Dugor (Duncan, 1946). Higuchi (1991) discusses a figure similar to Ito in Palau.

8. These B-24s "flew an average of 21 daily sorties against Yap" June 23–27 (Morison, 1953, p. 313). The 13th Air Force attacked daily from June 23 to 27, with 19 to 30 Liberators and "kept the Japanese at Yap so busy that they had nothing to offer their hard pressed comrades on Guam and Saipan" (Olson & Mortensen, 1950, p. 688). In this series of raids, B-24s flying long-range missions from the Admiralties dropped 257 tons of bombs, destroyed 46 planes; 2 Liberators were lost and 21 were damaged (Morison, 1953, p. 313; Olson & Mortensen, pp. 687–688). Similar attacks accompanied the Tinian and Guam landings. During the battle for Tinian, carriers pounded Yap and nearby atolls daily from July 25 to 28, with only one or two defensive aircraft seen (Morison, 1953, p. 367).

9. Recent archaeological work confirms the impact of the brief period of military occupation (including destruction of men's houses, dwellings, village meeting houses, and dance areas) and details some of the military's actions (Cordy, 1986, p. 20; Hunter-Anderson, 1983, pp. 73–74; Hunter-Anderson & Moore, this volume).

10. Future publications from this research will include Micronesian songs of this era. On Yap, familiar wartime songs were written about the first air attack; about an American air search for those escaping from the Japanese; one titled "Eating Anything," about wartime hardships; and a humorous song, "Work at Headquarters," written by Venitu Gurtmag and other young men who danced it during Japanese parties. Joseph-Mary Goofalaan shared a song from Maap that related the story of Maap women isolated in a copra-making work camp and their worried male relatives working on Nimgil airstrip while it was under attack. Unfortunately, many songs have been and will be lost. They are not widely known because most were shared only within a single village. On the other hand, the memory of the war survives in recent creative work. Goofalaan wrote the Yapese men's sitting dance called "Palkir u Mal" with a World War II theme for the national 1988 Independence Day celebrations for the new Federated States of Micronesia (see Pinsker, 1992).

11. But note that Lingenfelter (1975, p. 186) says that the Japanese were permitted to use Yapese agricultural labor to ensure their food supply until the Japanese were evacuated; only then were all Yapese free to return to their villages.

12. Japanese young men's associations, *Seinendan*, led by Japanese educators, had played a role in training Yapese youth in potentially political activities; in the late 1940s, men shaped by their participation in these groups continued Seinendan in a way that American administrators phrased as conservative (chiefs) v. progressive (Seinendan) political competition (Drucker, n.d.).

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Archaeology and Oral History of the Japanese Lighthouse at Yap

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DARLENE R. MOORE

The archaeological remains of the Japanese lighthouse at Dalap, in Lebinaw Village, Gagil Municipality, Yap State, Federated States of Micronesia, are described and interpreted. Yapese lighthouse builders were interviewed, and details of their construction efforts and their wartime recollections and experiences are presented. A contemporary Yapese dance chant, which includes references to the American bombing of the lighthouse, is included as part of the oral history of this traumatic time in Yap.

Although the physical remains of World War II in Micronesia are being documented by archaeologists (see, for example, Bodner & Welch, 1992; Carucci, 1993; Christiansen, 1994; Denfeld, 1988), and some of these sites are promoted as tourist attractions, the wartime experiences of the Islanders themselves have received little outside attention. We attempted to redress this imbalance during our 1992 study of the Japanese lighthouse site at Dalap, in Lebinaw Village, Gagil Municipality, Yap State, Federated States of Micronesia (Hunter-Anderson & Moore, 1992; see Figures 1 and 2).[1] Built by local labor on a hilltop overlooking an eastern reef entrance, Yap's lighthouse is one of several erected under the direction of the Japanese during their tenure in Micronesia from 1914 to 1944 (for historical details of this time, see Peattie, 1988). It is unusual and, perhaps, unique, in having

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

Figure 1. *The Yap Islands; star indicates location of Japanese Lighthouse Project Area (adapted from Johnson, Alvis, & Hetzler, 1960, p. 53).*

been purposefully destroyed—by the Japanese themselves—before it was operational.

Our objective here is to raise outside awareness of this midcentury



Figure 2. *Gagil-Tomil Island, villages of Gachapar, Lebinaw, Leng, Riken, Wanyan; star indicates Japanese Lighthouse Project Area.*

episode in modern Yapese history by summarizing our archaeological findings and presenting some of the oral history of the Dalap lighthouse site, including a contemporary Yapese dance chant that mentions the American bombing of the lighthouse and conveys some of the horror of the war in this small island. Exposure of such events as the building of the lighthouse, and their consequences, through archaeological documentation, oral history, dance, and other means, not only increases public awareness of the past, but also, exposure can highlight future possibilities. The owners are considering a plan to develop the lighthouse site into a tourist attraction.[2]

JAPANESE-ERA LIGHTHOUSES IN MICRONESIA

To our knowledge, no survey of Japanese-era lighthouses in Micronesia has been conducted, and so their total number and physical condition remain uncertain. We know of at least six in addition to the lighthouse at Dalap: at Saipan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas; at Sapuk, Weno (formerly Moen) Island in Chuuk Lagoon; at Alei Islet, Polowat Atoll, in Chuuk State; and at the islands of Babeldaob, Angaur, and Urukthapel in the Republic of Palau. We have visited the lighthouses at Saipan, Polowat, and Weno. Each of these structures is somewhat different from the others in size, orientation, and in other ways, but detailed comparisons have not been undertaken. It is not clear whether the Japanese used a modular design formula or followed similar design principles determined by the limited functions of these facilities.

Construction dates and details about the design and construction of Japanese lighthouses in Micronesia were not located in our library searches; military or civil documents in Japanese archives may eventually yield such information. A prewar list of lighthouses *(Annual Report,* 1937) indicates there were only two lighthouses in Micronesia in the late 1930s, one at Tinian and the other at Palau (which Palau island is not specified). We know of no lighthouse remains at Tinian, and apparently the lighthouse at Weno was built well before 1937 (Rock, 1992; T. Rock, personal communication, May 25, 1992), casting doubt on the accuracy of the prewar list. According to Peattie (1988, pp. 253–254), the 1940 Japanese budgets for the islands included large sums of money designated for "lighthouse construction," but whether the monies were spent only for this purpose has been seriously questioned (Wilds, 1955, cited in Peattie, 1988).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1914 Japan seized all of the German-held Micronesian islands, including Yap. The seizure was accomplished by Japanese military detachments who were sent to the various island groups. The naval detachment designated to seize Yap arrived on October 14, 1914 (Peattie, 1988, p. 64). Japan immediately began to operate the internationally-used Yap cable station,[3] diverting the Yap–Shanghai cable to the Japanese-held Ryukyu Islands. Thereafter, Americans using the Yap cable had to route their messages to Shanghai and Manila through Japan (Lee, 1939).

In 1919 the League of Nations granted Japan a mandate over Micronesia, and a civilian administrative organization, the South Seas government, was created to administer the islands. Under the South Seas government, six administrative districts were recognized, and a branch government was established at each district. The Yap branch government administered the islands from Pikelot in the east to Ngulu in the west (see map in the front matter of this volume).

Yap's experience under Japanese rule differed from some of the other Micronesian islands. Few Japanese civilians emigrated to Yap, and no homestead or farming land was made available to outsiders. Professionals came to Yap mainly to operate Japanese concerns, such as the branch office of the South Seas government, the cable station, the meteorological laboratory, post office, hospital, agricultural station, and schools. Although small demonstration farms were developed, the Japanese did not alter the landscape for any major enterprise, such as sugarcane plantations (as was done in the Marianas). A mine was opened, but it involved a small area and the operation was short-lived. Even though the Japanese withdrew from the League of Nations in the mid-1930s, the League-sanctioned South Seas government continued to administer the islands until the disruptions of World War II, when the Japanese military took over.

Even prior to Japan's 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor and Guam, which marked the beginning of US involvement in World War II, the Japanese Navy, not the South Seas government, determined what construction projects were to be implemented in the islands (Peattie, 1988, p. 250). Most of the indirect military construction undertaken prior to 1941 consisted of building or expanding Japanese facilities such as airfields and harbors. Construction continued under the direction of the navy until the autumn of 1943 when Japanese Army detachments arrived in Micronesia and began to fortify the islands (Peattie, 1988, pp. 263–265). In 1944 the number of Japanese military assigned to Yap was estimated to be about 10,000 (The Western Carolines, 1946).

In 1943 the United States mounted aggressive military campaigns against the Japanese-held Micronesian islands in an effort to push west across the Pacific. By December the Americans had gained the Gilberts (now known as Kiribati); by February 1944 they had secured the Marshalls. Although these operations focused primarily on eastern Micronesia, during February and March some air attacks were carried out against Japanese bases and other targets in the western Pacific. In February the Japanese installations on Chuuk were bombed, and from March 30 to April 1,US planes flew

hundreds of raids over Palau and the Western Carolines, including Yap, where the airport was bombed and planes were destroyed on the ground (Denfeld, 1988; Hoyt, 1980, p. 94).

By August 1944 the United States had gained the Mariana Islands and had devised a plan to invade Palau, Yap, and Ulithi Atoll in order to break Japan's line of defense, to link US forces in the north with those in New Hebrides and Australia, and to gain a major fleet anchorage. The plan, known as The Western Carolines Operation, was implemented on September 15 with a landing on Peleliu, Palau (The Western Carolines, 1946). Five days later, the US landing at Ulithi Atoll obtained for the navy the safe anchorage needed for the supply ships of the Seventh Fleet, which was moved forward from the Marshalls. Plans to invade Yap were canceled because by then it had been determined that the remaining Japanese garrisons, including those in the Eastern Carolines, had been isolated and no longer presented a threat. No ground combat between Japanese and American soldiers occurred on Yap during World War II; however, Yap-based Japanese planes are credited with making a few attacks on US ships anchored in Ulithi lagoon.[4]

The Dalap lighthouse site was still intact in May 1944, as shown in an aerial photo[5] taken at that time from a US plane. It appears that the purposeful demolition of the lighthouse occurred after the American bombing raids on Yap, which began in July and continued into September.

THE DALAP LIGHTHOUSE ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITE

Methods

Before the lighthouse site could be mapped and photographed, it was necessary to clear by hand the thickly overgrown site with machetes, axes, and saws. Major site clearing took 3 days with an eight-person crew, and additional clearing was done as necessary during the course of field documentation (see Plate 1).

Plan-view drawings of the platform and of the various concrete structures built upon it were made in the field using Brunton and Silva compasses, tapes, levels, and rules. Baselines were set up along both axes of the platform, and several of the measurements were taken at right angles from these. Other points were plotted using azimuths and taped distances. Messrs. Figirmad and Waifathal assisted with these tasks. Color slides and black-and-

Plate 1. *Mr. Garong and Mr. Benag cutting the vegetation away from the generator and storage structure.*

white photographs were taken of the features and artifacts. All artifacts, except for pieces of shrapnel and most of the glass bottles, were removed. The artifacts were inventoried, described, and deposited with the Yap Historic Preservation Office.

Findings

The lighthouse complex was built on an artificially truncated hilltop, said to have been the highest hill in Gagil. The complex consists of a platform, the ruins of a lighthouse and office building, a generator and storage building, and a water catchment and washing area.

The level platform, which received bomb damage during the war, measures about 50 m long (N/S) by 40 m wide. The exterior slopes of the platform had been stabilized by facing them with courses of stacked rock within a concrete retaining wall. The entrance to the platform is located near the center of the north side. Two concrete pillars separated by a

distance of 3.6 m mark either side of the entrance. Yapese informants referred to them as *mong*, the Japanese word for gate (see Plate 2). At the northwest corner of the platform a series of two or three steps (the original configuration is too damaged to tell for certain) leads from the original access road to the platform. The southwest corner of the platform is destroyed, and five fairly large depressions (bomb holes) occur at various places on the platform surface.

The number of rock courses and the height of the retaining walls vary around the edges of the platform. This variation is due in part to the original configuration of the hill. For example, there is no, or very little, slope at

Plate 2. *The north side of the west entrance pillar. The photo rod is 50 cm long.*

the north and northwest sides of the platform. In contrast, its southwest, south, and southeast sides have markedly steep slopes on which 10 or more courses of stacked rock face the platform, creating its exterior surface above a basal concrete wall.

The platform provided a level surface and firm foundation for the lighthouse and its associated structures. Originally, the structures built on the platform included a lighthouse tower that joined an office building on one side and a stairs-entrance on the other, a generator and storage building, and an area for water catchment, washing, and drainage. All of the structures were built of concrete reinforced with steel rebar. Because of American strafing, bombing, and shelling, and Japanese dynamiting, the structures are partially damaged or entirely destroyed.

The lighthouse tower was toppled during the war, according to our informants, by the Japanese (Plate 3). The remains of the tower lie to the south of its foundation and entrance stairs. The top of the tower is missing; thus the original lighthouse configuration cannot be determined from the remains. However, the tower had two entrances, on opposite sides of its base; one doorway was located on the raised exterior porch and the other

Plate 3. *Base of the toppled lighthouse tower, foundation, and northern staircase.*

provided access to the office building through a hallway. There were two windows on opposite sides of the tower shaft. A series of concrete spiral steps on the inside of the tower rose from its base to its top. The steps encircled a central, hollow shaft.

Portions of the circular foundation for the tower are intact. A double set of curved stairs, each with eight steps, ascends to the elevated porch and the west entrance. Two shallow, circular, concrete basins, each with an outer diameter of 1.8 m, are located on the ground between the stairs. Yapese informants told us that these circular features were footbaths that people used prior to climbing the stairs to the lighthouse entrance.

The remains and rubble of the office building are located on the east side of the lighthouse tower, and it appears that a short hall, or passage, connected the office with the tower. The office building is totally destroyed, and meager information about its original configuration can be gained from the concrete rubble.

The concrete generator and storage building is located on the northwest portion of the platform. Although damaged by shelling and strafing, its walls and roof are intact (Plate 4). The rectangular building measures 6.3 m by



Plate 4. *Front view of the generator and storage structure.*

4.3 m. Two windows and a door are located on its east side, and an interior wall divides the space into two rooms. The floors are concrete, and raised curbs on the floors set off rectangular spaces adjacent to the walls. The interior sides of the outer walls have impressions in the concrete for a wooden framework that would have been fastened to the walls to support a floor-to-ceiling shelving system. One of the boards is still attached to the wall. Yapese informants recalled that this building was never completed and that no generator was installed.

The water catchment, washing area, and drain are located on the southwest portion of the platform. These concrete structures are intact. The catchment is set into the ground and is 2.5 m long, 1.80 m wide, and 1.75 m deep. Its interior space is divided into two tanks. The washing area, located 1.68 m south of the catchment, consists of two tanks set into the ground on either side of a shallow basin, or stall. The concrete floor of the rectangular stall rests on the ground. Its exterior dimensions are 2.14 m long by 1.38 m wide. A drain is located on the west side of the stall. The square concrete tanks located on either end of the stall are also set into the ground. The design of the system for using these tanks and the concrete catchment is not apparent. The Yapese indicated that construction in this portion of the site was not completed.

A few artifacts were found on the surface of the lighthouse complex. These consist of pieces of metal hardware, a metal tool, Japanese glass bottles and bottle fragments, red clay bricks, and a cache of Yapese cultural items such as a boar's tusk, a pearl-shell valuable, and a cowrie shell strung with wire, together with a whetstone and a flashlight bulb. These items were turned over to the Yap State Historic Preservation Office. We observed no remnants of floor tiles nor office furnishings, but because considerable plant litter covered the surface of the platform, it is possible that such materials and other artifacts are present but hidden from view.

REMEMBERING DALAP

Now largely obscured by jungle growth and weathered by the tropical sun and rain, the Dalap lighthouse site represents a harsh time in Yap when the island people were drawn into a fierce international conflict through none of their own doing. The Yapese commemorate no World War II events, but they have preserved memories of this time in a dance and chant performed for tourists. The Yapese-composed translation into English of the Yapese

dance chant is presented intact because it is a primary ethnographic document that powerfully conveys its meanings, regardless of grammatical and spelling errors. In doing so, we respect the Yapese effort to impart their wartime experiences to us in their own voice(s), whether in Yapese or in English.[6] The following text of the chant is taken from a brochure provided by the Manta Ray Hotel in Yap.

> This song is for a dance composed by the elders and performed by the youths of Maa Village, in Tamil Municipality. This song is about the World War II between the Japanese and American soldiers, in which a lot of Yapese elders are still treasured today.
>
> The song and dance are not only for entertainment purposes, but also for the promotion of the Yapese cultural heritage identities as well. So please, relax and enjoy yourself.

Kammagar

1. On a bright clear morning
   The day war stroke
   The beauty of the Island of Yap.
   American planes started dropping bombs at Colonia and
   The lighthouse at Dalap. No one was awared
   Or even prepared for such a war.

2. When seen the American planes dropping
   Bombs at Colonia and the lighthouse (Dalap),
   Everyone assumed that Japanese was just
   Drilled for a possible combat.

3. When seen the American flags on the wings of
   The planes, everyone was astonishingly
   Certain the war was realistic, with distress
   And dismay everyone started rushing into the
   Valleys, taro patches, and some to the water
   For the war was extremely furious.

4. On the morning of the next day before anyone
   Could prepare for the morning feast, the skies

Began to roar with heavy smokes and
Lightening of the machine gun barrels.
Everyone dodged and some stumbled as they
Seeked a safe place to hide. When it was
Cleared, most of the belongings were
Destroyed, including cooking pots which made
It impossible for the next day's routined.

5. One of the American plane was seen coming
Down ablazed, was so frightened and stumbled
Around without hopes of being alived.

6. When gained consciousnes, there was no food
Left anywhere. Everyone was starving to death.

One Person Sing *(Gasig)*

Excuse me, I'm going to express our sympathy to our parents for all the adversity they had gone through during the war.

1. Thanks to Mr. Bill Acker and Mr. Jesse Faimau
For their presence and the arrangement they
Made and we are very proud.

2. Thanks to all the tourists who came all over
The world here to praise us. We all
Appreciate you being here. We are very proud,
We are very proud . . . .

Interviews

At the beginning of the project, interviews with Yapese men who worked on the Dalap lighthouse construction project were conducted in the Manegil *faluw* (men's house) on the beach in Lebinaw Village. Later, as the vegetation was cleared and the edges and walls of the structures began to emerge at the lighthouse site, we talked with some of these men about their work experiences at Dalap. Our informants live in Lebinaw and Leng Villages, and they ranged in age from 63 to 78. Most had directly participated in building the lighthouse, performing a variety of tasks. One man was too young to work at the time, but he recalled bringing lunch to his father, who was working at the job site.

We found that questions pertaining to the lighthouse inspired answers that also pertained to other wartime experiences and events in Yap. Because these experiences provide often neglected local contexts for global historic events such as World War II, we have synthesized much of this material here.

The Yapese said that work parties were organized by the *doboka,* the Japanese organization responsible for road construction and concrete work, and that such labor gangs of Yapese and Carolinians worked on doboka projects throughout Yap during the war. Men, women, and children were pressed into service on major construction projects such as the two airports, one of which was built in southern Yap and was used during and after the war. The other airport project, never completed, was located on Gagil-Tamil Island, at Madalay Village.

Another forced labor project was the sweet-potato gardens in southern Yap, run by the Japanese agricultural brigade, *kaikontai,* called by the Yapese *kaikanchi.* Women and children were made to work on this project to produce food for the Japanese.

Prior to the war, the Yapese had worked on several other Japanese projects, such as the iron mine in Gachapar. There was a Yapese song about this project, which was abandoned by the mid-1930s. At the time of its construction, no songs were composed about the lighthouse; the informants explained that everyone was too tired to create a song about it.

It is probable that the lighthouse construction at Dalap began in 1940 or 1941. Yapese informants told us that the project went on for 3 years and was not finished when it became a target for repeated American air strikes in 1944.

The lighthouse project was considered the largest and most difficult of all the doboka undertakings in Yap. Only men in their late teens to early middle age worked on it. The typical workday was 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. The laborers were paid the equivalent of US 50 cents, or 2 yen (see Table of Equivalents in Useem, 1946, p. 150) per day until halfway through the project when all work payments ceased. The Yapese said that the Japanese inadequately compensated them for their efforts. Niggardly payment for substantial work was commemorated in the name, "One Cigarette," given a large outrigger canoe constructed by the Yapese for a Japanese policeman stationed in Gachapar Village. All of the master canoe makers *(salap ko muw)* from Gagil worked on the project, and the payment was one cigarette for each of them, hence the name, reminding people of this offense. In Yap,

such a canoe is one of the most valuable items that can be produced using traditional knowledge and materials.

In Muyub Village, Gagil, a Yapese canoe was also built exclusively for the lighthouse project. It was kept in its own *sipal* 'canoe house' at M'lil, near the Manegil faluw in Lebinaw. Throughout the project, the Yapese sailed and maintained the canoe, which was used to transport building materials. This canoe was not named.

Details of the Building Sequence and Associated Tasks

The lighthouse project involved a sequence of building events. First, a pier at the west end of the Lebinaw causeway was constructed; next, the unpaved road leading from this pier up (inland) to the lighthouse site was built. Then the lighthouse complex at Dalap was built over a period of about 3 years. The pier was constructed at the site of a Yapese *chobok* 'piled rock canoe dock' in an area known as Tanebinaw. People were living nearby at the time.

Much of the pier-to-lighthouse road construction was done by Outer Islanders, or Carolinians (people from the coral islands of the Central Carolines), under the supervision of Siling, a Yapese man from Gachapar Village, Gagil. This man spoke the Carolinian language, as well as Yapese and some Japanese, and he supervised the Micronesian labor gangs throughout the project.

The road from the pier to the lighthouse was built across a large taro patch *(mu'ut ni ga');* several plots within the taro patch were destroyed when the roadbed was created by infilling to raise it well above the groundwater level. No compensation was paid to the owners for their loss of productive land. The road construction also disturbed or destroyed an unknown number of stone house and sitting platforms in coastal Lebinaw. Rocks taken from these architectural features were incorporated into the roadbed in lowlying areas.

Most of the rocks and sand for the road and for the lighthouse complex were quarried at Riken Village and brought in a single truck to the construction site. Informants said only one truck was available for the project. All other materials, whether obtained locally or brought by boat, were carried up the road by the laborers. When not in use, the road was chained off at the north end near the north corner of the platform that supported the lighthouse.

Building the Lighthouse

The Yapese informants stated that building the lighthouse complex was the most difficult of all the Japanese construction projects undertaken on Yap.

Over 100 Yapese and Carolinian men were forced to work on the project. The six Japanese employed in the work included one supervisor-project manager, whose name was Furusawa, two masons, two carpenters, and one specialist for the design and building of windows and stairs. The food for these men was supplied from Colonia by sampan.

The lighthouse complex construction involved several kinds of tasks: hauling supplies, such as cement and fuel, from the pier to the building site; felling trees and ripping them into planks, which were then carried to the site; cutting mangrove posts and carrying them to the site; and gathering rocks at Riken Village for truck transport to the site. Other tasks included breaking rocks by hand into gravel to be mixed with cement to make concrete, carrying water by hand to the site to mix the concrete, and mixing and pouring the concrete by hand. Continuously for 2 days before a concrete pour, the Micronesians were assigned to carry water from the Gilaw Spring in Lebinaw in 5-gallon tin containers, two per man, up to the site.

Hardwoods cut for lumber included mangrove trees, mahogany *(Calophyllum inophyllum)*, breadfruit *(Artocarpus altilis)*, and *lach*, the Yapese name for a tree that is probably an acacia.

The work was extremely difficult, and the Japanese assigned daily work quotas. The workers had to meet the quota before they were finished for the day. For example, if the task was breaking rocks into gravel using hand tools, a certain number of containers per day had to be filled with gravel. Sometimes the men had to work very long days to reach their quotas.

If a worker was sick or too slow, the Japanese punished him severely. Punishments were slaps, punches, kicks, and beatings with a piece of wood. A vividly remembered punishment consisted of the victim kneeling for a long time on crushed shells scattered over a cement platform while enduring a bamboo stalk being pressed by two men against the backs of his knees.

The hill on which the Japanese decided to build the lighthouse complex had been a Yapese burial ground and was considered sacred by the Yapese. However, the Yapese people were not consulted about nor were they compensated for the ultimate destruction of the graves during the ground-leveling process that involved dynamiting, excavating, and filling. It is not known how many graves were destroyed. We observed some intact burial features on the forested slopes of the hill below the complex.

When some of the graves were destroyed during the leveling of the hilltop, the Carolinians removed the bones and gave them to the Yapese, who reburied them elsewhere in the village. In other cases, when no des-

cendants could identify the remains in a grave, no bone recovery and reburial efforts were made.

All construction work was accomplished with hand tools. Picks, shovels, rakes, machetes, and so forth had to be supplied by the Yapese workers, who said they had a difficult time obtaining the tools to perform the required work.

The first task in the construction process was clearing the hill of vegetation, which informants stated was mainly *Pandanus*. The trees were cut and burned. Next came the leveling of the hill. The surface of the platform is now 7 to 10 m lower than the original hilltop. The first 3 m of the hill was removed entirely by hand, using picks and shovels. Below about 3 m, bedrock was encountered. The Japanese used dynamite to break up the bedrock, which was then removed by hand to level the site. The loose rock was stockpiled. Some of it was used to face the slopes of the platform, and some was broken into gravel for the concrete.

Once the platform was constructed, work on the lighthouse and other features began, but the exact date construction began is not known. It is known, however, that not all of the buildings were complete by the time the site was bombed and dynamited in 1944. In part, this facility could not be finished because American bombing elsewhere in Micronesia destroyed the Japanese supply lines to Yap early in 1944.

The lighthouse tower walls were built up in sections, each about 2 m high. The wood planks of the concrete forms were braced with mangrove wood, and then the poured concrete was left to cure in place for 2 to 7 days. Chipping smoothed the ridges left by the wood forms.

According to informants, the lighthouse was plastered inside and outside. The doors were made of local mahogany. Glass windows were installed all around the top of the tower, which was ringed on the outside by a concrete walkway with a handrail. The light in the tower had been installed, but it never functioned because the generator never arrived.

Only the office building, described as beautiful, was completely finished. The windows were glassed and the doors installed, but no furnishings or supplies were placed inside. Some parts of the office building were painted.

The generator and storage building structure was not completed—it lacked doors, windows, and furnishings. Wood shelves had been installed, but were never stocked.

The water catchment and washing area also was not completed. The roof and water channeling system to the catchment tanks were not built.

In addition to the walled earth platform that supported the lighthouse, generator and storage building, office, and water catchment and washing facilities, some structures were built off the platform. Within 20 m of the north end of the platform, a warehouse for storing building supplies was erected, as was a residence and office structure for the project manager, Mr. Furuzawa (a man about 30 years of age who lived there with his wife). These temporary buildings were made of wood and had tin roofs.

We noted, but did not systematically investigate, an area west of the lighthouse platform and road. According to the Yapese, this area contained two houses, each with its own concrete water catchment tank. Entrance to this area was through a gateway marked by two concrete pillars similar to those built at the north entrance to the lighthouse platform. A carpenter's house, also of wood and tin, was built north of the two houses, but it apparently had no catchment tank. The carpenter was in his thirties, but informants could not recall his name.

US Attacks on the Lighthouse Complex

Our informants stated that the first American air raid on Yap came on March 30 or 31, 1944, and it was aimed at three targets: Colonia, the airport in southern Yap Island, and the lighthouse complex. During the strafing and bombing of the lighthouse complex, heavy damage was inflicted on the warehouse and the manager's house off the platform, the two residences west of the road, and the office building. The tower still stood after this attack.

The most intense air attacks occurred in the summer of 1944. Informants said the daily raids failed to topple the tower, although it was a primary target. In frustration the Japanese decided to blow up the tower themselves so that the shelling would cease. No Yapese were present when the lighthouse was destroyed, nor during the bombing raids. They said that one Japanese (whether a soldier or a civilian is not known) died there. When the lighthouse complex and the Gagil-Tamil area, including Lebinaw, were under air attack, the Yapese fled to other villages or hid in the jungle. The terror of this time is reflected in the dance chant quoted above.

In anticipation of enemy landings on the beach, the Japanese dug trenches across the road that led to the pier. After the war the Yapese filled in some of these trenches, and the road between the pier and the village of Lebinaw is still used (Plate 5). There may be other defensive features in the lighthouse area, such as an ammunition cave, which was rumored to have been bulldozed closed by the Americans. An undetermined number of years after the war, a local man lived in the generator and storage building for a short time.



Plate 5. *The causeway joining the east end of the Japanese pier.*

CONCLUSION

In this report on the archaeology and human experiential aspects of a little-known episode in modern Yapese history, we have noted the involuntary nature of the Yapese involvement in building the lighthouse. Though the owners were neither consulted about nor compensated for the use of their land for the lighthouse, this time around they appear to be taking control of the future uses of this special portion of their history. In a fine irony, the Yapese expect that the lighthouse site will be of interest to Japanese tourists, notwithstanding the fact that the Japanese government has not memorialized any World War II events in Yap, as they have done elsewhere in Micronesia.

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grateful for the logistical support provided by the Yap State Historic Preservation Office. During our archival research the efforts of Dr. Mary McCutcheon at the National Archives in Washington, DC, and Mr. John Sablan and the staff at the Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, are gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

1. The impetus for studying World War II sites and features has come from island historic preservation programs established by the US National Parks Service during the 1970s and from separate congressional grants. The Yap lighthouse study project is an example of the latter. The Yap State Historic Preservation Office obtained support for the project from a specially funded federal program to record and preserve historic lighthouses.

2. Previous archaeological surveys in Yap have noted Japanese-era features (Adams, Campbell, & Ross, 1990; Hunter-Anderson, 1983; Pickering, 1980), but archaeological projects devoted to Yap's historic sites are limited to two "predevelopment reviews" performed in 1980 (Price, 1982a, 1982b). Apparently both sites were being considered for development as properties of historic interest to the Yap government; however, neither has been developed nor has stabilization been attempted.

3. After Spain was defeated in the Spanish-American War, Germany purchased the Carolines, including Yap, from Spain in 1899. The German administration established a vast communications system in the western Pacific, with Yap as the main node linking Shanghai, Guam, and Manado, in Sulawesi, formerly Celebes (Lee, 1939, p. 6; Peattie, 1988, pp. 57–58). For a history of the contentious relations between Japan and the United States over Yap and its cable station, see Peattie (1988, pp. 55–61).

4. This information is taken from page 7 of the "Ulithi" Encyclopedia, WVTY United States Armed Forces Radio Station, Ulithi, Western Carolines, an undated document at the Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

5. We have been unable to locate a print of this photograph; it can be viewed on microfilm at the Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

6. Mr. Andrew Kugfas, Yap State Historic Preservation Officer, concurs that the Yapese-composed English translation of the dance chant should be reproduced here "as is." He pointed out that in the composition of Yapese dance chants, poetic license is frequently taken with grammar and syntax to make the words fit the rhythm and music of the dance. An example of this is found in the first stanza.

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From the Spaces to the Holes: Rālik–Ratak Remembrances of World War II

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This article uses stories of World War II, elicited in 1990 and 1991 from Marshall Islander war survivors, to explore the conceptual space occupied by accounts of the war. At one level, the aging storytellers use the stories as pedagogical devices that rethink and "re-present" the fundamental cosmological propositions and cultural values contained in stories about primeval times. At a much different level, the stories are used as statements that draw on the efficacy of each person's life historical experience to construct contextually empowering elements of each storyteller's multifaceted social self. Two stories are discussed in depth to show how contrary evaluations of Japanese and American rule rely on the same judgments of good and bad rulers applied differently, depending on the varied characteristics of the social actors and the contextual conditions of the interviews themselves.

As elaborations of events that rest on the margins of day-to-day existence, the stories of World War II in the Republic of the Marshall Islands take on a near mythic status for their aging raconteurs.[1] But these stories differ from chants and the "stories of old," for they are neither unique nor sacred in the repertoire of present-day tales. While chants have the constructive power to bring things into being, and ancient stories—those of primordial culture heroes like Lōktañūr and Jebero, Limanman, Lewa, and Etao—define the raison d'etre for Marshallese existence, war stories are constructed as reinterpretations of the fundamental themes of creation stories, chants, and tales of the earth's earliest inhabitants. As told by the

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Islander survivors of the wartime experience, the war stories rework historically resonant themes into new tales that demonstrate tentative conclusions about a complex set of ongoing negotiations concerning colonial and postcolonial identities. These identities range from the most localized component of a single person's multifaceted presentation of self to broad generalizations about Americans or Japanese. Telling stories of the war, therefore, has a far different aim from the telling of creation stories, serving more as pedagogical proof than ontological proposition.

This article discusses the several causes and conditions that underlie the particular way stories of World War II are told, linking them in one sense to the prototypical tropes and imagery that derive from the stories of old and that are used to distinguish good from bad actions and right demeanor from wrong. In another, much different sense, the stories are themselves empowering statements that draw on the efficacy of the past to allow each person to place his or her own multifaceted constructions of identity in an ongoing set of contextually significant power negotiations (Bourdieu, 1991; White, 1994). It is not surprising that in this sense the stories of the war differ in their self-fashioning according to the varied characteristics of the social actors, and I briefly outline a few of the differential social characteristics that influence these contextually constrained constructions of the war.

Following a short introduction to World War II in the Marshall Islands, I present the two recurrent themes in local people's stories of the war. After indicating how these antithetical themes are interrelated, I then show how they are substantially recast into a specific interpretation, or "telling," of World War II that depends upon the social positioning of the storytellers themselves.

WORLD WAR II AND THE EXPERIENCE OF MARSHALL ISLANDERS

The Marshall Islands lie near the eastern fringe of the chains of islands that Europeans and Americans refer to as Micronesia (see map in the front matter of this volume). At the beginning of World War II, Micronesia was an important part of the *Nan'yō,* the South Seas empire that Japan developed after the World War I for its economic potential and as a frontier for migration (Peattie, 1988). As Japan traveled the path toward World War II, the Marshalls, along with the islands of Kiribati (formerly the Gilbert Islands), formed the outermost defensive perimeter around the home islands of Japan and

Okinawa. These perimeter islands were among the first locations to be attacked when the Allies began their march along the "second road to Tokyo." Although the war eventually brought hardship and suffering to many of the residents of Micronesia, there were also many for whom the prewar buildup had meant travel, jobs, and exposure to the excitement of city life. Even though Micronesians were classified as third-class citizens of the empire, most retain positive memories of life prior to the war.

The Marshall Islands most affected by Japanese war ambitions were Jāl-wōj (Jaluit), Mile (Mili), Maḷo-eḷap (Maloelap), Wōjjā (Wotje), Kuwajleen (Kwajalein), and Āne-wetak (Enewetak); Mājro (Majuro) and other atolls experienced less significant effects. Arṇo was a temporary relocation site for Islanders near the end of the war. Major battles took place on Kuwajleen and Āne-wetak; the other Japanese bases in the Marshalls were bypassed, isolated, and systematically bombed between the beginning of 1944 and the end of the war. Finally, for places such as Āne-wetak and Pikinni (Bikini), the US decision to test nuclear weapons extended the experiences of exile, hunger, and some other conditions of warfare long beyond August 1945 (see Carucci, 1989).

STRANGER–KINGS ON LOCAL LANDS

Ultimately, World War II was a battle fought among foreigners on local land (Falgout, 1992; see also Richard, 1957, Vol. III). Although certainly a foreigner's battle, it was equally about the *control* of local lands and a battle over the shape of the relationships that typify the interactions between foreigners and between foreigners and local peoples. One fundamental means adopted by Marshall Islanders to explain the war's perpetrators and their actions are stories of chiefly contestation. Some of these stories involve the sly culture hero, Etao, and his interactions with established island chiefs (see Carucci, 1989), but perhaps the prototypical story involves the relationships among Lōktañūr's offspring and their race to determine who would first rule the Marshall Islands. A shortened version (with some spelling alterations) of Kramer and Nevermann's (n.d., pp. 31–33–VI) early twentieth century recording of the story contends that

> Lōktañūr was a woman from the heavens who lived on Woja, Aelōñḷaplap [Ailinglaplap], with her five sons, Tūmur, Mejilep, Ditata, Lajlaplap, and Jebero. They learned how to make outrigger paddling can-

oes from Lewa and Lomedal, who had come to Woja from Pikinni. But they did not know yet how to make sails.

It was said that the first sibling to reach the windward-most end of Aelōñļapļap would become king, so each brother began to fashion a canoe for the trip. Only Lōktañūr knew how to make masts, sails, rigging, deckhouses, and drums. When Tūmur's boat was ready his mother requested: "Take me with you," but he did not want to take his mother's big bundle and was afraid. Next she asked Mejilep to travel with him to the east, but he refused. The same happened with Ditata and Lajlaplap. Only the fifth, Jebero, was willing to take his mother along with him.

When she came aboard, she told him: "You will be king!" "How is that possible?" he answered. "My four brothers have already left. I'll never overtake them." His mother said "You'll see." Jebero became more and more upset as she erected the mast, the rigging, the belaying pins, and finally, the sail. Finally, when she demonstrated their use, he calmed down. Then she instructed him in sailing and put Jebero in the stern of the canoe where chiefs should sit. Then they set sail and the boat flew along, soon overtaking the other four. When they passed Tūmur, he shouted "Stop! I want to sail with you!" They took him aboard. But, his mother said to Jebero: "Cast off the pennant, let it fall." Then the heavy sail fell on Tūmur and broke his back. He fell into the water and died. Jebero, however, was the first to reach the eastern end of the atoll, and became king, whereas his brothers became commoners [*kadjur*].

Just how is the tale of Lōktañūr and Jebero refashioned to account for and accommodate the events of World War II? From the perspective of local people, or commoners, the race to be won takes place among foreigners who are inherently imbued with greater power than the local people, who await them at the end of the race. Moreover, the race transpires in order to decide who will have the right to rule over local lands and peoples. In a recent Arno version of the Lōktañūr tale (Rynkiewich, 1972), the losing siblings die at sea and do not become commoners; on Ujļañ (Ujelang) and Āne-wetak (Carucci, 1980, in press), Jebero (Pleiades) shares the high chieftainship with Tūmur (Antares), the oldest brother, and the intermediate siblings die at sea. In each instance, the race determines which foreign chiefly sibling is suited to rule.

Marshall Sahlins (1985) describes the Polynesian variants of this tale as structural attempts to set the concept of community in opposition to the antithetical issues of power and chieftainship. These issues of power and hierarchy become aligned with foreigners so as to keep them at a distance from what is local and communal. The Lōktañūr tale represents the spe-

cifically Marshallese formulation and resolution of this Stranger-King scenario. Given its focus on issues of foreignness and chiefly rank, community solidarity and caring, it is not surprising that the story becomes a prototype Marshall Islanders use to make sense of the shifting relationships with pre– and post–World War II colonial rulers and to situate the wartime confrontations of these rulers.

The Lōktañūr tale represents an alternative outcome to the preordained pattern of succession by primogeniture. Its dynamic inheres in the incongruity between birthright and demonstrated action. These incongruities become apparent as the solidarities and ambivalences of the sibling relationship (cf. Shore, 1989) are explored in relation to the ties to Lōktañūr, the primal matriarch and mother. The Lōktañūr tale would follow a much shorter course if Tūmur had welcomed his mother aboard his canoe, thereby demonstrating through demeanor the proper alignment of authority with the culturally valued attributes of sacrifice and generosity. Instead, the tale points up a logical opposition between the inherent empowerment guaranteed by birthright and the kindness and generosity required of those in positions of rank and leadership.

When the Lōktañūr tale is reused to derive logical order from the occurrences of World War II, having a common mother and a common residence are no longer the legitimizing bases for the authority of the Stranger-Kings. Divested of preordained structural limits, the legitimacy of authority must then be *demonstrated through action* and rationalized through shared typifications of the *relationship* between local people and these unknown others. Given that these relationships are multidimensional, there is no single winner of this race. Instead, characteristic actions are differentially attributed to Japan and the United States by Marshall Islands residents as a way to construct and project empowered images of one's self and one's own community in a complex and ever-changing social situation. Two markedly different ways of fashioning these constructions of selves and others form the focus of this article.

Marshall Islanders fashion their stories of the war into morality tales that validate the importance of sharing and solidarity as ideal daily practices that become even more imperative in times of suffering. In the Lōktañūr tale, Jebero's kindness and his agreement to share his canoe with his mother allows him to circumvent the competitive race that was expected to rank the sibling chiefs. Just as these discourses of love, sharing, and solidarity are placed in opposition to the competitive canoe race, they are also stressed by females to a greater degree than males. As I have argued elsewhere

(Carucci, 1980), this alignment makes sense inasmuch as Marshallese females both give birth to family members and control the bilateral extended families in which the symbols of solidarity—loving, caring for, watching over, and so forth—must be demonstrated on a daily basis.

Johannes Fabian (1990, p. 280) suggests that "the major elements of a conceptualization of power" are rooted in "a process whereby experience and received traditions are made into knowledge that can be stated discursively." This is precisely what happens in the telling of Marshallese stories of the war. The following discussion shows how the poles of Sahlins' (1985) countervalent schemata—the rank-engendering and the solidarity-legitimizing tropes—are brought into alignment with one another in telling the story of World War II. But the two storytellers presented here have selected different winners of their race. They offer contrastive accounts that demonstrate how each storyteller portrays Japan or the United States as being representative of the truly caring youngest sibling ruler (Jebero) in the Lōktañūr tale. These contrastive accounts not only point to the multifaceted ways in which Marshall Islanders experienced the war, but also they demonstrate the different ways in which each storyteller must fashion his or her own current constructions of self out of complex fragments of life historical material.

The differential valuation of these outside chiefs (Japan and the United States) in stories about World War II seems striking. But the differences in the stories are not surprising, given the continuously renegotiated character of the relationships between the Marshall Islands and Japan and the United States, the investments of identity that each person must draw from his or her life historical experience, and the complex contextual conditions of the interview process. Jebero becomes the pivotal mythic prototype for these discussions of Stranger-Kings for two reasons. First, as a true "commoner's chief," he successfully combines the positive attributes of loving and caring with legitimate links through his mother to the heavens. Second, he *demonstrates* his suitability to rule through proper demeanor. These are precisely the characteristics that each storyteller attributes to interactions with Japan and the United States, depending on the different social and political value of his or her historically grounded experiences. Therefore, as Bourdieu (1991) and Fabian (1990) would suggest, each storyteller uses the representational resources at his or her disposal to create for me an account of the war that is not only culturally viable but also self-empowering.

CONTEXTS OF PERSON AND PERFORMANCE

Although the stories of World War II are used to demonstrate unique characteristics of each outside participant (Japan and the United States), the stories are told within what many Marshall Islanders portray as a continuation of the American colonial era (even though formal political independence began in 1985). Moreover, the stories are told for *me,* an American. Though these features, per se, do not produce single uniform characterizations of Japan or the United States, they lend a certain contour to many of the accounts.

Each resident who gives me his or her recollections of the war also embeds within the story important life historical features of a personal nature. As critical legitimations of identity, each account retrospectively fashions a person's own life and experience to demonstrate that it was a life well lived. Those who were educated under the Japanese and had acquired positions of respect prior to World War II commonly give far more positive accounts of life under the Japanese administration than those who received their education and came to hold respected positions under the Americans.[2] Based on this valuation or devaluation of experience with the Japanese versus the Americans, each raconteur then must develop a correlated theory of history, developmentalist and evolutionist or devolutionist and degenerationist. For the select few who situate their stories in farsighted cyclical views, the era encompassed by their lives must be depicted as part of a cycle of improvement or of loss.

The precise nature of these contrasts is apparent in the stories of the war by Thaddeus and Clanton, two Marshallese men from different stations in life. Their accounts share several features with those of many other Marshallese, but the unique attributes are equally informative in relation to their different life histories.

DISTANT CHIEFS AND THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY

Clanton, who was raised on Roñlap (Rongelap) Atoll northwest of Kuwajleen, portrays the Japanese in a fashion typical of most Marshall Islanders. In response to my query[3] "What happened during the war?" he responds:

> Before the Second World War came and was very intense, we lived under the government of the Japanese, and the government of the Japanese was a little different from the government of the Americans [*RiPālle*] because the Japanese mainly used force, ability, power, and the strength of their laws. The thing is, in terms of this thing, helping, well, they helped a lot, but in terms of watching over people, well, sometimes their laws were very heavy [burdensome]. It is as if just a little thing [happened] and you would be in court. We feared that we would not be good. (LMC: And if you did wrong?) If you did wrong, well, they would take us to jail and try us and *jik jik* [slap us], give us the sort of punishment that, in the times of the Americans, well, we have not yet seen. Slap us, yes. Because with the Japanese power, the thing that they say [holds], it is all strength [*kajoor en*]. This is what was straight with them. Well then, there is not a single Marshallese who could get upset with them. (LMC: But if you worked "straight" [properly]?) Well, if you worked properly, then the way they did us, treated us, was good, and you would obey and follow their laws, but on the other hand, improper action, well, you would be in the courts (Clanton, in 1991).

Although harsh treatment is a common remembrance, many Marshall Islanders feel that the absolute boundaries demarcated by Japanese justice were well suited to Marshallese people. The "innocent until proven guilty" dictum of the United States has come to mean that those who can afford to pay a fine or to hire a good lawyer will go without punishment even if they are guilty. Kanki Amlej puts it this way:

> In terms of the good things the Japanese did toward us, because these friends of ours were almost like us in terms of their lifestyle and their laws, if we said they were bad they would straighten us out. They really straightened us out because there was no evil that persisted as it does today. If you were bad they would take you into the office and beat you and beat you, and so it was rare that the Marshallese did anything bad during those times. Everyone was good because they were frightened. (LMC: Yes, I understand.) And so the thing I am saying is that this was good because they were closer to us in the way that they tossed out these laws and bargained with us to keep us from being damaged and bad.
>
> But then the Americans they are good because they do not emulate us, but they said "you must maintain your freedom and directedness" [*anemkwōj ilo jimue*]. So after that we *did not* maintain our freedom in a straight fashion [he laughs], but instead we maintain our freedom by traveling about in an aimless manner, and so we ourselves have damaged ourselves. (HM & LMC: Yes, perhaps that is right.) So the good thing about the Americans is that they have no desire to

> beat us and cause us to be covered with scars on our bodies. They do not have any laws in the courthouse that say anything about beating us and placing us in jail, but as for fines [punishment], those exist. So the thing is, if you have to give them a very large sum of money, well this is also a fairly heavy thing. (LMC: So this is their punishment?) This is in line with the monied lives they lead, and the importance that they give to money. (LMC: Yes, I understand.) So this is another thing that is equally difficult. Nonetheless our bodies are not hurt, whereas with the Japanese our bodies are in pain but we [act in] a straight way, and so these are the changes and differences that I saw during those times (Kanki, in 1990).

While the Japanese are here portrayed as being "like us," the indisputability of Japanese authority and the harshness of their administration in judicial matters become the collective representation of Japanese otherness, an otherness that parallels talk about Marshall Islands chiefs. As with chiefs, when local people were well cared for in an ongoing reciprocal exchange, there were no complaints. During the Japanese era, being well cared for meant that goods were inexpensive and available, and schools, medical care, and limited travel were provided. When the Japanese military government took control of island affairs, and as schools closed and travel was constrained, and particularly as supplies of imported goods dwindled, the relationship changed. The changes are often represented in terms that parallel recent changes in chiefly-commoner relationships in the Marshall Islands. Clanton describes these changes of Japanese governance and Marshallese chiefs in an analogous manner:

Changes in Japanese Governance

Before the battle, there were no difficulties in terms of movements, in terms of [people's] lives, foods. The people of Roñlap were almost like a single person. They were very close to one another, they were all relatives [*nukin*], and they watched over one another nicely. There were no difficulties in terms of anything, needs and these things.

There were [many] sorts of goods: rice, flour, sugar, tinned foods, clothes, biscuits. I do not know why, but they were not expensive; these folks,

Changes in Marshall Islands Chiefs

As for Roñlap, there was only one chief, this one, Jeimata only—Jeimata Kabua, he who is chief today—Amata Kabua today. Well, then, Roñlap tended not to have things happen because there was only one chief. Sometimes they would make their rounds and the chiefs tended to watch over people, bring them the [things] they needed, goods and foods, bring them things from Jōbwad [Jabwor] and take them to Jōbwad [if they needed to be doctored]. It was very good the way they watched over their commoners. Yes, because in

what was it, the dollars of the Japanese had a lot of content [value] right? Yen. It was fine the way we used it, and during the times before the battle, goods were inexpensive. Just like when the [US] Navy first came, things were very [inexpensive].

[Thinking] forward to the time that the battle began, that is, after they damaged Pearl Harbor, and when they began building Kuwajleen, Mile, Maloelap . . . those places where they did build . . . now the government of the civilians was gone and the government of the soldiers began. And now the government of the military, well there was no freedom there. Everything belonged to the soldiers. And let us say, the power [ability] of the people of the Marshalls, the correctness of their ways in terms of those places they lived and the things they ate and their possessions, well, they had no control [*maroñ*] over things now. So, at this time, the power of the military government began to work and from then [on].

On Roñlap, there were two types who came, the one group known as *kebitai,* and some weathermen. Those of us who were small, young single men, we worked with the soldiers, and [it was because] we knew how to speak Japanese. We went and helped the soldiers and worked on the watchtower. We got paid with the Japanese. The thing is, we got paid if we worked, but if they wanted something, they would come and take it without payment. Just take it and go. This was in line with the laws, with the thinking of their government. This included fruits and anything they wanted that was there. If they saw something and desired it, they took it and left. They did not say "Who does this belong to?" and "How much those times when they weighed copra, 3 mills [a small levy or tax] belonged to the chief.

Well, when they were coming, there is a Marshallese custom they call *komāātāt* [first fruits], and when they came we komāātāt, all of the land heads of the chief. Then there were first fruits tributes they made, there were foods and various things, and when the chief came we all komāātāt, [literally, 'to totally finish,' 'to exhaust the supply of']. Everyone came to see the chief and these things came afterward [in addition to]; they were not combined with the mills on copra.

(LMC: What about the chiefly share—*mona* 'meals' or 'food'—in copra?) Well as for copra, you would divide. The divisions were already set. Three mills for the chief. Then you see the land head, his share was greater than that belonging to the chief. Yes, during those times. And *kajoor* [commoners 'the strength'], a greater part than the land head and the chief. Yes because they said "There is the one who is working," and it tended to go along without any problems.

Well, nowadays, it has changed because now the chief is here [elevated] and the commoner [laughs] is here [much lower]. Yes, things have very much changed. But in previous times the chiefs tended to [be powerful], but the chiefs also took people, watched over them, and [took them to be] doctored. But the chief's money, 3 mills, like 3 cents, it was very [reasonable]. The difference between the two [past and present] is [laughs] great. Well, this is typical of what life was like (Clanton, in 1991).

> does it cost?" They did not. (LMC: Did they treat chiefs and people the same?) First off, [prior to the war], they very much knew how to watch over people and elevate the chiefs. Then, when the battle became stronger, it is as if there was nothing belonging to the chiefs. Chiefs and people were almost the same in their [Japanese] thinking (Clanton, in 1991).

Whereas changes in the chiefly scenario have taken place over a lifetime, along with many other alterations in daily existence, the changes in Japanese treatment of Islanders took place rapidly. Therefore, they are rationalized by Clanton as an administrative change: "Now the civilian government was gone and the soldiers' government took over." The analogue with the chief is precise because the core of the Japanese ethos remains constant, but undesirable potentialities of that ethos become apparent. Clanton's construction of these continuities for chiefs in an indigenous style is reminiscent of the classical Maori formulation (Sahlins, 1985, p. 14; Schrempp, 1992, p. 80 ff.): "As for Roñļap [Rongelap] there was only one chief, Jeimata only, he who is chief today." The continuity of a core identity between Jeimata and Amata is represented by the posited "continuity in being," despite the literal *re*-placement of the living instantiation of that being in a new personage—Amata. The surface differences are accounted for by different genitors who have an effect on the surface attributes of the two chiefs, but not on the core elements of the person (Carucci, 1985). For the outsiders, the Japanese component of the performers' identities remains constant; contextual shifts in demeanor are accounted for by changes in surficial attributes, from civilians to soldiers.

In the recollections of Marshall Islanders, some Japanese are set apart from this scenario of increasing oppression even during the military era. In many stories about Japanese military personnel, the considerate soldiers are of low rank. This is not critical, however, because the representational value of both the Japanese and the Americans is judged by their *actions.* In Clanton's recollections, Roñļap people were blessed with a considerate Jebero-like commoner's chief:

> (LMC: And you say that one Japanese was fairly friendly?) Oh, yes, and I do not think that it was only there [Roñļap], for I have spoken with some others and they say on their atolls there were, if not one,

> two [kind Japanese soldiers]. Well, the thing that was good about that place [Roñļap], it was he who was highly ranked of the soldiers [who was considerate]. I do not remember his name but he was a *taichō* [commander] (Clanton, in 1991).

As in the tale of Lōktañūr and Jebero, Clanton finds the combination of rank and kindness worthy of special note in his personal characterization of the Roñļap taichō. In local Roñļap people's caring for one another in the prewar years, Clanton finds the ideals of demonstrated solidarity. Using that model, Clanton believes that many atolls had small groups of enlisted Japanese soliders who were considerate and understanding in their interactions with Marshall Islanders. Yet the foreign character *and* high rank of the Roñļap taichō make his kindnesses exceptional.

LIVED EXPERIENCE AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE AMERICAN–JAPANESE CONTRAST

The existential conditions of Clanton's life circumstances cause him to depict the Japanese in an already existing relationship with Marshall Islanders. Clanton may have heard stories of earlier times under Spanish, German, or early Japanese rule, but because he was only about 12 years of age in 1940, his depictions of the civilian era are largely homogeneous and continuous. In contrast, Labwinmij Laelañeo, who claims to have been born in 1909, has a much more multifaceted view of the Japanese. He recalls what happened when the Germans left the Marshalls during World War I.

> While I was on Pikaarej [Bikarej], the fleet arrived, the one that went and traveled ['flew'] from this atoll [Mājro]. The German ships, when they sailed from Jāl-wōj, they ran off to the atoll here to the east [Arṇo]. During that time I was still a boy, and I saw the fleet belonging to the Germans escape (Labwinmij, in 1990).

This story provides a different contextual background that allows Labwinmij to fashion his Japanese much as younger men and women fashion the Americans: as conquering chiefs, as early colonizers, as compromised in their idealistic colonial claims, as a postcolonial power with certain ongoing interests and, therefore, with certain negotiable possibilities for a struggling newly independent state. Labwinmij has a multilayered account of the Japanese company era: the time prior to the local policeman, the policeman era, the remunerated labor recruitment era, the forced labor era, the initial

bombing, and so forth. Despite his failing memory, he gives a rich account that reflects the variety of his experiences of the Japanese era and requires an elaborated theory of who the Japanese were:

> Our life with the Japanese [before the battle] was not very good. We were quite damaged because a policeman came to the atoll east of here [Arṇo] and his laws were very strict.
>
> Well, things were very good for us prior to the time we lived with the policeman. It was good because we maintained a life under the laws of the atoll and we worked out all of the various agreements.
>
> The policeman remained around here for a while and watched over this atoll, to get ready for their selecting people to go to the work locations (Labwinmij, in 1990).[4]

Although Clanton's age cohort has a condensed view of the Japanese era, the cohort members commonly have an elaborated view of the American era because they lived the majority of their adult lives during this period. They witnessed the arrival of the Americans, the US Navy era, the civilian administration, the Trust Territory era, the Peace Corps period, the times leading up to and including independence, and the free association dependency era. In contrast, most of Clanton's age cohort members recall only a generalized prewar Japanese civilian era, a gradual buildup, and then, almost unexpectedly, the war itself. The relatively undifferentiated portrayal of the Japanese thus lends itself to a sharply contrastive view of the Americans.[5]

Particularly those *closest to the American centers* of activity—people from Mājro, Kuwajleen, Āne-wetak, and others who worked in these locations—typically construct their tales of the new warrior-chiefs in contrast to their immediate past experience with the Japanese. Three notable features in nearly every story of this sort are: first, the overwhelming American use of military force that reduced years of Japanese preparation to rubble in only a few hours (including the seemingly sacred and superhuman rooteedness of that force in instruments of destruction); second, the seemingly endless supply of goods that followed upon the American arrival; and third, the carefree distribution of those goods to Islanders. In combination with the actual taking of the islands *(juurki,* literally, 'placing one's foot upon'), these story features establish the Americans' sacredness and their right to occupy the position of conquering chiefs.

For Clanton's age cohort the Americans are consistently understood in relation to experiences with the Japanese in the military era and immediately prior to the war. These contrastive experiences allow Americans to

be fashioned most commonly into collective analogues of the younger sibling, Jebero, who usurps the rule from the older sibling, Tūmur. In the legend of Lōktañūr and her offspring, it is Tūmur's failure to "care for," "watch over," and "love" his mother, and Jebero's demonstration of the characteristics lacking in his older siblings, that empower Jebero and allow him to become the ascendant deity and chief. Clanton's Japanese become analogues of Tūmur, chiefly rulers who, as the war progresses, become increasingly intolerant in their treatment of local people. The authoritarian Japanese style before the war is portrayed in Marshallese stories of thrashings and "command form" interactions with local people, but the ultimate abuses came during the war in places like Jāl-wōj and Mile after the American blockade of the seas led to marginal subsistence conditions for soldiers. Harsh Japanese military restrictions were imposed on the Islanders concerning food collecting and the physical movement of people, even communal gathering, and these constraints led to hardship and resulted in Islanders' deaths (cf. Higuchi, 1986; see also Poyer and George, this volume, for similar events in Yap and Palau). Even on Roñļap the ultimate denial of proper chiefly demeanor on the part of the Japanese is portrayed in extermination stories.

Extermination stories are constructed on all of the atolls where fairly substantial numbers of Japanese soliders were present, and the stories are also found on several atolls where only small Japanese garrisons were present. Although my colleagues and I have not found any evidence to confirm that the Japanese had any intention of conducting mass exterminations, the value of the stories as representations of a broken trust between the local people and their colonizer-chiefs is critical. Clanton begins this part of his narrative by situating the demeanor of the Japanese soldiers:

> (LMC: When the Japanese came, were they kind?) I will make a comparative example of an animal, O.K.? Well, the lion, is it O.K.? Is it considerate? Because they came in a certain atmosphere, because they needed it, they needed to use it [Roñļap], and my belief is that if they would have come in kindness, it would have been [different]. But instead they came in their ferocity. And we were frightened at that time and when they asked us things, no one would respond and say "good" or "bad"; we just bowed down, that is all. We would not say "no."
>
> (LMC: Now, when the battle began, what occurred on Roñļap?) Well, when the battle appeared, now, me, I do not know, but I think there was a message to each of the bases belonging to the military from the admiral and those who were of high rank on Kuwajleen. I

> think they sent a message because there was an evil thought about destroying [throwing away] all of the Marshallese people. The thing is, this was never successful [*ar jab bo*], and we do not know. But the reason we knew their thoughts had changed is because the laws began to change more and they began to really watch us, watch us Marshallese. And what did they hope to see? If you came out, then they would say we were spying or some such thing, an agent, or, well, these sorts of things. On account of these things, they had bad thoughts about causing extreme damage to the Marshallese people.
>
> (LMC: Were they going to shoot people or what?) Well, it is possible, or they may have been going to make holes. I think the thing was, they were going to make holes, because do you see these hiding places [bunkers]? Well, earlier on they had two entrances, but then I think there was a message to make a single door because then when they made them [the holes with one entrance], it would be good for putting people inside, and then when it was time to get rid of them, it would be possible to use a single hand grenade and . . . . This was the thought, and then they initiated the battle [*kajutak bata eo*] and then [they] began to fear their weakness, and then there were no more boats, no time to bring their needs at that point, and then the real thoughts of the Japanese were [to kill the Marshallese]. This is representative of what I have thought about deeply and come to know clearly [*kile*], and after the war, from what I have heard from other fellows from elsewhere, they say it was to have been the same [where they were]. Well, this is what I saw as the battle became stronger and was a great struggle (Clanton, in 1991).

The extermination stories align themselves with other Marshall Islanders' stories of Japanese soldiers who chose to die in service of *Tennō-heika* (emperor deity) rather than surrender to US forces.[6] Even though Marshall Islanders were third-class citizens of the Japanese Empire, they were considered citizens. Like Thaddeus (see below), many expected to move up to full citizenship after the war. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Japanese expected the Marshall Islanders to conform to the Japanese code of honor. But it is my contention that most Marshall Islanders make sense of Japanese and Americans in terms of their own practice and the "fit" with local cultural expectations. Thus, when Japanese military abuses of local resources and citizens began, and when the ultimate futility of the Japanese war effort became apparent, *most* Marshallese switched loyalties and sided with their new conqueror-chiefs, the Americans. From the perspective of many Japanese soldiers, the Marshallese became traitors to the Japanese cause and committed treasonous acts by sharing information with the Americans as spies or agents. *Threats* of extermination were a logical Japanese

device to force Marshall Islanders to reconfirm their daily pledges of allegiance to Tennōheika. *Fears* of extermination coalesced into a representation of the outermost margin of possible conduct, a conceptual location so reprehensible that it forced local people to realign themselves with the Americans. *Stories* of the moments when local people sensed the exterminations were about to be enacted thus become the rationalizations that allow most Marshall Islanders to justify their chosen alliance with the new colonizers.

Battle tales are most highly elaborated on Kuwajleen and Āne-wetak, where the definitive struggles between the Americans and Japanese took place. I have outlined a few of the Āne-wetak stories elsewhere (Carucci, 1989), but the Kuwajleen tales are equally important.

One standard way of legitimizing the American takeover of the Marshall Islands is to construct a lineal connection between the American conquerer-chiefs, the soldiers who saved Islanders from certain extinction under the Japanese, and other Americans (or 'white people' RiPalle in general) who occupied the area in earlier times. Most salient here are the missionary experience and the sense of shared religious identity that Marshall Islanders use to represent the inevitability of the Americans' return and the Islanders' feelings of oneness with them.

Carl Heine, a European-Marshallese who remained on Jāl-wōj as the minister of the Protestant mission long after the foreign missionaries had been sent home, is the most commonly mentioned martyr of the war in the Marshall Islands. Many local people claim that Heine was beheaded by a Japanese guillotine on Inne, Jāl-wōj, after military authorities accused him of spying for the Americans.

This thread of shared European missionary experience is then rewoven into a story told about the battle on Kuwajleen, the first hand-to-hand, personalized warfare encounter in which the triad of American, Japanese, and Marshall Islander identities was inextricably renegotiated. The continuity of shared identity among the missionaries of the past, local Islanders, and the returning Americans is used to assert the goodness of the conqueror's cause and the inevitability of their final victory over the Japanese. Thaddeus gives a brief account of the pastor tale on Kuwajleen:

> There were some [Marshallese] who thought that they would stand up against the Americans, because they did not understand the kinds of customs according to which the Americans were arriving [the customs of warfare]. They were taken in by the kinds of thinking of the Japanese, the Japanese soldiers, and so they went ahead and they were damaged. Some Marshallese attempted one of these operations

> on Kuwajleen. And when they saw the Japanese and the kind of strength that they were building and the things that they were doing to ready themselves for war, well, they said that they would side with them. But when the Americans landed, then the difficult times arrived, and then they did not know what to do. They did not know where their strength and their sense of potency [*maroñ in kajoor*] were located. And those were the ones who thought they would try to assist the Japanese with their methods.
>
> And there is a story about a preacher [teacher]. His name was Dr. Erling [Henley?]. He landed at the time that they conquered [first put foot upon] Kuwajleen, and he was the chaplain. And when he landed with the American soldiers and placed his foot upon Kuwajleen, he knew a little bit of Marshallese . . . and spoke Pidgin, using some of this knowledge and the words that were suited for him to use. And the very first word he spoke was *aenōmmon* [peace]. That was the word that was appropriate for him to say. And so when he landed, he went around to the holes where people had hidden themselves, and he did not know if there were Marshallese or Japanese inside, but he would call out and say "Come here, come here. It is fine. Peace has arrived." And he would go to another hole, and say: "Come, come out. It is fine. Peace." And he went to one hole which was precisely the location of a person from these atolls, and he called out and said "It's okay. Peace. Come here. Come here. Peace. Come here. There is no damage." And such was the way he spoke in Marshallese. But that fellow responded with a hand grenade. (HM: Who was that?) Lokujo. A man from Naṃ-dik [Namodrik]. So that fellow pulled on [the fuse of] the hand grenade and looked to see how he would get rid of it. But, in those holes there were coconut logs about this large in circumference, there at the opening of the shelter, and it is not that he threw it precisely through the door and outward, but instead it hit that post and came back. And it came back and exploded inside. And all of the people inside of the hole died. (HM: And that fellow, Lokujo?) Well, he died. Only a few lived, and it is two of them who tell this story. They were there by the other opening, some other Marshallese. And so this hand grenade came back inside on them and they died, and the minister, he looked inside and he saw them in their death inside the hole (Thaddeus, in 1990).

Thaddeus uses this story to respond to a question about Marshall Islanders who became soldiers and fought alongside the Japanese during the war, and his telling reflects this intent. Other raconteurs, however, use the tale as a deictic example of the predestined, inevitable character of the American takeover, and of the rootedness of this outcome in the shared religious identity of Americans and Marshall Islanders. Still others transform the story into a Judas-like story of betrayal. In these accounts the betrayer,

Lokujo in Thaddeus' version, is usually the only one in the bunker to be killed; the survivors remain huddled out of fear, but also for mutual support, often praying. These versions of the story become prototypes for demonstrated solidarity as a mechanism to overcome almost certain death. The communal praying connects the survivors with the pastor, and Lokujo's death is fashioned into a predestined form of retribution, a classical Marshallese mode of describing his attempt to smite a man of God. For many of those who recount the Kuwajleen tale in this way, the Americans' second coming was foretold by the missionary teachers on Jālwōj at the time of their departure during the period of Japanese buildup for the war. The military chaplain's encounter with Lokujo and its outcome serve as an indexical reminder of that prophecy and its inevitable fulfillment.

Daisey Lojkar, a resident of Kijjinbwi (Kijinbwi) and Ero (Erro, on Kuwajleen) during the war, uses standard representations of chiefly-commoner demeanor to describe the first encounters with American soldiers. Like many Marshallese, she uses representations of shared religious identity to create special linkages with the Americans that allowed local people to identify with these unknown strangers and to deal with the awe and fear that they felt toward them.

> (LMC: And did the Americans ever come and land on the islet where you were staying?) Yes, they actually came at the time of the battle. When they conquered, they came to our islets and we came forward and revealed to them [God's] books, the songbook and the big book, and read them and looked at them. And we bowed down, and then we ate together because we had already finished preparing pandanus, coconut, and breadfruit. We brought them over and we ate with them, the Americans, but we [exclusive] were frightened. We were frightened, but they said "Do not be afraid," because there were many Marshallese who came with them, and also some of them knew how to speak Marshallese. And they said "Do not be afraid of us because we have really come to watch over you." So then we sat down and ate, but we were still frightened because we had just seen them for the first time. And there was nothing in particular that we did; we just ate. And then there was an old man who prayed. And then we ate together.
>
> We were petrified, and this is expected because we just saw them for the first time, but they were good. The way in which they came and mixed among us was good. And then, afterward, when the tanks landed and came up onto the islet, we were amazed. "Why is it that these boats are coming and continue coming up right onto the islet toward us?" So then we went ahead and sat down because there was nothing else possible for us to contemplate. So we sat down and

> waited and watched to see what would happen. And so things went onward and onward, and they came toward us and kept coming until they were next to us. And when they parked next to us, well, we listened.
>
> There had once been a missionary who had come to Kuwajleen, and he said "Well, if the Americans ever come, the way in which they treat you will be really good." Some of the missionaries who had come to the Marshalls came and taught us English and then returned to America, and they said "You guys really look out for the Marshallese because the Marshallese really *know*. We have already taught them about the Bible and they really know it." And so then when they came, we revealed the songbook and the large book to them. We gave the books to them and they looked at them (Daisey, in 1991).

The linkage with the Americans is here transformed into prophecy, and the Bible and songbook become the iconic proof of a crucial link of shared identity between Americans and Marshallese. Daisy's portrayal of the sense of awe at seeing the Americans is a common theme in Marshallese first postwar contact stories, a theme she roots in the awesomeness of the soldiers' amphibious vehicles as well as in the Americans' appearance. Her story combines elements of demeanor suitable toward conquering chiefs—bowing down and sharing food prepared for the conquerors and guests—so that it becomes a depiction of the event reminiscent of the commonly recited biblical stories about the miracles of Jesus.

An equally frequent measurement of the awe that was associated with the Americans relates to the goods they brought. Manutil Lokwōt, who experienced the American takeover of Mājro Atoll on January 30 and 31, 1944 (Morison, 1962, Vol. 7, pp. 226–27), paints an image of the plentitude that followed.

> (LMC: Did the Americans find Marshall Islanders to work for them?) Yes. Many Marshallese, nearly a hundred, worked for the military. They made things around there, unloaded and loaded food from ships, and it would continue until there was no place for the food. The island was smaller than the food. From those places where they unloaded foods, the stacks of food would be even with the [tops of the] coconut trees. The lagoon waters were filled with reflected light from cans [of food] and all sorts of things that they threw away from the ships, for there was no more room to store food on the island. All of the large warehouses were full, [but] the supply ships did not cease to arrive (Manutil, in 1990).

As in many Marshall Island locations where Japanese garrisons were bypassed and isolated by the island-hopping strategy that allowed the US

forces to sweep rapidly across Micronesia, stories of the battle are replaced by escape and rescue tales. The following is Clanton's adumbrated version of this time.

> (LMC: And what happened when the Americans came to Roñļap?) Well, at the time the Americans came, then the [Marshallese] scouts came. They came and told us to run off, to begin to move, and people had already come to this conclusion themselves [*kile*] and ran off from where the soldiers were and the place where they had been living. Plus there was one Japanese soldier who was very good [sympathetic, considerate]. The thing is, he tended not to reveal his words [thoughts], but he said, "Well, it is OK if you move to the other islet, Āneaetok." But he then said, "Well, that is no good, because the [Japanese] soldiers can still come along the reef in your direction." So then we moved to an islet they call Pikej [Kiejej?]; there is a pass [between it and the main islet] and thus they could not come because there were no canoes. And then he destroyed all the sailing craft so that they could not come.
>
> Then the scouts came and we revealed that that fellow had supported us and was good, the leader of the Japanese. They [the Marshallese scouts for the Americans] came there. On account of the fact that we traveled back and forth to reach the islet they call Āneaetok, they would say "Yes they [the Americans] came yesterday" or "They came 3 days ago," and then the day when we were arriving, they departed. But then, when the Americans did arrive, well, it was good because we [had] moved. We went and remained on a small islet and they came and encountered us there (Clanton, in 1991).

THADDEUS SAMPSON AND THE WAR ON JĀL–WŌJ

As the center of Japanese activity in the Marshalls prior to the war, Jāl-wōj is remembered as a bustling and enticing city by the seniors who now look back on their young adult lives with fondness. For the early war years, Jāl-wōj was developed as a major military facility but, unlike Kuwajleen, as the battles moved through the Marshalls it was ultimately bypassed and isolated, except for the daily morning bombing runs of Allied airmen. The large military presence there meant that the Islanders suffered substantial deprivation; therefore, many of them share images of a declining trust in the Japanese and an open-armed welcome of the American soldiers.

Thaddeus Sampson, however is atypical in this respect, and his optimism about the Japanese agenda, combined with his substantial ambivalence about life with the Americans, is worthy of special attention. Thaddeus' stories are comparable with those of Clanton in several respects, but the differences reflect different experiences of the war on Roñļap and Jāl-wōj, life historical differences in their careers, and differences in the interview situations in 1990–1991.

At one level, Thaddeus' stories, with their relatively "pro-Japanese" bent, are colored by the presence of Henry Moses, my research assistant, who was a coparticipant in the interview. As the research progressed, Henry and I became increasingly concerned about a "pro-American" bias in the stories, which undoubtedly related to my citizenship. In addition, by the time of Thaddeus' interview, Henry was also upset because his remuneration (which was controlled by the limited funds of the research grant) did not match the salary of translators for the *Nitijela* (House of Commons branch of the Republic of the Marshall Islands Legislature). These factors led Henry to encourage interviewees to give "pro-Japanese" accounts. Despite my warnings about "leading" our informants, during Thaddeus' interview Henry both actively posited answers to questions addressed to Thaddeus and selectively reinforced his "pro-Japanese" responses. Although this does not invalidate Thaddeus' thoughtful stories or push them beyond the range of viable cultural constructions, it is necessary to mention these contextual conditions so as to understand better the differences between Clanton's and Thaddeus' accounts.

Equally relevant is the centrality of the Japanese war effort on Jāl-wōj, the government center of the Marshall Islands and a major Japanese military installation. With the possible exception of Kuwajleen, none of the other military bases—Mile, Ṃaļo-eļap, Wōjjā, and Āne-wetak—came to affect as many Marshall Islanders' lives as Jāl-wōj did. Because of his age and social position at the time, Thaddeus' career was set in place by the Japanese presence on Jāl-wōj, only to be radically altered by the arrival of the Americans, and it is within this context that his stories must be understood. In comparison, Clanton, who claims to have been born 3 years later (in 1928), and who is from the outlying islands, had the critical formative part of his career postponed by the war. It was not until the renegotiated American postwar era that his life's trajectory was set. It is precisely the differential course of these two life historical sequences in relation to a phenomenologically fixed occurrence (the war) that allows that occurrence to be fash-

ioned into culturally and personally elaborated events with substantially different significance.

Like the accounts of others on bypassed atolls, Thaddeus ends his story with a description of his family's escape:

> (HM: And so you [plural, four or more] were the last to leave [Jōbwad]?) Yes, we were the last. At that time all of the people had left Jōbwad. All of the foreigners [*ruwamaejet*]. A paper informed them. It said all of the company people should move from the islet. They needed to move to that other islet, Iṃiej. And all of us, we were to move to the various islets [throughout Jāl-wōj], and so I went to Ae. And I remained there. But, at that time, there was no sailing. The ocean was closed to ships. Planes flew, and the boats moved only when it was dark. But the sorts of boats that were traveling were sailing canoes and that sort of thing, and so then I sailed to Mājrwirōk [Mejrirok] and remained there for a while, and my father, his back was hurting and he was suffering, and then after a while he could not move, and so it was a long time that we stayed there. Perhaps it was 2 or 3 months. So from Ae we sailed at night and headed for Emelep. Then it was almost another month that we were there on Emelep. (HM: And where was it that you were heading for? Jittok-en/Jitokken?) Yes, Jitokk-en. We remained and remained, and then when it was precisely the right time for us to return to Jitokk-en, because these folks [the Marshallese scouts] wrote us a note and said that it was time for them to appear, we sailed from Emelep and headed straight for Aeto. Naaetoen. Nonetheless, we did not head directly there. We went first to Lijiron and we landed there with one boat and one sailing canoe. So we sailed from Piñlep [Pingelap] and went on and on and on until day overcame us, and so we landed on Bijiron and hid the boats. So then from that time, that night, we went ahead and sailed to Ṇaarmej [Narmij]. We reached Ṇaarmej and landed; it was almost night and we remained there, and then after two nights there, on to Natol; then we went to Bokwan-ake [Bokanake]. And then we remained there until the time we escaped.
>
> (HM: Yes, so you stayed there until onward and onward?) Until we ran off. Yes, there are many kinds of stories about our trials and our doubts and there are all kinds of stories that we could tell, because it was a long time until we ran off. Well, then the boats came and stole us. (HM: Who?) Well, that fellow Meoulik [a Marshallese scout]. (HM: There on Bokwan-ake?) Yes, he encountered people there and [helped them get ready?]. And do not think that he just yelled out to us, because he went toward the islet and lay down. That is, that fellow Tata. So he landed and saw folks and then spoke to them: "*Ioo, le sir.* The two of us are going to land and travel around at night and speak to folks and reveal to them when it is time to es-

> cape." (HM: Because now, who is it who was going to land there?) Anko was one of them. Akji was another one, but after he had landed on Ṃaḷo-eḷap. Because those fellows—Abija and those others from Mājro and those fellows Lañinbit, and Lukien [?], plus Abija—well, those were the fellows and also some young men from Ṃaḷo-eḷap.
>
> And so they came and stole us [exclusive], and we thought it was only us, but they had also stolen some from Piñlep and from Mājrwirōk, and onward, because those ships had been on the ocean side of Jāl-wōj and had come up close to the reef as dawn was approaching and had taken people. They had met and talked it over, and now, as to that group there to the eastward, well, they, [the Japanese soldiers] shot the [Japanese] commander and that old man Kalibo, Reverend Kalibo. Well, it was at that time that the two of them, [Kalibo] and the commissioner, brought people up [out of their shelters] to run off. Only Japanese soldiers were there. All of the times when the [American] soldiers landed, that is, took over a [Japanese] location, it was Americans only. The Marshallese [scouts] did not go there with them. But, nonetheless, during those times some seers said "If we are slow, we will be gone [killed], because there is only one opening to the holes now." It would have been only another single week and then, they say, everyone would have been damaged. (HM: But the thing is, the rescue ships came in time?) Yes, the ships that stole us away hurried along and they disrupted this agreement. (HM: And were these LCIs? The LCIs?) Well, the ship of Captain Krull sailed with them. It was a destroyer. And so we [close to you, four or more persons] lifted things up, and they accompanied us so that we could escape from there, and we ran off. And all of us together, all of those ships that landed [*jodik*] steamed toward us, and so then we departed Jāl-wōj (Thaddeus, in 1990).

Thaddeus' description of the final days of his wartime involvement ends with a few indications of the mounting trepidation he felt toward the Japanese. His fading loyalties to the Japanese are rationalized in the above description of the Japanese shooting their own men. But, at the same time, he sees the Americans as "stealing" people from Jāl-wōj, not rescuing them. Unlike Clanton, who shifts loyalties to the Americans easily, Thaddeus' own identity is much more invested in the array of social persona he was able to create on Jāl-wōj during Japanese times prior to the war. His prewar descriptions are much different from Clanton's, and the 1942 retribution bombings for the Pearl Harbor attack leave Thaddeus with much greater ambivalence about the positive intentions of the Americans. Those bombings focused on several Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands, but although the admiral on Kuwajleen was killed and Japanese forces on Ṃaḷo-eḷap also suf-

fered, the most gruesome scene in which Marshallese lives were lost took place on Jāl-wōj where outlying Islanders had established communal "towns" in the capitol center. Thaddeus notes the traumatic effect of this early war scene and the disruptive consequences for his career.

> (HM: Are there things that you remember about the times before the battle? Can you talk about those times, then the times up through the middle of the battle, and then onward to the times with the Americans?) Well, I went to school in the times prior to the battle, and then graduated, and then, after a single year after the time that I had completed my schooling, the bombs began falling on Jōbwad, that location they call Tur. Planes flew toward us from Hawai'i and those places, and they came and set fire to Kuwajleen and set fire to Maloelap and Jāl-wōj and Mile. So they set those places on fire, and there were 70-some people who died. They said all of our folks had died. We dug them out, revealed them from the midst of the rubble where the bomb had fallen, and combining them all together, there were almost 70-some or 80, 80 people. So then we took them all away. Some people were torn to pieces, torn into bits, and when we went to turn them over, and looked at them face upward, a portion of each person was gone. So after that, when we went to take them to another place, we pulled them onto the road and there were parts hanging off of them. During this era, I was still young and unmarried . . . I was 16 or 17 years old. So then, we transported them over to a *jenpan,* a [Japanese] boat belonging to the company that they gave to us so we could load them with the people who had died there—70 some people and all of them dead. Some others remained alive and they took them to the hospital, and then after some short period of time, they died. (LMC: So then you loaded them onto a jenpan and . . .) Yes, a jenpan, and we took them . . . to the islet of Jōbwad to a grave they called *kobamarōñ* [combined abilities], and the reason they called it combined abilities is that it was a huge gravesite where they placed all of those who had died. This grave is located there, what they call Elbuñbuñ [Elbunbun], there on the islet of Jāl-wōj. So they buried them and when that was finished, we returned. And at that time I was working with the commissioner as an interpreter. I translated from Marshallese into Japanese. So when I graduated from school, I went and worked with the high-ranked people, the person who was the governor of the Marshalls. So then, after we had buried those people, I went back and worked, and another year went by and there was no additional damage (Thaddeus, in 1990).

Although Thaddeus remembers the harshness of Japanese laws, he views the laws as a representation of the true commitment of the Japanese to Micronesians and their improvement. He views violent retribution as a

justifiable and effective way to maintain the moral order of society. The American era, in contrast, has resulted in an erosion of this moral order, in Thaddeus' view. He depicts Japanese laws as inculcating a strict obedience that clearly separated the responses to good and bad behavior.

> But during those times, once hair began to appear around here [down around one's ears], you would be damaged.[7] That was the law during the times that they were teaching you. Such was the way they schooled you—they would beat you in the head until blood would come out of your nose. And then you would say [whispered]: "Did they not tell you that this was a bad thing? Well, I will never do it again." Theft, it was very, very bad. Lying, it was also very bad. Those were the three things. (HM: So it was the responsibility of the government to make us act better [*kamadmōdi kej*]?) If they caught you stealing, well, you would see that fellow who was in charge of theft. And if you were caught lying, you would encounter the person who was in charge of the laws concerning lying [and suffer] up to the precise severity of your lies. The blood would flow from your nose. But if you did things properly, you would be "sugared." Those things that were the desirable foods of diabetics would all belong to you. Such would be their tendency to elevate you to heavenly heights. (LMC: So you are saying that these friends of ours, they had a certain type of life?) Yes, there was not a single murder during that time. There was no word to designate the activity called murder, because you knew if you murdered a person, you would encounter death. The law would turn the affront around and kill you. [Here Thaddeus discusses what would happen if a murder had occurred.] After you had murdered someone they would say: "Well, he murdered that young fellow over there." Well, then we would go out and watch them shoot him. [The punishment] would never vary in the least. (LMC: So they would shoot him?) Yes, it was so we could see them shoot him. And they [would] allow us to watch. (LMC: So during those times people remained truthful?) Yes, people said, well, if we go out and murder someone, we will end up exactly like him. So there was no murder (Thaddeus, in 1990).

Thaddeus retains his absolute separation between good and bad as the topic shifts to reflect on changes in customs during American times. As is true of most informants born during Japanese times, he naturalizes Marshallese custom during the Japanese era, as though things were always that way. Equally, Thaddeus sees life during the early years of his life in a more positive way than he sees the changes that have occurred as he has aged. Nonetheless, after some direct prompting by Henry, Thaddeus radically separates the ideal elements of existence during Japanese times and stresses

the deleterious effects of American custom on local life to a greater degree than most Marshall Islanders.

> (LMC: And then, in terms of families, what were customs like during those days?) Well, there is no difference from our customs today. We made people into chiefs. We watched over one another. (LMC: And did people watch over one another more then [during Japanese times] or now?) It was greater in those days than now. (HM: It was very much greater during those days, so let us say the difference between then and now is . . . .) During those times, the thing that was most critical was love. In these days, we love one another, but at the same time we lie about loving. (LMC: And what is it that you see that has created this particular arrangement?) Well, the most critical thing has been American custom
>
> . . . . The customs of these days that have gotten rid of our own. And then, in addition to that, the knowledge of becoming haughty [of how to 'elevate one's throat,' i.e., heart] . . . becoming stuck up is due to the fact that there is a great deal of money. So then, people know that you have a lot of money, and then you do not want to watch over those with nothing. So then, you are haughty. (LMC: So you are saying that it is just these days that we are seeing this sort of approach?)[8] Well, there is a great deal of difference between the times when Japanese custom prevailed and now. The customs that were absolutely best were those. Those that are absolutely worst are these today. Is that not why we have suicide? Is it not that those fellows tie [ropes] around their throats to make others feel sorry for them. (HM: As you were saying, the customs have disappeared.) Yes, they are gone. And nowadays, those fellows' hair, they do not cut it until it is very long.
>
> (LMC: So, you are saying, sir, that these days are significantly different from . . . .) Yes, it has really changed. Today is very bad. The customs have been entirely destroyed, the laws have been entirely demolished. There is a great deal of false pretense [*kakūtōtō*]. But then, when you talk about food these days, we say that the food of those folks, our friends [the Japanese], was very bad. But . . . all the various things, in terms of food, were good. In terms of the way people were, the people were good. All sorts of customs were good. And these customs were those that belonged to our friends [the Japanese]. (LMC: And so, this is prior to the war?) Yes, before the war. But then, in the midst of the war, well, there were the customs of war. [LMC: Yes.] But you see, kindness and truth and honesty in terms of love, all of these things remained with our friends [the Japanese].
>
> There is none of this with the Americans. (LMC: There is *none* with the Americans?) Slyness is the thing that remains there with the Americans. (HM: Yes, and this is correct, because is it not that Etao

> [the sly trickster] escaped from this area and clung on there in the areas belonging to the Americans?) [Response addressed to HM:] Yes, if this fellow [LMC] asks if those days were better than these days, there is not a single American who can say that they are comparable. You [Americans] must be kind. If you are asking about these times and expect us to love you [plural], you [command form] must be kind. (HM: Yes, it is good that you have revealed these things so that they will know.) Yes, these are the things that I am saying. Who has asked you [Americans] to come and destroy the peacefulness and the customs that were so good? (Thaddeus, in 1990).

Thaddeus' bold talk is much bolstered here by Henry's prompting, for, in effect, it is taboo for Marshall Islanders to use the command form, noted at the end of Thaddeus' discussion, with casual acquaintances. But in this case the discourse is directed not only to me. I become the intermediary through whom Thaddeus and Henry can speak to an American audience, as by their use of plural, impersonal yous and theys. These pleas are comparative discourses about the demeanor of outside ruling chiefs and, in this instance, Henry and Thaddeus are imploring Americans to become less "stuck up" and more considerate, loving, and attentive to Marshall Islanders. The structure of this particular interview, begun by Henry and joined by me upon my return from another interview, causes the two to construct together a bolder perspective than is the case in any interview where I was present from the beginning.

Equally, however, Thaddeus' social position under the Japanese and then under the Americans shifts in a way antithetical to that of Clanton. Thaddeus was an "urban" dweller and on the road to becoming someone in the emerging Japanese colonial structure. As Bourdieu (1991) notes, fundamental categorizations, indeed one's entire knowledge base, are vested in certain *ways* of knowing. This is certainly true for Thaddeus, who had earned a respectable position with the Japanese.

> (HM: And so where were you working at that time [after the second attack on Jāl-wōj, when the blockade of the seas began]?) Well, then I was working in the office. I was an interpreter for the *komissar* and I also worked at the sorts of work that the high-ranked Japanese told me to do. (LMC: Do you remember the name of the komissar at that time?) Yes, Kanae *Stojo* (HM: Oh, he was a Stojo?) Yes, Stojo. Governor of the Marshalls (Thaddeus, in 1990).

Later in the interview, Thaddeus, in a common style of Marshallese understatement that contrasts sharply with the bold statements about changes in custom (see above), lends value to his position.

> Well, it was my good fortune with the Japanese, because [even after the war began] they still needed me to translate and to reveal to them Marshallese customs and to reveal the needs of the Marshallese, and I was highly enough ranked with them that they thought about taking me to stay with the *Jidi,* with the fellow who was highly ranked, so that I could remain with him there in his office and watch over him and interpret for him and take care of his needs. And so when he took trips around the islands, I also "rounded" with him.
>
> (HM: But the thing is, on account of the beginning of the battle . . . .) Yes, on account of the beginning of the battle, all sorts of things were made bad. Nonetheless, if it had not been that the war began, then I would have been one of the ones who was selected to go to Japan and go to school (Thaddeus, in 1990).

The war interrupted this trajectory, and Thaddeus' work on Mājro after the Americans arrived was of a very different order.

> From Tutu [Arṇo Atoll, where "rescued" Islanders were taken from Jāl-wōj and other Japanese occupied atolls] we came to Laura [Mājro Atoll], and then after a short period of time they came to ask for workers for here [Mieko Piij/Mieko Beach, Ulika/Uliga, Mājro]. . . . I came and worked at a place where we repaired truck tires. And sometimes I went over there to the location where they unloaded goods. That was at the time when there were a lot of ships. . . . The ships came with bombs. There were many bombs on board and they said "Unload those bombs over in that location." And so we did this type of work and then things went on and they said "Okay, it is time to return them to Jāl-wōj." Well, then we returned to Jāl-wōj (Thaddeus, in 1990).

While Thaddeus experienced downward mobility in the short run, Clanton, an outlying Islander, had his first major work opportunity on Kuwajleen after the Americans took control of the atoll, and then he became an assistant and translator with Dr. Leonard Mason on the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesia (Arṇo) project. Clanton's move from periphery to center presents a radical contrast to Thaddeus' experience that is but an individualized metaphor for the marginalization of Jāl-wōj and the increasing importance of Mājro in the American period.

The centrality of Thaddeus' position with the Japanese gives him, vis-à-vis many Marshallese, many more categories and much more detailed knowledge of the Japanese and their character, or demeanor. At the same time, he must rationalize Japanese abuses during the war in some way other than by contrasting the "bad" wartime Japanese with the "good" Americans. To accomplish this, he separates peacetime demeanor from the abuses of

war and divides good leaders from bad. And, in terms of those who (e.g., Yamamoto and certain other leaders such as the prime minister of Japan) knew that the Japanese were not yet ready to confront the Americans in a war, he segments them from those who led them into a conflict prior to the time that it could be won.

Two events are commonly used by Jāl-wōj residents to point out the ruthless and inhumane demeanor of the Japanese during the war. The first is an account of a submarine attack by a Captain Andrew on a Japanese vessel and the subsequent bombing of the survivors by Japanese planes in an attempt to locate the submarine. The second, later in the war, was the Japanese threat to exterminate the Marshallese. Thaddeus recalls both of these events, but he rationalizes the Japanese actions as the operation of the "laws belonging to wartime." His account of the submarine attack lacks the sense of abhorrence of most Marshallese accounts of the event. He describes the aftermath:

> (LMC: And how many people were on board to your knowledge?) There were thousands and thousands . . . more precisely, it was around 50,000 or so. Because it was a huge ship. This was the quota for Mile. (HM: And how many lived?) Well, it is possible perhaps around 10,000, 10-some. (LMC: And so, then, if there were 50-some thousand, how come so few remained?) Well, they bombed them . . . when they were damaged by the torpedo, then the planes went off and tried to locate the submarine. And so, they threw off these depth charges to frighten the submarine. (LMC: And these were vehicles from where?) They were Japanese. They went up in planes and dropped the sorts of bombs to damage submarines. . . . And the reason that so many people were damaged was on account of this bombing, on account of the Japanese planes going up to find the submarine. (LMC: And so they themselves damaged themselves?) Well, it was because they thought the submarine was right around there. They did not realize that it had sent off its bomb [torpedo] and then run off and stayed there right next to the face of the reef; and this was the ship that belonged to that fellow they called Commander Andrew, and at that time he was second-highest ranking. And then those people from the [Japanese] ship, as the bombs rained down they fell overboard. And those who were still alive, they pulled them on board. And those who were gone, well, they had been killed by sharks (Thaddeus, in 1990).

Marshall Islanders commonly find it abhorrent that the Japanese bombed their own soldiers in seeking out Captain Andrew's submarine, but Thaddeus fully rationalizes the Japanese actions. For Thaddeus, the soldiers

were killed by sharks. After two detailed questions, Thaddeus notes that Japanese *planes* did the bombing, but he does not place moral responsibility for the deaths on the shoulders of the Japanese commanders who sent up the planes. Instead, Thaddeus merely reviews the details of the incident, allowing the story to stand as evidence of the "laws that govern warfare."

Similarly, although both Clanton and Thaddeus give versions of the Marshallese extermination story, Thaddeus' story presents the incident only as part of the experiences of warfare. He refers to Japanese actions in the abstract, as "they," rather than blemish Japanese demeanor per se:

> Nonetheless, during those times some seers said "If we are slow, we will be gone [killed], because there is only one opening to the holes now." And it is true that they constructed a single opening to a huge hole, so that everyone [inside] would be exterminated. One time! And all of the Marshallese would be inside. And after they had already finished meeting, then they decided that it was the time for the Marshallese to die. It would have been only another week, and then they say that everyone would have been damaged (Thaddeus, in 1990).

The beginnings of this shift to a wartime mentality among the Japanese are marked in Thaddeus' account by the story of the execution of the Japanese "prime minister" by prowar advocates:

> The prime minister of that location [Japan] revealed that Japan was inadequate. His name is, perhaps, Nakasoritanyo. He said it was as if Japan [he means the United States] was like a rooster, a type that was consuming a cake. (LMC: A cake?) Yes, a cake. Yes, they showed us a picture and there was this cake, and he said: "Well, yes, it was like this thing." (HM: And what is the meaning of this "like a cake"?) Well, it is as if the cake was Japan and the rooster was America. It would go ahead and consume the cake and keep going and going until it had all been exhausted. And so, then the reason he proclaimed was: "Let us not be like this cake." So that we would not be inadequate. He said, "If the Americans were unloading a ship full of chickens; well, it would be solely chickens, it would not be a single other type of thing. If it was hats, it would be hats solely, and they would unload them until dark and then again until morning. And, as for clothing, well, we need not say. And, if it was eggs, well, it would be eggs only." And this is what that fellow there in Japan was saying. And this is the reason he was saying they [the Japanese] were inadequate. And then, if we move on to the things of war—if we are talking about guns, well, when the guns actually were shot they went *buk! buk! buk!* But their [the US] guns went *brrrrr!* And these things were very good at creating damage. Well, the folks who shot this fellow were

> seven men, and these were not high-ranking people. They were the sort who were low-ranked officers. (HM: And why is this, that they were able to . . . ?) Well, perhaps they had already talked it over. (HM: And the high-ranked people told them to do it?) They said, "Oh you [plural, four or more] officers, go ahead and [kill that fellow]; and the thing about it was, that fellow was very intelligent. And so he came and he wrote this thing and revealed his words in finality because he knew [that he would be killed] (Thaddeus, in 1990).

Thaddeus gives a similar portrait of Yamamoto, a brilliant Japanese strategist who knew Japan was not at the time the military equivalent of the United States. As with many Marshallese, Yamamoto's knowledge derived, in Marshallese terms, from his chameleon-like character—he is a replica of the sly cultural figure Etao. Though the success of Etao's exploits rest in his magical ability to transform himself from human to superhuman deified form, the Marshallese say Yamamoto received his insider's knowledge of America while he was a student in America. Prototypically, he is portrayed as a Harvard graduate. Unlike the prime minister, Yamamoto escaped execution at the hands of his Japanese colleagues with his brilliant plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, but ultimately, many Marshall Islanders contend, he was killed by a US plane in the Solomons when he was "exposed" by a "double agent" working for the United States.

In the end, their differential valuations of Japanese and American customs cause Clanton and Thaddeus to give alternate readings to World War II, the nexus point at which their ways of life intersect. Each of these men constructs a self-empowering account, but while the general contours of the war remain constant, the elaboration and texture of detail are unique in each person's story. For Thaddeus, the Japanese were the truly desirable ruling chiefs. He stresses the desirability of life under the Japanese and its suitability to Marshall Islanders. In contrast, he depicts the negative influence of American customs on Marshallese life, noting the undesirable effects of money, hoarding, haughty demeanor, and lack of discipline. Concomitantly, his portrayal becomes a degenerationist view of the current historical period, a time of grave cultural and moral decline.

For Clanton, the Americans become legitimate commoners' chiefs, along the pattern of Jebero, replacing an originally desirable Japanese governance that went bad during the war. His view is obviously affected by family members who assisted the Americans during the war.[9] Nonetheless, his own developmentalist account of equal treatment and personal opportunities under the Americans stands in stark contrast to the harsh discipli-

nary strictness and abhorrent wartime practices he associates with the Japanese.

Thus Marshall Islanders' portraits of the war become multifaceted gems. Although certain differences in these two accounts derive from interactive features of the interviews (as mentioned above), most of the differences are attributable to the differential social and life historical positions of the men who fashioned them. In the end, these accounts of the war are valuable in part because they are social histories that give us Islanders' perspectives on an otherwise unknown past and in part because they are accounts of a sacred past kept at a distance from daily life. But most important, they are valued representations of a past embedded in the social present. They are stories in which the storytellers must build a certain cultural space for themselves in terms of a lived past that constitutes an important part of each person's current identity. Although several social scientists have noted the multivalent character of Pacific Islander selves (Carucci, 1987; Lutz, 1985, 1988; Shore, 1982; Strathern, 1988, 1991), of equal importance are the highly historicized contexts that require each of these contextually fashioned personae to be situated and rationalized in terms of logically sequenced life historical travelogues. The result is a viable cultural legitimacy for the current presentation of one's own life. Neither histories nor personae exist in the absence of such accounts, nor do such accounts create meaning except as simultaneously personal and cultural public accountings of symbolic capital displayed in the ongoing practice of daily life.

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Notes

1. "From the spaces to the holes" in this article's title represents a general translation of how several Marshall Islanders conceived of the nearly

inexplicable horror and fear of battle. *The spaces* refers to the short hiatus between rounds of shelling and machine gunfire, whereas *the holes* condenses reminiscences about time spent in foxholes and makeshift trenches. The survivors were those who found refuge in the successful alignment or connection of the spaces and the holes.

2. The accounts equally reflect the different experiences of males and females, chiefs and commoners, locations of residence, etc. Though these are important parameters, I do not concentrate on the differentiating potential of each in this analysis.

3. In subsequent quotations "LMC" indicates questions I asked. "HM" designates questions asked by Henry Moses, a Marshall Islands resident who helped me recruit World War II storytellers and who occasionally assisted with the interviews.

4. Several of my informants on Ujlaṇ in the 1970s were born in the final two decades of the nineteenth century and recounted even more elaborated stories about the late German era and the Japanese times. For example, Kerolain, an Āne-wetak resident who died there in the 1980s, recalled being taken to school on Jāl-wōj in the early years of the twentieth century, when Germany still ruled the Marshalls. For her, this followed an earlier era of colonial experience in which Āne-wetak laborers were taken to Ujlaṇ to work the copra plantation that Germany had established there.

5. My point here is similar to that of Rosaldo (1980), who shows how important the life experiences are of a certain age cohort of maturing young men in relation to their portrayal of Ilongot life.

6. US battle histories commonly construct analogous stories to explain the Japanese fighter pilots' *kamikaze* tactics as the war neared its end. For US citizens, such suicidal tactics are on the fringes of individual moral accountability. US portrayals of kamikaze tactics commonly fail to recognize the cultural power of the Japanese communal sense of moral accountability that links kamikaze with such practices as *hara-kiri.* While US military histories are enamored of the idea of such dedication to a cause on a soldier's part, it is often the apparent irrationality and seeming futility of the kamikaze effort that is stressed rather than its rootedness in an alternate model of personal and cultural identity.

7. These comments indexically point to me, the American interviewer, whose hair length exceeds that which Thaddeus depicts with his hand motions. The interview segment that preceded these comments appears here in his depiction of American custom that follows.

8. This follows a long section in which Thaddeus described how the purchasing power of the prewar Japanese yen was much greater than is the case recently with American dollars (though dollars immediately after the war were also "laden with exchange value").

9. See Thaddeus' reference to Abija in the "rescue" story above.

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Through a Glass Darkly: Palau's Passage Through War, 1944–1945

KAREN R. GEORGE

On March 30, 1944, the violence of World War II reached the Palau Islands. Aircraft from US Navy carriers launched air strikes on Japanese installations in the island group. In September 1944 the southern islands of Angaur and Peleliu were invaded by US troops. The 183 Islanders remaining on Angaur took refuge in caves for over 3 weeks before emerging to live under American military government until the end of the war. The northern islands of Babeldaob and Koror were "bypassed" and "neutralized." Marine aircraft based on Peleliu made regular daily strafing and bombing raids over the islands. Palauans on Babeldaob struggled for survival, enduring air strikes, famine, and increasing Japanese brutality. This article reconstructs these different experiences of war in Palau by integrating Palauan voices with American military records.

In the dawn light of March 30, 1944, aircraft from the US Fifth Fleet's Task Force 58 came out of the sun and swooped low over the airfield at Airai on Babeldaob. The planes skimmed over Koror's Malakal Harbor and struck at Japanese airstrips on the southern islands of Peleliu and Angaur (see map of Palau). This attack on Palau was designed to provide strategic support for an April operation at Hollandia in New Guinea. The raid would destroy Japanese aircraft and shipping throughout the area so that they could not be used to obstruct the Allied landings (Morison, 1953, p. 28).

At the Airai airfield on that March morning, Palauan workers under the command of Japanese soldiers had just begun the day's construction

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
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work. Fourteen-year-old Minoru Ueki was employed with his schoolmates in helping to build the new airstrip. He remembers

> The planes just appeared and began to circle around the place and many of us were saying, even some of the Japanese soldiers were saying, "They're our planes. They came from Saipan. . . . They are here to help us, they are looking after us." And then all of a sudden they began to attack us, right there in the field, and so we had to run. . . . Two of my classmates were injured; two died, one of them right in front of me.

Mengesebuuch Yalap (born 1929) was in Aimeliik, on Babeldaob, that day (see map of Babeldaob). She too thought the planes were Japanese and ran out to greet them. She recalls:

> The reason we thought they were Japanese was that the Japanese planes usually practiced up in the air doing circles and things, so we ran out to look. . . . There were nine planes. At the front was the first group of three and then other groups of three, right and left. They all started shooting. . . . It was kind of funny for me at first because I was young, but when the fires started all over Koror we realized that we had to hide ourselves. . . . When the bombs came down they exploded, really big. We were like mice trying to hide ourselves in the bushes or anywhere we could cover ourselves.

Others shared this initial belief that the planes were Japanese. They expected to look up and see Japanese aircraft, but when the planes suddenly began to fire, people followed basic instructions they had learned from the Japanese or they responded through an instinct for survival. Minoru Ueki, despite the shock of seeing his friends die, acted quickly because of his previous training. The Japanese had assigned him to a working group, so he joined the other members and fled into the jungle to find shelter. Mereb Eruang (b. 1914), employed as a watchman in Koror, held his post and waited for orders, while Direou Orrukei (b. 1925), also in Koror, "had no idea what [she] should do" because she "did not know what a bullet was, or that it could kill." Rose Adelbai (b.1921) recalls: "We knew it was a war, but we didn't know what was going on because it had never happened to us."

On Peleliu and Angaur people reacted in similar ways, taking shelter wherever they could, some in prepared tunnels, others in natural caves or in the jungle. A young woman told how she "didn't know that the shots could kill, that you could die from these things." Obechou Delutaoch (b. 1917) stared in awe when the planes started firing. In fear she fled to her family's


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cave under one of the Rock Islands, thinking all the time "This is probably war, war starting."

How much people knew about the war influenced how they reacted to this first bombing raid. As historian Mark Peattie reveals in his study of the Japanese in Micronesia, preparations for war in Palau had begun in the 1930s (1988, pp. 230–256). Those who were employed by the Japanese and those who lived in Koror gained some knowledge of the approaching war; others heard nothing but "the word that was going around," the rumor of war (Benged Sechewas, Tibedakl Olblai). In her work on the war in Palau, Wakako Higuchi (1991, p. 146) states that as early as 1940, the Japanese "sponsored . . . daily activities for the purpose of raising the nationalistic consciousness of both the Japanese and the Islanders." These included days of worship, patriotic marches, restraint and frugality, and defense training. Firefighting groups and other voluntary organizations sprang up among the Islanders and Japanese, and Palauans contributed their savings in support of the war effort. With these developments, Higuchi states, "Palauan knowledge of the national situation deepened" and they "came to understand the war situation" (1991, pp. 147–148). Information collected in the course of my 43 interviews with Palauans in 1990 suggests that this understanding was limited. During the prewar period, those Palauans who had close contact with the Japanese and took part in these activities and organizations developed a raised consciousness about being a part of the Japanese world and about the war effort. But did they know what the "war effort" truly meant? Having no history of modern industrial warfare, Palauans knew of war only in its traditional sense of small-scale conflicts between districts, villages, or clans. Almost all had heard rumors about war in varying forms, but no one at this time could know the actuality of large-scale mechanized war, and they therefore had no frame of reference through which to understand what was likely to happen.

After the March raid the Japanese began to evacuate people from the southern islands to Babeldaob. Obechou Delutaoch (b. 1917) remembers being transported from Peleliu by boat to Ngaraard. There was no choice, said one woman (b. 1927): "I didn't really want to leave Peleliu. I didn't want to go up to Babeldaob." Baiei Babul (b. 1921) recalls that people were afraid of moving, but the Japanese said they had to go "because of the war—Peleliu was going to get the worst of it."

Although all Islanders were evacuated from Peleliu, nearly 200 people

did remain on Angaur. American invasion operations in the Mariana Islands during June and July meant that bombing raids in the Palau area also increased and worsened, with the consequence that no more boats were allowed to make the northward journey from Angaur to Babeldaob. Sixteen-year-old Mathias Akitaya's family had decided they were going to stay despite the Japanese command that everyone must leave.

> But around the end of July, because of the decree from the soldiers, they were going to force us to leave. But then there were no boats allowed in the channel between Peleliu and Angaur, so we were kind of stranded (Mathias Akitaya).

By August 1944 the focus of air raids against Palau changed. No longer support missions for other operations, the raids were now directed at "softening up" Palau for the projected invasion. American strategists had originally planned to seize Babeldaob for a major base in the Western Carolines; however, following support and reconnaissance operations over the islands in June, they estimated that Babeldaob was heavily defended by nearly 37,000 Japanese troops. To attack Babeldaob "would not be worth what it would cost" (81st WDHC, 1948, p. 46), so the Americans decided to take the more lightly defended southern islands of Angaur and Peleliu instead. The invasion was set for September 1944. The nature of the experience of war for the people stranded on Angaur and for those in refuge on Babeldaob was therefore initially determined by American planning. Outside events shaped inside experience.

During August the 868th Bombardment Squadron, based at Los Negros in the Admiralty Islands, carried out night bombing raids on the Palau group using B-24 bombers and destroying shipping, airfields, and Japanese defense installations. In early September daylight raids were added and bombers swept over the islands daily, tearing up the airstrips and reducing the town of Koror to smoking rubble. As D-Day[1] for Peleliu approached, carrier-based aircraft from Task Force 38 were also brought in, and for a week they ranged over and strafed the islands in nearly 1,500 missions (Craven & Cate, 1983, pp. 299–300, 306). Palauan memories of this period before the September landings hinge on the type of bombing they endured, which was determined by where they worked or took refuge. Koror saw heavier and more intense attacks from high level bombers; Babeldaob saw more intermittent strikes by carrier-based aircraft. Angaur and Peleliu were "softened up" by both kinds of attack.

WAR ON ANGAUR

At break of day on September 12, 1944, 3 days before D-Day for Peleliu, the prelanding bombardment of the southern islands began. Battleships, light cruisers, and destroyers pounded the islands with shells, stripping down the jungle. Fighters from carrier groups swept overhead, strafing constantly. For 5 days shells and bombs pierced the island of Angaur (Craven & Cate, 1983, pp. 307–308; Morison, 1958, pp. 34–44). During the earlier raids in September, people had sought refuge in caves in the rocky northern end of the island. During these days of bombardment, nobody ventured outside. "There was no sense in going out. We didn't even know what was going on outside" (Mathias Akitaya). But outside, fires were burning and black smoke billowed. As shells hit, debris was thrown high into the air, including whole trees and clouds of dirt and dust (81st WDHC, 1948, p. 70). Inside the shelters the Islanders could see nothing and the noise was deafening. Smoke hung low in the sky, and the earth shuddered with the force of the explosions. The cave in which Robert Eldukl (b. 1917) took refuge was not really a cave at all, but instead

> two sides of big rocks standing together. . . . There were openings and sometimes bullets would come inside. . . . But we were at the end . . . and the shape was like this [V-shaped], two rocks meeting, long and narrow, so that there was a gap in the middle and the bombs could come in.

The smoke from the explosions seeped into these "corners of rock," and all that people could do was wait in fear to see what happened. They could not even talk during the bombardment because of the noise.

The first American troops of the 81st Infantry Wildcat Division landed on Angaur early on the morning of September 17, making slow progress through the debris from the shelling, the fallen trees, tangled wire, and land mines (81st WDHC, 1948, p. 70). US Navy Lieutenant John Useem, the man who was to be responsible for the civilian inhabitants of this battlefield once they had been coaxed out of hiding and into American hands, came ashore in the third wave of assault troops. His team of military government personnel disembarked the following day. Through interrogation of Japanese prisoners of war, it was ascertained that the Islanders had taken refuge in caves on the northwest tip of the island. Useem therefore selected a site for his camp at the northern end of Lake Aztec, close to the 81st Division prisoner of war stockade (see map of Angaur). He needed to be close to



the action and near the aid stations so that medical relief would be available to the civilians when they emerged (John Useem).[2]

Air strikes and naval bombardment continued almost 24 hours a day over the next 4 days. By the fourth day the southern end of the island was declared secure, and fighting then became focused in the north, the "toughest terrain on the island" (81st WDHC, 1948, pp. 96–98), where the Japanese had fortified themselves and where the Islanders had taken refuge.

From her shelter among the rocks, Sister Elene Ebud (b. 1917), a Palauan Catholic nun, could hear the roar of the planes,

> the boom, boom, boom from the ship, the cannons and the machine guns . . . as they shoot from the boats. . . . Then the planes shoot also and they drop bombs. There was a lot of smoke, and somebody died. We were very afraid and we just prayed for our Lord to help us.

Night and day no one could sleep because of the noise and the constant fear of what was to come. As the days passed, hunger and thirst became pressing problems. The available food, dry rice and a few Japanese cookies, was divided. Sister Elene made sure that a little more was set aside for the children. Before the invasion Robert Eldukl was part of a team that, under Japanese orders, hid food in various locations around the island so that if Americans captured one stockpile there would be another point to go to for food. During the early period in the caves, the people "relied on those foods" (Robert Eldukl), and small groups of men would venture out at night to collect supplies. However, it was not long before the last rations were burned and destroyed in the encroaching fighting. Eldukl remembers the day when nothing was left and a Japanese soldier said to him "Now we will have to learn to eat leaves and roots." Masao Guiliberte (b. 1922) remembers that the food shortage did not concern him very much: "Because of fear . . . we didn't really know that we were hungry."

On September 20 the Americans declared Angaur officially secure, but the fighting, or "mopping up" as it was now called, continued fiercely and unabated (81st WDHC, 1948, pp. 100–101). From that day until early October, heavy artillery was aimed day and night at the Japanese stronghold in the Angaur Bowl and Romauldo Hill area in the north. Angaur was now in American hands, but for the Islanders that meant only that conditions became much worse. "The Japanese and the Palauans were now at the front line together" (Mathias Akitaya).

The Islanders knew that the rocks could not provide complete protection. A young woman, Kesiil Kaich (b. 1926), was shot in the arm while inside a cave. Mathias Akitaya and his sister were in their shelter when a shell exploded near the entrance. The flying shrapnel hit Mathias' sister in the leg, and he was injured in the back. Sister Elene's cousin was killed by shrapnel.

As the days passed, however, the biggest danger came not from shells but from lack of water. The only water to which people had access was the small amount that dripped down the walls of the shelter and collected in the

crevices of the rocks. Beyond this, men had to risk going out at night to the marshy area around nearby Lake Salome, right on the front line, to collect the brackish water (Mathias Akitaya, Masao Guiliberte). Rain showers were therefore a blessing. Mathias recalls his relief when the rain came through a gap in the roof and ran down the sides of the shelter.

> One night I was sitting, leaning against the rough stone . . . and as I was sleeping there were drops of water dripping down onto my stomach. So I had a big bowl, a Palauan bowl carved out of wood, and all night I held that bowl, waiting for each drop to fall and finally it filled the bowl, and that was one time we drank pure water.

On September 24 the Americans began broadcasting to the Japanese to induce them to surrender (81st WDHC, 1948, p. 111). They hoped this would also allow them to establish contact with the Islanders. There was some fear that the Japanese were "holding the people against their will" (Richard, 1957a, p. 612). Robert Eldukl heard this broadcast and recalls that it was in Japanese. He thought it was one of the captured Japanese soldiers urging the Islanders and Japanese to come out of the caves, announcing that they would be given food and clothing if they did. But he, like others, had been cautioned by Japanese soldiers that the Americans were "fierce people" (Robert Eldukl). The Japanese had told the Islanders that if they tried to surrender, the American soldiers would hurt or kill them. They also warned, "If you try to go, *we* will kill you" (Robert Eldukl).

With such expectations it is not surprising that Islanders did not respond to this first appeal. On October 1 the Americans made a second attempt. No Japanese appeared, but six Islanders straggled out—one man, two women, and three children (81st WDHC, 1948, pp. 121–122). They were frightened and weak from malnutrition. A Chamorro man, Ramon Cabrera, headed the small group because he knew a little English. For a brief period all firing ceased as the people were rescued and taken to the 17th field hospital (81st WDHC, 1948, p. 122; Richard, 1957a, p. 612).

John Useem received word immediately and he recalls his first sight of these Islanders:

> They were terribly frightened of us. They'd been told by the Japanese that we were going to rape the women and murder the men.
>
> They were extremely hungry. Their clothes were ragged. I decided the thing we had to do first was to take care of their bodies (John Useem).

As Useem cared for these six people, those still in their caves barely moved. The war went on, 7 more days of bombardment and fighting. Grad-

ually the severity of the attacks led some people to realize that there was no hope if they stayed where they were. At noon on October 8, 87 people came out of hiding and made their way to the American troops (81st WDHC, 1948, p. 122).

Robert Eldukl, Sister Elene, and Masao Guiliberte were among them. Conditions in the caves were almost unbearable, and the American broadcasts offered food and safety. Eldukl remembers that when they finally decided to go, they planned to do it secretly, tricking the Japanese soldiers.

> There was another cave that we knew about and we told the soldiers that the cave we were staying in at the moment was safer, and . . . we suggested they could bring the soldiers here because they were getting injured and wounded . . . and we [would go] to the other cave. So we were able to do that and while we were pretending that we were on our way to the other cave, we came to the Americans.

Sister Elene realized "This is the day. We have to go!" Everyone felt it would be better to carry little in case they had to run, so Elene tied up her few belongings in an old Japanese flag. The group chose two older men who knew a little English to approach the Americans first. Once the men established it was safe, the rest of the group followed.

As the Islanders approached the enemy soldiers they were extremely frightened because the Americans looked so different from the Japanese. Sister Elene was confused to see the soldiers handing out and eating candy because in Japanese times candy was only for children. Masao Guiliberte was shocked by the size of the Americans: "Some of us were afraid because the Americans were big and it was hot and they only wore shorts. Because of the sun they were all wearing sunglasses and their skin had turned red."

The Islanders immediately became the responsibility of Lieutenant Useem. He found that within this group were not only Palauans but also Chamorros from Guam and people from Yap, Ulithi, and Sonsorol. Many had come to Angaur as employees in the Japanese-run phosphate mines. "They were all mixed up and they were terribly frightened of us. The Japanese Army had treated them as what was left over. They were thirsty, they were hungry, they were injured, they were dying" (John Useem).

Useem had to work quickly to feed, clothe, and protect the Islanders. At this time every aspect of their survival was his responsibility. Useem's language officer, Francis Mahoney, used his knowledge of Japanese to communicate with the Islanders. Discussion revealed that as many as 90 Islanders were still hiding in the caves. Three Palauans volunteered to return and convince the others that it was safe to emerge. Robert Eldukl was one

of the three. He was scared as he made his way back among the rocks. The three men had brought a small amount of food to give to the Palauans to convince them to follow. They told them they would have to escape early the next morning before the American bombardment was due to begin again.

As the sun rose Eldukl and the other two men led the rest of the Islanders out of the caves to the American camp. Many were wounded or ill and were taken directly to the hospital. The rest were taken to Useem's camp on the eastern side of Lake Aztec. At the time the group arrived, several of Useem's men were digging a hole for a latrine, and some of the Islanders looked at it with terror, believing that it would be their grave (Useem, 1945a, p. 579). Having no experience with Americans, they recalled the dire warnings of the Japanese.

The arrival of the second group brought the total number of Islanders in the camp to 183. For Useem and his men, most of each day and night was "preoccupied with the sheer physical process of living" (John Useem). Useem remembers that people were ill and dying, babies were being born, and occasional fights and disagreements were erupting between groups because of the cramped and stressful conditions. There were shortages of necessary items because no civil affairs supplies, such as construction material for living quarters, clothing, cooking equipment, and food stocks for civilian use, had been unloaded in the assault period (Richard, 1957a, p. 613). Useem had to practice "moonlight requisition" (stealing) wherever he could. Food for the Islanders was made up from K rations and remaining Japanese stocks of rice. Clothing consisted of any pieces of American and Japanese uniforms that could be secured (Useem, 1945b, p. 6). The increased number of people meant that as many as 20 had to be sheltered in pyramid tents that should have housed only 8. Some people were squeezed into crudely built shacks (Useem, 1945c, p. 93).

The Islanders, emerging from nearly a month of darkness, starvation, and fear, did not notice any lack of supplies or discomfort. For Masao Guiliberte, like many others, the contrast between the deprivation they had suffered and the large amounts of food and clothing the Americans now offered was stark. He recalls that "it seemed like we were experiencing something like heaven." The tents for the Islanders were enclosed within a fence and "Life," as Mathias Akitaya recalled, "actually began within that fence."

People rested, sometimes sleeping, sometimes sitting quietly and talking. There were children in the group, but there was "practically no move-

ment, no running about" (Useem, 1945a, p. 580). The calm of the people masked extreme stress and confusion. The ordeal was not over yet.

Useem was careful about security. Guards were posted at the perimeter of the camp day and night. Mathias recalls that military police watched over them constantly, and if anyone went anywhere, guards had to accompany the person. But most Islanders, because of illness, exhaustion, and fear, had little interest in moving beyond the confines of the camp. At night the area was blacked out and perimeter security was established (John Useem).

One evening not long after the arrival of the second group, a heavy rain shower fell. Useem had retired for the night, aware of the emotional strain most of the people were under, but not knowing where it might lead. That night, the horrors of the time in the cave, combined with fear of the Japanese, fear of the Americans, confusion over the suddenly changed circumstances, and the continuing noise and activity of combat, were too much for one Islander. In a crazed state he grabbed an adze and first attacked several Palauans before "lurching out into the perimeters of the camp" (John Useem) and killing three of Useem's men, breaking their skulls. At this point Useem was awakened by shouts. People were yelling "Japanese! Japanese!" and Useem leaped from his bed. His immediate assumption was that the camp had been invaded.

> So in this pitch black, heavy rain, with no knowledge, no language capacity, with great turmoil and confusion, everyone extremely frightened, I had to figure out what was going on. It took me until around 6:00 in the morning to learn and by then I was covered in blood. . . . Over [the next] 2 or 3 hours, I calmed the people down and got them to the point where they had some degree of security, although children were crying and they were frightened (John Useem).

Robert Eldukl remembers that night. The man who had "gone crazy" was shot during his rampage, and the Palauans were very afraid that the Americans "might kill the Palauans because of this incident" (Robert Eldukl). They knew that soldiers had been killed and wounded and, though they had no understanding of how American justice worked, they expected some kind of retaliation. Some people developed "bad feelings toward the family of the man because of the incident" (Robert Eldukl). Eldukl recalls that the Islanders planned to punish the family, "but Mahoney and Useem, the commanding officers, were able to convince them and talk them out of it" (Robert Eldukl).

In the early light of the following morning, a delegation from the man's family came to see Useem. They fell to the ground and said to him "We

are ready to die" (John Useem). Through his interpreter he asked them why they wished to die, and they explained that "Our family has been destroyed, our household has been disgraced. Our clan no longer has a name, so please kill us, whatever way you wish. We don't know how you kill in America" (John Useem).

Useem was astounded, but answered as calmly as he could: "I am an American and I am not going to kill you" (John Useem). The people began to kiss his feet and beg him to kill them. In recounting this story to me 46 years after the event, Useem was still distressed by the role the Islanders asked him to play. When they confronted him, he was confused and had to take some time to think about what he could do. After an hour he again told the Islanders that he would not kill them. They replied, "We are not persons." Although Useem had no knowledge of Palauan culture, he intuitively believed their assertion. He agonized over a solution. Finally he went over to the airfield to see whether any flights were going to Saipan and if it was possible to take the Islanders involved out of Angaur. The transfer was arranged. The other Islanders were told that the man was mentally ill and that was the reason he acted the way he did. Robert Eldukl saw that Useem had taken control of the situation and had "talked them out" of wanting punishment for the family (Robert Eldukl).

For Palauans, life in the camp was simple and complex at the same time. Food and shelter were abundant, and daily life was safer than it had been for many months; however, the Islanders still harbored a fear of Americans and of what their future was to be. Useem recalls that many people had brought a few "precious possessions" with them when they came out of the caves. One had a crucifix, another some of his grandparent's clothing. These became their "private property," which they clung to tightly. It was all that was left of their old life (John Useem).

The camp was the center of a new life. On October 23 all Japanese resistance on Angaur was declared overcome and hostilities ceased (81st WDHC, 1948, pp. 128–132; Smith, 1984, pp. 529–530). Now great improvements in living conditions could be made, and eventually the camp shifted south to a better location, a new village of 42 tents around a central kitchen area. The American flag was raised over the village on December 3, 1944 (Richard, 1957a, pp. 627–628).

For the rest of the war, Islanders on Angaur lived and worked in this village and were supervised by the American military government. The world was turned upside down. Men like Robert Eldukl, who only months before had worked for Japanese soldiers, now began to work for the American

military. Food was plentiful, housing improved greatly, and entertainment—particularly American movies and baseball games—abounded. The war was over for them.

The force that had shaped the lives and actions of the Palauans and other Islanders on Angaur was the almost unbearable suffering of many days of hiding in the caves. To survive, they chose to surrender themselves to an unknown enemy. Their immediate reactions to this enemy were determined by their experiences of suffering. As many saw it, they came out of "hell" to "heaven." The positive response of the Islanders on Angaur to the new life of plenty offered by the Americans was a direct result of their previous deprivation. In turning to the Americans for aid, the Islanders on Angaur did not turn against the Japanese. Many maintained a concern for their former administrators.

WAR ON BABELDAOB

On "bypassed" Babeldaob, the situation was markedly different.[3] There was no invasion: The war unfolded there as a prolonged air attack. Every day the people on Angaur could see heavy bombers taking off from the strip on Angaur and fighter planes taking off from Peleliu, all heading north in the direction of Babeldaob. Many wondered what hope there could be for their relatives there.

The taking of Peleliu and Angaur brought war into the heart of Palau. As these southern battlefields were transformed into American bases, the bypassed islands of Koror and Babeldaob were patrolled and "neutralized" more regularly and more intensely. The main island of Koror had been evacuated of most of its population during August and September when the frequency of air strikes increased with the invasions in the south. Approximately 6,000 Islanders on Babeldaob[4] shared the island with an estimated 37,000 Japanese troops (Richard, 1957b, p. 18; VMF 122), government officials, and civilians, many of whom now worked for the military. The Japanese military command and the civilian administration established government and organizational centers, primarily in Ngatpang, Aimeliik, and Airai (see map). Other troops were scattered across Babeldaob, taking over Palauan villages (interviews with Palauans, 1990; MAG 11; VMF 121; VMF 122). Islanders moved into the jungle, to *hinanba* 'places of refuge.' Ngeremlengui and Ngaraard received most of the evacuees from Peleliu and Angaur. The majority of these people found a place to stay with relatives

in jungle hinanba. Although the Japanese ordered the Islanders to take refuge away from the military camps, given the large number of troops occupying the relatively small island of Babeldaob, they were always close to *some* concentration of Japanese. In addition, some lived closer to Japanese camps because they worked for the soldiers. Although many Palauans remained in the same province throughout the war, others moved back and forth, mainly to search for and transport food or to establish and work on new farms. Most of this movement occurred at the instigation of the Japanese military.

For the Palauans on Babeldaob, relations with the Japanese often constituted the crux of the process of survival.[5] The Islanders who had stayed on Angaur during the American invasion had been in contact with the Japanese, but their daily life was not tied to their relationship with the soldiers. On Babeldaob, however, the degree to which Palauans suffered from the two main dangers—famine and air attacks—was to a large extent determined by the demands of the Japanese soldiers. Palauans suffered malnutrition as a direct result of Japanese seizure of their farms and other food supplies. Other Islanders died or were injured in air attacks because they were out in the open, farming or fishing for the Japanese.[6] The Palauans on Babeldaob, still under the administration of Japan, were forced to obey the orders of their occupiers, even when it endangered their lives.

Palauans remember that the planes came every day, both during daylight and at night. The war diary of the Peleliu-based Marine Aircraft Group Eleven (MAG 11) and the existing diaries of the squadrons operating under its command [VMF 121; VMF 122; VMF (N) 541; VMTB 134] corroborate Palauan memories of air attacks on Babeldaob. Operations were canceled only when the weather was so poor that targets were invisible through the thick cloud and rain or when the wind was too hazardous for flying. From October 1944 until early April 1945, the number of sorties over Babeldaob increased steadily. In October, 600 sorties were made across the island to drop bombs or to strafe or napalm numerous targets. The number of planes involved in each daylight raid ranged between 2 and 48. Total sorties for the month of February 1945 doubled the previous October figure when 1,205 planes swept across Babeldaob.

The raids varied in focus. There were general bombing and strafing sweeps over the entire island and there were raids specifically designed to pick out and destroy Japanese transport barges and other surface vessels. These were conducted at regular intervals throughout the day. During daily combat air patrols, four Corsairs patrolled for 2 hours at a time as pilots sought out enemy targets—buildings of all kinds, boats, trucks, storage fa-

cilities, gun positions, and any personnel out in open view. Other bomb strikes were aimed at particular targets or concentrated on one area of Babeldaob, usually a sector known to be heavily populated by Japanese troops or the site of enemy storage facilities, radio installations, or anti-aircraft batteries. They could occur at any time of day, but were usually scheduled for early morning or late afternoon. During the hours of darkness, night fighters struck at assigned targets and then harassed and heckled Koror and Babeldaob with bombs and bullets (MAG 11). Every day and night, fighters patrolled the land and sea "hunting"[7] for targets, and a squadron of torpedo bombers sought out enemy submarines. After completing assigned strikes, the pilots flew over the island to home base, seeking out and strafing "targets of opportunity"[8] along the route (MAG 11).

Although the American squadrons carried out several forms of air attack on the northern Palau Islands, the Palauans themselves were generally not aware of these differences. They did not distinguish between being strafed by aircraft on a barge sweep and being shot at by planes on combat air patrol. They did, however, recognize that Japanese facilities and personnel were major targets, and they became aware of which activities put them most at risk. Everyone learned the general routine of the regular patrols—morning and afternoon—but they also realized there were other unscheduled attacks. They often had no choice about risking dangerous situations if they were under Japanese orders. Depending on where they took refuge and what work they did for the Japanese, Islanders were forced into different degrees of danger. Fishermen were at particular risk from barge sweeps, people living or working near Japanese encampments from strikes on Japanese troops, and those laboring on farms from napalm strikes on gardens.

For Palauans and Japanese alike, the intensity and frequency of the air attacks severely limited daily life. Bombing and strafing caused injury and death and destroyed food supplies, bringing about starvation and disease. Strikes were sometimes made against gardens and farms for the specific purposes of destroying food supplies, exacerbating food shortages, and weakening the Japanese. The raids continued for almost a year, from September 1944 right up to a final raid on the last day of the war on August 15, 1945. Japanese–Islander relations declined rapidly, and one Palauan described this environment thus: "One year is a long time. One day is long, very long" (Fumio Rengiil, b. 1917).

In contrast to Angaur, the wartime experiences of the people on Babeldaob involved more people in many different situations. In addition to the bombing and famine, laboring, carrying, and farming for the soldiers and

Japanese callousness and maltreatment were experienced in interconnected ways. People suffered more or less from each of these depending on who they were, their age and sex, where they had taken refuge, and whether they were forced to work for the soldiers.

In 1944 Wilhelm Rengiil was a 15-year-old boy attending the Vocational School in Koror. As a student he was immediately drafted by the Japanese to work at a variety of tasks. Initially he was posted to Airai to boil water day after day to extract salt for the soldiers. Wilhelm recalls that the planes came over regularly and that he would rush into the safety of a nearby cave when they fired. Later he was ordered to help transport supplies across the channel between Koror and Babeldaob. Each night the barges were brought out from camouflaged hiding places, and Wilhelm would meet the soldiers around 8 o'clock when it was dark. It was while helping with this job that Wilhelm narrowly survived an air attack. One evening a plane suddenly appeared overhead and fired at the barge. He and the other Islanders reacted quickly by diving straight into the water and swimming to safety. In contrast, many of the Japanese soldiers did not respond fast enough. When Wilhelm returned the next morning, eight bodies were still with the barge. The vessel was covered with blood, the bodies badly burned.

During early 1945 when the number of attacks over Babeldaob increased, Wilhelm fled with his family to a hideout in the jungle where they stayed for nearly 3 months. Wilhelm believes he survived only because of this cave: "Every day from Peleliu, there would be a dozen, sometimes a dozen to 18 planes dropping bombs all over." He, his father, and his brother left the cave to fish and farm at night or in the very early morning when there were few or no planes. They learned over time that "at least 10 to 15 small, one-pilot warplanes came and did a routine checkup patrol every day. So . . . during the daytime we slept and in the evening we worked on the farm and planted crops."

Direou Orrukei, in refuge at Melekeok, remembers that "We were like animals, because at night we would cook our food and [work in the] garden because the soldiers said they did not want to see any smoke or fire during the daytime . . . so we did everything at night."

Despite the dangers, Rose Kebekol (b. 1922) often went out of her cave in Aimeliik during the daytime. She had to search for whatever food she could get because she was caring for her parents and her own two young children. She recalls: "We would watch for when the planes went away and then we would run outside and go looking for food. If they came back we would hide ourselves underneath the bushes." On one occasion, however, a

bomb landed within about 60 m (200 ft) of her, and she felt lucky that she was not injured. Others were not as fortunate. Rose remembers reacting with horror as she watched planes shoot "firelike things" right into a cave just below her own. A man inside was killed outright and a woman ran out screaming.

Another woman, an evacuee from Peleliu to Ngaraard, remembers that while she was out in the open, "I looked up and I saw this bomb coming down. So I ran a couple of feet to hide myself because I didn't know what it would do. I watched it and it came down, but it didn't explode." Bombs that did not explode were not harmless. Many of the bombs used by the Americans had delayed fuses and therefore exploded some time after impact (MAG 11).

Men who were fishing were in the greatest danger because pilots would sweep low over the shoreline seeking out boats. When planes appeared, the men jumped into the water and held themselves underneath by hanging onto rocks, waiting until the planes left. At low tide there was not even the protection of the water (Jonathon Emul, b. 1927).

The continuous air raids made it dangerous to go out to collect food. The destruction of gardens and farms forced many Palauans to exist on roots, leaves, fruits of the mangroves, small crabs, and shrimp. Some of the foods they collected were almost inedible. Rose Adelbai, like many others, remembers having to soak a bitter poisonous fruit for days before it could be eaten safely.[9] Today many Palauans are embarrassed or angry at how poor they became during the war (Mongami Kelmal, b. 1926; Woman, Ngermid, b. 1922). Alfonso Oiterong (b. 1924) remembers with sadness that

> in those days it became sort of natural to see a child lying there, alive, but unable to move, because it was starving. . . . We would see a mother holding a baby and the baby was breathing, the mother was dead. That kind of thing became common and we couldn't do anything. We ourselves were starving.

The Japanese soldiers reacted to the starvation and the incessant air raids by forcing Islanders to work harder to provide food for the soldiers. In desperation the Japanese claimed all farms for themselves and forced the Palauans to make new farms solely for Japanese use.

> The Japanese would tell us to make gardens or farms. The parents were supposed to make the farms for the soldiers. The father of the house would have to make the biggest farm and the mother a smaller one. One farm per head for the soldiers. Even if you had a 3-year-old,

> he would have to have a farm right there for the soldiers. So five members of the family would have to make five farms (Rose Adelbai).

The food was "only for the soldiers" (Rose Adelbai). The family was not allowed to take anything. When they were permitted to collect from their farms, it was under strict rules and observation. Direou Orrukei recalls that people were allowed to collect food only at night, under guard.

> The soldiers [would] accompany us for about 30 minutes to the taro patch. . . . It was very dark and we couldn't see anything. If you wanted to get a taro, you would just stick your hand in and feel the taro and try to use a knife to cut it and not cut yourself. And then for 30 minutes the soldiers would be watching and we would be trying to get as much as we could in that time. . . . That was the only way we could get food.

When people planted new farms for their own use, the Japanese military invariably moved in and took them too. Many Islanders had no option but to steal from their own land. Others were too frightened to touch anything, fearing Japanese retribution. Tibedakl Olblai (b. 1917) was forced to farm for the Japanese, but she remembers "that was not enough" for the soldiers; they would "even steal farms from us, our own personal ones, and when we went to take crops from our own farms, they would beat us."

In addition to working on farms, Palauan women were often conscripted to carry food supplies from one area to another. Obechou Delutaoch, then 27 years old, remembers that once a month the soldiers drafted her and several other women to carry goods from Ngaraard to other military units stationed in Ngardmau, a distance of about 16 km.

> We would have to walk all the way to Ngardmau to deliver the food for the soldiers and then go home. I had no idea how far it was because at the time there was no particular path. We would have to climb hills, go over, go under. At the same time we had to make sure that the food was not going to get spoiled. When we went in the evening, we had to hurry before daytime came because the planes would start coming. If we did not reach Ngardmau before daylight came, we would have to find a place to stay and wait the whole day for the shooting and everything to clear and then at 4 or 5 o'clock we would have to journey on.

Obechou recalls that earlier in the war the Japanese warned Palauans not to go out in the open during daytime because doing so would make them clear targets for American planes; however, as the soldiers became more

desperate in their quest for food, they became much less concerned about the safety of the Palauans.

On Babeldaob many people turned against the Japanese military because of their callousness. Some even used quiet strategies of resistance and retaliation. Mereb Eruang, employed to fish for the Japanese, would steal from his catch to provide food for his family before he turned the remaining fish over to the Japanese. Dengelei Saburo (b. 1930) protected her tapioca crop by cutting off the exposed stems above the ground so that the plants were hidden beneath. Anthony Polloi's family planted poisonous tapioca between the edible tapioca plants or around the perimeter of the garden so that the soldiers would become ill when they stole and ate them. In such ways Palauans were able to use the ignorance of the Japanese against them, tricking the soldiers and protecting themselves. Harsh treatment by the Japanese, coupled with a widespread rumor (mentioned by nearly every Palauan I interviewed) that the Japanese planned to kill all the Palauans by blowing them up in a cave at Ngatpang, turned many Palauans on Babeldaob against the Japanese. Some were angered into retaliation, others frightened into submission.

The Japanese made some effort to heal the rift between the military and the Palauans by appointing an officer, Captain Yoshiyasu Morikawa, to oversee and take responsibility for organizing Palauans, particularly in the area of food production (Higuchi, 1991, pp. 149–156). In contrast to their negative assessment of the attitudes of many Japanese soldiers, Palauans saw Morikawa's concern for their welfare as unusual. A powerful myth developed around the figure of Morikawa, the crux of which was the belief that this young and handsome officer was an American spy (Higuchi, 1991, p. 149; Walter, 1993, pp. 163–172). In turning from the cruelty of the Japanese, some Palauans began to believe in an opposite, mirror image of the good Americans who could save them. This conception decided a man called Joseph Tellei to lead a group of Islanders from Babeldaob to the southern islands in December 1944 to seek freedom and safety with their American "enemies" (Higuchi, 1986).

CONCLUSION

Islanders on Angaur and Babeldaob experienced World War II in different ways. The small number who remained on Angaur suffered through a short

but intense period of battle. Despite the horror of the weeks in the caves, they retained a close relationship with the Japanese because they could see that the soldiers were not directly responsible for their suffering. The people on Angaur chose to surrender themselves to the Americans to ensure their own survival. They then experienced the rest of the war as mostly a time of plenty. Peace and reconstruction began early because the southern islands were rapidly transformed into American air bases (see Walter, 1993). In contrast, on Babeldaob, Palauans lived through a long year of continuous suffering that was intensified by Japanese actions—their recruitment of labor, seizure of farms, and callous treatment of the Islanders. A deep split therefore developed between the Babeldaob Palauans and the Japanese.

Different experiences of war influenced the ways in which Palauans adapted to the new world of American administration that came with the end of the war.[10] With the coming of American occupation forces, Islanders on Babeldaob, like those on Angaur, emerged from the "hell" of war into a "heaven" of plenty. The whole of Palau had suffered the physical devastation of war, but by August 1945 Angaur and Peleliu had been under American military government for almost a year and had experienced material development in the form of new roads, new housing, and jobs. But Babeldaob had just emerged from the ravages of the war in August 1945, and the healing of the land and the people had only just begun. In terms of physical reconstruction and adaptation to American ways, conditions in the south were well in advance of those on Babeldaob.

After the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, American planes continued to fly out of the morning sun and pass over the airstrip at Airai and across Babeldaob and Koror, but during these daily reconnaissance patrols they never fired their weapons. Palauans gradually began to realize that they no longer needed to fear the planes. Eight-year-old Anthony Polloi was happy that he could now go out in the open. One day, however, he stopped suddenly when he saw two soldiers with guns. They were not Japanese. He was frightened, but also curious because on the top of one man's head he saw a striking halo of blond hair. Before the war, Anthony had attended catechism classes arranged by the local Catholic priest, and there he had seen pictures of the Archangel Gabriel, with flowing blond locks. He stared at the blond soldier and then quickly turned and ran as fast as he could back to his mother, shouting at her with excitement, "I've seen an angel! I've seen an angel!"

The new world of peace heralded by Anthony's "angel" was to bring about many new problems and contradictions for Palauans. The different experiences in the north and south of peace and reconstruction were also to influence Palau's next journey, through the American naval administration in the period 1945 through 1951 (see Walter, 1993, pp. 237–335).

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Notes

1. The expression "D-Day" is used throughout military literature to refer to the day selected for the start of an operation. It does not refer only to the Allied invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944.

2. Quotations with this source, (John Useem), are derived from my series of interviews with Useem on July 5–7, 1990.

3. "Bypassed" is military terminology for areas that are not directly invaded by troops but are neutralized through bombing and other means.

4. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, 5,350 Islanders came under American control (Island Command Peleliu). This figure includes the 183 Islanders on Angaur. Using Japanese documents, Tadao Yanaihara (1940, p. 30) recorded the 1937 population as 6,360.

5. In the following discussions of relations between Palauans and Japanese, I am referring primarily to relationships with the Japanese military.

6. A comparison of Yanaihara's (1940, p. 30) 1937 population figure for Palau of 6,360 and the postwar American figure of 5,350, minus the 183 Islanders on Angaur, reveals that approximately 1,000 Islanders died as a result of starvation or bombing during the war.

7. "Hunting" for targets is the terminology used throughout squadron war diaries.

8. "Targets of opportunity" is a term used throughout squadron war diaries.

9. This fruit is referred to by Palauans as *denges* or *belloi* and is the fruit of the oriental mangrove (see Nero, 1989, p. 145).

10. For an anthropological perspective on the meaning of the war to Palauans, see Nero (1989).

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The Limitations of Collective Security: The United States and the Micronesian Trusteeship, 1945–1947

HAL M. FRIEDMAN

Between 1945 and 1947, the United States sought an exclusive strategic trusteeship over Micronesia. Tensions developed, however, within the US government over settling for a trusteeship arrangement under the United Nations versus annexation of the island groups. Eventually, the United States opted for a strategic trusteeship, but not before differences surfaced within the executive departments and between the United States and the Soviet Union over trusteeship or annexation of Micronesia. A little-known aspect of the early Cold War, this controversy involved Great Power conflict over the issues of US imperialism, superpower tensions, and Pacific Basin colonialism.

Between 1945 and 1947, the United States set out upon an imperial course to guarantee its future security in the Pacific and East Asia by taking direct control over the Pacific Islands taken from Japan at the end of World War II, especially the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana groups in Micronesia. American policymakers and strategic planners throughout the US government were convinced—by their perceptions of a failed interwar Washington Treaty System, the trauma of Pearl Harbor and the defeats of the winter of 1941–1942, the costs of the island-hopping campaign of 1942–1945, and rising tensions with the Soviet Union—that future American security in the region could only be guaranteed by unilateral and complete American control over Micronesia.

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American imperialism in Micronesia was expressed most clearly during the post–1945 negotiations among the Great Powers over the future disposition of conquered and colonial territory in the Pacific Basin. Between 1945 and 1947, American officials made it clear that the United States expected a free hand to dictate the future strategic-political framework of the Pacific Basin by wielding control over the islands in the former Japanese Mandate. In addition, these negotiations demonstrated some points about American attitudes toward the concept of collective security, toward the idea of postwar Great Power cooperation, and toward the image of the Soviet Union as a future threat to American strategic interests in the Pacific and East Asia.

First, postwar relations demonstrated the very low level of confidence that many American policymakers and planners had in the United Nations. Conditioned by their perceptions of the failures of the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, and the Washington Treaty System, many American strategic planners saw UN trusteeships as a suspect and substandard way to guarantee that the Pacific become a postwar American lake. Different policymakers and planners from different bureaucracies had, at times, superficially conflicting ideas about the role of the United Nations. In general, however, officials from the concerned executive departments were more preoccupied with creating trusteeships that projected an image of American confidence in the United Nations than with concluding agreements that required an actual and substantive American committment to collective security.

Second, the negotiations over international trusteeships became an arena for polarized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as contentions over the future of the region became clearer. American fears about strategic security in the postwar Pacific were expressed when the United States lobbied for a special strategic trusteeship over Micronesia, which made a mockery of the trusteeship concept and fostered suspicions in the Soviet Union about postwar American intentions in the Pacific Basin and East Asia. This stimulus-response diplomatic atmosphere, in turn, helped fuel mutual fears between the two superpowers, fears that had already been aroused by disagreements over the postwar management of Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.

Finally, postwar relations demonstrate just how intertwined Micronesia became with other areas of the world. The region has been considered an

isolated and unimportant "backwater" by most Cold War historians (for exceptions see Cullather, 1991; Foltos, 1989; Friedman, 1993; Gallicchio, 1991; Pomeroy, 1951). But a closer look at postwar Soviet-American relations over the disposition of Micronesia does suggest that the fate of the region became closely intertwined in major global political issues during the origins of the Cold War. Micronesia mattered in the larger scheme of the international relations during the early Cold War because of its continued perceived importance to East Asian affairs, its continued central importance to postwar American defense of the Western Hemisphere, and the role of regional trusteeship issues in global political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union.

THE CONTEXT

American plans for the postwar Pacific were dominated by fears that some hostile power might acquire control over the resources of the East Asian mainland and the strategic facilities of the Pacific Islands and then use these assets for military purposes against the United States. In the context of Pearl Harbor and the origins of the Cold War, Japan and then, after the fall of 1945, the Soviet Union figured prominently in American strategic thinking as possible future aggressors in the Pacific. To forestall the possibility of a future surprise attack on the United States from East Asia, American wartime planners sought to achieve as firm control over Micronesia as possible (Foltos, 1989; Friedman, 1993).

The negotiations over UN trusteeships between 1945 and 1947 provide historians with an early example of the clash between American national security goals and postwar collective security ideals (see Claude, 1984, pp. 349–377; Gerber, 1982). American military planners, seeking US sovereignty over Micronesia so that the region could serve as the linchpin of a comprehensive base system, hoped that American sovereignty and an active defense of the region would allow the United States to deny the area to foreign powers and guarantee that Pearl Harbor-style attacks were never again inflicted on the United States. But pressure on the military services from the Roosevelt and Truman administrations and the State and Interior Departments mounted because of the incompatability of annexation with the American political image as an anticolonial power. The US Army and the Navy eventually and begrudgingly accepted the idea of an international trust-

eeship over the former Japanese Mandate islands (Foltos, 1989; Louis, 1977, pp. 68–87, 159–197, 259–273, 366–377, 475–496, 512–573; Thorne, 1978, pp. 252–269, 371–375, 489–494, 654–671).

As a form of the old League of Nations mandate system that was carried over to the United Nations, trusteeships were supposedly a means by which great powers would develop former colonies into independent nations. In reality, the multilateralism implied in *international trusteeship* gave way to the unilateralism of *strategic trusteeship*, in which the United States would have sole authority for the occupation, defense, and administration of Micronesia and most of the islands north of the equator that were taken from Japan (Claude, 1984, pp. 349–377; Louis, 1977, pp. 461–573). Though the United Nations would have the right to inspect the islands once a year, and though the United States was required to pay lip service to clauses calling for the eventual independence of the islands, strategic trusteeship was just one step short of annexation and it defied the idea of postwar multilateral cooperation and collective security in the Pacific (Nufer, 1978, pp. 26–35). With Micronesia, the Ryukyus, Japan, the Philippines, the Bonins, the Volcanoes, and Marcus Island under firm American control, and with the US Navy and Army Air Force deployed in strength in the Pacific, the Pacific Basin truly became an American lake and the United States, for all intents and purposes, achieved a unilateral solution to its postwar security anxieties (Friedman, 1993).

THE UN AND POSTWAR AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

Trusteeship for Micronesia was still a suspect status to military officials who sought annexation as a means to prevent other powers from gaining any influence over the islands. Many American officials who were charged with planning strategic policy for the region never fully accepted the trusteeship concept and never vested great confidence in the United Nations as a guarantor of American postwar security or international peace. This lack of confidence in UN processes and in the trusteeship concept was not limited to military officials and officers. Numerous civilian officials, even those identified as supporters of collective security concepts, voiced doubts concerning the efficacy of the United Nations and sought to ensure American security in the Pacific through unilateral control over the islands, constructing in the meantime an international facade to protect the US image as anticolonial.

Doubts about the United Nations began even before the war ended in Europe. In April 1945, two senior members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Republican Arthur Vandenburg of Michigan and Democrat Tom Connolly of Texas, had to be reassured by Vice Adm. Russell Willson of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, during the United Nations Conference, that the United States would not offer the former Japanese Mandate islands for trusteeship until complete arrangements had been made with the Allied powers and the United Nations about the administering power authority over the respective trusteeships (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1945, pp. 448–449). Willson assured Vandenburg and Connally that the United States would have full veto powers in the Security Council and that nothing he foresaw in the future would prevent it from negotiating treaties, acquiring strategic territory, or providing for firm American security in the Pacific after the war (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1945, pp. 448–449).

Even Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes, whose favorable views of international trusteeship were considered subversive by many military leaders, was concerned with governing the islands taken from Japan in a way that ensured American consolidation over the region, though he also sought means by which to preserve the US image as an anticolonial power. In the fall of 1945, Ickes called repeatedly for Micronesia and the other islands taken from Japan to be placed under Interior Department civil administration, though he also saw the need to leave limited "military reservations" under the War and Navy Departments' control in peacetime and to have entire island chains under military control in time of war or national emergency. Although Ickes couched his call for civilian administration in humanitarian language, he and other Interior Department officials wielded markedly conservative arguments in support of their idea that the Interior Department should govern the non-White civilian populations in Micronesia (Ickes to Truman, September 12, 1945, December 29, 1945). Just a few days after the war ended, for example, Ickes wrote Truman to argue for civil administration in the islands in order to keep "with the traditions of the American people," to assist in guaranteeing a permanent peace, and to forestall charges by foreign powers that the United States had created a "militaristic empire" in Micronesia by which indigenous populations were governed. Ickes especially wanted the United States to be able to go to the peace table demonstrating its "democratic, non-imperialistic attitude . . . toward the island peoples" (Ickes to Truman, September 12, 1945, December 29, 1945). Even after he resigned his portfolio in February 1946, Ickes

continued to call for American leadership in establishing a trusteeship so that the United States could retain both its moral leadership in the international political arena and its image and reputation as a "progressive and enlightened democracy" (Krug to Marshall, May 3, 1947).

In September 1945, Abe Fortas, as acting secretary of the Interior, elaborated to Truman on the problem of direct military rule over the Micronesian islands. Fortas, who authored the strategic trusteeship concept as a bureaucratic compromise when the military, in spring 1945, repeatedly called for annexation, now again asserted that the United States would come under a significant amount of international criticism for violating the spirit of the UN Charter if it was to maintain direct military rule over civilians, especially after the other Great Powers reverted to civil administration in their respective colonies and trusteeships. Fortas put the matter in terms of preserving American wartime prestige and the political capital it had invested in the United Nations as world attention began to focus on the American administration of Micronesia (Fortas to Truman, n.d). Neither Ickes' nor Fortas' primary concern was the future viability of the United Nations; they were concerned first with preserving the American political image in that body and ensuring US national security in the western Pacific.

Truman responded to the Interior Department by establishing an interdepartmental committee, consisting of the secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the Interior, that would discuss the issues of strategic trusteeship versus annexation and civil versus military government. The committee never met, but representatives of the four secretaries did. It is unclear what influence they might have had, if any, on American policy toward Micronesia because the islands were not high on Truman's priority list in the fall of 1945 or even for much of 1946. Faced with deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, as well as recovery crises in Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and the United States, Truman probably had little time to spare for island administration issues.

This desire to shelve the problem is evidenced by Truman's endorsement of Secretary of State James Byrnes' January 1946 views on establishing a definite status for the islands. Contrary to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal's assertion that Byrnes was prepared to hand the islands over to the United Nations in early 1946, before the conditions of strategic trusteeship had been decided upon (Millis, 1951, pp. 130–131), Byrnes did remind Truman that the Potsdam Agreement of July 1945 stated that enemy territory was not to be disposed of until peace treaties with the defeated powers were signed. Given that a peace treaty with Japan had not been signed by

the beginning of 1946, Byrnes argued that the islands taken from Japan should remain under American military rule until a peace conference was convened, a treaty signed, territorial dispositions determined, and the trusteeship system perfected. In other words, the United States should hold on to the islands until the conditions of trusteeship were made subservient to American conditions for future strategic security in the area. Byrnes took his cue from the divided occupation of Germany, where four Allied zones had been created to administer the defeated nation. He did not want to see any similar divided authority occur with respect to Japan or the Pacific territories taken from Japan, which were now under American control (Byrnes to Truman, January 5, 1946; Truman to Byrnes, January 9, 1946).

Nevertheless the need to wait for a Japanese peace treaty did not stop Byrnes from suggesting that the United States offer the islands to the United Nations under specific conditions. To Byrnes, offering the islands in the context of strategic trusteeship was part of a goodwill international gesture, an attempt to quell international criticism of the United States for violating its own wartime rhetoric against territorial aggrandizement. It was also a means by which the United States could retain complete military control over the islands in case of failure by the United Nations to agree upon the terms of the trusteeship. In effect, the United States had nothing to lose by offering the islands for trusteeship under American conditions while the United States remained in physical control of the area (Byrnes to Truman, January 5, 1946). Truman concurred in these moves, stating that nothing could be done for some time but that plans should be made. He also told reporters that the United States would place islands it did not need for its own defense under UN trusteeship and that islands the United States perceived as needed for national security would be placed under individual, that is, American, trusteeship with permission from the United Nations (Acheson, January 22, 1946; Truman, January 15, 1946). Thus, early on Truman made the distinction between strategic and international trusteeship in a context of cautionary and conservative circumspection toward the UN system. Neither Truman nor Byrnes suggested handing the islands over to any power or organization in any way that threatened future American suzerainty over the Pacific islands taken from Japan.

The lack of faith in a UN-led collective security system was again expressed in April 1946 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicated to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee that a comprehensive global base system, representing a blanketing of the Pacific with American forces, was "an essential requirement for United States security in the event of a failure

of the United Nations to preserve world peace" (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, p. 1173). In the same month, Rear Adm. Matthias Gardner, assistant chief of Naval Operations for Strategic Plans, sent a memo to Brig. Gen. George Lincoln, chief of the Current Group in the US Army's Operations and Plans Division, suggesting changes to a Joint Staff Planners document titled "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific." Gardner's officers thought the document should be forwarded to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, but they first wanted certain wording changed that dealt with American sovereignty over various areas of the Pacific north of the equator. Specifically, Strategic Plans wanted strategic control of the former Japanese Mandate, Marcus Island, and sections of the Bonins and Volcanoes to be labeled as "unlimited and exclusive sovereignty" rather than merely "full control" (Gardner to Lincoln, April 23, 1946).

In addition, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee now belied its April 1945 facade of confidence in collective security and strategic trusteeship by calling into question UN procedures and processes themselves. In June 1946 the committee concurred with the Joint Planning Staff and the Joint Post-War Committee that the UN Charter allowed the United States exclusive control over certain strategic areas and that the veto power in the Security Council might guarantee the United States this exclusive control. The committee, however, was concerned that the veto power of the other Security Council members might prevent the United States from establishing control over these strategic areas in the first place or that veto powers for Security Council members might be curtailed in the future (JCS 570/48, January 17, 1946). Accordingly, committee members wanted to retain sovereign control over Micronesia and saw the move as a quid pro quo for the Soviet Union's retention of unilateral control over the Kuril Islands. The committee asserted that backing away from the altruistic stance of trusteeship might harm the UN process but that the precedent had already been set by the Soviet refusal to offer the Kurils in any form of trusteeship (Claude, 1984, pp. 357–377; JCS 570/48, January 17, 1946; Louis, 1977, pp. 461–573). What the committee did not mention is that the Soviets annexed the Kurils according to the terms of the Yalta Agreement, a document that did not stipulate trusteeship for the area. The United States could not claim the same kind of diplomatic guarantee for Micronesia, but the committee saw a closely similar circumstance. These same considerations prompted the Joint Chiefs to call again for annexation of the islands taken from Japan. In June 1946 Fleet Adm. William Leahy, chief of staff to the president and nominal chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recorded in his diary that

> the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached a conclusion that United States sovereignty over the Japanese Mandated Islands is, from the military point of view, necessary to the national defense, and decided to report that conclusion to the Secretary of State and the President. (Leahy, June 28, 1946)

Not all of the officials connected with trusteeship issues favored annexation or dismissed the subtle but important nuances of the significance of international trusteeship issues to the future viability of the United Nations. Comdr. P. A. Borel, an assistant to Capt. Robert Dennison, assistant chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, spoke in July 1946 about the importance of the United Nations to American international political interests and image. Borel first pointed out to Dennison that although the Joint Chiefs wanted to annex Micronesia, the bottom line in the annexation versus trusteeship argument dictated that the United States could not take a unilateral course in regard to the former Japanese Mandate for several reasons. First, the Cairo and subsequent wartime declarations did not give the United States a free hand in territorial dispositions. Second, the United States had consistently sought the approval of other nations for whatever it did in regard to Micronesia. Third, the United States had too much political capital invested in the United Nations to weaken the organization by circumventing UN clauses, thereby laying the United States open to charges of hypocrisy. Borel also denied that a link existed between Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and the Kurils and American domination in the western Pacific, because the Soviets had a free hand given to them by the Yalta Agreement. In the end, Borel suggested that the United States stop trying to annex the islands on a "blood and treasure" argument that would give it sole rights to fortify the chains; instead, he suggested the United States merely opt for strategic trusteeship that would still guarantee American security in the area by denying the islands to other powers (Borel to Dennison, July 24, 1946). Borel, however, seems to have held a minority opinion within policy and planning circles.

Most officials continued to see an innocence on the part of the United States. In a September 1946 memorandum from Gen. Carl Spaatz, commanding general of the Army Air Force, to W. Stuart Symington, assistant secretary of the War Department (for Air), Spaatz tried to counter statements made by John Foster Dulles (US delegate to the United Nations for trusteeship negotiations) by pointing out that "far-flung" bases distant from the United States were threatening to other nations and that their defensive

value to the United States was therefore lower because of the international suspicions they engendered (Spaatz to Symington, September 3, 1946). Spaatz focused the argument about American control over the newly won territory by claiming that American strategic security actually centered on prewar US possessions, such as Hawai'i, Guam, Wake, and the Aleutians, and that recent American policy changes merely included policing a defeated Japan and supporting the newly independent Philippines. Spaatz claimed that the United States was in Hawai'i mainly to provide trans-Pacific aircraft with a safe haven, just as the islands had done for Yankee Clipper ships in the 1800s! Furnishing support for the new Philippine republic, which "compared to our own during the closing decades of the Eighteenth Century," explained why American bases were in that archipelago, and General MacArthur's "nurturing" of the Japanese people "in a new way of life which apparently they welcome" explained why the United States had bases so close to the Soviet Union (Spaatz to Symington, September 3, 1946). Spaatz also claimed that American possessions, not military bases, were providing for the security of a postwar American airways system in the area.

Spaatz's basic mistrust of collective security concepts could not be hidden in his statement about a US lack of aggressive intentions. He tied interwar and wartime events, together with mistrust for the concept of collective security, into a formula for unilateral American security in the postwar Pacific. Claiming that the United States erred in the 1920s and 1930s by reducing its armaments and trusting other nations to do the same, Spaatz then asserted that the United States was simply spreading a "protective wing" over the Pacific, with prewar American possessions as the basis for that protection; that US troops in Japan, Korea, and the former Mandate were merely fulfilling the pledges of the Potsdam Agreement; and that the United States had to continue its strategic vigilance in the region, based on its deployed military power, until "that time when world opinion has the voice and the power to assure the peaceful resolution of differences among sovereign states." To do otherwise would "result in such a national weakening of military power that it invites aggression by other nations remaining militarily strong" (Spaatz to Symington, September 3, 1946).

Lack of trust in the United Nations reached even higher levels than Spaatz's. In September 1946, Adm. John Towers, commander in chief of the US Pacific Fleet and commander in chief and military governor of the Pacific Ocean Areas, and Rear Adm. Charles Pownall, Tower's deputy military governor, suggested to Truman and Forrestal that bases in the Pacific be limited

to the Guam–Saipan–Tinian complex, the Philippines, Okinawa, Alaska, the Aleutians, and Hawai'i because of funding limitations for base development. Towers never mentioned annexation or trusteeship, but he did stress that the United States should be in effective control. Truman and Forrestal concurred in Towers' recommendation, but Truman specifically mentioned that the United States retain Okinawa and Micronesia on a sovereign basis "until the United Nations was far enough along to give us [the United States] confidence in a trusteeship system" (*The Forrestal Diaries,* September 30, 1946; Reynolds, 1991, pp. 521–522; Towers to Truman, September 30, 1946).

This mistrust of the United Nations at the highest levels of policymaking became more explicit in October 1946, by which time Byrnes sought to offer the islands to the United Nations for trusteeship even though a peace treaty had not been signed between the Allied powers and Japan (Millis, 1951, pp. 213–214). Byrnes was probably convinced by this time that there would be no early peace treaty. Accordingly, he may have wanted an American-led solution in the United Nations to the disposition of Japan's territories so as to allow for sanctioned American control over the Pacific Islands. Forrestal and Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz, chief of Naval Operations, were alarmed at Byrnes' idea and they expressed a desire for the United States to retain sovereignty over Micronesia until the terms of trusteeship were made more concrete. They were convinced that offering the islands too soon would allow them to be "surrendered piecemeal" to the United Nations or to some foreign power by "those responsible for the drafting" (Millis, 1951, pp. 213–214).

Moreover, subordinate commanders in the Pacific continued to discuss American military dispositions and base construction in the region in a more unilateral context than even President Truman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff were probably willing to entertain. In December 1946, by which time the United States had presented a plan for trusteeship over the islands to the UN Security Council, US Army Lt. Gen. Ennis Whitehead, commanding general of the Pacific Air Command, was continuing to inform his subordinate commanders that the former Japanese Mandate islands were to come under the exclusive and permanent control of the United States as part of an American overall base plan for the postwar Pacific. Whitehead did not mention UN trusteeship, indicating either his disagreement with policymakers or at least a communication gap between policymakers and policy implementers over the means of defending and administering the new Pacific empire (Whitehead, December 12, 1946).

In the same month, Dulles conferred with Forrestal about the idea of demilitarizing the entire Pacific, including Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Micronesia, and the Kuril-Sakhalin area. Dulles could have been referring to an idea enunciated by President Roosevelt in the mid-1930s (Harrison, 1988, pp. 47–72; Ickes, 1954, Vol. 2, pp. 272–276, Vol. 3, pp. 342–349). At that time, Roosevelt attempted to obtain British cooperation in neutralizing the Pacific region, quarantining Japan by means of a united Anglo-American front based on naval power, and deterring Japanese aggression. Forrestal seemed to approve of the idea as long as it was not "like the old days . . . when it is all one-sided. We don't fortify the Philippines and they [Japan] did fortify the Mandates" (Forrestal to Dulles, December 16, 1946). Forrestal was alluding to the "foolish diplomacy" of 1919 and 1922 when policymakers had agreed to Japanese administration over Micronesia and the nonfortification of Guam and the Philippines. To many military and civilian officials charged with strategic responsibilities in the 1940s, the United Nations was nothing but a more recent manifestation of the League of Nations, and they believed that America's position in the Pacific could be undermined in a way reminiscent of the interwar period.

Maintaining a public facade about the efficacy of international cooperation, collective security, and trusteeship, these officials privately asserted that the United States should annex Micronesia and ward off all international attempts to administer the area. One such example of this public–private disparity occurred in March 1947 when Secretary Forrestal responded to a letter from a concerned history instructor in Virginia. Lysabeth Muney, of Sweetbriar College, thought that the 1946 atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands were being used to justify a large postwar navy, to make a mockery of the United Nations, and to damage the concept of collective security (Muney to Forrestal, March 1, 1947). Forrestal assured the concerned historian that he was fully supportive of collective security and united action as the basis for peace and that he saw the US Navy as an integral part of an international police force "enforcing the peace" (Forrestal to Muney, March 19, 1947). Forrestal claimed that his "faith, in other words, is in the United Nations as the agency for universal peace dynamically perpetuated" (Forrestal to Muney). Although Forrestal did not mention the trusteeship system in the letter, it can be assumed that his allegedly strong support for the United Nations would have been accompanied by support for the concept of international trusteeship.

But in private, Forrestal and many other policymakers and planners expressed serious reservations about the United Nations and believed that

trusteeship was an inadequate way to provide for postwar American security in the Pacific or anywhere else in the world. Many in the military favored the outright annexation of Micronesia and the other islands taken from Japan. Even George Kennan and the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, as late as October 1947, called for an American, rather than a UN, strategic trusteeship over the Bonins, Volcanoes, and Marcus Island (PPSP No. 10, October 14, 1947; PPSP No. 10/1, October 15, 1947). Forrestal's thinking was along similar lines. Although he claimed as early as the spring of 1945 that he opposed the idea of annexation, his continued support of American sovereignty over Micronesia in 1946, because of a lack of confidence in the United Nations, belied his claims of 1945 and those of the winter of 1947 (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 211–213, 290, 350; Louis, 1977, pp. 482–483).

By 1947 Forrestal was willing to accept publicly a strategic trusteeship over Micronesia, but he never thought of the arrangement in the context of international cooperation, collective security, or UN administration. Throughout the entire period of 1945–1947, he consistently spoke of exclusive American control in the region, veto power for the United States on the UN Security and Trusteeship Councils in order to prevent any influence from other nations in the American administration of the islands, and complete American military, political, and economic rights over the area (Forrestal, February 22, 1947; Sherman to Forrestal, February 25, 1947). Though Forrestal was eventually willing to endure the facade of a UN-supervised strategic trusteeship, what he actually had in mind and what actually resulted in 1947 was a subtle subversion of UN principles concerning the international supervision of conquered territories in favor of American strategic security. Here Forrestal's thinking was again consistent with that of many officials who saw unilateral American security as a more important objective during the 1940s than proving the efficacy of collective security concepts.

STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED

The emphasis on unilateral American security was manifested in efforts, beginning as early as March 1945, to limit the number of nations directly involved in trusteeship negotiations. At that time, Secretary of War Henry Stimson argued that if the United States had to offer the islands in the context of international trusteeships, the negotiating powers should be lim-

ited to Security Council members because "the smaller numbers of the Security Council would make negotiations much less complicated" (Louis, 1977, pp. 482–486; Millis, 1951, pp. 37–38). The attempt to make the process less complicated by limiting the number of nations involved focused in the phrase *states directly concerned.* The term literally meant those nations that had direct concrete or perceived interests in the various trusteeships that were being organized throughout the world between 1945 and 1947. The meaning of the term, however, became the basis for a controversy between the United States and the Soviet Union because the Soviets attempted to acquire a voice in almost all trusteeship matters and the United States attempted to curtail severely the number of states directly involved in regional trusteeship negotiations.

This attitude on the part of American policymakers surfaced before the United Nations was even established at San Francisco in April 1945. Stimson and Forrestal wrote to Roosevelt just before Roosevelt's death to state their support for the trusteeship concept but to convey their desire to delay trusteeship proceedings until the end of the war. Both men claimed that negotiations in the United Nations might harm Allied cooperation against Germany and Japan during the final stages of the war, because of the increasingly divergent postwar aims of the various nations (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1945, p. 212). Although strained relations between the western Allies and the Soviet Union over events in Eastern Europe after 1944 may have vindicated Stimson's and Forrestal's viewpoints about the tenuous nature of wartime cooperation, neither argued for delay as a means of fostering conditions more conducive to multilateral trusteeship negotiations. Instead, a delay was suggested to give the United States a chance to consolidate its military control over Micronesia and to allow the Americans to present the Soviet Union with a fait accompli.

Primary documents also reveal how interdependent Micronesia became with other issues and regions when American strategic policymakers and planners thought in the context of states directly concerned. Secretary Ickes, for instance, linked his wartime duties as US Petroleum Administrator with his attempt to have Micronesia placed under UN trusteeship and Interior Department civil administration. Before and during the war, Ickes had been attempting to formulate a coherent US strategic oil policy that would guarantee American and European access to the oil resources of the Middle East, which were considered necessary for victory and postwar recovery. Desiring some direct participation by the US government in the Middle East oil concessions granted to American corporations, Ickes was constantly

struggling against attempts by both the British and private American oil companies to prevent the US government from having direct involvement (Miller, 1980, pp. 21–149; Painter, 1986, pp. 11–95). Writing Roosevelt just a few days before the president died, Ickes linked Middle East oil with Micronesia by arguing against American unilateral annexation of the islands. He was particularly concerned that American-claimed sovereignty over Micronesia might provide an excuse for the British to claim the same status over their mandates in the Middle East, thereby annexing the oil concessions there and excluding the United States from access to the region's strategic resources (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1945, pp. 140–141, 198–199).

As another example of regional linkage, Forrestal in April 1946 told Byrnes that it would be unwise for the United States to label itself a state directly concerned in the negotiation of the four African trusteeships of the British Cameroons, Tanganyika, Togoland, and Ruanda-Urundi (now Cameroon, Tanzania, Togo, Rwanda, and Burundi, respectively). Claiming that the United States had no strategic interests in those areas, Forrestal believed that American involvement in the African trusteeships matter would defeat American efforts to have the number of states directly concerned kept to an absolute minimum when it came to the negotiations over the former Japanese Mandate in the Pacific (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 565–568). Similarly, in May 1946 John Hickerson, the State Department's deputy director of the Office of European Affairs, suggested to G. H. Middleton, first secretary of the British Embassy, that if the British and French governments would not insist on being states directly concerned with the former Japanese Mandate, then the United States would agree to abstain from being a state directly concerned with the British and French Mandates in Africa. Hickerson also told Middleton that the entire rationale for the American proposal was to limit the number of states signing any agreement, thereby limiting the number of nations with any kind of veto power over the arrangements before the agreements reached the United Nations General Assembly for ratification (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, p. 562, 589; Hickerson to Middleton, May 24, 1946).

A State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee planning document from May 1946 suggested that American strategic plans for a trusteeship system in the postwar Pacific assumed some cooperation between the western Allies in administering the area; however, the plan excluded the Soviet Union (SWNCC 59, May 24, 1946). In planning for all of the following trusteeships—Micronesia, the Ryukyus, the Bonins, the Australian Mandate (the

eastern portion of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Admiralty Islands, Bougainville, and Buka), the New Zealand Mandate (Western Samoa), and the British Mandate (Nauru Island)—the committee was willing to consider China, the Philippines, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands as states directly concerned. But the framers of the document strove to keep the number of states concerning each trusteeship as limited as possible, and the Soviet Union was the obvious missing Great Power in the list because it did not appear as a state directly or indirectly concerned with any of the Pacific trusteeships (Carney to Nimitz, May 10, 1946; SWNCC 59/2, July 2, 1946).

Another instance of Soviet-American friction occurred in June 1946 when Dulles asserted to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the states directly concerned in the Micronesian trusteeship were the United States, the United Kingdom, and France because those three nations were the remaining victorious Allied and associated powers from the Treaty of Versailles! Gromyko countered that the Soviet Union was directly concerned not only in all trusteeship matters but also in any political, economic, or geographic problem in the world. Dulles argued that the State Department did not consider a nation directly concerned merely because of "geographic propinquity" (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, p. 555). Though he was not prepared at the time to pursue these technical details further, the objective of excluding the Soviet Union from any possible voice in the Micronesian negotiations was apparent and would reappear throughout the negotiation process.

More detailed instructions along these lines followed in the same month from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Benjamin Gerig, chief of the State Department's Division of Dependent Area Affairs. Gerig was told that in any negotiations with other Allied powers over trusteeships, especially with the British, French, and Belgians, the United States desired to keep the number of states directly concerned to an absolute minimum (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 596–598). In addition Gerig was told that geographic propinquity should have nothing to do with this criteria, that the United States only wanted to be "consulted" about the other trusteeships, and that the United States desired to stress informal consultations about trusteeship matters rather than official deliberations in the Security Council or General Assembly (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 596–598). This attempted limitation of the states directly concerned with the American position in Micronesia reached an extreme in August 1946 when Acheson instructed John Minter, the American chargé d'affaires

in Australia, to inform the Australian government that the United States desired to be the sole state directly concerned with the former Japanese Mandate after consultation with other interested states (Dennison to Rusk, August 6, 1946; *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, p. 617).

MICRONESIA AND SOVIET–AMERICAN RELATIONS

Micronesia became intertwined with Soviet-American relations in other areas of the world. At least as early as November 1944, the American position on postwar Micronesia became linked with the Soviet Union's position in Eastern Europe. At that time, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed the foreign minister of the Norwegian government-in-exile that the Soviet Union wanted an outright claim to Bear Island and a Soviet-Norwegian condominium over Spitsbergen Archipelago in order to guarantee Soviet lines of communication in that area after the war. When questioned about this request by the Norwegian official, Molotov asserted there should be no problem with the request because the United States was doing the same sort of thing with the former Japanese Mandate in the Pacific (SWNCC 159/2, July 5, 1945).

During the war some American planners saw similar opportunities in linking American control over Micronesia with Soviet spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. In particular, Army Lt. Gen. Stanley Embick, chair of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, pointed out in 1944 the possibility of a quid pro quo agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union over Micronesia and Eastern Europe. The committee even urged American officials to agree to cross-channel operations into France and Soviet postwar control of Eastern Europe in return for Soviet entry into the war against Japan and postwar American hegemony over the Pacific Basin (JCS 973, July 28, 1944; JCS 973/1, August 4, 1944). However, Embick and the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, were probably in the minority at this time. Most planners and policymakers would not have wanted American actions in the Pacific to be approximated with those of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe in 1944, given the possibly disastrous consequences for domestic political opinion from such a linkage.

John Dower (1971, pp. 148–164) believes that the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, expended considerable energy attempting to draw a parallel between Soviet control in Eastern Europe and American control in Japan and the Pacific. Dower offers as evidence Soviet efforts to establish

an Allied control commission in Japan that would have safeguarded American control over that country in return for American acquiescence to Soviet control of the commissions in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Dower asserts that Byrnes and Molotov came to an understanding in December 1945 over Micronesia and the Kuril-Sakhalin area, which complemented the Yalta Agreement made by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin the previous February. Dower thinks the United States and the Soviet Union were able to come to an agreement because of what contemporary critic Eleanor Lattimore labeled "security imperialism." As a type of imperialism that Lattimore claimed was undertaken for reasons of military security rather than economic exploitation, security imperialism supposedly allowed the two superpowers to realize their own geostrategic goals while continuing to criticize the European colonial powers for failing to grant independence to their subject areas (Lattimore, 1945, pp. 313–316). The label of security imperialism is apt, but evidence exists that contradicts Dower's claims about Soviet efforts at a quid pro quo agreement or an understanding between Byrnes and Molotov as early as December 1945. To the contrary, primary sources indicate that the Soviet Union attempted to frustrate American designs for Micronesia on several occasions.

Marc Gallicchio has also done much of the groundbreaking work concerning Soviet-American relations in northeast Asia, especially on the controversy over the Kuril-Sakhalin area. But Gallicchio's work does not focus on Micronesia and does not explore the possibilities that some sort of quid pro quo agreement may have existed between the United States and the Soviet Union (Gallicchio, 1988, pp. 3, 5, 9, 10, 71, 78, 80–82, 86–88; 1991, pp. 69–101). The controversy over the control of the Kuril-Sakhalin area emphasized the importance of the Pacific to the United States and suggests a new light in which to view American perceptions of Micronesia. In this section I expand Dower's (1971) and Gallicchio's work and analyze the way in which the two areas (Kuril-Sakhalin and Micronesia) became interdependent in the minds of American strategic planners in the late 1940s.

By 1946, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which had earlier implied that an opportunity for a quid pro quo agreement existed between the United States and the Soviet Union over Micronesia and Eastern Europe, now claimed that sentiment in the country was no longer conducive to altruistic ideas about international trusteeship in the islands and that opinion was moving toward unilateral annexation. The committee members left no doubts as to why this change had occurred when it stated that an example

of unilateral annexation already existed in the Soviet acquisition of the Kuril Islands (JCS 570/48, January 17, 1946). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, long opposed to a trusteeship in Micronesia, also used Soviet control over the Kurils to argue against offering Micronesia as an international trusteeship. They asserted that American moral leadership in the United Nations would suffer if the United States cynically offered the islands for a trusteeship in which virtual American control was assured anyway. The Joint Chiefs claimed that if the United States took control solely on the grounds that the islands were of vital strategic importance, much as the Soviet Union had done in the Kurils, then American prestige in the United Nations would not be damaged (SWNCC 59/2, July 2, 1946).

The Joint Chiefs were not concerned with America's position vis-à-vis the United Nations, as is apparent from their attacks on the concept of trusteeships and on the United Nations' alleged inability to protect American interests in the Pacific. They were concerned with ensuring long-term American security in the Pacific and they were willing to violate previous agreements and rhetoric about internationalism to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, their argument indicates the frustration they must have felt over having to witness the United States being subjected to international controls in Micronesia while the Soviet Union received a free hand in the Kuril-Sakhalin area (SWNCC 59/2, July 2, 1946).

More important, these officers saw Micronesia in the context of rising tensions with the Soviet Union. They perceived strategic threats from the Soviet submarine fleet and tactical air force in the Far East, threats facilitated by unilateral Soviet control of the Kuril-Sakhalin area. In addition they warned that the Soviet Union might be able to complement these assets by utilizing strategic facilities in northern China and southern Korea if or when those areas became communist. To American military officers, the best way to contain the Soviet threat in East Asia was to take direct control of Micronesia, use the islands as part of a deterrence system in time of peace, and develop the islands as a strategic basing system for deep strikes into Soviet territory in the event of war (SWNCC 59/2, July 2, 1946).

Other geographic areas also became linked with the American position on Micronesia, and negotiations documents suggest connections between the Pacific and events in Europe and the Middle East. For example, the Soviet Union proposed in May 1946 that it be given a unilateral trusteeship over Tripolitania (now Libya), one of the territories taken from Italy at the end of the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that at most the Soviets might be granted partial participation, but not sole administration, and so

might use this rebuff to oppose sole American trusteeship over the former Japanese Mandate. Given this probability, the Joint Chiefs argued that the United States would be justified in annexing Micronesia to guarantee its position in the Pacific. They justified this action by again claiming that the Soviet Union set a precedent for annexation by refusing to offer the Kurils as an international trusteeship (Sheehy, 1992, pp. 21, 26, 28; SWNCC 59/2, July 2, 1946). Despite these American insinuations of bad faith, the Soviets successfully deflected all US efforts to obtain occupation or base rights in the Kuril-Sakhalin area and they also prevented the Kurils from being established as a trusteeship.

As 1946 wore on, Soviet unilateral control of the Kuril-Sakhalin area and protests over American fortification rights in Micronesia created an even more determined call in the United States for the direct annexation of Micronesia. Sen. Harry Byrd of Virginia said "it would be 'absurd' to talk about placing Pacific bases under trusteeship when the Soviet Union was gaining complete control of the Kuriles" (Gale, 1979, p. 59; Richard, 1957, Vol. 3, p. 16). During a November 1946 conversation between Gromyko and Dulles, Gromyko tried to establish the Soviet Union as a state directly concerned with the negotiations over the trusteeships, including the strategic trust territory of Micronesia, and he also attempted to "interfere" in the clauses granting the United States unilateral military fortification rights in the islands (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 690–692). Not only would these actions have been totally contrary to American wishes, but also, for American officials, they seemed particularly threatening. The United States complained that too many restrictions were being placed on its administration of Micronesia, that the Soviets had a free hand in the Kurils, and that the United States should have similar rights for itself in Micronesia (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 690–692).

The Soviet position modified during this same conversation between Gromyko and Dulles. Gromyko offered that the Soviet Union could be considered a state directly concerned over the disposition of the former Italian colonies and the Pacific territories, including the former Mandate, in return for relinquishing such status over British, French, and Belgian Mandates in Africa. In addition, he intimated that the Soviet Union would be willing to relinquish this status over the New Guinea Mandate, but that the Soviets were most concerned with unilateral American fortification rights in Micronesia. Dulles again linked unilateral Soviet fortification rights in the Kurils to a similar position for the United States in Micronesia, and apparently no agreement was reached because of this impasse (*Foreign Relations of the*

United States, 1946, pp. 690–692). The incident, however, represents how central trusteeship matters could become to Soviet-American relations. To the Soviet leadership, the American position could only have been seen as an attempt to build bases in their "backyard" under a United Nations facade. To the Americans, the Soviet proposals could only have been seen as attempts to interfere in areas that the Soviet Union had not helped to liberate from the Japanese and that were of obvious strategic value to the United States, given the perceived history of the interwar period and the lessons of Pearl Harbor.

A December 1946 conversation between Byrnes and Molotov indicates the intensity of the stimulus-response mentality that poisoned Soviet-American relations over the two areas and goes far in dispelling any notion that efforts at accommodation took place. Molotov told Byrnes that the Soviet Union had to be consulted on any plans to fortify the Pacific Islands. Byrnes responded that he wanted to know what the Soviets proposed to do with the Kurils and Sakhalin. Molotov said these islands were not open to discussion because they were part of a former agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta. Byrnes retorted that he regarded nothing as being subject to previous agreements. Each time Molotov brought up the subject of fortifications in Micronesia, Byrnes inquired into Soviet intentions in the Kurils and Sakhalin (Millis, 1951, pp. 233–234; Richard, 1957, Vol. 3, pp. 28–29). Byrnes later recounted this conversation to Forrestal and said that he was in no great hurry to see a trusteeship agreement consummated. The tenor of his remarks implied that he was content to let the Soviet Union and the United Nations deal with a unilateral American consolidation in Micronesia. Subsequent to Byrnes' assertion, Forrestal expressed the view that "any negotiations with Russia had to be predicated upon a thorough awareness of the unbending determination of the Russians to accomplish world Communization" (Forrestal to Byrnes, January 21, 1947).

Other issues became prevalent during the fall and winter of 1946–1947. By the fall of 1946, Truman, though still uncertain about the efficacy of trusteeship, was unwilling to annex Micronesia or to retain continued sovereignty over the islands, and he wanted the trusteeship issues solved quickly (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, p. 661). Public opinion may have accounted for this change in attitude. Throughout 1946 numerous letters were sent to Truman from major American organizations—including the Congress of Industrial Organizations, Lions International, National League of Women Voters, and Rotary International, as well as a telegram from Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts in his capacity as president of

the United Nations Council of Philadelphia—all of them calling for the United States to place formerly Japanese Micronesia under UN trusteeship immediately. It is possible that the lack of a unified executive department policy and the apparent discrepancy between wartime rhetoric and postwar reality was beginning to catch up with Truman (Truman to Strauss, February 2, 1946; Truman to White, February 2, 1946).

But it is difficult to believe that American public opinion alone could have forced Truman to opt for strategic trusteeship. Lester Foltos (1989, p. 328) argues that Truman had always had a predilection for a UN solution to American security anxieties in the Pacific and that he found the idea of unilateral territorial annexation repugnant. Forrestal's (Forrestal to Byrnes, January 21, 1947) and Towers' diary entries (Towers to Truman, September 30, 1946), if accurate, cast doubt on Foltos' conclusion but support my contention that public opinion may not have been a great influence if Truman had preconceived notions of the United Nations. In addition, Truman's endorsement of Byrnes' wait-and-see policy concerning Japan and its territories, and Truman's own answers to critics of military rule in Micronesia, suggest that he had little trouble handling public opinion that was critical of his policy (Truman to Strauss, February 2, 1946; Truman to White, February 2, 1946).

There are three other possible explanations for Truman's sudden concern in the early fall of 1946. First, perhaps Truman had so many higher-priority items to deal with in other areas of the world, not to mention in the United States itself, that Micronesia took the proverbial back seat for most of 1946. After all, the islands were securely in American military hands and nothing would have changed that fact. The United States could merely wait and see what developments would help or hinder its position in the Pacific and East Asia. This military situation may explain his slow reaction to Stimson's and Forrestal's urgings, on April 13, 1945, that the United States annex the islands taken from Japan before a comprehensive peace settlement was reached (Forrestal and Stimson to Truman, April 13, 1945).

Second, Truman may have shifted from his wait-and-see policy in the fall of 1946 because negotiations were stalemating in the United Nations as a result of the American military's reluctance on strategic trusteeship. While concerned with American public opinion, he may have been more concerned with the emerging US global image as an imperial power stalling the UN process. Finally, by the fall of 1946, Truman had waited to see the postwar disposition of the European Axis nations' territories. Instead of a rapid settlement over the disposition of Germany, the Western Allies and

the Soviet Union had taken to haggling over reparations, postwar boundaries, and other issues related to a divided Germany and a prostrate Poland. It is not difficult to envision Truman suspecting that the Soviets had plans for dividing postwar Japan and possibly even its former Pacific territories in a similar manner. Fully suspicious of Soviet intentions by the fall of 1946, Truman probably decided that there would be no multilateral peace treaty with Japan and that the status of Japan's territories would have to be established first.

Accordingly, in October 1946, Truman had American planners create a Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the former Japanese Mandate and he had the draft presented to the Security Council for approval on November 6, 1946 (*Intelligence Review,* March 6, 1947, p. 48). The Soviets were considerably disturbed by this unilateral action and communicated to Dulles their dissatisfaction with what they took as an American attempt at a fait accompli. The Soviets also stated that they did not wish to see the United States carry out similar actions with regard to other Pacific Islands being considered for trusteeship, such as Okinawa (Dennison to Forrestal, January 22, 1947; *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, p. 701).

Still, similar attempts at unilateral or near-unilateral solutions to trusteeship matters seem to have continued on the part of the United States. Dulles assured the British government in the same month that the United States would not conduct private agreements or even prior consultations with the Soviets concerning the former Japanese Mandate or the Italian colonies. Apparently, the British were concerned with what it considered Soviet and Chinese interference in the negotiations of the Italian trusteeships, and Dulles was concerned with similar intrusions into the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 703–704). The documents suggest, therefore, that despite Soviet protests some American officials were prepared to submit a similar kind of draft trusteeship agreement for Okinawa without prior Security Council consultations.

By February 1947 the Soviets acquiesced to American demands for trusteeship over the former Mandate and agreed that it would not be necessary to wait for a comprehensive peace treaty with Japan. The Soviets' stated reasons included the decisive US role in defeating Japan and the signficantly larger losses the Americans suffered because of that role in comparison with other Allied powers in the region (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1947, pp. 264–265; *Intelligence Review,* March 6, 1947, p. 48). Inis Claude (1984, pp. 373–374) believes that the Soviet Union agreed

to the unilateral American draft because the probable result of continued protest would have been American annexation anyway, a situation in which the Soviets would have had absolutely no voice. Though this is speculation, it may also be that Soviet knowledge of American support in the UN General Assembly or fear of unilateral trusteeship agreements over other areas considered more important may have given the Soviets the incentive to acquiesce in the American fait accompli.

Most probably, however, the Soviets ceased to resist the idea of a pre-peace treaty trusteeship agreement because they were able to suggest changes in the draft that, if rebuffed, could lead to renewed charges of American imperialism in the Pacific. The US draft had counted on the islands being considered "an integral part of the United States." The Draft Trusteeship Agreement also stated the goal of assisting the islands in self-government, asserted that the United States would be the sole administering power over Micronesia, and that without US approval the terms of the trusteeship could not be changed (Press Release #142, February 25, 1947). The Soviets proposed deleting the phrase "as an integral part of the United States," sought to replace "self-government" as the goal with that of "independence," and wanted to vest authority to change trusteeship agreements in the Security Council, not in the administering authority (JCS 1619/20, March 3, 1947). The United States seemed willing to consider only the first Soviet proposal, on Micronesia's exclusion as an integral part of the United States, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other military planning bodies were still voicing concerns about the trusteeship system (owing to the potential US loss of veto powers and influence in the United Nations) and because military planners never believed the islands could be independent (JCS 1619/20, March 3, 1947).

As things turned out, by the time the Micronesian trusteeship agreement was signed in April 1947 and established in July 1947, the United States had agreed to eliminate the phrase "as an integral part of the United States," and the agreement was amended to include independence as an eventual political goal. In all likelihood, the United States agreed to these changes because the nature of the strategic trusteeship agreement was in effect synonymous with annexation anyway. However, it is a significant note about US attitudes toward its future position in the United Nations that Article 15 of the agreement was never amended and that the United States retained sole rights over changes to the trusteeship arrangement until the 1970s and 1980s (Dorrance, 1992, pp. 72–92; Nufer, 1978, pp. 95–103).

TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT

American concerns over being labeled an imperial power by the Soviet Union provide a final fascinating context to Soviet-American relations over Micronesia. The possibility of accusations was considered important by American planners, but official thoughts on the subject again indicate the low priority that substantive international cooperation had for many American officials. Documents show that the United States was fully determined to gain control over Micronesia and to exercise a regional hegemony over the western Pacific no matter what the objectives of other nations in the region were. Although a trusteeship arrangement was being used to deflect charges of imperialism from other nations, the evidence is that acquiring control over the area was the primary objective. But Soviet charges of imperialism were taken seriously by American officials because of the perceived damage that could have been done to America's international prestige if its adherence to UN principles appeared Janus-faced in any way.

For example, American concerns over being branded an imperial power seemed confirmed in March 1946 when the Soviets insinuated that whatever power controlled Micronesia would also have aggressive intentions in the Pacific. Though the Soviets admitted that Germany had not been able to use the islands for aggressive purposes in the Pacific, linking the perceived villain of the two world wars with control of the islands set the stage for accusing the United States of imperial intent in Micronesia (*The Forrestal Diaries,* March 27, 1946). In addition, Japan's possession of Micronesia was linked to the disruption of world peace. Although this was a point upon which most American strategic planners would have agreed, the Soviets then intimated that future prospects for world peace would be endangered by American control of the strategic islands. The American naval attaché in Moscow reported that the accusations were probably the prelude to a propaganda offensive against the United States in which the Soviets would demand a US military withdrawal (*The Forrestal Diaries,* March 27, 1946). Similarly, in November 1946, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and Elbridge Durbrow in Moscow reported to Byrnes that Soviet charges, published in *Pravda,* of imperialism in the Pacific were geared toward branding the United States as a power planning for military aggrandizement in East Asia instead of a power planning only to make Micronesia a defensive buffer zone (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 679–682).

Summing up American attitudes toward the issue, John Foster Dulles claimed in the same month that the most important matter at stake in

Micronesia was not the establishment of a successful trusteeship but the guarantee of American strategic security while avoiding charges of colonialism by the Soviets. Dulles even stated that the United States was determined to take control of Micronesia for strategic purposes, with or without UN approval (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, p. 669; Webb, 1974, p. 79). Apparently, the primary objective from the perspective of American policymakers and planners was not avoiding the practice of imperialism but avoiding an indictment for doing so by other nations (*Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, pp. 684–685).

Soviet charges of imperialism and American defensive countercharges are also a compelling case study of denial by the United States concerning its motives and actions. Capt. R. F. Pryce, deputy naval advisor to Byrnes, along with officers in the Office of Naval Intelligence and the State Department's Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, produced memoranda in October 1946 and January 1947, respectively, that analyzed Soviet political, press, and radio reactions in the fall of 1946 to the American Draft Trusteeship Agreement in particular and to US East Asian policy in general. Through investigation of the newspapers *Pravda, Izvestia,* and *Red Fleet,* and broadcasts on Radio Moscow, Pryce and the officers from Naval Intelligence and the State Department analyzed Soviet charges that it was US policy to exercise US rights as conqueror in the Pacific Basin, to create an American lake of the Pacific Ocean, and to maintain large numbers of air, ground, and naval forces at newly constructed bases north and south of the equator. These reports also charged the United States with annexing 1,500 Pacific Islands, attempting to enlist Pacific Islanders in the American armed forces, employing the strategic trusteeship to mask militaristic designs for the area on the part of the ruling American business and military classes, and dropping what came to be called an iron curtain over Micronesia. The reports even quoted individuals such as former Pres. Herbert Hoover, Fleet Adm. William Halsey, Vice Adm. Forrest Sherman, and Rep. E. V. Izac (chair of the House Committee on Naval Affairs' Subcommittee on Pacific Bases) to the effect that the Draft Trusteeship Agreement allowed the United States to establish its frontier in East Asia rather than on the American west coast, allowed it to attack or intercept targets coming out of East Asia, and made the Pacific Ocean an American lake (Office of Naval Intelligence, January 28, 1947; Pryce to Nimitz, October 8, 1946; State Department Intelligence Memorandum OCL–3443.13, n.d.).

Today the general accurateness of the Soviet charges is impressive. Aside from the tone and rhetoric and the idea of American business circles

pulling the strings of government, the Soviet reports were correct in saying that the United States was trying to use strategic trusteeship as a mask for virtual annexation. Moreover, American policymakers and planners enunciated a desire to turn the Pacific into an American lake, to blanket Micronesia with bases and mobile forces, and to defend American interests in the region with an aggressive use of power projection and forward force posturing. Though the Soviet reports may have been only political propaganda, it would not be surprising to discover that the Soviets in 1946 perceived American military preparations and the Micronesia strategic trusteeship as preludes to offensive action or even preventive war. How else would the leadership of such a damaged nation be expected to have perceived American actions? To their credit, individuals in Pryce's office seemed to acknowledge that the reports were somewhat accurate (Pryce to Nimitz, October 8, 1946), and the State Department intelligence officers perceived that the Soviets were made nervous by American control over Micronesia, because of the islands' strategic value to any power attempting to attack the Soviet Union or project power toward northeast Asia (State Department Intelligence Memorandum OC–3443.13, n.d., p. 6).

CONCLUSION

Between 1945 and 1947, the United States largely succeeded in its attempt to establish a unilateral sphere of strategic influence in Micronesia. Although strategic trusteeship through the United Nations was a second-best solution for many military planners and civilian officials, the United States nevertheless accepted this option and succeeded in obtaining international recognition of an essentially unilateral solution to its anxieties about postwar strategic security.

For many officials, guaranteed American security meant not having to rely on the United Nations, on Great Power cooperation, and on collective security to uphold the postwar order. But even those officials who opted for the concept of collective security and for strategic trusteeship (as a sign of American committment to the United Nations) subtly demonstrated on numerous occasions that the spirit, if not the letter, of wartime Rooseveltian rhetoric about national self-determination, the efficacy of international law, and multilateral solutions to international security dilemmas were dead in the American mind. Any international agreements that were concluded were done so with the primary purpose of protecting America's international

political image and its invested capital in the United Nations, not with the purpose of demonstrating confidence in collective security concepts. Officials with backgrounds and interests as diverse as those of James Forrestal, John Foster Dulles, and Harold Ickes could all agree that what was really at stake in the postwar Pacific was the promotion of America's image as a liberal, anticolonial power while the reality of the United States as a great hegemonic power seeking to guard its selfish national interests was concealed.

We know that all nations involved in these processes exhibited a Janus-faced quality in their foreign policies, and it is easy to explain American actions once they are set in the context of interwar and wartime events. But what is most striking about American policy toward Micronesia between 1945 and 1947 is the paradoxical solution to American security anxieties. On one hand, American officials blatantly recognized that sincere international trusteeship under UN auspices would not satisfy American desires for guaranteed security in the Pacific. On the other hand, the US invention of strategic trusteeship as the answer to its anxieties was itself a subtle subversion of the American-created conception of a global collective security organization because the solution came extremely close to unilateral annexation and helped to produce a self-fulfilling prophecy about the future impotence of the United Nations.

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Reviews

Guam's Trial of the Century: News, Hegemony and Rumor in an American Colony, by Peter DeBenedittis. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1993. 183 pp, references, index. Cloth, US $55.00.

Guam's Trial of the Century is an analysis of the media coverage of former Governor Ricardo "Ricky" J. Bordallo's 1986 corruption trial written by the media advisor for Bordallo's then political rival (and now current governor), Carl Gutierrez. It is a disturbing book, not so much for its self-characterized "provocative" (p. 2) conclusions as for the liberties taken with academic analysis in their support.

The term *academic* is deliberately used here instead of *objective*—the book discusses some of the more well understood constraints on professional objectivity in the media and, by extension, in academia. DeBenedittis' (en)tangled review of this material, however, does more to obscure than advance the argument so central to his work.

To be fair, readers are told early in the piece that it will be a subjective account in which "reflexive participant observation," combined with interviews, analyses of media reports, and rumor, will reflect the "existence of discrepant meaning systems" (p. 19) and render transparent the mechanisms of hegemony in Guam media. But in DeBenedittis' hands, so-called mechanisms of participant observation inadvertently (or otherwise) centralize the position of researcher and elevate personal grievance to intellectual discourse.

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The research had, as its genesis, the antagonism DeBenedittis felt toward the Guam media over their treatment of Gutierrez during the primary election: "I had an axe to grind . . . I was angry at the media" (p. 23). Guam's larger media organizations were hostile to his project, no doubt in recognition of this. Lee Webber, the president and publisher of the *Pacific Daily News (PDN)*, went as far as to ban *PDN* staff from participating, signaling the influence personal animosity would play in research outcomes. Indeed, though DeBenedittis notes the "humbling" (p. 23) nature of the project, the *PDN* "boycott" (p. 115) remained an emotional issue:

> The only difference between myself and the *PDN* is that I have made my motives and ideology plain for all to see. But is doing so enough? Although *I* believe what I write is true, I do not pretend to be objective or unbiased. What I write is *my* point of view. My agony comes in weighing just how important it is to document the covert aspects of the news-making process. (p. 118)

It becomes the reader's agony as well. DeBenedittis argues that self-revelation is necessary for readers to understand both the process and product of research and to "know that the revelation is purposive, intentional and not merely narcissistic" (Ruby & Meyerhoff, 1982, p. 6, quoted in DeBenedittis, p. 22). The avidity with which this precept is followed in his own case, however, must be assessed in juxtaposition with the lack of information about other analytical constructs and processes.

Promisingly, rumor was charged with an important role in the analysis of Guam's "information environment . . . to fill in the gaps between what was reported by the press, claimed by officials, and believed by the community" (pp. 22–23). This is much in line with the current focus in communication research on the cultural and social contexts of mediated messages. It also recognizes the continuing vitality of indigenous Chamorro communication patterns, though DeBenedittis appears to misunderstand this (see below).

DeBenedittis' use of rumor, however, creates more gaps than it fills. To begin with, we do not learn the actual content of many rumors: what it was exactly that was "believed" by the community. We must rely on simple assertion that the "backyard barbecue talk" (p. 5) and "the talk on the streets" (p. 19) do indeed represent "discrepant meaning systems." Argument by simple assertion may be the operating principle in the political arena, but it does not make for convincing scholarship.

Second, his "community" is never clearly defined. The sources of the rumors he relates are either obscured—"the rumor mill" (pp. 8, 19, 87, 98,

109, 111, 144, 148, 169–171)—or they seem to be derived from the narrow world of elite politics: "some Democratic insiders . . . at various political rallies" (p. 5). Readers do not have to be overly enamored with quantitative methodology to wonder whether DeBenedittis' opportunity sample includes people on the military bases and in the villages, in addition to GovGuam bureaucrats. As determined as he is to lay his own biases bare, DeBenedittis is curiously haphazard in providing the information needed to convince readers that his observations do reflect those of a "community."

Without this information, we have no way to contextualize his findings with regard to the media–community relationship. For example, DeBenedittis "found" that in the trial coverage generally, the prosecution's case was advantaged. By the time the defense was covered in the media, "the court of public opinion has repeated[ly] heard news reports suggesting guilt. Only the most open-minded will not have rendered a guilty verdict" (p. 132). Recent events in another "celebrity trial" (p. 131), that of O. J. Simpson, show public opinion to be more volatile and complex than postulated in this scenario.

Another significant gap in the research concerns Bordallo himself, who refused to be interviewed. His stated suspicion that DeBenedittis' political agenda would affect research outcomes appears fulfilled in DeBenedittis' interview with trial prosecutor K. William O'Connor:

> Researcher [DeBenedittis]: A lot of people in the Gutierrez camp think [crossover sympathy votes] knocked them out of the primary. What do you say to them? What do you say to the people, who were innocent bystanders who were running against the man who turned this indictment, at least momentarily, perhaps to his advantage? (p. 101)

O'Connor also spent much of the interview refuting the conspiracy theories presented to him by DeBenedittis. Similary, though most of the journalists emphasized the factual nature of news reporting, DeBenedittis persisted in trying to force an admission of deliberate bias in editorial policy:

> Researcher [DeBenedittis]: Well, what I'm really driving at Karl, is something happened so that Ricky was framed, so that he was positioned, he was referred to in a manner. Something happened. Can you elaborate on the process?
>
> Cates: Well sure, he was indicted. (p. 130)

Evidence of editorial intervention was a central preoccupation for DeBenedittis because he believes that "ordinary" people do not "self-con-

sciously" (p. 17) evaluate media messages: "criticisms are cited to build a framework for defensive news consumption . . . [to] give people who consume news the ability to use news in ways that can be more enriching for them and society" (p. 25). Chamorro informants Catherine Sablan Gault and Robert Underwood provide evidence, however, that ordinary people have managed to assess, and dismiss, Guam news media as critically wanting, without the benefit of DeBenedittis' paternal intervention. Gault tells of how Chamorros rely on the "age-old system of transmitting the news . . . word of mouth" for a "deeper understanding of the news" (p. 96), and Underwood opined that non-Chamorro media owners and journalists "are really not very influential to the average person. They [the average people] really don't pay attention" (p. 170).

The example highlights the central failure of the book: Although DeBenedittis identifies the "clash of cultures" (p. 16) as the underlying issue of the trial, his treatment of Chamorro culture is systematically skewed throughout. And though he might argue that this reflects the partiality of his perspective, it is important to note how that perspective operates within colonial parameters.

First, analytical structure: DeBenedittis takes the position that the case is a "rare" (p. 16) lens for viewing hegemony because it involved a struggle *between* "power blocs comprising the ruling structure" (p. 16)—the governor of Guam versus the US Department of Justice—rather than between the ruling class and the subjugated classes or groups, or both. It is difficult to classify Chamorro politicians, even governors, as part of the "ruling structure" of colonial Guam. As a territory, Guam's political system is by definition *structured* on subjugation. To miscast a Chamorro politician in this way, particularly one identified as a Chamorro nationalist, is a serious analytical error.

Second, fetishization of culture: DeBenedittis offers an admission in partial evidence of his "understanding" vis-à-vis his "subjective relationship" (p. 22) to Guam culture: "I am not a Chamorro, though I have lived in and loved Guam for eight years" (p. 23). This permutation of the "Hawaiian-at-heart" phenomenon has been deconstructed by Pacific Island scholarship as a violent discourse of native disenfranchisement. In essence, it rationalizes the continued US occupation of native land by obscuring the fundamental source of the right to that land—race—through the fetishization of culture. DeBenedittis' statement, then, demonstrates a clear misunderstanding of the true nature of his "subjective relationship" with Guam.

Third, use of Chamorro "voices": Only four Chamorros were interviewed at length, and a mere 6 of the approximately 175 written sources listed in the references, are Chamorro (5 of these being Underwood; notable omissions include Carano & Sanchez, 1964; Gault, 1983; and Taitano, 1983). Though these are often quoted at length, he does not demonstrate an intellectual flexibility with the insights he is provided. For example, the hegemony chapter reads like a series of book reviews organized by colonial imperative. The seminal work on the topic by Robert Underwood (1981), which I had assumed the DeBenedittis thesis would internalize and extend when I read of it in abstract, is sandwiched, in cannibalized form, between reviews of Euro-American scholarship on theory and practice and Euro-American scholarship on crime and trial coverage. Stuart Hall's and Todd Gitlin's names are used as the subtitles for the sections in which their work is discussed. By comparison, Underwood's classic discussion of the "Channel Islands" effect appears under the subtitle "A Guamanian View"—adding "color," as it were.

DeBenedittis does structure his "frame analysis" (p. 83) on Underwood's five possible "lessons" to be learned from the Bordallo trial, but he then relegates most analysis of the Chamorro perspective of proceedings to a separate chapter. Many points raised in this scholarly apartheid contribute directly to arguments advanced in the earlier chapters, a phenomenon reinforced on at least two occasions with the phrase "As reported in [previous chapters]" (pp. 144–145)].

Finally, fatal impact theory: As applied by DeBenedittis to the entangled media culture of Guam, hegemony theory internalizes a persistent theme identified by Diaz (1994, p. 29) as the "precarious cultural position of the Chamorro" that historically has been embraced by "a whole parade of foreign observers" self-charged with the "heroic labor" (p. 30) of recording Chamorro culturalisms. In this book, we see DeBenedittis functioning as the "new" folklorist, no longer recording the traditional discourses of Chamorro autonomy but those of the academy.

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Understanding Law in Micronesia: An Interpretive Approach to Transplanted Law, by Brian Z. Tamanaha. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993. viii + 214 pp, bibliography, index. Paper, US $48.75.

Brian Z. Tamanaha was an assistant attorney general in Yap from 1986 to 1988. He also served as a staff attorney for a couple of months during part of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) Constitutional Convention held in 1990 in Pohnpei, the capital of the FSM.

Despite his rather limited background in the FSM, Tamanaha has published more words of academic legal commentary concerning law in the FSM than has any other author. His first two writings were law review articles (1988, 1989). His recent book, *Understanding Law in Micronesia,* is based on his Juris Doctor thesis (1992) of the same title. He has also written an article (1993) drawn almost entirely from a portion of this book.

Tamanaha is sending increasingly radical and divisive messages to Micronesians. His first article reflected his infatuation with customs and traditions but seemed essentially harmless. His second called for "a more Micronesian law" (1989, p. 114) and for American judges to be replaced by Micronesians who would do what they think is "right" (p. 109), notwithstanding that this might require overriding the FSM Constitution, statutes, and even their own prior decisions (pp. 109–113).

Now, in *Understanding Law in Micronesia,* he concludes that to create a system of justice suitable for themselves, Micronesians must create a

"vacuum of knowledge" (p. 195) by excluding from participation all US-trained lawyers, Micronesian and American alike. He also advocates dismantling the "state legal system" (p. 196), which, I take it, would require setting aside all constitutions, statutes, and everything else Micronesians have done in the name of self-government over the past 30 years.

Tamanaha begins the book in a rather homey albeit trendy way. He tells us "stories." The first is of a 30-day field trip (a "good old fashioned political junket," he says; p. 20) he took, in August 1987, in his role as a new assistant attorney general in Yap. His other stories are about judges—two about Micronesian state court judges (former Yap Chief Justice John Tharngan and Pohnpei Associate Justice Judah Johnny)—and about opinions I wrote in my former capacity as chief justice of the FSM Supreme Court. My failure to address those stories at length here should not be taken as an indication of agreement either with Tamanaha's statements or with his understandings of the lessons to be learned from those stories. As Tamanaha admits, these stories "do not fit into a wonderfully coherent and comprehensive package" (p. 74). Indeed, the stories do not produce any coherent conclusions that support anything else in the book. They are interesting but not necessarily accurate.

The stories are followed by some 100 pages (pp. 76–175) of laborious and portentous discussions and ruminations about various strains of sociological and anthropological thought, law, and judging. Although the topics are inherently interesting, his discourse is unfocused and seems unnecessarily esoteric, being laced with terms such as "intersubjective legal communities" (p. 111), "internal legal attitude" (p. 115), and "intersubjectivity" (p. 116).

This section also fails to produce any coherent and comprehensive package. Tamanaha draws no clear conclusion. His primary concern, however, is with the Westernization of the legal system in Micronesia, and most of what he says in these pages are obvious truths. The continuing and growing themes in Tamanaha's writings are that (a) Americans and Micronesians have different backgrounds and that those differences in background cause them to look at the world in different ways; (b) legal training—at least US legal training—compounds the problem by causing people to think even more differently, especially considering legal issues; and (c) the major involvement of Americans and US-law-trained Micronesians in the legal system of the FSM has caused the system to be more Western, and less traditionally and locally based, than it should be. Going beyond that, Tamanaha concludes that American attorneys and judges, and now even

Micronesian attorneys who have been trained in the United States, are inherently incapable of responding to legal issues in ways that will be relevant to the legally untrained intersubjective community in the FSM. Given to stereotyping and generalizations, he assumes that all such persons will unfailingly disserve the needs of Micronesia, especially as to matters of custom and tradition.

Tamanaha suggests two possible courses of action for the FSM. The first option, what he calls the "simplest strategy," would be to "foster the development of an intersubjective legal community made up of members not trained in the US legal tradition" (p. 195). How would one do that?

> Exclusion of U.S. trained lawyers, expatriate as well as Micronesian, from participation as members in the legal system would be a necessary aspect of this strategy, thereby creating a vacuum of knowledge and eliminating the existing assemblage which insures continuity with the U.S. legal tradition. (p. 195)

This "vacuum of knowledge," Tamanaha opines, would produce wondrous results.

> Automatically, this would result in a break from the existing legal meaning system, even if all the laws on the books remain the existing body of transplanted laws. These laws on the books would simply take on different meanings, internally consistent within the new legal meaning system of the new intersubjective legal community, though far different from how they are now interpreted. (p. 195)

For readers fearful that exclusion of US-trained lawyers might be insufficient to restore the requisite Micronesian purity, Tamanaha suggests a "more extreme strategy" (p. 196).

> Elimination of the state legal system—by dissolving the complex of actions currently organized by the common response—would automatically end the autonomy of law from the social community. Neither the figurations of the state legal system nor the intersubjective legal community would thereafter exist to be autonomous. (p. 196)

This elimination of the state system, according to Tamanaha, should pose no problems Micronesians could not handle with aplomb.

> As legal pluralists insist, Micronesians would not then be left with a lawless society; their system for the maintenance of normative order just would not be organized in its current form as the state legal system. That particular social configuration would be eliminated. (p. 196)

Lest this seem excessive, Tamanaha assures us "This strategy might not be as radical as it sounds. Almost no difference would be felt on places like Ifaluk" (p. 196).

Tamanaha tends to focus on theory; he does not long linger on the facts. Thus he does not furnish even one example of how he believes these new and "different meanings" (p. 195) would ameliorate things in the FSM. He says nothing about what would become of the US-trained Micronesian lawyers, the Micronesian judges who have been exposed to Western thought, or the rest of government, let alone the implications of his suggestions for unity, economic development, or health care in Micronesia, or for relations with the rest of the world.

The theories Tamanaha advances are radical, potentially disastrous ones. No responsible person would put forward such proposals without great caution and introspection. This book, however, reflects no such thoroughness.

The book bristles with typographical errors. In this day of computers and spell-checking programs, the frequent appearance of misspellings and ungrammatical sentences is unsettling. Lack of concern with accuracy inevitably goes beyond form, affecting substance as well. If there is any theory under which one should give special credence to anything Tamanaha says about Micronesia, it would be that even his relatively short stint in a small part of the FSM at least gave him the opportunity to observe at first hand the realities of the legal system there. (As Tamanaha puts it, "The validity of my assertions depend [*sic*] upon my ability for acute observation, and to engage in critical self-reflection as to the sources of and influences upon my observations"; p. 103.) Thus it is especially disturbing that when he attempts to lay out the basic information upon which his theories are based, he has so many things wrong.

For example, in attempting to describe what he identifies later as the "intersubjective legal community" (p. 111), he tells the reader "Currently, there are six FSM citizens with degrees from U.S. law schools" (p. 128). He then correctly identifies the four Yapese graduates and the Speaker of the FSM Congress, but any person who had lived in Yap for a while would know of these five. More significant is that Tamanaha overlooked Wesley Simina or Maketo Robert, of Chuuk, and Bueleen Carl and Martin Jano, of Pohnpei, all of whom graduated in 1991 or before then.

In a footnote, University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) graduates are dismissed as irrelevant: "A couple of other Micronesians have studied law at the University of Papua New Guinea, but to date none have passed the

FSM Bar Exam" (p. 28). This is wrong too. At least six FSM citizens graduated from that law school. One, Delson Ehmes, was already practicing law when the FSM courts were established and has continued to do so since then. Two UPNG graduates, Joses Gallon and Joseph Philip (the national public defender), passed the bar exam a few years ago. Still another, Wanis Simina, has been a Chuuk State Court justice for several years. Two other state court justices, Pohnpei Chief Justice Edwel Santos and Kosrae Justice Harry Skilling, attended the UPNG law school for shorter times.

In describing another "significant body among legal actors" (p. 30), he says "Trial counselors do not appear in the national court, kept out by a bar exam which so far no non-lawyer has passed" (p. 30). Here too he is wrong. Non-lawyer trial counselors are allowed by court rule to appear and do appear in the national court under the supervision of admitted attorneys. Moreover, Tamanaha apparently is unaware that Camillo Noket, a long-time trial counselor with Micronesian Legal Services Corporation and now the FSM attorney general, was a trial counselor who gained admission to the bar by passing the bar exam in 1989. Matt Mix in Pohnpei also passed the exam as a trial counselor. In recent years, several more Micronesian trial counselors have passed the bar examination and have been admitted to practice as attorneys.

In describing state court judges, he says "They handle a range of cases, mostly involving uncomplicated criminal and civil matters" (pp. 30–31). This is so glaringly wrong that one must suspect Tamanaha of being disingenuous in an attempt to bolster his contention that the legal system in the FSM has essentially been placed in the hands of expatriates. The highest state courts in the FSM have always had the same broad civil jurisdiction that state supreme courts have in the United States. In 1992, pursuant to constitutional amendment, they were also given criminal jurisdiction comparable to that of the state courts in the United States.

Whatever may be the reason for these pervasive factual errors, it is apparent that Tamanaha does not know his "intersubjective legal communities" (p. 111). Nor is custom his strong point. In his discussion of *Tammed v. FSM* (1990), Tamanaha states that "Under Yapese custom these beatings were an appropriate community response" (p. 69). Actually, this point was disputed, and the appellate panel remanded the case so that the very question might be considered. After hearing evidence on the point, the trial court did not find either beating to have been in conformity with custom.

Disdain for the facts even taints Tamanaha's most serious and basic criticism of FSM Supreme Court decisions: that the Court has given undue

emphasis to committee reports and constitutional language. Central to his entire notion that the FSM Constitution and, therefore, the FSM legal system are something of a sham, is his conviction that committee reports were prepared by expatriate staff and that Micronesians had little comprehension of anything said there. In dismissing the *Alaphonso v. FSM* (1982) analysis, he says "The Committee Report Judge King referred to in his opinion was written by Expatriate legal counsel to the Convention" (p. 60). In truth, the Civil Liberties Report was not prepared by an expatriate but by a US-trained Micronesian attorney, Arthur Ngiraklsong, who is now chief justice of the Republic of Palau.

For Tamanaha so lightly to toss aside decisions made by Micronesians in their nation building efforts over many years requires a heavy dose of paternalism. Tamanaha has an ample supply of it and a great capacity to disregard, as ignorant and misguided, decisions made by Micronesians.

For example, one of his stories in this book is about a decision written by Pohnpei State Supreme Court Justice Judah Johnny (*Pohnpei State v. Hawk,* 1986). Tamanaha notes that Justice Johnny determined the meaning of a particular provision of the Pohnpei State Constitution by comparing the English and Pohnpei versions and then taking both into consideration in construing the meaning of the clause. Judge Johnny's opinion is well written and reveals the author's thinking as the reasoning proceeded from step to step. Yet Tamanaha says that "A U.S. judge would not have been led to this outcome" (p. 54). This conclusion is not particularly objectionable on an academic level, for Tamanaha attempts to support his conclusion with reasons. What is telling and offensive, however, is Tamanaha's casual speculation that Judge Johnny "did not even perceive the dilemma" (p. 53) he was facing.

In discussing the case of *Tammed v. FSM* (1990), Tamanaha cannot explain why Chief Justice Tharngan, sitting on a panel of the FSM Supreme Court, joined in the opinion, which Tamanaha dislikes. Tamanaha therefore concludes that Judge Tharngan did not understand the implications of the decision. As a member of that panel, I can say that the three judges agonized over the case and spent almost three full days, well into the evening of two, discussing the case and its implications from every angle. For Tamanaha to assume that Judge Tharngan did not understand the ruling underestimates both Judge Tharngan and the integrity of the judicial process that produced that decision.

To reach the conclusions he does, Tamanaha must go beyond saying that the Micronesian judges do not understand what they are doing. He must also undermine the credibility of the constitution and the nation building

effort itself. In discussing the *Alaphonso v. FSM* (1982) decision, he ridicules as "embarassingly [*sic*] false" (p. 59) the Court's reference to the delegates to the Micronesian Constitutional Convention as "framers" (p. 59) whose intentions could be discerned by looking at the words selected and the explanations in the committee reports. According to Tamanaha, the Micronesian convention delegates had no real understanding of the import of the words in the constitution. Moreover, he would disregard the committee reports under his mistaken assumption that all were written by expatriates. The constitutional process inevitably was a challenging, perhaps even somewhat strange, one. The delegates, representing many language groups, were not able to work in their indigenous languages. More than that, the legal and political histories that the constitutional words represent were often foreign to them. But Tamanaha's denigration of the process tells more about his own paternalistic assumptions than about the process itself.

The Micronesian Constitutional Convention, held in Saipan, was a historic and exciting event. I lived in Saipan at the time, and my wife, Joan King, covered the convention as a reporter for the *Pacific Daily News* and a stringer for the *Washington Post.* Both of us knew and spoke with many of the delegates and convention staff, all of whom were deeply engaged in the building of a nation. From July 12, 1975, until the convention adopted the proposed constitution on November 8, 1975, there were numerous committee meetings, decisions, reports, actions, and floor debates. Much of the two-volume journal of the Micronesian Constitutional Convention, comprising more than 1,000 pages, is devoted to floor debates of the delegates themselves. Tamanaha also underestimates the interplay among the delegates and the staff. Many of the staff were former Peace Corps and legal service attorneys who had lived in Micronesia and were committed to Micronesian self-determination and self-government. Also, many staff members were Micronesians.

Tamanaha's basic point—that Micronesian reliance on American models and US-trained attorneys and judges may profoundly affect the basic nature of the system itself and ultimately the people and their values and their ways of life—is surely correct. It is also true that the FSM and state constitutions and national and state statutes and many court decisions are Western based and that this is due in considerable part to Micronesian reliance on Western-trained attorneys. But this Westernization is also grounded in historical factors, in experience and training, and in the current needs of a new nation attempting to develop a unified system of government and a climate favorable to economic development.

Today, if Tamanaha wants to find the source of the Westernization he decries, he should look beyond those few Micronesian attorneys trained in the United States. Some persons in the Federated States of Micronesia undoubtedly would be interested in attempting to restore life as it might have been today if no one from across the reef had arrived on their shores. But I fear Tamanaha has been too impressed by his trip to the Yap Outer Islands.

For good or for ill, what is best for Micronesia no longer can be measured by whether it will fly in Ifalik. The great majority of the citizens of the FSM live on the major islands—Kosrae, Pohnpei, Yap, and within the Chuuk Lagoon. Many untitled persons are fearful of being relegated to the protections available under customary law and procedures. Many people in Micronesia now drive motorboats and pickup trucks. They use electricity. Many have VCRs and cable TV. They eat rice and drink beer. Spam, corned beef, and turkey tails are all now decidedly more Micronesian than American. When illness strikes, they seek assistance from medical people who have received training in Western methods of treatment. Many are medevacked to Hawai'i or Guam for further treatment. So it is with schooling too. Micronesians understandably want their children to learn English so that they can learn about the rest of the world, draw upon the knowledge and information there, and perhaps attend American universities.

It has become as true for Micronesians as for the rest of us that, as Pogo says, "We have met the enemy and he is us."

In a place where Westernization is pervasive in daily lives, in goods consumed, in the institutions of government, in the systems of education and health care, and in aspirations for economic development, it would be anomalous and truly remarkable for the legal system to stand alone, pristine, wholly customary and untouched by Western thought or value.

So let Tamanaha try to emulate the Khmer Rouge. Let him advocate dismantling the state legal system in an effort to create a pure Micronesian system of justice in an "intersubjective legal community" otherwise pervaded by Western products and concepts. Perhaps if he were successful, then he would finally grasp that Westernization of the legal system in Micronesia has come from the Micronesians themselves and is in the interests of many—and that it is their choice to make.

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The Business of Marriage: Transformations in Oceanic Matrimony, edited by Richard A. Marksbury. Pittsburgh and London: University of Pittsburgh Press (ASAO Monograph No. 14), 1993. x + 265 pp, maps, tables, references. Cloth, US $49.95; paper, US $19.95.

In the introductory chapter Richard A. Marksbury prepares us for the major themes of this book, noting that "the cultural dissimilarities found within Oceania are less important than the unifying principle of the region's rapid entry into a decolonized worldwide society" (p. 5). When applied to marriage, parallelism is to be expected among the examples presented, despite disparate traditions. We expect to find in the studies that intrusion of a cash economy will be found to be the "most significant factor acting upon traditional prescribed patterns of marriage" (p. 11). Marksbury sets the stage further by outlining the chief changes in Oceanic marriage, including delay in age at marriage, money used for personal rather than redistributional purposes, changing male–female roles, decreased stability, the incurring of debt to meet marriage payment demands, and increased independence in choice of partner. He also indicates that the effects of

urbanization will be found to be crucial, especially with regard to the diminished role of kinship.

Achsah Carrier considers the marriage practices of the people of Ponam Island, just off the north coast of Manus. Here, a long history of migrant labor beginning in German times has led to frequent absences of men and promoted enhancement of the economic role of women. The younger men, through the power of their cash earnings, have weakened the control over marriage enjoyed earlier by village headmen. By the 1980s a shift had occurred from the complementary exchanges formerly practiced between bride's and groom's kin to asymmetrical presentation on the part of the groom and his kin. This practice amounted to extraction of wealth from the migrant men. Attendant to these factors was the disappearance of arranged marriages, changes in bride-price, and the introduction of new, and disappearance of old, prestations.

In his study of the Telefolmin, Dan Jorgensen traces the effects of the introduction and expansion of cash into bridewealth payments. Extensive use of shells as payments shifted to their approximation in value of steel tools; later, cash began to be used directly. Eventually the use of cash resulted in the actual commensurability of brides with cash. With the imposition of Australian law, which declared freedom of marital choice for women, together with the preference for nonlocal men because of their cash earnings, patterns of sister exchange and local exogamy broke down. The convertibility of cash escalated bridewealth and brought great pressure on the earnings of younger men.

Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi explores how the advent of cash commercialized marriage in another New Guinea society, the Gende. For this group cash entered the economy after 1950, and by the 1960s the presence of mining companies and coffee growing in the vicinity stimulated an emigration of young men for labor purposes. After that, few men were permanent residents in the villages. Those who worked provided a flow of cash, but their absence brought on added burdens for the women. These were occasioned by the practice that required women to work to pay back the bride-price that earlier was provided by the groom and his kin. Another result of the inflow of cash was that, with the accompanying rise in bride-price, many men refused to marry or otherwise evaded payments. Women left the villages in search of wealthy husbands, though not all were successful, and some who were, were mistreated. Some women chose spinsterhood, and later age at marriage become more common.

The status of women in New Guinea under conditions of change—a question the preceding studies dealt with at least tangentially—is the focus of Susan M. Pflanz-Cook's study of the Manga. She argues that the status of women improved between 1961 and 1981 with the enactment of legislation favoring women's choice in marriage, an inflation of bride-price due to cash inflow, missionary condemnation of polygyny, and the availability to cash income for women. She supports this thesis by applying Sanday's measurement of indicators of female autonomy.

The final chapter on New Guinea by Pamela Rosi and Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi focuses on the situation of an educated elite in Port Moresby, where migration from outer regions has concentrated large numbers of people. The authors' methodology involved extensive interviews and the projective techniques of analyzing poetry, lyrics, and sketches. The results show the ascendancy of romantic love as the chief motive for marriage, and the case histories show that both men and women among the educated elite have significant conflicts and frustrations. These include struggles against the burden of bride-price and resistance to it by both sexes, the preference for ethnically exogamous marriages, and conflicts between career and marriage on the part of the women.

In the first of two Micronesian studies, Suzanne Falgout gives an outline of Pohnpei society, with its emphasis on titles, and the role of matrilineality in the arrangement of marriage to capture and keep titles within the female line. Nineteenth-century changes included liaisons between Pohnpei women and European men that created powerful allies and economic benefits for chiefs. Later, during German times, the disruption of matrilineal inheritance of land and a decline of matrilineality in general weakened the role of women as mothers. Still later, with the increased participation of women in the cash economy, their position was redefined as wives and as important contributors to family economies.

Sherwood G. Lingenfelter, with a team of Yapese co-workers, studied male–female relations in Yap. He notes a shift in patterns of courtship from formerly balanced gift giving between the principals to an unbalanced situation brought on by cash earnings of men. Today rental cars, guitars, and beer are essentials for courtship. These are usually supplied by men, who expect sexual gratification in return.

In marriage itself, the former greater economic contribution of Yapese women through their vegetable production is now supplanted by the purchasing power of wage earning men. Surveys were done on the balance of power in marriage, and an assessment was made both of wives and husbands

by their mates. On the basis of these and other relevant data, Lingenfelter concluded that men are now "in a more dominant position in marital economic exchanges" (p. 172) than was formerly the case.

Indo-Fijian marriage is explored by Shireen Lateef. Some early changes were apparent in colonial times, which affected marriage practices as they had been known in India. Among these changes were the breakdown of the caste system, long-term failure of authorities to recognize marriages performed by Muslim or Hindu priests, and separation of husband and wife by employment. Later other powerful forces, including urbanization and the intrusion of Western values, put further strains on the system. Nevertheless, Lateef contends that "traditional forms of marriage are not totally disappearing" (p. 205). Among new forms are the "arranged love marriage," in which discovered liaisons are legitimized by arrangements between the families concerned; "love marriage," which was still restricted by considerations of race and religion; and "bureau marriage," which retains the tradition of separation of the prospective spouses until shortly before marriage.

In setting the stage for his study of Samoan marriage in Hawai'i, Robert W. Franco discusses traditional forms on the home islands, which involved elaborate exchanges featuring highly valued mats and the establishment of political alliances and hypergamy. Since cash has entered the arrangement of marriage, interaction has increased between American Samoa and Western Samoa, with people from the latter islands supplying mats in exchange for American money. Movement to Hawai'i has led to an increase in the number of families headed by females, the breakdown of parental control over the young, and to interethnic marriage, the last of which involves the complication of the non-Samoan spouse resisting demands to contribute support to the kin of the Samoan spouse. Hawai'i forms a central position in the network of Samoan migrations, which span the Pacific from New Zealand and Australia to the US mainland. This network insures that intraethnic marriage of Samoans will continue despite the increase in ethnic exogamy.

The final chapter of the book contains Martha C. Ward's summary conclusions. She sees class consciousness as becoming more important than kin consciousness. She also supports the notion of marriage as a business in her apparent defense of arranged marriage. Bride-price is presented as a tyrannical practice that treats women as commodities. The liberation of women from generally oppressing situations comes through employment in the cash economy and in interethnic marriages in Oceania. Marriage will become secularized, a separation of parenting from marriage will occur, the

number of female-headed families will increase, and there will be less control over sexual activity through a decrease in kin intervention. Family planning will be more widely practiced and, with the increase in wage earning among women, there will be more single women and women with children. We will also begin to see homosexual marriages. Ward predicts that marriages in Oceania will "also grow to resemble those in suburban New Jersey" (p. 262).

The Pan-Oceanic representativeness of the book might be questioned. Five of the nine studies come from New Guinea. None of the rest of Melanesia is represented. There are two from Micronesia and only one Polynesian example. For each of the latter two areas, only high islands are studied. Perhaps the great emphasis on New Guinea does highlight the theme expressed in the title, *The Business of Marriage.* The emphasis on presentations by the groom's family (usually reciprocated) found on that large island conforms to some degree to Western notions of business. Moreover, with the injection of cash into such practices, the Western conception of marriage as a business transaction is enhanced. In this regard Jorgensen has stressed the difference between bride-price, as gift exchange, and bride-wealth, or commodity exchange, in referring to the entry of money into transactions, though only Marksbury among the other authors favors the latter term. Given the resistance being shown to such payments, they may be on their way out of favor. This trend, together with the decline of arranged marriages, seems to weaken conceptions of Oceanic marriage as business. On the other hand, several of the authors have argued that, even under conditions of the ascendancy of romantic love as the expressed motive for marriage, considerations of income employment, education, and shared values also enter into the choices of mates.

The back-cover description of the book's contents did not prepare me for the concern with the relative statuses of men and women that is exhibited. Although only two of the chapters, those by Pflanz-Cook and Lingenfelter, specifically address this topic, relative status is featured in several of the other chapters. In the former two cases, systematic treatment is given, and neither author can be accused of employing a perspective that can be attributed to sex bias. Neither can such bias be supposed in Lateef's Indo-Fijian study. In this case the well-known traditions of both Muslim and Hindu cultures clearly restrict the activities of women and regulate their role in marriage. In other examples, however, I am less sure of freedom from such bias.

The contrasting conclusions of Pflanz-Cook and Lingenfelter point to real variations in the matter of gender statuses and thus run counter to the

convergence of marriage customs in Oceania, as expressed by Marksbury and Ward. Can we also expect significant variation within such more compact cultural regions as New Guinea? Consider the contrasting portrayals of wife beating for that island. Rosi and Zimmer-Tamakoshi see a recent increase in the practice that is related to excessive alcohol consumption. The other picture is that of Pflanz-Cook, who features wife beating as a time-honored practice among the Manga, and that under conditions of recent change husband beating is equally frequent.

Then there are such statements as "women used to be fattened up before courtship rituals just as the pigs were before festivals" (p. 252), and "the real work of marriage, whether in the Pacific, or elsewhere, is done by women" (p. 254). Other statements are less blatant, but I come away with the feeling that other readers will see as I do that in some of the chapters women are more favorably presented and their problems regarded as more poignant than those of men. Regardless of this overemphasis on gender statuses and a possible lack of objectivity in some of the treatment, the contributions made by the case histories, projective approaches, interviews, questionnaires, and the general field observations that are employed in the book have produced a body of data that enriches our understanding of marriage in Oceania, especially under conditions of change.

This book has been a long time in gestation. Conception occurred at a meeting of the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania in 1984 and then, following through the multitiered procedures of that organization, it became a symposium topic at the 1987 meeting of that organization. Not only has this cumbersome process delayed appearance of the studies, but also another 7 years ensued before the book has become available. Anthropologists who participate in such a long-term process from submission to monitoring, refereeing, and editing do so at considerable disadvantage in the highly competitive arena of career advancement. There is also the problem of delaying access to important material for use in comparative studies. On the positive side, undoubted advantage inheres in having a set of papers on a single topic collected in one volume.

Although some of the field research was carried out before the period of preparation for this volume began, other material is the product of ongoing research; one chapter includes fieldwork done as recently as 1991. This sort of continuing research has the merit of keeping the material fresh, an especially important factor in treating a topic of such dynamic character as is represented in this collection. Such devotion to long-term field research has become a hallmark of anthropologists working in Oceania and one that

may well be emulated by others carrying out research elsewhere in the world.

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Diplomas and Thatch Houses: Asserting Tradition in a Changing Micronesia, by Juliana Flinn. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. viii + 187 pp, table, notes, references, index. Cloth, US $32.50.

Diplomas, which signify participation in the world of schools, here stand for change, while *thatch houses,* signifying perpetuation of a local adaptation, stand for tradition. Those doing the *asserting* are the people of Pulap, one of the Western Islands in Chuuk State, Federated States of Micronesia. Juliana Flinn's ethnography elaborates the interconnections among these three as it explores some of the ways in which the Pulap people talk about themselves and others. In this exploration Flinn draws on the notion of cultural identity, especially as it is worked out in Linnekin and Poyer's important edited volume *Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific* (1990).

Cultural identity is meant to subsume ethnicity, and in so doing demotes that potent term from social scientific concept to folk knowledge too tainted by Western folk beliefs about biology and group identity to be eligible for the scholarly status usually assigned to it. With its assumptions about the necessity of belief in shared descent (whether genetically accurate or not), ethnicity just does not work well when applied to many Oceanic societies, even though it has proven extremely useful in the analysis of American and other Western societies.

The contrast between Western and Pacific assumptions has been framed as a contrast between Darwinian (cultural identity is in the blood) and Lamarckian (cultural identity is acquired) models of relationship and identity (Watson, 1990). This is an attractive metaphor and it is heuristically useful. For example, a Micronesian college student from an island similar in many ways to Pulap once told me, after working his way through the Linnekin and

Poyer volume (1990), that when he returned home and ran for political office he was going to make an issue of the way some people were beginning to talk about denying full membership in the community to those who had a parent from somewhere else. "I'm going to tell them that this Darwinian way of thinking is wrong and that they need to go back to Lamarck." Later he came to see that requiring all eligible voters to master Linnekin and Poyer was probably impractical and that his platform would have to be phrased in more concrete terms. But he had put his finger on a real issue: He was right that this was a relatively new way of talking about people's identity, and he was also right that it was very painful for those who suddenly found themselves threatened with ouster from full membership on the basis of that new way of talking.

The Pulap people apparently did not talk this way during the period covered by this book (from the mid-1970s to 1989). Instead, we are told that "who was born Pulapese and who was not born Pulapese are not pressing questions" (p. 5). Why do people in a given community choose one way rather than another to talk about the acquisition of cultural identity? This is an important question, with significant implications for the politics of modernity and tradition in Micronesia and elsewhere. Juliana Flinn's book can take us a good part of the way to its answer; however, it cannot take us all the way.

The observation that this book does not provide the basis for a comprehensive understanding of why a people should begin to replace Lamarckian conceptions of cultural identity with more Darwinian notions does not mean that it is a book without merit—far from it. But it does reveal some important limitations of this volume and the mode of analysis it so well exemplifies.

Despite her manifest familiarity with the ins and outs of recent Pulap history and what must be her close acquaintance with many of the members of this small population (based on a tour as a Peace Corps Volunteer followed by a stint of ethnographic research and then several follow-up visits), Flinn's description and analysis do not often reflect the contextual complexities that provide the settings for what might be called the changing ecology of self in Micronesia. The use of the ethnographic present, exemplified in the statement that questions about who was and who was not born Pulap "are not pressing," belies the ever-changing nature of this dimension of social reality. Not only does this usage make it difficult if not impossible to determine the stability of any particular feature of cultural knowledge in the way the Pulap think of themselves, but it also makes it equally hard to place Flinn's Pulap

into a frame that can encompass other Micronesian societies, including Pulaps of the past and Pulaps yet to be. Furthermore, this synchronic descriptive strategy even subverts what I take to be one of the book's main arguments.

Flinn points out that the markers of identity used by the Pulap people "concern customs Pulapese label traditional, but it is the contrast that is critical, not the extent to which customs truly replicate the past" (p. 127). Before assessing the plausibility of so relativistic and semiotic an understanding of a people's judgments about themselves and others, some sense of the temporal context out of which it arises is, I think, necessary.

To be fair, in several of her chapters she does set her descriptions in the particularities of the time and place where she made her observations. But more often than not the reader is offered timeless descriptions of what must be, by their very nature, time-bound cultural phenomena. Furthermore, most of the descriptions of Pulap conceptions of identity are offered (as descriptions of cultural knowledge of persons so often are) as coherent and consistent and uniformly present. The production of this cultural knowledge, its distribution across the social landscape, and its deployment in action, political and otherwise, are not described.

For example, Flinn claims that the Pulap people use tradition and their fidelity to it in order to make claims about their right to take part in contemporary Micronesian affairs (p. 138). But we are not told to whom or against whom those claims are made, nor by whom (which particular Pulap individual), nor to what consequence. Without that information, and having been told that the Pulap people came late to the table of modernity, readers are left to wonder if perhaps all those reported claims to moral superiority based on "traditional" dress and comportment might not be just sour grapes—or perhaps I should say sour coconuts. Because Flinn does not do much more than assert that the Pulap assert tradition, such questions are bound to arise.

It is interesting to read that the Pulap people resist "internal colonialism" (p. 156) by denigrating Chuuk Lagoon residents, but it would be useful to know just how successful that resistance has been. Perhaps it serves important psychic needs, helping people to struggle against the ultimate in internal colonialism, the colonization of the consciousness. Even to consider such an issue, though, would require learning much more about Pulap inner worlds and their relation to action than the book provides. Unfortunately, with the exception of a brief mention of "self-esteem" (p. 161), the model

of the person Flinn uses seems fairly indistinguishable from a Skinnerian black box. This is particularly frustrating because she must know many of the Pulap people very well, given the substantial time she has spent living with the members of this small community.

On the other hand, if, as she claims, the denigration of Chuuk Lagoon residents is a strategy for "eluding economic and political domination by others in Chuuk, and achieving a respected position for themselves" (p. 156), we can only ask: Has it worked? What is the response of those so denigrated? Again we are left with neither an answer provided by the author nor a way to begin constructing one for ourselves.

Flinn specifies in great detail the contrasts that her Pulap informants drew between themselves and other Micronesians, especially people from the other Western Islands and the other outlying islands of Chuuk as well as Chuuk itself. However, this Pulap view is the only one we are shown. In other words, all the stereotypes are one-sided. We do not have Hall Island versions of Pulap identity, for example, or Lagoon versions of Western Islanders; nor do we have much sense of how people who have formed kin or marriage ties across these bounded stereotypes cope with the contradictions that intimacy invariably poses to cultural knowledge of the "other."

With all the recent attention given to the relation between anthropology and the "other," it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the "other" also has others. When culturally constituted conceptions of the self are expressed (as Flinn demonstrates that they are on Pulap) through the use of various sets of others in the social field as negative examples, then the chances are that some kind of interactive, mutually constitutive process is at work. But to understand that process, all parties need to be heard from; otherwise, we are left with partial reports of what by their nature must be merely temporary details of difference. And that means, in turn, that we are left wondering why the author has bothered to provide all those details of dress and comportment used by Pulap people to set themselves off as superior beings when they seem destined to be outdated in the near future.

Disembodied cultural knowledge, presented without attention to its distribution across the social world and without a serious concern with its mobilization in behavior, inevitably becomes a kind of description of description. This book is no exception. In essence it seems to be an account of the social world of the Pulap people, as some of them related it to their ethnographer. As such it contains only part of the material needed to explain

why it is that those Pulap chose "Lamarckian" rather than "Darwinian" means to distinguish themselves.

Certainly all of this does not mean that the work is fatally flawed. In fact it does a very good job of laying out the importance of moving beyond an unreflective use of the concept of "ethnicity" when talking about the kinds of people who make up contemporary Micronesia. It crisply lays out the elements of Pulap cultural identity, circa 1980, and argues convincingly for seeing those elements as pieces of an ideological project mounted by the Pulap people to claim moral stature.

The book is organized into six clearly written chapters that provide the reader with much interesting information. Following an introduction that summarizes the main points and sketches in the Pulap social world, it outlines the relations of this remote island with other Micronesian communities, especially Yap and its so-called empire, and with the various colonial regimes that have inserted themselves into that world. The third chapter presents a useful discussion of social structure (matrilineal kinship, clans, and chieftainship) on the atoll, while the fourth presents material on Pulap town dwellers and the community they have created in Weno (formerly Moen), Chuuk. Here the creative use Pulap people make of tradition in a highly untraditional context is very well described. The next chapter (which in many ways is the heart of the book) takes up the issue of formal schooling, which during Flinn's involvement with the Pulap people covered the entire gamut of American-built education, from elementary school through college. Much of Flinn's experience was in schools and many of her informants seem to be drawn from the school context. This is also the context in which stereotyping and identity-mongering, both negative and positive, seem to be most salient. Given the American cast of these schools, and the many island communities represented in their student bodies, I wonder what role American implicit assumptions about identity, especially ethnic pluralism, have played in the flowering of the politics of identity in Chuuk and the rest of Micronesia.

Schooling also provides the context for much of the mobility within and out of Micronesia, and the Pulap people are no exception. The final chapter of this work discusses that mobility and its relationship to kinship and identity while also summarizing the book as a whole.

Diplomas and Thatch Houses is well suited for undergraduate courses. I can say this with some confidence, having assigned it in my upper-level Pacific Ethnography class a year or so ago. Students found it interesting

and accessible. Among the things they responded to most positively were Flinn's continuous attention to the question of whether or not a particular piece of behavior should be catalogued as "modern" or "traditional." Given the rapid pace of social change these students had experienced in their own lives, this was a concern to which they could relate well. And her fascination with what she views as the paradox of new behaviors and items of material culture being labeled traditional, while traditional material was being used in new ways or at least in new contexts, struck their postmodern sensibilities as perfectly appropriate.

More fundamentally, the book worked as a good teaching ethnography always does, subverting students' belief in the inevitability of their cultural knowledge by showing them the lineaments of an alternative common sense. So, for example, the hostility of the people of Pulap toward the people of Ulul challenged students' understanding of community, identity, and history. They were not struck by the fact that this hostility was grounded in historical grievance (a nineteenth-century raid that wiped out all but 30 of the Pulap people)—the discourse of ancestral victimhood was one with which they were amply familiar. What they did find remarkable was that the present inhabitants of Ulul are descended from a replacement population that had no connection with the people who mounted that raid. Here is a Lamarckian inheritance of acquired cultural identity with a vengeance, so to speak.

In the discussion provoked by this passage, it became evident that it had led many people in the class to reflect on their own ideas about historical responsibility, the transmission of cultural identity through time, and the role of cultural knowledge about these matters in the constitution of American social reality. It is for this reason that I am glad to recommend this book, despite what I believe are its flaws.

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Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll, by Jonathan M. Weisgall. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. xvii + 415 pp, maps, photographs, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth, US $31.95.

Jonathan Weisgall is a Washington DC–based attorney who has represented the people of Bikini Atoll since 1975. His involvement with the Bikinians was a matter of chance. Fresh out of Stanford Law School and beginning a career with a well-known law firm, Weisgall was directed to take a phone call by a senior partner who was late for lunch. The call was on behalf of the Micronesian Legal Services Corporation. It had recently begun its operations in the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and help was needed in the Marshall Islands to assist the Bikinians. Weisgall's career turned in a direction that he would never have imagined in his wildest dreams. He eventually founded his own law firm and has spent most of his career as the Bikinians' advocate.

Weisgall also appears to have been well served by having majored in history as an undergraduate at Columbia University. *Operation Crossroads* is the result of a self-professed love of both history and the law and a decade of research and writing. The book is well organized and well written, and the quality of the research is as impressive as it is meticulous.

As his title suggests, Weisgall's main concern is with events related to Operation Crossroads, the code name for the two nuclear detonations at Bikini in 1946. The book is not about the Bikinians per se. Their story has been told elsewhere and is summarily treated in three of the book's 32 chapters. Similarly, only a single chapter is devoted to the 21 nuclear tests that were conducted at Bikini between 1954 and 1958.

At the end of World War II, the United States knew precious little about its new destructive force. Prior to the use of nuclear weapons against Japan, only one atomic bomb had been tested. Code-named Trinity, the bomb heralded the atomic age when it was detonated in the desert of New Mexico on July 16, 1945, only a few weeks before the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The contingencies of war, however, had allowed scant opportunity for the collection of scientific data about the effects of the new weapon, and the need for such information provided the rationale for Operation Crossroads.

As Weisgall describes, however, interservice rivalries dating back to the end of World War I shaped the agenda at Bikini in 1946 as much if not

more than scientific needs. Until World War I the roles of the army and navy were clear: The army fought on the land while the navy toiled at sea. The introduction of the airplane in World War I had complicated matters. Among others, the infamous Brig. Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell believed that air power alone had won the war. Ships were vulnerable to air attack, and Mitchell declared the navy obsolete.

A quarter of a century later, Operation Crossroads was a continuation of the same debate. The navy was intent on demonstrating that its vessels could withstand a nuclear attack while the army wanted as many ships as possible to sink. The operation was billed as a cooperative venture between the services, but in reality it was marked by intense rivalry.

On January 24, 1946, it was announced that Bikini Atoll in the northern Marshall Islands had been selected for the forthcoming tests. The code name was appropriate: The dawning of the atomic age was a crossroads for all humanity. Ironically, the isolation of Bikini Atoll that had previously kept its people out of harm's way was a large factor in its selection as a nuclear test site. The comedian Bob Hope had his own commentary: "As soon as the war ended, we located the one spot on earth that hadn't been touched by war and blew it to hell" (p. 33).

One of the immediate tasks at hand was the removal of the Bikinians, and uninhabited Rongerik to the east of Bikini was selected as their new home. From the US military authorities' point of view, "Bikini and Rongerik look as alike as two Idaho potatoes" (p. 309), but they could not have been more wrong. Rongerik did not have the capacity to support even a small population, and the Bikinians experienced near starvation before being relocated twice more. Their eventual resettlement on an island in the southern Marshalls has never been satisfactory, and for a half century the Bikinians have been a discontented and anguished people, the first victims of the nuclear age in the Marshalls.

Operations Crossroads had all the trappings of a three-ring circus and was accompanied by a media frenzy. As a reflection of the era, it was a mostly male affair. The navy was inundated with 6,000 requests to cover the event; in the end, 168 male reporters, but no females, were selected. Altogether, the service personnel, scientists, and technicians involved totaled 41,963 men. The female contingent consisted of 37 nurses. The 95 target ships alone would have comprised the fifth-largest navy in the world, and they were accompanied by 175 support vessels and 150 aircraft. The operation was four times larger than the force that had invaded Guadalcanal in the Solomons during the war. It was "more exhaustively photographed,

reported, and measured than any previous event in history" (p. 117). One half of the world's supply of film was at Bikini in 1946.

There was much debate about the value of Operation Crossroads. Many of the scientists involved in the Manhattan Project that had developed the bomb thought the tests were of little value. At a time when the United States was arguing for the peaceful use of nuclear power and international control of nuclear weapons, some members of the US Congress believed that the events at Bikini would send the wrong message to the world. Others were strongly in favor, and one member of Congress declared Operation Crossroads "the greatest event in the history of mankind except only the birth of Christ Himself" (p. 80).

Understandably, developments surrounding the atomic bomb were shrouded in secrecy. Even today, it is a little known fact that President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the development of the bomb in October 1941, prior to America's entry into World War II. During his tenure as vice-president, Harry S. Truman was not informed. After the war, only General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower and the army general in charge of the Manhattan Project knew how many weapons were in America's nuclear stockpile.

Secrecy contributed to a widespread public fear of and opposition to Operation Crossroads. In part, the secrecy masked how little was known about the new weapon. Had the level of ignorance been known, that alone would have been sufficient cause for alarm. A contingency plan had been devised to evacuate the entire state of New Mexico in the event that the Trinity test, conducted a year earlier, turned into a disaster. At the time of Operation Crossroads, no one knew about the long-term consequences of radiation, how to decontaminate radioactive naval vessels, whether an underwater nuclear detonation would generate a chain reaction, or what the likely impact on Bikini Atoll would be.

At the same time there was a refusal to admit to the possibility of unseen dangers. A military official testifying before a Senate committee reported his understanding that death through exposure to radiation "is a very pleasant way to die" (p. 140). As Weisgall notes with regard to several situations, "Ignorance had met arrogance" (p. 9).

Test "Able" was conducted at Bikini on July 1, 1946. Like the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Able was an aerial shot with the equivalent of 23,000 tons of TNT. The event was broadcast live around the world: "Listen world, this is Crossroads" (pp. 182, 185), but the results were anticlimactic. The air drop missed the main target ship by a half mile. Partly because of

the observers' distance from the test, the explosion was neither as spectacular nor as loud as anticipated. The visible damage to the targeted vessels was not impressive, and Bikini Atoll itself appeared undamaged. One visiting member of Congress dismissed Able as a "giant firecracker" (p. 187), and two thirds of the news media left in disappointment.

On July 25, test "Baker" was an entirely different story, and again the event was broadcast around the world. The magnitude of the blast was the same as the first, but it was detonated 90 feet below the surface of Bikini's lagoon. A gigantic column of water rose over a mile in height and collapsed back into the lagoon, carrying an enormous load of radioactive debris. Baker was described as one of the most spectacular sights ever seen, and it created waves larger than any natural phenomenon, with the possible exception of those generated by the explosion of Krakatoa volcano in 1883. The amount of damage to the assembled fleet was staggering; even more hazardous, most of the vessels suffered massive radiological contamination.

Predictions prior to Baker had warned that the "witch's brew" (pp. 206, 216) created by the test would make many of the vessels dangerous for an indeterminable time to come. To make matters worse, the radioactivity in the waters of Bikini's lagoon contaminated vessels that had not been affected by the blast itself. One observer noted, however, that the US Navy "is contemptuous of anything that isn't big and noisy and that refuses to come out in the open and fight" (p. 245). Warnings were largely ignored, and relatively few of the thousands of men at Bikini were advised to take precautionary measures. To the contrary,

> for weeks after the tests men routinely boarded target ships, swept them, scraped them, ate their meals on board, and even slept aboard them; they were constantly exposed to the danger of inhaling plutonium and fission products from the Baker test. (p. 239)

Two weeks after Baker, mounting evidence convinced navy officials of the dangers involved, and access to the target ships was curtailed. Bikini Atoll was evacuated at the end of September 1946.

Of the 95 target ships, 17 were sunk directly by Able and Baker. Others remained dangerously contaminated for as long as 5 years, and all but seven ships were eventually deemed unsalvageable and were scuttled.

Weisgall reports that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, radiation levels at Bikini Atoll were sufficiently low that they posed no health hazards, and the Atomic Energy Commission considered restoring the Bikinians to their homeland. However, the decision to develop thermonuclear weapons brought

nuclear testing back to the Pacific. The first hydrogen bomb test was held at Enewetak Atoll on November 1, 1952; the destruction was so great that Bikini was called back into use.

"Bravo," the first hydrogen bomb test at Bikini, was held on March 1, 1954. With a payload of 750 Hiroshima bombs (or 15 million tons of TNT), it brought disaster. Fallout spread eastward from Bikini and distributed a white, radioactive, ashy rain on the atolls of Rongelap, Rongerik, Utirik, and Ailinginae. Twenty-eight American servicemen on Rongerik, 236 Marshallese on the other atolls, and 23 crewmen on a Japanese fishing vessel were within the fallout zone. According to the first official explanation, an unpredicted shift in the prevailing winds had carried the fallout from Bravo over the inhabited atolls and not to the open sea north of Bikini as expected.

The first explanation was a cover-up of a tragedy in the making, and Weisgall charitably describes it as "disingenuous at best" (p. 304). It was later acknowledged that officials at Bikini knew a full 6 hours before Bravo that the prevailing winds had shifted and that they had nevertheless proceeded to detonate Bravo. To make matters worse, the American servicemen at Rongerik were evacuated within a day, but there was a delay of 2 and 3 days, respectively, before relief came to the badly stricken Islanders on Rongerik and Utirik. The initial explanation severely damaged America's credibility and, a point not mentioned by Weisgall, added fuel to the speculation that the United States had deliberately allowed the Marshallese to be used as human guinea pigs. The film *Half Life* (O'Rourke, 1986) has made much of this point.

Weisgall reports "The tragedy of Bravo continues to haunt the Bikinians and its other victims. Bikini Island was hopelessly contaminated" (p. 304). After Bravo, another 20 nuclear tests were conducted at Bikini before President Eisenhower declared a moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing in November 1958. In all, Bikini suffered 23 nuclear tests. Whether Bikini and other islands in the atoll can eventually be made safe for human habitation remains unknown.

Ironically, the debate over nuclear weapons and the future of the US Navy was largely dispelled after Operation Crossroads. Belatedly it would seem, and particularly after the lesson learned at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, no navy would ever again cluster so many ships in a single location. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the importance of battleships has been downplayed, but aircraft carriers and submarines with nuclear capacities are the heart of a modern navy.

In the end, the main lesson learned at Bikini was simple. The real power of nuclear weapons was not the immediate destruction of any target. As was demonstrated in 1946, "the real weapon developed at Bikini was radioactivity" (p. 291). Nuclear bombs would be most effective against entire cities and industrialized areas. Had Bravo been detonated at Washington, DC, and the fallout spread in a northeasterly direction, the entire northeastern seaboard to the Canadian border would have been decimated.

Weisgall's book is important for anyone interested in the Pacific after World War II. Although it does not focus on the island peoples themselves, it is a careful and detailed account of events in the immediate postwar years that had enormous consequences not only for the Marshalls but also for the larger Pacific region. Weisgall set out to inform his readers about Operations Crossroads, and he has succeeded very well.

Going beyond Weisgall's account, it is now known that more atolls within the Marshalls than previously thought have been contaminated and that the people of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utirik have not been the only ones adversely affected. The Compact of Free Association that now defines the political relationship between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the United States contains provisions for the compensation of nuclear victims, and it is certain that the litigation will be a long and drawn-out process.

Events in the Marshalls are also related to developments in French Polynesia. Pacific peoples almost everywhere have followed the results of the French nuclear test program on Moruroa Atoll near Tahiti in addition to the American activities at Bikini and Enewetak. For the island peoples most directly involved, the nuclear age has brought unwanted relocations, the destruction of islands, despair over lost homelands, sickness and death, and contamination of their environment. The feelings of anguish, deprivation, and loss have been great. There have been many costs, but few if any benefits. Not surprisingly, the sentiment in the Pacific today that the region should no longer serve the military and strategic needs of the external metropolitan powers is almost universally shared. The Movement for a Nuclear-Free and Independent Pacific emerged in the 1960s and has gained in strength in subsequent decades. The movement realized some tangible results with the signing of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, on Hiroshima Day, August 6, 1985.

Given the nuclear history of the Marshalls, it is ironic that the government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands has recently advanced a scheme to store nuclear wastes for profit. Bikini Atoll appears to be the

likely site. Most Bikinians are in opposition to any such proposal, and they are joined by most other Pacific peoples, particularly their closest neighbors in the Federated States of Micronesia. Given the strong and overwhelming sentiments of the region, the officialdom of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is greatly out of sync with the rest of the contemporary Pacific.

Reference

O'Rourke, D. (Film maker). (1986). *Half life: A parable for the nuclear age* [Film]. (Available from Direct Cinema Ltd., P.O. Box 10003, Santa Monica, CA).

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Micronesia: An Introduction to the U.S. Territories, by Paul Greco (Producer). Spotswood, Australia: Pacific Community Development, 1994. Video, 31 min., color. Price not available.

Trying to tell a story of a region as diverse as Micronesia in 30 minutes of videotape is certainly not an easy task. Although writer, producer, and photographer Paul Greco's attempt in *Micronesia: An Introduction to the U.S. Territories* competently condenses aspects of the region's colonial history, his dreary vision proves to be neither intellectually enlightening nor stylistically engaging.

Whereas Greco's previous productions have centered on the Marshall Islands (e.g., *The Marshall Islands: A Matter of Trust,* 1988; *Sky of Fire, Seeds of Hope,* 1991), this video's expanded scope focuses primarily on Micronesia's colonial history. The familiar characters and themes in this history are recounted: Magellan, massive depopulation, copra trading, changes in land tenure, the Sokehs Rebellion, Trust Territory, US nuclear testing, economic dependence, IPSECO, tourism and militarism in the Marianas, and the Compacts of Free Association. Greco outlines the Spanish, German, Japanese, and American administrations, documenting not only the different interests and effects of each colonial presence, but also pointing out that the colonizers had different kinds of impacts on each island within

the region. For example, the town of Koror, in Palau, in many ways resembled a Japanese town during the Japanese administration of the islands while other islands experienced much less Japanese presence and influence.

Greco documents these events chronologically. After an introduction to the geography of the region, the story begins with a few brief comments on the Islanders' ways of living before the first waves of missionaries, colonizers, traders, beachcombers, and whalers arrived. Greco moves the viewer from island to island as he describes outsiders' influence and activity (and, occasionally, the Islanders' involvement and responses). At times this nomadic approach is disorienting as the narrative structure sails back and forth across the northern Pacific like an erratic navigator.

But it is Greco's monotonous presentation and tendency to locate (lock in) Micronesia within a discourse of tragedy and decay that ultimately weaken the video. Complemented by Greco's voice-over narration, the visual composition of the video consists of still photographs, each displayed for a few seconds in one long series. This technique is reminiscent of filmstrips shown in schools years ago, a disappointingly rudimentary style in an age when fast-paced, high technology productions dominate the screens. The steady, even pace of *Micronesia,* along with a leaden musical sound track, might well lull to sleep a generation of viewers accustomed to MTV-style television. Still photographs can be fascinating, but in *Micronesia* many are unabsorbing, disappearing from the screen without leaving particularly provocative or memorable impressions.

Like most other films and videos about the region, *Micronesia* portrays the region as fraught with so much degradation and uncontrolled change that viewers will find it difficult to envision ways in which Micronesians can successfully confront the challenges they face today. Hardly a celebration of Micronesia past or present, the video laments the passing of an allegedly once-pure and idyllic place. Even the music is portentous and funereal. Few would disagree that the region has experienced profound economic, political, social, and cultural changes, particularly in the past several decades. Though the video dispels the image of the Pacific Islands as paradise, representations of Micronesia here reinforce a divergent discourse: that Micronesia is a destructed (by others) and destructive (by self) region so corrupted by foreign influences that the indigenous folks are all running amok. Greco's voice harmonizes with a chorus of similar tragic representations heard in most of the films and videos about Micronesia.

Listen carefully to Greco's voice in the subtitle of the video: *An Introduction to the U.S. Territories.* Though the Federated States of Micro-

nesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are intimately related to the United States through the Compacts of Free Association, and though the Northern Mariana Islands are connected to the United States through a commonwealth status, none of the political entities, with the exception of Guam, is a *territory* of the United States. (At the beginning of the video, Greco announces that Kiribati and Nauru, although considered part of the Micronesian culture area, are not included in the video because they were never administered by the United States.) Released in 1994, the video is current enough to include a discussion of Palau's recently ratified Compact, but Greco has maintained the "territory" subtitle. The subtitle suggests continued colonization of the islands: Is it Greco's point to intimate post–Trust Territory neocolonization or is it a mild inaccuracy that both subverts a sense of independence for Micronesians and supports the notion of a cultural-national identity crisis?

Early on, Greco says Micronesians are faced with the challenge to "regain a sense of who they are." Again, as other film makers have emphasized, Greco contends that the successive waves of colonization in Micronesia (in particular, the American administration) have eroded indigenous cultures to the extent that Micronesians are experiencing an identity crisis. With long shots and closeups focusing on material objects such as sports cars and high-rise buildings, Guam, for instance, is characterized as if it were a suburb of Los Angeles. Surely the dynamics involved in cultural identity are more complex than Greco implies. In addition to examining the ways in which outside influences have eroded indigenous customs and identity, a richer analysis would include a look at the ways in which cultural integrity has been maintained despite a remarkable history of colonization. Such an analysis would also look at the ways in which outside influences—actively accepted, adopted, and appropriated by indigenous groups—have emerged as parts of Micronesians' own identities. Furthermore, how do notions and expressions of cultural identity differ among individuals within the cultural group? Did Micronesians really "lose a sense of who they are"?

In telling his story, Greco emphasizes the negative impacts of colonialism in the region and the problems currently facing Micronesians. The few achievements he describes by Micronesians occurred hundreds of years ago, implying that since the arrival and subsequent corruption by outsiders, Micronesians have accomplished nothing significant. Abused victims of the colonizer, Micronesians are continually acted upon—weak folks left struggling to "take control of their own islands." By presenting such a grim story, Greco prevents us from seeing and discourages us from imagining ways in

which Micronesians resisted or ignored the presence of outsiders, maintained some of their own traditions, or achieved anything on their own or in their own ways. The Sokehs Rebellion against the Germans on Pohnpei and a Chamorro land rights movement on Guam are mentioned, but these amount to little more than isolated incidents of resistance in a tragic history of domination and exploitation; their inclusion underscores the ill treatment of the colonized rather than highlights the response of the colonized. The viewer is left to wonder if there is a story to tell about Micronesia that does not involve the tragic encounters between the colonizer and the colonized.

These other stories are missing from film and video (as well as print), stories that would present a fuller, richer, more complex Micronesia: stories of indigenous resistance, cooperation, and compliance; stories of conflict among and between Islanders; stories told from Islanders' perspectives; stories that feature Micronesians as the main characters; and stories whose characters function independently from the outsider. After a litany of "problems," "struggles," and "challenges" facing contemporary Micronesians, Greco's tone moves a bit in this direction at the end of the video: He points out that Micronesians are "rebuilding ties with other Pacific peoples" and are "forging links with the rest of the region." At least in the future Greco envisions Micronesians as central actors in their own history.

Micronesia might best be shown to audiences unfamiliar with the region's colonial history or it might be offered as a good example of the media's negative portrayal of Micronesia. Those searching for new insights or a stimulating presentation of the conventional wisdom will probably be disappointed. (Film distributors' address: Pacific Community Development, 58 Paxton Street, Spotswood, Australia 3015.)

References

Greco, P. (Producer). (1988). *The Marshall Islands: A matter of trust* [Film]. (Available from Bush Co-operative, Aspendale, Australia).

Greco, P. (Producer). (1991). *Sky of fire, seeds of hope* [Film]. (Available from Pacific Community Development, 58 Paxton Street, Spotswood, Australia 3015).

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

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