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In this essay on the problems of Micronesia, we have a scholarly presentation which encompasses the three different perspectives involved—those of the United States, the United Nations, and the Micronesians themselves. The inhabitants of these islands (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands), administered by the United States since World War II, have increasingly expressed a desire for greater autonomy at a time when their strategic importance may be growing more vital with the advent of the Nixon Doctrine and the reversion of Okinawa. President Nixon himself has demonstrated new interest in Micronesia with his recent appointment of a personal representative, with the rank of Ambassador, to resolve the disparate views within the administration (Interior, State and Defense Departments) and to work directly with the Micronesians on the future political status of their islands.

THE CROSS OF MICRONESIA

A research paper prepared

by

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
INTRODUCTION

The Cross of Micronesia. In the summer of 1970 the Congress of Micronesia rejected a U.S. offer of commonwealth status that would have enabled Micronesians to obtain U.S. citizenship easily and permitted an indefinite continuation of funds for the economically poor Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

To most Americans the rejection must seem surprising and puzzling. It must also be especially bewildering, for in recent years the United States has been increasingly generous in meeting Micronesian needs. After years of a constant budget ceiling of \$7.5 million, the budget was more than doubled to

\$17.5 million in fiscal 1963 and then raised to \$25 million in 1967, \$35 million in 1968, \$50 million in 1970, and \$60 million in fiscal 1971.

This lavish attention, however, followed 20 years of neglect, indifference, and thoughtless decisions on the part of the United States. The political, economic, and social stagnation of those years was aggravated by the removal of the entire population from Bikini, Eniwetok, and Kwajalein to permit the use of these islands for nuclear tests and antiballistic missile development. This past is the cross which the United States bears today in Micronesia, and this burden—despite an increasingly active program of development in all fields—is compounded by the dilemma which the



United States faces between its strategic interest and its moral and legal obligation for democracy, self-government, and self-determination.

The Micronesians, on the other hand, bear a much heavier cross—an accumulated burden of 450 years of foreign rule. One can imagine hearing the sigh of an old Saipanese who learned Spanish as a child, went to a German school in his youth, spoke Japanese as an adult, and now struggles with English in the twilight of his life.

Unlike the previous administrations, however, and despite its record of past neglect, the United States has intended in good faith to further the best interests of the Micronesians. The United States is now devoting increasing resources toward improving its administration, fostering the development of political institutions, promoting economic progress, and developing educational and health programs.

Yet, there is a growing feeling among Micronesians that the United States, in the development of Micronesia, is changing the islands and the islanders utterly—if it has not already done so. In other words, the development of Micronesia would mean the Americanization of Micronesia. Not all Micronesians would object to such a prospect, but the coming of age of Micronesia is intertwined with a crisis of identity and status.

In examining the Cross of Micronesia, the authors sought to consult with as many United States, Micronesian, and United Nations officials as possible, although this was difficult because of their location at the Naval War College in Newport. They were fortunate, however, in having the opportunity of meeting with Senator Henry M. Jackson and Representative Wayne N. Aspinall, Chairmen of the respective Senate and House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs.¹ They also consulted with officials in the United Nations Secretariat and especially

acknowledge their gratitude to Minister Kenneth Rogers of Australia, Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory in 1970. Finally, while on an official visit to Washington, two prominent Micronesians—Leo A. Falcum, Executive Officer of the Trust Territory Government, and Dwight Heine, Special Consultant to the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory—were most gracious in taking time off from their busy schedules to discuss the future of their homeland. The authors were unable to travel to Micronesia although one of them became acquainted with several elected Micronesian representatives while visiting the trust territory several years ago, and it is principally through the words of these Micronesian representatives and their official documents that the Micronesian side of the story of the Cross of Micronesia will be presented.

Description of Micronesia. Micronesia is now used as a term synonymous with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. It comprises the islands of three archipelagoes—the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas with the exception of Guam which is an unincorporated U.S. territory—lying north of the equator and considerably west of the Hawaiian Islands. There are six administrative districts, four of which—Palau, Yap, Truk and Ponape—lie within the Carolines. The Marianas and the Marshalls each form a district.²

There are more than 2,000 separate islands scattered over an ocean area of 3,000,000 square miles or approximately the size of the continental United States. However, the total land area is less than 700 square miles or somewhat larger than the island of Oahu. Although there are large volcanic islands, the great majority are less than 1 square mile in area, giving rise thereby to the name Micronesia (small islands) which distinguishes this area from Melanesia (black islands) to the south

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and Polynesia (many islands) to the east.³

The people of the trust territory are classified as Micronesians except for about 1,000 Polynesian inhabitants of Kapingamarangi and Nukuoro. This classification, however, carries no implication of a homogeneous population, for regional and local groups exhibit marked variations in physical characteristics, languages, and customs. Nine major languages with multiple dialects indicate clearly the distinctive ethnic entities within the trust territory.⁴

The Chamorros of the Marianas and the Marshallese are the most Westernized, the former reflecting Spanish acculturation and the latter mirroring over 150 years of contact with American sailors and missionaries. Japanese influence remains strong, particularly in the Carolines where there was extensive intermarriage between the Japanese and the local people. The total population was 102,250 in 1970.⁵

Historical Background. Despite the disparate cultures separated by vast expanses of water, there is a basic similarity in the life style of island dwellers—that fine adjustment to the ecology of a small tropical island. The real common bond, however, has been foreign bondage. The Spaniards, the Germans, and the Japanese all have left their imprint, and each departed in haste and in defeat.

Micronesia first came to the attention of the Western World when Ferdinand Magellan sighted Guam on 6 March 1521.⁶

The Spanish claim of sovereignty over the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls was challenged in the 19th century. In 1885 Germany seized the Marshalls. In 1898 the United States defeated Spain in a brief war and acquired Guam and also Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The next year Spain withdrew from the Pacific and sold the rest of the Marianas and the Carolines to

Germany.⁷ German control of Micronesia was abruptly terminated at the outbreak of World War I when Japanese naval squadrons took possession of the undefended islands.

Spanish colonial policy in the Pacific was autocratic and restricted to the pacification and Christianization of the Marianas. The Chamorros resisted Spanish rule, and the most obvious result of the Spanish-Chamorro wars in the 17th century was the decimation of the native population from an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 to less than 5,000.⁸

The German administration was also autocratic but efficient in economic development, including the use of forced labor which provoked a futile rebellion in 1910 by the Ponapeans on Sokehs. The Germans publicly shot 17 Ponapeans under a tree in Colonia which still stands and shipped the rest of the community to Palau, a thousand miles away. It was a severe punishment to inflict on the Micronesians, one of whose chiefs expressed their attitude toward their homes thusly, "Even though I travel on all the islands, my own island will remain in my head. No one can make me forget it." The exiled Ponapeans succeeded in prevailing upon the Japanese to repatriate them to their homeland in 1922.⁹

Japanese rule was complete and direct, and the policy was to develop the islands economically and settle Japanese colonists and subsequently in the 1930's to establish military bases in preparation for World War II.¹⁰ Although Japanese rule was intended for the benefit of Japan, most Micronesians now look back fondly to the period between the wars which was marked by prosperity, peace, and propriety of relations between the two peoples. For some other Micronesians, however, there are unhappy memories. Dwight Heine, for example, was impressed into a Japanese labor battalion during the war, and both of his parents were beheaded by the Japanese.¹¹

UNITED NATIONS STRATEGIC TRUSTEESHIP

The Wilsonian Legacy. It may be said that the world is a little different today because of American idealism. The map of Europe was redrawn in 1919 because of the Wilsonian principles of self-determination and nonannexation. And so were the maps of Africa and Asia after World War II.

At the Versailles Conference, Japan sought outright annexation of the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls, to which Great Britain and the other European Allies had agreed secretly in 1916. President Wilson, however, opposed Japanese annexation—not only in principle but also because of the realization that Japanese possession of Micronesia was not in the interests of the United States, since the islands could be used against Guam and the Philippines.¹²

Only force could have dislodged the Japanese, but Wilson succeeded in preserving both his principles and the minimal U.S. strategic interest through the adoption of the concept of mandates. In 1920 the Council of the League of Nations confirmed a Class C Mandate for Japan which provided that the islands were to be open to visitation and unfortified. While this did not prevent the Japanese from closing off the islands in 1935, recent investigation indicates that large-scale militarization did not occur until the late 1930's when the road to war was discernible.¹³ A post-war inspection also indicated that the vaunted Truk bastion was "a fraud among fortresses" in that its defenses were superficial.¹⁴

That Japan was to lose the islands completely at the end of the war was clear, but there was an intense debate among civilian and military officials as to whether the United States should seek outright annexation or submit to some form of internationalization in succession to the mandate system.¹⁵

The Atlantic Charter ("no aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise") and the Cairo Declarations ("no thought of territorial expansion") had now been added to the Wilsonian legacy which again triumphed, this time in the form of a strategic trusteeship.

In the Trusteeship Agreement approved by the Security Council and the U.S. Government,¹⁶ the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was designated a strategic area and the United States the Administering Authority with the right to fortify the islands and to close off any part of the territory for security reasons. The terms of the agreement cannot be altered without the consent of the Administering Authority. Finally, the functions of the United Nations relating to the strategic trusteeship were to be exercised by the Security Council with its rule of unanimity instead of the General Assembly.¹⁷

The strategic trusteeship may be described as an excellent example of the reconciliation of the requirements of international law with the security interests of a great power. That the United States chose this road, not once, but twice in a lifetime, is testimony to the traditional American championship of freedom and a tribute to the vitality of the Wilsonian legacy.

Objectives of the Trusteeship. The historical importance of the mandate system was that it embodied the principle of international accountability—that the well-being and development of the dependent people formed "a sacred trust of civilization." There were three classes of mandates: A for the Middle East, B for Africa except Southwest Africa, and C for the Pacific islands and Southwest Africa. The class C designation denoted that the people were not deemed capable of self-government for the foreseeable future.

The League of Nations Covenant was silent on the future political status of

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the mandated territories except for those in the Middle East which were classified as A or suitable for eventual independence. The United Nations Charter, however, explicitly declares in article 76(b) that a basic objective of the trusteeship system shall be the progressive development of the inhabitants of the trust territories toward "self-government or independence."

This basic objective is contained in article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement which spells out in detail the responsibilities of the United States. In return for unfettered strategic control and use of the islands and in discharging its obligations under article 76(b) of the United Nations Charter, the first paragraph of article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement commits the United States to:

1. foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the trust territory and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and to this end shall give the inhabitants of the trust territory a progressively increasing share of the administrative services in the territory; shall develop their participation in government; shall give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the territory; and shall take other appropriate measures toward these ends.

The remaining three paragraphs of article 6 obligate the United States to promote economic advancement, including the protection of the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources; social advancement,

including the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms; and educational advancement.

When the Trusteeship Agreement came into force in 1947, the U.S. Navy continued to administer the islands. In 1951 responsibility for administration was turned over to the Department of the Interior. The headquarters, then in Honolulu, was transferred to Guam in 1954 and finally to Saipan in 1962.

Frugality and Nondisturbance. The first 15 years of the trust territory were marked by a policy of frugality and nondisturbance of the Micronesians. The policy was intended to foster the growth of a modernized native society by encouraging only that which is believed desirable in the native culture. It was opposed to the school of assimilation into the "superior" society of the dominant group (i.e., the United States).

In reality, however, the policy of frugality was dictated by a sense of priorities embodied in the Marshall plan and point 4. A leading student of Micronesia, Professor Norman Meller of the University of Hawaii, concluded that the policy more closely approximated the "zoological park" idea.¹⁸ Another writer termed it the "squirrel philosophy": "The islands became a treasured 'nut' to be buried in the South Seas and not to be disturbed until 'winter'—when the hardships of political climate would stimulate growing hunger for a reliable western Pacific defense line."¹⁹

Micronesia, however, was not a zoological park under the Japanese who had developed it economically. The Micronesians profited in the process and became increasingly dependent on a money economy and began to appreciate the efficiency of the machine age and its products. The Japanese also provided education, medical care, and community services such as electricity in the urbanized areas.²⁰

Of greater significance were Japanese immigration and intermarriages with the Micronesians. By 1940 the Japanese outnumbered the Micronesians by 70,000 to 50,000. The Japanese not only ruled Micronesia, but also worked and lived with the Micronesians. At the end of the war, however, the United States repatriated all Japanese nationals from the islands. The abrupt departure of so many people could not but entail cases of personal hardship, including the separation of relatives, and Micronesian petitions to the United Nations in the immediate postwar years often centered around Japanese husbands and relatives.²¹

In this context the "zoo" policy meant turning the clock back.²² The infrastructure destroyed during the war remained largely unreconstructed, and a long period of economic stagnation ensued. Willard Price estimated that the per capita annual income of the Micronesian in 1964 was only one-fifth of what it was during the heyday of Japanese rule.²³

As the only American writer who had visited and studied Micronesia under both the Japanese and American administrations, Price was constantly asked during his 1964 visit to the islands, "Is it better now, or worse?" Although he felt that the only answer was the equivocal "better and worse"²⁴ and devoted two chapters to explaining it, Price concluded: "But, when everything favorable that can be said has been said, the fact remains that the Trust is progressing backward."²⁵

He recommended: "Nothing would do the Trust more good than some bad publicity. Only by a thorough dose of the bitter truth can a generous but uninformed public be alerted of its responsibility for the Forgotten Sisters of the richest nation on earth."²⁶

Bikini, Eniwetok, and Kwajalein.

Under the Trusteeship Agreement the United States has the right (article 13)

to close portions of the territory for security reasons and the right (article 5) to direct their military use. Until 1962 severe restrictions on entry into Micronesia, including entry by U.S. citizens, were maintained and enforced. Security clearance by the Chief of Naval Operations was required before the High Commissioner would consider issuing an entry permit. With almost no exceptions, the only entrants into Micronesia, other than Armed Forces personnel, were the American employees of the trust territory government.²⁷

The policy of frugality and non-disturbance of the natives, however, was waived in matters pertaining to the strategic use of the islands. On Saipan the CIA built a \$28 million facility which was used until 1962 as a training center for the Chinese Nationalist return to the mainland. The trust territory government, which had its seat in Honolulu and Guam, inherited the CIA facility and thus found a home in the territory it was to administer.²⁸

In 1946 the 166 inhabitants of Bikini Atoll were removed to Kili, a tiny single island without lagoon in the far south of the Marshalls. For atoll people, it was an environmental wrench. At Bikini they had 36 islands with a total area of 2.32 square miles and, what was equally important, a lagoon of 229.4 square miles. Kili is a single island in the middle of the ocean, lagoonless and .36 of a square mile.²⁹

In 1947 the 146 inhabitants of Eniwetok were evacuated to Ujelang Atoll where the conditions of existence are "not satisfactory" in the words of the 1970 United Nations Visiting Mission.³⁰ The 166 Bikinians were paid \$25,000 in cash and a \$300,000 trust fund, while the 146 natives of Eniwetok, whose islands were smaller, received the same lump sum and a \$150,000 trust fund.

In 1954 a hydrogen bomb test in Bikini resulted in radioactive fallout on Rongelap, nearly 100 miles away. Ten

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years passed before the U.S. Congress appropriated \$10,494 for compensation of each of the 86 Rongelapese, 13 of whom were already dead, although there was no reason to believe that they had not died from natural causes.³¹

Many Marshallese were enraged by the Rongelap incident, particularly since a similar incident in 1954 involving the 23 men of a Japanese fishing boat resulted in a prompt U.S. compensation of \$100,000 for each Japanese.

In the 1960's U.S. nuclear testing was conducted on Christmas Island, an uninhabited island far removed from the Marshalls. There have been no such U.S. tests in the Pacific since signing of the limited test ban treaty in 1963.

The only major strategic activity now undertaken in the trust territory is the Army Missile Range Facility on Kwajalein which represents a billion dollar investment since 1947.³² The use of the land was not regularized until a 99-year lease was signed in 1964 on the basis of \$500 an acre for past use and \$500 an acre for future use—that is, \$10.10 per year per acre.³³ An additional payment of \$40 per month was provided for the original 148 residents of the Mid-Corridor Islands who were relocated to Ebeye in the early 1960's as a safety precaution.³⁴

These cases represent examples of inept acquisition of land, inequitable compensation, and insensitive resettlement of the population. Compensation was not even based on the income the land produced on a subsistence economy.³⁵ Indeed, what the Micronesians now need is compensation for life on a money economy, not a coconut economy.

In April 1970 the Mid-Corridor people took matters in their own hands, returned to the missile range islands, and staged a sit-in, bringing missile testing to a halt and thus forcing the Army to renegotiate the 1964 agreement. On 18 December 1970 the Army agreed to pay \$420,000 per year to the Mid-Corridor people until they are

allowed to return to their islands. In 1975 the agreement will be subject to reexamination and renegotiation.³⁶

THE SHIFTING OF THE CROSS

Winds of Change. The neglect and indifference of the 1950's were replaced by a renewed interest in the welfare of the Micronesians in the 1960's. This was the result of several converging developments.

In 1959 Hawaii became the 50th State of the Union, and the American public's warm reception of Hawaii was matched by official uneasiness over past deficiencies in America's Pacific and Caribbean dependencies. For the first time in history, the Pacific islanders are represented in the U.S. Congress as the Hawaiian Congressmen also serve as spokesmen for the Guamanians, Samoans, and Micronesians. It should also be noted that the plight of the people of Appalachia was also recognized at this time.

Hawaii is an area akin in outlook and cultural background to Micronesia, and the Hawaiian Congressmen began to press for greater assistance for their fellow Pacific islanders. They not only supported larger appropriations for the trust territory budget, but also introduced amendments to extend the benefits of Federal programs to Micronesians. As a result, the Micronesians became eligible for participation in a variety of Federal programs such as those relating to education, health, food assistance, and job training.³⁷

Meanwhile, the achievement of statehood by Hawaii coincided with the granting of independence to British, French, and Belgian colonies. In 1960 alone the number of new African members of the United Nations leaped by 16, and the balance of voting power shifted to the Third World. Furthermore, of the 11 United Nations trusteeships, only two remain—Micronesia administered by the United States and

New Guinea by Australia. Two trust territories in the Pacific were among those which became independent—Western Samoa in 1962 and Nauru in 1968.

The 15th session of the General Assembly in 1960 was noteworthy not only because of the appearance of Nikita Khrushchev, but also because of the adoption of two resolutions. Resolution 1541 (XV) was an affirmation that the United Nations would be satisfied with decolonization including independence, free association, or integration with an independent state; but also served as a justification for censuring Portugal for not transmitting information under article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter.³⁸

The Fifteenth General Assembly, however, should be known for its Anti-Colonialist Charter—Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted 14 December 1960, the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."³⁹ It solemnly proclaims the necessity for a speedy end to colonialism and declares that all peoples have the right to self-determination. Almost every development at the United Nations since that time in the field of decolonization has been in terms of this declaration and the Special Committee of 24 established thereunder.⁴⁰ This is the Committee of 24 from which the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew in early 1971.

The United States, already uneasy over the possible consequences of neglect in Micronesia, was aware of the possible implications of Resolution 1514 (XV) and the Committee of 24. The real impetus from the United Nations, however, came from the Trusteeship Council which is composed of equal numbers of administering and nonadministering members, including such other permanent members of the Security Council.⁴¹ Since there are now only two administering authorities, the United States and Australia, there are

no other nonadministering members to be elected because of the inclusion of the Republic of China, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

Members of the U.N. Visiting Missions are drawn from the membership of the Trusteeship Council, and no mission has ever included a Soviet representative. The inspections and findings of the various missions have always been undertaken in a critical but constructive spirit, reflecting its makeup, and the United States was thus unusually receptive to their recommendations.

Until 1961, Visiting Missions appointed by the Trusteeship Council dallied but briefly in Micronesia. The decolonization of Africa and Western Samoa's imminent independence, however, prompted the 1961 mission to conduct a proper survey. Its report was not hypercritical, but pointed to so many deficiencies that the new Kennedy administration was stimulated into unaccustomed activity.⁴²

An energetic Alaskan, M. Wilfred Goding, was appointed High Commissioner in 1961. One of his first accomplishments was to persuade the U.S. Congress to more than double the budget from \$7.5 million to \$17.5 million. Goding made 38 trips to Washington in 4 years, mostly in order to raise funds. A new Micronesian quip was coined, "In Goding we trust," to be added to the early nickname, "Rust Territory."⁴³

The budget continued to rise until it reached \$60 million in fiscal 1971. A survey of the territory's resources by Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., provided a long-range plan for economic development. The administration did not accept all the recommendations, particularly that on alienation of land (i.e., sale of land to nonnatives), but proceeded on the road to tourism by modernizing air transport and building tourist hotels.

Major emphasis was placed on education, especially the teaching of English

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as a second language (the TESI Program) and thus the *lingua franca* for the nine major linguistic groups, and public high schools were opened in each of the districts. A crash program began the improvement of health services and was spurred on further by a critical World Health Organization (WHO) investigation in 1965, which highlighted the prevalence of tuberculosis and the poverty of general sanitation.⁴⁴

The Peace Corps was invited in 1966 and reached its peak in 1968 with 665 volunteers. The dispersal of so many Americans could not but significantly influence the attitudes and aspirations of the Micronesians. Their overwhelming presence became a matter of controversy among Americans and Micronesians alike. The number of volunteers was reduced to 338 in 1971.⁴⁵ Most Micronesians, however, were impressed by the young Americans who were willing to live among them in their villages and also to intercede on their behalf with the administration. In the latter respect, the Peace Corps volunteer lawyers rendered invaluable service for the Micronesians, but their efforts were often considered "meddling" in local politics by administrators. On balance, however, the volunteers gave the Micronesians a look at a type of American different from the occasional Government employee.

The Accomplishments. By 1962 the United States had concluded that it was to the advantage of American security to recast the old policy of frugality for one of generosity. The decision was made to bring the Micronesians into the orbit of the 20th century as quickly as possible by accelerating the planned educational, social, economic, and political development of the islands. The last was to be undertaken with a view toward shaping future relationships between Micronesia and the United States.⁴⁶

What have been the accomplishments

of the new deal for Micronesia during the past decade? A useful reference for taking stock is the report of the 1970 U.N. Visiting Mission which consisted of Mr. Kenneth Rogers of Australia as Chairman, Mr. Men-Hsien Wang of China, Mr. Alain Deschamps of France, and Mr. David Lane of the United Kingdom.

In education the U.N. Mission recognized the formidable task of providing educational services for the widely scattered islands. Progress noted by the 1967 Visiting Mission has been continued, and very significant advancement has been made in some sectors in education. The mission recommended greater priority to vocational and technical education and more attention to curricula of more relevance to Micronesian society and economy.⁴⁷

The deplorable state of health during the first 15 years has now been remedied, and both the administration and the Congress of Micronesia are optimistic that the Comprehensive Health Plan will meet the goal of bringing the health services up to, if not surpassing, the minimum standards of a U.S. community. Micronesians have taken over most positions in the medical and health services and account for 96 percent of the 900 persons employed.⁴⁸ The major problem in social advancement is juvenile delinquency.⁴⁹

In the economic development, the following is the conclusion of the 1970 Visiting Mission:

The Visiting Mission did not see signs of significant progress in the economy of the Territory as a whole. In particular, the basic infrastructure is still in a lamentable state, agriculture is stagnant and seems to be threatened by the movement of population to the towns, the adverse trade balance is increasing and, apparently, some pressure is beginning to be felt on prices.⁵⁰

The mission did notice some encouraging developments in tourism and air transport and the readiness of the administration to consider reforms and to continue financial assistance.

The Visiting Mission also discussed a number of unresolved issues, particularly those relating to land and war claims. Indeed, the mission found that Palau representatives gave priority to the restoration of public lands to Palauan control and the payment of war damage claims over discussions of the future political status of the trust territory.⁵¹ The Micronesians are also suspicious of the land registration program, a 5-year program costing \$5 million, which many now believe might take over 15 years for completion.⁵²

One generation after the end of World War II, the damages suffered by an innocent people remain uncompensated. It was not until 1969 that the United States was able to obtain agreement from Japan for a settlement of the war claims. The agreement treats all Japanese claims in Micronesia as fully and finally settled and commits both Governments to a joint *ex gratia* grant of \$5 million each to the Micronesians.⁵³ The Micronesians have been disappointed over the long delay in the settlement of the claims and have expressed dissatisfaction over the \$10 million figure as well as the fact that the Micronesians were not consulted during the negotiations. Representative Patsy T. Mink, in testimony before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, supported the Micronesians and asked for House approval of a fund up to \$100 million to pay all claims.⁵⁴

Another category of claims concerns the use or loss of property after the securing of the islands, thus the post-secure or postwar damage claims amounting to some \$20 million. Legislation for the settlement of both categories is still pending, and the Visiting Mission hoped that it would be treated with priority "in justice to the claimants

and in the interests of good government and popular confidence in government procedures."⁵⁵

Of the four areas of development, the United States was most successful in political and constitutional development. The Micronesians themselves acknowledged this contribution:

Whatever our particular evaluations of the American administration in Micronesia may be, we feel that one contribution has been indelible, one achievement almost unqualified: the idea of democratic, representative, constitutional government. Our recommendation of a free associated state is indissolubly linked to our desire for such a democratic, representative, constitutional government. We endorse this system—which was brought to us by America and which we have come to know as an essentially American system.⁵⁶

The U.N. Visiting Mission paid tribute to the fact that the inhabitants of the trust territory enjoy a degree of personal freedom and civil liberties which would be regarded as enviable in many parts of the world.⁵⁷

The United States had succeeded in educating a leadership which is articulate and creating a political institution which has become a vehicle for political advancement.⁵⁸ The problem was the pace, degree, and direction of self-government. The U.N. Visiting Mission, in tracing the achievements of the Congress of Micronesia and its Status Commission, recommended that greater responsibility be given to the Congress, including the possibility of cabinet government.⁵⁹

COMING OF AGE OF THE MICRONESIANS

1968: Summer of Dissent. When the United States created the Congress of

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Micronesia in 1965, it took the first important step toward promoting political advancement on a territory-wide basis. By that time most of the world had been decolonized, and most of the trust territories had already assumed the responsibilities of self-government or independence. Thus the Micronesians are coming of age politically somewhat belatedly—after Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, and Nauru.

The question of land was the first issue for the new Congress of Micronesia. Land is Micronesia's scarcest resource and its most precious—precious not only because of its scarcity (the density of population is 140 per square mile and only 100 of the 2,000 islands are inhabited or inhabitable) but because of the role it plays in traditional cultural patterns. Only in the Marianas does land tenure resemble the Western system in law and spirit.

The administration has acknowledged this fact and has gone to great length in protecting the inhabitants against the loss of their lands in accordance with article 6(2) of the Trusteeship Agreement. It has continued to adhere to the policy of nonalienation of land to non-Micronesians,⁶⁰ and it has excepted the application of common law to the ownership, use, inheritance, and transfer of land.⁶¹ And nothing is more eloquent than the administration's description of land tenure in the U.S. annual reports to the United Nations, viz, "Land is identified with food . . . That is my food."⁶²

For the Micronesians the unhappy experience of land and the administration was embodied in Eminent Domain, always spoken of in capital letters. The existing law allows the administration almost unlimited power to take private land for public use, even though 60 percent of the land (90 percent in the Marianas) are "public."⁶³

The Congress of Micronesia and the administration, as well, believe that this power should be limited, but neither is

able to agree on how. In 1966 Senator Amata Kabua of the Marshalls, Kwajalein to be precise, introduced an eminent domain bill which the Congress passed. The High Commissioner vetoed it.

In 1967 the administration submitted its proposal. The Congress amended it extensively to reflect their 1966 version. The High Commissioner did not approve it.

In 1968, the summer of dissent,⁶⁴ the Congress did three things—it voted to override the 1967 pocket veto, it passed another bill identical to the 1967 one, and, for good measure, it passed a bill repealing the existing statutory provisions on eminent domain. The High Commissioner refused to give his approval to these measures.

In 1968 the Congress of Micronesia also passed a bill to provide that the burden of proof shall be on the trust territory government to establish the ownership of certain interests in land and to permit the validity of certain land transfers occurring between the last day of the German administration and the first day of the American administration of the trust territory to be challenged. The High Commissioner also refused to approve this legislation.⁶⁵

The Micronesians contend that much of what is classified as public land really belongs to Micronesians from whom the Japanese administration appropriated it. Judge Joseph Fanachoor of Yap, who has served as an interpreter for the Germans, a policeman for the Japanese, and a judge for the Americans, relates how the Japanese beat up the Yapese to force them to sell their land and then returned to beat them up to force them to contribute the money to the Japanese war effort.⁶⁶ This account was corroborated by E.J. Kahn, Jr., in *A Reporter in Micronesia* which gave the following description of the fortunes of the Etsehit brothers who were born in Ponape of a German father and a Belgian mother:

Both brothers were constantly bedeviled by the Japanese, who at one time or another "bought a good deal of their land at prices arbitrarily set by the purchaser. The brothers have since recovered most of their property, after long and not altogether tranquil negotiations with the Trust Territory administration."⁶⁷

The United States has insisted that it is protecting the people against the loss of their lands under article 6(2) of the Trusteeship Agreement by prohibiting the alienation of land to non-Micronesians, and as for the public lands, it is holding these in trust for the Micronesians. At the 1970 session of the Trusteeship Council, Edward Johnston, the High Commissioner, stated the position of the administration:

Before leaving the subject of land in Micronesia, we would again point out that the Administering Authority holds no land title on its own behalf in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Those lands which are designated "public lands" are held by the Administering Authority in trust for the people of Micronesia, and we thank the representative of France for his suggestion that we must obviously work harder to assure that the citizens of Micronesia truly understand this important point.⁶⁸

The Micronesians do know that the land is theirs, and the message is clear—they want it back.

1969: Summer of Decision. At the first session of the Congress of Micronesia in 1965, the House of Representatives turned down a bid for organic legislation for the trust territory and did so again at its second session. Resolutions calling for closer ties or special

relations with the United States were also defeated at the latter session. However, in this 1966 session the Congress of Micronesia did petition the President of the United States "to establish a commission to consult the people of Micronesia to ascertain their wishes and views, and to study and critically assess the political alternatives open to Micronesia."⁶⁹

A year passed while the Department of State, Defense, and the Interior deliberated upon the terms of the resolution to be introduced into the U.S. Congress providing for a status commission.⁷⁰ When the Congress of Micronesia reconvened for its third session, 10 July to 8 August 1967, it decided to establish its own status commission to study the future political alternatives and to help educate the people politically. This move coincided with the growing Micronesian determination to gain control of the land and represented a recognition that the shape of the political future would have an important influence on the shape of their future society. The Micronesians decided they had better make themselves heard. Having seized the initiative, the Congress of Micronesia has been off and running since.

The U.S. response came shortly after the Congress of Micronesia adjourned. On 21 August 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to the U.S. Congress asking for the adoption of a joint resolution setting up a Federal status commission, with the view of enabling the Micronesians "freely to express their wishes as soon as possible, and not later than June 30, 1972, on the future status of the Trust Territory." The joint resolution failed to pass in 1967, again in the election year of 1968, and yet again in 1969.⁷¹ The proposal and the proposed plebiscite have been overtaken by events.

In the meantime, the Future Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia went to work. At the end of

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June 1968 the Commission produced its Interim Report, a document of 125 pages, which concentrated on identifying alternative options for Micronesia, viz, independence, free association, integration with a major power, and continuation as a trust territory.

The Interim Report made a favorable impression on the Congress which extended the mandate of the Commission and appropriated the relatively large sum of \$70,000. The Commission held public hearings in each of the six districts; talked to the political leaders of Nauru (whose 6,000 inhabitants on 8 square miles became independent in 1968) and the Cook Islands (which opted for free association with New Zealand in 1965); visited American Samoa, Western Samoa, Fiji, and the Trust Territory of New Guinea administered by Australia. Finally, the Commission engaged Professor James W. Davidson of the Australian National University, Canberra, as its consultant. Davidson, a New Zealander, had been one of the architects of the Cook Islands free association and Western Samoa's independence Constitution. He was also an adviser to the Nauruans during their negotiations for independence.

In July 1969 the Commission issued its final report, the tone of which is reflected in the statement that the United States has not lacked good will but rather a clearly defined objective and a sense of urgency.⁷² It recommended a self-governing Micronesia in free association with the United States.⁷³ Its concept of free association was derived from United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960. It summarily dismissed association or integration with Japan as being neither advantageous nor practicable. It recommended independence only as a second alternative to be considered if self-government in free association with the United States should not be possible.⁷⁴

While recognizing the opportunity

for an American standard of living that integration with the United States would bring, the Commission rejected that option. The disadvantages were greater—other U.S. citizens would have an equal right to acquire land and conduct business in Micronesia; Micronesia would lose control of its own affairs; Micronesians would be subject to U.S. taxes; Micronesians would have fewer opportunities to hold key positions in the Government; and intensified Americanization would diminish the prospect of preserving Micronesian cultures.⁷⁵

In arriving at its conclusions, the Commission recognized the powerful emotional component of the sentiment in the Marianas District for reintegration with Guam. It treaded carefully around "this peculiar circumstance" and went so far as to state that "it will not oppose a political union which reflects the freely-expressed desire of a majority of the residents of the district."⁷⁶ But it also noted that it was ultimately for the United States and the United Nations to resolve this question and expressed the hope that separation would not be taken until all the possibilities for partnership had been explored.

The significance of the Commission and its report lies in the fact that the Micronesians, in examining the future status, finally became aware of the implications of the strategic trusteeship; that is, under current legal authority the United States may locate military bases on any Micronesian island at any time. The Commission considered the most surprising aspect of its hearings in the six districts was the degree of anxiety at the prospect of the location of U.S. military bases. This concern expressed itself in three different ways—use of land; the social-cultural impact of numerous foreigners on vulnerable, conservative, and numerically insignificant Micronesian communities; and the risk of war and destruction.⁷⁷

The Commission, nonetheless, stated:

Our experience with the military has not always been encouraging. But as a self-governing state in free association with the United States, we would accept the necessity of such military needs and we would feel confident that we could enter into responsible negotiations with the military, endeavoring to meet American requirements while protecting our own interests.⁷⁸

The Future Political Status Commission thus recognized two inescapable realities: the fact of longstanding American strategic interest in the area and the need for Micronesian self-government. Micronesia had to become fully self-governing "because the continuation of a quasi-colonial status would prove degrading to Micronesia and unworthy of America."⁷⁹

1970: Summer of Determination.⁸⁰

The Congress of Micronesia endorsed the report of the Status Commission and established a Political Status Delegation. The Micronesian Delegation was authorized to press for an early resolution of the future political status of Micronesia and to take part in preliminary discussions regarding future relations between Micronesia and the United States.

Talks were held in Washington in September 1969, on Saipan in January 1970, and again on Saipan in May 1970. The Micronesian Delegation was headed by Senator Lazarus Sali of Palau who also headed the Status Commission. The U.S. Delegation was chaired by the Honorable Harrison Loesch, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Public Land Management.

The Micronesian Delegation submitted its report to the Congress of Micronesia on 22 July 1970, and it is on this report that the following is perforce based. The writers have not seen the report of the U.S. Delegation and presume that it is classified.

The Micronesian Delegation presented a list of 11 topics for discussion during the Washington talks which lasted about 3 weeks. These 11 topics were:⁸¹

1. That the people of Micronesia will draft and adopt their own constitution;
2. That the Micronesians will be assured that there will be no confiscation of their land and no military bases will be established in the islands without full consultation and consent of the Government of Micronesia and fair compensation; that land currently held, controlled or possessed by the United States under lease or other arrangements will be renegotiated;
3. That the United States, subject to certain exemptions, limitations, and conditions, will conduct Micronesia's external affairs and provide protection from outside aggression and consult with Micronesia before entering into international obligations with respect to Micronesia;
4. That Micronesia will agree not to allow any other country to enter into Micronesia for military purposes;
5. That the United States will agree to an early settlement of Micronesia's postwar damage claims;
6. That the United States will remove all barriers to the free movement of Micronesians into the United States;
7. That the United States will also agree to remove all barriers to the free movement of goods from Micronesia into the United States;

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8. That the United States will seek full consultation with the Government of Micronesia in matters of shipping, civil aviation and communication;

9. That Micronesians will have access to the United States Ninth Circuit Court and the United States Supreme Court;

10. That Micronesia will continue to have access to banking facilities in the United States, to the use of United States currency and postal services; and

11. That the United States will guarantee financial aid to Micronesia.

No conclusions were reached during these preliminary discussions in Washington, but the Micronesian Delegation reported U.S. agreement in principle with the basic Micronesian position except for the question of the control of land. The Micronesians insisted on unqualified control of land, while the U.S. Delegation presented a formula for the acquisition of land which gave the President of the United States ultimate power to acquire land in Micronesia. There was also disagreement as to whether any association would be permanent or revocable.

The next exchange between the two delegations occurred in January 1970, during the special session of the Congress of Micronesia on Saipan. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Harrison Loesch informally presented to the Micronesians a draft bill which would have made Micronesia an unincorporated territory of the United States, like Guam and the Virgin Islands. Surprised and taken aback by this turn of events, the Micronesians could not but find this to be "almost totally objectionable."^{8 2}

Discussions were resumed on Saipan from 4 to 8 May 1970. The Micronesian

Delegation, in pursuing free association, put forth the following four principles:^{8 3}

1. That sovereignty in Micronesia resides in the people of Micronesia and their duly constituted government;

2. That the people of Micronesia possess the right of self-determination and may therefore choose independence or self-government in free association with any nation or organization of nations;

3. That the people of Micronesia have the right to adopt their own constitution and to amend, change or revoke any constitution or governmental plan at any time; and

4. That free association should be in the form of a revocable compact, terminable unilaterally by either party.

From the Micronesian point of view, it was understood that following agreement on the principles, the United States and Micronesia would prepare a compact detailing the rights and obligations of both parties. Briefly, it meant that the United States would have control of external affairs and defense, and the Micronesians full and unqualified powers in their internal affairs.^{8 4}

The U.S. Delegation presented a proposal for commonwealth status, thus implying rejection of or nonreceptivity to the Micronesian desire for free association. Under the proposal the Micronesians would become U.S. nationals or, on simple application to the Federal Court, U.S. citizens. The Micronesian Delegation found the U.S. proposal unacceptable on three basic issues: control of land, control of laws, and control of future status.^{8 5}

Land. Under the terms of the U.S. proposal, the U.S. Government would

have the right to retain whatever land it now holds and the right, failing negotiation, to acquire additional land under a complicated formula with ultimate resort to eminent domain. The Micronesians replied that they must insist on unqualified Micronesian control of land because of their circumstances and traditions:

This does not mean that a Government of Micronesia would not be ready to enter into negotiations with the United States for the lease of certain areas. Moreover, in making this statement, we are fully conscious that the United States would be the more powerful partner to such negotiations. But, on the issue of legal control, we are unable to agree to any compromise. This, indeed, has been one of the primary motives for insistence upon a relation of free association.⁸⁶

The U.S. proposal would also permit the purchase of land in Micronesia by a non-Micronesian provided he is an established resident and the transaction is approved by a majority of a special commission of local residents. The Micronesian Delegation doubted the efficacy of such safeguards within the context of the current proposal. It did not point out that the Constitution of American Samoa, ratified by the Secretary of the Interior in 1967, continues the policy of protecting Samoans against the alienation of their land and also that the U.S. Congress reintroduced nonalienation of Indian tribal land in the Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934.

Control of Law. The U.S. proposal stipulates that the future constitution of Micronesia must provide for a republican form of government (and separation of powers), include a bill of rights, and not be contrary to the provisions of the

U.S. Act establishing the commonwealth relationship or the Constitution of the United States. No law enacted by the Congress of Micronesia could be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, laws of the United States, or treaties entered into by the United States. The Micronesians objected to this unlimited application of the principle of federal supremacy.⁸⁷ They have already indicated that they are prepared to accept federal supremacy only in external affairs and defense.

Control of Future Status. The Micronesian Delegation found the single most objectionable feature to be the permanent and irrevocable status under the commonwealth proposal. While the Micronesians have consistently pressed for a status which is unilaterally terminable, they indicated a receptivity to safeguards against abrupt or hasty termination by either party. The report itself cited the free association relations between the United Kingdom and certain former British territories which provided that a 90-day period must elapse between the introduction and passage of legislation to terminate the relationship, and such legislation must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the legislature. In addition, the approval of two-thirds of the electorate in a referendum is required.⁸⁸

The Micronesian Delegation concluded that the U.S. proposal, however well-intentioned, would make Micronesians an insignificant, remote minority at the mercy of whatever changes in policy, politics, and administration occur in the United States.

The delegation next discussed independence, which it maintained was a real alternative which Micronesians have the right to choose and should consider. It believed that "any valid strategic interest in Micronesia could as readily be accommodated in terms of an honorable treaty between Micronesia and the

United States, as by a clause in a Trusteeship Agreement in which Micronesians did not participate."⁸⁹

On the other hand, the disadvantages of independence are substantial and arise principally out of economic factors. "The lack of certain natural resources, the small population, geographical dispersion, cultural diversity, communications and transportation difficulties would gravely challenge any administration and would particularly test a newly-independent government."⁹⁰ These factors which the Micronesian Delegation cited were the same ones which the U.S. Delegation called the particular circumstances that would not make independence a realistically appropriate status for some time to come.⁹¹

The Micronesian Delegation concluded that, despite the differences described, there was some advantage in continuing negotiations with the United States, and there was also the possibility of discussions with Members of the U.S. Congress who must eventually endorse any change in Micronesia's political status.⁹² These differences, however, do not obscure the agreement among the Administering Authority, Micronesian representatives, and the United Nations that Micronesia must eventually be self-governing.⁹³

The delegation believed that the transition to self-government must be begun now, even though the final nature of this government—free association, independence, commonwealth—has not yet been decided. It recommended that the Congress of Micronesia consider immediate measures for the introduction of an executive council or cabinet government, the power of advice and consent in the appointment of the next High Commissioner and other key officials of the administration, increasing legislative control of the budget, and the transformation of the district administrations into district governments responsible to the people. Self-

government at the district level would help safeguard the interests, identities, and traditions of the individual districts.⁹⁴

Finally, the Congress of Micronesia was asked to consider the possibility of convening a constitutional convention, a survey on the economic implications of free association and independence, expert legal assistance in Washington, and assistance from the United Nations.⁹⁵

A Look Backward. In looking back, one cannot but be struck at how far the Micronesians have traveled in a very short time. There was no territorial forum from which the elected representatives of the Micronesians could speak as a whole to the Americans until the Congress of Micronesia met in 1965. Since that year they have set up a status commission to study their circumstances and their options, they have made their choices and authorized a negotiating delegation, and they have pursued their goals with consistency and persistence.

In doing so, the Micronesians have shown themselves sensitive and imaginative, and seem to indicate that they have come to realize that no nation—Spain, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, or the United States—is made up of people who are all good or all bad, all efficient or all inefficient, all honest or all dishonest. Of the Americans, the Micronesians are certain of their good will, but fault them for their lack of a clearly defined objective and a sense of urgency or priority in Micronesia.⁹⁶

Acting on that assumption, the Micronesians have consistently seized the initiative and held the high ground with the view of forcing the United States to pay attention to them and to take them seriously. They have appealed to the conscience and sense of fair play of the Americans by acting within the tradition of American freedom and democracy. They could not do otherwise since that tradition is now part of their

heritage. They have sought to have the United States act in consonance with the Trusteeship Agreement and the Wilsonian legacy. They have done this, simply and briefly, by forcing the United States to negotiate with them as if they were not only constituent but also sovereign representatives. In other words, they refused to play Indians.

Yet, as the report of the Micronesian Delegation states, the two delegations have arrived at something of an impasse concerning Micronesia's future. The report suggests some of the responsible factors:

1. First and foremost, United States security interests in Micronesia seem to be the overriding consideration in the position of the United States.

2. Second, the position of the United States seems to be based upon its past experience with its territories and possessions, the United States now seeking to fit Micronesia into the commonwealth slot based upon a status similar to that of Puerto Rico.

3. Third, the two Delegations approached the May discussions in different manners. The Micronesian Delegation hoped to center discussions on the major issues and to reach agreement on general principles defining free association. The United States Delegation entered the discussions with a firm proposal, hoped to center discussions upon it, and was not authorized to deviate in substance.

4. Lastly, the Report discussed "the matter of the attitude of the United States Delegation and its apparent misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the wishes and desires of the people of Micro-

nesia." In other words, the United States offer implies that the Micronesians want to become Americans, and the United States apparently believes that it can best determine what is the best status for Micronesia.

DILEMMA FOR THE UNITED STATES

Strategic Interest. The Micronesians are convinced that the U.S. strategic interest in Micronesia is undiminished and inflexible and is the basis for the U.S. insistence on eminent domain, federal supremacy, and permanent association. In practical terms, they believe that the Department of Defense is planning to relocate existing bases in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan to various islands in Micronesia.

But, is it simply a matter of bases? What then is the U.S. strategic interest in Micronesia? The primary and paramount interest is—denial.

Japan was able to undertake the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor because it controlled Micronesia. From the Carolines the Japanese then advanced to the west, the south, the east, and even the north. By the end of December 1941, Guam, Wake, the Gilberts, and most of the Philippines were in Japanese hands. Before the middle of the next year the Japanese had moved down to New Guinea, the Bismareks, and the Solomons.

Over 6,000 Americans were killed wresting Micronesia from Japanese control.⁹⁸ Today, a generation after Pearl Harbor, the temper of the American people is still such that it would hardly countenance permitting the islands to return to Japan or to go to any other nation. It should be emphasized that the American people include the citizens of the State of Hawaii and the Territory of Guam, two American territories which bracket Micronesia from the east and from the west and which were not only

subjected to enemy attack but also, in the case of Guam, suffered grievously under enemy occupation for 3 years.

On the other hand, perhaps three or four thousand Micronesians died during the fighting in World War II.⁹⁹ The number will never be known, and this was out of an estimated 50,000 Micronesians. The virtual total destruction of the economic structure has yet to be made up, while losses in personal property were massive in the combat zones. For the Micronesians, a policy of denial means the removal of Micronesia from the contention of the great powers and stability during a period of unsettled international conditions.

Denial is thus in the interest of both the United States and Micronesia. It is the only undiminished and inflexible element in the strategic importance of Micronesia.

The Potential of Bases. Other elements of the U.S. strategic interest in Micronesia consist of the Kwajalein Missile Range Facility and potential sites for future bases. The use of Kwajalein has now been placed on a mutually satisfactory basis through negotiations and increased compensation. See *supra*.

As for future bases, a glance at a map shows clearly that the potential sites are in the Marianas, Yap, and Palau, for these islands are in the proximity of the Asian mainland and its offshore islands. Hanson W. Baldwin maintains that continued U.S. control of Micronesia is essential but points out that Guam, with its fine harbor of Apra and well-developed airfields and ammunition storage areas, is the natural focus for U.S. military facilities in Micronesia. Because of overcrowding on Guam, he believes that ultimately Rota and Saipan will be required, and there may well be need for development of staging fields or refueling or communications facilities at Ulithi Atoll (Yap) and in the Palau group.¹⁰⁰

Mr. Baldwin's scale of priorities—Guam first, then the Marianas, and later possibly Yap and Palau—coincides with the political receptivity of these islands to military facilities. Guam is U.S. territory and the Guamanians are U.S. citizens who have long been accustomed to the presence of the military. The people in the Marianas have expressed their desire to reintegrate with Guam and become U.S. citizens and also have petitioned for U.S. bases. The Yapese are apprehensive, however, while the Palauans have gone on record against military bases.

Except for Guam which is American and Kwajalein which is in being, the matter of bases is still a potential but valuable asset. There are plans, but plans are not decisions. Recently, however, such plans have acquired an immediacy because of the reversion of Okinawa and the post-Vietnam scene; and, if there should be a need for alternate sites to bases in Okinawa and/or the Philippines, Micronesia's westernmost islands would be the logical candidates. In this eventuality it appears highly unlikely that the U.S. Congress would authorize enormous sums, say, several billions of dollars, for the construction of an "Okinawa" in Micronesia. Indeed, even if congressional sentiment and limited budgetary resources were not real-world constraints, a good case could be made for a modest basing plan designed to support a maritime strategy (with ground forces afloat) over one which envisions forward deployment of ground forces in permanent facilities such as those in Okinawa.

In the latter respect, the role which the United States should play in Asia under the Nixon Doctrine would have to be defined more precisely in terms of the sort of presence in the Western Pacific required to support it before the Department of Defense can determine what forces and facilities are needed. In the meantime, hardware will get better and better but more costly; new

concepts (sea base and strategic mobility) utilizing new hardware will continue to be developed; officers in the Pentagon will continue to revise plans for bases in Micronesia; and students at the war colleges will add further knowledge and understanding of the 100,000 Micronesians and their 2,000 islands.

Removing the Uncertainty. Most Micronesians are aware of the difference between planning and actual decisions. That, however, is exactly what agitates them—the certainty of strategic interest and the uncertainty of bases. They know that the United States is increasingly attracted to the idea of bases in Micronesia, but they do not know where, when, or how the land needed would be taken. Now and then every district is racked by rumors that this or that piece of land is about to be confiscated and used as a base.

Philip W. Quigg, managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, has recommended that the United States make a policy statement that no land would be acquired for bases without full consultation and adequate compensation.¹⁰¹ This, he believed, would improve the climate in Micronesia, pending a resolution of the status question.

Another suggestion has been to consider locating bases on uninhabited islands, an appealing idea since only 100 of more than 2,000 islands are inhabited. Such islands are well suited as training sites for amphibious forces. Most of the uninhabited islands, however, lack sufficient land and water to support a typical base area, and the development of a port facility would be very expensive.

Nevertheless, the above ideas do not appear sufficient to quiet the anxiety or fear of the Micronesians outside of the Marianas, for they do not end the uncertainty of where the bases would be located and if eminent domain would be exercised. This frustration must be removed before there could be a satis-

factory resolution of the future political status of Micronesia and its relationship with the United States.

After 25 years it might also be time for the United States to state definitely what it needs, even if it is simply an option to build. But how could the Department of Defense and the services define their land requirements in Micronesia when important decisions on force structure and future missions are yet to be taken? Would not the military simply color up the map and continue to hoard the land as the proverbial squirrel does?

Not if they have to pay for it from their current budget—in the manner airlines take out options on aircraft under development and Federal agencies obtain PL 480 counterpart funds from the Treasury by giving up dollars from their budgets. The need to negotiate a satisfactory lease and to pay hard cash for it appears to be the only practical means of obtaining a rational definition of military land requirements. The lease will provide the trust territory government with needed revenues, and, like the Kwajalein agreement, it could be subject to reexamination and renegotiation after 5 years.

There is sufficient public land available that there need be no resort to acquisition of private land. In this case, eminent domain would not be needed. In any case, the complicated formula entailing ultimate resort to eminent domain under the commonwealth proposal is so diluted that it is doubtful whether the United States would wish to go to the ultimate step in the face of adamant popular opposition. Good community relations are a necessity in Japan and elsewhere, and there is no reason to make an exception in Micronesia.

Finally, the B-29 airfields and deep-water wharves built during the war in the Marianas are waiting to be rehabilitated, and the people there have been asking for the return of the military. The Marianas are, of course, 700 miles

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further away from Southeast Asia than are the Palau and Yap Islands. On the other hand, the Marianas are closer to Shanghai, Peking, Tokyo, and Vladivostok.

Defining military land requirements as suggested above might produce some unexpected results, for the desires of any consumer, including the military, generally outrun available means. The Micronesian fear of bases might simply evaporate when it comes down to a matter of hard cash, particularly as long as the market is limited to only one purchaser and if the seller seeks to drive too hard a bargain.

Legal and Moral Obligation. The strategic interest has generally pre-occupied most Americans who have been interested in Micronesia. The United States, however, has a strong political interest in the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and in the future development of Micronesia. Economically, of course, the islands are a liability and would continue to require large sums of money unless or until the oceanic resources are developed.

The political interest results from a legal obligation in the Trusteeship Agreement to develop the Micronesians for self-government or independence as well as from a moral obligation that derives from the traditional American championship of freedom and democracy. It would be extremely damaging to the prestige and position of the United States as the leader of the free world if it were to allow an exclusive concern with its strategic interest to preclude an honorable fulfillment of its legal and moral obligation. The consequences of such an unfortunate development, although difficult to predict now, cannot be lightly brushed aside, for who could have predicted the repercussions resulting from thoughtless neglect and arbitrary decisions on Bikini and Eniwetok?

The United States has dealt intelli-

gently with dependent members of the American political family. The Philippines received its independence in 1946, and the status of commonwealth was newly created for Puerto Rico where the sentiment is now shifting toward statehood but with a rise in militancy among those favoring independence. Alaska and Hawaii became States, while Guam and the Virgin Islands received Organic Acts with the status of unincorporated territory. It should be stressed at this point that friends and allies of the United States—Australia, the United Kingdom, China, and France—have reaffirmed in the Trusteeship Council the right of the Micronesians to self-determination, including independence.^{1 02}

There is no doubt that the United States will find a bold and imaginative resolution of the dilemma between its strategic interest and its legal and moral obligation. It will then add a new dimension to the Wilsonian legacy which has given international law the mandate and the strategic trusteeship. It can do so if it perceives clearly what its paramount strategic and political interests are in Micronesia.

BEHIND THE RHETORIC

Fragile Unity. That the widely dispersed and culturally different islands of the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas are now a political entity is a historical happenstance—not once but four times. Spain, Germany, Japan, the League of Nations, the United States, and the United Nations—without these outside forces there would not have been an entity known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

If outside forces were responsible for the unity of Micronesia, they were also responsible for one significant fragmentation—the artificial detachment of Guam from the rest of the Marianas. By every criterion—ethnic, cultural, geographic, and popular wish—the Marianas and Guam are one.

In a special unofficial poll in the Marianas on 9 November 1969, a total of 1,942 voted in favor of reintegration with Guam, 19 for independence, 107 for unincorporated territory of the United States, and 1,116 for free association. Of 4,954 registered voters, 3,233 voted in this poll.¹⁰³ Another indication of popular feeling consists of petitions by the Saipan Legislature for the return of U.S. military forces to Saipan.¹⁰⁴

A few days prior to this poll, another unofficial poll on Guam showed 2,688 voted for reintegration with the Marianas and 3,720 against. However, only 6,408 out of about 18,000 registered voters took the trouble to vote, and this poll cannot be taken as a definitive indication of Guamanian popular wishes.¹⁰⁵

In the 1970 elections for the Congress of Micronesia, the future political status of the trust territory was a real issue and the decisive factor in the Marianas. Those Congressmen who had spoken out for free association and/or independence were defeated by members of the Popular Party which seeks union with Guam. Elsewhere the status issue was not a factor, and American officials generally agree that the other Micronesians, although not as fully informed as the Chamorros of the Marianas are, support their elected representatives in the drive for a new status, i.e., free association.

When the first session of the Fourth Congress of Micronesia convened on 11 January 1971, the differences between the Chamorros who want to join the United States in one form or another and the rest of the Micronesians who want free association became more pronounced. The representatives from the Marianas found themselves increasingly frozen out of the work of the Congress. Their secessionist sentiment flared up when the Congress passed an income tax bill which the Marianas District leaders say is not equitable.

On 19 February the Marianas District Legislature unanimously adopted a resolution advising the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations that the Mariana Islands "will secede from the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by force of arms if necessary, and with or without the approval of the United Nations."

Less than 24 hours later, at about 4:30 in the morning of 20 February, the Senate and House chambers of the Congress of Micronesia were burned to the ground. The fire appeared to have been deliberately set, according to investigators on the scene. Late that afternoon the Congress met in an old club building and decided to adjourn *sine die*, but a special session will be called as soon as vital records destroyed in the fire can be reconstructed to permit a continuation of the work of the Congress. The Congress still had 9 working days remaining when the fire occurred, and only three bills had been passed.¹⁰⁶

Rumors spread widely after the fire, and officials of the trust territory government sought to calm the people, denying that there was any evidence to connect the fire with opposition to the tax bill. The government, however, thought it prudent to ask Air Micronesia to bump enough passengers so that nine representatives from Ponape and Palau could leave Saipan on the first available flight the next morning.¹⁰⁷ Conversely, it is unlikely that any representative of the Marianas would dare set foot in Palau or any of the other districts.

The consequences of this unfortunate incident are only dimly perceived as this is being written, but there appears to be a profound cleavage in the fragile unity.

A Simmering Volcano? If the Chamorros are the disaffected element in the Trust Territory, the driving force are the Palauans. Ambitious and aggressive, the Palauans are sometimes spoken of as the Jews or the Ibos of the Pacific.

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For example, the first Micronesian lawyer is a Palauan.

The Palauans adapted well under the Japanese administration which had its headquarters in Koror, the capital of Palau. The Palauans have never forgotten the benefits and the prestige they enjoyed then nor the bombings and attendant deprivations ensuing thereafter. Willard Price wrote in 1964 of the decay he encountered at every turn in Palau¹⁰⁸ and concluded that there was "a simmering volcano," the more dangerous because it had religious and fanatic overtones.¹⁰⁹

If any individual Micronesian stands out as the leading personality in the drive for a new status, he would be Senator Lazarus Salii of Palau. As chairman of both the Status Commission and the Negotiating Delegation, Senator Salii has been responsible for much of the impetus and direction of the Micronesian movement for free association. Many Americans believe he could be Micronesia's first elected High Commissioner, while others think he harbors the ambition of being the George Washington of Micronesia. On the other hand, articulate Micronesians, who are prone to sloganeering, tend to refer to Salii as Thomas Jefferson or Patrick Henry. Unlike the stereotyped, boisterous Palauan, Salii is quiet, thoughtful, often enigmatic.¹¹⁰

In the Marshall Islands, American whalers and missionaries had a long impact on the people before the Germans and the Japanese came. The Marshallese are therefore more aware of the world around them than some of the other districts. The Marshallese appreciate keenly both the material benefits of the American presence and the potential value of their 70 square miles in their future relationship with the United States. Despite resentment over Bikini, Eniwetok, and Kwajalein, the Marshallese are widely regarded as being more pro-American than the people of any district except for the Marianas.¹¹¹

If the Chamorros of the Marianas want to opt out, the Ponapeans appear to appreciate the advantages of a united Micronesia and the dangers of insular separatism. This may be due to their remoteness and to the diversity of the cultures in the Ponape District. Besides a Polynesian element in the south, the two main islands—Ponape and Kusai—are inhabited by two different peoples who are at odds so much that in 1968 the Congress of Micronesia endorsed their separation into two districts.¹¹²

Of the two remaining districts, both Truk and Yap have been less receptive to American influence and have remained relatively conservative and traditionalist. Yap, in particular, would prefer to remain a picturesque anachronism, but change is coming and expectations are rising.

The Two Worlds of Micronesia. Truk and Yap illustrate the disparity of development among the different islands of Micronesia, not only in terms of plumbing, but also in the matter of outlook. Indeed, there are two worlds in Micronesia.

According to the 1967 Territorial Health Census,¹¹³ 16,600 or about 40 percent out of a labor force of 41,000 were reported to be remuneratively employed. And half of the 16,600 were listed as subsistence-copra farmers, fishermen, handicraft producers, or boatbuilders who receive a small cash income. The average copra producer, for example, earns an estimated \$285 annually.

The above figures indicate that in 1967 only 20 percent of the total labor force received wages on either a regular or part-time basis. Of the 8,222 wage earners, 5,235 were employed by the trust territory government, municipal and district governments, and other governmental agencies. Of the 2,987 in the private sector, the largest group was in construction. The average annual wage was \$1,306 for the government

employee and \$741 for the privately employed. Micronesian wages and employment have continued to rise steadily, and in 1969 the comparable figures had become \$2,015 and \$947. The gap between the government employee and the private worker is unfortunately widening instead of narrowing.

This is the world of the district centers where anyone who is anyone is connected with the government and where most of the residents are now dependent almost entirely on wages for the purchase of food, readymade clothing, and other necessities. The rest of Micronesia still lives on a coconut economy, and the Administering Authority has reported: "Fully 50% of the population remains on a traditional subsistence economy, depending on home-grown food crops and fish, and producing copra and handicraft only for cash to purchase essential items. For many such families the annual income is less than \$100 a year."¹⁴

William R. Norwood, the previous High Commissioner, has described the great contrast between living in the district center and living in the more remote communities. He was not prepared for the fact that "in certain islands of Micronesia the residents are living in substantially the same conditions as their ancestors maybe two hundred years ago, the time Captain Cook and others were exploring the Pacific... while others in the district centers are living as people in Hawaii were living maybe thirty years ago." In addition, he had not expected to find "the tradition of caste and clan and the stratification of the society in some of the districts."¹⁵

A Micronesian view of this second world was given recently by Carl Heine, Deputy District Administrator for Yap, who spoke of "that mythological absurdity called 'Micronesian dignity': 'Is life so cheap, and 'Micronesian dignity' so important that human hunger, ignorance, poverty and poor

medical care can be deleted from the agenda of the status delegation? Can true dignity be conferred if the soul is hopeless and the body destitute?"¹⁶ Carl Heine, who is sympathetic to the quest for a new status except for independence, concluded that it would be a mistake for Micronesia to return to the nobility of its obsolete past where only a few shared honor and dignity and the multitude lived in bondage.

CONCLUSION

Since the Impasse. When the Congress of Micronesia considered the report of its Status Delegation during the summer of 1970, there was growing sentiment for independence. Of the 23 speakers whose statements were published in the *Political Status Digest*,¹⁷ eight spoke explicitly in favor of independence, while only two were for the commonwealth status and even then not in its entirety as offered.

Senator Salii, however, stated that independence, while it might be desirable in the long-range, was not a responsible choice for Micronesia now. He recommended that the Congress recognize that "the only position which will protect Micronesian interest, and at the same time salvage what is left of United States integrity in Micronesia, is self-government in free association with the United States." As for the commonwealth offer, it would make Micronesia "the newest, the smallest, the remotest non-white minority in the United States political family—as permanent and as American, shall we say, as the American Indian."

The following paragraph from Senator Salii's statement on 14 August 1970 probably sums up Micronesian feeling with all the eloquence he could muster:

I have always thought that Micronesia belonged to Micronesians and that the Micronesians had the right to rule their home

islands. I have never believed that the fact that other nations fought wars in our islands and waters and negotiated agreements, mandates, trusteeships among themselves when they finished fighting ever affected the fact that we were Micronesians and this was Micronesia. In peace and in war, this was our home. To others, it was a strategic area, a defense perimeter, a Trust Territory, but we considered this our home. And in the last few years, we have insisted that we have the right to rule our homes.¹¹⁸

The status question dominated the Third Congress of Micronesia which ended 27 August 1970. The Congress adopted the report of its Status Delegation, endorsed the four principles for free association, rejected the commonwealth offer in its present form, invited the United States to continue discussions, insisted on the primacy of its role in the status question, solicited the advice of the United Nations, and established a Joint Committee on Future Status to continue the work of the Status Commission and the Status Delegation.

Unlike the Third Congress, the Fourth Congress of Micronesia, which convened on 11 January 1971, exhibited no great sense of urgency or concern about the status question. It soon became apparent that the new Congress was proceeding to implement the recommendations in the report of the Status Delegation for the transition to self-government.

Measures introduced to further this objective include those on the election of the High Commissioner and the Deputy High Commissioner, advice and consent powers over major administrative appointments, the establishment of an executive council, and the income tax. Only the latter passed the Congress before the unfortunate fire aborted the

session. There were also proposals to extend the territorial seas to 12 miles and to invite the Committee of 24 to the trust territory. On the other hand, the Micronesians indicated where their education and development were leading them by asking the administration to seek the extension of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 to the trust territory.

At the same time, the new Joint Committee on Future Status was organized with Senator Lazarus Salii and Representative Ekpap Silk as cochairmen. The Joint Committee was authorized by the Third Congress not only to continue discussions with the United States, but also to conduct a study on the economic implications of free association and independence and a study of alternative forms of democratic internal government with the view of ultimately holding a constitutional convention. In other words, the Joint Commission was also charged with the implementation of specific recommendations in the Status Delegation report.

The Future. The past is prolog. In the 19th century the United States showed no interest in the Marshalls, and Guam would likely not have been detached from the Marianas if the Philippines had not been acquired. In 1945 the United States would not have insisted on a strategic trusteeship except to prevent Micronesia from ever becoming a staging base for another Pearl Harbor. Once the islands were denied to others, the United States lost interest.

Changed conditions in East Asia have brought about a reexamination of the current base structure in the Western Pacific and a renewed interest in Micronesia. The United States has attempted to pick up where it left off 25 years ago—hurrying up to catch up, trying to do too much too late. Much more than 25 years, however, have gone by, to wit:

There is no question but that the yearning of the world's

peoples for control over their own political destinies is a fact of 20th century life which must be intelligently dealt with by the present administering powers, the dependent peoples themselves, and the international community as a whole. . . .

The smallness, the isolation, and the lack of adequate economic resources to make them self-supporting, clearly dictate for almost all of these areas some sort of association—at least economic and defensive—with a stronger power which can provide continuing assistance to them. As political opinion in these areas matures, it should become obvious to the people that such an association, rather than complete freedom, will be most conducive to their long-term interests. It is therefore considered that given the time and the opportunity to develop their political maturity, self-determination in these small island territories will follow the lead of the Cook Islanders—a free association with the administering power which leaves the population in complete control over its internal processes but which continues the responsibility of the administering power over external affairs.¹¹⁹

This is the point which the Micronesians have sought to convey across the waves of the Pacific. An appreciation of their attitudes as a political fact is not meant as a criticism of U.S. administration. Rather, it constitutes a *sine qua non* for building a sound relationship which would encompass both the welfare of the Micronesians and the security of the United States.

The Micronesians have already rejected the commonwealth offer in its present form, and although they have

flirted with the idea of independence since the impasse last year, their position remains complete internal self-government and free association with the United States. The task for both the Micronesians and the Americans is to define in concrete terms those elements in the spectrum between the commonwealth proposal and the free association concept with which both sides could live. This task challenges the imagination and statesmanship of those who have the responsibility.

Meanwhile, until the future status of the trust territory is resolved, there are some steps which the United States could take. Philip W. Quigg in his *Foreign Affairs* article, for example, makes five recommendations:¹²⁰

1. Assure the Micronesians that the United States will not confiscate land or establish bases without full consultation and fair compensation.
2. Take the administration of the islands out of the Department of Interior and place it directly in the White House.
3. Encourage the Micronesians to tax themselves and give them genuine experience in appropriation of funds and the administration of projects.
4. Remove all barriers to the entry of Micronesian products to the United States.
5. Explore further the possibility of admitting foreign capital, especially Japanese.

To these must be added, as a matter of urgent priority, a prompt and satisfactory settlement of the damage claims arising out of a war which ended 26 years ago and a review of the land registration program and the question of

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public land, perhaps entailing ultimate Micronesian responsibility and participation, in a spirit befitting an administration which returned the sacred Blue Lake and its surrounding 48,000 acres to the 1,400 Taos Indians in New Mexico.¹²¹

Subsequent to the completion of this paper, President Nixon announced on 13 March from Key Biscayne, where he was spending the weekend following his visit to Newport, the appointment of Franklin Hayden Williams as his personal representative with the rank of ambassador to negotiate an agreement

with the Micronesians. Ambassador Williams, who is president of the Asia Foundation, was reported to have been tasked to resolve the somewhat disparate views within the administration and to convince the Micronesians to accept whatever plan he works out.¹²²

The United States is now entering a critical period in its relations with the Micronesians. If the Micronesians choose to continue their association with the United States, they should be allowed to do so in freedom and in dignity, for they really have no viable alternative.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Col. Vincente T. Blaz, U.S. Marine Corps, is a native of the Territory of Guam. He did his undergraduate work at the University of Notre Dame, following which he entered the U.S. Marine Corps

as the first native of Guam to be a career officer in the U.S. Armed Forces. He later earned a master's degree from The George Washington University. He has held numerous command and staff billets in the Corps in both infantry and artillery, and in Vietnam (1965-66) he was the Operations Officer of the 9th Marine Regiment. He has traveled extensively in Micronesia (1959 and 1969). In 1968 he coauthored an article on the subject of Marine reservists for *Coronet*; in 1969 he received an award for outstanding achievement from the Freedom Foundation at Valley Forge for an article he wrote on voting rights. Lieutenant Colonel Blaz is currently a student at the Naval War College, School of Naval Warfare.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Samuel S.H. Lee, a career Foreign Service officer, is a native of Hawaii. He earned both a bachelor's and a master's degree from the University of Missouri, was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of

Glasgow in 1953-54, and did graduate work in international relations at Yale University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955 and was first assigned as vice consul in Palermo, Sicily. Subsequently he served as vice consul in Hamburg, Germany (1956-60); consul in Zagreb, Yugoslavia (1963-64); and second secretary at the Embassy in Saigon (1964-65). He has had several tours of duty in the Department of State, Washington, D.C., where he was intelligence research specialist on the Arabian Peninsula, foreign affairs officer for negotiations on military rights, and political desk officer for UNESCO. Mr. Lee is currently a student at the Naval War College, School of Naval Warfare.

FOOTNOTES

1. Appreciation is due to Antonio B. Won Pat, Guam's Representative in Washington, who was instrumental in arranging the appointments and furnished valuable staff assistance. The writers also met with each of the Hawaiian Congressional Delegations. Among the many helpful officials in the Departments of Interior and State, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Harrison Loesch, who headed the U.S. Delegation to the status talks in 1970, was most generous with his time.

2. U.S. Dept. of State, *22nd Annual Report, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), p. 1.

3. John W. Coulter, *The Pacific Dependencies of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 162-163.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
5. Office of the High Commissioner, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, *Highlights*, 1 December 1970, p. 3.
6. Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez, *A Complete History of Guam* (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1964), p. 41. A good historical account of Micronesia may be found in Harry W. Bergbauer, Jr., "A Review of the Political Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific," *Naval War College Review*, March 1970, p. 43-51.
7. Germany paid \$4.5 million. Coulter, p. 173.
8. Carano and Sanchez, p. 86.
9. Ely J. Kahn, Jr., *A Reporter in Micronesia* (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 22; also, Coulter, p. 272. The hanging tree used by the Germans in Koror, Palau, still exists—complete with iron rungs to facilitate elevating victims to the desired branch.
10. Stanley A. de Smith, *Microstates and Micronesia* (New York: New York University Press, 1970), p. 125-127.
11. Kahn, p. 83.
12. Paul H. Clyde, *Japan's Pacific Mandate* (New York: Macmillan, 1935), p. 31.
13. De Smith, note 10 on p. 129.
14. Dorothy E. Richard, *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands* (Washington: Office of Chief of Naval Operations, 1957), v. II, p. 14.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 58-63. Also, Ruth B. Russell and J. Mulher, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 336-346, 573-587; Norman Meller, *The Congress of Micronesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1969), p. 384-386.
16. United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 394-400.
17. United Nations, Office of Public Information, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: July 1968), p. 43-44.
18. Meller, p. 16.
19. Edward C. O'Connor, "Micronesia America's Frontier in the Far East," *National War College Forum*, Spring 1970, p. 73.
20. The Trust Territory Census of 1958 included a question on literacy in English and Japanese. Of the total population, 5 years of age and over, 27.2 percent spoke Japanese and 21.1 percent could still read it. The comparable figures for English were 25.6 percent and 25.2 percent, U.S. Dept. of State, p. 178.
21. As late as 1967, Ponapeans in Kitti asked the United Nations Visiting Mission as to whether relatives in Japan could return. This request, along with other questions, was typed for the Visiting Mission by the Reverend William McGarry. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, *Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1967 T/1658/Add. 1*, (New York: 1967), p. 49, or T/1668, p. 60.
22. See Robert Trumbull, *Paradise in Trust* (New York: Sloane, 1959), p. 168, for an account on how urbanized Palauan women had to give up rice and learn to grow taro again.
23. Willard Price, *America's Paradise Lost* (New York: Day, 1966), p. 199.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
27. Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., *Economic Development Plan for Micronesia* (Washington, 1966), pt. I, p. 39.
28. Kahn, p. 39-40.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 76-77.
30. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, *Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1970 T/1707*, (New York: 1970), p. 42. See a passionate account by a former Peace Corpsman regarding rat bites on Ujelang in Jerry Fite, "Colonizing Paradise," *Washington Monthly*, December 1970, p. 50-58.
31. Kahn, p. 81-82.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
34. *Pacific Daily News*, 2 November 1970, p. 25.
35. William R. Norwood, former High Commissioner from 1966 to 1969, cited Eniwetok as the classic example in which pricing was inequitable in terms of the value of the land to the Micronesians. *Micronesian Reporter*, Third Quarter 1970, p. 8. Also see Trusteeship Council, *Report of 1967 UN Visiting Mission*, p. 98.

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36. *Micronesian News Service*, 23 December 1970.

37. In February 1971 Senator Hiram L. Fong, for example, reintroduced legislation to make the trust territory eligible for benefits under the Public Works and Economic Development Act, which already covers Hawaii, Guam, and American Samoa. The chief executives of the four island areas formed a Pacific Islands Economic Development Commission in 1970 to seek Federal assistance under the act to develop skipjack tuna fisheries. The bill, reintroduced by Senator Fong, was cosponsored by Senator Daniel K. Inouye. See "Bill to Aid Economies," *Pacific Daily News*, 4 February 1971, p. 1. In the House, Representative Patsy T. Mink provides the Micronesians with unique representation for their welfare and interests in the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, while Representative Spark Matsunaga supported floor action in raising the budget ceiling from \$50 million to \$60 million in fiscal 1971. *Congressional Record*, 14 September 1970, p. 118636.

38. De Smith, p. 31. See Resolutions 1541 (XV) and 1542 (XV), United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records of the General Assembly*, 15th sess., supp. no. 16, A/4684 (New York: 1961), p. 29-31.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 66-67.

40. See especially William O. Miller, "The United Nations and Oceania: New Dimensions in the Cold War Refrain," *Naval War College Review*, June 1969, p. 45-59.

41. *Charter of the UN*, art. 86.

42. De Smith, p. 136.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 137; Kahn, p. 37-38.

44. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, *Report of the World Health Organization on Its Investigation of the Complaints Contained in a Petition Concerning the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands*, T/1647 (New York: 14 January 1966).

45. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record*, T/PV.1362 (New York: 3 June 1970), p. 32.

46. Meller, p. 18.

47. Trusteeship Council, *Report of 1970 UN Visiting Mission*, p. 103.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 72 ff.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 40-41.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 40-41.

53. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report 91-1278, S.J. Res. 211, 6 October 1970, p. 1-12.

54. *Pacific Sunday News*, 28 June 1970, p. 31.

55. Trusteeship Council, *Report of 1970 UN Visiting Mission*, p. 106-107.

56. Congress of Micronesia, *Report, the Future Political Status Commission*, 3d Cong., 2d sess. (Saipan, Mariana Islands: July 1969), p. 8.

57. Trusteeship Council, *Report of 1970 UN Visiting Mission*, p. 126.

58. The story of the use of the Congress of Micronesia for political advancement is told authoritatively by Norman Meller in *The Congress of Micronesia*, *op. cit.*, who was not only recording history but also participating in it as a teacher and adviser to the Micronesians.

59. Trusteeship Council, *Report of 1970 UN Visiting Mission*, p. 115.

60. U.S. Dept. of State, p. 56.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 54-56.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

64. After Marjorie Smith's "The Summer of Dissent," *Micronesian Reporter*, Fourth Quarter 1968, p. 22-25.

65. U.S. Dept. of State, p. 159.

66. "Interview: Joseph Vanachoor," *Micronesian Reporter*, Second Quarter 1969, p. 2-4.

67. Kahn, p. 162.

68. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record*, T/PV.1368 (New York: 11 June 1970), p. 13-15.

69. De Smith, p. 170.

70. Meller, p. 402.

71. De Smith, p. 170.

72. Congress of Micronesia, *Report of Status Commission*, p. 12, 14.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 48-49.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
80. After Office of the High Commissioner, "Congress Adjourns 'Summer of Determination,'" *Highlights*, 1 September 1970, p. 1.
81. Congress of Micronesia, *Report of the Political Status Delegation of the Congress of Micronesia*, 3d Cong., 3d regular sess. (Saipan, Mariana Islands: 22 July 1970), p. 2-3.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 40-41.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 50-52.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 52-56.
96. Congress of Micronesia, *Report of Status Commission*, p. 12, 14.
97. Congress of Micronesia, *Report of Status Delegation*, p. 44-46.
98. Meller, p. 14.
99. De Smith, p. 127.
100. Hanson W. Baldwin, *Strategy for Tomorrow* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 280.
101. Philip W. Quigg, "Coming of Age in Micronesia," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969, p. 493-508.
102. United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records*, S/9400 (New York: 1969), p. 75-76; United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records*, S/9893 (New York: 1970), p. 78-79.
103. Trusteeship Council, *Report of 1970 UN Visiting Mission*, p. 172.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
106. *Micronesian News Service*, 20 February 1971.
107. "Heavy Guard on TT's American Community," *Pacific Daily News*, 22 February 1971, p. 1, 23.
108. Price, p. 129.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
110. Smith, p. 26.
111. De Smith, p. 135.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
113. U.S. Dept. of State, p. 83-85.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
115. "Interview: William R. Norwood," *Micronesian Reporter*, Third Quarter 1969, p. 4.
116. Carl Heine, "Micronesia Is Confused about What It Wants," *Pacific Islands Monthly*, September 1970, p. 118.
117. Congress of Micronesia, *Political Status Digest* 3d regular sess., July-August 1970. This contains all major speeches and remarks, texts of six resolutions, and newspaper and magazine articles.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
119. Miller, p. 56-57.
120. Quigg, p. 504-506.
121. Winthrop Griffith, "The 'Taos Indians Have a Small Generation Gap,'" *The New York Times Magazine*, 21 February 1971, p. 94.
122. "President Appoints an Aide to Resolve Micronesia Impasse," *The New York Times*, 14 March 1971, p. 16:3; also William M. Blair, "Morton Says He Plans Steps to Ease Micronesia Problem," *The New York Times*, 12 March 1971, p. 48:4.