

The New Freely-Associated States of Micronesia: Their Natural and Social Environmental Challenges

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ABSTRACT: The former United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) which has been administered by the United States since the end of World War II, has divided itself up into four separate political entities: (1) the Federated States of Micronesia, (2) the Republic of Belau, (3) the Marshall Islands Republic, and (4) the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The first three of these aforementioned entities are freely-associated states with the United States. This is a new form of political arrangement for these areas and it is also new for the United States. All of these areas have a colonial history of domination by Spain, Germany, Japan, and the US, and these colonial powers have all left legacies which the new states have to deal with. There are also a number of natural environmental factors – such as vast distance and the limited store of natural resources – which are constraints that the new states have to face and overcome with the help of the former colonial powers and the rest of the world. Whether or not these new states can be successful in their continued economic and social development at a pace rapid enough to bring sufficient foreign capital, depends on their own energy and also on the nature and quality of the outside assistance.

The new year of 1988 marked the start of an entirely new political status for the Micronesian archipelagos of the Marianas, Carolines and Marshalls. All of these areas, which are formerly a part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands – a United Nations Trusteeship administered by the United States since WWII – became autonomous, self-governing states after nearly 20 years of negotiations. These islands have not enjoyed autonomy for some 320 years; since the Spanish Jesuit priest Diego Luis de Sanvitores established the first colony at Guam in 1668. Who are these new states? What sorts of environmental and geopolitical issues will they face in the coming decade? What opportunities will there be for economic and social development? These and similar questions can be answered at least partially, by a look at their recent record of social, political, and economic experience.

There are several definitions of the term, Micronesia. Geographically, Micronesia includes the Marianas, Carolines, Marshalls, Kiribati (Gilberts), and Nauru. Culturally, Micronesia includes generally the same groups, although there is a heavy Polynesian influence at Kapingamarangi Atoll, which is near the equator S of Truk and Pohnpei, and a Melanesian influence at Tobi Island in Palau¹). Some ethnographers have considered Tuvalu (Ellice Islands) to be culturally Micronesian.

Politically, until very recently, Micronesia has been thought of as being synonymous with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). This includes the Marshalls, the Carolines, and all the Marianas except Guam, which is an unincorporated territory of the United States. Today, however, that part of Micronesia which was the TTPI forms a series of four new political entities: (1) the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), formerly the Marshalls district of the TTPI; (2) the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly the districts of Truk, Yap, Pohnpei, and Kosrae; (3) the Republic of Belau (Palau) formerly the district of Palau; and (4) the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). The first three of these new political entities are “freely-associated states” of the United States; the latter one – the CNMI – is a commonwealth of the US. The freely-associated states are entirely new political arrangements both in the American political experience as well as in the Micronesian one. The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Island has, of course, a closer relationship with the United States than the freely-associated states have, and this is because the people of the Marianas wanted it so.

These new political entities in Micronesia emerged after a nearly 20 years of negotiations which began in 1969. The United States wanted to see all of the TTPI

remain together in a new status, however, as the negotiations went on it became increasingly clear that fragmentation was unavoidable because of the wishes of the people. In the early 1970s the Marianas broke off from the rest of the Micronesian future political status commission of the Congress of Micronesia, and formed their own commission. This, the Americans recognized and undertook separate negotiations with them which resulted, by 1978, in the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands which was ratified by all the people in a plebiscite that year.

The remaining districts of the TTPI – Palau, Yap, Truk, Pohnpei, Kosrae, and the Marshalls – continued their negotiations, and in 1975 settled upon a status of “free-association” with the United States. This status called for complete autonomy and self-government under an established constitution which would be ratified by all the people. It also called for regular economic support from the United States as well as other ties and arrangements which would be subscribed to by both sides under a Compact of Free Association. A “compact” here is tantamount to a treaty, and renegotiation is called for after a 15 year period; hence this status is not a permanent one.

Concurrent with the negotiations for a compact of free association with the United States, the Micronesian TTPI districts which remained after the separation of the CNMI, held a constitutional convention which resulted in a draft document after considerable debate by 1977. It was decided by the Congress of Micronesia and the United States representatives that a regionwide plebiscite would be held to ratify this constitution. All those ratifying would become a “federation of states” under that constitution; those not ratifying would have to devise and adopt their own constitution, become separate states entirely, and pursue their own compact negotiations with the United States. This was agreed to and the plebiscite was held in 1978. The result was that four districts of the TTPI ratified the constitution and became the Federated States of Micronesia. These, as stated above, are: Yap, Truk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae. Palau began its own constitutional convention, as did the Marshalls, and these two separate entities also continued their negotiations for a Compact with the US. As negotiated, all of the Compacts provide for local authority for internal and foreign affairs; US plenary authority for defense; the extension of specified domestic programs such as weather and postal services, regulatory agencies for land, air, sea, and federal emergency act provisions.

By 1982 the FSM, the RMI, and the CNMI were all ready to have the Trusteeship Agreement terminated and get on with the business of governing themselves under their new status. Only Palau remained unready. This was because there was a disharmony between the Palau constitution and the negotiated Compact of Free Association with the United States. The Palau constitution provided that no nuclear weapons or

materials could come into the territorial boundaries of Palau without a favorable vote of 75% of the electorate. This meant that US naval ships could not call upon Palau ports since the presence of nuclear materials on US warships is “neither confirmed nor denied” in all cases. Furthermore, the conflict between the Palau constitution and the compact meant that the United States could not live up to its agreement to “provide for the defense” of Palau. It took eight years and seven plebiscite to work out the difficulties in Palau, but on 21 August 1987 – after a constitutional amendment dropping the 75% approval requirement for nuclear weapons entry – the Palauan electorate finally approved the Compact of Free Association with the United States²⁾. The terms of the Compacts are as follows:

Palau will receive \$ 7 million annually for the first ten years of the Compact and \$ 6 million annually for the next five years. In addition, \$ 1 million annually will be given for infrastructure maintenance for ten years commencing on the fifth anniversary.

Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) will receive \$ 60 million annually for the first five years of the Compact, \$ 51 million annually for the second five-year period, and \$ 40 million annually for the third five-year period. Over the 15 year period, no less than 40% of these amounts must be dedicated to capital improvement accounts.

Marshalls will receive \$ 19 million annually for the first five years, \$ 15 million annually for the second five years, and \$ 12 million annually for the third five years. Further, all these accounts will be adjusted for each fiscal year by the per cent which equals two-thirds of the percentage change in the US gross national product's (GNP) implicit price deflator (IPD), or 7% whichever is less in any one year, using the beginning of FY1981 as a base.

In addition there are certain miscellaneous payments which are provided for, and these include \$ 9 million annually to the Marshalls to use at its discretion but with attention to the Kwajalein Atoll area which is the location of a US missile-testing facility. There will also be \$ 6 million annually for the term of the Compacts overall, to be divided as follows:

- \$ 1 million for surveillance and enforcement in Micronesian maritime areas;
- \$ 2 million annually for health and medical programs; and,
- \$ 3 million annually in support of educational scholarships.

To many neighboring Pacific island nations these terms seem over-generous, however there are a number of questions yet to be answered regarding the future development of these new and comparatively affluent Micronesian states which may render continuing – or even greater assistance – necessary; among them: (1) what has been their past colonial experience with economic development, and how will the Micronesians support themselves in the future beyond the subsidies which they will receive from the United States, (2) will they be politically recognized by other nations, or simply patronized without real recognition; (3) how will they relate to the other new nations in the Pacific, especially those in the south?

Considering the economic development of the area, we find that while there has always been some progressive production and improvement, this has always been small, slow, and expensive. The earliest economic commentary on the islands was made by a Chinese who landed at Palau in 1783 with the English sea captain Henry Wilson:

This is very poor place and very poor people; no got clothes, not got rice, no got hog, no got nothing only yams, little fish and cocoa-nut [sic]; no got nothing make trade, very little make eat³⁾.

More than 200 years later the economic situation in Micronesia was still essentially the same. An annual report prepared by American authorities in the Trust Territory government during the so-called "peak years" of the 1970s, says much the same thing:

... The territorial economic base is scanty. Labor, land, natural resources, capital, and infrastructure basic to development are meager ...⁴⁾.

Even today, with the new governments having made their transitions to autonomy the main sources of funding are still being imposed:

... the [first] major portion being an annual grant ... from the United States. [And] the second largest source of funding is also from the United States ... in the form of federal categorical grants ...⁵⁾.

What happened in between in history. The Spanish — who traced their claim to area from Magellan's circumnavigation in 1521 when he stopped briefly in the Marianas — did little in the way of economic development. With difficulty, they brought Christianity, opened a few schools, and introduced corn cultivation⁶⁾. In 1899, following the Spanish-American War, the Germans bought the islands from Spain and embarked upon an economic development program which far exceeded anything the Spanish had undertaken in the more than 300 years before. The Germans' main economic interest was copra, then known as "Micronesian gold" because of its high price and demand on the world market as an important ingredient in soap and cosmetics manufacture. Several agricultural experimental stations were established, surveys were taken, and new farming methods and coconut strains were developed and tested⁷⁾. The Germans spent quite a bit of money in the islands. The records show that they bought more than 5,662 ha from the islanders at about ten marks per hectare⁸⁾. However, the Germans never realized profitable returns on their investments. The Jaluit Gesellschaft, then the largest conglomerate in Micronesia, was formed with an initial capital investment of M 1,200,000, and was subsidized at M 120,000 per year. But, the highest annual copra production was 1,100 tons in 1912 worth only M 301,827⁹⁾. Poor crops, reluctant workers, droughts, typhoons, and pestiferous insects plagued the Germans' agricultural and economic development programs. They also instituted mining operations — notably in Palau — but these never brought any real profits either⁷⁾. Although the Germans pursued a policy of excluding other foreign business interests in Micronesia, they nevertheless encountered determined

Japanese competition. The Japanese started fisheries and moved in quickly with considerable skill. They also established themselves in the trepang — sea cucumbers valued for food by orientals — and shell trade, and muscled-in on the German copra business¹⁰⁾. Finally, after World War I broke out the Japanese swiftly ousted the Germans in 1914 thus ending a 15 year period of economic development, which in retrospect profited very few people.

The Japanese further expanded the Micronesian economy by increasing copra production and introducing extensive sugar plantations. They widened the phosphate mining activities in Palau and the Marshalls, and pumped money for economic development into the islands in larger amounts than ever before. Several large companies were formed which were under the control of a few Japanese corporations, the largest of which was the *Nan'yo Boieki Kaisha* (South Seas Trading Company) — "Nanpo" for short — which had a capital investment of more than Y 40,000,000¹¹⁾. Businesses of all sorts were undertaken: ice-making, shipbuilding, fishing, and all sorts of agricultural enterprises. Skilled labor was needed quickly to run this created economy and so thousands of Japanese, Koreans, Okinawans, and other orientals were brought in to work under two large homesteading programs¹²⁾. After 1935 the islands were systematically fortified. In 1942 Micronesia became a battleground.

The American approaches in Micronesia were entirely different than those of the previous colonial administrations:

Indiscriminate exploitation of the meager resources of the area is to be avoided. Trade and industry should be encouraged along lines which directly benefit the inhabitants by providing for their physical needs and material well being and which are of such a nature that ultimate ownership and management can be transferred into their hands. The establishment, for the profit of aliens, of enterprises which tend to maintain the island economy at the level of cheap labor and which do not permit the islanders to enjoy the full benefits of their own labor shall not be tolerated¹³⁾.

This order, promulgated by the US military administration immediately after World War II, set the tone for the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement which followed in 1974, and which outlined some broad, developmental goals:

Promote the economic, social, and educational advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants. ... Regulate the use of natural resources; encourage the development of fisheries, agriculture, and industries. ... Encourage qualified students to pursue higher education, including training at the professional level¹⁴⁾.

But while the American statements were noble, during the first 15 years of American administration under the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement development was exceedingly slow. From 1947 to 1962 about \$ 84,140,000 was budgeted for the islands' administration and development for an average of \$ 5,600,00 per year⁴⁾. The main American interest during that time was the testing of various thermo-nuclear devices in the Mar-

shalls¹⁵⁾ and the establishment of a CIA training base at Saipan¹⁶⁾. Then, during the administration of President Kennedy – following considerable international as well as Micronesian criticism – the decision was made to retain the islands under the American political rubric¹⁷⁾, and considerable attention was given to human resource development¹⁸⁾. By the end of the 1960s American policies were promoting doctrines of self-sufficiency, and

... the fastest possible development with maximum Micronesian participation ... guiding towards a goal of self-sustaining economic growth¹⁹⁾.

Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, however, it became clear that “the fastest possible development” was not the same as “self-sustaining economic growth.” The external assistance from the United States which flooded the islands from the mid 1960s to the late 1970s had a tremendous effect. Between 1962 and 1972 US appropriations for Micronesia amounted to \$ 366,779,274 for a rounded average of \$ 36,678,000 per year for the period. By the late 1970s yearly appropriations from all sources in the United States reached and exceeded \$ 70,000,000 per year⁴⁾. Capital construction financed by the US caused the ratio of investment to GTP to rise spectacularly from slightly more than 7% in 1960, to almost 67% in 1970¹⁹⁾. Looking back now on this US federal government appropriations “boom period” of the 1960s and 1970s, the investment had only scant bearing on productivity but immense bearing on a continual rise in budgets to support all the added infrastructure, and also a wage-price spiral¹⁹⁾. Some observers say now that the new Micronesian states look like they will have high wage economics well into the future, depending for their consumption levels upon continual US subsidies under the Compacts of Free Association²⁰⁾. Tourism may offer some hope for a better balance of payments²¹⁾ picture in the future, and considerable investment is being made in this area currently; however, it is still difficult to see clearly how much income this industry will generate for the islands²²⁾. US subsidies are to be reduced, or even stabilized during the period of the Compacts, budgetary receipts must grow equally with the expansion of industries. The amount of moneys that would be involved here would be very large. “Self-sustaining economic growth” (even without “maximum Micronesian participation”) seems improbable for a long time.

The new freely-associated states of Micronesia, including the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and even together with the US Territory of Guam, are modern-day classic cases of clientstates, dependent economically upon a highly-industrialized international power. Micronesian resource participation – particularly human resource participation – is small (real estate is an exception). The fact that the ratio of investment to GTP was a staggering 67% in 1970 as mentioned earlier, and is of course considerably greater today, means that most of this investment is being imposed with labor, capital, and management being imported²³⁾. This is precisely

what the previous German and Japanese colonial administrations did – without success. It is abundantly clear that with regard to economic development, the new states of Micronesia are limited by their general smallness and the amount of natural resources available. Massive economic demonstrations of aid and investment have, more often simply added to the cost of up-keep, or required continued labor importation for maintenance, than they have as yet adequately developed Micronesian labor expertise.

The new political status for the islands means that some of the external assistance can be broadened and might be shifted – that is it might come from countries other than the United States. This possibility is partly a function of the diplomatic recognition which the new island countries will receive. The United States recognizes them, of course. So does Australia. Their neighboring independent countries in the Pacific also recognize them; they have membership now in the South Pacific Forum which is the regional organization for the independent nations of the Pacific. Japan, however, does not recognize the new Micronesian states, and neither does Germany. Part of the reason for the slowness in official recognition has to do with the legal definitions of “free association.” What does this term mean? Specifically, are they truly independent when their description is usually given as “autonomous self-governing” states. While such debate is not important – or even an issue – among tourists, visitors, and even many of the Micronesians themselves – it remains an important international legal question to be settled before many other sources of public aid, and commercial investment can be realized²⁴⁾.

The Soviet Union, although interested of late in Pacific developments among the new nations²⁵⁾ does not recognize the new Micronesian states. The Soviet contention from the beginning of the Trusteeship has been that the United States “has the area under their control and will do nothing to given it up.”²⁶⁾ It remains to be seen, however, what the Soviet posture might be in the future if many nations begin to recognize the freely associated status of the new Micronesian states. The Russians have their largest armada in the Pacific²⁷⁾ and there is no reason to think that they will not investigate the matter of courtesy calls on Micronesian ports – especially by luxury liners – if such activity would prove to be useful and manageable in the future²⁸⁾.

There are a number of domestic social issues in the new Micronesian states which are bound to offer special challenges to the new governments over the next 15 years, and among them is the changing relationship between men and women²⁹⁾. This has been an issue largely ignored because popularly, Micronesia is sometimes described as “a man’s world” by visitors and tourists, and with some good reasons. The superficial observer can easily see that it is the women who do the brunt of the everyday household chores while the men work in the public and private labor markets. Implicit

here is the assumption that the men will take the intellectual and leadership roles, and they have usually gotten first pick for available white collar jobs. During the Trusteeship period the most outstanding social program was public education. All Micronesians could go as far in their educational endeavors as their abilities and talents could take them. Girls were encouraged also to enroll in schools and then to apply for off-island scholarships for postsecondary programs on a equal basis with the boys. During the 1970s large numbers of Micronesians left the islands to participate in higher education programs on the United States mainland and elsewhere. Some observed have called attention to this phenomena and its implications, as "the education explosion" in Micronesia of the 1970s³⁰).

The women have performed very well in their educational programs, oftentimes better than the men in the sense that they have stayed in school to complete their program instead of dropping out, and have returned to their home islands with degrees³¹). Today there are many women in the new Micronesian states

who cannot find jobs simply because it is culturally dictated that the men will have first refusals – in some cases even without possessing a degree. This situation is creating a cadre of disillusioned Micronesian women.

The natural and social environmental questions which have been addressed here with regard to the new states in Micronesia, are only points of departure for further attention and investigation which must now be given. These new states have potentially serious economic problems facing them partly as a result of the legacy of their colonial experiences, and partly due to the meagerness of the natural resources available. More important, however, are the social attitudes of the Micronesian people themselves in continuing their general advancement and development in a spirit of determination and in a climate of increasing social progress. The role of the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the other metropolitan powers of the Pacific need now to be vigorous in their support and encouragement – and continued protection – of the new Micronesian states.

Footnotes

- 1) There are a number of different designations and spellings now for the new Micronesian states, and these have come about as a result of the growing nationalism from changing political status from Trusteeships towards autonomy. For example, the Palau Islands which are formerly the Palau District of the TTPI, have been renamed by the people as the Republic of Belau. "Belau" is the way "Palau" is spoken and written in the local language, and has been thus adopted. The old spelling and usage of "Palau" however, remains as far as the US Coast and Geological Survey is concerned, until regular revisions of printed maps are scheduled. Other examples seen in the literature are "Pohnpei" for Ponape, and "Kosrae" for Kusaie.
- 2) All references for the Compacts of Free Association come from: US Department of State, EAP/FAS, # 5317, Washington, DC; see also US Congressional Research Service, "The Compact of Free Association: Foreign Policy Provisions; A Section by Section Legal Analysis" US Library of Congress, 1984.
- 3) Keate, John: The History of Prince Lee Boo. Thomas Hughes, London 1823, p. 23.
- 4) Trust Territory, Annual Reports, 1972, US Department of the Interior, Washington, DC, p. 45; hereafter, Annual Reports 1947ff.
- 5) Trust Territory, Annual Reports, 1984, p. 51.
- 6) For an excellent accounting of the history of the early Spanish administration, see: Carano, Paul; Sanchez, Pedro: A Complete History of Guam. Tuttle and Company, Rutland, Vermont 1964.
- 7) For an excellent accounting of the German administration and agricultural development during the period, see: Hempenstall, Peter J.: Pacific Islanders Under German Rule. Australian National University Press, Canberra 1978; also: Firth, Stewart: German Firms in the Western Pacific Islands, 1857–1914. Journal of Pacific History 8, 10–28 (1973).
- 8) In today's terms that would be 13,985 acres at about \$ 3.00 per acre; vide: OPNAV 503-1, Civil Affairs Handbooks, 1943. Micronesian Area Research Center, Pacific Collections, University of Guam.
- 9) This is about \$ 188,642 by recent rates of exchange. The 1901 exchange rate for Marks was \$ 1.00 = M 4.1, thus putting the worth then at about \$ 75,457. US Treasury Department Circular, Washington, DC 1901.
- 10) For an excellent account of the Japanese in Micronesia, see: Peattie, Mark R.: Tropic Sun: Japanese in Micronesia, 1895–1945. Pacific Monograph Series, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1987.
- 11) Ibid., Peattie. The Japanese yen at the time was worth \$.498, or approximately 50 cents.
- 12) Ibid., Peattie; see also: Myers, Ramon H.; Peattie, Mark R. (eds.), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945. Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1984, pp. 172–210.
- 13) The Fourteen Points of Admiral Sprunace's Order. In: Hezel, Francis X.; Berg, Mark L. (eds.), Micronesia: Winds of Change. TTPI Education Department Omnibus Program, 1979, pp. 495–496.
- 14) United Nations Trusteeship Agreement, United Nations General Assembly, 1 July 1947, Article VI; Micronesian Area Research Center, Pacific Collections, University of Guam.
- 15) For a good accounting of the context in the development of the thermo-nuclear testing programs in Micronesia, see: Weisgall, Jonathan M.: Micronesia and the Nuclear Pacific Since Hiroshima. SAIS Review 5, 2, 41–55 (1985)
- 16) There is neither a definitive nor a comprehensive public account of the American CIA training center which was established at Saipan. Only journalistic accounts are available. The best of these is: Wooten, Alfred: The CIA Spy School at Saipan. Glimpses of Micronesia 24, 4, 24–26 (1984)
- 17) In October 1962, a decision was taken by the US National Security Council to retain Micronesia under some appropriate form of American political control; see: The Solomon Report, Washington, DC 1963, "Summary", unpublished xeroxed copy, Micronesian Area Research Center, Pacific Collections, University of Guam.
- 18) see: The Nathan Report, Robert R. Nathan Associates, TTPI, Saipan 1967, See also, The Stanford Research Institute Report, SRI, TTPI, Saipan 1972, both reports are available at the Micronesian Area Research Center, Pacific Collections, University of Guam. General documentation for the development of human resources can also be found in Annual Reports 1970–78.

- 19) Income and Employment in Micronesia, A special report, Washington, DC, US Department of the Interior, 16 April 1970, p. 17; hereafter, Income and Employment.
- 20) There has always been a severe difficulty in measuring economic phenomena in Micronesia empirically because of scanty or non-existent statistics. Any accounting of national income accounts lacks precision. For the period 1957 through 1975 figures on imports, foreign investment, income, wages, profits, etc., are scarce, incomplete, inaccurate, or non-existent.
- 21) Of course, "balance of payments" as such is a misnomer in Micronesia. US dollars are the currency; there is no bank of issue. The payments problem, then, is a government budgetary problem for the new states, similarly as it was for the US during the Trusteeship, and with the Japanese and German colonial administrations before that.
- 22) Tourism is the fastest-growing and most lucrative industry in Micronesia today. In 1987 Japanese tourists to Guam topped half a million for the first time; Guam Visitors' Bureau (GVB), Statistics, October 1987. Other tourist centers in Saipan, Truk, and Palau have also benefited from the Japanese "tourist boom."
- 23) see: Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Compact of Free Association, Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Washington, DC 1984, copy in State Department, FAS/EAP # 5317; also in Micronesian Area Research Center, Pacific Collections, University of Guam.
- 24) Metropolitan governments other than those bordering the Pacific island nations are becoming increasingly interested in this general issue. The West German government recently convened a special conference on the theme: "New Approaches to Development Cooperation with South Pacific Countries." The Proceedings of this conference can be obtained from: Institut für Internationale Begegnungen e. V., Walramstraße 9, 5300 Bonn, FR Germany.
- 25) Recent Soviet interest in the Pacific is well known and there are many citations in the literature. A good overview and review is: Kimura, Hiroshi: Soviet Focus on the Pacific. Problems of Communism 36, 3, 1-8 (1987)
- 26) Interview with Professor Kim Malakhovsky, Chairman, Pacific Division, Institute for Oriental Studies, Soviet Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 21 May 1987.
- 27) An excellent overview of current Soviet military strength in the Pacific is found in the entire issue of Pacific Defence Reporter (Australia), 3, 9 (March 1987)
- 28) In March 1987 a Russian cruise ship did, in fact visit Palau and some officers had a brief tour ashore, as well as some Palauan and American government officials being entertained aboard. Ref.: US State Department, FAS/EAP, # 5317, Washington, DC.
- 29) For one discussion of the changing role of women in Micronesia, see: Remengesau, Francesca K.: The Emergence and Challenge of Palauan Women in Micronesia. In: Conference Proceedings²⁴).
- 30) For a thorough explanation, see: Hezel, Francis X.: The Education Explosion in Truk. Pacific Studies 2, 2, 167-185 (1978)
- 31) A general study on educational drop-outs is: Workman, Randall et al.: Island Voyagers in New Quests: An Assessment of Degree Completion Among Micronesian College Students. Micronesian Area Research Center Report, University of Guam, 1981.