Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

By EUGENE F. BOGAN

THE United States Government is about to face up to the realities of the issue of whether government administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is to be left in the hands of its military establishment or entrusted to one of the civilian agencies of the Federal Government. Therein lies a dilemma.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands comprises the island areas of the Western Pacific which were mandated to Japan by the League of Nations after World War I and administered by that country until their capture by United States forces during 1944. The Territory represents a great zone of thousands of small islands scattered over 5,000,000 square miles of sea.

The United States Navy on occupation instituted military government in these island areas. Since the termination of hostilities, the Naval Establishment has continued supervision of the government administration of the islands. On April 2, 1947 the United Nations Security Council approved a trusteeship agreement designating the United States as the administering authority for these former Japanese island areas, and naming them officially the "Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands."

PRESSURE FOR CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION

In 1947 the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior recommended that civil administration of the Trust Territory should remain with "the Navy Department on an interim basis," but should be transferred to "a civilian agency of the Government at the earliest practicable date to be determined by the President." [1]

This recommendation for administration by a civilian agency also covered the island of Guam, the largest of the Mariana Islands, which has been under United States sovereignty for fifty years. During this entire period the Naval Establishment has conducted the civil government of Guam, handicapped by the situation that the Congress during half a century has not enacted any legislation providing for the constitutional status of the island. Naval government was, of course, reinstituted after Guam was retaken from the Japanese in August 1944.

The picture therefore is that in the case of Guam the Naval Establishment has been conducting the government by right of United States sovereignty, and in the case of the huge Trust Territory has been conducting a form of military government and later "trusteeship" administration. These are forms of government which have quite different, and obvious, legal bases. Essentially, however, the realities of government administration in Guam and the Trust Territory have been simple and inexpensive. Since, for military reasons, naval personnel and facilities of necessity have been spread throughout the island areas, much of the ordinary expense of government administration has been avoided. Government has been largely handled by personnel, shipping, and facilities which would in any event be situated in the island areas.

[1] Letter from Secretary of State to President, dated June 18, 1947, H. Doc. 333, 80th Cong.

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Meanwhile, during the last five years there has been much fulmination in Washington from many quarters to "do away with military government" in the island areas. Regardless of the legal bases of the two types of government, and of the realities of the situation, many well-advised people as well as many chronic "viewers with alarm" regard any government administration supervised by a branch of the armed forces as "military government." There has been at Cabinet level the official recommendation noted above for turning responsibility of government over to a civilian agency. A congressional committee recommended in 1947 "that it is desirable for the future to have a civil administration over the islands of the Pacific." [2] There have been occasional editorials in responsible newspapers to the same effect.[3]

This is an easily accepted principle, thinking in the broad theoretical sense. It is a principle very easily accepted when one remembers that in the case of an occupied enemy country of the size, population, and economic potential of Germany, it was possible as of September 21, 1949 to effect the transition from military to civilian administration. There is very naturally considerable appeal in the thesis that if administration through a civilian agency is advisable and practicable in the case of Germany, then in the case of the Trust Territory, which in a *de facto* (but not *de jure*) sense is as much a part of the United States as Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, civilian administration should be mandatory.

Despite this, there are considerations which are perhaps not decisive but which have had sufficient force to delay for five years the transition to administration by a civilian agency in the case of the Trust Territory, and for *fifty years* in the case of the United States islands of Guam and Samoa. Some of these considerations may be broadly identified as follows: (a) the realities of the geography of the island areas; (b) the realistic nature of the task of civil administration in the island areas; (c) the economic realities in the island areas; (d) the interest of the United States taxpayer; (e) the real interests and needs of the island peoples; (f) the fact that for some years it was accepted that the conduct of administration in the Pacific island areas such as Guam and Samoa through a military agency has not in any realistic sense implied "military administration."

The matter of transition from "military" to "civilian" administration is now rapidly passing from the debate, discussion, and study stage to the stage of decision.

CIVILIAN RULE FOR GUAM

As to the United States possession of Guam, the decision has been made. On September 7, 1949, the President by Executive order transferred as of July 1, 1950 "the administration of the island of Guam from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior." [4]

Guam, it should be noted, has an area of 225 square miles and a native population of something less than 25,000 people.

Within a week after this order was issued, the *Washington* (D. C.) *Times Herald* [5] reported, with evident legislative rumblings, that James P. Davis, head of the Department of the Interior's division of territories and island

[2] Supplemental Report of Subcommittee Studying Pacific Bases, pursuant to H. Res. 154, 79th Cong., p. 8.

[3] For example, the *New York Times* of Feb. 18, 1947 and July 8, 1948.

[4] Executive Order 10077, Sept. 9, 1949, 14 F.R. 5033.

[5] Sept. 13, 1949.

possessions, had asked the Senate appropriations committee for a supplemental appropriation of $600,000 "to pay the salaries of 196 civilian administrators scheduled to take over [administration of Guam] next July 1." But some of the members of the committee wanted thorough investigation and study of the matter, even suggesting an official inspection trip to the island, before acting on the proposal. They claimed that there was no legislative authority for the change to civilian administration. And "Sen. Thomas (D) of Oklahoma said it would be cheaper to let the Navy continue operating the island."

It is singular to note that these rumblings, and their very evident implications, arose in the case of *one* island, 225 square miles in size, United States territory for fifty years, and having less than 25,000 native inhabitants. And in the same month there was an easy popular acceptance of the shift in Germany to control by a civilian agency.

At least one of the implications takes on a form of substance when contrasts are made. One hundred and ninety-six civilian administrators are reported in the article as the personnel need on the transfer of the administration of Guam to a civilian agency. A House investigating committee in 1947, speaking as to the *thousands of islands* of the whole Trust Territory, reported:

> Therefore, naval military government is now administering a total of about 48,000 inhabitants of the Marshall, Caroline, Palau, and Bonin groups, and the Marianas (less Guam) scattered over an area of some 5,000,000 square miles. At the present time it is employing 119 officers and 225 enlisted men, but these figures will gradually *be reduced to an authorized complement of 72 officers and 149 men.* In matters relating to agriculture, trade, and industry, it is assisted by the U. S. Commercial Company—a subsidiary of the RFC—which has about *60* specialists in the field. [Emphasis supplied.] [6]

Perhaps it is well for the writer to interject at this point the personal note that it is not the purpose of the present article to delineate on issue, nor to support one side of a controversy. An effort is being made to sketch a dilemma, to indicate some of the underlying facts, and, let us say, to discuss objectively some of the horns of the dilemma.

THE REALITIES OF GEOGRAPHY

For one who has not been in the island area, the geographic factor is difficult to evaluate. Yet it is one of the major horns of the dilemma, and must be briefly sketched as follows:

The island groups involved are known as the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Palaus, the northern Marianas, together with the Bonins and Marcus Island.

The easternmost archipelago, the Marshalls, numbers some 34 coral atolls broken into over a thousand islands, cover 600,000 square miles of sea, and have a combined land area of only 74 square miles. The native population approximates 10,000.

The Carolines begin west of the Marshalls and stretch for 1,500 miles east and west and 500 miles north and south. Here again are over a thousand islands, but with an aggregate land area of only 380 square miles and a native population of perhaps less than 35,000. Of these 380 square miles of land, 83 are included in the former Japanese bastion of Truk Atoll with its 100 islets.

The Marianas, north of the Carolines near their western end, are best described as a north-to-south chain of 15 volcanic islands with a land area of 245 square miles and a present native population of less than 5,000.

The Palaus, southwest of the Carolines, comprise another north-to-south

[6] Report of Subcommittee, *op. cit.* note 2 *supra,* p. 4.

chain, 500 miles long, of 26 volcanic and coral islands, with a land area of 175 square miles and a native population approximating 5,000.

The Bonins and Marcus Island are even tinier dots spread over hundreds of miles of sea.

The geographical picture therefore is one of many thousands of islands, groupable into about 120 island units, with a combined land area of *less* than 1,000 square miles, sprawled over 5,000,000 square miles of sea, thinly sprinkled with a native population numbering perhaps 50,000, spread in hundreds of widely separated communities. The native population comprises mostly brown-skinned Melanesian and Polynesian mixtures, and Chamorros, broadly referred to as Micronesians. This population breaks down into a number of distinct language groups, and widely diverse levels of political, economic, and social development.

A PARTICULAR ISLAND GROUP

To bring this geographic understanding into sharper focus, it is desirable to take a fairly close, although brief, look at one of the large island groups, such as the Marshalls, and its people. As has been noted, the Marshall Islands number 34 large coral atolls covering a huge expanse of sea. A number of the atolls, such as Wotje, Likiep, Maloelap, Aur, Arno, Majuro, Mille, Ebon, Jaluit, Ailinglaplap, and Kwajalein, are lush and have, for coral atolls, large land areas. The population numbers around 10,000 and was steadily declining until this was arrested by the medical and sanitation programs begun by the Navy in 1944. The atolls named could support a population of 40,000.

The people are brown-skinned Micronesians and roughly described as having pleasing features and being "smallish" in stature as compared to the average American. They are intelligent and as a stock are in no wise inferior to Europeans. Average literacy (from missionary efforts alone) is perhaps that of the American fourth grade. The islanders are accustomed to a simple money economy and have political maturity sufficient for local (village and atoll) administration.

There is no political awareness in the broad sense of words like "autonomy," "self-government," "democracy," "civil rights." These people simply have not been exposed to the world, to world history, and to the tempo of the highly sophisticated political conceptions of the Western world. But there is the political awareness that comes from a wise government of their communal life since a time when the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, from the existence and prerogatives of several royal families in the islands, and from the legends of ancient wars of conquest. This sense comes also from having successfully contrived, during sixty years of German and Japanese exploitation, the survival of the best patterns of native life.

But it would take a full generation (plus an education abroad) to develop a Marshall Islander who could represent the island group at the United Nations. It would probably take a full generation to spread through the island folk an understanding of the United Nations in the values and terms of the understanding at the American high school level.

The islanders are not "savages" or "coolies" or "primitives" or "preindustrialists," and are not to be treated as such. They have an independent spirit and can support and maintain themselves in their own environment. They do not want or need charity, handouts, "mothering," or to live on the public pap or be public wards. One of the perils of the future is that an overly

paternal administration can precipitate these excellent people into the present unhappy legal status of so many American Indians—wards of the United States.

In their present culture pattern, the Marshallese are a clothes-wearing, Christian society. Although the islands can produce the necessities for human subsistence, the money economy introduced during many years by the Western world, and the Christian doctrine introduced by Americans, have created a need for many imported articles. Necessities now include articles such as cutting tools of metal, medical supplies, soap, pencils, paper, cloth, needles, thread, lamps, oil, combs, paints, sheet iron, sailcloth, canoe wood, cordage, and fishhooks. Quasi necessities are imports such as salt, rice, flour, tinned meats, and biscuit. Much desired non-necessities are such articles as sewing machines, phonographs, bicycles, sugar, tobacco, tea, and coffee.

There are available in the Marshalls numerous people with capacity, background, and training to provide atoll and village administrators, minor officials, and policemen. The population can supply its own native medical practitioners and assistants, storekeepers, school teachers, ministers, interpreters, guides, pilots, clerks, stevedores, carpenters, seamen, and miscellaneous skilled and unskilled labor. These people also enjoy the distinction, among all the island peoples of the Pacific Basin, of being the most skilled seamen and navigators.

Danger of exploitation

In their present environment and present stage of political and economic development, these people are readily vulnerable to exploitation. When the Japanese took over the islands in 1914, the Marshall Islanders had barely emerged under the German administration from a primitive tribal life. The Japanese during thirty years treated them as inferiors, exploited them in a passive way, but left them largely their own way of life (in which many ancient tribal customs and taboos have survived in a culture pattern broadly Western), and did give them simple economic opportunities. All real business and trade was Japanese, and the islanders have not had the opportunity to develop "businessmen" in their communities.

The Marshallese are as vulnerable to social exploitation as to business exploitation. Incredible damage can be done if there is turned loose on the people, under the guise of administrators, a swarm of educators, social workers, and government "specialists." Too often the over-zealous in these fields ardently propagate their individual callings for the sake of the calling, and not in relation to actual local needs and environment. A major peril is that in the course of time a well-intentioned effort will be made to apply to the island communities, as a strait jacket, American forms and styles and what is known as the "pattern of democratic government." Native communal life and institutions, despite the overlay of several royal families and "kingdoms," hew much closer to real democratic processes and values than most American communities. Government should not be practiced for the sake of enhancing the business and forms of government, but for the welfare and to the extent of the real needs of the people.

Naval policies and accomplishments

Wartime military government began in the Marshalls on January 31, 1944, when the writer handed to King Lainglen on Majuro Atoll a copy of Admiral Nimitz' proclamation "that the powers of the Emperor of Japan shall be suspended during the period of military

occupation by the United States." [7] Wise administrative policies were followed. Garrison forces were segregated from native communities. There were no bread lines or public handouts. The island people worked for what they secured from the occupation forces. An economic cycle geared to a wage scale of 40 cents a day was established and served as an admirable wartime substitute for the prewar copra (as a cash crop) economy.

Naval officers established throughout the Marshalls excellent sanitary controls and an efficient native medical system built around native medical practitioners, with a hospital headquarters on Majuro Atoll, largely native staffed. Village schools supported by native communities and staffed with native teachers were functioning as early as April 1944.

Native communities by popular choice selected new officials and were entirely self-governing. Basically, as soon as the pleasant discovery was made that these people were fully capable of governing themselves in quite an adult manner, in a practical sense all portfolios of government were left to the native communities except those of foreign affairs and war. The Marshall Islanders loyally supported our war effort. Their contributions ranged from providing more volunteers for stevedore battalions than was the need, to piloting, scouting, and espionage.

Widely separated communities

The islanders are scattered in many small communities, separated by great distances, throughout the archipelago. Except for limited possibilities of aircraft transportation, contact must always be by ship and is difficult. Not only are the distances great, but there are the navigational hazards of threading coral passages and avoiding reefs and coral heads. In many places the matter of merely getting to shore from a ship is a major undertaking. Occasionally, if a wartime type of beaching craft is used, one finds a community where a landing is possible by merely beaching the ship. Not infrequently one reaches the beach only by laying to off a lee shore and negotiating breakers and a dangerous ocean reef by small boat.

An idea of distances can be conjectured from the following: An overlay of a map of the Marshalls on the eastern United States, with Rongerik Atoll situated over the city of Buffalo, would approximately place Kwajalein, Ebon, Jaluit, Majuro, and Maloelap atolls over Pittsburgh, Richmond, Washington, Philadelphia, and New York, respectively. The most populous atoll would be Majuro, with a population of over 1,000, broken down into a dozen communities. Of the latter, Majuro village as the metropolis of the Marshalls would number perhaps 500 inhabitants.

This word picture of the Marshalls must be concluded with the observation that this island group spreads over *only* one-eighth of the 5,000,000 square miles of sea of the Trust Territory.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE TRUST TERRITORY

Just as pertinent to this inquiry as geography is an understanding of the economic potential of the Trust Territory.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that there are to the United States no significant economic resources of value in the area. Such limited resources as exist will barely suffice to maintain the population on a marginal economy. Said the House investigating commit-

[7] "Proclamation No. 1" of C. W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Military Governor of the Marshall Islands.

tee, "No great economic wealth can be expected from these islands and atolls of the Pacific." [8]

In the Marianas (notably Saipan), a limited sugar production is practicable. From several other islands a modest phosphate production has been achieved. There has also been some bauxite production on several islands. Under the Japanese even this production, together with marine products, had to be heavily subsidized. Native industries (an imposing term for island economy!) include fishing, cultured pearls (petty), and the marketing of copra, Trochus shells, and native handicraft.

Future income prospects of the islanders would seem to derive entirely from marketing copra as a "cash crop" and native handicraft as "manufactured goods," and from employment on government and military activities in the area. Petty local economic cycles exist in the operation by islanders of small community stores handling "trade goods" and in interisland transportation by native sailing craft, including seagoing outriggers.

An economic potential which will barely provide subsistence for the population of the Trust Territory poses two queries: (1) Whence will come the revenues to maintain in the Territory government services erected along Western patterns? (2) Is not the real potential of the economy of the area such that the area will become a heavy economic liability to the United States? This will be adverted to again.

THE UNITED STATES POSITION

The United States position in the Territory is naturally one of self-interest. It may be tersely put as follows:

1. *Strategic.* The Territory has an obvious strategic importance to the defense of the United States. The security of peace in the Pacific demands the control of the area by the United States. As a matter of fact, the United States Trusteeship is within the jurisdiction of the Security Council of the United Nations.[9]

2. *Economic.* In blunt terms, the economic interest of the United States is basically a problem of finding ways and means to avoid having the area and its people become heavy economic liabilities to the United States Treasury.

3. *Humanitarian.* The humanitarian interest is in the narrow sense that since for strategic reasons this country is burdened with numerous potential economic liabilities, it has a heavy human responsibility to see that the island people receive a "fair break." This has been put in somewhat more elegant language in the obligation the United States assumed under Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations. The United States has agreed among other things that it shall:

> 1. foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory toward self-government . . . ; and to this end shall give to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory a progressively increasing share in the administrative services in the Territory; shall develop their participation in local government; shall give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system of law for the Territory; and shall take other appropriate measures toward these ends;
>
> 2. promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants, . . . and improve the means of transportation and communication;
>
> 3. promote the social advance of the inhabitants and to this end shall protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the population without discrimi-

[8] Report of Subcommittee, *op. cit.* note 2 *supra*, p. 8.

[9] Article 83, Charter of the United Nations; Preamble of Trusteeship Agreement.

nation; . . . and institute such other regulations as may be necessary to protect the inhabitants against social abuses; . . .

There is, by the way, not a word in the Trusteeship Agreement as to whether the United States taxpayers or the island taxpayers are to pay the bill for bringing these people up to political, social, and economic maturity on the Western pattern, or the bill for improving "the means of transportation and communication."

THE PARAMOUNT PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT

The paramount problem of government administration in the area concerns transportation and communication. Government administration in the usual sense is an essentially simple matter. In perhaps no other area of the world is there more truth in the saying that "the least government is the best government." But in the far-flung reaches of the Territory the simplest of government services is confronted with the major hurdle of—transportation and communication.

In a word, these basic facilities of government become incredibly costly. Therein lies one of the sorest horns of the dilemma.

Historically, we know that the Japanese met this obstacle only through heavy government subsidies. Is the United States to do the same? If we received general economic value from the area, perhaps the cost problem could be faced. The cost consideration has certainly made it easier to accept the other considerations which have been indicated as delaying a change of administration.

The cost of transportation and communication involves not merely the cost of the actual facilities—ships and instruments. There is a heavy personnel factor. Ships require crews, and instruments require installations and operators. The personnel actually on the job have dependents—these require transportation and maintenance.

Basically, it is believed, the inertia against the transition of government administration from the supervision of the Naval Establishment to that of a civilian agency stems from the problem of transportation and communication. No civilian agency has, at the moment, a private fleet available for a job of government. The Navy must in any event be spread throughout the Trust Territory and must maintain there ships, shore facilities, and personnel service of all kinds. This includes medical and sanitation personnel. Its shipping and aircraft regularly travel within the area and enter and leave the area. As, to a great extent, government services can be handled as a side line by personnel already in the area, little additional personnel is required as long as administration remains on its present basis.

The end result is that for a civilian agency to take over administration means an extraordinarily expensive duplication of facilities and personnel. Echoing a remark in the article quoted earlier in these pages, "it would be cheaper" for the Navy to do the job.

IS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IMPERATIVE?

But the dilemma is—is it wise? Is it practicable? Can we leave this task in the hands of a military arm of government and still live up to our obligations under international law and to American tradition? Is not transfer to a civilian agency imperative?

Both sides of this have been admirably and pithily given by Felix Keesing in an article of a year or so ago:

> Critics of naval government have pointed out as weaknesses the lack of continuing personnel and experience, as naval officers go on to other types of service; the ab-

sence of stable clear-cut policies to date, resulting in insecurity and emergency conditions of administration; the danger of "top brass" over-ruling the trained administrator because of superior rank. Correspondingly, proponents of using naval personnel claim that a civilian administrative service would involve much duplication of function with the existing naval establishments; that relationships between naval and civilian personnel would be complicated (e.g., supply, repair, etc.) to the point of impairing efficiency; that the quality of men obtainable for long-term work in such small remote islands with limited career opportunities would not be high; that a civilian bureaucracy would want to perpetuate itself for career reasons, and so would less readily turn over responsibility to local native leadership.[10]

Discussion of this problem has, in some circles, gone below the dignified level of statesmanship and proceeded on the basis of acrimony, clichés, catch phrases, and the like. One columnist headed a broadside for the case of the civilian agency with "This Nation ought to be on the mourner's bench for being the only Power in the Pacific which, even in peacetime, has governed a populated area as a military base," [11] and then proceeded to labor a case in favor of the Department of the Interior as the administrative agency.

Others in the same vein have fulminated about "denial of civil rights" in any system in which government personnel wear military uniforms. Typical is the pattern of one writer who has indulged in frequent criticism of Naval administration. Using the odd vehicle of an article on rebuilding the city of Agana on Guam, this writer somehow contrives to visualize as a threat to the personal liberties of every American, the delay in transferring the Trust Territory to a civilian agency:

[10] *Far Eastern Survey,* Vol. XVI, No. 6, p. 61.

[11] "Man to Man," *Washington Star,* April 16, 1946.

A study of the handling of a practical problem such as the rehabilitation of Agana makes apparent the every-day implications of military rule over civilians under the American flag and illuminates the issues of military versus civilian government in territories for which the United States is responsible. Such a study may suggest to Americans who have never experienced military rule *as civilians* implications which the increasing power of the military in the United States may hold for the personal liberties and the established way of life of every American.[12]

THE TAXPAYER'S INTEREST

The taxpayer's interest in this dilemma is not insubstantial. The United States during a hundred years has had considerable experience with dependent territories and dependent peoples. Considerable public treasure has been poured into Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and even the Aleutian Islands on behalf of the vanishing Aleuts. Huge sums are annually appropriated for the affairs of the American Indians. Except in the case of Guam and American Samoa, such areas and peoples have been handled by a civilian agency of the Government.

In theory and in principle, the case for civilian agency control of the Trust Territory would appear to write off any possibility of using an agency of the armed forces. From the taxpayer's standpoint, when one looks at the realities and the expense equation in the case of the Trust Territory, one pauses. This pause has lasted five years in the case of the Trust Territory, as it has lasted fifty years in the case of Guam and Samoa. The situation as to the Trust Territory is certainly one for which we have no precedent. Hawaii, Alaska, and the Philippines are no precedent. These are enormously rich areas of large land masses.

[12] Laura Thompson, *Far Eastern Survey,* Vol. XVI, No. 6, p. 66.

A TECHNICAL HORN TO THE DILEMMA

No one can possibly make out a case that the people and the economy of the Trust Territory can supply the public revenues to support a government administration by a civilian agency of the Federal Government. The island economy simply cannot produce sufficient wherewithal to finance an administrative structure which would inevitably be conceived in patterns followed by Federal agencies in Washington. It is a certainty that substantially the full expense of government, on such a transfer, will have to come from appropriations out of the United States Treasury.

Our commitments to the people of these islands under the trusteeship agreement, it will be remembered, include an obligation "to promote the development of the inhabitants . . . *toward self-government*" and an obligation to "promote the social advancement of the inhabitants and to this end to protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the population without discrimination."

To be self-governing, a people must be self-supporting. The government transportation system the island economy could support would be limited to one comprised of sailing cutters, schooners, and seagoing outriggers, and perhaps an occasional small engine-driven vessel. This would also be the communications vehicle.

If the islanders made use of the Navy transportation facilities, the expense of which would in any event be a United States Treasury burden, one could probably wink at principle and say that they were otherwise supporting their own "self-government"—provided, of course, such was the case. But any system which places these people in the situation of being direct dependents of the United States Treasury will lead them *away* from that same "self-government" which we are obligated to "promote" them "toward." Especially will such dependence have an obvious result exactly contrary to our written trusteeship obligation to "promote the social advancement of the inhabitants."

In considering, in relation to the principle of self-support, the principle of self-government, one is brought up rather abruptly by that request, reported earlier in this article, for a $600,000 appropriation for administrative personnel on the one island of Guam. Logically, it would seem that government services on Guam, of all the Pacific Islands involved in this dilemma, should and could be self-supporting. Not the least of the economic assets of that island is the huge monthly military pay roll, plus the fact that numerous native inhabitants of Guam are employed by the United States Government on the island.

CONCLUSION

Fundamentally, the dilemma seems to be a clash between principle and realities. The most significant of the realities seems to be cost. Whether realities can be recognized and achieved without a compromise of principle, depends on wise statesmanship. The question of principle is erected on a foundation of our obligations to, and the welfare of, the island peoples. Perhaps we should compromise the realities by footing all the government bills, on the basis that this is really payment for the strategic usefulness of the island areas to us. But if we do, we are in conflict with our obligation to advance these people toward self-government.

Thinking solely in terms of the people of the island areas, and their welfare, when this writer left the Marshalls in 1944 after a year of wartime government work, he carried with him these convictions:

The islanders needed a period of time to adjust themselves to being a part of the American family. To meet the competitions of life in their new scene and ready contact with the West, they require a preparation period of roughly one generation. During this generation the islanders should be:

1. Free from the exploitation of their labor, land, and products by competitive private commercial interests.

2. Free from social and religious exploitation and competition.

3. Free, with American help at the outset, to cure the sanitary and medical problems inherited from the Japanese administration; to lower infant mortality, to increase their population, and to breed a healthy younger generation.

4. Free to operate their own school system under native teachers, with American help and books wisely restricted to the educational needs of the island environment and its limited economic opportunities.

5. Free to administer their local affairs under native law and custom and to devise, with American guidance at the outset, a simple over-all administrative and legal system suited to their environment, as a substitute for the Japanese system.

6. Free to develop their own economic cycle, to restrict business opportunities to Marshall Islanders, with necessary business contacts abroad in the early years funneling through the American administration.

7. Free to work out their internal economy, under American guidance, so as to create their own public funds for island administration and thus to avoid any burden to the American Treasury.

8. Free to demonstrate that the Marshall Islands and their people can be an economic and cultural asset and not a liability to the United States.

The island peoples have the capacity to meet these aims. While they were conceived in terms of the Marshalls, they are relatively valid as to the whole Trust Territory.

Even though these represent one person's view as to the needs of the people, they are nevertheless pertinent to any examination of this dilemma on transition of government administration; for in the last analysis, if there were no people in the islands, there would be no dilemma. The dilemma stems from the people.

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