



Reconsidering European Contributions to Global Justice

Aid Curse with Chinese Characteristics?

Chinese Development Flows and Economic Reforms

Samuel Brazys and Krishna C. Vadlamannati

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Abstract

The emergence of China as a major development partner requires a reassessment of traditional donor-recipient dynamics. In addition to using new rhetoric like 'South-South cooperation' or 'Win-Win', China has also eschewed classifications and practices of the traditional donors of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Donor Assistance Committee (DAC). Yet this 'new approach' and wilful ignorance is unlikely to spare China from the same issues confronted by traditional donors. In this paper, we consider the extent to which Chinese development efforts may disincentive difficult economic reforms by providing recipient governments with a budgetary cushion. Using panel data covering 122 countries during 2000-2014 period, we find that the presence and persistence of Chinese development aid inhibits broader economic policy reforms, after addressing endogeneity concerns using instrumental variable approach. These findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications, data, instruments and approaches and are suggestive of an institutional aid curse 'with Chinese characteristics' as insidious as the one which has plagued some traditional donor-recipient relationships.

Keywords

Development aid, economic reforms, endogeneity, China

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Introduction

In 2004, prompted by major donors, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), one of three Western Pacific States in a 'Compact of Free Association' with the United States, undertook an economic reform initiative to replace sub-national sales taxes with a national value added tax (VAT). Since its founding in 1986, the FSM has been one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world, with aid to gross domestic product (GDP) ratios consistently in excess of 30 per cent and aid to government budget ratios routinely above 80 per cent (Brazys 2010).¹ The tax reform effort was to be a keystone initiative in modernising the FSM's government revenues to offset a built-in decrement in annual budget grants from the United States. The effort came tantalisingly close to fruition in 2013 when implementing legislation was passed at the national level and by two of the four constituent states. However, both Pohnpei and Yap states failed to pass the necessary laws and, as of January 2018, the VAT reform remained in limbo.

Why did the VAT reform effort fail in the FSM, despite clear cut aggregate economic benefits, urging from major donor partners, and technical support and advice from respected international organisations? The *prima facie* explanation is that the reforms, while beneficial in aggregate, were politically costly as they were opposed by vested business interests, particularly in the wholesale and retail sectors (Dang 2013).² However, it was undoubtedly easier to avoid these political costs as the mid-2000s also saw a gradual shifting in the source of external budgetary assistance. While still dominated by the United States, the People's Republic of China increased the amount and frequency of its assistance to the FSM. After making a commitment of four million dollars in 2008 (AidData), China disbursed \$1.5 million in 2011 (FSM 2011) before committing a further \$10 million, or roughly 4 per cent of GDP, in 2015 (Daleno 2015). While these funds did not directly offset the promised revenue increase from the tax reform, they were welcomed as an alternative by a political elite wary of economic dependence on the United States (*ibid.*).³ As unconditional budget grants, the funds softened the budget constraint which allowed politicians to use official largess to maintain popular support.⁴

¹ Particularly for the FSM state governments in Pohnpei, Chuuk, Yap and Kosrae.

² This same domestic constituency was also broadly opposed to trade liberalisation efforts (Brazys 2014).

³ While working for the FSM Executive, on numerous occasions the author heard senior policymakers, including the President, invoke China as an alternative to US support. The unconditional nature of Chinese budgetary grants was touted in contrast to the US Compact funding which is approved via an annual meeting of the Joint Economic Management Committee (JEMCO) which seats three US and two FSM members and makes budgetary decisions via a majority vote.

⁴ Members of the FSM Congress, state legislatures, governors, and the President are allocated 'representation funds', see FSM (2015). While working for the FSM Executive, the author heard several second-hand accounts of politicians' representation funds being utilized to buy rice and/or other consumables for constituents. These impressions are substantiated by various Public Auditor accounts have found irregularities with respect to these funds, see Jaynes (2017) or Johnson (2008). Representation funds are allocated from general funding which would include tax revenues and unconditional budget support, such as the Chinese grants, but not conditional budget support like the JEMCO-approved US Compact grants.

In this paper we investigate if our implicit suggestion that Chinese aid inhibited economic reform via an institutional ‘aid curse’ is observable as a more general phenomenon. The importance of this inquiry stems from China taking its place amongst the largest development partners over the past 15 years (Dreher et al 2017). This fact, coupled with a burgeoning literature on the characteristics (Bräutigam 2011), modalities (Schiere 2010; Dreher et al. 2017), and impacts (BenYishay et al 2016; Dreher et al. 2016; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018) of Chinese development efforts, stresses the importance of fully considering all aspects of how China is engaging the developing world. While China explicitly distances itself from traditional donor-recipient dynamics (Woods 2008; Bräutigam 2011), and has been reluctant to engage with international institutions promoting development cooperation, transparency and effectiveness, it cannot escape encountering many of the issues that have confronted traditional donors. Even if Chinese development programs are qualitatively different, ‘dragon fruits’ compared to traditional donors’ ‘apples’, these external flows still have the potential to impact the political economy of the host countries (Dreher et al. 2018).

In that vein, while the institutional aid curse has received considerable scholarly attention, there is substantially less work which considers if Chinese development efforts can be linked to institutional retardation. While previous literature has evidenced the potential for a general institutional aid curse (Knack 2001; Moss et al. 2006; Brazys 2017), China appears to be a particularly likely candidate given its stated policies of non-interference and its indifference to governance or conditionality reforms (Brazys et al. 2017; Hernandez 2017). While stunting local institutional reform may not be the aim of Chinese development flows, it is nonetheless a negative externality that can ultimately work at cross-purposes to broader economic development. Our vignette is also suggestive of a further complication of China’s rise as a development actor, namely its interactions with traditional donors. Early evidence suggests that Chinese development efforts may be undermining the aims of traditional donors (Brazys et al. 2017; Hernandez 2017; Humphrey and Michaelowa 2018), even if this relationship is unintentional or indirect (Swedlund 2017). A Chinese aid curse which frustrates institutional reform would directly challenge the aims of many traditional donors who seek to promote good governance via aid conditionality (Moleneers et al. 2015). Again, this externality is unlikely to perturb a China that trumpets a rhetoric of non-interference in local government affairs.

In the following sections, we first develop theoretical underpinnings for an aid curse ‘with Chinese characteristics’. We then test our theoretical expectations by drawing on a recently developed global database of Chinese aid projects to explain changes in the Index of Economic Freedom, utilizing a measure of Dalai Lama visits as an instrument for Chinese aid flows. We then conclude with thoughts on the implications of our findings not only on Chinese development efforts but also on China’s role as a new global power.

Aid curse with Chinese characteristics

Scholars have recognized the potential for negative consequences from aid, or ‘aid dependence’, for at least 50 years (Crocker 1968). Simply put, the condition is one of reliance by a recipient state on some level of aid that persists over time. This reliance has at least three implications (Brazys 2017). First, aid-dependent states may be subject to pressure from their patrons on issues of geo-strategic importance. A vast literature exists concerning the presence of ‘vote-buying’ in international institutions (Vreeland and Dreher 2014; Carter and Stone 2015; Kersting and Kilby 2016; Brazys and Panke 2017) and on donors using aid in their own interest to secure political, military or economic aims (McKinlay and Little 1977; Berthelemy and Tichit 2004; Bermeo 2017). Second, aid-dependent states may experience depressed economic growth. Like its resource-variant, aid-induced ‘Dutch Disease’ can lead to an exchange rate appreciation and an associated shift in domestic production from tradable to non-tradable sectors, creating a drag on growth (Younger 1992; Arellano et al. 2009; Rajan and Subramanian 2011).⁵ Finally, aid dependence can work against good governance by casting an institutional ‘aid curse’. While there is evidence that governance, broadly, can be undermined by high levels of aid (Knack 2001; Brazys 2016), institutional aid-dependence effects are most often associated with immature domestic tax collection efforts (Moss et al. 2006; Besley and Persson 2014).

While there is no reason to suspect that Chinese development efforts might not also lead to geo-strategic or economic aid-dependence dynamics, this paper pays particular focus to the prospect for a Chinese institutional aid curse.⁶ We suggest that Chinese aid induces institutional dependence based on its fundamental characteristics of ‘non-interference’ and respect for state sovereignty (Alden 2005; Bräutigam 2011; Reilly 2012). China has repeatedly and explicitly disavowed any desire for government reform with its development packages (Hernandez 2017). It has been widely shown that economic reforms have political costs to leaders in the short run and this absence of institutional conditionality makes Chinese aid attractive to leaders who fear that institutional reform might undermine their domestic bases of support (Mohan and Power 2008; Swedlund 2017). Non-interference means, at a minimum, that Chinese aid is unlikely to proactively *contribute* to economic institutional reform.

⁵ Even in the absence of an exchange rate effect, aid may still induce ‘Dutch Disease’ like effects by encouraging consumer spending on what are, in the developing world mostly imported tradable consumer goods, which will again incentivize a shift from tradable production into non-tradable retail and/or services (Brazys 2010).

⁶ Indeed, several authors have shown that the detrimental institutional effects of aid dependence were more prevalent (or only existed) during the heightened geo-strategic tension of the Cold War (Dunning 2004; Brazys 2017). China’s rise has increased geo-strategic concerns (Shambaugh 2013; Chan 2017), which China as a principal figure in several international standoffs. Thus, like the DAC donors of the Cold War, China may well be less concerned with using its aid and economic clout in a manner that promotes institutional development than with securing reliable allies or resources. (Zafar 2007).

However, there are several characteristics of Chinese development assistance that may actively *hinder* economic reform. First, any evidence that the political ‘aid curse’ might be overstated (Altincekic and Bearce 2014) is predicated on a theoretical basis that aid is not as fungible, unconditional or stable as resources revenues as was assumed in earlier findings (Djankov et al. 2008). However, substantial work has suggested that Chinese aid is fungible, unconditional and stable (Kishi and Raleigh 2015; Strange, Dreher et al. 2017). Fungibility is a topic that has received extensive attention in the aid literature, especially with respect to dependence and the undermining of domestic revenue-generating institutions. Cash grants, or other forms of budget support, may enable governments to function without having to raise revenues from domestic sources. Taxation and tax-reform are both politically costly, especially for ‘visible’ taxes such as Value Added Tax (VAT) or income tax (Appel 2006). Yet, it is precisely these tax reforms which are often needed in developing countries to both widen and deepen the tax base, putting government finances on a sustainable footing (Keen and Ligthart 1999). Indeed, earlier aid-dependence literature has shown countries with aid to government budget ratios in excess of 100 per cent (Knack 2001). When aid is unhindered in usage, it can fund the wide variety of government functions, including largess such as public employment, fuel or food subsidies, or constituent-targeted infrastructure projects (Ahmed 2012). Thus, fungible aid which enables government leaders to put off costly domestic reforms is likely to lead to institutional aid dependence. To the extent that Chinese aid comes as cash, it is characteristically ‘no-strings-attached’ and likely to fulfil the fungibility criteria that can induce the dependence described above (Perlez 2006; Woods 2008: 1210; Gonzalez-Vicente 2015; Hackenesch 2015).

The second and third characteristics of Chinese flows that may induce institutional aid dependence relate to Chinese project assistance. Unlike the flows which resemble budgetary support, these flows are often in kind related to commercial projects, and tied to Chinese suppliers/providers (Dreher et al. 2018). While these flows may be less fungible than budgetary grants, they may still have sufficient *political* fungibility in that they can be targeted to the core supporters of political elites. If a leader can direct sufficient patronage to her ‘selectorate’, then she may not need to promote broader growth or revenue via economic reform (De Mesquita 2005; De Mesquita and Smith 2010; Ahmed 2012). Indeed, engaging in such reforms might undermine the political support of the ‘selectorate’ as it might introduce them to foreign competition, privatize state or semi-state assets from which they might be securing rents and/or introduce income or wealth taxes to which they are net contributors (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2011). In this way, the aid may entrench existing institutions and patronage networks and create an institutional dependence that inhibits economic reform. While Chinese aid would not be alone in being used for targeted political purposes, recent empirical work suggests that it is directed in this way (Dreher et al. 2016). Beyond this, the non-interference and national sovereignty characteristics again suggest that in the absence of some other (Chinese) economic or security motivations, the Chinese government is unlikely to be perturbed by how projects are distributed within a given country. Accordingly, Chinese aid may well induce a political curse that leads to institutional retardation.

A final characteristics of Chinese development flows that may facilitate institutional aid dependence is the institutional impact of Chinese projects themselves. Chinese development flows are often associated with contemporaneous commercial projects and/or are explicitly commercial themselves. While China has undertaken a vast array of domestic economic initiatives, observers suggest that incomplete reforms have stunted the full potential of the Chinese growth model (Wederman 2004). A key shortcoming is the absence of a full promotion of the rule of law, particularly with regards to transparency and competition in contracting. The presence of corrupt business practices in China is no secret and, indeed, has been the focus of a major domestic reform effort under Xi Jinping (Yuen 2014). While scepticism persists that this latter effort is more of a political purge rather than an economic reform, there is little evidence that the focus has been expanded internationally, in any event. Indeed, China ranks poorly on Transparency International's 'exporting corruption' index and several studies have found evidence that China's development efforts are associated with increased local corruption (Brazys et al. 2017; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018). Moreover, similar to the OECD DAC's reporting and transparency principles, China has also not joined the OECD's Convention on Combating Bribery of Public Officials in International Business Transactions ('anti-bribery convention') aimed at deterring foreign corrupt practices by firms engaging in outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Brazys and Kotsadam 2017). Even if corrupt practices accompanying Chinese development efforts do not directly obstruct economic reforms, they are likely to subvert the normative environment for governance reform. Moreover, they may create and/or entrench the rent-seeking constituency that would stand in opposition to economic reform. Collectively, these mechanisms suggest the following hypothesis:

Countries with larger levels of Chinese aid will be less likely to engage in economic institutional reform.

This hypothesis may operate through one or more of the mechanisms described above. Chinese aid provides resources which allow leaders to secure political support in the short term. These leaders have no incentive to introduce costly and political unpopular economic reforms if they have sufficiently fungible resources to maintain support in the short term if Chinese aid allows them to maintain support and power. Other donors' aid flows can (and perhaps have) induce a similar institutional aid dependence. However, China's development assistance seems particularly prone to facilitating this type of relationship due to unconcern with how flows are used in partner countries and a lack of any potentially compensating governance conditionality.

Data and methods

Model specifications

To examine our theoretical propositions, we consider panel data covering 117 countries (see Table 1 in the appendix for list of countries) over the 2000–2014 (15 years) period which coincides with China's rise as a major development partner. Since some of the data are not available for all countries for all years, our dataset is unbalanced. We thus estimate:

$$\Delta EFI_{it} = \phi_c + \beta EFI_{it-1} + \beta \ln(Aid)_{it-1} + \beta Z_{it} + \lambda_t + \nu_i + \omega_{it} \quad (1)$$

Wherein, ΔEFI_{it} is our outcome variable which measures economic reforms, ϕ is the intercept, Aid_{it-1} is our key variable of interest, Z_{it} are control variables, and λ_t is year dummies, ν_i is country specific dummies and ω_{it} is error term. Following de Soysa and Vadlamannati (2012), Dreher et al. (2009) and others we employ the year-to-year change in Economic Freedom Index (EFI) for country I at year t as our dependent variable. This index is a measure of economic policy reforms (Bjørnskov and Foss 2010) constructed by Gwartney and Lawson (2008) and the data is available in five year-intervals over the period 1970–2000, and on yearly basis thereafter. The EFI is a comprehensive measure made up of five sub-indices capturing: expenditure and tax reforms; property rights and legal reforms; trade reforms; reforms related to access to sound money; and labour, business and credit reforms. These five sub-indices are in turn roughly made up of 35 components of objective indicators under each sub index. In order to construct the indices, each variable in the respective sub-indices was transformed to an index on a 0-10 scale. Where higher values of the original variable indicate higher freedom, the formula $[(V_i - V_{\min}) / (V_{\max} - V_{\min})] \times 10$ was used for transformation. Conversely, when higher values indicate less freedom, the formula was $[(V_{\max} - V_i) / (V_{\max} - V_{\min})] \times 10$. The sub-component indices were then averaged to determine each component. The component indices within each area were averaged to derive indices for each of the five aforementioned areas. In turn, the five area indices are averaged to derive the summary index for each country. The final index is then ranked on the scale of 0 (not free) to 10 (totally free).⁷ Another way of interpreting this would be that the value of 0 denotes the absence of state regulations or state failure to provide these public goods, while 10 denotes the highest level in a highly competitive market economy. As we use year-to-year change in the EFI as our measure of policy reforms, a positive value indicates a movement towards more free market policies and a negative value would be a move towards more state regulation and dirigisme. In other words, the economic reforms capture the new policy decisions taken by the state in the short run and not necessarily the accumulation of reforms over the years resulting in economic

⁷ For detailed methodology on the EFI, see Fraser Institute (2017).

freedom (i.e. EFI) in the long run, which we also use in our analysis. We control for policy convergence by including a lagged value of EFI because countries already at high values change much slower than those at lower values. The mean value of year-to-year change in EFI in our sample is 0.03 with a standard deviation of 0.19 suggesting significant variation in policy reforms among countries in the sample, with a maximum value of 1.34 and minimum value of -1.09. The detailed description on EFI is captured in Exhibit 1 in the appendix.

Our main independent variable is Chinese development aid which we utilize from the newly released global dataset on Chinese development activities— the AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, version 1.0 (AidData 2017) developed by Dreher et al. (2017). This data captures official Chinese state finance which includes both foreign aid— which is akin to the OECD's Official Development Assistance (ODA), and other forms of state financing (concession and non-concessional) — which is similar to the OECD's Other Official Flows (OOF) with development or commercial intent. The dataset covers Chinese aid activities in 138 countries during the 2000-2014 period spanning cross five geographic regions in the world namely, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Central and Eastern Europe (Dreher et al. 2017). According to AidData (2017), the total amount of aid and other state financing during the period amounted to \$354.4 billion. This dataset was first used by Dreher et al. (2017) to examine the growth effects of Chinese aid across 138 developing countries. However, the earlier version of the Chinese aid data was generated by the Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology⁸ developed by Strange, Cheng et al. (2017), which sourced information from various secondary sources focusing exclusively on Sub-Saharan Africa. That dataset has been used by scholars to examine the causes and consequences of Chinese aid in Africa.⁹

In this paper we use two measures of Chinese aid activities. First, we use total number of Chinese aid projects (log) which ranges from 0 to maximum value of 58 (Pakistan). The mean of aid projects is about 6 with a standard deviation of 7 projects. The distribution of aid projects over time suggests that the number of aid projects increased dramatically from 2005 onwards. Second, we deploy total Chinese aid flows per capita (log), measured in US dollar constant prices — the broader definition capturing both ODA and OOF for 122 countries during the 2000-2014 period. The mean value of Chinese aid per capita is about \$44 with a standard deviation of \$385 suggesting significant variation in the sample, and a maximum value of \$14,360. Figure 1 captures the distribution of Chinese total aid in the world during the 2000-2014 period. Much of the Chinese aid is concentrated in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa followed by Latin America.

⁸ For more details on TUFF methodology, see AidData.

⁹ E.g., Dreher et al. (2018); Isaksson and Kotsadam (2016); Brazys et al. (2017); Hernandez (2017); Strange, Dreher et al. (2017).




Figure 1: Distribution of Chinese development aid during 2000-2014 period




Figure 2: Economic reforms and Chinese aid per capita (log) during 2000-2014 period




Figure 3: Economic reforms and Chinese aid projects (log) during 2000-2014 period

Figure 2 captures the trend of Chinese aid flows log (mean), while Figure 3 shows Chinese aid projects log (mean) and yearly change in EFI during 2000-2014 period. Both figures show lower levels of economic reforms coinciding with increased Chinese aid activities. Notice that the change in EFI has been dramatic since 2007 which might be attributed to global financial crisis which we control in our regression models.

The vector of control variables (Z_{it}) includes other potential determinants of economic policy reforms, which we obtain from the extant literature on the subject. We follow Gassebner et al. (2011), Dreher et al. (2009) and Pitlik (2007) and other comprehensive studies on the determinants of Economic Freedom (Potrafke 2013; Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2012). The list of potential control variables is long, but we are aware of the trap of ‘garbage-can models’ or ‘kitchen-sink models’ in which various variables are dumped onto the right hand side of the equation, making interpretation of results difficult (Achen 2005; Schrodtt 2014). We adopt the conservative strategy of accounting only for six key factors that affect economic policy reforms, adding several more only in robustness checks.

Accordingly, we control for the level of development by including per capita income (logged) in US Dollar constant prices and rate of growth of GDP obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017) since economic reforms are likelier to be more peaceful the richer a country is as well as one that is benefiting from higher economic growth. To measure the nature of the political regime in power, we include the Polity IV (polity2) democracy index (Gurr and Jagers 1995). We subtract the autocracy score from the democracy score, which is standard practice. Thus, the democracy score

ranges from +10 (full democracy) to –10 (full autocracy).¹⁰ Next, we also include a measure of economic crisis, which is a dummy variable indicating whether a country has experienced one or more of the following crises, namely systemic banking, currency, and debt (Laeven and Valencia 2008). Sharma (2012) argues that most countries are likely to undertake key economic policy reforms when they stare at an economic or financial crisis. Likewise, we also control for IMF programs as Boockmann and Dreher (2003) show that countries participating in IMF and World Bank programs have significant effect on undertaking economic policy reforms. We include a discrete variable taking the value 1 if a country is under an IMF program for more than five months in a financial year and 0 otherwise (Dreher 2006). Previous studies find strong resistance for most resource rich countries to implement economic policy reforms (Torvik 2009). Thus, we include a measure of natural resource rents as a share of GDP from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). Accordingly, the World Bank defines resource rents as unit price minus the cost of production times the quantity produced. The descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2 in the appendix and the details on definitions and data sources are provided in Table 3 in the appendix.

Endogeneity concerns

It is quite possible that our key explanatory variable – Chinese development aid – is endogenous to economic policy reforms. It could be that economic policy reforms (or the lack of it) might influence Chinese aid allocation in the first place. Not taking this endogeneity into account would induce a bias in our estimate of the effect of Chinese aid on economic policy reforms. This issue is not trivial because those who argue that Chinese aid curtail economic reforms also make causal claims that Chinese development assistance seeks out countries that score poorly on the economic reforms.¹¹ This problem, which has long plagued empirical studies of aid and governance, seems likely to be more pronounced when considering Chinese aid again precisely due to the ‘governance-blind’ nature of Chinese flows. Particularly if/when Chinese development flows are directed to countries with high levels of natural resource endowment, these same countries may also suffer the institutional ‘resource’ curse, confounding identification between aid and governance. To address this concern, we use a two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV hereafter) estimator. We identify two instruments to address the endogeneity problem. Following Dreher et al. (2018, 2017) we use, (i) the probability of a recipient country receiving Chinese aid weighted by steel production (log) in China,

¹⁰ Though Polity IV index has faced some criticism (see Potrafke 2012), it captures three important elements of democracy namely, presence of institutions, existence of effective constraints on executive and participation in political process, which are found to be key for economic reforms (Alesina et al. 2006; Pitlik and Wirth 2003). Nevertheless, we also use Bjørnskov and Rode's (2018) updated and expanded version of Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland's (2010) regime type data. Our results remain robust to using alternative regime type data.

¹¹ The empirical evidence however suggest a strong negative correlation between Chinese aid allocation and per capita income in recipient countries (Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Dreher et al. 2018).

$iv = \left[\frac{1}{15} \sum_{y=1}^{15} p_{it} \times \ln(steel)_t \right]$ lagged by two-years. While the steel production data

comes from the World Steel Association's statistical yearbook (2017), the probability to receive Chinese aid is the share of years during the sample period (2000-2014) a recipient has received Chinese development aid. By interacting the two variables we gauge whether countries with a high probability to receive Chinese aid is in turn driven by steel production in China. The identifying assumption is the same as in Dreher et al. (2017) that economic policy reforms in recipient countries with varying chances of obtaining Chinese aid will not be in any way affected by changes in steel production in China, other than its impact on development aid. Notice that like Dreher et al. (2017) we also control for recipient country and year fixed effects which control for the effect of the probability of receiving Chinese aid on economic reforms, making our instrumental variable exogenous. We also construct alternative versions of instruments in which we weight probability of receiving aid with Chinese GDP (log) measured in US\$ Constant

prices $iv = \left[\frac{1}{15} \sum_{y=1}^{15} p_{it} \times \ln(GDP)_t \right]$ and with inverse distance measured in miles (log)

$$iv = \left[\frac{1}{15} \sum_{y=1}^{15} p_{it} \times \sum_{k \neq i} \frac{1}{dist_{i,k,t}} \right]. \text{ (ii).}^{12}$$

Our second instrument is a count measure of number of state visits made by Dalai Lama lagged by two-years. Fuchs and Klan (2013) show evidence that countries officially receiving the Dalai Lama on a state visit are more likely to be punished by China through a reduction of their exports. Furthermore, they find that the 'Dalai Lama Effect' is more prominent post-2000 period onwards compared to earlier periods. We believe that the same analogy can be extended to development aid which is driven by Chinese state. For instance, in 2016, India came to the rescue of Mongolia by offering a \$1 billion line of credit when China cancelled \$4.2 billion in aid and imposed a trade blockade on Mongolia for receiving the Dalai Lama on a state visit (Indian Express 2018). Our data on Dalai Lama's state visits covers the period 2000 to 2014, with the information on the travel pattern sourced from the Office of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.

The validity of our instruments depends on two conditions. The first is instrument relevance, i.e., they must be correlated with the explanatory variable in question. The joint F-statistic in the first stage of the IV regressions as suggested by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) must be examined to test the relevance of the instruments. Thus, the instruments would be relevant when the first stage regression model F-statistics meet the thumb rule threshold of being above 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). However, the F-test has been criticized in the literature as being insufficient to measure the degree of instrument relevance. More powerful tests, namely the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic, offer reliable statistical inferences in a weak

¹² The results with alternative instruments are not shown here but are available in the appendix.

instrument setting (e.g., Cragg and Donald 1993; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). In all three cases, an F-statistic above the critical value (10 per cent maximal test size) indicates the rejection of weak instruments. Second, the instrumental variables should not vary systematically with the disturbance term in the second stage equation, i.e. $E[\omega_{it} | IV_{it}] = 0$, meaning the instruments cannot have an independent effect directly on the dependent variable. As for the exclusion restriction, we are not aware of a theoretical or an empirical argument that links either Chinese steel production or Dalai Lama's state visits directly explaining the economic policy reforms of country i . Nevertheless, the Hansen J-test (Hansen 1982) is employed to check whether the selected instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction.

Empirical results

Our results broadly support our hypothesis, as shown in Table 1. In our first model, column 1, which uses a simple count of the number of Chinese aid projects, the sign of the coefficient is negative, although not statistically significant. However, in the models which use Chinese aid per capita (log), we see results that support our claim (column 2). These results are particularly strong when using our preferred approach, instrumenting Chinese aid with probability of Chinese aid weighted by steel production and Dalai Lama state visits in column 3. The substantive effects in column 3 suggests that a 100 per cent change in the log of Chinese aid per capita decreases the economic reforms by 0.0395 points, which is significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level. In practice, as an example, a country that is at the 95th percentile of per capita aid from China (\$250), will see an annual EFI change of -0.54 less than a country at the 35th percentile (\$1.45). This is a drastic amount considering that the mean annual economic reforms measure in our sample is 0.03, and indeed the 0.54 change is nearly three standard deviations of the EFI change in our sample. Notice that the additional statistics provided below in column 3 suggests that the instruments pass the exclusion criteria when examining the Hansen J-statistic which shows that the null of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the conventional level of significance in our 2SLS-IV models. Furthermore, the joint F-statistic from the first stage rejects the null that both the instruments selected are not relevant instruments. In fact, we obtained higher joint F-statistic of 12.3 and a Kleibergen-Paap LM statistics of 26.4 respectively which remain significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level. Our instrumental variable approach results are also robust to using alternative set of instruments which are discussed in the next section.

Table 1: Influence of Chinese Aid on Economic Reforms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Economic Freedom index t-1	-0.345*** (0.0228)	-0.314*** (0.0183)	-0.391*** (0.0329)
Per capita GDP (log)	0.0867 (0.0817)	0.102* (0.0584)	0.105 (0.0868)
GDP growth rate	0.00365** (0.00174)	0.00492*** (0.00146)	0.00642*** (0.00183)
Polity democracy index	0.00408 (0.00333)	0.00557* (0.00302)	0.00397 (0.00385)
Economic crises	-0.103** (0.0445)	-0.138*** (0.0334)	-0.157*** (0.0450)
Natural resource Rents/GDP	-0.000853 (0.00143)	-0.00161 (0.00119)	0.000551 (0.00144)
IMF Program	-0.0186 (0.0207)	-0.0131 (0.0177)	-0.00982 (0.0213)
Chinese Aid projects (log) t-1	-0.00368 (0.0119)		
Chinese Aid per capita current prices (log) t-1		-0.00298* (0.00157)	-0.0405*** (0.0129)
Constant	0.966* (0.522)	0.735** (0.374)	1.207* (0.618)
Estimator	FGLS	FGLS	2SLS-IV
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
First Stage F-statistics			12.23***
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic			26.47***
SarganJ-statistic [p-value]			0.8748
Number of Observations	894	1,224	1149
Number of Countries	99	98	98

Notes:

(1) Standard errors in parenthesis

(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

The control variables perform as expected, where the effects of the level of economic development, and regime type, predict higher levels of economic reforms, although these results are not robust across the models. The GDP growth rate is a robust predictor of economic reforms and is robust in all the models in Table 1. The highly significant negative effect of economic crises is interesting. For instance, countries with banking, currency and debt crises are associated with a 0.15 point decline in economic reforms which is 77 per cent of the standard deviation of change in EFI measure. Many who argue that development aid matters for (bad) economic outcomes often fail to control for economic crises. The strong effects of the economic crises in our models might suggest a powerful force in deterring policy reforms, regardless of the degree of Chinese development aid. It is also noteworthy that adding other variables, i.e., IMF program participation, and natural resource rents, has no effect on the impact of Chinese aid, which remains negative and significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level (see column 3).

Table 2: Influence of Chinese aid vs. DAC aid on Economic Reform

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic Freedom index t-1	-0.318*** (0.0186)	-0.325*** (0.0188)	-0.326*** (0.0195)	-0.332*** (0.0215)
Per capita GDP (log)	0.114* (0.0628)	0.159** (0.0623)	0.123* (0.0636)	0.201*** (0.0751)
GDP growth rate	0.00416*** (0.00140)	0.00403*** (0.00139)	0.00433*** (0.00144)	0.00463*** (0.00157)
Polity democracy index	0.00652** (0.00315)	0.00591* (0.00302)	0.00627** (0.00312)	0.00641* (0.00348)
Economic crises	-0.152*** (0.0342)	-0.155*** (0.0337)	-0.163*** (0.0373)	-0.161*** (0.0394)
Natural resource Rents/GDP	-0.00160 (0.00119)	-0.00146 (0.00120)	-0.00139 (0.00119)	-0.00127 (0.00131)
IMF Program	-0.0189 (0.0167)	-0.0168 (0.0164)	-0.0232 (0.0174)	-0.0236 (0.0192)
DAC Aid per capita current prices (log) t-1	0.00140 (0.00911)			-0.00992 (0.0126)
EU Aid per capita current prices (log) t-1		0.0177** (0.00828)		0.0136 (0.0105)
USA Aid per capita current prices (log) t-1			0.00229 (0.00701)	0.000678 (0.00852)
Chinese Aid per capita current prices (log) t-1				-0.00338* (0.00176)
Constant	0.652 (0.404)	0.430 (0.397)	0.634 (0.408)	0.245 (0.479)
Estimator	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	119	117	116	95
Number of Countries	1,293	1,284	1,203	1,019

Notes:

(1) Standard errors in parenthesis

(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Robustness checks

We examine the robustness of our findings in several ways. First, we consider missing data points in Chinese aid. The AidData dataset includes at least 53 aid projects for which no detailed information on aid amount is available. We treat those observations as zero to re-estimate our baseline models reported in Table 1. Our results based on this dataset remains robust and hence the results are not unduly influenced by these missing data points. Second, we exclude the observations with extreme values reported in the Chinese aid data which could influence our main findings. We therefore exclude the 13 highest aid observations. After excluding the outliers, our results are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that the results are not driven by extreme values. Third, we use an alternative

method of operationalization of our main variable of interest. We replace Chinese aid per capita measure with total aid flows measured in US Dollar constant prices (log). Our results hold when we use total aid flows (log) which remains positive and significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level. Fourth, following others we include additional control variables, such as population (log) (e.g., de Soysa and Vadlamnati 2017; Bjørnskov 2016), labour strikes, anti-government protests, number of cabinet changes (see Campos et al. 2010), the *Herfindahl-Hirschman* index of government fractionalization (e.g., Campos et al. 2010; Alesina et al. 2006; Pitlik and Wirth 2003), left-leaning government dummy (e.g., de Soysa and Vadlamnati 2017; Potrafke 2013; Alesina et al. 2006), economic sanctions dummy, International Country Risk Guide's (ICRG) measures on corruption and rule of law indices (Pitlik and Wirth 2003), which could influence both the degree of aid allocation as well as economic policy reforms. Inclusion of these additional variables does not change the substantive findings from our results.

Fifth, following Knedlik and Kronthaler (2007), we replace our dependent variable which is based on Fraser Institute's Economic freedom index with the index of economic freedom computed by Heritage Foundation which is coded on the scale of 0-100, wherein higher value denotes full economic freedom from government. The Heritage Foundation's index includes ten different categories viz., business, trade, fiscal burden, government spending, monetary policy, investment, finance, labour, as well as secure property rights and absence of corruption. However, it has been suggested that the Heritage Foundations' index of economic freedom lacks transparency and questions are raised on the theoretical and methodological foundations (Quinn et al. 2011).¹³ It has also been observed that there are frequent changes to the methodology used to compute the index (Dreher and Gehring 2012). Nevertheless, we compute yearly changes of this index as our next best alternative dependent variable. Our baseline results using this new measure remain robust. Sixth, as discussed earlier, we use alternative instruments, namely the probability of receiving China's aid weighted with Chinese GDP (log) measured in 2005 US Dollar constant prices and the probability measure weighted by inverse distance from recipient country's capital to Beijing measured in miles (log). Again, our results remain robust to these alternative instruments. Both instruments pass the relevance and exclusion criteria and the effects of Chinese aid per capita on policy reforms remains negative and significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level. Finally, the EFI measure from Fraser institute is available on a 5-yearly basis for the following period: 1981–1985; 1986–1990; 1991–1995; 1996–2000 and on yearly basis thereafter. Although our study period begins from 2000 onwards, the missing data between 1995–2000, which is likely to be interpolated, can affect the EFI score in the year 2000. Therefore, our standard errors must be adjusted. Hence, we reproduce the same regressions as in Table 1 and 2 using the Panel bootstrap standard errors computed with 100 replications. Again, these results replicate the same conclusions as the analysis presented in Table 1-2. The full robustness check output tables are available in the

¹³ The correlation between Fraser Institute's EFI measure and Heritage Foundation's IEF is about 0.84.

appendix. In summary, the results are remarkably robust to using alternative data, sample size, specifications, and testing procedures.

Conclusions and discussion

The findings in this paper suggest that China faces similar issues as a development partner to those that have confronted 60 years of DAC development efforts. In particular, larger Chinese aid efforts undermine the impetus for the economic reforms that can ultimately free countries from the yoke of dependence on external flows. However, the fact that China appears to be (officially) indifferent to these externalities makes aid dependence ‘with Chinese characteristics’ perhaps an even greater challenge to overcome. Further externalities may stem from Chinese aid dependence allowing developing countries to skirt or shirk reforms demanded via traditional donor conditionality, and/or inducing those donors to loosen the conditions under which their aid is given (Hernandez 2017).

Indeed, many of China’s development efforts appear focused on securing access to natural resources and, while this may be associated with increased levels of current economic growth, the failure of host countries to develop diversified economies built on strong institutional foundations could ultimately lead to major economic slowdowns if not recessions (Zafar 2007). It also remains unclear if China’s principles of ‘non-interference’ and ‘sovereignty’ are more than just rhetorical devices. China may be willing to be ‘hands off’ as long as its investments are secure. If and when countries stagger in meeting their obligations to China, *post hoc* conditionality may appear. Several incidents already suggest that Chinese ‘non-interference’ may only be skin deep. Recently, Sri Lanka, struggling to service development loans from China, signed over a major port on a 99-year lease (Schultz 2017). Similarly, a senior Australian official stated concerns about small-island states in the Pacific, including the FSM, racking up large debts to China (South China Morning Post 2018). Indeed, when Tonga pressed China to transform a \$60 million loan into a grant in 2013 (15 per cent of GDP), concerns were raised that China would use that leverage to establish a naval base in the country (Pacific Islands Report 2013).

More broadly, our findings add further support to literature which suggests China is acting as a revisionist power as it takes its mantle as a leader in global international affairs (Brazys and Dukalskis 2017). While economic growth may flourish in the short term, China’s apparent disregard for promoting norms of good governance (not to mention other civil, political and human rights) brings into question the long-term sustainability of Chinese global leadership or of the development efforts in the countries in which they are present. Indeed, resentment towards China has already bubbled to the surface in a number of developing countries where they operate (Buckley 2013; Wang and Elliot 2014). As much as China may want to pursue a new approach to development partnerships, they are likely to face the same learning curves as the DAC donors before them.

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Appendix

Table 1: List of countries

Afghanistan	Colombia	Indonesia	Myanmar	Swaziland
Albania	Comoros	Iran	Namibia	Syria
Algeria	Congo, Democratic Republic	Iraq	Nepal	Tajikistan
Angola	Congo, Republic	Jamaica	New Zealand	Tanzania
Antigua & Barbuda	Costa Rica	Jordan	Nicaragua	Thailand
Argentina	Cote d'Ivoire	Kazakhstan	Niger	Togo
Armenia	Cuba	Kenya	Nigeria	Tonga
Azerbaijan	Cyprus	Kyrgyz Republic	North Korea	Trinidad and Tobago
Bahrain	Djibouti	Laos	Pakistan	Tunisia
Bangladesh	Dominican Republic	Lebanon	Palestinian Adm. Areas	Turkey
Barbados	Ecuador	Lesotho	Papua New Guinea	Turkmenistan
Belarus	Egypt	Liberia	Peru	Uganda
Benin	Equatorial Guinea	Macedonia	Philippines	Ukraine
Bolivia	Eritrea	Madagascar	Romania	United Arab Emirates
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Ethiopia	Malawi	Russia	Uruguay
Botswana	Fiji	Malaysia	Rwanda	Uzbekistan
Brazil	Gabon	Maldives	Sao Tome and Principe	Vanuatu
Bulgaria	Georgia	Mali	Senegal	Venezuela
Burundi	Ghana	Mauritania	Serbia	Vietnam
Cambodia	Grenada	Mauritius	Seychelles	Yemen
Cameroon	Guinea	Mexico	Sierra Leone	Zambia
Cape Verde	Guinea-Bissau	Moldova	South Africa	Zimbabwe
Central African Republic	Guyana	Mongolia	Sri Lanka	
Chad	Haiti	Morocco	Sudan	
Chile	India	Mozambique	Suriname	

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
Change in Economic Freedom index	0.03	0.19	-1.09	1.34	1982
Economic Freedom index t-1	6.71	0.92	2.93	8.86	1864
GDP growth rate	8.00	1.58	4.78	11.12	2580
Polity democracy index	4.22	5.83	-82.48	104.48	2580
Economic crises	3.61	6.43	-10.00	10.00	2375
Natural resource Rents/GDP	0.03	0.17	0.00	1.00	2580
IMF Program	11.50	16.48	-1.19	100.37	2576
Left governments	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00	2579
Chinese Aid projects	5.18	6.66	0.00	58.00	1951
Chinese Aid projects (log)	1.66	0.87	0.00	4.06	1339
Chinese Aid per capita	45.34	389.15	0.00	14361	1793
Chinese Aid per capita (log)	-1.73	4.50	-6.91	9.57	1793
Chinese ODA per capita	28.42	197.88	0.00	4909	1058
Chinese ODA per capita (log)	-0.90	3.74	-6.91	8.50	1058
Chinese Grants per capita	16.74	192.45	0.00	4909	980
Chinese Grants per capita (log)	-1.92	3.39	-6.91	8.50	980

Table 3: Data sources and definitions

Variables	Data definition and sources
EFI	EFI is made up of five sub indices capturing: expenditure and tax reforms; property rights and legal reforms; trade reforms; reforms related to access to sound money; labor, business and credit reforms. These five sub indices are made up of 35 components of objective indicators. The final index is ranked on the scale of 0 (not free) to 10 (totally free) and is sourced from the Fraser Institute.
Change in EFI	Year-to-year change in EFI sourced from the Fraser Institute.
Chinese aid per capita	Aid flows including ODA and OOF -type flows measured in US\$ constant prices (logged) and is sourced from the AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, version 1.0 (AidData 2017) developed by Dreher et al. (2018)
Chinese ODA per capita	ODA flows measured in US\$ constant prices (logged), sourced from the AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, version 1.0 (AidData 2017) developed by Dreher et al. (2018)
Chinese grants per capita	Grants flows measured in US\$ constant prices (logged) and is sourced from the AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, version 1.0 (AidData 2017) developed by Dreher et al. (2018).
Chinese aid projects	Count of all aid (ODA and OOF) projects in countryi and year t (logged) based on the information sourced from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, version 1.0 (AidData 2017) developed by Dreher et al. (2018)
Per capita GDP (log)	GDP per head in 2000 US\$ constant prices sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2017, World Bank.
Polity democracy	Polity IV, polity2 index coded on the scale of -10 to +10 where highest value implies full democracy lagged by a year sourced from Gurr (2002)
Economic crises	Dummy takes the value 1 if a country is exposed to either currency crisis, banking crisis, debt crisis (or all together) lagged by a year sourced from Laeven and Valencia (2008)
GDP growth rate	Rate of growth of GDP sourced from the WDI, World Bank 2017
Natural resource rents/GDP	Total rents from natural resources as a share of GDP sourced from the World Bank dataset on resource rents, 2017.
IMF program	Dummy takes the value 1 if a country has been in an IMF program for more than five months during the year and 0 otherwise, obtained from Dreher (2006)

Exhibit 1: Components of the Fraser Economic Freedom Index (EFI) (Gwartney and Lawson 2008)

Area 1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises

- A General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption
- B Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
- C Government enterprises and investment
- D Top marginal tax rate
 - i Top marginal income tax rate
 - ii Top marginal income and payroll tax rates

Area 2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights

- A Judicial independence (GCR)
- B Impartial courts (GCR)
- C Protection of property rights (GCR)
- D Military interference in rule of law and the political process (CRG)
- E Integrity of the legal system (CRG)
- F Legal enforcement of contracts (DB)
- G Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property (DB)

Area 3: Access to Sound Money

- A Money Growth
- B Standard deviation of inflation
- C Inflation: Most recent year
- D Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts

Area 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally

- A Taxes on international trade
 - i. Revenues from trade taxes (% of trade sector)
 - ii Mean tariff rate
 - iii Standard deviation of tariff rates
- B Regulatory Trade Barriers
 - i Non-tariff trade barriers (GCR)
 - ii Compliance cost of importing and exporting (DB)
- C Size of the trade sector relative to expected
- D Black-market exchange rates
- E International capital market controls
 - i Foreign ownership/investment restrictions (GCR)
 - ii Capital controls

Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business

- A Credit market regulations
 - i. Ownership of banks
 - ii Foreign bank competition
 - iii Private sector credit
 - iv Interest rate controls/negative real interest rates
- B Labor market regulations
 - i Minimum wage (DB)
 - ii Hiring and firing regulations (GCR)
 - iii Centralized collective bargaining (GCR)
 - iv Mandated cost of hiring (DB)
 - v Mandated cost of worker dismissal (DB)
 - vi Conscription
- C Business Regulations
 - i Price controls
 - ii Administrative requirements (GCR)
 - iii Bureaucracy costs (GCR)
 - iv Starting a business (DB)
 - v Extra payments/bribes (GCR)
 - vi Licensing restrictions (DB)
 - vii Cost of tax compliance (DB)

Robustness tests

Robustness table 1: Influence of Chinese aid on economic reforms: Excluding outliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Economic Freedom index t-1	-0.314*** (0.0184)	-0.353*** (0.0268)	-0.357*** (0.0267)	-0.402*** (0.0381)	-0.381*** (0.0497)	-0.382*** (0.0547)
GDP growth rate t-1	-0.000896 (0.00152)	-5.10e-05 (0.00200)	0.000937 (0.00209)	-0.00145 (0.00242)	-0.00170 (0.00337)	-0.00104 (0.00433)
Polity democracy index t-1	0.00802*** (0.00301)	0.00396 (0.00360)	0.000574 (0.00373)	0.00694 (0.00514)	0.00525 (0.00558)	0.00480 (0.00720)
Economic crises t-1	-0.120*** (0.0338)	-0.119** (0.0581)	-0.128** (0.0600)	-0.0831 (0.0568)	-0.0398 (0.100)	-0.151 (0.0966)
Natural resource Rents/GDP t-1	0.000731 (0.00123)	0.00297* (0.00176)	0.00145 (0.00178)	0.00181 (0.00172)	0.000341 (0.00253)	-0.00154 (0.00345)
IMF Program t-1	0.0249 (0.0169)	0.0340 (0.0208)	0.0671*** (0.0214)	0.0228 (0.0241)	0.0212 (0.0284)	0.0870** (0.0359)
Left Government t-1	-0.0200 (0.0202)	-0.00118 (0.0312)	0.0444 (0.0309)	0.00789 (0.0332)	0.0118 (0.0391)	0.103 (0.0728)
Chinese Aid per capita (log) t-1	-0.00197 (0.00161)			-0.0582*** (0.0166)		
Chinese ODA per capita (log) t-1		-0.00484** (0.00240)			-0.0624*** (0.0181)	
Chinese Grants per capita (log) t-1			-9.66e-05 (0.00281)			-0.0836 (0.0606)
Constant	1.365*** (0.0975)	1.525*** (0.132)	1.556*** (0.133)	1.955*** (0.246)	1.840*** (0.286)	1.807*** (0.318)
Estimator	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	2SLS-IV	2SLS-IV	2SLS-IV
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	1,221	705	673	1,146	672	651
Number of Countries	98	88	95	98	88	95

Notes:

(1) Standard errors in parenthesis

(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Robustness table 2: Influence of Chinese aid on economic reforms: China aid in US\$ million

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Economic Freedom index t-1	-0.320*** (0.0190)	-0.353*** (0.0268)	-0.378*** (0.0293)	-0.387*** (0.0331)	-0.398*** (0.0503)	-0.415*** (0.0679)
GDP growth rate t-1	-0.00101 (0.00153)	-9.39e-05 (0.00200)	0.000905 (0.00242)	-0.00143 (0.00218)	-0.00201 (0.00331)	0.00151 (0.00474)
Polity democracy index t-1	0.00841*** (0.00301)	0.00397 (0.00361)	0.00173 (0.00404)	0.00795* (0.00446)	0.00591 (0.00534)	0.00279 (0.00742)
Economic crises t-1	-0.120*** (0.0339)	-0.121** (0.0581)	-0.167** (0.0760)	-0.101** (0.0507)	-0.0586 (0.0960)	-0.313** (0.139)
Natural resource Rents/GDP t-1	0.00110 (0.00124)	0.00300* (0.00176)	0.000876 (0.00196)	0.00193 (0.00150)	0.000692 (0.00251)	0.00239 (0.00386)
IMF Program t-1	0.0284* (0.0171)	0.0342 (0.0208)	0.0507** (0.0230)	0.0242 (0.0207)	0.0299 (0.0272)	0.0372 (0.0401)
Left Government t-1	-0.0156 (0.0206)	-0.00117 (0.0313)	0.0506 (0.0358)	-0.000696 (0.0267)	0.0174 (0.0369)	-0.0185 (0.0717)
Chinese Aid (log) t-1	-0.00158** (0.000800)			-0.0203*** (0.00487)		
Chinese ODA (log) t-1		-0.00187 (0.00123)			-0.0287*** (0.00814)	
Chinese Grants (log) t-1			-0.00141 (0.00433)			0.133 (0.115)
Constant	1.414*** (0.102)	1.554*** (0.134)	1.695*** (0.161)		2.320*** (0.357)	-0.408 (1.953)
Estimator	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	2SLS-IV	2SLS-IV	2SLS-IV
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	1,199	705	536	1127	672	517
Number of Countries	98	88	88	98	88	88

Notes:

(1) Standard errors in parenthesis

(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Robustness table 3: Influence of Chinese aid on economic reforms: Kitchen sink approach

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Economic Freedom index t-1	-0.322*** (0.0194)	-0.354*** (0.0272)	-0.355*** (0.0271)	-0.392*** (0.0343)	-0.375*** (0.0493)	-0.365*** (0.0572)
GDP growth rate t-1	-0.00269* (0.00153)	-0.00184 (0.00201)	-0.000994 (0.00211)	-0.00355* (0.00211)	-0.00253 (0.00339)	-0.00364 (0.00450)
Polity democracy index t-1	0.00960*** (0.00316)	0.00858** (0.00387)	0.00478 (0.00403)	0.00757 (0.00466)	0.00765 (0.00640)	0.00764 (0.00796)
Economic crises t-1	-0.132*** (0.0345)	-0.123** (0.0571)	-0.128** (0.0596)	-0.0994* (0.0528)	-0.0405 (0.0986)	-0.141 (0.0980)
Natural resource Rents/GDP t-1	0.000262 (0.00127)	0.00251 (0.00174)	0.000860 (0.00177)	4.12e-05 (0.00149)	-0.000136 (0.00261)	-0.00225 (0.00368)
IMF Program t-1	0.0297* (0.0171)	0.0375* (0.0208)	0.0726*** (0.0215)	0.0206 (0.0214)	0.0216 (0.0297)	0.0986** (0.0392)
Left Government t-1	0.00275 (0.0214)	0.0197 (0.0322)	0.0671** (0.0325)	0.0234 (0.0281)	0.0191 (0.0408)	0.140* (0.0850)
Labor Strikes t-1	-0.00276 (0.0119)	-0.00877 (0.0150)	-0.0108 (0.0141)	0.00548 (0.0121)	-0.00714 (0.0170)	-0.0293 (0.0193)
Anti-government demonstrations t-1	-0.00512*** (0.00179)	-0.00628*** (0.00226)	-0.00611*** (0.00211)	-0.00706*** (0.00228)	-0.00825*** (0.00285)	-0.00625** (0.00266)
Cabinet changes t-1	-0.00436 (0.0113)	-0.0107 (0.0145)	-0.00367 (0.0146)	0.00739 (0.0138)	0.0139 (0.0215)	-0.00569 (0.0233)
Government System t-1	-0.0883** (0.0346)	-0.0883** (0.0396)	-0.0743* (0.0380)	-0.0920* (0.0501)	-0.0322 (0.0582)	-0.0863 (0.0548)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Government index t-1	-0.0474 (0.0327)	-0.0761* (0.0453)	-0.0682 (0.0446)	-0.0248 (0.0450)	-0.0636 (0.0770)	0.0377 (0.108)
Sanctions t-1	0.0623 (0.0545)	0.141** (0.0673)	0.120* (0.0657)	0.160* (0.0845)	0.101 (0.0666)	0.107 (0.0801)
Chinese Aid per capita (log) t-1	-0.00356** (0.00165)			-0.0399*** (0.0109)		
Chinese ODA per capita (log) t-1		-0.00486** (0.00241)			-0.0643*** (0.0174)	
Chinese Grants per capita (log) t-1			-0.00162 (0.00285)			-0.0894 (0.0625)
Constant	1.374*** (0.111)	1.447*** (0.146)	1.480*** (0.146)	1.760*** (0.213)	1.753*** (0.271)	1.693*** (0.301)
Estimator	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	2SLS-IV	2SLS-IV	2SLS-IV
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	1,139	680	649	1,069	648	627
Number of Countries	95	85	92	95	85	92

Notes:

(1) Standard errors in parenthesis

(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Robustness table 4: Influence of Chinese aid on economic reforms: Alternative dependent variable: Heritage Foundation's EFI

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom index t-1	-0.250*** (0.0169)	-0.231*** (0.0147)	-0.257*** (0.0193)	-0.284*** (0.0196)
GDP growth rate t-1	-0.0371*** (0.0141)	-0.00902 (0.0128)	-0.0334** (0.0147)	-0.0422** (0.0181)
Polity democracy index t-1	0.0494* (0.0296)	0.0522* (0.0284)	0.0324 (0.0316)	0.0103 (0.0325)
Economic crises t-1	0.158 (0.338)	-0.325 (0.296)	-0.182 (0.442)	0.544 (0.474)
Natural resource Rents/GDP t-1	0.0390*** (0.0101)	0.0113 (0.00873)	0.0536*** (0.0117)	0.0462*** (0.0126)
IMF Program t-1	-0.433*** (0.165)	-0.286* (0.152)	-0.280 (0.175)	-0.329* (0.183)
Left Government t-1	-0.648*** (0.226)	-0.669*** (0.189)	-0.734*** (0.267)	-0.907*** (0.271)
Chinese Aid projects (log) t-1	-0.227** (0.100)			
Chinese Aid per capita (log) t-1		-0.0233* (0.0133)		
Chinese ODA per capita (log) t-1			-0.0190 (0.0191)	
Chinese Grants per capita (log) t-1				0.00550 (0.0223)
Constant	8.041*** (0.826)	7.098*** (0.690)	7.502*** (0.796)	8.433*** (0.813)
Estimator	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS	FGLS
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Observations	1,044	1,398	819	770
Number of Countries	112	109	100	107

Notes:

(1) Standard errors in parenthesis

(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Robustness table 5: Influence of Chinese aid on economic reforms: alternative instrumental variables

	(1)	(2)
Economic Freedom index t-1	-0.406*** (0.0380)	-0.358*** (0.0502)
GDP growth rate t-1	-0.00167 (0.00228)	-0.000564 (0.00374)
Polity democracy index t-1	0.00463 (0.00477)	0.00576 (0.00604)
Economic crises t-1	-0.0903* (0.0548)	-0.0683 (0.106)
Natural resource Rents/GDP t-1	0.000734 (0.00162)	0.000410 (0.00279)
IMF Program t-1	0.0229 (0.0229)	0.0169 (0.0314)
Left Government t-1	0.000304 (0.0298)	0.0100 (0.0428)
Chinese Aid per capita (log) t-1	-0.0508*** (0.0145)	
Chinese ODA per capita (log) t-1		-0.0746*** (0.0241)
Constant	1.979*** (0.247)	1.762*** (0.283)
Estimator	2SLS-IV	2SLS-IV
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
First Stage <i>F</i> -statistics	11.46***	6.38***
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic	25.82***	14.59***
Sargan <i>J</i> -statistic [<i>p</i> -value]	0.724	0.189
Number of Observations	1,110	667
Number of Countries	98	89

Notes:

(1) Standard errors in parenthesis

(2) Statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Robustness table 6: Influence of Chinese Aid on economic reforms: SGMM approach

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent variable	0.00852 (0.141)	0.212 (0.162)
Economic Freedom index t-1	-0.987*** (0.163)	-1.223*** (0.204)
GDP growth rate t-1	-0.00298* (0.00158)	-0.00379 (0.00243)
Polity democracy index t-1	0.00704 (0.00531)	0.000401 (0.00436)
Economic crises t-1	-0.0781* (0.0405)	-0.0175 (0.0630)
Natural resource Rents/GDP t-1	0.000991 (0.00257)	0.00239 (0.00296)
IMF Program t-1	0.0140 (0.0150)	0.0200 (0.0156)
Left Government t-1	-0.00351 (0.0468)	0.0191 (0.0603)
Chinese Aid per capita (log) t-1	-0.0189* (0.0102)	
Chinese ODA per capita (log) t-1		-0.0101 (0.00610)
Estimator	SGMM	SGMM
Country Fixed Effects	NO	NO
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) P-value	0.003	0.046
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) P-value	0.476	0.657
Sargan <i>J</i> -statistic [<i>p</i> -value]	0.277	0.522
Number of Observations	1,066	502
Number of Countries	97	74

Notes:

(1) Standard errors in parenthesis

(2) Statistical significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

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GLOBUS is a research project that critically examines the European Union's contribution to global justice. Challenges to global justice are multifaceted and what is just is contested. Combining normative and empirical research GLOBUS explores underlying political and structural obstacles to justice. Analyses of the EU's positions and policies are combined with in-depth studies of non-European perspectives on the practices of the EU. Particular attention is paid to the fields of migration, trade and development, cooperation and conflict, as well as climate change. GLOBUS' team of researchers covers the disciplines of politics, international relations, law, economics, sociology and political theory. The project is coordinated by ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo and has partners in Brazil, China, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy and South Africa. It is funded by the Horizon 2020 Programme of the European Union for the period 1.6.2016 - 31.5.2020.

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